15 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/575fd74b2c0220cb32780f0e819fc80c.pdf 372740dc44a33c68193f09f3b6423935 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. �SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary. � SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. �SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How the Czechs Deceived Us Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 42-43 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/55a952cd0f0ec80384ad5eaa57ef3d6c.pdf 38b04017f5c4f1151050f6988208938b PDF Text Text 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik �SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. �SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- �SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples �48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45). � 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik �SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. �SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- �SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples �48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples 48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Free" and "Czechoslovakian" Don't Rhyme! Description An account of the resource V. L. Borin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 44-48 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Borin, V. L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/445e73f92086848920fa0e59b230ac7f.pdf 95ca621af0286949d3bcf9d53f14cadb PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," �óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon �SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still � SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," �óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon �SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource No Agreement with the Czechs Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 49-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cd097d77bb364356e1484c3c8e2503bd.pdf 967b63980e85bd86edd8d53a5c90cddd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still 52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · '  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Beneš Sold Out to the Kremlin Description An account of the resource R. Umiastowski Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 51-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Umiastowski, R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fbdef89074b2bc4b98bdc86f97c61bc3.pdf cca5aaa530f7aff178cddb1cf114da18 PDF Text Text S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But �66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 �SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s �68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46). � S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But �66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 �SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s �68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But 66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s 68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Secret Funds of Benes' Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 55-58 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1a59f5ef3d2e8febb2330f47e4e94be7.pdf e8f42dd6667bf6fe8b19186d469d7024 PDF Text Text S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. �60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r �SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.) � S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. �60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r �SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. 60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Fight for Democracy in Central Europe Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 59-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6db964469e40c6a82c1dc4ccd8616824.pdf 60da0c84711338aeaf96dbd2056f4382 PDF Text Text 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's �SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But �64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.) � 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's �SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But �64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But 64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Independent Slovakia Should Not Have Been Destroyed Description An account of the resource Hon. Charles J. Kersten Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kersten, Charles J., 1902-1972 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b49364ff5e662df0a866f35276b20458.pdf 34a0be96c1ad38d3f8547688b8ebaaf2 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modem language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; cxercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover , bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a br ief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Pet er P. Yurchak, s hould be read by all students inter est ed in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation ; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00 ; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK WSTORY by Joseph Škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 27, 1864-MSGR. ANDREW HLINKA-Aug. 16, 1938 Champion of Slovak Freedom � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modem language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; cxercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover , bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a br ief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Pet er P. Yurchak, s hould be read by all students inter est ed in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation ; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00 ; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK WSTORY by Joseph Škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 27, 1864-MSGR. ANDREW HLINKA-Aug. 16, 1938 Champion of Slovak Freedom � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Andrew Hlinka (August 16, 1938) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4c7f3780847a7cdbce96718eb7a6328c.pdf 5f17683da3998d3f9912c3a122735e3e PDF Text Text �S LU \ľ AKl A is publisbcd periodica lly by the Slovak League of Arneľica, a eultural and civie federation of Amer1eans of Slovak de::;cent. 1'he chief puľpose of 8 LOV AKl A 1s to promote a better understanding and appreciation oľ thc Slovak nation an d its long shuggle ľoľ Íľeedorn and in dependence. As Arneľicans, memhcľs of the Blovak L eaguc oľ ..\merica firmly bch eve that thc Slon.1k nation, just as all nations, has an inhcrent and Gocl-given right to ľľeedom and independence. 'ľhey ,ne clccli<:atcd to the cause of the Amcrie;an wa)' of life, Slovak freedom and world peac-e a11cl are determ:ined to oppose the plague of C01m11unisrn and all othrľ totnlitaľia11 political systems. yeaľ Subsniption to SloYakia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewhere. 8end subscriptions to: S L OVAKIA Box 150 Micl<lletown, Pa. Printed in t he U. S. A. JEDNOTA P RESS Middletown, Pa. � �S LU \ľ AKl A is publisbcd periodica lly by the Slovak League of Arneľica, a eultural and civie federation of Amer1eans of Slovak de::;cent. 1'he chief puľpose of 8 LOV AKl A 1s to promote a better understanding and appreciation oľ thc Slovak nation an d its long shuggle ľoľ Íľeedorn and in dependence. As Arneľicans, memhcľs of the Blovak L eaguc oľ ..\merica firmly bch eve that thc Slon.1k nation, just as all nations, has an inhcrent and Gocl-given right to ľľeedom and independence. 'ľhey ,ne clccli<:atcd to the cause of the Amcrie;an wa)' of life, Slovak freedom and world peac-e a11cl are determ:ined to oppose the plague of C01m11unisrn and all othrľ totnlitaľia11 political systems. yeaľ Subsniption to SloYakia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewhere. 8end subscriptions to: S L OVAKIA Box 150 Micl<lletown, Pa. Printed in t he U. S. A. JEDNOTA P RESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d30e6d7dd5f8d711753576fe2f105984.pdf e38c890cc26110e84f610292af06c7a2 PDF Text Text DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- �2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even �SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. �4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. �SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three �6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha �SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- �8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- �SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond �10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters �SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." �12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • • � DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- �2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even �SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. �4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. �SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three �6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha �SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- �8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- �SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond �10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters �SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." �12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- 2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. 4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three 6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- 8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond 10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." 12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource What Led to the Proclamation of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 1-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9239fef5d8ab6eb3b2433e8a2957d812.pdf 084956448e2ce672b0e4c5192a28a424 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý �14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná �SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica �16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- �SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .; � SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý �14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná �SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica �16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- �SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .; � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý 14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica 16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .;  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia - Winter Wonderland Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 13-17 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a19b874d39bd901d74ba5515132f17d0.pdf ae1523694f48a1f23883043c2922ad02 PDF Text Text 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned �SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man! � 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned �SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Trenčín Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 18-19 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4faeb77e99e69680a9f2152513c74572.pdf 58bc32caec09d426b05f6f702ff94fcc PDF Text Text 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or 22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 20-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/633239456f9942d65640c2f1d5618b0a.pdf e11fbcd5c8fa5b411ed329bd1daa0656 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS" DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as• sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program. Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK, chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation. Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from. Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948 that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon. form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA. But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno. GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago, Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or. Cerny sald. Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples; a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id �SLOVAKIA 26 in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why, even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore, why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?" Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno, as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll! And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho• slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak" and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But there is more to the story. One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place. The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the "JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow: " It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard. ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal twins Lettrich•Zenkl. "After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature and does not contorm with American democracy. "But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe �H SLOVAKIA persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened to martyr Johnny Hvasta. "Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority, but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta .should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan money. When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln• fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt." Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA, RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars? now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but ·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§ Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because �SLOVAKIA 27 Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department. Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian" wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan, anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In• dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng! • • • WHO SAID IT? "l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence. It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44). • • • "To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs? T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951). � SLOVAKIA THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS" DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as• sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program. Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK, chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation. Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from. Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948 that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon. form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA. But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno. GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago, Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or. Cerny sald. Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples; a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id �SLOVAKIA 26 in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why, even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore, why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?" Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno, as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll! And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho• slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak" and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But there is more to the story. One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place. The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the "JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow: " It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard. ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal twins Lettrich•Zenkl. "After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature and does not contorm with American democracy. "But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe �H SLOVAKIA persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened to martyr Johnny Hvasta. "Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority, but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta .should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan money. When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln• fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt." Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA, RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars? now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but ·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§ Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because �SLOVAKIA 27 Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department. Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian" wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan, anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In• dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng! • • • WHO SAID IT? "l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence. It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44). • • • "To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs? T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS" DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as• sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program. Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK, chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation. Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from. Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948 that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon. form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA. But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno. GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago, Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or. Cerny sald. Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples; a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id SLOVAKIA 26 in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why, even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore, why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?" Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno, as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll! And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho• slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak" and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But there is more to the story. One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place. The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the "JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow: " It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard. ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal twins Lettrich•Zenkl. "After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature and does not contorm with American democracy. "But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe H SLOVAKIA persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened to martyr Johnny Hvasta. "Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority, but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta .should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan money. When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln• fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt." Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA, RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars? now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but ·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§ Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because SLOVAKIA 27 Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department. Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian" wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan, anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In• dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng! • • • WHO SAID IT? "l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence. It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44). • • • "To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs? T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Story of the Two "Krnos" Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 24-27 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4cf23d1de317242aa7b3b53d9845a1ba.pdf 5ae41e4c22c3723c5c58f0fff39e3903 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak �iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA). � 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak �iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Purge in Prague Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 28-29 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5d874ab3ff3e920b5c4045f562f1bea1.pdf 069341f7fa513c43e52d7f06e07296cf PDF Text Text 30 SLOVA.KIA THEY WANTED TO BE FREE Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be independent. At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory, as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the former French ambassador to Warsow. For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939. Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes, oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary," refers to Sldor's vislts. ·, "OCTOBER 19, 1938" CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR "Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars, •and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of the Slovaks." · Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated, my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth 1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present 1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the �SLOVA.KIA 31 norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls problem to the Czechoslovak State." In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses• sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale, were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso, and not by Prague. "I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous :mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects. But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment. "Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party !s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon, thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and �32 SLOVAK.IA army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State Bank is already in the process of organlzation." So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore 14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939. This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars. Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended, emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete Slovak lndependence. Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs. Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) . • • • WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way, and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so, my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia. 1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o! llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City, December 21, 1943). � 30 SLOVA.KIA THEY WANTED TO BE FREE Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be independent. At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory, as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the former French ambassador to Warsow. For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939. Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes, oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary," refers to Sldor's vislts. ·, "OCTOBER 19, 1938" CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR "Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars, •and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of the Slovaks." · Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated, my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth 1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present 1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the �SLOVA.KIA 31 norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls problem to the Czechoslovak State." In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses• sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale, were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso, and not by Prague. "I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous :mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects. But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment. "Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party !s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon, thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and �32 SLOVAK.IA army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State Bank is already in the process of organlzation." So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore 14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939. This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars. Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended, emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete Slovak lndependence. Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs. Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) . • • • WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way, and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so, my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia. 1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o! llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City, December 21, 1943). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 30 SLOVA.KIA THEY WANTED TO BE FREE Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be independent. At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory, as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the former French ambassador to Warsow. For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939. Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes, oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary," refers to Sldor's vislts. ·, "OCTOBER 19, 1938" CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR "Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars, •and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of the Slovaks." · Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated, my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth 1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present 1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the SLOVA.KIA 31 norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls problem to the Czechoslovak State." In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses• sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale, were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso, and not by Prague. "I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous :mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects. But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment. "Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party !s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon, thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and 32 SLOVAK.IA army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State Bank is already in the process of organlzation." So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore 14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939. This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars. Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended, emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete Slovak lndependence. Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs. Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) . • • • WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way, and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so, my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia. 1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o! llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City, December 21, 1943).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource They Wanted to Be Free Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 30-32 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d377e2402045defeb8c0365217471579.pdf 07ff1183ac8e8c98dd57469c932c6c68 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 33 THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci," pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and Methodius. And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792 is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793 Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833 John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to the theme of ťhe first Slovak State. At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk" was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the •border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu Pravoslav Červenák, titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska" (Mirror of Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured Slovak life of the future. In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon. But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža, Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year, In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament. �34 SLOVAKIA . Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the Unlverslty. In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It had deep roots. To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861, about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ), about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact, whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca. T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon. In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back of it. In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr. Schnleszl wrote: "Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu. tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat, and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other • Ide o penly." The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota. tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and the WOTld of lhe Future), which read: "So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh sooner or lat er." What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state in dependence is death. After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and 1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve �SLOVAKIA 86 S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In 1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of Slovak In public llfe. After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30, 1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr promlses. If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de• tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled. It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless, that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918, than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T. G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií, t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts, communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor· ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl• tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks, all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs! Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate. Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and 0 �36 SLOVAKIA 1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak parllament W&S the most imporllant. The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament. V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course, to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact, he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures, 1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia, to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government, the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall rea.lize al! the rest of our demands. Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938. Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd: "The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons, requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble." Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl. On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls: " It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty �SLOVAKIA 37 of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia." True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak ,generatlons was at long last realized. The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia. Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed !nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands. But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy, they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the ·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London at that tilne, wrote: " . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner, nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944, pg. 21). The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939. ,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From 1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure of the State. Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex- �38 SLOVAKIA pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word, Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda, speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and, of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them. Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla. .And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and that head 1s the Presldent. Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla. He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was adopted. But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts good, but bad polnts as well. Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they, on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it 1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach, but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles. �SLOVAKIA 39 -Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli! foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however, remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of July, 1940. After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and, because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr. Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr. Aladar Kočiš. Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than that of -a.ny nelghborlng country. Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons, but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc. During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks, roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance, deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown), one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood. �40 SLOVAKIA Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst 1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them, and, above all else, protect them. During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia. If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia after tbe war. About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government 1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several Slovak members. A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government. The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves, thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will ,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political state which had explolted them for thirty years. Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak people never fared better under any otber government - before or slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia, they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners. Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and �SLOVAKIA events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament. After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled. Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before 1939 or after 1945. The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe. • • • WHO SAID IT? BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!• Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far• reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944). • • • DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia. Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate, NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele• gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country, where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth· ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945). � SLOVAKIA 33 THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci," pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and Methodius. And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792 is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793 Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833 John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to the theme of ťhe first Slovak State. At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk" was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the •border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu Pravoslav Červenák, titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska" (Mirror of Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured Slovak life of the future. In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon. But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža, Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year, In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament. �34 SLOVAKIA . Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the Unlverslty. In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It had deep roots. To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861, about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ), about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact, whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca. T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon. In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back of it. In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr. Schnleszl wrote: "Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu. tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat, and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other • Ide o penly." The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota. tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and the WOTld of lhe Future), which read: "So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh sooner or lat er." What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state in dependence is death. After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and 1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve �SLOVAKIA 86 S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In 1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of Slovak In public llfe. After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30, 1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr promlses. If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de• tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled. It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless, that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918, than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T. G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií, t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts, communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor· ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl• tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks, all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs! Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate. Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and 0 �36 SLOVAKIA 1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak parllament W&S the most imporllant. The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament. V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course, to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact, he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures, 1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia, to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government, the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall rea.lize al! the rest of our demands. Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938. Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd: "The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons, requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble." Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl. On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls: " It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty �SLOVAKIA 37 of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia." True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak ,generatlons was at long last realized. The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia. Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed !nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands. But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy, they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the ·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London at that tilne, wrote: " . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner, nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944, pg. 21). The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939. ,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From 1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure of the State. Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex- �38 SLOVAKIA pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word, Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda, speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and, of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them. Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla. .And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and that head 1s the Presldent. Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla. He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was adopted. But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts good, but bad polnts as well. Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they, on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it 1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach, but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles. �SLOVAKIA 39 -Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli! foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however, remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of July, 1940. After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and, because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr. Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr. Aladar Kočiš. Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than that of -a.ny nelghborlng country. Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons, but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc. During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks, roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance, deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown), one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood. �40 SLOVAKIA Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst 1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them, and, above all else, protect them. During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia. If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia after tbe war. About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government 1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several Slovak members. A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government. The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves, thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will ,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political state which had explolted them for thirty years. Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak people never fared better under any otber government - before or slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia, they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners. Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and �SLOVAKIA events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament. After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled. Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before 1939 or after 1945. The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe. • • • WHO SAID IT? BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!• Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far• reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944). • • • DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia. Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate, NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele• gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country, where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth· ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 33 THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci," pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and Methodius. And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792 is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793 Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833 John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to the theme of ťhe first Slovak State. At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk" was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the •border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu Pravoslav Červenák, titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska" (Mirror of Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured Slovak life of the future. In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon. But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža, Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year, In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament. 34 SLOVAKIA . Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the Unlverslty. In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It had deep roots. To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861, about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ), about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact, whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca. T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon. In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back of it. In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr. Schnleszl wrote: "Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu. tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat, and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other • Ide o penly." The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota. tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and the WOTld of lhe Future), which read: "So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh sooner or lat er." What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state in dependence is death. After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and 1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve SLOVAKIA 86 S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In 1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of Slovak In public llfe. After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30, 1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr promlses. If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de• tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled. It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless, that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918, than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T. G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií, t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts, communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor· ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl• tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks, all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs! Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate. Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and 0 36 SLOVAKIA 1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak parllament W&S the most imporllant. The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament. V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course, to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact, he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures, 1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia, to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government, the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall rea.lize al! the rest of our demands. Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938. Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd: "The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons, requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble." Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl. On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls: " It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty SLOVAKIA 37 of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia." True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak ,generatlons was at long last realized. The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia. Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed !nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands. But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy, they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the ·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London at that tilne, wrote: " . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner, nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944, pg. 21). The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939. ,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From 1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure of the State. Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex- 38 SLOVAKIA pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word, Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda, speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and, of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them. Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla. .And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and that head 1s the Presldent. Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla. He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was adopted. But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts good, but bad polnts as well. Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they, on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it 1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach, but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles. SLOVAKIA 39 -Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli! foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however, remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of July, 1940. After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and, because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr. Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr. Aladar Kočiš. Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than that of -a.ny nelghborlng country. Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons, but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc. During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks, roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance, deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown), one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood. 40 SLOVAKIA Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst 1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them, and, above all else, protect them. During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia. If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia after tbe war. About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government 1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several Slovak members. A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government. The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves, thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will ,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political state which had explolted them for thirty years. Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak people never fared better under any otber government - before or slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia, they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners. Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and SLOVAKIA events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament. After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled. Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before 1939 or after 1945. The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe. • • • WHO SAID IT? BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!• Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far• reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944). • • • DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia. Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate, NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele• gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country, where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth· ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Assembly and Government Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 33-41 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73ed61a7432b837fbbfd88aed839943e.pdf a139e2a752f4a4675e186a5ee6b6a376 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA ~2 ----------------------------JANO.ŠIK - THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD IVAN HOUDEK Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall, at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth. The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews: the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally contradlctory, but rather complement each other. The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a ~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.; VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly hl.storlcal, not merely legendary. Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace, where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona, most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk. Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II (1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met �SLOVAKIA 43 one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the turning-point of bis life. Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account, and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report. The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk, who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest. As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch, "Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery. Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially, beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled. Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain, the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont, and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary. Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk); Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon. �f4 SLOVAKIA Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss: Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these, however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance, James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai; broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway 1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon. A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont, near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský, whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general. Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay, Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands, as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town, ~everal wine merchants, and many others. Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor. This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels 1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed to Slovakla's legendary hero. At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov, and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle" in Ťarcbová. Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine. �SLOVAKIA 45 Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely, Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's rormer sw&etheart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose, in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora, Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death. Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a, or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and !he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly friendly w!th Jánošik. To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla, Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well as a murderer, might be hanged. Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens of the village of Ťarcbová. �SLOVAKIA. Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655. The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713, before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St. Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme. Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce) four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th, who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib on the rack for three days. All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll ~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts. The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš, where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk. Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny, The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest �SLOVAKIA au suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern• keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons. Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon .and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why ·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result, in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and. ·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be· half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed. We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds. Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the 11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage to bis people. Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.), the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however, that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon. Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt �48 SLOVAKIA of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and ,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant, generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people. T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s, ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century. T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník" (J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky (National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i. J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno. šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's " Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and "Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich• mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's " Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd " J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková" In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894. Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!, J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ; Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play, Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik, 1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár, 1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po �SLOVAKIA 49 Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in 1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka, 1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár, 1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913; Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's "Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches- tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55. Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h• wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama, and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ. Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor, Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables, folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore. Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš, :\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe �liO sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine. l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile, and a fourth of b.is men on the march. Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold, silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the subject. The following places have been named after the famous outaaw: Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov; Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl (Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec. These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear. Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers, is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso. Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1 �SLOV.A.KU. 61 šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec, as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr stolen ducats. Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In ,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course, there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been red and w,hite In color. It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace. But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions. Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge. 'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed, and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2, 1929). • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors, and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al• ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney: H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London). � SLOVAKIA ~2 ----------------------------JANO.ŠIK - THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD IVAN HOUDEK Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall, at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth. The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews: the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally contradlctory, but rather complement each other. The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a ~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.; VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly hl.storlcal, not merely legendary. Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace, where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona, most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk. Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II (1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met �SLOVAKIA 43 one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the turning-point of bis life. Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account, and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report. The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk, who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest. As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch, "Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery. Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially, beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled. Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain, the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont, and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary. Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk); Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon. �f4 SLOVAKIA Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss: Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these, however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance, James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai; broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway 1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon. A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont, near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský, whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general. Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay, Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands, as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town, ~everal wine merchants, and many others. Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor. This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels 1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed to Slovakla's legendary hero. At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov, and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle" in Ťarcbová. Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine. �SLOVAKIA 45 Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely, Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's rormer sw&etheart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose, in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora, Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death. Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a, or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and !he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly friendly w!th Jánošik. To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla, Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well as a murderer, might be hanged. Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens of the village of Ťarcbová. �SLOVAKIA. Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655. The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713, before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St. Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme. Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce) four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th, who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib on the rack for three days. All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll ~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts. The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš, where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk. Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny, The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest �SLOVAKIA au suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern• keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons. Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon .and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why ·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result, in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and. ·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be· half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed. We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds. Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the 11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage to bis people. Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.), the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however, that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon. Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt �48 SLOVAKIA of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and ,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant, generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people. T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s, ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century. T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník" (J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky (National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i. J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno. šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's " Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and "Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich• mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's " Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd " J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková" In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894. Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!, J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ; Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play, Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik, 1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár, 1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po �SLOVAKIA 49 Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in 1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka, 1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár, 1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913; Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's "Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches- tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55. Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h• wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama, and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ. Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor, Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables, folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore. Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš, :\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe �liO sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine. l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile, and a fourth of b.is men on the march. Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold, silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the subject. The following places have been named after the famous outaaw: Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov; Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl (Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec. These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear. Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers, is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso. Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1 �SLOV.A.KU. 61 šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec, as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr stolen ducats. Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In ,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course, there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been red and w,hite In color. It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace. But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions. Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge. 'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed, and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2, 1929). • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors, and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al• ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney: H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA ~2 ----------------------------JANO.ŠIK - THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD IVAN HOUDEK Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall, at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth. The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews: the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally contradlctory, but rather complement each other. The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a ~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.; VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly hl.storlcal, not merely legendary. Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace, where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona, most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk. Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II (1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met SLOVAKIA 43 one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the turning-point of bis life. Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account, and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report. The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk, who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest. As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch, "Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery. Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially, beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled. Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain, the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont, and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary. Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk); Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon. f4 SLOVAKIA Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss: Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these, however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance, James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai; broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway 1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon. A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont, near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský, whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general. Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay, Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands, as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town, ~everal wine merchants, and many others. Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor. This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels 1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed to Slovakla's legendary hero. At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov, and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle" in Ťarcbová. Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine. SLOVAKIA 45 Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely, Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's rormer sw&etheart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose, in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora, Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death. Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a, or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and !he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly friendly w!th Jánošik. To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla, Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well as a murderer, might be hanged. Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens of the village of Ťarcbová. SLOVAKIA. Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655. The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713, before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St. Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme. Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce) four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th, who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib on the rack for three days. All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll ~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts. The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš, where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk. Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny, The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest SLOVAKIA au suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern• keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons. Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon .and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why ·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result, in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and. ·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be· half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed. We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds. Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the 11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage to bis people. Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.), the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however, that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon. Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt 48 SLOVAKIA of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and ,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant, generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people. T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s, ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century. T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník" (J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky (National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i. J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno. šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's " Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and "Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich• mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's " Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd " J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková" In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894. Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!, J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ; Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play, Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik, 1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár, 1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po SLOVAKIA 49 Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in 1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka, 1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár, 1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913; Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's "Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches- tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55. Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h• wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama, and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ. Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor, Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables, folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore. Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš, :\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe liO sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine. l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile, and a fourth of b.is men on the march. Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold, silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the subject. The following places have been named after the famous outaaw: Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov; Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl (Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec. These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear. Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers, is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso. Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1 SLOV.A.KU. 61 šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec, as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr stolen ducats. Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In ,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course, there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been red and w,hite In color. It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace. But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions. Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge. 'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed, and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2, 1929). • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors, and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al• ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney: H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Jánošík - The Slovak Robin Hood Description An account of the resource Ivan Houdek Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 42-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Houdek, Ivan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f6ae8ca91a79ec7fce08f88c521a2e71.pdf 9c9c0537daff002f613c92fa6496f927 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. 56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Edward Beneš - Stalin's Stooge Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 52-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8db9dd47a0cbc4f10cc1ef6b84edb23c.pdf 83131de0e65840790ccb5638a6cb6ae1 PDF Text Text 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• �SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the �60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in �SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly �SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk �63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. �64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.) � 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• �SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the �60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in �SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly �SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk �63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. �64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the 60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk 63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. 64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Are the Slovaks and Czechs Two "Closely Related" Nations? Description An account of the resource Dr. A. Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 58-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0c1574aed9759ceac81f746ecc985631.pdf 48197f46eb317f88e9b972eea385fe07 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to youi self with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAl LESSO S A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. B ard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a brief sumar y of the Slovak Grammar. Bard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAK.S, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover , bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES F ROl\l SLOV AK HISTORY by Joseph škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff ; a documented refutat ion of several errors propagated by writers and hist orians; 229 pages, bard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A. HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 2, 1855 - REV. S~EPHEN FURDEK - January 18, 1915 Organizer, publis her, writer, c hampion of Slovak freedom. Born in Trstená, Orava County, Slovakia, died in Cleveland, Ohio. Founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the U . S. A., the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union of the U. S. A., and the Slovak League of America. Furdek is referred to as the apostle of Americans of Slovak descent. � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to youi self with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAl LESSO S A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. B ard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a brief sumar y of the Slovak Grammar. Bard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAK.S, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover , bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES F ROl\l SLOV AK HISTORY by Joseph škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff ; a documented refutat ion of several errors propagated by writers and hist orians; 229 pages, bard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A. HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 2, 1855 - REV. S~EPHEN FURDEK - January 18, 1915 Organizer, publis her, writer, c hampion of Slovak freedom. Born in Trstená, Orava County, Slovakia, died in Cleveland, Ohio. Founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the U . S. A., the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union of the U. S. A., and the Slovak League of America. Furdek is referred to as the apostle of Americans of Slovak descent. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 Description An account of the resource includes portrait of Rev. Stephen Furdek (January 18, 1915) https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f30c64a4bd4a22b37d12baac6a29f30f.pdf e73e7263a4953f406560710ee0c95f84 PDF Text Text �SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civi<: fedetation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the S lovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firrnly beliP. ve that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given r ight to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, S lovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. THE SLOV AK LEAGUE OF AMERICA P . O. Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOT A PRESS Mlddletown, Pa. � �SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civi<: fedetation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the S lovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firrnly beliP. ve that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given r ight to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, S lovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. THE SLOV AK LEAGUE OF AMERICA P . O. Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOT A PRESS Mlddletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/62d8bf281c11a13fdbc1a16bf1801964.pdf cff62a63b570183b9523e931ef1c7a2b PDF Text Text Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.) • John J. Sirotn ak Houorary President 610-612 Lincoln Trus t Bldg. Scranton 3, Pa. Or. Peter P. Hletko 1943 W . 48th Street Chicago 9, Illinois Dr. Jul ius J. Janci 311 W. King St., Owosso, Mich . President Stephanie O. H usek Philip A. Hrobak Georgian Court College P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa. Lakewood, N. J . Vice-President ADVISORY COUNCIL M ichael Sinchak 333 Schoonmaker Avenue !'.Ionessen, Pa. Michael J . Vargovich National P resident First Catholic Slovak Union of U. S. A. Vice-P resident Julia Krajcovi c 1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, III. H elen K ocan National President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recor ding Secretary Dr. F rancis Hrusovsky 10510 Buckeye Road Cleveland 4. Ohio Frank Bobus National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Secretary- Treasurer Frank J . Gurcak Stephen ·J. Tk ach 4755 Haptist Road Pittsburgh 27, Pa. National P resident Pe nna. Slovak U nion Gabri el a E. Vavrek EXE CU T IVE COMMI TTEE National President Ladies P ennsylvan ia Slovak Union Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. John Rozbo r il Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J. National President Slovak Cathollc Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affi liated w ith the S lovak League of America) JEDNOTA SLOV E NSKÁ OBRANA ŽENSKÁ J EDN OTA Middletown, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohlo. BRATSTVO SLOVE NSKÉ NOVI NY Wilkes-Ba rre, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. KAT OLÍCKY SOKO L SVORNOSŤ Passalc, N. J . Whitaker. Pa. OSADNÉ H L ASY Chicago, Tli. ZORN I Č KA �CASTLE ORAVA, one of the most beautiful castles in Slovakia, nestles some 360 ft. above t he Orava river. The stronghold consists of t hree sections, built at different times; the lower, built in 1543; the centra!, built in about 1010; and the upper, built in 1561 . � Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.) • John J. Sirotn ak Houorary President 610-612 Lincoln Trus t Bldg. Scranton 3, Pa. Or. Peter P. Hletko 1943 W . 48th Street Chicago 9, Illinois Dr. Jul ius J. Janci 311 W. King St., Owosso, Mich . President Stephanie O. H usek Philip A. Hrobak Georgian Court College P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa. Lakewood, N. J . Vice-President ADVISORY COUNCIL M ichael Sinchak 333 Schoonmaker Avenue !'.Ionessen, Pa. Michael J . Vargovich National P resident First Catholic Slovak Union of U. S. A. Vice-P resident Julia Krajcovi c 1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, III. H elen K ocan National President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recor ding Secretary Dr. F rancis Hrusovsky 10510 Buckeye Road Cleveland 4. Ohio Frank Bobus National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Secretary- Treasurer Frank J . Gurcak Stephen ·J. Tk ach 4755 Haptist Road Pittsburgh 27, Pa. National P resident Pe nna. Slovak U nion Gabri el a E. Vavrek EXE CU T IVE COMMI TTEE National President Ladies P ennsylvan ia Slovak Union Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. John Rozbo r il Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J. National President Slovak Cathollc Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affi liated w ith the S lovak League of America) JEDNOTA SLOV E NSKÁ OBRANA ŽENSKÁ J EDN OTA Middletown, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohlo. BRATSTVO SLOVE NSKÉ NOVI NY Wilkes-Ba rre, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. KAT OLÍCKY SOKO L SVORNOSŤ Passalc, N. J . Whitaker. Pa. OSADNÉ H L ASY Chicago, Tli. ZORN I Č KA �CASTLE ORAVA, one of the most beautiful castles in Slovakia, nestles some 360 ft. above t he Orava river. The stronghold consists of t hree sections, built at different times; the lower, built in 1543; the centra!, built in about 1010; and the upper, built in 1561 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/40e81e2fe8d5b5c0bf9262cf1e0bc665.pdf 14c54436e9ee99212664b4d1318fffa9 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA FREE CZECHS SPEAK OUT J. Sed.lak We have become accustomed to speaking plainly. Wbat are we figbting for? We are figbting for the return of buman rights and dignity. That is why we are determined to fight against the installatio•1 of neo-communism after tihe defeat of communism. We are opposed resolutely to every terror and totalitarian system of government. That ls why we are in exile today. Tbat is why we are also fighting uncompromisingly against bolshevism for the liberation of our country so that free nations could live happlly in a free world. It is the fight for the unalienable rights of indivlduals and na.tions, which we must defend as such. Faithful to this principle, we recognize and respect tbe rights of the Sudeten Germans and the Slovak nation to national selfdetermination. We are not, therefore, bartering wlth a right that is natural and sacred, and we reject the so-called "Czechoslovaks" who are doing so even today. After all the faithlessness - committed by the representatives of this so-called "CzechosJovaklsm" from 1918 to the present tíme, and especially after April 18, 1947, when the first Slovak president, a Catholic priest, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was ~hamefully murdered - we have no business in Slovakla. We are not, do not want to be and we cannot be the occupants or the conquerors of freedom-loving Slovakia, because we would thereby betray the very ideals of democracy and freedom we are fighting for. It is better to be accla!med a sincere frlend in Slovakia tban a hated ruler. · We welcome the cooperatlon of all democra.tic peoples, especially tbe Czechs, with our free Czech National Council. However, we reject tbe collaborators witb bolsbevism of yes'terday who a.re adherents of the group Jed by Dr. Zenkl and Dr. Ripka. We cannot collaborat.e with the Zenkl-Ripka outfit because we are resolutely oppoS'Eld to the installatlon of neo-communism after tbe defeat of bolsbevism. We reject most resolutely the bolsbevik dictatorship against wbich wc are striving to arouse tbe western democracies. But just as resolutely do we reject even tbe "people's-democratic" dictatorsbip which in our country is represented by Gottwalďs "Government Program of Košice" - the program whicb Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka, Majer and their group are trying to propagate and defend in exile. We are fighting for real freedom and democracy; for the release of a ll political prisoners incarcerated slnce 1945 to tbe present time: for a return of the Jand to our agriculturists and nationallzed businesses to their rigbtful owners; we are fighting foť the inviolabillty of private ownersbip. Furtbermore we are fig,hting to carry througb and insuring extensive social reforms in tbe interest:; of workers and laborers and foľ their rigbt to organize freely. We are fighting fo!· basic human freedoms, formulated by great democrats of tbe West, as well as tbe inviolability and sacredness of the family as the· foundat!on of a nation. We are fighting, tberefore, for thé return of h uman dign!ty to our enslaved brothers and sisters in oúr· betraye<l country so tbat they migbt live and build free,Jy and withou t fear. �SLOVAKIA 63 Our fight is in fact a fight for the realization of the principles of Christian morality. And since the lnterest of welfare and development of the Europ,ean nations demands larger federalized units, we a re fľom the beglnnlng of our struggle for a federatlon of free nations. Furthermore, we also reject yesterday's collaborators wlth the c ommunu;ts because we are in no way responsi ble for the c rimes c ommitted by th em while they were in th e services of the Kremlin. In t he interests of justice we shall not cease demanding the just pun!shment of t he gullty. At this time we emphaslze th at we stand o pposed also to the shady speculations of the guilty to promo te chaos after libe r ation and to repeat "May 1946" wh ich would work injustlce to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and would place power into the hands of the "street" and crimina.ls. The injustlces of retribution shall never again be repeated, but impar tial law of norma! courts s hall prevail. T o the aUempts of yesterday's collaborators with bolsh evism to picture and explain to the West, and especlally to the American public, our b asic stan d towards them in s uch a way as if th e matter c oncerued were only Zenkl and Prchala, we proclaim: We are not c once rned with Prchala or Zenkl, but our nation. We reject most <lecisively Zenkľs totality and his system of leadership hypocritically wrapped in a cloak of democracy. We reject dangerous neo-communism which with the rest of the bolshevik collaborators they are striving to smuggle into the USA, Canada, Australia, England and other countries of the West, and there gain fertile soil for it. That is t he pian of the conspiracy of neo-communism agains! democracy ! To realize th eir pian, the Zenk lites today are trying to s ell themselves to the West. But the democ rats of the W est should be aware of the fact that the Zenklltes are only as devoted to them today as they were only yesterday to the Soviets, and that by a lding them th ey are only strength ening traitors of democracy, who can never gain our natlon for the West. Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led by traitors or confidantes or y esterday's infor mers of their f ellow-citizens who w anted to seize their properties, and so much the less by those who are responsible for the present national tragedy. Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led and shall not be inf luenced by people who went into exil e on a special perm it and with the knowledge of Gottwald and Nosek ( as Vojta Beneš, brother of Dr. E. Beneš, and others). Nor shall they be led by the agents oť Prague or their confidentlal friends. T,he r ecent case of agent K. Strausse in London is still fresh in our me mories. We must guide ourselves accordingly. Certainly the West has b een warned by the chief of the atomic esplonage network who stole lnto England as a "political refugee" and roused the whole of England wlth hls presence. And does the West know how many sples ot the Czech neo-com munists have successfully gotten into mllltar y an d other lmportant enterprises? We are not bitter with hatred. We c an, however, have no truck with t'he followers of neo-communism, who attack us with falsehoods in t he "New Yo rkské Listy" and other publicatlons. It 1s symbolic, because hatred, falsehoods and half-truths are the weapons of communism. W e plead and warn b ecause we are opposed to terror. We �64 SLOVAKIA cannot, therefore, remaln sllent to the vlolence perpetrated by neo-communists against Czech antl-commun!st ex!les w:hlch has at• tained such a degree that Czech patriota, not havlng a hearlng or support anywhere, are asklng confusedly: "ls lt now a curse to have a clean past?" T he neo-communists, outraglng lmpoverlshed exlles, are uslng the beggar's staff to torce them lnto submisslon. That is the trled metbod of c ommunists and neo-communlsts trom the Nazl concentratlon camps, where these people, even though prlsoners, were absolute rulers in t-he Interna! management. There they also tried. to llquidate everything that wlli; not lncllned toward communlsm. Why, Dr. Zenkl was famiUar fa Buchenwald wlth these meth ods of the communist "arch,prlsoners" and ithe camp "polltboro" as were A. Zápotocký and Joseph Plojhar in other concentratlon camps. Some wlt• nesses have returned ,vho stlll remember how Zenkl carrled on Jn Buchenwald. Thls is our basic stand to whlch we adhere firmly and uncompromlslngly. - ("BOHEMIA," Vo!. 4, Nos. 7- 8, 1951) . • • • • WH O SAID IT? " The re are a lso such people who wou ld want t o apply t he Atla ntic Charter in the case of Slovakia. T hat is not only shortsig htedneH, b ut also a gross insult t o Czechoslovakia. T he Czechoslovak problem is ou r ve ry own, an interna! problem." - (Jan Masaryk, London, J an. 20, 1943). • "Czechoslovakia 1s and shall remain a FREE country . . . . Some people say that we have no freedom, that there is religlous persecutlon and propagate all klnds of nonsense about us. I proclalm that all these statements are false. lt 1s not true that we bave rel!gious oppresslon or tdlat democrastlc and indivldual treedoms are suppressec!. 1 AM A PERSON OEEPL Y FOUNOED RELIGJOUSLY and I would not remaln bome even five mlnutes, lf everything that is written about us here were true. . . . I KNOW GOTTWALD A GOOD MANY YEARS, HE IS AN EMI:-.IENT PERSON AND A GREAT CZECH PATRIOT. . . . IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST S WANT T O DRI VE (Ján Masaryk, DinANYBODY FROM THE GOVERNMENT." neľ Address, Piótsbu rgh Unlvel'sity Club, fanu,ary 13, 1947) . • "Today we base ourselves on our alliance with Russia which has NO INTENTION ot lnfluenclng us but whlch wlll not permit base torces of reactlon to plot agalnst us to enact another Munlch and another March 15, 1939. Our Interna! situatlon. too, ts completely dlfrerent. . . . Our program does not mean forclble bring1ng lnto line, or TOTALITARIANISM; it slmply means tha.t the múPLE are takIng the management of public affalrs lnto thelr own hands by means o! natlonal committees, whlcb wlll In due course constltute a natlonal assemb!y. Later parllament wlll declde wbat our Constltutlon and laws are to be. Our people wlll choose the right path." - (Zdenek Flerllnger, Prime Minister, Address at Social Democratlc Party meet· Ing, Prague, June • • 19. 5). � 62 SLOVAKIA FREE CZECHS SPEAK OUT J. Sed.lak We have become accustomed to speaking plainly. Wbat are we figbting for? We are figbting for the return of buman rights and dignity. That is why we are determined to fight against the installatio•1 of neo-communism after tihe defeat of communism. We are opposed resolutely to every terror and totalitarian system of government. That ls why we are in exile today. Tbat is why we are also fighting uncompromisingly against bolshevism for the liberation of our country so that free nations could live happlly in a free world. It is the fight for the unalienable rights of indivlduals and na.tions, which we must defend as such. Faithful to this principle, we recognize and respect tbe rights of the Sudeten Germans and the Slovak nation to national selfdetermination. We are not, therefore, bartering wlth a right that is natural and sacred, and we reject the so-called "Czechoslovaks" who are doing so even today. After all the faithlessness - committed by the representatives of this so-called "CzechosJovaklsm" from 1918 to the present tíme, and especially after April 18, 1947, when the first Slovak president, a Catholic priest, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was ~hamefully murdered - we have no business in Slovakla. We are not, do not want to be and we cannot be the occupants or the conquerors of freedom-loving Slovakia, because we would thereby betray the very ideals of democracy and freedom we are fighting for. It is better to be accla!med a sincere frlend in Slovakia tban a hated ruler. · We welcome the cooperatlon of all democra.tic peoples, especially tbe Czechs, with our free Czech National Council. However, we reject tbe collaborators witb bolsbevism of yes'terday who a.re adherents of the group Jed by Dr. Zenkl and Dr. Ripka. We cannot collaborat.e with the Zenkl-Ripka outfit because we are resolutely oppoS'Eld to the installatlon of neo-communism after tbe defeat of bolsbevism. We reject most resolutely the bolsbevik dictatorship against wbich wc are striving to arouse tbe western democracies. But just as resolutely do we reject even tbe "people's-democratic" dictatorsbip which in our country is represented by Gottwalďs "Government Program of Košice" - the program whicb Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka, Majer and their group are trying to propagate and defend in exile. We are fighting for real freedom and democracy; for the release of a ll political prisoners incarcerated slnce 1945 to tbe present time: for a return of the Jand to our agriculturists and nationallzed businesses to their rigbtful owners; we are fighting foť the inviolabillty of private ownersbip. Furtbermore we are fig,hting to carry througb and insuring extensive social reforms in tbe interest:; of workers and laborers and foľ their rigbt to organize freely. We are fighting fo!· basic human freedoms, formulated by great democrats of tbe West, as well as tbe inviolability and sacredness of the family as the· foundat!on of a nation. We are fighting, tberefore, for thé return of h uman dign!ty to our enslaved brothers and sisters in oúr· betraye<l country so tbat they migbt live and build free,Jy and withou t fear. �SLOVAKIA 63 Our fight is in fact a fight for the realization of the principles of Christian morality. And since the lnterest of welfare and development of the Europ,ean nations demands larger federalized units, we a re fľom the beglnnlng of our struggle for a federatlon of free nations. Furthermore, we also reject yesterday's collaborators wlth the c ommunu;ts because we are in no way responsi ble for the c rimes c ommitted by th em while they were in th e services of the Kremlin. In t he interests of justice we shall not cease demanding the just pun!shment of t he gullty. At this time we emphaslze th at we stand o pposed also to the shady speculations of the guilty to promo te chaos after libe r ation and to repeat "May 1946" wh ich would work injustlce to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and would place power into the hands of the "street" and crimina.ls. The injustlces of retribution shall never again be repeated, but impar tial law of norma! courts s hall prevail. T o the aUempts of yesterday's collaborators with bolsh evism to picture and explain to the West, and especlally to the American public, our b asic stan d towards them in s uch a way as if th e matter c oncerued were only Zenkl and Prchala, we proclaim: We are not c once rned with Prchala or Zenkl, but our nation. We reject most <lecisively Zenkľs totality and his system of leadership hypocritically wrapped in a cloak of democracy. We reject dangerous neo-communism which with the rest of the bolshevik collaborators they are striving to smuggle into the USA, Canada, Australia, England and other countries of the West, and there gain fertile soil for it. That is t he pian of the conspiracy of neo-communism agains! democracy ! To realize th eir pian, the Zenk lites today are trying to s ell themselves to the West. But the democ rats of the W est should be aware of the fact that the Zenklltes are only as devoted to them today as they were only yesterday to the Soviets, and that by a lding them th ey are only strength ening traitors of democracy, who can never gain our natlon for the West. Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led by traitors or confidantes or y esterday's infor mers of their f ellow-citizens who w anted to seize their properties, and so much the less by those who are responsible for the present national tragedy. Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led and shall not be inf luenced by people who went into exil e on a special perm it and with the knowledge of Gottwald and Nosek ( as Vojta Beneš, brother of Dr. E. Beneš, and others). Nor shall they be led by the agents oť Prague or their confidentlal friends. T,he r ecent case of agent K. Strausse in London is still fresh in our me mories. We must guide ourselves accordingly. Certainly the West has b een warned by the chief of the atomic esplonage network who stole lnto England as a "political refugee" and roused the whole of England wlth hls presence. And does the West know how many sples ot the Czech neo-com munists have successfully gotten into mllltar y an d other lmportant enterprises? We are not bitter with hatred. We c an, however, have no truck with t'he followers of neo-communism, who attack us with falsehoods in t he "New Yo rkské Listy" and other publicatlons. It 1s symbolic, because hatred, falsehoods and half-truths are the weapons of communism. W e plead and warn b ecause we are opposed to terror. We �64 SLOVAKIA cannot, therefore, remaln sllent to the vlolence perpetrated by neo-communists against Czech antl-commun!st ex!les w:hlch has at• tained such a degree that Czech patriota, not havlng a hearlng or support anywhere, are asklng confusedly: "ls lt now a curse to have a clean past?" T he neo-communists, outraglng lmpoverlshed exlles, are uslng the beggar's staff to torce them lnto submisslon. That is the trled metbod of c ommunists and neo-communlsts trom the Nazl concentratlon camps, where these people, even though prlsoners, were absolute rulers in t-he Interna! management. There they also tried. to llquidate everything that wlli; not lncllned toward communlsm. Why, Dr. Zenkl was famiUar fa Buchenwald wlth these meth ods of the communist "arch,prlsoners" and ithe camp "polltboro" as were A. Zápotocký and Joseph Plojhar in other concentratlon camps. Some wlt• nesses have returned ,vho stlll remember how Zenkl carrled on Jn Buchenwald. Thls is our basic stand to whlch we adhere firmly and uncompromlslngly. - ("BOHEMIA," Vo!. 4, Nos. 7- 8, 1951) . • • • • WH O SAID IT? " The re are a lso such people who wou ld want t o apply t he Atla ntic Charter in the case of Slovakia. T hat is not only shortsig htedneH, b ut also a gross insult t o Czechoslovakia. T he Czechoslovak problem is ou r ve ry own, an interna! problem." - (Jan Masaryk, London, J an. 20, 1943). • "Czechoslovakia 1s and shall remain a FREE country . . . . Some people say that we have no freedom, that there is religlous persecutlon and propagate all klnds of nonsense about us. I proclalm that all these statements are false. lt 1s not true that we bave rel!gious oppresslon or tdlat democrastlc and indivldual treedoms are suppressec!. 1 AM A PERSON OEEPL Y FOUNOED RELIGJOUSLY and I would not remaln bome even five mlnutes, lf everything that is written about us here were true. . . . I KNOW GOTTWALD A GOOD MANY YEARS, HE IS AN EMI:-.IENT PERSON AND A GREAT CZECH PATRIOT. . . . IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST S WANT T O DRI VE (Ján Masaryk, DinANYBODY FROM THE GOVERNMENT." neľ Address, Piótsbu rgh Unlvel'sity Club, fanu,ary 13, 1947) . • "Today we base ourselves on our alliance with Russia which has NO INTENTION ot lnfluenclng us but whlch wlll not permit base torces of reactlon to plot agalnst us to enact another Munlch and another March 15, 1939. Our Interna! situatlon. too, ts completely dlfrerent. . . . Our program does not mean forclble bring1ng lnto line, or TOTALITARIANISM; it slmply means tha.t the múPLE are takIng the management of public affalrs lnto thelr own hands by means o! natlonal committees, whlcb wlll In due course constltute a natlonal assemb!y. Later parllament wlll declde wbat our Constltutlon and laws are to be. Our people wlll choose the right path." - (Zdenek Flerllnger, Prime Minister, Address at Social Democratlc Party meet· Ing, Prague, June • • 19. 5). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA FREE CZECHS SPEAK OUT J. Sed.lak We have become accustomed to speaking plainly. Wbat are we figbting for? We are figbting for the return of buman rights and dignity. That is why we are determined to fight against the installatio•1 of neo-communism after tihe defeat of communism. We are opposed resolutely to every terror and totalitarian system of government. That ls why we are in exile today. Tbat is why we are also fighting uncompromisingly against bolshevism for the liberation of our country so that free nations could live happlly in a free world. It is the fight for the unalienable rights of indivlduals and na.tions, which we must defend as such. Faithful to this principle, we recognize and respect tbe rights of the Sudeten Germans and the Slovak nation to national selfdetermination. We are not, therefore, bartering wlth a right that is natural and sacred, and we reject the so-called "Czechoslovaks" who are doing so even today. After all the faithlessness - committed by the representatives of this so-called "CzechosJovaklsm" from 1918 to the present tíme, and especially after April 18, 1947, when the first Slovak president, a Catholic priest, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was ~hamefully murdered - we have no business in Slovakla. We are not, do not want to be and we cannot be the occupants or the conquerors of freedom-loving Slovakia, because we would thereby betray the very ideals of democracy and freedom we are fighting for. It is better to be accla!med a sincere frlend in Slovakia tban a hated ruler. · We welcome the cooperatlon of all democra.tic peoples, especially tbe Czechs, with our free Czech National Council. However, we reject tbe collaborators witb bolsbevism of yes'terday who a.re adherents of the group Jed by Dr. Zenkl and Dr. Ripka. We cannot collaborat.e with the Zenkl-Ripka outfit because we are resolutely oppoS'Eld to the installatlon of neo-communism after tbe defeat of bolsbevism. We reject most resolutely the bolsbevik dictatorship against wbich wc are striving to arouse tbe western democracies. But just as resolutely do we reject even tbe "people's-democratic" dictatorsbip which in our country is represented by Gottwalďs "Government Program of Košice" - the program whicb Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka, Majer and their group are trying to propagate and defend in exile. We are fighting for real freedom and democracy; for the release of a ll political prisoners incarcerated slnce 1945 to tbe present time: for a return of the Jand to our agriculturists and nationallzed businesses to their rigbtful owners; we are fighting foť the inviolabillty of private ownersbip. Furtbermore we are fig,hting to carry througb and insuring extensive social reforms in tbe interest:; of workers and laborers and foľ their rigbt to organize freely. We are fighting fo!· basic human freedoms, formulated by great democrats of tbe West, as well as tbe inviolability and sacredness of the family as the· foundat!on of a nation. We are fighting, tberefore, for thé return of h uman dign!ty to our enslaved brothers and sisters in oúr· betraye<l country so tbat they migbt live and build free,Jy and withou t fear. SLOVAKIA 63 Our fight is in fact a fight for the realization of the principles of Christian morality. And since the lnterest of welfare and development of the Europ,ean nations demands larger federalized units, we a re fľom the beglnnlng of our struggle for a federatlon of free nations. Furthermore, we also reject yesterday's collaborators wlth the c ommunu;ts because we are in no way responsi ble for the c rimes c ommitted by th em while they were in th e services of the Kremlin. In t he interests of justice we shall not cease demanding the just pun!shment of t he gullty. At this time we emphaslze th at we stand o pposed also to the shady speculations of the guilty to promo te chaos after libe r ation and to repeat "May 1946" wh ich would work injustlce to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and would place power into the hands of the "street" and crimina.ls. The injustlces of retribution shall never again be repeated, but impar tial law of norma! courts s hall prevail. T o the aUempts of yesterday's collaborators with bolsh evism to picture and explain to the West, and especlally to the American public, our b asic stan d towards them in s uch a way as if th e matter c oncerued were only Zenkl and Prchala, we proclaim: We are not c once rned with Prchala or Zenkl, but our nation. We reject most <lecisively Zenkľs totality and his system of leadership hypocritically wrapped in a cloak of democracy. We reject dangerous neo-communism which with the rest of the bolshevik collaborators they are striving to smuggle into the USA, Canada, Australia, England and other countries of the West, and there gain fertile soil for it. That is t he pian of the conspiracy of neo-communism agains! democracy ! To realize th eir pian, the Zenk lites today are trying to s ell themselves to the West. But the democ rats of the W est should be aware of the fact that the Zenklltes are only as devoted to them today as they were only yesterday to the Soviets, and that by a lding them th ey are only strength ening traitors of democracy, who can never gain our natlon for the West. Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led by traitors or confidantes or y esterday's infor mers of their f ellow-citizens who w anted to seize their properties, and so much the less by those who are responsible for the present national tragedy. Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led and shall not be inf luenced by people who went into exil e on a special perm it and with the knowledge of Gottwald and Nosek ( as Vojta Beneš, brother of Dr. E. Beneš, and others). Nor shall they be led by the agents oť Prague or their confidentlal friends. T,he r ecent case of agent K. Strausse in London is still fresh in our me mories. We must guide ourselves accordingly. Certainly the West has b een warned by the chief of the atomic esplonage network who stole lnto England as a "political refugee" and roused the whole of England wlth hls presence. And does the West know how many sples ot the Czech neo-com munists have successfully gotten into mllltar y an d other lmportant enterprises? We are not bitter with hatred. We c an, however, have no truck with t'he followers of neo-communism, who attack us with falsehoods in t he "New Yo rkské Listy" and other publicatlons. It 1s symbolic, because hatred, falsehoods and half-truths are the weapons of communism. W e plead and warn b ecause we are opposed to terror. We 64 SLOVAKIA cannot, therefore, remaln sllent to the vlolence perpetrated by neo-communists against Czech antl-commun!st ex!les w:hlch has at• tained such a degree that Czech patriota, not havlng a hearlng or support anywhere, are asklng confusedly: "ls lt now a curse to have a clean past?" T he neo-communists, outraglng lmpoverlshed exlles, are uslng the beggar's staff to torce them lnto submisslon. That is the trled metbod of c ommunists and neo-communlsts trom the Nazl concentratlon camps, where these people, even though prlsoners, were absolute rulers in t-he Interna! management. There they also tried. to llquidate everything that wlli; not lncllned toward communlsm. Why, Dr. Zenkl was famiUar fa Buchenwald wlth these meth ods of the communist "arch,prlsoners" and ithe camp "polltboro" as were A. Zápotocký and Joseph Plojhar in other concentratlon camps. Some wlt• nesses have returned ,vho stlll remember how Zenkl carrled on Jn Buchenwald. Thls is our basic stand to whlch we adhere firmly and uncompromlslngly. - ("BOHEMIA," Vo!. 4, Nos. 7- 8, 1951) . • • • • WH O SAID IT? " The re are a lso such people who wou ld want t o apply t he Atla ntic Charter in the case of Slovakia. T hat is not only shortsig htedneH, b ut also a gross insult t o Czechoslovakia. T he Czechoslovak problem is ou r ve ry own, an interna! problem." - (Jan Masaryk, London, J an. 20, 1943). • "Czechoslovakia 1s and shall remain a FREE country . . . . Some people say that we have no freedom, that there is religlous persecutlon and propagate all klnds of nonsense about us. I proclalm that all these statements are false. lt 1s not true that we bave rel!gious oppresslon or tdlat democrastlc and indivldual treedoms are suppressec!. 1 AM A PERSON OEEPL Y FOUNOED RELIGJOUSLY and I would not remaln bome even five mlnutes, lf everything that is written about us here were true. . . . I KNOW GOTTWALD A GOOD MANY YEARS, HE IS AN EMI:-.IENT PERSON AND A GREAT CZECH PATRIOT. . . . IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST S WANT T O DRI VE (Ján Masaryk, DinANYBODY FROM THE GOVERNMENT." neľ Address, Piótsbu rgh Unlvel'sity Club, fanu,ary 13, 1947) . • "Today we base ourselves on our alliance with Russia which has NO INTENTION ot lnfluenclng us but whlch wlll not permit base torces of reactlon to plot agalnst us to enact another Munlch and another March 15, 1939. Our Interna! situatlon. too, ts completely dlfrerent. . . . Our program does not mean forclble bring1ng lnto line, or TOTALITARIANISM; it slmply means tha.t the múPLE are takIng the management of public affalrs lnto thelr own hands by means o! natlonal committees, whlcb wlll In due course constltute a natlonal assemb!y. Later parllament wlll declde wbat our Constltutlon and laws are to be. Our people wlll choose the right path." - (Zdenek Flerllnger, Prime Minister, Address at Social Democratlc Party meet· Ing, Prague, June • • 19. 5).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Free Czechs Speak Out Description An account of the resource J. Sedlak Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sedlak, J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a21d54db609ec35b652b11a433b72aa5.pdf a4cf2e12e8894cac1637514bfacdde6a PDF Text Text SLOVAKJA CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM JOHN F. GLEI MAN Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist• Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later, and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies. But what 1s the truth? Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes. 'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918. The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the Russlans, but that did not make them Russians. But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said, are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb trl be. True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called 1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh - Czech national imperlallsm. �61 SLOVAKIA Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime. Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products. They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks. The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated. Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939. The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks. Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as Czech romantlcism. The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism, have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the unalterable Joglc of h!story. Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter. • • • • WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S. S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944). � SLOVAKJA CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM JOHN F. GLEI MAN Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist• Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later, and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies. But what 1s the truth? Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes. 'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918. The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the Russlans, but that did not make them Russians. But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said, are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb trl be. True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called 1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh - Czech national imperlallsm. �61 SLOVAKIA Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime. Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products. They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks. The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated. Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939. The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks. Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as Czech romantlcism. The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism, have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the unalterable Joglc of h!story. Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter. • • • • WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S. S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKJA CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM JOHN F. GLEI MAN Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist• Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later, and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies. But what 1s the truth? Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes. 'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918. The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the Russlans, but that did not make them Russians. But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said, are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb trl be. True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called 1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh - Czech national imperlallsm. 61 SLOVAKIA Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime. Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products. They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks. The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated. Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939. The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks. Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as Czech romantlcism. The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism, have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the unalterable Joglc of h!story. Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter. • • • • WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S. S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czechoslovak Romanticism Description An account of the resource John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 60-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1029af3398a2c9fa89f1a6e4991ec2ca.pdf a632d718bcae98511576910a6922921c PDF Text Text 56 SLOVAKIA CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE DR. A . GRÉBERT Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland, Hungary and Germany. For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama• tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country. The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha, the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs o[ thls. When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved "the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326). True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light, whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts. Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu· atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia. The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to 1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain herself." (op. cit. pg. 332). Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit. lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo· macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars �SLOVAK.IA 67 and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr. Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t catastrophies that could have overtaken them. Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\ in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be interpreted to competent authorities." But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the Slovak State. The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt. That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states. And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International Communism. Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could not see thls. puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce recognitlon. On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs, he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See." Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war." Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war. To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe He �58 SLOVAKI.A Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican. Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally" under tbe care of the Nazi government! Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact" as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad• vantage of such contacts." Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!" Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy. Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later, on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London. In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora! condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla, wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn 1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand agalnst tbe present r egime." �fiLOVAKlA 69 That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc. No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only with more lies. To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of course, that made Beneš all the more furious. 1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much. Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord· ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism! • • • • WHO SAID IT? "We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order, for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1, 1943). • "Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor. respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for. eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October !10. l 946, 4th sess!on). � 56 SLOVAKIA CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE DR. A . GRÉBERT Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland, Hungary and Germany. For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama• tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country. The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha, the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs o[ thls. When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved "the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326). True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light, whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts. Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu· atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia. The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to 1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain herself." (op. cit. pg. 332). Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit. lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo· macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars �SLOVAK.IA 67 and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr. Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t catastrophies that could have overtaken them. Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\ in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be interpreted to competent authorities." But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the Slovak State. The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt. That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states. And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International Communism. Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could not see thls. puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce recognitlon. On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs, he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See." Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war." Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war. To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe He �58 SLOVAKI.A Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican. Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally" under tbe care of the Nazi government! Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact" as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad• vantage of such contacts." Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!" Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy. Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later, on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London. In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora! condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla, wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn 1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand agalnst tbe present r egime." �fiLOVAKlA 69 That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc. No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only with more lies. To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of course, that made Beneš all the more furious. 1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much. Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord· ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism! • • • • WHO SAID IT? "We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order, for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1, 1943). • "Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor. respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for. eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October !10. l 946, 4th sess!on). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 56 SLOVAKIA CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE DR. A . GRÉBERT Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland, Hungary and Germany. For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama• tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country. The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha, the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs o[ thls. When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved "the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326). True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light, whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts. Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu· atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia. The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to 1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain herself." (op. cit. pg. 332). Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit. lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo· macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars SLOVAK.IA 67 and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr. Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t catastrophies that could have overtaken them. Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\ in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be interpreted to competent authorities." But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the Slovak State. The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt. That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states. And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International Communism. Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could not see thls. puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce recognitlon. On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs, he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See." Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war." Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war. To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe He 58 SLOVAKI.A Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican. Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally" under tbe care of the Nazi government! Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact" as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad• vantage of such contacts." Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!" Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy. Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later, on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London. In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora! condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla, wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn 1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand agalnst tbe present r egime." fiLOVAKlA 69 That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc. No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only with more lies. To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of course, that made Beneš all the more furious. 1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much. Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord· ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism! • • • • WHO SAID IT? "We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order, for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1, 1943). • "Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor. respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for. eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October !10. l 946, 4th sess!on).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czech Intrigues Against the Slovak State Description An account of the resource Dr. A. Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 56-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5c09054c2c8a653f3c653bd4cad00439.pdf 6ba3219f01480f8c2a8671bce204f0be PDF Text Text 54 S LOVAKIA and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples. Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo• vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other democratic countries of tbe world. T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America, s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today. • • • • THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA OR. ANDREW SLOVAK (The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr. Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr. Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking of Slovak socialists.) The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho• slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re• gard to differences In political convictions. Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo· vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f. sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help. I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the idea of Slovak statehood. Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks. �SLOVA.KU. 66 We do not want to restrict any one, but neltber do we wish to be restricted. The three actualities mentioned above mean much for every Intel• ligent Slovak. The f!rst factor means that the Slovak nation wishes to travel along its own Slovak road wlthout hatred and to live on friendly terms with all its neighbors - on the west with the Czechs, wlth the Poles on the north and with the Magyars on the south. The second fact surprised all o( us. Though we knew that Slo• vakia was rich in materials, nevertheless even the biggest optimista were s u rp,rlsed that it was so sel(-1:;ufricient. The third fact is really a memento for all of us. When Dr. Strán&ky mentioned that the Slovaks were to continue the role of the smaller, unwanted brother, he opened the eyes of all o( us. even though he did not lntend to. It is In the interest of all the nations of Centra! Europe that Slovakla should exlst as an Independent state unit, because the Slovak wishes to live in peace and contentment, as our poet has ex· pressed lt: " The Slovak sows on bis own and reaps only on hls own." H istory has proved that the poet was also rlght when he sald: " If it is the s word, swords have we too, and you know tbat we know how to use them." I thlnk it is necessary that memb ers of all nations of the Danub e Basin become aware of t he fact that the Slovaks are capable of taklng car e of themselves and that tbey want to Jive In peace and contentment, but independently. * WHO SAID IT ?: - * * "Th e treaty is a historic landmark In the relations between our two countries; lt is undoubtedly one of the foundation stones of security, prosperity, and strength of the Czechoslovak Repub lic. The treaty revealed ltself as one of the most lm• portant Instruments of a constructive European pollcy. . . . It 1s in• tended, not. only for the special needs of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, but it serves also, the common European interests on the basis of Britls h-Soviet-Amerlcan cooperatlon . . . . lt enables other natlons of Centra! Europe, partlcularly tbe Polisb natlon, to arrive at such a degree of cooperation with tbe neighboring Soviet power as dlstinguished the Soviet-Czecboslovak relatlonsbip - cooperation which is based upon the principle of mutual respect for their freedom and lndependence and also upon tbat of non-interference In tbe!r natlonal affairs . . . . The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact is welcomed, first and foremost, by our nation, for in this w ay, the great expectatlon of our people receives its fulfillment .... The his toric merlts of the CzechoslO· vaklan treaty are due to President Deneš, who, a year ago, provided tbe lnltlative for the whole undertaklng, both by his general polit ical program, as well as by his concrete proposals, and who hlmself dlrected the particularly important negotiations. All of us, together wltb the whole nation, congratulate President Deneš on bis h!gbly s lgnlflcant and meritorious success and we are all slncerely gratifled by bis present offlclal vislt to the Soviet Union. wblcb wlll undoubtedly s trengtµen Czechoslovak-Sovlet frlendsblp." {Dr. Hubert Rlpka to tbe Czecholllovak State Councll. London, December 15, 1943). � 54 S LOVAKIA and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples. Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo• vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other democratic countries of tbe world. T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America, s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today. • • • • THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA OR. ANDREW SLOVAK (The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr. Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr. Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking of Slovak socialists.) The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho• slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re• gard to differences In political convictions. Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo· vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f. sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help. I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the idea of Slovak statehood. Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks. �SLOVA.KU. 66 We do not want to restrict any one, but neltber do we wish to be restricted. The three actualities mentioned above mean much for every Intel• ligent Slovak. The f!rst factor means that the Slovak nation wishes to travel along its own Slovak road wlthout hatred and to live on friendly terms with all its neighbors - on the west with the Czechs, wlth the Poles on the north and with the Magyars on the south. The second fact surprised all o( us. Though we knew that Slo• vakia was rich in materials, nevertheless even the biggest optimista were s u rp,rlsed that it was so sel(-1:;ufricient. The third fact is really a memento for all of us. When Dr. Strán&ky mentioned that the Slovaks were to continue the role of the smaller, unwanted brother, he opened the eyes of all o( us. even though he did not lntend to. It is In the interest of all the nations of Centra! Europe that Slovakla should exlst as an Independent state unit, because the Slovak wishes to live in peace and contentment, as our poet has ex· pressed lt: " The Slovak sows on bis own and reaps only on hls own." H istory has proved that the poet was also rlght when he sald: " If it is the s word, swords have we too, and you know tbat we know how to use them." I thlnk it is necessary that memb ers of all nations of the Danub e Basin become aware of t he fact that the Slovaks are capable of taklng car e of themselves and that tbey want to Jive In peace and contentment, but independently. * WHO SAID IT ?: - * * "Th e treaty is a historic landmark In the relations between our two countries; lt is undoubtedly one of the foundation stones of security, prosperity, and strength of the Czechoslovak Repub lic. The treaty revealed ltself as one of the most lm• portant Instruments of a constructive European pollcy. . . . It 1s in• tended, not. only for the special needs of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, but it serves also, the common European interests on the basis of Britls h-Soviet-Amerlcan cooperatlon . . . . lt enables other natlons of Centra! Europe, partlcularly tbe Polisb natlon, to arrive at such a degree of cooperation with tbe neighboring Soviet power as dlstinguished the Soviet-Czecboslovak relatlonsbip - cooperation which is based upon the principle of mutual respect for their freedom and lndependence and also upon tbat of non-interference In tbe!r natlonal affairs . . . . The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact is welcomed, first and foremost, by our nation, for in this w ay, the great expectatlon of our people receives its fulfillment .... The his toric merlts of the CzechoslO· vaklan treaty are due to President Deneš, who, a year ago, provided tbe lnltlative for the whole undertaklng, both by his general polit ical program, as well as by his concrete proposals, and who hlmself dlrected the particularly important negotiations. All of us, together wltb the whole nation, congratulate President Deneš on bis h!gbly s lgnlflcant and meritorious success and we are all slncerely gratifled by bis present offlclal vislt to the Soviet Union. wblcb wlll undoubtedly s trengtµen Czechoslovak-Sovlet frlendsblp." {Dr. Hubert Rlpka to tbe Czecholllovak State Councll. London, December 15, 1943). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 54 S LOVAKIA and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples. Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo• vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other democratic countries of tbe world. T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America, s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today. • • • • THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA OR. ANDREW SLOVAK (The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr. Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr. Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking of Slovak socialists.) The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho• slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re• gard to differences In political convictions. Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo· vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f. sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help. I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the idea of Slovak statehood. Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks. SLOVA.KU. 66 We do not want to restrict any one, but neltber do we wish to be restricted. The three actualities mentioned above mean much for every Intel• ligent Slovak. The f!rst factor means that the Slovak nation wishes to travel along its own Slovak road wlthout hatred and to live on friendly terms with all its neighbors - on the west with the Czechs, wlth the Poles on the north and with the Magyars on the south. The second fact surprised all o( us. Though we knew that Slo• vakia was rich in materials, nevertheless even the biggest optimista were s u rp,rlsed that it was so sel(-1:;ufricient. The third fact is really a memento for all of us. When Dr. Strán&ky mentioned that the Slovaks were to continue the role of the smaller, unwanted brother, he opened the eyes of all o( us. even though he did not lntend to. It is In the interest of all the nations of Centra! Europe that Slovakla should exlst as an Independent state unit, because the Slovak wishes to live in peace and contentment, as our poet has ex· pressed lt: " The Slovak sows on bis own and reaps only on hls own." H istory has proved that the poet was also rlght when he sald: " If it is the s word, swords have we too, and you know tbat we know how to use them." I thlnk it is necessary that memb ers of all nations of the Danub e Basin become aware of t he fact that the Slovaks are capable of taklng car e of themselves and that tbey want to Jive In peace and contentment, but independently. * WHO SAID IT ?: - * * "Th e treaty is a historic landmark In the relations between our two countries; lt is undoubtedly one of the foundation stones of security, prosperity, and strength of the Czechoslovak Repub lic. The treaty revealed ltself as one of the most lm• portant Instruments of a constructive European pollcy. . . . It 1s in• tended, not. only for the special needs of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, but it serves also, the common European interests on the basis of Britls h-Soviet-Amerlcan cooperatlon . . . . lt enables other natlons of Centra! Europe, partlcularly tbe Polisb natlon, to arrive at such a degree of cooperation with tbe neighboring Soviet power as dlstinguished the Soviet-Czecboslovak relatlonsbip - cooperation which is based upon the principle of mutual respect for their freedom and lndependence and also upon tbat of non-interference In tbe!r natlonal affairs . . . . The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact is welcomed, first and foremost, by our nation, for in this w ay, the great expectatlon of our people receives its fulfillment .... The his toric merlts of the CzechoslO· vaklan treaty are due to President Deneš, who, a year ago, provided tbe lnltlative for the whole undertaklng, both by his general polit ical program, as well as by his concrete proposals, and who hlmself dlrected the particularly important negotiations. All of us, together wltb the whole nation, congratulate President Deneš on bis h!gbly s lgnlflcant and meritorious success and we are all slncerely gratifled by bis present offlclal vislt to the Soviet Union. wblcb wlll undoubtedly s trengtµen Czechoslovak-Sovlet frlendsblp." {Dr. Hubert Rlpka to tbe Czecholllovak State Councll. London, December 15, 1943).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks Do Not Want Czechoslovakia Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Slovak Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 54-55 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Slovak, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2f9ee0bdd6e035a6cf1554a603a9b7bc.pdf c5d53e854ee68e8d0df6cc0216ae73b8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 53 THE SLOV~ WILL NOT BE SILENCED DR. JOSEPH PAUČO Even though enemles of Slovak freedom and independence shall contlnue to exert themselves to silence the Slovaks, they shall not succeed. Thelr sacred cause shall !Ind honorable and noble defenders. And, In Ume, it shall prevall. Thelr falth In eventual victory is increasing every day. At one Ume many people tJhought th-a,t the idea and t he trufä about the lndependence of the Slovak natlon would forever remaln foreign to the Un1ted States. But, lo and behold, today only totally uninformed people belleve that the Slovaks are Czechs or' CzechosJovaks. Mostly those who do not follow events outside of Amerlca. t hose who have not been beyond the ocean, or those who are stub• horn. Thelr numbers are few. On the other hand, as time goes on, more is belng said about Slovakla and the Slovak natlon. But even more than that. Today there are many honest men in politlcs, publlshers, newsmen and commentators, who do not hesitate to lance tbe boil of Czechoslovakism. Tbe dlstlngulshed CBS commentator Edward R. Murrow, for example, dld not hesltate to state the trutb as he aaw it. He not only made known that there was a strong movement for Slovak !ndependenee, but even mentioned the fact that th e antagonism between t he Czechs a nd the Slovaks dates back farth er t han comm unism ltself. Tbe so-called "Czecboslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) are trylng to Iure the Slovaks lnto a joint flght against communism. All other tblngs llke Slovak freedom, independence and national existence - must not be considered for the tlme belng. True, we must all comblne in tbe fight agalnst communlsm. But why teli the Slovaks that tbey must fight ~a!nst communlsm with the Czechs a nd on ly w ith t he Czechs - when it 1s a matter of historical record that the Slovaks fought commun1sm for over a hundred years without the Czechs ·t There 1s no force under tbe sun to force the Slovaks to play the "Czechoslovak" game, wblch threatens tbe very existence of the Slovak natlon by subordinatlng lt to tbe Czechs. Tbe Slovaks bave had tbelr flll of Magyars, Czechs, Russlans and Germans. Tbey are no Ionger lnterested In the joint st-ate of Czechoslovakia. They have outllved all tbat and lnslst on freedom and lndependence. The Slovaks have fought and are stlll vallantly fightlng communlsm, but not for the sake of belng enslaved and explolted by the Czechs or any other natlon. They do not want any one to teli them to flght communism for the sake of the prlnclples of T. G. Masaryk or Dr. Edward Beneš, because thelr pollcles were anti-Slovak and antiChristlan, undemocratlc and totally allen and opposed to Slovak national tradltlons and rellgious convictlons. The Slovaks wlll not be forced to flght communlsm with any group tbat fosters and promotes Czechoslovaklsm - the ideology that claims the S lova ks are only a bra nch of the Czech n at ion a nd t hat th e Slovak la nguage is only a dialect of the Czech nation ; in aho rt that the Slovak natlon doea not exlat - because that ldeology ls dedlcated to the enslavement �54 S LOVAKIA and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples. Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo• vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other democratic countries of tbe world. T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America, s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today. • • • • THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA OR. ANDREW SLOVAK (The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr. Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr. Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking of Slovak socialists.) The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho• slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re• gard to differences In political convictions. Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo· vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f. sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help. I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the idea of Slovak statehood. Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks. � SLOVAKIA 53 THE SLOV~ WILL NOT BE SILENCED DR. JOSEPH PAUČO Even though enemles of Slovak freedom and independence shall contlnue to exert themselves to silence the Slovaks, they shall not succeed. Thelr sacred cause shall !Ind honorable and noble defenders. And, In Ume, it shall prevall. Thelr falth In eventual victory is increasing every day. At one Ume many people tJhought th-a,t the idea and t he trufä about the lndependence of the Slovak natlon would forever remaln foreign to the Un1ted States. But, lo and behold, today only totally uninformed people belleve that the Slovaks are Czechs or' CzechosJovaks. Mostly those who do not follow events outside of Amerlca. t hose who have not been beyond the ocean, or those who are stub• horn. Thelr numbers are few. On the other hand, as time goes on, more is belng said about Slovakla and the Slovak natlon. But even more than that. Today there are many honest men in politlcs, publlshers, newsmen and commentators, who do not hesitate to lance tbe boil of Czechoslovakism. Tbe dlstlngulshed CBS commentator Edward R. Murrow, for example, dld not hesltate to state the trutb as he aaw it. He not only made known that there was a strong movement for Slovak !ndependenee, but even mentioned the fact that th e antagonism between t he Czechs a nd the Slovaks dates back farth er t han comm unism ltself. Tbe so-called "Czecboslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) are trylng to Iure the Slovaks lnto a joint flght against communism. All other tblngs llke Slovak freedom, independence and national existence - must not be considered for the tlme belng. True, we must all comblne in tbe fight agalnst communlsm. But why teli the Slovaks that tbey must fight ~a!nst communlsm with the Czechs a nd on ly w ith t he Czechs - when it 1s a matter of historical record that the Slovaks fought commun1sm for over a hundred years without the Czechs ·t There 1s no force under tbe sun to force the Slovaks to play the "Czechoslovak" game, wblch threatens tbe very existence of the Slovak natlon by subordinatlng lt to tbe Czechs. Tbe Slovaks bave had tbelr flll of Magyars, Czechs, Russlans and Germans. Tbey are no Ionger lnterested In the joint st-ate of Czechoslovakia. They have outllved all tbat and lnslst on freedom and lndependence. The Slovaks have fought and are stlll vallantly fightlng communlsm, but not for the sake of belng enslaved and explolted by the Czechs or any other natlon. They do not want any one to teli them to flght communism for the sake of the prlnclples of T. G. Masaryk or Dr. Edward Beneš, because thelr pollcles were anti-Slovak and antiChristlan, undemocratlc and totally allen and opposed to Slovak national tradltlons and rellgious convictlons. The Slovaks wlll not be forced to flght communlsm with any group tbat fosters and promotes Czechoslovaklsm - the ideology that claims the S lova ks are only a bra nch of the Czech n at ion a nd t hat th e Slovak la nguage is only a dialect of the Czech nation ; in aho rt that the Slovak natlon doea not exlat - because that ldeology ls dedlcated to the enslavement �54 S LOVAKIA and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples. Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo• vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other democratic countries of tbe world. T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America, s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today. • • • • THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA OR. ANDREW SLOVAK (The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr. Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr. Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking of Slovak socialists.) The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho• slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re• gard to differences In political convictions. Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo· vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f. sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help. I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the idea of Slovak statehood. Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 53 THE SLOV~ WILL NOT BE SILENCED DR. JOSEPH PAUČO Even though enemles of Slovak freedom and independence shall contlnue to exert themselves to silence the Slovaks, they shall not succeed. Thelr sacred cause shall !Ind honorable and noble defenders. And, In Ume, it shall prevall. Thelr falth In eventual victory is increasing every day. At one Ume many people tJhought th-a,t the idea and t he trufä about the lndependence of the Slovak natlon would forever remaln foreign to the Un1ted States. But, lo and behold, today only totally uninformed people belleve that the Slovaks are Czechs or' CzechosJovaks. Mostly those who do not follow events outside of Amerlca. t hose who have not been beyond the ocean, or those who are stub• horn. Thelr numbers are few. On the other hand, as time goes on, more is belng said about Slovakla and the Slovak natlon. But even more than that. Today there are many honest men in politlcs, publlshers, newsmen and commentators, who do not hesitate to lance tbe boil of Czechoslovakism. Tbe dlstlngulshed CBS commentator Edward R. Murrow, for example, dld not hesltate to state the trutb as he aaw it. He not only made known that there was a strong movement for Slovak !ndependenee, but even mentioned the fact that th e antagonism between t he Czechs a nd the Slovaks dates back farth er t han comm unism ltself. Tbe so-called "Czecboslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) are trylng to Iure the Slovaks lnto a joint flght against communism. All other tblngs llke Slovak freedom, independence and national existence - must not be considered for the tlme belng. True, we must all comblne in tbe fight agalnst communlsm. But why teli the Slovaks that tbey must fight ~a!nst communlsm with the Czechs a nd on ly w ith t he Czechs - when it 1s a matter of historical record that the Slovaks fought commun1sm for over a hundred years without the Czechs ·t There 1s no force under tbe sun to force the Slovaks to play the "Czechoslovak" game, wblch threatens tbe very existence of the Slovak natlon by subordinatlng lt to tbe Czechs. Tbe Slovaks bave had tbelr flll of Magyars, Czechs, Russlans and Germans. Tbey are no Ionger lnterested In the joint st-ate of Czechoslovakia. They have outllved all tbat and lnslst on freedom and lndependence. The Slovaks have fought and are stlll vallantly fightlng communlsm, but not for the sake of belng enslaved and explolted by the Czechs or any other natlon. They do not want any one to teli them to flght communism for the sake of the prlnclples of T. G. Masaryk or Dr. Edward Beneš, because thelr pollcles were anti-Slovak and antiChristlan, undemocratlc and totally allen and opposed to Slovak national tradltlons and rellgious convictlons. The Slovaks wlll not be forced to flght communlsm with any group tbat fosters and promotes Czechoslovaklsm - the ideology that claims the S lova ks are only a bra nch of the Czech n at ion a nd t hat th e Slovak la nguage is only a dialect of the Czech nation ; in aho rt that the Slovak natlon doea not exlat - because that ldeology ls dedlcated to the enslavement 54 S LOVAKIA and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples. Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo• vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other democratic countries of tbe world. T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America, s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today. • • • • THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA OR. ANDREW SLOVAK (The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr. Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr. Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking of Slovak socialists.) The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho• slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re• gard to differences In political convictions. Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo· vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f. sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help. I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the idea of Slovak statehood. Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks Will Not Be Silenced... Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Paučo Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 53-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/229d5ee6eca6e6abde0a43f9ad6e53fa.pdf a496aa4c7f8cd43ea73f60fb8e1e9599 PDF Text Text 48 SLOVAKIA THE SWVAKS AND DR. JOSEPH LE'ITRICH OR. JOSEPH BYSTRICKÝ (The author of this article is the former persona) secretary of Rt. Rev. Msgr. Andrew Cvlnček, Vice President of the Slovak Demo• cratic Party and the Slovak National Council In Bratislava of whlch Dr. Lettrich was Presldent. Mr. Bystrlck:9' also was Chairman of the· Universlty Students' Club of tbe Slovak Democratlc Party.) Dr. Joseph Lettrich became very exclted over the H. R. Concurrent Resolution 139, which was introduced In the U. S. Congress In July, 1951, by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of M!lwaukee, Wls. In thls resolution Congressman Kersten asks the Unlted States to allow the Slovak nation decide In free elections whether lt wants to live in a joint State with the Czech nation, or in an independent, national State of its own. In a letter to Kersten, Dr. Joseph Lettr!ch presented himself as a representatlve of tbe "absolute majority" of the Slovak people, because, he said, in the elections of May, 1946, the Slovak nat!on voted 62% for the Slovak Democratic Party of which he was pres!dent. Lettrich was not the only one who protested against the Kersten Resolutlon. Dr. George Slávik, former ambassador of Beneš's communistdominated Prague regime, also protested, saying that Slovak lndependence is demanded only by those Slovaks "who collaborated with nazism" and who fled from the "just " punishment of the "People's Courts." Both allegations, malicious and false, are very serious and indicate that here we have to do wlth people whose political means of combat are falsehoods, decepttons, dlshonorable acts and a false presentation of the struggle of the Slovak natlon for State lndependence. Dr. Lettrlch attempts to show that all who voted in the May 1946 elect!ons for the Slovak Democratic Party are for the continued exlstence of the synthetlc Czechoslovak State, because the Slovak Demo• cratlc Party - his political party - was for tbat State. What a terrible mistake! Why did the Slovaks vote for the Democratic Party of Slovakla? Today it 1s abundantly clear to all objective and informed observers that after the advent of the Bolshevik Army to Košice, the Jargest city in east Slovakla, the so-called "provislonal" Czechoslovak Government of Dr. Beneš, wlth its "Košice Program," declded that only two polltical parties shall be allowed in Slovakia, to wit: The Communist Party and the Democr atic Party. The platform of the Slovak Communlst Party was well-known to everybody, because it was an old party. But the Slovak Democrattc Party was a new party whose program was not deflned clearly and was unknown to the public. In 1945, there really was no dlfference between the Communlst and tbe Democrat!c part!es of Slovakia as far as policy was concerned. Dr. Lettrlch was well aware of that fact and admltted it when, as presldent of the Democratic Party, he wrote: "Basically, our political program - our politlcal li ne - completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there r eally was no dlfference between an adherent �SLOVAKIA 49 of the Slovak Communiat Party and an adhe rent of the Democratic Party ... 1 emphaaize that we must mutually help each other and that all of ua must solve common problems together, becauae for once and for all t lme we must reallze that there l1 no fundamental dlfference between the Communist Party and the De mocratlc Party of Slovakia." - ("MY 1946) - Prague, No. 23, June 8, 1946.) Both partles participated In equal measure in all the crimes which the Soviet and natlve communlsts perpetrated in Slovakla; both are responsible for the 30,0()'{), Slovaks deported to Siberla In 1945; and both parties are responsible for the incarceratlon of Slovak cltizens, priests and bishops. Communists and representatlves of tbe Democratic Party stole in equal measure and in "brotherly" fashion, threw people out of thelr own homes into the streets In the name of t'he "new people's democratlc" order and then, when these people protested they had no place to live, in both parties sent them 10 concentration camps as elements detrlmental to society and hostlle to the "people's" democracy. During the time of the " triumphant" march of the Bolshevik army, there was not a slngle famUy in Slovakia which dld not have some one to sh ed tears for. To rid itself of the Slovaks who d!d not want to become frlendly with the communist "Jegal" order and wlU1 the Czechoslovak State idea, the new regime used to send them - wfrhout training, with insufficient raiment and arms, in the blisterlng cold, at the beginnlng of 1945 - into battle against the Germans in the Llptovsk~ Svät~ Mikuláä sector. The so-called "Fourth Czechoslovak Brigade", formed in Levoča at th e beginning of February 1945 excluslvely of people who were agalnst communism and Czechos lovaklsm, shed its blood practically to a man in that sector. Those mlssed by the Germans were kllled by Soviet soldiers, who used machine guns and automatlcs to chase barefooted and unarmed Slovaks into the fight. T h is 1s the manner In which the new Czechoslovak communist regime wanted to rid ltself of lts opponents. Despite all this, however, the Idea of an independent Slovak State contlnued to grow, and the Slovak nation ideallzed lt completely and wrapped lt In a robe of sacredness. People could not talk about it in a loud volce, because the "People's Courts," created by the National Front of the Communist and Democratlc parties, arbitrarlly dealt death even for trlvlal matters. Already in July 1945, just before the St. Cyril and Methodius celebration at Devín, the communist pollce arrested some 100 university students in Bratislava, accusing them of attemptlng to make a demonstratlon for an independent Slovak State. Slovak students were daily "guests" of the people's democratlc police who were fully aware of the fact that the unlverslty students were for Slovak State lndependence in an overwhelmlng majority. The communist pollce used to raid the fľaternity houses of the students every March 14 to ascertaln whether t he students were celebratlng the "Slovak Independence Day." The hostlle attitude of the Slovak natlon to the Democratic Party, óf · whlch Dr. Lettrich was chairman, was a lso manltested by leading Cathollc politlcians ot that Ume, who parted wlth Lettrich's party and aniiounced the formation of a new politlcal party, the Chrlstlan Republican Party. Monslgnor Andrew Cvlnček, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Ing. K. F ilo and others wanted a party which, under the given circumstances �50 SLOVAKIA and possibllities, would best satisfy the feeling and the needs of the Slovak nation, that is a party which would be democratic and Chrlstlan in practice, one that would defend all democratic freedoms and especially the freedom of rel!gion, which at that Ume exlsted only on paper, because all - and I repeat - ALL existlng Catholic societles were dissolved and thelr actlvity forbidden. In the Spring of 194.6, when the new Christlan Republican Party was to be organized - a party in whlch the Slovak saw a ray of a new and better llfe - the National Front of communists and Lettrichites would not allow lt. At that time Dr. Joseph Lettrich announced: "The National Front shall not allow a party w ith a confessional program." - Indeed, it was clear to the communists that a party founded on Christlan principles would be the greatest adversary or communism. Lettrlch and his group also were aware of that, but they also knew that by allowing t his party to organize and function, their Democratic Party would certainly be ruined in tJie coming elections. Consequently, the Christian Republican Party was not allowed to organize, but soon thereafter an announcement was made that permission was granted for a new Marxist party, the Social Democratlc Party. Then Dr. Lettrich offered the representatives of the Christian Republicans a proposal, whereby the Catbolics would get appropriate representation in government and leglslative organs. The Democratic Party agreed to add the toilowing points to its program: a) to do away with the People's Courts; b) to return religious schools, rraternities and other natlonalized properties to the Church; c) to permit Catholic societles to exist and runction without government interference; d) to f!ght the execution or Dr. Joseph Tiso. The Slovak people, however, had little or no falth in the agree· ment of the Catholics and the Democratic Party concluded In April 1946, because Dr. Lettrich remained as head of the Democratic Party - the same Lettrich who compromised himself so strongly in tbe Fall ot 1944 by collaborating with the communists to nationalize all Catholic schools, churches and other properties, to lnstitute People's Courts, etc. The absolute majority or the Slovak nation was determined to use the "White Ballot" in the May 1946 elections to expresa its opposition to the communlst regirne and the Czechoslovak State idea. It was only when the Council of Catbolic Bishops of Slovakia, after careful and lengthy deliberation, decided that it was necessary to choose tbe lesser of two evils, that tbe vast majority of Slovaks decided to vote for the Democratic Party. It is true that 62% ot the voters of Slovakia voted for the Demo• cratic Party, but lt is just as true that this bappened not out or love or respect for Dr. Joseph Lettrich or the Czechoslovak Republlc, but because the great Catholic majority respected the dlcision or the Bishop's Council and voted against communlsm and the communlsts in Slovakla. Dr. Lettrich was the head ot a party whicb in its absolute majority was against bim, but could not unseat him because the voter in the so-called "Third Czecboslovak Republlc" had only one right - the right to obey and keep his mouth sbut. The fact stlll remains: the idea of Slovak State lndependence was the decidlng factor in the 1946 elections. �SLOV.AKJA 51 The Democratic Party saw that it could not gain Slovak voters by simply preaching Czechoslovak mutuality, therefore, it decided to use Slovak State independence as a silent means of propaganda. Dr. Nicholas Franek, at that time a candidate for the deputy mandate of the Bratislava dlstrlct {later Minister of Unlflcation in Prague and now a refugee in America and a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ! ), attended a secret meeting of Slovak un!verslty students, before the electlons of May 1946, at the Centra! Secretariate of the Democratlc Party, and, among other thlngs, sa!d: "None ot us believes Dr. Lettrich. He is overly compromised with his close collaboration wlth the communists. For us Dr. Lettrich cannot be any kind of guarantee that freedoms shall be restored in our country. However, we must keep him as president for the Ume being, otherwise the communists would see to it that we are Jiquidated. After the electlons we shall endeavor to have tbe elected Slovak deput!es procla!m the Slovak State legally in the Prague Parl!ament and in the Slovak National Councll in Bratislava." That is how Dr. Franek got the unlversity students to vote for the Democratlc Party; they belleved that Dr. Franek and bis colleagues would keep their promlses after the elections. And tbe students really worked to assure the victory of the Democratic Party. The Slovak s tudents, whom I sent out into all the districts of Slovakia to conv!nce the people to vote for the Democratlc Party, spoke in the spirit of Dr. Franek's speech. That is why we are so much more disappointed now that Dr. Franek, enjoying politlcal asylum in America, 1s stlll supporting the Czechoslovaks, when he knows fully well that t hey were and s tlJJ are responsible for the naitlonal catastrophe or the Slovak nation. The electlons in May 1946 were elect!ons for the independence of the Slovak State. Propaganda of the Democratic Party was dlrected in that spirit, and it was only that kind of propaganda that made the Slovaks forget some of the sufferlngs they llved through, because they firmly believed that lt was worth whlle to flght, suffer and die for State independence. The enthusiasm of Slovakia in the May 1946 elections reflected this spirit. And for the idea ot an independent Slovak State six university students were wounded by communist bullets in front of Svoradov and 329 were deprived of stipends and expelled from the student boarding houses. But the idea for national and State independence was much stronger than incarcerations and sufferings. True, the Democratlc Party got 62% of the votes in 1946. But we must remember that: a) some citlzens were deprlved of their right to vote; b) 2% voted for the Freedom Party which had State independence in lts platform; c) several percent or the votes went to the Communlst Party because or opposltlon to Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, the voters tlguring that it was wlser or smarter to vote outrlght for the Communist Party, instead of its affillate, the Democratic Party. So, all factors considered, more than 75% of the Slovak votes in May 1946 were cast for an independent Slovak State. That is why we - who :proudly claim the program of national and State independence - are not afraid of the elections proposed by Congressman Kersten in hla Resolution R. H. 139. The people who are afraid of such elections know fully well that if the Slovaks were glven an oppQrtunlty to declde whether they wanted to Jive In Czechoslovakla �52 SLOVAKIA or not, they would answer forcefully and conslsten tly: NO! That is why Lettrich and Company would want to to convince the Government of the United States that the Slovaks are for CzechosJovakia and that an independent Slovakia ls promoted only by some "nazis" who escaped the "just" punishment of the "people's" courts. If Dr. Lettrich really ls the great democrat he poses to be, Jet him not be a!rald or the de!eat he would have to suffer with hls several frlends in case such an election is held. It the Slovaks are for the Czechoslovak Republlc, as Dr. Lett• rich claims, then they certalnly wlll say so in such an electlon. When I talked wlth Dr. Lettrlch after the executlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he told me that accord!ng to reports he has in his possession, the absolute majority of Slovak university students was !or a Slovak State and regards Dr. Joseph Tlso as a martyr and those who condemned him as murderers who should be brought to tria!. "In Prague," Dr. Lettrich told me at that Ume, "I met a certaln unlversity student and asked hlm what he thougbt about the executlon or Dr. T!so. Tb!s student replied: ' The Czecha put General Štefänik out of the way, they jailed Hlinka and now hanged Tiso with them'." we have nothing further to talk about After tbe executlon of the Presldent of Slovakia, Msgr. Andrew told me: "Wlth the executlon of Dr. Joseph Tlso Czechos lovakla ls llquldated and no one shall restore !t by means of free electlons." And before I fled from Slovakla, he sald: "Figbt for the State lndependence or Slovakla!" With the executlon of Dr. Tlso a revolutlou and the destruction of the Democratic Party threatened In Slovakla. So the presidency of the Democratic Party called together the executlve commlttee of the Party (1 was present also), and at thls meeting the delegates or the lndlvlclual distrlcts said in one accord: "After the execution of Dr. Joseph Tiao we loat all our members. The Democratic Party exiata only theoretically, but for all pactical purposea it is liquldated." Adm!ttlng that he was a general without an army, and that bis program or collaboratlon wlth the communlsts and Czechoslovakism was not the program of the Slovak nat!on, Dr. Joseph Lettrlch asked the delegates present for advice how to save the Democratlc Party. It was after thls meeting that Lettrlch assumed the role or Pilate and attempted to just!fy hlmself In the eyes of the Slovak people by proclalmlng In the newspapers that Dr. Edward Bene!\ and the Natlonal Soclallsts, and not he and the Democratlc Party, were responslble for the execution of Tlso. But thls came too late. Wlth the execution of Dr. Joseph Tlso nails were sunk deep into the Czechoslovak comn by all classes of the Slovak people - the tradesmen, buslnessmen, workers and farmers and the lntelllgentsia. The Slovak nation deflnltely is for an independent Slovakla. The Slovak natlon reallzes tbat the road to independence !s fuH of sorrow and suf\ferlng, but !s, nevertheless, determlned to attain lndependence at all costs. It ls provlng that dally. Therefore, we welcome the resolutlon ot Congressman Kersten "for the freedom of the Slovaks," because free elections wlll prove who was rlght: we, who are for an jndependent Slovak Republlc, or those who are trying to enslave Slovakla. Cvlnček � 48 SLOVAKIA THE SWVAKS AND DR. JOSEPH LE'ITRICH OR. JOSEPH BYSTRICKÝ (The author of this article is the former persona) secretary of Rt. Rev. Msgr. Andrew Cvlnček, Vice President of the Slovak Demo• cratic Party and the Slovak National Council In Bratislava of whlch Dr. Lettrich was Presldent. Mr. Bystrlck:9' also was Chairman of the· Universlty Students' Club of tbe Slovak Democratlc Party.) Dr. Joseph Lettrich became very exclted over the H. R. Concurrent Resolution 139, which was introduced In the U. S. Congress In July, 1951, by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of M!lwaukee, Wls. In thls resolution Congressman Kersten asks the Unlted States to allow the Slovak nation decide In free elections whether lt wants to live in a joint State with the Czech nation, or in an independent, national State of its own. In a letter to Kersten, Dr. Joseph Lettr!ch presented himself as a representatlve of tbe "absolute majority" of the Slovak people, because, he said, in the elections of May, 1946, the Slovak nat!on voted 62% for the Slovak Democratic Party of which he was pres!dent. Lettrich was not the only one who protested against the Kersten Resolutlon. Dr. George Slávik, former ambassador of Beneš's communistdominated Prague regime, also protested, saying that Slovak lndependence is demanded only by those Slovaks "who collaborated with nazism" and who fled from the "just " punishment of the "People's Courts." Both allegations, malicious and false, are very serious and indicate that here we have to do wlth people whose political means of combat are falsehoods, decepttons, dlshonorable acts and a false presentation of the struggle of the Slovak natlon for State lndependence. Dr. Lettrlch attempts to show that all who voted in the May 1946 elect!ons for the Slovak Democratic Party are for the continued exlstence of the synthetlc Czechoslovak State, because the Slovak Demo• cratlc Party - his political party - was for tbat State. What a terrible mistake! Why did the Slovaks vote for the Democratic Party of Slovakla? Today it 1s abundantly clear to all objective and informed observers that after the advent of the Bolshevik Army to Košice, the Jargest city in east Slovakla, the so-called "provislonal" Czechoslovak Government of Dr. Beneš, wlth its "Košice Program," declded that only two polltical parties shall be allowed in Slovakia, to wit: The Communist Party and the Democr atic Party. The platform of the Slovak Communlst Party was well-known to everybody, because it was an old party. But the Slovak Democrattc Party was a new party whose program was not deflned clearly and was unknown to the public. In 1945, there really was no dlfference between the Communlst and tbe Democrat!c part!es of Slovakia as far as policy was concerned. Dr. Lettrlch was well aware of that fact and admltted it when, as presldent of the Democratic Party, he wrote: "Basically, our political program - our politlcal li ne - completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there r eally was no dlfference between an adherent �SLOVAKIA 49 of the Slovak Communiat Party and an adhe rent of the Democratic Party ... 1 emphaaize that we must mutually help each other and that all of ua must solve common problems together, becauae for once and for all t lme we must reallze that there l1 no fundamental dlfference between the Communist Party and the De mocratlc Party of Slovakia." - ("MY 1946) - Prague, No. 23, June 8, 1946.) Both partles participated In equal measure in all the crimes which the Soviet and natlve communlsts perpetrated in Slovakla; both are responsible for the 30,0()'{), Slovaks deported to Siberla In 1945; and both parties are responsible for the incarceratlon of Slovak cltizens, priests and bishops. Communists and representatlves of tbe Democratic Party stole in equal measure and in "brotherly" fashion, threw people out of thelr own homes into the streets In the name of t'he "new people's democratlc" order and then, when these people protested they had no place to live, in both parties sent them 10 concentration camps as elements detrlmental to society and hostlle to the "people's" democracy. During the time of the " triumphant" march of the Bolshevik army, there was not a slngle famUy in Slovakia which dld not have some one to sh ed tears for. To rid itself of the Slovaks who d!d not want to become frlendly with the communist "Jegal" order and wlU1 the Czechoslovak State idea, the new regime used to send them - wfrhout training, with insufficient raiment and arms, in the blisterlng cold, at the beginnlng of 1945 - into battle against the Germans in the Llptovsk~ Svät~ Mikuláä sector. The so-called "Fourth Czechoslovak Brigade", formed in Levoča at th e beginning of February 1945 excluslvely of people who were agalnst communism and Czechos lovaklsm, shed its blood practically to a man in that sector. Those mlssed by the Germans were kllled by Soviet soldiers, who used machine guns and automatlcs to chase barefooted and unarmed Slovaks into the fight. T h is 1s the manner In which the new Czechoslovak communist regime wanted to rid ltself of lts opponents. Despite all this, however, the Idea of an independent Slovak State contlnued to grow, and the Slovak nation ideallzed lt completely and wrapped lt In a robe of sacredness. People could not talk about it in a loud volce, because the "People's Courts," created by the National Front of the Communist and Democratlc parties, arbitrarlly dealt death even for trlvlal matters. Already in July 1945, just before the St. Cyril and Methodius celebration at Devín, the communist pollce arrested some 100 university students in Bratislava, accusing them of attemptlng to make a demonstratlon for an independent Slovak State. Slovak students were daily "guests" of the people's democratlc police who were fully aware of the fact that the unlverslty students were for Slovak State lndependence in an overwhelmlng majority. The communist pollce used to raid the fľaternity houses of the students every March 14 to ascertaln whether t he students were celebratlng the "Slovak Independence Day." The hostlle attitude of the Slovak natlon to the Democratic Party, óf · whlch Dr. Lettrich was chairman, was a lso manltested by leading Cathollc politlcians ot that Ume, who parted wlth Lettrich's party and aniiounced the formation of a new politlcal party, the Chrlstlan Republican Party. Monslgnor Andrew Cvlnček, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Ing. K. F ilo and others wanted a party which, under the given circumstances �50 SLOVAKIA and possibllities, would best satisfy the feeling and the needs of the Slovak nation, that is a party which would be democratic and Chrlstlan in practice, one that would defend all democratic freedoms and especially the freedom of rel!gion, which at that Ume exlsted only on paper, because all - and I repeat - ALL existlng Catholic societles were dissolved and thelr actlvity forbidden. In the Spring of 194.6, when the new Christlan Republican Party was to be organized - a party in whlch the Slovak saw a ray of a new and better llfe - the National Front of communists and Lettrichites would not allow lt. At that time Dr. Joseph Lettrich announced: "The National Front shall not allow a party w ith a confessional program." - Indeed, it was clear to the communists that a party founded on Christlan principles would be the greatest adversary or communism. Lettrlch and his group also were aware of that, but they also knew that by allowing t his party to organize and function, their Democratic Party would certainly be ruined in tJie coming elections. Consequently, the Christian Republican Party was not allowed to organize, but soon thereafter an announcement was made that permission was granted for a new Marxist party, the Social Democratlc Party. Then Dr. Lettrich offered the representatives of the Christian Republicans a proposal, whereby the Catbolics would get appropriate representation in government and leglslative organs. The Democratic Party agreed to add the toilowing points to its program: a) to do away with the People's Courts; b) to return religious schools, rraternities and other natlonalized properties to the Church; c) to permit Catholic societles to exist and runction without government interference; d) to f!ght the execution or Dr. Joseph Tiso. The Slovak people, however, had little or no falth in the agree· ment of the Catholics and the Democratic Party concluded In April 1946, because Dr. Lettrich remained as head of the Democratic Party - the same Lettrich who compromised himself so strongly in tbe Fall ot 1944 by collaborating with the communists to nationalize all Catholic schools, churches and other properties, to lnstitute People's Courts, etc. The absolute majority or the Slovak nation was determined to use the "White Ballot" in the May 1946 elections to expresa its opposition to the communlst regirne and the Czechoslovak State idea. It was only when the Council of Catbolic Bishops of Slovakia, after careful and lengthy deliberation, decided that it was necessary to choose tbe lesser of two evils, that tbe vast majority of Slovaks decided to vote for the Democratic Party. It is true that 62% ot the voters of Slovakia voted for the Demo• cratic Party, but lt is just as true that this bappened not out or love or respect for Dr. Joseph Lettrich or the Czechoslovak Republlc, but because the great Catholic majority respected the dlcision or the Bishop's Council and voted against communlsm and the communlsts in Slovakla. Dr. Lettrich was the head ot a party whicb in its absolute majority was against bim, but could not unseat him because the voter in the so-called "Third Czecboslovak Republlc" had only one right - the right to obey and keep his mouth sbut. The fact stlll remains: the idea of Slovak State lndependence was the decidlng factor in the 1946 elections. �SLOV.AKJA 51 The Democratic Party saw that it could not gain Slovak voters by simply preaching Czechoslovak mutuality, therefore, it decided to use Slovak State independence as a silent means of propaganda. Dr. Nicholas Franek, at that time a candidate for the deputy mandate of the Bratislava dlstrlct {later Minister of Unlflcation in Prague and now a refugee in America and a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ! ), attended a secret meeting of Slovak un!verslty students, before the electlons of May 1946, at the Centra! Secretariate of the Democratlc Party, and, among other thlngs, sa!d: "None ot us believes Dr. Lettrich. He is overly compromised with his close collaboration wlth the communists. For us Dr. Lettrich cannot be any kind of guarantee that freedoms shall be restored in our country. However, we must keep him as president for the Ume being, otherwise the communists would see to it that we are Jiquidated. After the electlons we shall endeavor to have tbe elected Slovak deput!es procla!m the Slovak State legally in the Prague Parl!ament and in the Slovak National Councll in Bratislava." That is how Dr. Franek got the unlversity students to vote for the Democratlc Party; they belleved that Dr. Franek and bis colleagues would keep their promlses after the elections. And tbe students really worked to assure the victory of the Democratic Party. The Slovak s tudents, whom I sent out into all the districts of Slovakia to conv!nce the people to vote for the Democratlc Party, spoke in the spirit of Dr. Franek's speech. That is why we are so much more disappointed now that Dr. Franek, enjoying politlcal asylum in America, 1s stlll supporting the Czechoslovaks, when he knows fully well that t hey were and s tlJJ are responsible for the naitlonal catastrophe or the Slovak nation. The electlons in May 1946 were elect!ons for the independence of the Slovak State. Propaganda of the Democratic Party was dlrected in that spirit, and it was only that kind of propaganda that made the Slovaks forget some of the sufferlngs they llved through, because they firmly believed that lt was worth whlle to flght, suffer and die for State independence. The enthusiasm of Slovakia in the May 1946 elections reflected this spirit. And for the idea ot an independent Slovak State six university students were wounded by communist bullets in front of Svoradov and 329 were deprived of stipends and expelled from the student boarding houses. But the idea for national and State independence was much stronger than incarcerations and sufferings. True, the Democratlc Party got 62% of the votes in 1946. But we must remember that: a) some citlzens were deprlved of their right to vote; b) 2% voted for the Freedom Party which had State independence in lts platform; c) several percent or the votes went to the Communlst Party because or opposltlon to Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, the voters tlguring that it was wlser or smarter to vote outrlght for the Communist Party, instead of its affillate, the Democratic Party. So, all factors considered, more than 75% of the Slovak votes in May 1946 were cast for an independent Slovak State. That is why we - who :proudly claim the program of national and State independence - are not afraid of the elections proposed by Congressman Kersten in hla Resolution R. H. 139. The people who are afraid of such elections know fully well that if the Slovaks were glven an oppQrtunlty to declde whether they wanted to Jive In Czechoslovakla �52 SLOVAKIA or not, they would answer forcefully and conslsten tly: NO! That is why Lettrich and Company would want to to convince the Government of the United States that the Slovaks are for CzechosJovakia and that an independent Slovakia ls promoted only by some "nazis" who escaped the "just" punishment of the "people's" courts. If Dr. Lettrich really ls the great democrat he poses to be, Jet him not be a!rald or the de!eat he would have to suffer with hls several frlends in case such an election is held. It the Slovaks are for the Czechoslovak Republlc, as Dr. Lett• rich claims, then they certalnly wlll say so in such an electlon. When I talked wlth Dr. Lettrlch after the executlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he told me that accord!ng to reports he has in his possession, the absolute majority of Slovak university students was !or a Slovak State and regards Dr. Joseph Tlso as a martyr and those who condemned him as murderers who should be brought to tria!. "In Prague," Dr. Lettrich told me at that Ume, "I met a certaln unlversity student and asked hlm what he thougbt about the executlon or Dr. T!so. Tb!s student replied: ' The Czecha put General Štefänik out of the way, they jailed Hlinka and now hanged Tiso with them'." we have nothing further to talk about After tbe executlon of the Presldent of Slovakia, Msgr. Andrew told me: "Wlth the executlon of Dr. Joseph Tlso Czechos lovakla ls llquldated and no one shall restore !t by means of free electlons." And before I fled from Slovakla, he sald: "Figbt for the State lndependence or Slovakla!" With the executlon of Dr. Tlso a revolutlou and the destruction of the Democratic Party threatened In Slovakla. So the presidency of the Democratic Party called together the executlve commlttee of the Party (1 was present also), and at thls meeting the delegates or the lndlvlclual distrlcts said in one accord: "After the execution of Dr. Joseph Tiao we loat all our members. The Democratic Party exiata only theoretically, but for all pactical purposea it is liquldated." Adm!ttlng that he was a general without an army, and that bis program or collaboratlon wlth the communlsts and Czechoslovakism was not the program of the Slovak nat!on, Dr. Joseph Lettrlch asked the delegates present for advice how to save the Democratlc Party. It was after thls meeting that Lettrlch assumed the role or Pilate and attempted to just!fy hlmself In the eyes of the Slovak people by proclalmlng In the newspapers that Dr. Edward Bene!\ and the Natlonal Soclallsts, and not he and the Democratlc Party, were responslble for the execution of Tlso. But thls came too late. Wlth the execution of Dr. Joseph Tlso nails were sunk deep into the Czechoslovak comn by all classes of the Slovak people - the tradesmen, buslnessmen, workers and farmers and the lntelllgentsia. The Slovak nation deflnltely is for an independent Slovakla. The Slovak natlon reallzes tbat the road to independence !s fuH of sorrow and suf\ferlng, but !s, nevertheless, determlned to attain lndependence at all costs. It ls provlng that dally. Therefore, we welcome the resolutlon ot Congressman Kersten "for the freedom of the Slovaks," because free elections wlll prove who was rlght: we, who are for an jndependent Slovak Republlc, or those who are trying to enslave Slovakla. Cvlnček � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 48 SLOVAKIA THE SWVAKS AND DR. JOSEPH LE'ITRICH OR. JOSEPH BYSTRICKÝ (The author of this article is the former persona) secretary of Rt. Rev. Msgr. Andrew Cvlnček, Vice President of the Slovak Demo• cratic Party and the Slovak National Council In Bratislava of whlch Dr. Lettrich was Presldent. Mr. Bystrlck:9' also was Chairman of the· Universlty Students' Club of tbe Slovak Democratlc Party.) Dr. Joseph Lettrich became very exclted over the H. R. Concurrent Resolution 139, which was introduced In the U. S. Congress In July, 1951, by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of M!lwaukee, Wls. In thls resolution Congressman Kersten asks the Unlted States to allow the Slovak nation decide In free elections whether lt wants to live in a joint State with the Czech nation, or in an independent, national State of its own. In a letter to Kersten, Dr. Joseph Lettr!ch presented himself as a representatlve of tbe "absolute majority" of the Slovak people, because, he said, in the elections of May, 1946, the Slovak nat!on voted 62% for the Slovak Democratic Party of which he was pres!dent. Lettrich was not the only one who protested against the Kersten Resolutlon. Dr. George Slávik, former ambassador of Beneš's communistdominated Prague regime, also protested, saying that Slovak lndependence is demanded only by those Slovaks "who collaborated with nazism" and who fled from the "just " punishment of the "People's Courts." Both allegations, malicious and false, are very serious and indicate that here we have to do wlth people whose political means of combat are falsehoods, decepttons, dlshonorable acts and a false presentation of the struggle of the Slovak natlon for State lndependence. Dr. Lettrlch attempts to show that all who voted in the May 1946 elect!ons for the Slovak Democratic Party are for the continued exlstence of the synthetlc Czechoslovak State, because the Slovak Demo• cratlc Party - his political party - was for tbat State. What a terrible mistake! Why did the Slovaks vote for the Democratic Party of Slovakla? Today it 1s abundantly clear to all objective and informed observers that after the advent of the Bolshevik Army to Košice, the Jargest city in east Slovakla, the so-called "provislonal" Czechoslovak Government of Dr. Beneš, wlth its "Košice Program," declded that only two polltical parties shall be allowed in Slovakia, to wit: The Communist Party and the Democr atic Party. The platform of the Slovak Communlst Party was well-known to everybody, because it was an old party. But the Slovak Democrattc Party was a new party whose program was not deflned clearly and was unknown to the public. In 1945, there really was no dlfference between the Communlst and tbe Democrat!c part!es of Slovakia as far as policy was concerned. Dr. Lettrlch was well aware of that fact and admltted it when, as presldent of the Democratic Party, he wrote: "Basically, our political program - our politlcal li ne - completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there r eally was no dlfference between an adherent SLOVAKIA 49 of the Slovak Communiat Party and an adhe rent of the Democratic Party ... 1 emphaaize that we must mutually help each other and that all of ua must solve common problems together, becauae for once and for all t lme we must reallze that there l1 no fundamental dlfference between the Communist Party and the De mocratlc Party of Slovakia." - ("MY 1946) - Prague, No. 23, June 8, 1946.) Both partles participated In equal measure in all the crimes which the Soviet and natlve communlsts perpetrated in Slovakla; both are responsible for the 30,0()'{), Slovaks deported to Siberla In 1945; and both parties are responsible for the incarceratlon of Slovak cltizens, priests and bishops. Communists and representatlves of tbe Democratic Party stole in equal measure and in "brotherly" fashion, threw people out of thelr own homes into the streets In the name of t'he "new people's democratlc" order and then, when these people protested they had no place to live, in both parties sent them 10 concentration camps as elements detrlmental to society and hostlle to the "people's" democracy. During the time of the " triumphant" march of the Bolshevik army, there was not a slngle famUy in Slovakia which dld not have some one to sh ed tears for. To rid itself of the Slovaks who d!d not want to become frlendly with the communist "Jegal" order and wlU1 the Czechoslovak State idea, the new regime used to send them - wfrhout training, with insufficient raiment and arms, in the blisterlng cold, at the beginnlng of 1945 - into battle against the Germans in the Llptovsk~ Svät~ Mikuláä sector. The so-called "Fourth Czechoslovak Brigade", formed in Levoča at th e beginning of February 1945 excluslvely of people who were agalnst communism and Czechos lovaklsm, shed its blood practically to a man in that sector. Those mlssed by the Germans were kllled by Soviet soldiers, who used machine guns and automatlcs to chase barefooted and unarmed Slovaks into the fight. T h is 1s the manner In which the new Czechoslovak communist regime wanted to rid ltself of lts opponents. Despite all this, however, the Idea of an independent Slovak State contlnued to grow, and the Slovak nation ideallzed lt completely and wrapped lt In a robe of sacredness. People could not talk about it in a loud volce, because the "People's Courts," created by the National Front of the Communist and Democratlc parties, arbitrarlly dealt death even for trlvlal matters. Already in July 1945, just before the St. Cyril and Methodius celebration at Devín, the communist pollce arrested some 100 university students in Bratislava, accusing them of attemptlng to make a demonstratlon for an independent Slovak State. Slovak students were daily "guests" of the people's democratlc police who were fully aware of the fact that the unlverslty students were for Slovak State lndependence in an overwhelmlng majority. The communist pollce used to raid the fľaternity houses of the students every March 14 to ascertaln whether t he students were celebratlng the "Slovak Independence Day." The hostlle attitude of the Slovak natlon to the Democratic Party, óf · whlch Dr. Lettrich was chairman, was a lso manltested by leading Cathollc politlcians ot that Ume, who parted wlth Lettrich's party and aniiounced the formation of a new politlcal party, the Chrlstlan Republican Party. Monslgnor Andrew Cvlnček, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Ing. K. F ilo and others wanted a party which, under the given circumstances 50 SLOVAKIA and possibllities, would best satisfy the feeling and the needs of the Slovak nation, that is a party which would be democratic and Chrlstlan in practice, one that would defend all democratic freedoms and especially the freedom of rel!gion, which at that Ume exlsted only on paper, because all - and I repeat - ALL existlng Catholic societles were dissolved and thelr actlvity forbidden. In the Spring of 194.6, when the new Christlan Republican Party was to be organized - a party in whlch the Slovak saw a ray of a new and better llfe - the National Front of communists and Lettrichites would not allow lt. At that time Dr. Joseph Lettrich announced: "The National Front shall not allow a party w ith a confessional program." - Indeed, it was clear to the communists that a party founded on Christlan principles would be the greatest adversary or communism. Lettrlch and his group also were aware of that, but they also knew that by allowing t his party to organize and function, their Democratic Party would certainly be ruined in tJie coming elections. Consequently, the Christian Republican Party was not allowed to organize, but soon thereafter an announcement was made that permission was granted for a new Marxist party, the Social Democratlc Party. Then Dr. Lettrich offered the representatives of the Christian Republicans a proposal, whereby the Catbolics would get appropriate representation in government and leglslative organs. The Democratic Party agreed to add the toilowing points to its program: a) to do away with the People's Courts; b) to return religious schools, rraternities and other natlonalized properties to the Church; c) to permit Catholic societles to exist and runction without government interference; d) to f!ght the execution or Dr. Joseph Tiso. The Slovak people, however, had little or no falth in the agree· ment of the Catholics and the Democratic Party concluded In April 1946, because Dr. Lettrich remained as head of the Democratic Party - the same Lettrich who compromised himself so strongly in tbe Fall ot 1944 by collaborating with the communists to nationalize all Catholic schools, churches and other properties, to lnstitute People's Courts, etc. The absolute majority or the Slovak nation was determined to use the "White Ballot" in the May 1946 elections to expresa its opposition to the communlst regirne and the Czechoslovak State idea. It was only when the Council of Catbolic Bishops of Slovakia, after careful and lengthy deliberation, decided that it was necessary to choose tbe lesser of two evils, that tbe vast majority of Slovaks decided to vote for the Democratic Party. It is true that 62% ot the voters of Slovakia voted for the Demo• cratic Party, but lt is just as true that this bappened not out or love or respect for Dr. Joseph Lettrich or the Czechoslovak Republlc, but because the great Catholic majority respected the dlcision or the Bishop's Council and voted against communlsm and the communlsts in Slovakla. Dr. Lettrich was the head ot a party whicb in its absolute majority was against bim, but could not unseat him because the voter in the so-called "Third Czecboslovak Republlc" had only one right - the right to obey and keep his mouth sbut. The fact stlll remains: the idea of Slovak State lndependence was the decidlng factor in the 1946 elections. SLOV.AKJA 51 The Democratic Party saw that it could not gain Slovak voters by simply preaching Czechoslovak mutuality, therefore, it decided to use Slovak State independence as a silent means of propaganda. Dr. Nicholas Franek, at that time a candidate for the deputy mandate of the Bratislava dlstrlct {later Minister of Unlflcation in Prague and now a refugee in America and a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ! ), attended a secret meeting of Slovak un!verslty students, before the electlons of May 1946, at the Centra! Secretariate of the Democratlc Party, and, among other thlngs, sa!d: "None ot us believes Dr. Lettrich. He is overly compromised with his close collaboration wlth the communists. For us Dr. Lettrich cannot be any kind of guarantee that freedoms shall be restored in our country. However, we must keep him as president for the Ume being, otherwise the communists would see to it that we are Jiquidated. After the electlons we shall endeavor to have tbe elected Slovak deput!es procla!m the Slovak State legally in the Prague Parl!ament and in the Slovak National Councll in Bratislava." That is how Dr. Franek got the unlversity students to vote for the Democratlc Party; they belleved that Dr. Franek and bis colleagues would keep their promlses after the elections. And tbe students really worked to assure the victory of the Democratic Party. The Slovak s tudents, whom I sent out into all the districts of Slovakia to conv!nce the people to vote for the Democratlc Party, spoke in the spirit of Dr. Franek's speech. That is why we are so much more disappointed now that Dr. Franek, enjoying politlcal asylum in America, 1s stlll supporting the Czechoslovaks, when he knows fully well that t hey were and s tlJJ are responsible for the naitlonal catastrophe or the Slovak nation. The electlons in May 1946 were elect!ons for the independence of the Slovak State. Propaganda of the Democratic Party was dlrected in that spirit, and it was only that kind of propaganda that made the Slovaks forget some of the sufferlngs they llved through, because they firmly believed that lt was worth whlle to flght, suffer and die for State independence. The enthusiasm of Slovakia in the May 1946 elections reflected this spirit. And for the idea ot an independent Slovak State six university students were wounded by communist bullets in front of Svoradov and 329 were deprived of stipends and expelled from the student boarding houses. But the idea for national and State independence was much stronger than incarcerations and sufferings. True, the Democratlc Party got 62% of the votes in 1946. But we must remember that: a) some citlzens were deprlved of their right to vote; b) 2% voted for the Freedom Party which had State independence in lts platform; c) several percent or the votes went to the Communlst Party because or opposltlon to Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, the voters tlguring that it was wlser or smarter to vote outrlght for the Communist Party, instead of its affillate, the Democratic Party. So, all factors considered, more than 75% of the Slovak votes in May 1946 were cast for an independent Slovak State. That is why we - who :proudly claim the program of national and State independence - are not afraid of the elections proposed by Congressman Kersten in hla Resolution R. H. 139. The people who are afraid of such elections know fully well that if the Slovaks were glven an oppQrtunlty to declde whether they wanted to Jive In Czechoslovakla 52 SLOVAKIA or not, they would answer forcefully and conslsten tly: NO! That is why Lettrich and Company would want to to convince the Government of the United States that the Slovaks are for CzechosJovakia and that an independent Slovakia ls promoted only by some "nazis" who escaped the "just" punishment of the "people's" courts. If Dr. Lettrich really ls the great democrat he poses to be, Jet him not be a!rald or the de!eat he would have to suffer with hls several frlends in case such an election is held. It the Slovaks are for the Czechoslovak Republlc, as Dr. Lett• rich claims, then they certalnly wlll say so in such an electlon. When I talked wlth Dr. Lettrlch after the executlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he told me that accord!ng to reports he has in his possession, the absolute majority of Slovak university students was !or a Slovak State and regards Dr. Joseph Tlso as a martyr and those who condemned him as murderers who should be brought to tria!. "In Prague," Dr. Lettrich told me at that Ume, "I met a certaln unlversity student and asked hlm what he thougbt about the executlon or Dr. T!so. Tb!s student replied: ' The Czecha put General Štefänik out of the way, they jailed Hlinka and now hanged Tiso with them'." we have nothing further to talk about After tbe executlon of the Presldent of Slovakia, Msgr. Andrew told me: "Wlth the executlon of Dr. Joseph Tlso Czechos lovakla ls llquldated and no one shall restore !t by means of free electlons." And before I fled from Slovakla, he sald: "Figbt for the State lndependence or Slovakla!" With the executlon of Dr. Tlso a revolutlou and the destruction of the Democratic Party threatened In Slovakla. So the presidency of the Democratic Party called together the executlve commlttee of the Party (1 was present also), and at thls meeting the delegates or the lndlvlclual distrlcts said in one accord: "After the execution of Dr. Joseph Tiao we loat all our members. The Democratic Party exiata only theoretically, but for all pactical purposea it is liquldated." Adm!ttlng that he was a general without an army, and that bis program or collaboratlon wlth the communlsts and Czechoslovakism was not the program of the Slovak nat!on, Dr. Joseph Lettrlch asked the delegates present for advice how to save the Democratlc Party. It was after thls meeting that Lettrlch assumed the role or Pilate and attempted to just!fy hlmself In the eyes of the Slovak people by proclalmlng In the newspapers that Dr. Edward Bene!\ and the Natlonal Soclallsts, and not he and the Democratlc Party, were responslble for the execution of Tlso. But thls came too late. Wlth the execution of Dr. Joseph Tlso nails were sunk deep into the Czechoslovak comn by all classes of the Slovak people - the tradesmen, buslnessmen, workers and farmers and the lntelllgentsia. The Slovak nation deflnltely is for an independent Slovakla. The Slovak natlon reallzes tbat the road to independence !s fuH of sorrow and suf\ferlng, but !s, nevertheless, determlned to attain lndependence at all costs. It ls provlng that dally. Therefore, we welcome the resolutlon ot Congressman Kersten "for the freedom of the Slovaks," because free elections wlll prove who was rlght: we, who are for an jndependent Slovak Republlc, or those who are trying to enslave Slovakla. Cvlnček  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks and Dr. Joseph Lettrich Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Bystrický Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 48-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bystrický, Joseph Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a2b785ff29172bb25725fc31a56885d4.pdf 6c84b656505739b67f12330875b66208 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 45 POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS? OR. JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion: Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague communist regime? The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000 Czecbs had fled to other countrles. rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany. But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak" program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape. It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the consent of Gottwald? Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech 'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25, 1948. He wrote: "Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to the west to date. "They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.' "The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident. "The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are more In America tban in Europe. "Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But �46 SLOVAKIA in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . ! "But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant appearance of legltlmacy? "Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is su pposed to embrace the following polnts: 1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table; 2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln; 3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side; 4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war; 5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and 6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts. "Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate and thlnks nat!onalistlcally. "Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe west. "lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of ' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946 made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the communists became the strongest group in Parliament. "These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had 'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls! "The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error. Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the �SLOVAKIA 47 Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky." Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism and lmperialism. The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949. They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today. These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told. Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo• vak nations to the Kremlin. And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo• vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it. lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed ! • • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) . • "How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof. F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the ~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946). � SLOVAKIA 45 POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS? OR. JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion: Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague communist regime? The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000 Czecbs had fled to other countrles. rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany. But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak" program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape. It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the consent of Gottwald? Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech 'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25, 1948. He wrote: "Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to the west to date. "They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.' "The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident. "The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are more In America tban in Europe. "Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But �46 SLOVAKIA in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . ! "But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant appearance of legltlmacy? "Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is su pposed to embrace the following polnts: 1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table; 2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln; 3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side; 4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war; 5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and 6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts. "Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate and thlnks nat!onalistlcally. "Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe west. "lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of ' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946 made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the communists became the strongest group in Parliament. "These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had 'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls! "The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error. Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the �SLOVAKIA 47 Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky." Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism and lmperialism. The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949. They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today. These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told. Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo• vak nations to the Kremlin. And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo• vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it. lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed ! • • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) . • "How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof. F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the ~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 45 POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS? OR. JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion: Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague communist regime? The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000 Czecbs had fled to other countrles. rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany. But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak" program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape. It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the consent of Gottwald? Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech 'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25, 1948. He wrote: "Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to the west to date. "They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.' "The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident. "The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are more In America tban in Europe. "Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But 46 SLOVAKIA in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . ! "But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant appearance of legltlmacy? "Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is su pposed to embrace the following polnts: 1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table; 2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln; 3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side; 4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war; 5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and 6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts. "Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate and thlnks nat!onalistlcally. "Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe west. "lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of ' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946 made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the communists became the strongest group in Parliament. "These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had 'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls! "The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error. Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the SLOVAKIA 47 Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky." Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism and lmperialism. The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949. They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today. These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told. Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo• vak nations to the Kremlin. And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo• vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it. lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed ! • • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) . • "How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof. F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the ~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Political Refugees or Red Agents? Description An account of the resource Dr. John Vlkolinský Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 45-47 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vlkolinský, John Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/82c911652f06669a035681777a59135b.pdf 4a24bd63f4ddad2faf45a79ce0d14d70 PDF Text Text 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926. � 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Subterranean Caves of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 p. 44 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a381cf65883b3c9382b41ca001a3fdce.pdf b73421c08544cb795b727805d3d56009 PDF Text Text SLOV.AKIA 43 IDSTORY OF SWVAK ART Exposed to many influences, Slovakia bas had a variegated history. Stamped brlcks, excavated at various points. lndicate that the Romans extended their domlnlon beyond the Danube lnto the area whlch 1s now Slovakia. As early as the seventh century these reglons were lnhablted by tbe ancestors of the Slovaks who had to defend themselves agalnst the Uralo-Altaic Avars. Thls perlod 1s characterlzed by a mlxture of Slovak and Avar influences. In the nlnth century, the Great Moravian state was an lmportant factor, but it was extingulshed by the Magyars. Stability dld not ensue unt!l the time of the bu!lding of castles and of settlements round about them. Their rulns form one of the picturesque attract!ons of present-day Slovakla. At flrst the castles were but rudely bui!t structures for defense. Gradually more ornate forms of archltecture were employed. The apse of the castle at Nitra is a remnant of the old baslllca consecrated about the year 830. Some thlrty years later the Slovak apostles Salnts Cyril and Methodlus, held servlces here. Parts of the cathedra\ at Spišská Kapitula In Spiš, and the churches at Deakovce. Saint Benadlk on the Hron, and a few chapel rotundas. are remnants of thls early perlod. Gothlc monuments are to be found in the Spiš reglon. There is evldence here of the influence of the Franklsh school of architecture. Gothic archltecture spread lnto Slovakla princlpally from Poland and Sllesia. Remarkable as a well-nlgh perfect example of Gothlc a.rchitecture is the church of Saint James at Levoč:i.. The 21 metre hlgh altar !s noteworthy. Nothing llke lt ls to be found In the West. King Zapolya's chapel at Spišský Štvrtok (Donnersmark) is one of the ruost notable edlflces of thls period, consistlng of two Gothic stories above eacb otber. Bratislava, Košice, Bardiov, Prešov, and Trnava. can also boast of Gothic edifices. The oldest frescoes date from the year 1317. Spišská Kapitula, Levoča, Bardiov, and Kežmarok, have large wing altar paint!ngs in thelr churches. The lnfluence of Renalssance archltecture. comlng trom Italy, affected the buildlng of castles first. Between the flfteenth and eighteenth centuries most of the cities and towns of Spiš belonged to Poland. Thls lnfluenced the archltecture of the perlod. The Jesults built the first baroque churches. From the Danube the baroque style of archltecture, emanatlng from Vlenna, spread over all Slovakla. The baroque tower of the Bratislava City Hall resembles that of Diirnsteln In tbe Wachan reglon of Austrla. The castle at Bratislava was renovated by Maria Theresa, 1740 to 1780. At the foot of the castle the noblllty, whlch always lmltated royalty, bullt thelr splendld palaces. The Grassalkovich Palace and the Palace of the Prlmate, the latter bullt by Hlldebrand, are two remarkably fine speclmens of thls perlod. The lnterlors were exquisltely deco• rated. Thls luxury-lovlng era saw the introduction of fine tapestrles and gobelins. Sculptures decorate the exterlors and carvlngs the lnterlors of these bu!ldlngs. The Protestant churcb bullding!< disclose the archltectural In· fluence of Germany. The large wooden churches at Kežmarok and at �44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926. � SLOV.AKIA 43 IDSTORY OF SWVAK ART Exposed to many influences, Slovakia bas had a variegated history. Stamped brlcks, excavated at various points. lndicate that the Romans extended their domlnlon beyond the Danube lnto the area whlch 1s now Slovakia. As early as the seventh century these reglons were lnhablted by tbe ancestors of the Slovaks who had to defend themselves agalnst the Uralo-Altaic Avars. Thls perlod 1s characterlzed by a mlxture of Slovak and Avar influences. In the nlnth century, the Great Moravian state was an lmportant factor, but it was extingulshed by the Magyars. Stability dld not ensue unt!l the time of the bu!lding of castles and of settlements round about them. Their rulns form one of the picturesque attract!ons of present-day Slovakla. At flrst the castles were but rudely bui!t structures for defense. Gradually more ornate forms of archltecture were employed. The apse of the castle at Nitra is a remnant of the old baslllca consecrated about the year 830. Some thlrty years later the Slovak apostles Salnts Cyril and Methodlus, held servlces here. Parts of the cathedra\ at Spišská Kapitula In Spiš, and the churches at Deakovce. Saint Benadlk on the Hron, and a few chapel rotundas. are remnants of thls early perlod. Gothlc monuments are to be found in the Spiš reglon. There is evldence here of the influence of the Franklsh school of architecture. Gothic archltecture spread lnto Slovakla princlpally from Poland and Sllesia. Remarkable as a well-nlgh perfect example of Gothlc a.rchitecture is the church of Saint James at Levoč:i.. The 21 metre hlgh altar !s noteworthy. Nothing llke lt ls to be found In the West. King Zapolya's chapel at Spišský Štvrtok (Donnersmark) is one of the ruost notable edlflces of thls period, consistlng of two Gothic stories above eacb otber. Bratislava, Košice, Bardiov, Prešov, and Trnava. can also boast of Gothic edifices. The oldest frescoes date from the year 1317. Spišská Kapitula, Levoča, Bardiov, and Kežmarok, have large wing altar paint!ngs in thelr churches. The lnfluence of Renalssance archltecture. comlng trom Italy, affected the buildlng of castles first. Between the flfteenth and eighteenth centuries most of the cities and towns of Spiš belonged to Poland. Thls lnfluenced the archltecture of the perlod. The Jesults built the first baroque churches. From the Danube the baroque style of archltecture, emanatlng from Vlenna, spread over all Slovakla. The baroque tower of the Bratislava City Hall resembles that of Diirnsteln In tbe Wachan reglon of Austrla. The castle at Bratislava was renovated by Maria Theresa, 1740 to 1780. At the foot of the castle the noblllty, whlch always lmltated royalty, bullt thelr splendld palaces. The Grassalkovich Palace and the Palace of the Prlmate, the latter bullt by Hlldebrand, are two remarkably fine speclmens of thls perlod. The lnterlors were exquisltely deco• rated. Thls luxury-lovlng era saw the introduction of fine tapestrles and gobelins. Sculptures decorate the exterlors and carvlngs the lnterlors of these bu!ldlngs. The Protestant churcb bullding!< disclose the archltectural In· fluence of Germany. The large wooden churches at Kežmarok and at �44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV.AKIA 43 IDSTORY OF SWVAK ART Exposed to many influences, Slovakia bas had a variegated history. Stamped brlcks, excavated at various points. lndicate that the Romans extended their domlnlon beyond the Danube lnto the area whlch 1s now Slovakia. As early as the seventh century these reglons were lnhablted by tbe ancestors of the Slovaks who had to defend themselves agalnst the Uralo-Altaic Avars. Thls perlod 1s characterlzed by a mlxture of Slovak and Avar influences. In the nlnth century, the Great Moravian state was an lmportant factor, but it was extingulshed by the Magyars. Stability dld not ensue unt!l the time of the bu!lding of castles and of settlements round about them. Their rulns form one of the picturesque attract!ons of present-day Slovakla. At flrst the castles were but rudely bui!t structures for defense. Gradually more ornate forms of archltecture were employed. The apse of the castle at Nitra is a remnant of the old baslllca consecrated about the year 830. Some thlrty years later the Slovak apostles Salnts Cyril and Methodlus, held servlces here. Parts of the cathedra\ at Spišská Kapitula In Spiš, and the churches at Deakovce. Saint Benadlk on the Hron, and a few chapel rotundas. are remnants of thls early perlod. Gothlc monuments are to be found in the Spiš reglon. There is evldence here of the influence of the Franklsh school of architecture. Gothic archltecture spread lnto Slovakla princlpally from Poland and Sllesia. Remarkable as a well-nlgh perfect example of Gothlc a.rchitecture is the church of Saint James at Levoč:i.. The 21 metre hlgh altar !s noteworthy. Nothing llke lt ls to be found In the West. King Zapolya's chapel at Spišský Štvrtok (Donnersmark) is one of the ruost notable edlflces of thls period, consistlng of two Gothic stories above eacb otber. Bratislava, Košice, Bardiov, Prešov, and Trnava. can also boast of Gothic edifices. The oldest frescoes date from the year 1317. Spišská Kapitula, Levoča, Bardiov, and Kežmarok, have large wing altar paint!ngs in thelr churches. The lnfluence of Renalssance archltecture. comlng trom Italy, affected the buildlng of castles first. Between the flfteenth and eighteenth centuries most of the cities and towns of Spiš belonged to Poland. Thls lnfluenced the archltecture of the perlod. The Jesults built the first baroque churches. From the Danube the baroque style of archltecture, emanatlng from Vlenna, spread over all Slovakla. The baroque tower of the Bratislava City Hall resembles that of Diirnsteln In tbe Wachan reglon of Austrla. The castle at Bratislava was renovated by Maria Theresa, 1740 to 1780. At the foot of the castle the noblllty, whlch always lmltated royalty, bullt thelr splendld palaces. The Grassalkovich Palace and the Palace of the Prlmate, the latter bullt by Hlldebrand, are two remarkably fine speclmens of thls perlod. The lnterlors were exquisltely deco• rated. Thls luxury-lovlng era saw the introduction of fine tapestrles and gobelins. Sculptures decorate the exterlors and carvlngs the lnterlors of these bu!ldlngs. The Protestant churcb bullding!< disclose the archltectural In· fluence of Germany. The large wooden churches at Kežmarok and at 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource History of Slovak Art Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 43-44 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ec19ecb0c01c746e87cfc7dd598574c1.pdf 3705a464cbf3324171bf4a9c6845b6f6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 39 RADIO FREE EUROPE BY A SLOVAK EXILE "Radio Free Europe" !s functionlng ln Munich slnce May 1, 1961. The enterprise in itself ís proof of wha.t Amerícans are capable of do• ing and the gligantic ftnancial sacrifkes they are wllling to make to show the enslaved natlons behind the Iron Curtain that they are not forsaken and 'that 'the western world ís not forgetting about tlhem. Indeed, thls !s admlrable of the Amerícan people who have contrlbuted so generously to make the project possible. lt is a big thing, indeed, íf we follow the present psychologlcal flght aga.inst communlsm and lf we regard things objectlvely from a broader world vlewpolnt. Radlo Free Europe aftords the !atest proof of the gratitude earned by Amerlcans for resistlng communism so vaľiantly, nay, for taking over the offensl.ve to defeat militarily and politlcally the communls-t effort and the endless cha.in of -Red lies. Without thls remarkwble resistance of the United States, communism would have the doors open to the whole world. Of course, the question of whether Radlo l<'ree Europe (RFE) i5 using .proper methods to fight communism, whether these methods sumce for polítical reality or whether they comply to the mentality of t'h . e natlons to which RFE turns w!th its broadcasts, can be se11lously quest!loned. We must say frank,l y that Americans stm do not !ully under$and the complexity of the various, special polltical and natlonal problems existlng in Europe. But for this we cannot _bla.me them alone, but aH the more can we blame their European advisors, w·ho frequently ~Ive them a "pa!nted" plcture of the sttuation. lf RFE !s to perform and fulfill its mission ln the countries behlnd t:he Iron Curtain, it must above all else respect certain natural reallties; lts broadcasts must respect the polit!cal mentality of the individual natíons. The broadcasts must not hurt theír feelings, but must try to gain as wlde a clrcle of lísteners as posslble and influence them. Tben and only then shall RFE fulfill its missdon and oniy then American dollars shall not be thrown away uselessly. Today RFE beams lts broadcasts to Czechoslovakia eleven and onehalf bours daily. And even thougb two nat!ons - the Czechs and the Slovaks - live In Czecboslovakia, despite tbe fact tbat tbls reality is stressed even in the new Czecbo.!!lovak Constltutlon, even tbougb thls actuallty bas been acknowledged by the representatlves of the socalled "Czecboslovak resistance" wbo today are in tbe USA and ln other western countries, nevertheless RFE does not respect theae political realitles, or at least it does not do so consistently. At home tbe Czechs bave thelll' own Czech broadcastlng statlons and the Slovaks, too, bave 1ilielr own. That means tbat the Czecbs are accustomed to listenlng to tbelr Czech broadcasts, whlle the Slovaks listen to their Slovak statlons. These realltles are respected also by state broadCQSts, such as the Brltish Broadcasting Corporallion, th~ Itallan Sta'te Broadcast, tbe Vatlcan, Moscow, etc. Only American broadéastlng statlons - and the VOICE OF AMERICA and RADIO I•'REE EUROPE es,pec\ally - still insist on a joint Slovak and Czech broadcast. �40 S LOVAKIA The Slovaks at home and in exile are a,t a !oss t o understand why. 'l'his certaAnly does not enhance the misslon oí the Volce of A.merica o r that of Radio Free Europe. In fact it degmdes the idea of democ• racy in the eyes of the Slovaks and does not attain the deslr ed a nd ne• cessary effect. The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovak~, and the S lovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The Czec hs and Slovaks have been fully aware of this fact for decades, but offic ial Washington still is not. Why? The valiant reslstance of the Slovak nation agalnst communist terror, the hundreds of dead Slovak patiiots, t he thousands u pon thousands of impiisoned Slovaks and the love of the Slovak people for the United Sta.tes of Amerlca rlghtfully deserve that the Slovaks have their own Independent division in the American broadcastlng systems-especíally in the Volce of A.merica and Radlo Free Europe. Th ls demand does not emanate from any anti-Czech prejudice, but !rom purely prac• tlcal needs wlth an eye to t he objectlve that the broadcasts to Slovákia might fulfm their m ission. According to report.s of the !atest escapees from Slovakia and the opinion of Slovak exiles in western E urope, the RFE broadcas.ts are alien cto .the soul of the Slovak índividual, b ecause t he S lovak program:; ar e there only for show purposes; Slovak vo ices only assist in CZECH broa.dca.sts. Furthermore, these broadcasts do not even have regard for the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and clo not h ave people who enjoy lts confldence addresslng it. At present the Czechostovak broadcasts of Rimio Free Europe have been entrusted to repr esentatlves of Benes's politlcal conceptlons, to Messrs. Zenkl and llipka, leaders of .the Czech National Socialists. To make it appear that Slovaks, too, have a part In lt, Zenkl and Ripka seleoted a few Slovak politlcal unknowns and recommended them to R FE as "representa.t:lves o f the Slovak natlon." These enemies of Slovak freedom and independence, all traitors to the Slovak cause, who for a pr!ce propagate the dlscredited anti-Slovak and undemocratic poMcles of Benes, are not and cannot be acceptable to the Slovaks at horne or in exile. Why should exiled Czechs be a.llowed to -select the Slovaks to be employed by Radlo Free Europe, the instrument of the National Comanittee for Free E urope, W'hich 1s su pposed to be an American institution? The procedure is undemocratic and immoral and we must protest against lt. We want to be of service to the cause of freedom and the truth and that is why we feel it our mora! and politlcal duty ,to bring these matters before responsible American circles that are lncorrectly informed by "Czechoslovak" polltlclans, who prepared the pre,;ent tragedy for the Slov,ak and Czech nations by thelr capltulationary and pro-Sovi.et policy. As far as Slovakia !s concerned, we must once again stress the fact that the Czechoslovak polltical conception 1s not popular among the Slovak people and, therefore, no Idea presented In the name of thls conceptlon can catch the mlnds of the Slovaks. Even RFE canno t f,lght psychologlcally agalnst communlsm In Slovakia in the name of -thls conceptlon. Th e name of Masaryk, popular among Czechs, ls not popular at all In Slovakla and it canno t arouse the S\ovaks to figh t agalnst �SLOVAKIA 41 communlsm. Benes, whose name 1s rrequently mentioned ln the RFli: progra.ma by his adherents, 1s damned and condemned both in Bohemla and In Slovakia. The tact remalns that in Slovakia it 1s Chrlstlanity and Chrlstlan traditlon whlch gtves strength to the natlon !or lts self-consclou~ resls-tance to communist terror. Communlsm Ls not only polltically, but also ldeologlcally dangerous and, thererore, the foundatlon for the psychologlcal fight agaln.st communlsm must be Chrlstlanity and democra.cy. But the programs of RFE must expressively alS-O emphaslze this outune and not, as heretofore, at limes allow an antl-rellgious , antlChristlan, or even an evidently antl-Cathollc tendency t o be smugglod lnto lts broadcasts. Among bellevlng people fäls produces a pltlful bltterne.ss and antilpathy. So that •RFE could maintaln a s pirit of antl-commun lst resistan<:e even in Slovakfa, so that it could educate democratilcall y and preach and teach democracy to our oppressed natlon cut off by the Iron Curtaln trom the West, so that lt could objectlvely and wlthout prejudice Inform the Slovaks about what 1s happening In the world and generally wlth the ldeologtcal currents In the free world, lt is very necessary that thls be done In Independent Slovak broadcasts. lt 1s also necessary that as many S lovak representativ es ot Slovak reslstance In exile as posslble speak to the Slovak people so that RFl~ could lnfluence the wldest circle ot llsteners. It 1s not healthy to exclude trom tbe possibility or cooperatlon In this broadcast, whlch no ta bene carrles the name "The Broadcast of Free Europe," all Slovak patrlots just because thelr political convlctlons are not in accord wlth speciflc polltlcal cliques. As the sltuatlon In RFE obtalns today, tbls enterprlse has become the supply lnstitutlon of tbe rlslng generatlon or Czech soclallsts, many of whom even today are the detenders of Marxlst sociallsm and who up to 1948, nay even after 1948, collaborated wlth the communlst Prague regime. lt Ie a tact that the Slovaks today are llke a "clnderella" In tbe RFE, somethlng unwanted, something to be scorned. Only about 20 Slovaks are employed tor 140 Czechs; and In s ubordinate positlons. No Slovak ls employed In the management of tbe enterprlse. Czecb dlrectors declde about tbe Slovaks to be employed, and the Slovak program.s also are controlled by Czechs, who are not a cqualnted with Slovak prob lems, nor understand Slovak mentality, Any correctlon In thls relatio1111blp In a joint broadcast 1s slmply going t.arther aw-ay trom the reaJ questlon whlch can be resolved only by bavlng a separate Slovak broadcast managed by patrlotlc Slovak people. One more thought which must be hlghly stressed and that ls the thought whtch thls RFE b roadcast carries In lts tltle: FREE EUROPE. lndeed, what we regard as more lmportant and more necesaary In the lnterest ot the Slovak nation, and in the lnterest or Europe as a whole, 1s the propogatlon of <the Idea of a rree and unlted Europe. Tllls Idea must be propagated especlally by RFE already today so that !t mlght shlne as a llght lnto the future for all oppressed European natlons. That 1s the best way to lead European na.tlons to the consciousnee.e ot E uropean solidarity, to the Idea of a new, just and u nlted Enrope. B y stresslng tbl11 thought the beat service would be renderetl �SLOVA:KIA 42 the European nations themselves whlch were heretofore at Joggerheads because ot chauvinlstlc natlonalism, polltlcal fanatlctsms, syntheti,c politlcal partiitňons and the seclusion of one nation trom the other. A federalized united Europe ls the big hope especially ot the small naitlons. It is necessary, therefore, to resurrect a.nd encourage thts hope in them, because in a united Europe every natlon, small and large, shall be able to live freely and democracy shall become the common property of all natlons. RFE cannot effectJvely combat communism if lt does not respect the natural rights of the individual nations behind rthe Iron Curtain, lncluding the Slovak natlon. The crusade for treedom must include ALL nations and exclude NONE. RFE cannot fultill its mis• slon by allow~ng its broadcasts to insult the politlcal convictlons, the mentality, the pa,tríotic feelings and national tradltlons ot the Slovaks. The people of Slovakia cannot have confidence in the RFE as long as it employs renegade Slovaks to promote the Czech cause 01 Czechoslovakism, the bankrupt and dlscredited policies of the Czech National Sociallsts as propagated by Benes and his followers. The Slovaks are conscious or tbe !act that they are an lndlvidual naitlon and as such have an lnherent and God-given rlght to be free and independent. There is no Joglcal explanatlon for RFE or the Volce l•f America not recognizing or respecting that right. The anti-Slovak course of the RFE 1s out or line wlth everything that spells A.merica. Bu-t Slovaks stm hope tihat RFE shall In a very short tlme become in fact the TRUE volce of a free and united Europe, the volce of patriotic Slovaks in exile exhorting thelr brethren In Slovakla tú remain Joyal to thelr Chrlstian and democratic traditlons, - yes. RFE can and should become the VOICE OF FREE SLOVAKIA. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "Our rore1gn pollcy of 1946 wlll be based on Lhe solid, unalterable, masslve foundatlon of our agreement with the neighborlng SOVIE'ľ UNION. WE MUST fulflll fully, without besitation, everything resu1ting from tbis foundation . . . . Our relat!ons with the other nelghboNi will be acco1'11ng to the vlewpolnt of the SOVIET Pact. WE want a strong, democrat!c Poland WHICH WILL COLLABORATE 'WITH THE SOVIET UNION. For another solution of the POLJSH ques-tion, WE have no time. We want a decent, democratlc Hungary, C:OLLABORA TING WITH THE SOVIET UNION whlch lives In peace w!th us. The same applles to Yugoslav!a, Austria and Romanla. ou·r relatlons w!th the western Allles HAS NOT changed, and WILL NOT change. We are grateful to Brltaln for her help when she and WE stood alone. WE appreciate lmmensely and are ~rateful for Amerlcan interest and sympartby. We will need the help of the western democracies for economtc and cultural reconstructlon." - (Ján Masa• ryk. Broadcast to Czechoslovakla, London, December 31, 1944) . • "Just as Munic-h was undone and does not exist, just so there is no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem 1s onr Interna) problem an<I it !s recognlzed as such even by our allles." - (Dr. Benes, 6-22-43) . • � SLOVAKIA 39 RADIO FREE EUROPE BY A SLOVAK EXILE "Radio Free Europe" !s functionlng ln Munich slnce May 1, 1961. The enterprise in itself ís proof of wha.t Amerícans are capable of do• ing and the gligantic ftnancial sacrifkes they are wllling to make to show the enslaved natlons behind the Iron Curtain that they are not forsaken and 'that 'the western world ís not forgetting about tlhem. Indeed, thls !s admlrable of the Amerícan people who have contrlbuted so generously to make the project possible. lt is a big thing, indeed, íf we follow the present psychologlcal flght aga.inst communlsm and lf we regard things objectlvely from a broader world vlewpolnt. Radlo Free Europe aftords the !atest proof of the gratitude earned by Amerlcans for resistlng communism so vaľiantly, nay, for taking over the offensl.ve to defeat militarily and politlcally the communls-t effort and the endless cha.in of -Red lies. Without thls remarkwble resistance of the United States, communism would have the doors open to the whole world. Of course, the question of whether Radlo l<'ree Europe (RFE) i5 using .proper methods to fight communism, whether these methods sumce for polítical reality or whether they comply to the mentality of t'h . e natlons to which RFE turns w!th its broadcasts, can be se11lously quest!loned. We must say frank,l y that Americans stm do not !ully under$and the complexity of the various, special polltical and natlonal problems existlng in Europe. But for this we cannot _bla.me them alone, but aH the more can we blame their European advisors, w·ho frequently ~Ive them a "pa!nted" plcture of the sttuation. lf RFE !s to perform and fulfill its mission ln the countries behlnd t:he Iron Curtain, it must above all else respect certain natural reallties; lts broadcasts must respect the polit!cal mentality of the individual natíons. The broadcasts must not hurt theír feelings, but must try to gain as wlde a clrcle of lísteners as posslble and influence them. Tben and only then shall RFE fulfill its missdon and oniy then American dollars shall not be thrown away uselessly. Today RFE beams lts broadcasts to Czechoslovakia eleven and onehalf bours daily. And even thougb two nat!ons - the Czechs and the Slovaks - live In Czecboslovakia, despite tbe fact tbat tbls reality is stressed even in the new Czecbo.!!lovak Constltutlon, even tbougb thls actuallty bas been acknowledged by the representatlves of the socalled "Czecboslovak resistance" wbo today are in tbe USA and ln other western countries, nevertheless RFE does not respect theae political realitles, or at least it does not do so consistently. At home tbe Czechs bave thelll' own Czech broadcastlng statlons and the Slovaks, too, bave 1ilielr own. That means tbat the Czecbs are accustomed to listenlng to tbelr Czech broadcasts, whlle the Slovaks listen to their Slovak statlons. These realltles are respected also by state broadCQSts, such as the Brltish Broadcasting Corporallion, th~ Itallan Sta'te Broadcast, tbe Vatlcan, Moscow, etc. Only American broadéastlng statlons - and the VOICE OF AMERICA and RADIO I•'REE EUROPE es,pec\ally - still insist on a joint Slovak and Czech broadcast. �40 S LOVAKIA The Slovaks at home and in exile are a,t a !oss t o understand why. 'l'his certaAnly does not enhance the misslon oí the Volce of A.merica o r that of Radio Free Europe. In fact it degmdes the idea of democ• racy in the eyes of the Slovaks and does not attain the deslr ed a nd ne• cessary effect. The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovak~, and the S lovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The Czec hs and Slovaks have been fully aware of this fact for decades, but offic ial Washington still is not. Why? The valiant reslstance of the Slovak nation agalnst communist terror, the hundreds of dead Slovak patiiots, t he thousands u pon thousands of impiisoned Slovaks and the love of the Slovak people for the United Sta.tes of Amerlca rlghtfully deserve that the Slovaks have their own Independent division in the American broadcastlng systems-especíally in the Volce of A.merica and Radlo Free Europe. Th ls demand does not emanate from any anti-Czech prejudice, but !rom purely prac• tlcal needs wlth an eye to t he objectlve that the broadcasts to Slovákia might fulfm their m ission. According to report.s of the !atest escapees from Slovakia and the opinion of Slovak exiles in western E urope, the RFE broadcas.ts are alien cto .the soul of the Slovak índividual, b ecause t he S lovak program:; ar e there only for show purposes; Slovak vo ices only assist in CZECH broa.dca.sts. Furthermore, these broadcasts do not even have regard for the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and clo not h ave people who enjoy lts confldence addresslng it. At present the Czechostovak broadcasts of Rimio Free Europe have been entrusted to repr esentatlves of Benes's politlcal conceptlons, to Messrs. Zenkl and llipka, leaders of .the Czech National Socialists. To make it appear that Slovaks, too, have a part In lt, Zenkl and Ripka seleoted a few Slovak politlcal unknowns and recommended them to R FE as "representa.t:lves o f the Slovak natlon." These enemies of Slovak freedom and independence, all traitors to the Slovak cause, who for a pr!ce propagate the dlscredited anti-Slovak and undemocratic poMcles of Benes, are not and cannot be acceptable to the Slovaks at horne or in exile. Why should exiled Czechs be a.llowed to -select the Slovaks to be employed by Radlo Free Europe, the instrument of the National Comanittee for Free E urope, W'hich 1s su pposed to be an American institution? The procedure is undemocratic and immoral and we must protest against lt. We want to be of service to the cause of freedom and the truth and that is why we feel it our mora! and politlcal duty ,to bring these matters before responsible American circles that are lncorrectly informed by "Czechoslovak" polltlclans, who prepared the pre,;ent tragedy for the Slov,ak and Czech nations by thelr capltulationary and pro-Sovi.et policy. As far as Slovakia !s concerned, we must once again stress the fact that the Czechoslovak polltical conception 1s not popular among the Slovak people and, therefore, no Idea presented In the name of thls conceptlon can catch the mlnds of the Slovaks. Even RFE canno t f,lght psychologlcally agalnst communlsm In Slovakia in the name of -thls conceptlon. Th e name of Masaryk, popular among Czechs, ls not popular at all In Slovakla and it canno t arouse the S\ovaks to figh t agalnst �SLOVAKIA 41 communlsm. Benes, whose name 1s rrequently mentioned ln the RFli: progra.ma by his adherents, 1s damned and condemned both in Bohemla and In Slovakia. The tact remalns that in Slovakia it 1s Chrlstlanity and Chrlstlan traditlon whlch gtves strength to the natlon !or lts self-consclou~ resls-tance to communist terror. Communlsm Ls not only polltically, but also ldeologlcally dangerous and, thererore, the foundatlon for the psychologlcal fight agaln.st communlsm must be Chrlstlanity and democra.cy. But the programs of RFE must expressively alS-O emphaslze this outune and not, as heretofore, at limes allow an antl-rellgious , antlChristlan, or even an evidently antl-Cathollc tendency t o be smugglod lnto lts broadcasts. Among bellevlng people fäls produces a pltlful bltterne.ss and antilpathy. So that •RFE could maintaln a s pirit of antl-commun lst resistan<:e even in Slovakfa, so that it could educate democratilcall y and preach and teach democracy to our oppressed natlon cut off by the Iron Curtaln trom the West, so that lt could objectlvely and wlthout prejudice Inform the Slovaks about what 1s happening In the world and generally wlth the ldeologtcal currents In the free world, lt is very necessary that thls be done In Independent Slovak broadcasts. lt 1s also necessary that as many S lovak representativ es ot Slovak reslstance In exile as posslble speak to the Slovak people so that RFl~ could lnfluence the wldest circle ot llsteners. It 1s not healthy to exclude trom tbe possibility or cooperatlon In this broadcast, whlch no ta bene carrles the name "The Broadcast of Free Europe," all Slovak patrlots just because thelr political convlctlons are not in accord wlth speciflc polltlcal cliques. As the sltuatlon In RFE obtalns today, tbls enterprlse has become the supply lnstitutlon of tbe rlslng generatlon or Czech soclallsts, many of whom even today are the detenders of Marxlst sociallsm and who up to 1948, nay even after 1948, collaborated wlth the communlst Prague regime. lt Ie a tact that the Slovaks today are llke a "clnderella" In tbe RFE, somethlng unwanted, something to be scorned. Only about 20 Slovaks are employed tor 140 Czechs; and In s ubordinate positlons. No Slovak ls employed In the management of tbe enterprlse. Czecb dlrectors declde about tbe Slovaks to be employed, and the Slovak program.s also are controlled by Czechs, who are not a cqualnted with Slovak prob lems, nor understand Slovak mentality, Any correctlon In thls relatio1111blp In a joint broadcast 1s slmply going t.arther aw-ay trom the reaJ questlon whlch can be resolved only by bavlng a separate Slovak broadcast managed by patrlotlc Slovak people. One more thought which must be hlghly stressed and that ls the thought whtch thls RFE b roadcast carries In lts tltle: FREE EUROPE. lndeed, what we regard as more lmportant and more necesaary In the lnterest ot the Slovak nation, and in the lnterest or Europe as a whole, 1s the propogatlon of <the Idea of a rree and unlted Europe. Tllls Idea must be propagated especlally by RFE already today so that !t mlght shlne as a llght lnto the future for all oppressed European natlons. That 1s the best way to lead European na.tlons to the consciousnee.e ot E uropean solidarity, to the Idea of a new, just and u nlted Enrope. B y stresslng tbl11 thought the beat service would be renderetl �SLOVA:KIA 42 the European nations themselves whlch were heretofore at Joggerheads because ot chauvinlstlc natlonalism, polltlcal fanatlctsms, syntheti,c politlcal partiitňons and the seclusion of one nation trom the other. A federalized united Europe ls the big hope especially ot the small naitlons. It is necessary, therefore, to resurrect a.nd encourage thts hope in them, because in a united Europe every natlon, small and large, shall be able to live freely and democracy shall become the common property of all natlons. RFE cannot effectJvely combat communism if lt does not respect the natural rights of the individual nations behind rthe Iron Curtain, lncluding the Slovak natlon. The crusade for treedom must include ALL nations and exclude NONE. RFE cannot fultill its mis• slon by allow~ng its broadcasts to insult the politlcal convictlons, the mentality, the pa,tríotic feelings and national tradltlons ot the Slovaks. The people of Slovakia cannot have confidence in the RFE as long as it employs renegade Slovaks to promote the Czech cause 01 Czechoslovakism, the bankrupt and dlscredited policies of the Czech National Sociallsts as propagated by Benes and his followers. The Slovaks are conscious or tbe !act that they are an lndlvidual naitlon and as such have an lnherent and God-given rlght to be free and independent. There is no Joglcal explanatlon for RFE or the Volce l•f America not recognizing or respecting that right. The anti-Slovak course of the RFE 1s out or line wlth everything that spells A.merica. Bu-t Slovaks stm hope tihat RFE shall In a very short tlme become in fact the TRUE volce of a free and united Europe, the volce of patriotic Slovaks in exile exhorting thelr brethren In Slovakla tú remain Joyal to thelr Chrlstian and democratic traditlons, - yes. RFE can and should become the VOICE OF FREE SLOVAKIA. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "Our rore1gn pollcy of 1946 wlll be based on Lhe solid, unalterable, masslve foundatlon of our agreement with the neighborlng SOVIE'ľ UNION. WE MUST fulflll fully, without besitation, everything resu1ting from tbis foundation . . . . Our relat!ons with the other nelghboNi will be acco1'11ng to the vlewpolnt of the SOVIET Pact. WE want a strong, democrat!c Poland WHICH WILL COLLABORATE 'WITH THE SOVIET UNION. For another solution of the POLJSH ques-tion, WE have no time. We want a decent, democratlc Hungary, C:OLLABORA TING WITH THE SOVIET UNION whlch lives In peace w!th us. The same applles to Yugoslav!a, Austria and Romanla. ou·r relatlons w!th the western Allles HAS NOT changed, and WILL NOT change. We are grateful to Brltaln for her help when she and WE stood alone. WE appreciate lmmensely and are ~rateful for Amerlcan interest and sympartby. We will need the help of the western democracies for economtc and cultural reconstructlon." - (Ján Masa• ryk. Broadcast to Czechoslovakla, London, December 31, 1944) . • "Just as Munic-h was undone and does not exist, just so there is no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem 1s onr Interna) problem an<I it !s recognlzed as such even by our allles." - (Dr. Benes, 6-22-43) . • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 39 RADIO FREE EUROPE BY A SLOVAK EXILE "Radio Free Europe" !s functionlng ln Munich slnce May 1, 1961. The enterprise in itself ís proof of wha.t Amerícans are capable of do• ing and the gligantic ftnancial sacrifkes they are wllling to make to show the enslaved natlons behind the Iron Curtain that they are not forsaken and 'that 'the western world ís not forgetting about tlhem. Indeed, thls !s admlrable of the Amerícan people who have contrlbuted so generously to make the project possible. lt is a big thing, indeed, íf we follow the present psychologlcal flght aga.inst communlsm and lf we regard things objectlvely from a broader world vlewpolnt. Radlo Free Europe aftords the !atest proof of the gratitude earned by Amerlcans for resistlng communism so vaľiantly, nay, for taking over the offensl.ve to defeat militarily and politlcally the communls-t effort and the endless cha.in of -Red lies. Without thls remarkwble resistance of the United States, communism would have the doors open to the whole world. Of course, the question of whether Radlo l<'ree Europe (RFE) i5 using .proper methods to fight communism, whether these methods sumce for polítical reality or whether they comply to the mentality of t'h . e natlons to which RFE turns w!th its broadcasts, can be se11lously quest!loned. We must say frank,l y that Americans stm do not !ully under$and the complexity of the various, special polltical and natlonal problems existlng in Europe. But for this we cannot _bla.me them alone, but aH the more can we blame their European advisors, w·ho frequently ~Ive them a "pa!nted" plcture of the sttuation. lf RFE !s to perform and fulfill its mission ln the countries behlnd t:he Iron Curtain, it must above all else respect certain natural reallties; lts broadcasts must respect the polit!cal mentality of the individual natíons. The broadcasts must not hurt theír feelings, but must try to gain as wlde a clrcle of lísteners as posslble and influence them. Tben and only then shall RFE fulfill its missdon and oniy then American dollars shall not be thrown away uselessly. Today RFE beams lts broadcasts to Czechoslovakia eleven and onehalf bours daily. And even thougb two nat!ons - the Czechs and the Slovaks - live In Czecboslovakia, despite tbe fact tbat tbls reality is stressed even in the new Czecbo.!!lovak Constltutlon, even tbougb thls actuallty bas been acknowledged by the representatlves of the socalled "Czecboslovak resistance" wbo today are in tbe USA and ln other western countries, nevertheless RFE does not respect theae political realitles, or at least it does not do so consistently. At home tbe Czechs bave thelll' own Czech broadcastlng statlons and the Slovaks, too, bave 1ilielr own. That means tbat the Czecbs are accustomed to listenlng to tbelr Czech broadcasts, whlle the Slovaks listen to their Slovak statlons. These realltles are respected also by state broadCQSts, such as the Brltish Broadcasting Corporallion, th~ Itallan Sta'te Broadcast, tbe Vatlcan, Moscow, etc. Only American broadéastlng statlons - and the VOICE OF AMERICA and RADIO I•'REE EUROPE es,pec\ally - still insist on a joint Slovak and Czech broadcast. 40 S LOVAKIA The Slovaks at home and in exile are a,t a !oss t o understand why. 'l'his certaAnly does not enhance the misslon oí the Volce of A.merica o r that of Radio Free Europe. In fact it degmdes the idea of democ• racy in the eyes of the Slovaks and does not attain the deslr ed a nd ne• cessary effect. The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovak~, and the S lovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The Czec hs and Slovaks have been fully aware of this fact for decades, but offic ial Washington still is not. Why? The valiant reslstance of the Slovak nation agalnst communist terror, the hundreds of dead Slovak patiiots, t he thousands u pon thousands of impiisoned Slovaks and the love of the Slovak people for the United Sta.tes of Amerlca rlghtfully deserve that the Slovaks have their own Independent division in the American broadcastlng systems-especíally in the Volce of A.merica and Radlo Free Europe. Th ls demand does not emanate from any anti-Czech prejudice, but !rom purely prac• tlcal needs wlth an eye to t he objectlve that the broadcasts to Slovákia might fulfm their m ission. According to report.s of the !atest escapees from Slovakia and the opinion of Slovak exiles in western E urope, the RFE broadcas.ts are alien cto .the soul of the Slovak índividual, b ecause t he S lovak program:; ar e there only for show purposes; Slovak vo ices only assist in CZECH broa.dca.sts. Furthermore, these broadcasts do not even have regard for the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and clo not h ave people who enjoy lts confldence addresslng it. At present the Czechostovak broadcasts of Rimio Free Europe have been entrusted to repr esentatlves of Benes's politlcal conceptlons, to Messrs. Zenkl and llipka, leaders of .the Czech National Socialists. To make it appear that Slovaks, too, have a part In lt, Zenkl and Ripka seleoted a few Slovak politlcal unknowns and recommended them to R FE as "representa.t:lves o f the Slovak natlon." These enemies of Slovak freedom and independence, all traitors to the Slovak cause, who for a pr!ce propagate the dlscredited anti-Slovak and undemocratic poMcles of Benes, are not and cannot be acceptable to the Slovaks at horne or in exile. Why should exiled Czechs be a.llowed to -select the Slovaks to be employed by Radlo Free Europe, the instrument of the National Comanittee for Free E urope, W'hich 1s su pposed to be an American institution? The procedure is undemocratic and immoral and we must protest against lt. We want to be of service to the cause of freedom and the truth and that is why we feel it our mora! and politlcal duty ,to bring these matters before responsible American circles that are lncorrectly informed by "Czechoslovak" polltlclans, who prepared the pre,;ent tragedy for the Slov,ak and Czech nations by thelr capltulationary and pro-Sovi.et policy. As far as Slovakia !s concerned, we must once again stress the fact that the Czechoslovak polltical conception 1s not popular among the Slovak people and, therefore, no Idea presented In the name of thls conceptlon can catch the mlnds of the Slovaks. Even RFE canno t f,lght psychologlcally agalnst communlsm In Slovakia in the name of -thls conceptlon. Th e name of Masaryk, popular among Czechs, ls not popular at all In Slovakla and it canno t arouse the S\ovaks to figh t agalnst SLOVAKIA 41 communlsm. Benes, whose name 1s rrequently mentioned ln the RFli: progra.ma by his adherents, 1s damned and condemned both in Bohemla and In Slovakia. The tact remalns that in Slovakia it 1s Chrlstlanity and Chrlstlan traditlon whlch gtves strength to the natlon !or lts self-consclou~ resls-tance to communist terror. Communlsm Ls not only polltically, but also ldeologlcally dangerous and, thererore, the foundatlon for the psychologlcal fight agaln.st communlsm must be Chrlstlanity and democra.cy. But the programs of RFE must expressively alS-O emphaslze this outune and not, as heretofore, at limes allow an antl-rellgious , antlChristlan, or even an evidently antl-Cathollc tendency t o be smugglod lnto lts broadcasts. Among bellevlng people fäls produces a pltlful bltterne.ss and antilpathy. So that •RFE could maintaln a s pirit of antl-commun lst resistan<:e even in Slovakfa, so that it could educate democratilcall y and preach and teach democracy to our oppressed natlon cut off by the Iron Curtaln trom the West, so that lt could objectlvely and wlthout prejudice Inform the Slovaks about what 1s happening In the world and generally wlth the ldeologtcal currents In the free world, lt is very necessary that thls be done In Independent Slovak broadcasts. lt 1s also necessary that as many S lovak representativ es ot Slovak reslstance In exile as posslble speak to the Slovak people so that RFl~ could lnfluence the wldest circle ot llsteners. It 1s not healthy to exclude trom tbe possibility or cooperatlon In this broadcast, whlch no ta bene carrles the name "The Broadcast of Free Europe," all Slovak patrlots just because thelr political convlctlons are not in accord wlth speciflc polltlcal cliques. As the sltuatlon In RFE obtalns today, tbls enterprlse has become the supply lnstitutlon of tbe rlslng generatlon or Czech soclallsts, many of whom even today are the detenders of Marxlst sociallsm and who up to 1948, nay even after 1948, collaborated wlth the communlst Prague regime. lt Ie a tact that the Slovaks today are llke a "clnderella" In tbe RFE, somethlng unwanted, something to be scorned. Only about 20 Slovaks are employed tor 140 Czechs; and In s ubordinate positlons. No Slovak ls employed In the management of tbe enterprlse. Czecb dlrectors declde about tbe Slovaks to be employed, and the Slovak program.s also are controlled by Czechs, who are not a cqualnted with Slovak prob lems, nor understand Slovak mentality, Any correctlon In thls relatio1111blp In a joint broadcast 1s slmply going t.arther aw-ay trom the reaJ questlon whlch can be resolved only by bavlng a separate Slovak broadcast managed by patrlotlc Slovak people. One more thought which must be hlghly stressed and that ls the thought whtch thls RFE b roadcast carries In lts tltle: FREE EUROPE. lndeed, what we regard as more lmportant and more necesaary In the lnterest ot the Slovak nation, and in the lnterest or Europe as a whole, 1s the propogatlon of <the Idea of a rree and unlted Europe. Tllls Idea must be propagated especlally by RFE already today so that !t mlght shlne as a llght lnto the future for all oppressed European natlons. That 1s the best way to lead European na.tlons to the consciousnee.e ot E uropean solidarity, to the Idea of a new, just and u nlted Enrope. B y stresslng tbl11 thought the beat service would be renderetl SLOVA:KIA 42 the European nations themselves whlch were heretofore at Joggerheads because ot chauvinlstlc natlonalism, polltlcal fanatlctsms, syntheti,c politlcal partiitňons and the seclusion of one nation trom the other. A federalized united Europe ls the big hope especially ot the small naitlons. It is necessary, therefore, to resurrect a.nd encourage thts hope in them, because in a united Europe every natlon, small and large, shall be able to live freely and democracy shall become the common property of all natlons. RFE cannot effectJvely combat communism if lt does not respect the natural rights of the individual nations behind rthe Iron Curtain, lncluding the Slovak natlon. The crusade for treedom must include ALL nations and exclude NONE. RFE cannot fultill its mis• slon by allow~ng its broadcasts to insult the politlcal convictlons, the mentality, the pa,tríotic feelings and national tradltlons ot the Slovaks. The people of Slovakia cannot have confidence in the RFE as long as it employs renegade Slovaks to promote the Czech cause 01 Czechoslovakism, the bankrupt and dlscredited policies of the Czech National Sociallsts as propagated by Benes and his followers. The Slovaks are conscious or tbe !act that they are an lndlvidual naitlon and as such have an lnherent and God-given rlght to be free and independent. There is no Joglcal explanatlon for RFE or the Volce l•f America not recognizing or respecting that right. The anti-Slovak course of the RFE 1s out or line wlth everything that spells A.merica. Bu-t Slovaks stm hope tihat RFE shall In a very short tlme become in fact the TRUE volce of a free and united Europe, the volce of patriotic Slovaks in exile exhorting thelr brethren In Slovakla tú remain Joyal to thelr Chrlstian and democratic traditlons, - yes. RFE can and should become the VOICE OF FREE SLOVAKIA. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "Our rore1gn pollcy of 1946 wlll be based on Lhe solid, unalterable, masslve foundatlon of our agreement with the neighborlng SOVIE'ľ UNION. WE MUST fulflll fully, without besitation, everything resu1ting from tbis foundation . . . . Our relat!ons with the other nelghboNi will be acco1'11ng to the vlewpolnt of the SOVIET Pact. WE want a strong, democrat!c Poland WHICH WILL COLLABORATE 'WITH THE SOVIET UNION. For another solution of the POLJSH ques-tion, WE have no time. We want a decent, democratlc Hungary, C:OLLABORA TING WITH THE SOVIET UNION whlch lives In peace w!th us. The same applles to Yugoslav!a, Austria and Romanla. ou·r relatlons w!th the western Allles HAS NOT changed, and WILL NOT change. We are grateful to Brltaln for her help when she and WE stood alone. WE appreciate lmmensely and are ~rateful for Amerlcan interest and sympartby. We will need the help of the western democracies for economtc and cultural reconstructlon." - (Ján Masa• ryk. Broadcast to Czechoslovakla, London, December 31, 1944) . • "Just as Munic-h was undone and does not exist, just so there is no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem 1s onr Interna) problem an<I it !s recognlzed as such even by our allles." - (Dr. Benes, 6-22-43) . •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Radio Free Europe Description An account of the resource By A Slovak Exile Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 39-42 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6245d95fd753fdc339b150d063a36d38.pdf cf8b49fe89d9bb9a208f47c468cbdf5d PDF Text Text 38 SLOVAKIA w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late. • • • • A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES E. L. DELANEY Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks," was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. . But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd, mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava. Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry. Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary. It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years, he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•· cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin. But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col· Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our execut!ves and officdals. Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d. (REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los Angeles, Catif.) � 38 SLOVAKIA w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late. • • • • A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES E. L. DELANEY Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks," was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. . But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd, mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava. Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry. Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary. It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years, he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•· cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin. But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col· Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our execut!ves and officdals. Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d. (REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los Angeles, Catif.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 38 SLOVAKIA w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late. • • • • A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES E. L. DELANEY Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks," was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. . But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd, mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava. Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry. Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary. It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years, he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•· cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin. But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col· Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our execut!ves and officdals. Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d. (REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los Angeles, Catif.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Note on Tiso, Horthy and Beneš Description An account of the resource E. L. Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 p. 38 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/908f44da0194235f10ad22b09cb45e21.pdf 261c0cee0aaae307821756177eabdb83 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 35 OZEOH DOUBLE-DEALING PRINCE ADOLF ZU SCHWARZENBERG (This ls a reprint of the article published in the July, 1949, issue [Vo!. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22] of the "'New Englh1h Review Ma,ga,zine." The author heads one of the oldest familles in Bohemia and his ta.mily played an importa.n1 role in Bohemia's ootional life. The Prince is unquestionably qualitied to speak about th.e intrigues of Ma-saryk and Beneš and their undemocratic and un-Christlan pol!cies. This expo-sé ot Czech hypocrisy should be read by all Amerlcans. - Ed.) During and after the Flrst World War the ma.in feature in Bohemla's pollcy was a tendency to back both sides at the same Ume, more par,ticularly during rthe coutinuat!on of ho~tllitie-s. Bohemia. wa.s unt.11 1918 a part ot the Austro-Hungaria.n Monarchy, in whlch it formed a provlnce under Ha,bsburg rule and at the same Ume a. Kingdom, though enjoylng a very limrted a.utonomy; if !n<leed thl-s wa.s autonomy at all, for lt was by no mea.n-s self-government. On the whole, the Czechs, who are and always hav,e been the ma· Jority o! the inhabitants ot Bohemla and Mora.vla, d!spla.yed, even during the First World War, in dome-stlc a!fairs a fair!y loyal attttude towards the Governme.nt In Vienna., though cthere were some stgnlfican,t excepitlons. For ex,ample, the 28th Regiment of Infantry wa.s considered a.-s somewhat unrellable, and occa.slona.lly there were desertions to the enemy, which were more frequent tha.n in the other Czech regtments, yet at horne the Czechs stressed thelr absolute Joyalty to the Habsburg regimre and "'collabora.ted" wl!ling!y, more particular!y where their pockets were a.ffected. Neverthe!ess, while they aoted in th!s way within the black and yellow fľontier posts oť th,e Habsburg Monarchy, they had very ,a,bJe ageuts outside beyond the enemy Unes. In pru<ticular, there were T. G. Ma.sa.ryk, who acted as pros,pect!ve President or a future Czechoslovakian Republlc, Edward Beneš, and many others, who escaped beyond the front!ers and ~Ued down abroad where. wlth the help of the !uture victors, they set up a free autouomous provislonal government that was to come iruto e:,:istence after the defeat of the Centra! Powers. What, however, would have happened lf the Centra! Powet'S had emerged as vlctors? The answ,er ls more rthan slmple: Masaryk :ind Co. would have dlsappeared lnto oblivlon, and the Ozechs, who had stayed at ·home ,and had so marvelously pla.yed the rôle of loya.J subjects, would have proclalmed lnc-essa.ntly how fatth!ul they had alwaya been to the Ha.bsburgs and to the Monarchy, ha.vlng lost rthousands, or tens of thousands, of thelr best sons for the "Just Cause," and how enormous thelr contributlons to vlctory had been. Nevertheless, luck was not on the slde of the Centa! Powers. Iu consequence, from October 1918, onwards, the Czechs withln the Monarchy had to change qulckly to other tactlcs, transforming themselves llke chameleons, and they were forced to a-ppear as, tnnocent vlctims who had been p~rsecuted by ,t he bruta.l Habsburg regime. The same people who fran• tically roared "Hurmh" to greet the Emperor ~ e now not ashamed to utter calumnlou!l words agaki.st hlm. " Hallelujah" and "Cruclfy �36 SLOVAKIA Him" are so close to each other, but it would appeaľ that "Crucify Him" is much easier to shout. It must be admitted that ,the Czechs played this new ľôle with marvelous skill au<l admiľable flexibility. For Masaryk and hls col• leagues it was now easy enough to create a Czechoslova:kian Rep11hlic, hut to the very end Masaryk played a double galffie. When he was dealing with Framoe and the Unbled States he produced a pian for a Republic In Czechoslovakla, hut for Russia he put forward a Czech kingdom, leaving open the question whether a Romanoff or somebody e lse -should wear the crown of St. Wenceslaus, for so long as the Tsar reigned In Russia the word republic did not sound g,ood. lncidentally, Masaryk had promised lthe Slovaks autonomy as well as many other acceptable privlleges. but these never materialized and serious difficulties la,ter arose owlng to this. Thus, even when the Czechs were fightlng for indedimpence their double-dealing was proved. This particular characteristic has been up to the present yielded good results when it wa,s a question of dealing with the credulcu s. The situation is the same now, and it will always remain the same, so long as t-he victors •n a war in which Czechoslovakia is involved do noi invesligate thoroughly the kind of people wlt•h whom they ,"\.re dealing. lt is an old and very cheap trlck to play in wiU1 both sid-es in such great conflicts as the two World Wars, more particularly when the outcome is not at all clear, a.t least to the people most concerned. In the Secoud World War the situation was much the s11Jffie, and there was a distinct analogy with what happened in rt;s predecessor. From 1939 Ull'til 1946 Hacha functioned as President, first for the mu'til<ated second Czechoslovak Republic and then during the Nruzl occupation of the "Protectorate," therefore dlsplaying a fľiendly attitude, however invol11nta1;1y, towards the Hitler reglme. At the same time Benes and his associates set up in London a government with more or less open leanings to the left. If Hitler had won the war Hacba would have become tbe great man of the day. However, HiUer was def~ted, and Hacha, who had done his best to save bis country from tbe borrors of war, and had played this part not unsuccessfully, died i.n prison as au old and broken man, practically forgotten, while Beneš emerged as the great man of the future and as President of a reborn Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, Beneš did not long enjoy bis exalted position, for in Fellťllary 1948 the Communists, although a minority, seized power, a[ter .which Benes dlsappeaľed and Gotliwald became President. Even in normit,I times 1the double game of C1.ech policy caa be seen quite clearly. As long as Ozechos!ovak!a adopted the rôle ot dependence on the West, Beneš wa!< at the helm and from 1945 or.ward prepared the dellvery of his country to 'the Communists. All the mlnls,teľ'S in bis CaLinet (there were about two dozen of them) worked wlth their idolized Pres-ident, and In a most masterly f.ashion steered thelr country into Communtsm, always boping ror a good job as a re• ward for ťheir laudable work in the Bolshevist interest. Unfo11:u.nately for them, however, thing.s ,took a different turn, for although Bene~ put up a token-resista.nce for 11. rew days against 1tbe overthrow or democracy just to show a good face to the civilized world in the �SLOVAKIA 37 West, it was a comparatively easy task to belp Communist Gottwald lnto tbe Red saddle, thereby preventing a "civil war." From that fatal day In February 1948 it could no longer he doub'ted rt.hat Czechoslovakla was a Communlst country, leaning away from democracy and civill.zation, and progressing at full speed towards Red totalitarianlsm. wbich by now wa,s firmly ,secure as "a peopWs democracy" by force and terror. When the gove111men't, with its outward appearance of democracy, fell, Beneš and the member,s of his Oabin€-t had clearly accomplished thelr task as laid down by the Kremliu, and from then on they were no longer use,ful. Reallzing this they immediately "backed the other horse," each in his own way. Beneš res!gned, and Go'ttwald replaced him wlt.hout any diffioulty. All went smoothly, and Beneš did even more for Communlsm: he died. Some of tbe former m!nisters tried to escape across the frontier, but wel"e arrested; some, however, d!d reach the American zone in Bava.ria, where they started to play the part .of heroes and of defenders of democracy wbo had been forced to fly from tbe peraecutions of the Communlsts. Needless to say they behaved as lf they had always been ardent anti-Commu.nis'ts, here as in reality tbey helped Communlsm wherever they could so Jong as they were in office, and wlllingly or unwillingly pre-pared the overthrow of tlheir own regime. Thls they could have prevented with the help of 'trhe army, which had remalned Joyal, and with a little couragc, but courage is an unknown quality with the majorrty of the Czech nation. In the West, howeveľ, J.itt1e is known about these "heroes," or the rôle whlob they are playing In their endeavor to oover up their more tha.n doubtful past. At this 'J)Oint, it may be useful to draw a parallel with Nazl Ger• many. Any German one meets today will be sure to say that he bas always been opposed to the Naz!s, and will describe how much he has suffered a,t thelr hands, no matter whether he was In reality a Na.z! or not. Probably Hitler himself would say tbe same thing if he were still alive. It is the same in Italy where every It.allan ha~ been a partisan and fought against Mussolini, even lf he were in reality a Fascist. The same is the case wltb tlhe Czechs in e~ile. Take tbeir word for what lt. is wortb, but never believe tbem at first sight. It is well known that many Czechs had a very fine tíme under the Nazi occupation; they collabomted willingly and maide a lot of money. The rare exceptions only served to prove the rule. Durlng the Presidency or Beneš they wei,e more than ready to collaiborate with Moscow, but wben this became impossible they gathe!'t:d In London, wbence they have now mov.ed to Washilllgton, tľying to set up a government in exile and hoping to be at the helm wben adversity oveľ'tak8-'l Com• muni,sm. It is a game tbat has been played tíme and again, and the names of these emigres witb a doubtful pa'St make ,no difference; what makes a dlfčerence is whether or not they are 1·eliable. In attempting to answer this question lt can be safely stated that those wbo worked with and for Beneš until February 1948, wben Cze choslovakla'-s future became linked wltb Communlsm, are a 'Priori unreliable, wbereas those wbo were persecuted by Beneš and bis ,system and broke with it before Febuary 1948 are mostly reliable men who sbould be supportecl. It would be a great mlstake to trust emigres �38 SLOVAKIA w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late. • • • • A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES E. L. DELANEY Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks," was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. . But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd, mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava. Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry. Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary. It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years, he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•· cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin. But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col· Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our execut!ves and officdals. Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d. (REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los Angeles, Catif.) � SLOVAKIA 35 OZEOH DOUBLE-DEALING PRINCE ADOLF ZU SCHWARZENBERG (This ls a reprint of the article published in the July, 1949, issue [Vo!. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22] of the "'New Englh1h Review Ma,ga,zine." The author heads one of the oldest familles in Bohemia and his ta.mily played an importa.n1 role in Bohemia's ootional life. The Prince is unquestionably qualitied to speak about th.e intrigues of Ma-saryk and Beneš and their undemocratic and un-Christlan pol!cies. This expo-sé ot Czech hypocrisy should be read by all Amerlcans. - Ed.) During and after the Flrst World War the ma.in feature in Bohemla's pollcy was a tendency to back both sides at the same Ume, more par,ticularly during rthe coutinuat!on of ho~tllitie-s. Bohemia. wa.s unt.11 1918 a part ot the Austro-Hungaria.n Monarchy, in whlch it formed a provlnce under Ha,bsburg rule and at the same Ume a. Kingdom, though enjoylng a very limrted a.utonomy; if !n<leed thl-s wa.s autonomy at all, for lt was by no mea.n-s self-government. On the whole, the Czechs, who are and always hav,e been the ma· Jority o! the inhabitants ot Bohemla and Mora.vla, d!spla.yed, even during the First World War, in dome-stlc a!fairs a fair!y loyal attttude towards the Governme.nt In Vienna., though cthere were some stgnlfican,t excepitlons. For ex,ample, the 28th Regiment of Infantry wa.s considered a.-s somewhat unrellable, and occa.slona.lly there were desertions to the enemy, which were more frequent tha.n in the other Czech regtments, yet at horne the Czechs stressed thelr absolute Joyalty to the Habsburg regimre and "'collabora.ted" wl!ling!y, more particular!y where their pockets were a.ffected. Neverthe!ess, while they aoted in th!s way within the black and yellow fľontier posts oť th,e Habsburg Monarchy, they had very ,a,bJe ageuts outside beyond the enemy Unes. In pru<ticular, there were T. G. Ma.sa.ryk, who acted as pros,pect!ve President or a future Czechoslovakian Republlc, Edward Beneš, and many others, who escaped beyond the front!ers and ~Ued down abroad where. wlth the help of the !uture victors, they set up a free autouomous provislonal government that was to come iruto e:,:istence after the defeat of the Centra! Powers. What, however, would have happened lf the Centra! Powet'S had emerged as vlctors? The answ,er ls more rthan slmple: Masaryk :ind Co. would have dlsappeared lnto oblivlon, and the Ozechs, who had stayed at ·home ,and had so marvelously pla.yed the rôle of loya.J subjects, would have proclalmed lnc-essa.ntly how fatth!ul they had alwaya been to the Ha.bsburgs and to the Monarchy, ha.vlng lost rthousands, or tens of thousands, of thelr best sons for the "Just Cause," and how enormous thelr contributlons to vlctory had been. Nevertheless, luck was not on the slde of the Centa! Powers. Iu consequence, from October 1918, onwards, the Czechs withln the Monarchy had to change qulckly to other tactlcs, transforming themselves llke chameleons, and they were forced to a-ppear as, tnnocent vlctims who had been p~rsecuted by ,t he bruta.l Habsburg regime. The same people who fran• tically roared "Hurmh" to greet the Emperor ~ e now not ashamed to utter calumnlou!l words agaki.st hlm. " Hallelujah" and "Cruclfy �36 SLOVAKIA Him" are so close to each other, but it would appeaľ that "Crucify Him" is much easier to shout. It must be admitted that ,the Czechs played this new ľôle with marvelous skill au<l admiľable flexibility. For Masaryk and hls col• leagues it was now easy enough to create a Czechoslova:kian Rep11hlic, hut to the very end Masaryk played a double galffie. When he was dealing with Framoe and the Unbled States he produced a pian for a Republic In Czechoslovakla, hut for Russia he put forward a Czech kingdom, leaving open the question whether a Romanoff or somebody e lse -should wear the crown of St. Wenceslaus, for so long as the Tsar reigned In Russia the word republic did not sound g,ood. lncidentally, Masaryk had promised lthe Slovaks autonomy as well as many other acceptable privlleges. but these never materialized and serious difficulties la,ter arose owlng to this. Thus, even when the Czechs were fightlng for indedimpence their double-dealing was proved. This particular characteristic has been up to the present yielded good results when it wa,s a question of dealing with the credulcu s. The situation is the same now, and it will always remain the same, so long as t-he victors •n a war in which Czechoslovakia is involved do noi invesligate thoroughly the kind of people wlt•h whom they ,"\.re dealing. lt is an old and very cheap trlck to play in wiU1 both sid-es in such great conflicts as the two World Wars, more particularly when the outcome is not at all clear, a.t least to the people most concerned. In the Secoud World War the situation was much the s11Jffie, and there was a distinct analogy with what happened in rt;s predecessor. From 1939 Ull'til 1946 Hacha functioned as President, first for the mu'til<ated second Czechoslovak Republic and then during the Nruzl occupation of the "Protectorate," therefore dlsplaying a fľiendly attitude, however invol11nta1;1y, towards the Hitler reglme. At the same time Benes and his associates set up in London a government with more or less open leanings to the left. If Hitler had won the war Hacba would have become tbe great man of the day. However, HiUer was def~ted, and Hacha, who had done his best to save bis country from tbe borrors of war, and had played this part not unsuccessfully, died i.n prison as au old and broken man, practically forgotten, while Beneš emerged as the great man of the future and as President of a reborn Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, Beneš did not long enjoy bis exalted position, for in Fellťllary 1948 the Communists, although a minority, seized power, a[ter .which Benes dlsappeaľed and Gotliwald became President. Even in normit,I times 1the double game of C1.ech policy caa be seen quite clearly. As long as Ozechos!ovak!a adopted the rôle ot dependence on the West, Beneš wa!< at the helm and from 1945 or.ward prepared the dellvery of his country to 'the Communists. All the mlnls,teľ'S in bis CaLinet (there were about two dozen of them) worked wlth their idolized Pres-ident, and In a most masterly f.ashion steered thelr country into Communtsm, always boping ror a good job as a re• ward for ťheir laudable work in the Bolshevist interest. Unfo11:u.nately for them, however, thing.s ,took a different turn, for although Bene~ put up a token-resista.nce for 11. rew days against 1tbe overthrow or democracy just to show a good face to the civilized world in the �SLOVAKIA 37 West, it was a comparatively easy task to belp Communist Gottwald lnto tbe Red saddle, thereby preventing a "civil war." From that fatal day In February 1948 it could no longer he doub'ted rt.hat Czechoslovakla was a Communlst country, leaning away from democracy and civill.zation, and progressing at full speed towards Red totalitarianlsm. wbich by now wa,s firmly ,secure as "a peopWs democracy" by force and terror. When the gove111men't, with its outward appearance of democracy, fell, Beneš and the member,s of his Oabin€-t had clearly accomplished thelr task as laid down by the Kremliu, and from then on they were no longer use,ful. Reallzing this they immediately "backed the other horse," each in his own way. Beneš res!gned, and Go'ttwald replaced him wlt.hout any diffioulty. All went smoothly, and Beneš did even more for Communlsm: he died. Some of tbe former m!nisters tried to escape across the frontier, but wel"e arrested; some, however, d!d reach the American zone in Bava.ria, where they started to play the part .of heroes and of defenders of democracy wbo had been forced to fly from tbe peraecutions of the Communlsts. Needless to say they behaved as lf they had always been ardent anti-Commu.nis'ts, here as in reality tbey helped Communlsm wherever they could so Jong as they were in office, and wlllingly or unwillingly pre-pared the overthrow of tlheir own regime. Thls they could have prevented with the help of 'trhe army, which had remalned Joyal, and with a little couragc, but courage is an unknown quality with the majorrty of the Czech nation. In the West, howeveľ, J.itt1e is known about these "heroes," or the rôle whlob they are playing In their endeavor to oover up their more tha.n doubtful past. At this 'J)Oint, it may be useful to draw a parallel with Nazl Ger• many. Any German one meets today will be sure to say that he bas always been opposed to the Naz!s, and will describe how much he has suffered a,t thelr hands, no matter whether he was In reality a Na.z! or not. Probably Hitler himself would say tbe same thing if he were still alive. It is the same in Italy where every It.allan ha~ been a partisan and fought against Mussolini, even lf he were in reality a Fascist. The same is the case wltb tlhe Czechs in e~ile. Take tbeir word for what lt. is wortb, but never believe tbem at first sight. It is well known that many Czechs had a very fine tíme under the Nazi occupation; they collabomted willingly and maide a lot of money. The rare exceptions only served to prove the rule. Durlng the Presidency or Beneš they wei,e more than ready to collaiborate with Moscow, but wben this became impossible they gathe!'t:d In London, wbence they have now mov.ed to Washilllgton, tľying to set up a government in exile and hoping to be at the helm wben adversity oveľ'tak8-'l Com• muni,sm. It is a game tbat has been played tíme and again, and the names of these emigres witb a doubtful pa'St make ,no difference; what makes a dlfčerence is whether or not they are 1·eliable. In attempting to answer this question lt can be safely stated that those wbo worked with and for Beneš until February 1948, wben Cze choslovakla'-s future became linked wltb Communlsm, are a 'Priori unreliable, wbereas those wbo were persecuted by Beneš and bis ,system and broke with it before Febuary 1948 are mostly reliable men who sbould be supportecl. It would be a great mlstake to trust emigres �38 SLOVAKIA w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late. • • • • A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES E. L. DELANEY Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks," was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. . But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd, mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava. Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry. Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary. It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years, he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•· cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin. But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col· Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our execut!ves and officdals. Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d. (REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los Angeles, Catif.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 35 OZEOH DOUBLE-DEALING PRINCE ADOLF ZU SCHWARZENBERG (This ls a reprint of the article published in the July, 1949, issue [Vo!. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22] of the "'New Englh1h Review Ma,ga,zine." The author heads one of the oldest familles in Bohemia and his ta.mily played an importa.n1 role in Bohemia's ootional life. The Prince is unquestionably qualitied to speak about th.e intrigues of Ma-saryk and Beneš and their undemocratic and un-Christlan pol!cies. This expo-sé ot Czech hypocrisy should be read by all Amerlcans. - Ed.) During and after the Flrst World War the ma.in feature in Bohemla's pollcy was a tendency to back both sides at the same Ume, more par,ticularly during rthe coutinuat!on of ho~tllitie-s. Bohemia. wa.s unt.11 1918 a part ot the Austro-Hungaria.n Monarchy, in whlch it formed a provlnce under Ha,bsburg rule and at the same Ume a. Kingdom, though enjoylng a very limrted a.utonomy; if !n<leed thl-s wa.s autonomy at all, for lt was by no mea.n-s self-government. On the whole, the Czechs, who are and always hav,e been the ma· Jority o! the inhabitants ot Bohemla and Mora.vla, d!spla.yed, even during the First World War, in dome-stlc a!fairs a fair!y loyal attttude towards the Governme.nt In Vienna., though cthere were some stgnlfican,t excepitlons. For ex,ample, the 28th Regiment of Infantry wa.s considered a.-s somewhat unrellable, and occa.slona.lly there were desertions to the enemy, which were more frequent tha.n in the other Czech regtments, yet at horne the Czechs stressed thelr absolute Joyalty to the Habsburg regimre and "'collabora.ted" wl!ling!y, more particular!y where their pockets were a.ffected. Neverthe!ess, while they aoted in th!s way within the black and yellow fľontier posts oť th,e Habsburg Monarchy, they had very ,a,bJe ageuts outside beyond the enemy Unes. In pru<ticular, there were T. G. Ma.sa.ryk, who acted as pros,pect!ve President or a future Czechoslovakian Republlc, Edward Beneš, and many others, who escaped beyond the front!ers and ~Ued down abroad where. wlth the help of the !uture victors, they set up a free autouomous provislonal government that was to come iruto e:,:istence after the defeat of the Centra! Powers. What, however, would have happened lf the Centra! Powet'S had emerged as vlctors? The answ,er ls more rthan slmple: Masaryk :ind Co. would have dlsappeared lnto oblivlon, and the Ozechs, who had stayed at ·home ,and had so marvelously pla.yed the rôle of loya.J subjects, would have proclalmed lnc-essa.ntly how fatth!ul they had alwaya been to the Ha.bsburgs and to the Monarchy, ha.vlng lost rthousands, or tens of thousands, of thelr best sons for the "Just Cause," and how enormous thelr contributlons to vlctory had been. Nevertheless, luck was not on the slde of the Centa! Powers. Iu consequence, from October 1918, onwards, the Czechs withln the Monarchy had to change qulckly to other tactlcs, transforming themselves llke chameleons, and they were forced to a-ppear as, tnnocent vlctims who had been p~rsecuted by ,t he bruta.l Habsburg regime. The same people who fran• tically roared "Hurmh" to greet the Emperor ~ e now not ashamed to utter calumnlou!l words agaki.st hlm. " Hallelujah" and "Cruclfy 36 SLOVAKIA Him" are so close to each other, but it would appeaľ that "Crucify Him" is much easier to shout. It must be admitted that ,the Czechs played this new ľôle with marvelous skill au<l admiľable flexibility. For Masaryk and hls col• leagues it was now easy enough to create a Czechoslova:kian Rep11hlic, hut to the very end Masaryk played a double galffie. When he was dealing with Framoe and the Unbled States he produced a pian for a Republic In Czechoslovakla, hut for Russia he put forward a Czech kingdom, leaving open the question whether a Romanoff or somebody e lse -should wear the crown of St. Wenceslaus, for so long as the Tsar reigned In Russia the word republic did not sound g,ood. lncidentally, Masaryk had promised lthe Slovaks autonomy as well as many other acceptable privlleges. but these never materialized and serious difficulties la,ter arose owlng to this. Thus, even when the Czechs were fightlng for indedimpence their double-dealing was proved. This particular characteristic has been up to the present yielded good results when it wa,s a question of dealing with the credulcu s. The situation is the same now, and it will always remain the same, so long as t-he victors •n a war in which Czechoslovakia is involved do noi invesligate thoroughly the kind of people wlt•h whom they ,"\.re dealing. lt is an old and very cheap trlck to play in wiU1 both sid-es in such great conflicts as the two World Wars, more particularly when the outcome is not at all clear, a.t least to the people most concerned. In the Secoud World War the situation was much the s11Jffie, and there was a distinct analogy with what happened in rt;s predecessor. From 1939 Ull'til 1946 Hacha functioned as President, first for the mu'til<ated second Czechoslovak Republic and then during the Nruzl occupation of the "Protectorate," therefore dlsplaying a fľiendly attitude, however invol11nta1;1y, towards the Hitler reglme. At the same time Benes and his associates set up in London a government with more or less open leanings to the left. If Hitler had won the war Hacba would have become tbe great man of the day. However, HiUer was def~ted, and Hacha, who had done his best to save bis country from tbe borrors of war, and had played this part not unsuccessfully, died i.n prison as au old and broken man, practically forgotten, while Beneš emerged as the great man of the future and as President of a reborn Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, Beneš did not long enjoy bis exalted position, for in Fellťllary 1948 the Communists, although a minority, seized power, a[ter .which Benes dlsappeaľed and Gotliwald became President. Even in normit,I times 1the double game of C1.ech policy caa be seen quite clearly. As long as Ozechos!ovak!a adopted the rôle ot dependence on the West, Beneš wa!< at the helm and from 1945 or.ward prepared the dellvery of his country to 'the Communists. All the mlnls,teľ'S in bis CaLinet (there were about two dozen of them) worked wlth their idolized Pres-ident, and In a most masterly f.ashion steered thelr country into Communtsm, always boping ror a good job as a re• ward for ťheir laudable work in the Bolshevist interest. Unfo11:u.nately for them, however, thing.s ,took a different turn, for although Bene~ put up a token-resista.nce for 11. rew days against 1tbe overthrow or democracy just to show a good face to the civilized world in the SLOVAKIA 37 West, it was a comparatively easy task to belp Communist Gottwald lnto tbe Red saddle, thereby preventing a "civil war." From that fatal day In February 1948 it could no longer he doub'ted rt.hat Czechoslovakla was a Communlst country, leaning away from democracy and civill.zation, and progressing at full speed towards Red totalitarianlsm. wbich by now wa,s firmly ,secure as "a peopWs democracy" by force and terror. When the gove111men't, with its outward appearance of democracy, fell, Beneš and the member,s of his Oabin€-t had clearly accomplished thelr task as laid down by the Kremliu, and from then on they were no longer use,ful. Reallzing this they immediately "backed the other horse," each in his own way. Beneš res!gned, and Go'ttwald replaced him wlt.hout any diffioulty. All went smoothly, and Beneš did even more for Communlsm: he died. Some of tbe former m!nisters tried to escape across the frontier, but wel"e arrested; some, however, d!d reach the American zone in Bava.ria, where they started to play the part .of heroes and of defenders of democracy wbo had been forced to fly from tbe peraecutions of the Communlsts. Needless to say they behaved as lf they had always been ardent anti-Commu.nis'ts, here as in reality tbey helped Communlsm wherever they could so Jong as they were in office, and wlllingly or unwillingly pre-pared the overthrow of tlheir own regime. Thls they could have prevented with the help of 'trhe army, which had remalned Joyal, and with a little couragc, but courage is an unknown quality with the majorrty of the Czech nation. In the West, howeveľ, J.itt1e is known about these "heroes," or the rôle whlob they are playing In their endeavor to oover up their more tha.n doubtful past. At this 'J)Oint, it may be useful to draw a parallel with Nazl Ger• many. Any German one meets today will be sure to say that he bas always been opposed to the Naz!s, and will describe how much he has suffered a,t thelr hands, no matter whether he was In reality a Na.z! or not. Probably Hitler himself would say tbe same thing if he were still alive. It is the same in Italy where every It.allan ha~ been a partisan and fought against Mussolini, even lf he were in reality a Fascist. The same is the case wltb tlhe Czechs in e~ile. Take tbeir word for what lt. is wortb, but never believe tbem at first sight. It is well known that many Czechs had a very fine tíme under the Nazi occupation; they collabomted willingly and maide a lot of money. The rare exceptions only served to prove the rule. Durlng the Presidency or Beneš they wei,e more than ready to collaiborate with Moscow, but wben this became impossible they gathe!'t:d In London, wbence they have now mov.ed to Washilllgton, tľying to set up a government in exile and hoping to be at the helm wben adversity oveľ'tak8-'l Com• muni,sm. It is a game tbat has been played tíme and again, and the names of these emigres witb a doubtful pa'St make ,no difference; what makes a dlfčerence is whether or not they are 1·eliable. In attempting to answer this question lt can be safely stated that those wbo worked with and for Beneš until February 1948, wben Cze choslovakla'-s future became linked wltb Communlsm, are a 'Priori unreliable, wbereas those wbo were persecuted by Beneš and bis ,system and broke with it before Febuary 1948 are mostly reliable men who sbould be supportecl. It would be a great mlstake to trust emigres 38 SLOVAKIA w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late. • • • • A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES E. L. DELANEY Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks," was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. . But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd, mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava. Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry. Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary. It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years, he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•· cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin. But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col· Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our execut!ves and officdals. Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d. (REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los Angeles, Catif.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czech Double-Dealing Description An account of the resource Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 35-38 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Schwarzenberg, Adolf, 1890-1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7244682d680670ec4c562ef840bbef03.pdf a7ccb8b62904ee62106e826f79d899c1 PDF Text Text SLOVAKlA 31 THE WlllTE LEGION OF SLOVAKIA B Y: ANO NYMOU S There is a strong, anti-oommunlst reslstance in Slovakia, the eastern porUon of the 111-!ated Czecho-Slovaki-a. The movement is ,;pea11headed by the WHITE LEGION (BIELA LEGIA) which has been menrtioned i,n the AlmerLcan press from time to time. Liťtle is knowu ahout M.s compOSiltlon and its leaders, hut there ls no doubt ahout the fact that the Wh1te Leglon 1s very effective in its work of opposlng the Red stooges ot ithe Kremlln and preparing Slovakia for the d,a y of liheraition from the pla,gue of cornmunisro. I know hecause I am directly connec.ted wi:ilth lt. The Whlte Legion has heen carefully organ.ized and has existP.d for .some tlme. ]t !s feared by 4he Red regime of Prague, and its members are the most hunted men in Slovakia. Golt.twia.ld - S,talln's man "Fl'iday" in Czecho,Slovalda - and Ibis red stooges In Sloviakla know that the Whd.te Legion has quite a following, bec-ause 1t seems to know everyl'thlng thaJt is happening or even going to h appen Iu Slovakla and her nelghbors. That is why purges are frequent in Slov ak'la and pri.som; ,an(I concerutration camps ftlled to capacity. ]jut the work of the White Legjon goes on . . The White Legion hroadcas'ts from its hidlng place every Saturday and Sunday. To get a true plcture of llhe effects of tts hroadcast.s, especlally In Slovakia, one would have to visi-t some communist fa,mlly durdng one of thes e bTOadcais.ts and observe its reactions. The faces of the 11steners grow teruie and pale and seem to ask the questlon: '·Do they also know a,bout me? wm they reveal something about mc, too?" About the middle of lasit December, the White Leg!on broadcast poin,ted out thart Cp'l. Francls Gasparik of Žilina was a communlsit, a dangerous dndivldual and !Illforaner, and exhorted lts llsteners to be on guard. Up to that tlm e Gasparlk was quite cocky and imperlous, hut atlter the broa.doast •b ecame sullen and downcast; he was completely b roken. Ga,s,pardk remained home for a week, felgning illness, and llhen asked to b e tran.s.fe.i,red from Žilína. The Whlte Legjon was lnform ed by one of Gasparik's "frlends" that he had revealed resigned-Iy: "Now I k:now ľm a goner!" 'I\he White Leg·i on has proved to the commurústs that their par• tlsan appara.tus is not as perfect as they thought lit to he and that their activitles a.re not as secret as t-hey had wished them to he. The White Legion poses ca serlous prohlem to the Communi-st Party, hecause lt knows of the disasitrous effeots lt has on lts memhers. The Reds, of course, have ralsed a hue and a cry to securtty officials to llquldaite the Wihllte Leg'ion. Red offlclals and memhers ask qutzicatly why ithe White Leglon has not as yet heen uncovered and Ji. quldated? Seoorlty ofticlals ialways have the same answer: we are on the trail of the 'trailtors and lhope to make arrests soon. But the underground work ot the Wihiite Leglon goes on. · Last December several leadlng communls-ts of Prešov were arre&ted. This was the b eginilllng of the purge in connectrion w1 th th e so~alled Clemenitls ''deviMlonls,t" affair. It so happened that the �32 SLOVAKIA Whtte Legion r1adio beca.me sileni about the same tlme and rema.ined silent for a month. Was Clementis secretly associated witb the White Legion? Of course not, and <t.he communists knew he was not, but they had •to make hay. The people of Slovakia were iense and curfous; they gathered secretly about their receivers and listened for some sign of the Wrute Legion broadcasts. But the voice of 1Jbe Whiie Legion remained sllen,t. Coonmunist commissars were ex· tremely nervous. As the days passed, the communi11ts regaáned a measure of composure and told the Slovaks that tlhe White Legion had been líquidated. Preparations were in order to celebrate the apprehension and 1iquidation of rthe "traltors" In al! ,t he larger towns. Then, on the second Sunday of February, 1951, like a bolt out of t he clear, blue sky, the Wh~te Legion again began beaming its broadéas.ts. "The WMte Legion is broadcasting again and you can he-ar it bel!ter than ever" spread ex<:!tedly from person to person ihroughout Slovakla. 'rule stooges of Gottwald and Stalin had to postpone their fes.ti~tles: the White Legion was stm much alive! The inmates of the ooncentration camp at Novaky got the news of the White Legion broadcast that very Sunday evening and patriotic Slovak songs were sung deep into the n•i ght. All thanked God that the White Legion leaders were not captured as they had aJ. ready feared they had been. 'Dhe General Secretariate of the Communist Party in Slovakia meets frequeDJtly In the striotest secrecy. One of t he maln themes dijscussed 1s the Whlte Legion. With rare sincerity the communlsts themselves have admitted that tlhe influence of the Whňe Legion and lis broadca&ts ls much greaiter fäa,n they had supposed it to be. Because of it, the reliabillty o.f •the security organs in Slovakfa is constantly questioned and shake-ups are frequent. It seem.s that even the leadlng •Reds do not know who 1s trustwo11thy; everybody seems io be susplcious of everybody else and Ibis brother. Dlrectlves given by •t he White Legion are simple and clear. The people of Slovakia have been thoroughly instructed by the Legion broadcasts how -to protect themselves agalnst snares of ,the hated Secret Police. The Slovaks know the methods used by the Red secret agents; they know how to act, whrut to do and what to say in any particular case involváng the security police. They are patiently bldlng their tlme and avoiding as much open hostility as poss ible to prevent useless shedding or blood, but they vow that "our tíme shall come!" The lnfluen,ce of the White Legion is tremendously sign1flcant. Its services have saved hundreds of Slovaks from lncarcer-a.tion and persecuUon. 'I'he WhHe Legion flghits against Red tyranny without itself re.sorting to ,terror. The ranks of aotlve anti-communists in Slovakia are lncreasing steadily and t'he Reds there are displaying a grea.ter amdety about their future in the !and of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Apostles. The methods employed by the Whlte Legion have been quŕte successful. The White Legion ls teachlng the people of Slovakda to help and protec,t them selv01! and thus to defend human ri~ts against communis.tic terror of the regime. In Slovakia it has been definitely shown that the popuJ.ation, lf counseled properly, 1s capable of resisting its oppre.ssors even for a longer Ume. �SLOVAKIA 33 Credit must also be given 1the White Legion that the border guards are not performi-ng their duties very conscientiously. This allows a greater percentage of escapees to make its way to the free West. Of course, the communlsrts are aware of this and, consquently, frontitir guards are ohanged more frequerutly and checked more closely. But Slovaks, especially many of those tagged by the communists, still make their way to the West. Naturally the Whlte Legtion is ",taboo" in Slovakia. Its name must not be mentioned in public under penalty of imprisonmerut or worse. To minlmize 4he effectiveness of the White Legion, newspapers and radlo broadcasts - all government controlled - are forbidden to mention t!he name of the White Legion or its activities. One of the chief occupwtions of the Secret Police in Czecho-Slovakla i.s to track down the Wihilte Legäon. Great efforts have been expended to trace its transmitter, blrt to no avall. Slovakia is replete with legends about the movements of the Wblite Legion in the mountalns of Slovakia. Secret Police following -these leads have been known to disappear without a trace. As far as the Red bosses of Slovakia are concerned, the Whi,te Legion is no longer a nuisance, but a real menace to the securl.ty of the Red regime, which they term the "State." The view prevails even in high communisit circles thait army officia!ls and securJty agents are in some way connected with the While Legion, otherwtise - ii !s asked - how would it be possiible for the W•h lte Legion to carry on its "subversive" actlvities for such a long Ume wjthout being uncovered? From time to time the White Legion transmi,tter becomes sdlent. That, too, ls quíte understandable. It would be folly to carry on when danger threatens or when condi· tions are not jUS't right for the Legion's functions. The Reds in Slovak.ia have jammed Whi-te Legion broadcasts. At flrs,t their jammlng was not S'trong enough to cause too much difflculty, but slnce March of this year they have been more successful in preventing the White Legion broadcasts from being heard clearly. The White Legion has counteracted this measure by changing the wave-leng,th of its broadcasts frequently; before the Reds can change over to the proper w1ave-length, the W·hirt.e Legion is usually through witlh iJts most important repor-ts and directives. I have been informed tha4 the Wh'ite Legion is now coulllteracting the Red jammlng process by more eMectlive means. We must remember that the Reds in Slovakia have ithe modern appa.ratus of the State at their disposal. while the Whlte Legion has only whait it can get hold of on the black market. The duel between the broadca sts of the White Legion and the Red reglme of Czecho-Slovakla is quite interesting. I listened to the Whi,te Legion's; broadcasts recenUy and can honestiy say that the White Legion is winning its battle against the Red jammers of Prague and Bratislava. The Wihite Legion ls in existence for almost two years and has grown dear to the hearts of the Slovaks, who pray and hope for a hasiened liberatíon day. The White Legion has become a symbol of hope and courage to the Slovak people. The White Legion keeps lln telling the people of Slovakia thM the Reds and their stooges can be, must be, and wlll be driven out of thelr Iand, lf they are on the alert and follow t he directives of the Legion broadcasts. The White Le- �34 SLOVA.KlA gion has returned self-.confildence to the people; they feel that Red oppression can,not la,st long and are determined to be rea.dy for cthe grea,t drive on the Red tyrants when the opportune tlme presents itsell. The Wh1te Legion has taken hold of old and young allke and has influenced communists as well as non-communists. In the latter it strengthens the falth that their ens-lavement by the Reds shall not la.st long, wh.lle the fot•mer it divests of courage and underm1nes their faith in their own strength and their belief in victory. The White Legion has a.cco.mplished this revolution in the thlnldng of the Slovak.s in a smooth, peaceful wiay. To help those who are In immediate danger is considered llhe rurst civic duty oť all me.mbers of the White Leglon. The White Legion urges the Slovaks to persevere in their resistance to godless communlmn, to unite in the flght agains,t communtsm and in the defense of human rJghts and freedom. The program.s of tb.e White Legion are not chauvinistic; they fully realize they are not the only people who were forced behind the Iron Cur.tain after the war. Iťs a f,ight between the sons ol evll and the sons of good, a fight between the fooces of ligl:l't and fäe forces of darkness. The broadcasts of the W•h1te Legion do not mince words; opinions are stated llirectly and wlthou,t fea:r a bout the most burning question.s of éhe times. ShorUy ~ter its inaugurartion in April 1950, tbe White Legion transmitter reacted enthusia.stically to Presldent Truman's launched "truth offensive." A:t thait tlime it said that it identifies ltsell utterly ,v;ith the argumeD1ts advanced by Truman and ,that lt shall do everything wirt:hin its power to contrdbute to the succes.s of tlhat of'ďenslve. Slnce that Ume much has been said and wribten by man,y imporbant persons of the world, ,b ut I can say wÚhout fear of contradiction that very few people a.od organizart:íons with almost unMmited resources •have aotually contributed as much to that oampaign of truth as has the Whlte Legion of Slovalda with i-t.s very limited resources. Slova.ks can be 11lg1htfully proud of the fact that the WMte L egion orlginated in Slov,a.kia. But this did not happen by accident. The White Legion resulted from the century-old fight of the Slovak people against oommuni:&m. llt is a liv.ing testimony of true SloV'ak mentaUty - a menta:lity to which violence is alien. It is a system thait has been brougblt lnto being by v.Jolence, but does not exis,t by vlolence. Pemecuted by terror and ruthless tyranny, it efffectively flghts tyrants and terrorists without vengeance and aggressive violence. Today, the movement of the White Legion is uo Ionger llmited to tJhe terratory of Slovaldia; lt already has a foothold in Bohem:la and Moravfa, Poland and Hungary. Probably we shall not have to wait too long before the radlo transmitters of the White Legion corps or these nations begin haunting thelr respeictlve llttle Red dictart.ors and stooges of the KTemlln. The Whi-t.e Leg.ion of Slovak.la has a great and serious miss ion: to liberate the SJov,ak natlon from Red dominat1on and to f-!ght In the defense of, natural human rights. The Whlte Leglon has proved ltself. It deserves a ll the mora! and material help the western democraicie~ can give it . . . . BUT N O , W! � SLOVAKlA 31 THE WlllTE LEGION OF SLOVAKIA B Y: ANO NYMOU S There is a strong, anti-oommunlst reslstance in Slovakia, the eastern porUon of the 111-!ated Czecho-Slovaki-a. The movement is ,;pea11headed by the WHITE LEGION (BIELA LEGIA) which has been menrtioned i,n the AlmerLcan press from time to time. Liťtle is knowu ahout M.s compOSiltlon and its leaders, hut there ls no doubt ahout the fact that the Wh1te Leglon 1s very effective in its work of opposlng the Red stooges ot ithe Kremlln and preparing Slovakia for the d,a y of liheraition from the pla,gue of cornmunisro. I know hecause I am directly connec.ted wi:ilth lt. The Whlte Legion has heen carefully organ.ized and has existP.d for .some tlme. ]t !s feared by 4he Red regime of Prague, and its members are the most hunted men in Slovakia. Golt.twia.ld - S,talln's man "Fl'iday" in Czecho,Slovalda - and Ibis red stooges In Sloviakla know that the Whd.te Legion has quite a following, bec-ause 1t seems to know everyl'thlng thaJt is happening or even going to h appen Iu Slovakla and her nelghbors. That is why purges are frequent in Slov ak'la and pri.som; ,an(I concerutration camps ftlled to capacity. ]jut the work of the White Legjon goes on . . The White Legion hroadcas'ts from its hidlng place every Saturday and Sunday. To get a true plcture of llhe effects of tts hroadcast.s, especlally In Slovakia, one would have to visi-t some communist fa,mlly durdng one of thes e bTOadcais.ts and observe its reactions. The faces of the 11steners grow teruie and pale and seem to ask the questlon: '·Do they also know a,bout me? wm they reveal something about mc, too?" About the middle of lasit December, the White Leg!on broadcast poin,ted out thart Cp'l. Francls Gasparik of Žilina was a communlsit, a dangerous dndivldual and !Illforaner, and exhorted lts llsteners to be on guard. Up to that tlm e Gasparlk was quite cocky and imperlous, hut atlter the broa.doast •b ecame sullen and downcast; he was completely b roken. Ga,s,pardk remained home for a week, felgning illness, and llhen asked to b e tran.s.fe.i,red from Žilína. The Whlte Legjon was lnform ed by one of Gasparik's "frlends" that he had revealed resigned-Iy: "Now I k:now ľm a goner!" 'I\he White Leg·i on has proved to the commurústs that their par• tlsan appara.tus is not as perfect as they thought lit to he and that their activitles a.re not as secret as t-hey had wished them to he. The White Legion poses ca serlous prohlem to the Communi-st Party, hecause lt knows of the disasitrous effeots lt has on lts memhers. The Reds, of course, have ralsed a hue and a cry to securtty officials to llquldaite the Wihllte Leg'ion. Red offlclals and memhers ask qutzicatly why ithe White Leglon has not as yet heen uncovered and Ji. quldated? Seoorlty ofticlals ialways have the same answer: we are on the trail of the 'trailtors and lhope to make arrests soon. But the underground work ot the Wihiite Leglon goes on. · Last December several leadlng communls-ts of Prešov were arre&ted. This was the b eginilllng of the purge in connectrion w1 th th e so~alled Clemenitls ''deviMlonls,t" affair. It so happened that the �32 SLOVAKIA Whtte Legion r1adio beca.me sileni about the same tlme and rema.ined silent for a month. Was Clementis secretly associated witb the White Legion? Of course not, and <t.he communists knew he was not, but they had •to make hay. The people of Slovakia were iense and curfous; they gathered secretly about their receivers and listened for some sign of the Wrute Legion broadcasts. But the voice of 1Jbe Whiie Legion remained sllen,t. Coonmunist commissars were ex· tremely nervous. As the days passed, the communi11ts regaáned a measure of composure and told the Slovaks that tlhe White Legion had been líquidated. Preparations were in order to celebrate the apprehension and 1iquidation of rthe "traltors" In al! ,t he larger towns. Then, on the second Sunday of February, 1951, like a bolt out of t he clear, blue sky, the Wh~te Legion again began beaming its broadéas.ts. "The WMte Legion is broadcasting again and you can he-ar it bel!ter than ever" spread ex<:!tedly from person to person ihroughout Slovakla. 'rule stooges of Gottwald and Stalin had to postpone their fes.ti~tles: the White Legion was stm much alive! The inmates of the ooncentration camp at Novaky got the news of the White Legion broadcast that very Sunday evening and patriotic Slovak songs were sung deep into the n•i ght. All thanked God that the White Legion leaders were not captured as they had aJ. ready feared they had been. 'Dhe General Secretariate of the Communist Party in Slovakia meets frequeDJtly In the striotest secrecy. One of t he maln themes dijscussed 1s the Whlte Legion. With rare sincerity the communlsts themselves have admitted that tlhe influence of the Whňe Legion and lis broadca&ts ls much greaiter fäa,n they had supposed it to be. Because of it, the reliabillty o.f •the security organs in Slovakfa is constantly questioned and shake-ups are frequent. It seem.s that even the leadlng •Reds do not know who 1s trustwo11thy; everybody seems io be susplcious of everybody else and Ibis brother. Dlrectlves given by •t he White Legion are simple and clear. The people of Slovakia have been thoroughly instructed by the Legion broadcasts how -to protect themselves agalnst snares of ,the hated Secret Police. The Slovaks know the methods used by the Red secret agents; they know how to act, whrut to do and what to say in any particular case involváng the security police. They are patiently bldlng their tlme and avoiding as much open hostility as poss ible to prevent useless shedding or blood, but they vow that "our tíme shall come!" The lnfluen,ce of the White Legion is tremendously sign1flcant. Its services have saved hundreds of Slovaks from lncarcer-a.tion and persecuUon. 'I'he WhHe Legion flghits against Red tyranny without itself re.sorting to ,terror. The ranks of aotlve anti-communists in Slovakia are lncreasing steadily and t'he Reds there are displaying a grea.ter amdety about their future in the !and of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Apostles. The methods employed by the Whlte Legion have been quŕte successful. The White Legion ls teachlng the people of Slovakda to help and protec,t them selv01! and thus to defend human ri~ts against communis.tic terror of the regime. In Slovakia it has been definitely shown that the popuJ.ation, lf counseled properly, 1s capable of resisting its oppre.ssors even for a longer Ume. �SLOVAKIA 33 Credit must also be given 1the White Legion that the border guards are not performi-ng their duties very conscientiously. This allows a greater percentage of escapees to make its way to the free West. Of course, the communlsrts are aware of this and, consquently, frontitir guards are ohanged more frequerutly and checked more closely. But Slovaks, especially many of those tagged by the communists, still make their way to the West. Naturally the Whlte Legtion is ",taboo" in Slovakia. Its name must not be mentioned in public under penalty of imprisonmerut or worse. To minlmize 4he effectiveness of the White Legion, newspapers and radlo broadcasts - all government controlled - are forbidden to mention t!he name of the White Legion or its activities. One of the chief occupwtions of the Secret Police in Czecho-Slovakla i.s to track down the Wihilte Legäon. Great efforts have been expended to trace its transmitter, blrt to no avall. Slovakia is replete with legends about the movements of the Wblite Legion in the mountalns of Slovakia. Secret Police following -these leads have been known to disappear without a trace. As far as the Red bosses of Slovakia are concerned, the Whi,te Legion is no longer a nuisance, but a real menace to the securl.ty of the Red regime, which they term the "State." The view prevails even in high communisit circles thait army officia!ls and securJty agents are in some way connected with the While Legion, otherwtise - ii !s asked - how would it be possiible for the W•h lte Legion to carry on its "subversive" actlvities for such a long Ume wjthout being uncovered? From time to time the White Legion transmi,tter becomes sdlent. That, too, ls quíte understandable. It would be folly to carry on when danger threatens or when condi· tions are not jUS't right for the Legion's functions. The Reds in Slovak.ia have jammed Whi-te Legion broadcasts. At flrs,t their jammlng was not S'trong enough to cause too much difflculty, but slnce March of this year they have been more successful in preventing the White Legion broadcasts from being heard clearly. The White Legion has counteracted this measure by changing the wave-leng,th of its broadcasts frequently; before the Reds can change over to the proper w1ave-length, the W·hirt.e Legion is usually through witlh iJts most important repor-ts and directives. I have been informed tha4 the Wh'ite Legion is now coulllteracting the Red jammlng process by more eMectlive means. We must remember that the Reds in Slovakia have ithe modern appa.ratus of the State at their disposal. while the Whlte Legion has only whait it can get hold of on the black market. The duel between the broadca sts of the White Legion and the Red reglme of Czecho-Slovakla is quite interesting. I listened to the Whi,te Legion's; broadcasts recenUy and can honestiy say that the White Legion is winning its battle against the Red jammers of Prague and Bratislava. The Wihite Legion ls in existence for almost two years and has grown dear to the hearts of the Slovaks, who pray and hope for a hasiened liberatíon day. The White Legion has become a symbol of hope and courage to the Slovak people. The White Legion keeps lln telling the people of Slovakia thM the Reds and their stooges can be, must be, and wlll be driven out of thelr Iand, lf they are on the alert and follow t he directives of the Legion broadcasts. The White Le- �34 SLOVA.KlA gion has returned self-.confildence to the people; they feel that Red oppression can,not la,st long and are determined to be rea.dy for cthe grea,t drive on the Red tyrants when the opportune tlme presents itsell. The Wh1te Legion has taken hold of old and young allke and has influenced communists as well as non-communists. In the latter it strengthens the falth that their ens-lavement by the Reds shall not la.st long, wh.lle the fot•mer it divests of courage and underm1nes their faith in their own strength and their belief in victory. The White Legion has a.cco.mplished this revolution in the thlnldng of the Slovak.s in a smooth, peaceful wiay. To help those who are In immediate danger is considered llhe rurst civic duty oť all me.mbers of the White Leglon. The White Legion urges the Slovaks to persevere in their resistance to godless communlmn, to unite in the flght agains,t communtsm and in the defense of human rJghts and freedom. The program.s of tb.e White Legion are not chauvinistic; they fully realize they are not the only people who were forced behind the Iron Cur.tain after the war. Iťs a f,ight between the sons ol evll and the sons of good, a fight between the fooces of ligl:l't and fäe forces of darkness. The broadcasts of the W•h1te Legion do not mince words; opinions are stated llirectly and wlthou,t fea:r a bout the most burning question.s of éhe times. ShorUy ~ter its inaugurartion in April 1950, tbe White Legion transmitter reacted enthusia.stically to Presldent Truman's launched "truth offensive." A:t thait tlime it said that it identifies ltsell utterly ,v;ith the argumeD1ts advanced by Truman and ,that lt shall do everything wirt:hin its power to contrdbute to the succes.s of tlhat of'ďenslve. Slnce that Ume much has been said and wribten by man,y imporbant persons of the world, ,b ut I can say wÚhout fear of contradiction that very few people a.od organizart:íons with almost unMmited resources •have aotually contributed as much to that oampaign of truth as has the Whlte Legion of Slovalda with i-t.s very limited resources. Slova.ks can be 11lg1htfully proud of the fact that the WMte L egion orlginated in Slov,a.kia. But this did not happen by accident. The White Legion resulted from the century-old fight of the Slovak people against oommuni:&m. llt is a liv.ing testimony of true SloV'ak mentaUty - a menta:lity to which violence is alien. It is a system thait has been brougblt lnto being by v.Jolence, but does not exis,t by vlolence. Pemecuted by terror and ruthless tyranny, it efffectively flghts tyrants and terrorists without vengeance and aggressive violence. Today, the movement of the White Legion is uo Ionger llmited to tJhe terratory of Slovaldia; lt already has a foothold in Bohem:la and Moravfa, Poland and Hungary. Probably we shall not have to wait too long before the radlo transmitters of the White Legion corps or these nations begin haunting thelr respeictlve llttle Red dictart.ors and stooges of the KTemlln. The Whi-t.e Leg.ion of Slovak.la has a great and serious miss ion: to liberate the SJov,ak natlon from Red dominat1on and to f-!ght In the defense of, natural human rights. The Whlte Leglon has proved ltself. It deserves a ll the mora! and material help the western democraicie~ can give it . . . . BUT N O , W! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKlA 31 THE WlllTE LEGION OF SLOVAKIA B Y: ANO NYMOU S There is a strong, anti-oommunlst reslstance in Slovakia, the eastern porUon of the 111-!ated Czecho-Slovaki-a. The movement is ,;pea11headed by the WHITE LEGION (BIELA LEGIA) which has been menrtioned i,n the AlmerLcan press from time to time. Liťtle is knowu ahout M.s compOSiltlon and its leaders, hut there ls no doubt ahout the fact that the Wh1te Leglon 1s very effective in its work of opposlng the Red stooges ot ithe Kremlln and preparing Slovakia for the d,a y of liheraition from the pla,gue of cornmunisro. I know hecause I am directly connec.ted wi:ilth lt. The Whlte Legion has heen carefully organ.ized and has existP.d for .some tlme. ]t !s feared by 4he Red regime of Prague, and its members are the most hunted men in Slovakia. Golt.twia.ld - S,talln's man "Fl'iday" in Czecho,Slovalda - and Ibis red stooges In Sloviakla know that the Whd.te Legion has quite a following, bec-ause 1t seems to know everyl'thlng thaJt is happening or even going to h appen Iu Slovakla and her nelghbors. That is why purges are frequent in Slov ak'la and pri.som; ,an(I concerutration camps ftlled to capacity. ]jut the work of the White Legjon goes on . . The White Legion hroadcas'ts from its hidlng place every Saturday and Sunday. To get a true plcture of llhe effects of tts hroadcast.s, especlally In Slovakia, one would have to visi-t some communist fa,mlly durdng one of thes e bTOadcais.ts and observe its reactions. The faces of the 11steners grow teruie and pale and seem to ask the questlon: '·Do they also know a,bout me? wm they reveal something about mc, too?" About the middle of lasit December, the White Leg!on broadcast poin,ted out thart Cp'l. Francls Gasparik of Žilina was a communlsit, a dangerous dndivldual and !Illforaner, and exhorted lts llsteners to be on guard. Up to that tlm e Gasparlk was quite cocky and imperlous, hut atlter the broa.doast •b ecame sullen and downcast; he was completely b roken. Ga,s,pardk remained home for a week, felgning illness, and llhen asked to b e tran.s.fe.i,red from Žilína. The Whlte Legjon was lnform ed by one of Gasparik's "frlends" that he had revealed resigned-Iy: "Now I k:now ľm a goner!" 'I\he White Leg·i on has proved to the commurústs that their par• tlsan appara.tus is not as perfect as they thought lit to he and that their activitles a.re not as secret as t-hey had wished them to he. The White Legion poses ca serlous prohlem to the Communi-st Party, hecause lt knows of the disasitrous effeots lt has on lts memhers. The Reds, of course, have ralsed a hue and a cry to securtty officials to llquldaite the Wihllte Leg'ion. Red offlclals and memhers ask qutzicatly why ithe White Leglon has not as yet heen uncovered and Ji. quldated? Seoorlty ofticlals ialways have the same answer: we are on the trail of the 'trailtors and lhope to make arrests soon. But the underground work ot the Wihiite Leglon goes on. · Last December several leadlng communls-ts of Prešov were arre&ted. This was the b eginilllng of the purge in connectrion w1 th th e so~alled Clemenitls ''deviMlonls,t" affair. It so happened that the 32 SLOVAKIA Whtte Legion r1adio beca.me sileni about the same tlme and rema.ined silent for a month. Was Clementis secretly associated witb the White Legion? Of course not, and <t.he communists knew he was not, but they had •to make hay. The people of Slovakia were iense and curfous; they gathered secretly about their receivers and listened for some sign of the Wrute Legion broadcasts. But the voice of 1Jbe Whiie Legion remained sllen,t. Coonmunist commissars were ex· tremely nervous. As the days passed, the communi11ts regaáned a measure of composure and told the Slovaks that tlhe White Legion had been líquidated. Preparations were in order to celebrate the apprehension and 1iquidation of rthe "traltors" In al! ,t he larger towns. Then, on the second Sunday of February, 1951, like a bolt out of t he clear, blue sky, the Wh~te Legion again began beaming its broadéas.ts. "The WMte Legion is broadcasting again and you can he-ar it bel!ter than ever" spread ex<:!tedly from person to person ihroughout Slovakla. 'rule stooges of Gottwald and Stalin had to postpone their fes.ti~tles: the White Legion was stm much alive! The inmates of the ooncentration camp at Novaky got the news of the White Legion broadcast that very Sunday evening and patriotic Slovak songs were sung deep into the n•i ght. All thanked God that the White Legion leaders were not captured as they had aJ. ready feared they had been. 'Dhe General Secretariate of the Communist Party in Slovakia meets frequeDJtly In the striotest secrecy. One of t he maln themes dijscussed 1s the Whlte Legion. With rare sincerity the communlsts themselves have admitted that tlhe influence of the Whňe Legion and lis broadca&ts ls much greaiter fäa,n they had supposed it to be. Because of it, the reliabillty o.f •the security organs in Slovakfa is constantly questioned and shake-ups are frequent. It seem.s that even the leadlng •Reds do not know who 1s trustwo11thy; everybody seems io be susplcious of everybody else and Ibis brother. Dlrectlves given by •t he White Legion are simple and clear. The people of Slovakia have been thoroughly instructed by the Legion broadcasts how -to protect themselves agalnst snares of ,the hated Secret Police. The Slovaks know the methods used by the Red secret agents; they know how to act, whrut to do and what to say in any particular case involváng the security police. They are patiently bldlng their tlme and avoiding as much open hostility as poss ible to prevent useless shedding or blood, but they vow that "our tíme shall come!" The lnfluen,ce of the White Legion is tremendously sign1flcant. Its services have saved hundreds of Slovaks from lncarcer-a.tion and persecuUon. 'I'he WhHe Legion flghits against Red tyranny without itself re.sorting to ,terror. The ranks of aotlve anti-communists in Slovakia are lncreasing steadily and t'he Reds there are displaying a grea.ter amdety about their future in the !and of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Apostles. The methods employed by the Whlte Legion have been quŕte successful. The White Legion ls teachlng the people of Slovakda to help and protec,t them selv01! and thus to defend human ri~ts against communis.tic terror of the regime. In Slovakia it has been definitely shown that the popuJ.ation, lf counseled properly, 1s capable of resisting its oppre.ssors even for a longer Ume. SLOVAKIA 33 Credit must also be given 1the White Legion that the border guards are not performi-ng their duties very conscientiously. This allows a greater percentage of escapees to make its way to the free West. Of course, the communlsrts are aware of this and, consquently, frontitir guards are ohanged more frequerutly and checked more closely. But Slovaks, especially many of those tagged by the communists, still make their way to the West. Naturally the Whlte Legtion is ",taboo" in Slovakia. Its name must not be mentioned in public under penalty of imprisonmerut or worse. To minlmize 4he effectiveness of the White Legion, newspapers and radlo broadcasts - all government controlled - are forbidden to mention t!he name of the White Legion or its activities. One of the chief occupwtions of the Secret Police in Czecho-Slovakla i.s to track down the Wihilte Legäon. Great efforts have been expended to trace its transmitter, blrt to no avall. Slovakia is replete with legends about the movements of the Wblite Legion in the mountalns of Slovakia. Secret Police following -these leads have been known to disappear without a trace. As far as the Red bosses of Slovakia are concerned, the Whi,te Legion is no longer a nuisance, but a real menace to the securl.ty of the Red regime, which they term the "State." The view prevails even in high communisit circles thait army officia!ls and securJty agents are in some way connected with the While Legion, otherwtise - ii !s asked - how would it be possiible for the W•h lte Legion to carry on its "subversive" actlvities for such a long Ume wjthout being uncovered? From time to time the White Legion transmi,tter becomes sdlent. That, too, ls quíte understandable. It would be folly to carry on when danger threatens or when condi· tions are not jUS't right for the Legion's functions. The Reds in Slovak.ia have jammed Whi-te Legion broadcasts. At flrs,t their jammlng was not S'trong enough to cause too much difflculty, but slnce March of this year they have been more successful in preventing the White Legion broadcasts from being heard clearly. The White Legion has counteracted this measure by changing the wave-leng,th of its broadcasts frequently; before the Reds can change over to the proper w1ave-length, the W·hirt.e Legion is usually through witlh iJts most important repor-ts and directives. I have been informed tha4 the Wh'ite Legion is now coulllteracting the Red jammlng process by more eMectlive means. We must remember that the Reds in Slovakia have ithe modern appa.ratus of the State at their disposal. while the Whlte Legion has only whait it can get hold of on the black market. The duel between the broadca sts of the White Legion and the Red reglme of Czecho-Slovakla is quite interesting. I listened to the Whi,te Legion's; broadcasts recenUy and can honestiy say that the White Legion is winning its battle against the Red jammers of Prague and Bratislava. The Wihite Legion ls in existence for almost two years and has grown dear to the hearts of the Slovaks, who pray and hope for a hasiened liberatíon day. The White Legion has become a symbol of hope and courage to the Slovak people. The White Legion keeps lln telling the people of Slovakia thM the Reds and their stooges can be, must be, and wlll be driven out of thelr Iand, lf they are on the alert and follow t he directives of the Legion broadcasts. The White Le- 34 SLOVA.KlA gion has returned self-.confildence to the people; they feel that Red oppression can,not la,st long and are determined to be rea.dy for cthe grea,t drive on the Red tyrants when the opportune tlme presents itsell. The Wh1te Legion has taken hold of old and young allke and has influenced communists as well as non-communists. In the latter it strengthens the falth that their ens-lavement by the Reds shall not la.st long, wh.lle the fot•mer it divests of courage and underm1nes their faith in their own strength and their belief in victory. The White Legion has a.cco.mplished this revolution in the thlnldng of the Slovak.s in a smooth, peaceful wiay. To help those who are In immediate danger is considered llhe rurst civic duty oť all me.mbers of the White Leglon. The White Legion urges the Slovaks to persevere in their resistance to godless communlmn, to unite in the flght agains,t communtsm and in the defense of human rJghts and freedom. The program.s of tb.e White Legion are not chauvinistic; they fully realize they are not the only people who were forced behind the Iron Cur.tain after the war. Iťs a f,ight between the sons ol evll and the sons of good, a fight between the fooces of ligl:l't and fäe forces of darkness. The broadcasts of the W•h1te Legion do not mince words; opinions are stated llirectly and wlthou,t fea:r a bout the most burning question.s of éhe times. ShorUy ~ter its inaugurartion in April 1950, tbe White Legion transmitter reacted enthusia.stically to Presldent Truman's launched "truth offensive." A:t thait tlime it said that it identifies ltsell utterly ,v;ith the argumeD1ts advanced by Truman and ,that lt shall do everything wirt:hin its power to contrdbute to the succes.s of tlhat of'ďenslve. Slnce that Ume much has been said and wribten by man,y imporbant persons of the world, ,b ut I can say wÚhout fear of contradiction that very few people a.od organizart:íons with almost unMmited resources •have aotually contributed as much to that oampaign of truth as has the Whlte Legion of Slovalda with i-t.s very limited resources. Slova.ks can be 11lg1htfully proud of the fact that the WMte L egion orlginated in Slov,a.kia. But this did not happen by accident. The White Legion resulted from the century-old fight of the Slovak people against oommuni:&m. llt is a liv.ing testimony of true SloV'ak mentaUty - a menta:lity to which violence is alien. It is a system thait has been brougblt lnto being by v.Jolence, but does not exis,t by vlolence. Pemecuted by terror and ruthless tyranny, it efffectively flghts tyrants and terrorists without vengeance and aggressive violence. Today, the movement of the White Legion is uo Ionger llmited to tJhe terratory of Slovaldia; lt already has a foothold in Bohem:la and Moravfa, Poland and Hungary. Probably we shall not have to wait too long before the radlo transmitters of the White Legion corps or these nations begin haunting thelr respeictlve llttle Red dictart.ors and stooges of the KTemlln. The Whi-t.e Leg.ion of Slovak.la has a great and serious miss ion: to liberate the SJov,ak natlon from Red dominat1on and to f-!ght In the defense of, natural human rights. The Whlte Leglon has proved ltself. It deserves a ll the mora! and material help the western democraicie~ can give it . . . . BUT N O , W!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The White Legion of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Anonymous Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 31-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Anonymous Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/27b5940f75c9e6f99ce4633b24cd8071.pdf c1d159333a455b81345effec6f79a2ab PDF Text Text 30 SLOVAK.IA v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the heart of the contlnent. I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s, nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished. But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from the agents of Moscow, that 1s. • • • • SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due to tbe pure feellngs of the people. The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns and valleys. The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts, cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca, a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and elsewhere. The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin• ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for observlng the llfe of the Slovak people. � 30 SLOVAK.IA v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the heart of the contlnent. I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s, nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished. But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from the agents of Moscow, that 1s. • • • • SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due to tbe pure feellngs of the people. The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns and valleys. The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts, cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca, a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and elsewhere. The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin• ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for observlng the llfe of the Slovak people. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 30 SLOVAK.IA v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the heart of the contlnent. I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s, nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished. But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from the agents of Moscow, that 1s. • • • • SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due to tbe pure feellngs of the people. The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns and valleys. The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts, cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca, a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and elsewhere. The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin• ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Costumes and Customs Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 p. 30 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b620bf5179429bfc6dfaa814227e3664.pdf b0b8bbb833dd36aa1a57c72478e0fa35 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA CA STL~ OF SLOV AKIA A multitude of picturesque ruins of medieval cru;tles is one of the special attractions of Slovakia. They bear witness of the centurles during which Slovakia was a frontler bulwark of W estern European clvlllzaUon agalnst the continuous encroachment of the rapacious Turks. Llfe was full of romance and of danger. Wooden forts preceeded the mighty stone edlflces of the thirteenth and fourteenth centurles. Tbe dlsastrous Mongol incursion of 1241 proved tbe inefficacy of the wooden structures and there followed a period of intenslve building of castles with stone. Thls building activity continued well lnto the seventeeth century and ended with tbe foundation of Leopoldov in 1665 by Emperor Leopold 1. It was closely modeled after P alma Nuova in Northern Italy. By the beglnnlng of the eigbteenth century, lhe medieval castles no longer fulf!lled th e demands of mllitary technique and as the danger of further Turkls h invasions ceased, their owners a bandoned them to live In more comfortable quarters. Palaces replaced castles. A few of the old castles were refashloned and to this day remaln habltable. One of the largest and most lnteresting of the latter is at Bojnice wblcb has no less tban 21S balls and rooms, is enclrcled by wlde moats, and has several massive and lofty towers. As to tJhe number and the picturesgueness of ruins, the Váh river compares favorably to tbe Rhlne. Tbe setting is possl,bly even more romantic and certalnly more primltlve. Many of the rulns are flanked by dense forests. There are some tbirty of tbem, built mostly upon steep crags overlooking tlhe rlver. In the Middle Ages they were Quite lmpregnable. Standlng aloof from buman habitatlons of today, their very lsolation transports tbe vlsltor in spirit to bygone centuries of armored knlghts and robber barons. In those years royal authority was rather dlfficult to enforce. Tbe owner was truly lord over the Iand whlch bis eye could survey. The mightiest and the most accessible of the citadels on the Váh is at Trenčin. Between the years 1301-1321 lt was the residence ot the famous Matthew Cák, "lord of the Váh and of the Tatras," wbo possessed more than thlrty castles in different parts of tbe land. King Charles 'Robert of Hungary besleged hlm in vain. The only Ume the stronghold teli before an enemy was in 1528 after a month's arduous siege. The large stone can,non bans from this siege are stm visiblP. in tbe walls of the ruined castle. In 1663 the Turks, and in 1704 Francis Rakoczy II tried to capture it, but falled. Fire in 1790 reduced it to rulns. The most extensive ruin In Slovakia is Spišský Hrad, situated in the Spiš region. Bullt of whlte limestone, it gllstens six hundred feet a bove th.e surroundlng landscape. It !s huge, bavlng no less tban five large courtyards and 135 halls and rooms. The lookout tower has four storles. The walls are ten feet thlck and reach an altitude of seventy feet. It is also one of the oldest castles in Slovakia, being mentioned already In tbe year 1120. It was abandoned In 1710 and was turned into rulns by fire In 1780. �SLOVAKIA 29 Tbe most memorable of the ruins of S lovakia is magnificent De-v in, sltuated not far {rom Bratislava, some five mlles towards Vlenna. Devin is unlque. It is unllke anything else to be seen in Europe. A romantic complex of ruins loom some 240 feet above the confluence of the Danube and Morava rivers, right on the frontier between Slovakia and Austria. Here end the Carpathiaus, and across the Danube commence the Alps. The view from Devín is exquisitely beautiful. Regardless of season and weather it rewards the visitor with a vista which is insplring and penetrates his soul. Towards sunrise you behold the majestlc Danube flowlng swlftly towards the Black Sea. Along its left bank are hllls adorned wlth deciduous forests, and on the slopes, exposed to the Southern sun, are vlneyards, small and quiltlike, as are the fields on the more level opposite side or the stream. Also there are forests, restrul to gaze upon. They ascend hills, outposts of the Alps. Right beneath the ruins lies the town or Devin, exotic and appealing, where life is placid, more like the gently r1owing Morava than like the more energetic Danube. Towards sunset you see the fertile plains of Austria, park-like scenery with villages and an occasional manor set in woods and flelds. You see the Danube approaching, undulating, and forming many wooded islets. Across the Danube to the South you behold the Austrlan town of Hainburg nestled beneath the ruins of the bistoric fortress of Altenburg, the Carnuntum of the Romans, headquarters of one of their leglons. Finally, on the horlzon to the Southwest, the real Alps meet your avid gaze. Looking a.bout upon the wonderful panorama, you forget the woes and worries or everyday life and for the moment become a poet to whom tbe world is a paradise. You are treading upon prehistoric as well as on historic ground. Man was here long before the commencement of the Cbristian era. Bits or pottery from the Hallstatt period and remains of abodes from tbe second La Tene period have been uneartbed by archaeologlsts wbo bave been carrying on extensive excavations since 1923. Tbe future is likely to furtber extend tbe past. During tbe first two centuries of our ern Devín served as an outpost of the Roman Emplre against tbe turbulent Marcomanni and Quadl, Germanic tribes living north or the Danube. It was fol'tifled by the fourteenth legion. With the advent of the Slovaks about the sixth century, the place recelved lts present appellation, named probably after the national godess, Deva. It became a refuge from the ruth· less Uralo-Altaic Avars who held to the plains and to the swamps. As the Slovaks became united and powerful, it became one of thelr principal centers. It was here that King Louls the German besieged Rastislav, ruler of the so-called Great Moravian realm, without avail in 864. Great Moravia fell to piece~ in 906 before the savage onrush of the Magyar horsemen. Devin, however, remalned in the hands of the Slovaks well lnto the eleventh century. In 1683 it successfully wlthstood a slege by the Turks. The destruction of the castle was due to Napoleon who, in 1809, ordered it to be razed. What a hlstory Devin has had! For untold centuries it was strateglcally the mos t vila! point of Centra! Europe. In its immediate �30 SLOVAK.IA v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the heart of the contlnent. I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s, nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished. But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from the agents of Moscow, that 1s. • • • • SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due to tbe pure feellngs of the people. The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns and valleys. The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts, cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca, a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and elsewhere. The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin• ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for observlng the llfe of the Slovak people. � 28 SLOVAKIA CA STL~ OF SLOV AKIA A multitude of picturesque ruins of medieval cru;tles is one of the special attractions of Slovakia. They bear witness of the centurles during which Slovakia was a frontler bulwark of W estern European clvlllzaUon agalnst the continuous encroachment of the rapacious Turks. Llfe was full of romance and of danger. Wooden forts preceeded the mighty stone edlflces of the thirteenth and fourteenth centurles. Tbe dlsastrous Mongol incursion of 1241 proved tbe inefficacy of the wooden structures and there followed a period of intenslve building of castles with stone. Thls building activity continued well lnto the seventeeth century and ended with tbe foundation of Leopoldov in 1665 by Emperor Leopold 1. It was closely modeled after P alma Nuova in Northern Italy. By the beglnnlng of the eigbteenth century, lhe medieval castles no longer fulf!lled th e demands of mllitary technique and as the danger of further Turkls h invasions ceased, their owners a bandoned them to live In more comfortable quarters. Palaces replaced castles. A few of the old castles were refashloned and to this day remaln habltable. One of the largest and most lnteresting of the latter is at Bojnice wblcb has no less tban 21S balls and rooms, is enclrcled by wlde moats, and has several massive and lofty towers. As to tJhe number and the picturesgueness of ruins, the Váh river compares favorably to tbe Rhlne. Tbe setting is possl,bly even more romantic and certalnly more primltlve. Many of the rulns are flanked by dense forests. There are some tbirty of tbem, built mostly upon steep crags overlooking tlhe rlver. In the Middle Ages they were Quite lmpregnable. Standlng aloof from buman habitatlons of today, their very lsolation transports tbe vlsltor in spirit to bygone centuries of armored knlghts and robber barons. In those years royal authority was rather dlfficult to enforce. Tbe owner was truly lord over the Iand whlch bis eye could survey. The mightiest and the most accessible of the citadels on the Váh is at Trenčin. Between the years 1301-1321 lt was the residence ot the famous Matthew Cák, "lord of the Váh and of the Tatras," wbo possessed more than thlrty castles in different parts of tbe land. King Charles 'Robert of Hungary besleged hlm in vain. The only Ume the stronghold teli before an enemy was in 1528 after a month's arduous siege. The large stone can,non bans from this siege are stm visiblP. in tbe walls of the ruined castle. In 1663 the Turks, and in 1704 Francis Rakoczy II tried to capture it, but falled. Fire in 1790 reduced it to rulns. The most extensive ruin In Slovakia is Spišský Hrad, situated in the Spiš region. Bullt of whlte limestone, it gllstens six hundred feet a bove th.e surroundlng landscape. It !s huge, bavlng no less tban five large courtyards and 135 halls and rooms. The lookout tower has four storles. The walls are ten feet thlck and reach an altitude of seventy feet. It is also one of the oldest castles in Slovakia, being mentioned already In tbe year 1120. It was abandoned In 1710 and was turned into rulns by fire In 1780. �SLOVAKIA 29 Tbe most memorable of the ruins of S lovakia is magnificent De-v in, sltuated not far {rom Bratislava, some five mlles towards Vlenna. Devin is unlque. It is unllke anything else to be seen in Europe. A romantic complex of ruins loom some 240 feet above the confluence of the Danube and Morava rivers, right on the frontier between Slovakia and Austria. Here end the Carpathiaus, and across the Danube commence the Alps. The view from Devín is exquisitely beautiful. Regardless of season and weather it rewards the visitor with a vista which is insplring and penetrates his soul. Towards sunrise you behold the majestlc Danube flowlng swlftly towards the Black Sea. Along its left bank are hllls adorned wlth deciduous forests, and on the slopes, exposed to the Southern sun, are vlneyards, small and quiltlike, as are the fields on the more level opposite side or the stream. Also there are forests, restrul to gaze upon. They ascend hills, outposts of the Alps. Right beneath the ruins lies the town or Devin, exotic and appealing, where life is placid, more like the gently r1owing Morava than like the more energetic Danube. Towards sunset you see the fertile plains of Austria, park-like scenery with villages and an occasional manor set in woods and flelds. You see the Danube approaching, undulating, and forming many wooded islets. Across the Danube to the South you behold the Austrlan town of Hainburg nestled beneath the ruins of the bistoric fortress of Altenburg, the Carnuntum of the Romans, headquarters of one of their leglons. Finally, on the horlzon to the Southwest, the real Alps meet your avid gaze. Looking a.bout upon the wonderful panorama, you forget the woes and worries or everyday life and for the moment become a poet to whom tbe world is a paradise. You are treading upon prehistoric as well as on historic ground. Man was here long before the commencement of the Cbristian era. Bits or pottery from the Hallstatt period and remains of abodes from tbe second La Tene period have been uneartbed by archaeologlsts wbo bave been carrying on extensive excavations since 1923. Tbe future is likely to furtber extend tbe past. During tbe first two centuries of our ern Devín served as an outpost of the Roman Emplre against tbe turbulent Marcomanni and Quadl, Germanic tribes living north or the Danube. It was fol'tifled by the fourteenth legion. With the advent of the Slovaks about the sixth century, the place recelved lts present appellation, named probably after the national godess, Deva. It became a refuge from the ruth· less Uralo-Altaic Avars who held to the plains and to the swamps. As the Slovaks became united and powerful, it became one of thelr principal centers. It was here that King Louls the German besieged Rastislav, ruler of the so-called Great Moravian realm, without avail in 864. Great Moravia fell to piece~ in 906 before the savage onrush of the Magyar horsemen. Devin, however, remalned in the hands of the Slovaks well lnto the eleventh century. In 1683 it successfully wlthstood a slege by the Turks. The destruction of the castle was due to Napoleon who, in 1809, ordered it to be razed. What a hlstory Devin has had! For untold centuries it was strateglcally the mos t vila! point of Centra! Europe. In its immediate �30 SLOVAK.IA v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the heart of the contlnent. I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s, nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished. But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from the agents of Moscow, that 1s. • • • • SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due to tbe pure feellngs of the people. The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns and valleys. The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts, cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca, a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and elsewhere. The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin• ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for observlng the llfe of the Slovak people. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA CA STL~ OF SLOV AKIA A multitude of picturesque ruins of medieval cru;tles is one of the special attractions of Slovakia. They bear witness of the centurles during which Slovakia was a frontler bulwark of W estern European clvlllzaUon agalnst the continuous encroachment of the rapacious Turks. Llfe was full of romance and of danger. Wooden forts preceeded the mighty stone edlflces of the thirteenth and fourteenth centurles. Tbe dlsastrous Mongol incursion of 1241 proved tbe inefficacy of the wooden structures and there followed a period of intenslve building of castles with stone. Thls building activity continued well lnto the seventeeth century and ended with tbe foundation of Leopoldov in 1665 by Emperor Leopold 1. It was closely modeled after P alma Nuova in Northern Italy. By the beglnnlng of the eigbteenth century, lhe medieval castles no longer fulf!lled th e demands of mllitary technique and as the danger of further Turkls h invasions ceased, their owners a bandoned them to live In more comfortable quarters. Palaces replaced castles. A few of the old castles were refashloned and to this day remaln habltable. One of the largest and most lnteresting of the latter is at Bojnice wblcb has no less tban 21S balls and rooms, is enclrcled by wlde moats, and has several massive and lofty towers. As to tJhe number and the picturesgueness of ruins, the Váh river compares favorably to tbe Rhlne. Tbe setting is possl,bly even more romantic and certalnly more primltlve. Many of the rulns are flanked by dense forests. There are some tbirty of tbem, built mostly upon steep crags overlooking tlhe rlver. In the Middle Ages they were Quite lmpregnable. Standlng aloof from buman habitatlons of today, their very lsolation transports tbe vlsltor in spirit to bygone centuries of armored knlghts and robber barons. In those years royal authority was rather dlfficult to enforce. Tbe owner was truly lord over the Iand whlch bis eye could survey. The mightiest and the most accessible of the citadels on the Váh is at Trenčin. Between the years 1301-1321 lt was the residence ot the famous Matthew Cák, "lord of the Váh and of the Tatras," wbo possessed more than thlrty castles in different parts of tbe land. King Charles 'Robert of Hungary besleged hlm in vain. The only Ume the stronghold teli before an enemy was in 1528 after a month's arduous siege. The large stone can,non bans from this siege are stm visiblP. in tbe walls of the ruined castle. In 1663 the Turks, and in 1704 Francis Rakoczy II tried to capture it, but falled. Fire in 1790 reduced it to rulns. The most extensive ruin In Slovakia is Spišský Hrad, situated in the Spiš region. Bullt of whlte limestone, it gllstens six hundred feet a bove th.e surroundlng landscape. It !s huge, bavlng no less tban five large courtyards and 135 halls and rooms. The lookout tower has four storles. The walls are ten feet thlck and reach an altitude of seventy feet. It is also one of the oldest castles in Slovakia, being mentioned already In tbe year 1120. It was abandoned In 1710 and was turned into rulns by fire In 1780. SLOVAKIA 29 Tbe most memorable of the ruins of S lovakia is magnificent De-v in, sltuated not far {rom Bratislava, some five mlles towards Vlenna. Devin is unlque. It is unllke anything else to be seen in Europe. A romantic complex of ruins loom some 240 feet above the confluence of the Danube and Morava rivers, right on the frontier between Slovakia and Austria. Here end the Carpathiaus, and across the Danube commence the Alps. The view from Devín is exquisitely beautiful. Regardless of season and weather it rewards the visitor with a vista which is insplring and penetrates his soul. Towards sunrise you behold the majestlc Danube flowlng swlftly towards the Black Sea. Along its left bank are hllls adorned wlth deciduous forests, and on the slopes, exposed to the Southern sun, are vlneyards, small and quiltlike, as are the fields on the more level opposite side or the stream. Also there are forests, restrul to gaze upon. They ascend hills, outposts of the Alps. Right beneath the ruins lies the town or Devin, exotic and appealing, where life is placid, more like the gently r1owing Morava than like the more energetic Danube. Towards sunset you see the fertile plains of Austria, park-like scenery with villages and an occasional manor set in woods and flelds. You see the Danube approaching, undulating, and forming many wooded islets. Across the Danube to the South you behold the Austrlan town of Hainburg nestled beneath the ruins of the bistoric fortress of Altenburg, the Carnuntum of the Romans, headquarters of one of their leglons. Finally, on the horlzon to the Southwest, the real Alps meet your avid gaze. Looking a.bout upon the wonderful panorama, you forget the woes and worries or everyday life and for the moment become a poet to whom tbe world is a paradise. You are treading upon prehistoric as well as on historic ground. Man was here long before the commencement of the Cbristian era. Bits or pottery from the Hallstatt period and remains of abodes from tbe second La Tene period have been uneartbed by archaeologlsts wbo bave been carrying on extensive excavations since 1923. Tbe future is likely to furtber extend tbe past. During tbe first two centuries of our ern Devín served as an outpost of the Roman Emplre against tbe turbulent Marcomanni and Quadl, Germanic tribes living north or the Danube. It was fol'tifled by the fourteenth legion. With the advent of the Slovaks about the sixth century, the place recelved lts present appellation, named probably after the national godess, Deva. It became a refuge from the ruth· less Uralo-Altaic Avars who held to the plains and to the swamps. As the Slovaks became united and powerful, it became one of thelr principal centers. It was here that King Louls the German besieged Rastislav, ruler of the so-called Great Moravian realm, without avail in 864. Great Moravia fell to piece~ in 906 before the savage onrush of the Magyar horsemen. Devin, however, remalned in the hands of the Slovaks well lnto the eleventh century. In 1683 it successfully wlthstood a slege by the Turks. The destruction of the castle was due to Napoleon who, in 1809, ordered it to be razed. What a hlstory Devin has had! For untold centuries it was strateglcally the mos t vila! point of Centra! Europe. In its immediate 30 SLOVAK.IA v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the heart of the contlnent. I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s, nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished. But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from the agents of Moscow, that 1s. • • • • SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due to tbe pure feellngs of the people. The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns and valleys. The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts, cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca, a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and elsewhere. The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin• ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 28-30 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1246d85d021543acb464bfff70daf251.pdf 0c1947d1937f921a4b513ed0ba6c9322 PDF Text Text BLOVAKIA 27 violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons. Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the Russlan occupation. Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In that area. • • • MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local patrlots and was maintalned by them. Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary progress of the !and. The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918. Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok, Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums are at Bratislava and at Kremnica. Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava, the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at Prešov. čiansky • • • WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected. l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism. I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944). � BLOVAKIA 27 violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons. Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the Russlan occupation. Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In that area. • • • MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local patrlots and was maintalned by them. Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary progress of the !and. The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918. Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok, Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums are at Bratislava and at Kremnica. Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava, the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at Prešov. čiansky • • • WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected. l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism. I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document BLOVAKIA 27 violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons. Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the Russlan occupation. Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In that area. • • • MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local patrlots and was maintalned by them. Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary progress of the !and. The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918. Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok, Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums are at Bratislava and at Kremnica. Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava, the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at Prešov. čiansky • • • WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected. l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism. I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Museums of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 p. 27 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5e5e2567ea318500d36591c95c2961fb.pdf 1955ec5ec45e0530005398f324b39d77 PDF Text Text 16 SLOVAKIA WHY NO MORE CZEOHOSLOVAKIA ? DR. JOSEPH K I RSCHBAUM After the communist reglme Jn Bohemla and Slovakia came to power in February 1948, there appeared ln Europe, the Unlted States and In other non-European countrles a new "Czechoslovak" emlgration, conststlng of dlsmlssed diplomats and escaped politlcal leaders of the varlous Czech and Slovak civil partles. This emlgration, lf we are to appraise it by lts actlvlty, contlnues in the pollcles of Dr. Eward Beneš and hls followers, whlch means a contlnuatlon in the same mistakes and blunders whlch have evoked two dangerous crises in Europe durlng the past thlrty years. As a result of thls blundering policy more than half the population of the Czecboslovak Republic (Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Carpatho-Russlans) was elther deprlved of the most fundamental human and civil rlghts, or deslgnedly lmpeded In lts polltlcal and economical development. Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of tbe oldest families in Bohemia, had thls to say about Czech policy: "Even In norma! tlmes the double game of Czecb policy can be seen Quite clearly. As long as Czecboslovakia adopted the role of dependence on the West, Benes was at the helm and from 1945 onward prepared the dellvery of hls country to the Communists. Al! the mlndste-rs in hls Cablnet {there were about two dozen of them) worked with thelr ldollzed Presldent, and in a most masterly fashion steered thelr country lnto Communlsm, always hop!ng for a good job as a reward for thelr laudable work In the Bolshevist interest." NEW ENGLISH REVIEW MAGAZINE, 1949, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22). It is a fact that Czechoslovakia was re-establlshed at the end of World War II agalnst the w111 of the absolute majori ty of the Slovaks and the many mlll!ons of national minorltles by the polllical actlv!ty of a small group of Czech exiles, who were not concerned "·lth the lnterests of the Czech and Slovak nations, or the interests of the ,vbole of Europe, but were rather Jed by imperlallsm, their persona! amblt!ons and a des!re for revenge. And it ls a historical fact that the Czecboslovak State was surrendered, without res!stance, to the power of Mosoow by these pollticlans just as in 1938-1939, w!thout the least resistance, they surrendered it to Berlin. In tbe llgbt of these faots and In the interest of better organ!· zation and cooperatlon or the Centra! European natlons, as well as In the interest of trutb and justlce, lt appea:-s necessary to point out the arguments whlch speak agalnst the exlstence or the Czechoslovak Republlc. An analysis, lssuing from European and Centro-European points of vlew and not only from the lnterests of natlons and mlnorlt!es whlch were forced tnto the Czecboslovak Republ!c agalnst their wlll, is demanded In this connectlon by our slde, because !t !s based on the motlve contained In the Declaratlon o! Independence of the Unlted ~tates, In whlcb we read: " W hen in t he course of human events, it becomes necessary for �SLOVAKIA 17 one people to dissolve the political banda which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separated and equal station to whi ch the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opíníons of mankind requ ires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation." What are the causes which led the Slovaks and the minorities to demand the dlssolution of political ties with the Czech nation in t he Czechoslovak Republic? Generally speaking, we can mention, first of all, the following: 1. Tendencies for the preservatlon or restoration of the Czechos lovak Republic do not meet with the approval of the majority of lts inhabitants and the principle of democracy and the principles ex· pressed in the Atlantic Charter. 2. The Czechoslovak Republic has no cause to exist in a just arrangement of Europe even from the standpoint of European in· terests. 3. The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe or a federated Centra! Europe. More than thirty years of clever Czech propaganda migh t, at a first glance, contradict these allegations. There Js no argument ahout that. In the mirror of our experience with the propaganda of Goebels, and, today, that of Moscow, we see, however, that even a propaganda of falsehoods can be successful for a time, deceiving and convinclng many people. But the force of truth is eternal. By resorting to lies we may enjoy successes temporarily, but the truth shall prevail in the end. In the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, we are concerned witili nothing more than the truth. Tbat is why we are analyzing the above-mentioned arguments at least in their main outlines. And in dolng this, we pu.rposely refer to the testimonies of· objective, politlcal European observers, so that no one rnight say that the Slovak s truggle for freedom and independence issues from an exaggerated nationalism or natlonal intolerenace, as Cz&eh propaganda designedly claims that it does. The Slovaks were co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic and would have wished its preservation, if the Czechoslovak State would bave had possessed the prerequisites to fulfill the task that falls to a state in the sense of a modem, sociologlcal conception, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the standpolnt of European interests. The Czechoslovak Repu blic, however, diel not. The Slovaks, therefore, in the lntent of democracy, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter of the United Nations Organization, are demanding a new order of Centro-Eu.ropean relationships. to which the Czechoslovak Republic definitely 1s an obstacle, as shall be made clear in the arguments that follow. Are the tendenciea to preserve or restore the Czechoslovak Republic in harmony with the will of the majority of ita inhabítanta and the princ iples upon which a modern state ia founded ? �18 SLOVAKIA This question was already asked at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at whlch the Czechoslovak Republlc was born, as Lloyd George tells us in bis book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties": "Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians - is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech ban• ner, a new polyglot state in which six nations will be packed together, all filled with hatred of one against the other, arrested in their whole economic and social development and in the progress of their civilization by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning their whole public llfe? - How can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic community, geographical unity, or common history?" - {pp. 944, 946). Lloyd George evldently wa.s troubled wlth the prOl)osltion of setting up Czechoslovakia and stated bluntly: "The Czechs were specially favored by the Allies. The result was the recognition of the polyglot and incoherent state of Czechoslovakia." - (p. 948). We see, then, at the very beglnning of the Czechoslovak RepubJic, that nelther the lnterests o( the lnhabitants ot the newly-rlsing s tate, nor tbe prlnclple or the rlght of self-determlnation and of democratlc freedoms were tbe decldlng factors, but only the "special favor of tbe Allles." It was, tberefore, only natural tbat the Czecbo• slovak Republlc durlng al! lts 20 years was troubled with interna! controversles - cleverly masked abroad by a great propaganda apparatu.s - and that lt collapsed wltbout the least resistance of its populatlon with tbe flrst lmpact from outslde in 1938-1939. What is more, we can show that ,tbe majority of the inhabitants even deslred the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic by quotlng statements of Czech polltlclans themselves and recalllng those made durlng the polltlcal trlals of the "people's" democracy of Czechoslovakla versus the Slovaks, Germans and Magyars - the trials staged by the Czech Government after 1945. Why dld they deslre lts dlssolutlon? Indisputably because the Czechoslovak Republi c dld not satisfy the polltlcal and economlc !nterests and aspirations of its inhabitants, except those of the Czech minority which managed tbe State. Al the Par!s Peace Conference (1919), Dr. Edward Beneš declared that: "lt is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organlzatlon of tbe State by accepting as a basis of natural rights tbe prlnclples applled in the Constitutlon of tbe Swlss Republlc, tbat !s, to make the Czechoslovak Republlc a sor-t of Swltzerland . . ." Tbe Czecb governments, bowever, did not manage tbe Czechoslovak Republlc as Beneš had promlsed, but In sucb manner as Jf only an exclusive Czecb State was concerned, whose mission apparently wa,s to asslmilate the non-Czech populat!on, and espec!ally the Slovaks, and hold them in cbeck economlcally and soc!ally. Tbe resistance of the other lnhabltants and the support of tbe efforts whlch almed at the dlssolutlon of tbe Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, became an entlrely logical r~ult of the sltuation in whlcb tbe non-Czech inha.b!tants llved. Tbi.s was abundantly clear to objectlve observers already in 1938. Lloyd George said: "Had the Czech leaders, in tíme and without �SLOVAKIA 19 waiting for the menacing preasure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic on the llnes of the Swiu Confederation, the present troubles would (p. 952). Long before 1938, but especlally in the stlrr!ng months before MuniC'h and in the Sprlng of 1939, many dlscern!ng representatlves of the Czech and Slovak natlons were certaln that the Czechoslovak Republlc dld not develop into a forma,tion whlch could more lastlngly assure the secur!ty and the vltal !nterests of both these natlons wh!ch were the ethnlcal foundatlon of the Republlc. Ir the Czech natlon for a Ume enjoyed certa!n advantages because of the exlstence ot Czechoslovak!a, lt was only at the expense of the rest of the inhabitants. But the Czechs later had to pay dearly for those advantages and also had to become aware o[ the fact that the Czechoslovak State could not guarantee the securRy even or the Czech natlon agalnst a slngle nelghbor. As far as the S lovaks are conceTned, they could not resolve tbe ma,tter any other way, because the Slovak natlon In the Czechoslovak State - actually, however, in a CZECH State -· was In a posltlon altogether unbecomlng a cultured natlon, belng exposed to planned ass:lmllatlon and economical exploltatlon by the Czechs, wbom the whole state apparatus served. Here we are not even mentlon!ng th e status of the mlnorities as a problem, which occup!ed the League or Na.Uons for twenty years and, later, was an opportune alibi for the liquldation of the Cz-echoslovak Republ!c. Th!s problem, as well as t hat of the Slovak.s, was dealt with by such personallties as Lord Run• clman and C. A. Macartney. Rererrlng to Czechoslovak!a, the latter wrote: have been averted" - "The fact remains that the Government has been obliged more often than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its inhabltants, maintaining itself only by the expedienta of restrictlng the power, of the self-governing bodies to within the narrowest posslble limita, of filling the seats designated for 'experu' with its own nominees, and utilizing freely weapons of censorship and police supervision" (H UNGAIRY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 145). After completlng bis miss!on In 1938, Lord Runciman made even more unfavorable statements In reportlng on the status or the more than three and a half mlll!on German minority in the Republ!c. He said: " I have been left with the impreaaion that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discriminatio n, to a point where the resentment of the German populatlon was inevitably moving in the d irection of revolt. The Sudeten Germans fel>t, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by the Czechoslovak Government, but that llttle or no action had fol lowed these promises...." (Britlsh White Paper, Cmd. 5847). That is why the Republlc was not derended when Its in tegrity was threatened and, la,ter, not even when lts very exlstence was In danger. Not by a single nation of Czechoslovakia, not even the Czech natlon! �20 S LOVAKIA On the contrary, its dlssolutlon was made possible by its own inha.bitan,ts, the majority of whom could realize their natural right to freedom and their o wn State only by the destruction of Czechos lovakia. So it happened in the case of the Slovaks. W ri ting about the S lovaks in 1942, Macartney said: " ... most of them found themselves unable to accept the Peace Confe rence thesis of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. Some of them fe lt this to mean, in practice, domination by the economically and socially atronger Czecha, and they reacted in the form of a flamboyant Slovak nationalism which was the main reason for the absence of revolt with which they accepted the dissolution of the Czechos lovak State" (PRO BLEMS OF T HE DANUBE BASIN, p. 122). Dur ing the Second World War, a group of Czech exiles in London (The Czech Natio nal Commiltee) and Slovak exiles (The S lovak Na• tional Council in London), both fighting on the sid e of the Allies, tried to find a diťferent solutlon to the Czech and S lovak pr oblem than that which the fľamework of Czechoslovakia offered. Representatives of the Czech and Slovak natlons, in accord w ith the prlnciple of the right of self-determlnation and the r ight of every nation to independence, proposed ,the organlzing of a separate Slovak State and a separate Czech State within the framewo rk of a larger federalive Centro-European unit. Their efforts were prompted not only by t he interests of their own nations, but also by the interests of Eu ropean peace and prosperity, as well as by a sense for justice and the righ t. A g roup of Czech poli ticians headed by Ben eš, however, motivated by persona! prestige, by a desfre for revenge a nd the re newal of Czech i mperia'lism more than by t he interests of its own nation, did not hes.ltate to surrender the destiny of the Czech and Slovak natlons to the "tender" mercies of th~ Soviet Un ion. Unfortunately for the nations concerned, for Europe and the democratic world, this group of political madmen realized tbeir program. The Czechoslovak Republlc was restored by the grace of Moscow. Of course, no t in the interests of the Czecbs and the Slovaks, but, as it is abundantly clear today, in the interests of Moscow. Robert Ingrim, forelgn correspondent of leading European newspapers, wrote in 1946: " Russia's aim, when signing that t reaty against the wishes of Ame rica and Britain, was, of course, not to sec ure Czechia as an a ll y. They made use of Benes' fea r of a frontier revision in order to get a strong foothold in the he art of th e Continent" - (AFTER HITLER STALIN? - P. 180). What develo ped in the Czechoslovak Republic after 1945, and es pecially th e events of Feb ruary 1948, definitely prove that point. flut we must a lso state tbat restored Czechoslovakia realized it could exist only by having a Czecb majority assured. Beneš and his group were only too well aware of that and, therefore, promoted tbeir pian for ousting the Germans and Magyars trom Czechoslovakia. Because they were successful, over three million Germans and almost a half m illlon Magya rs were expelled from the ·Republic. Tbe consequences of thls " hum ane and orderly " expulsion by Beneš and bis regime will be feLt for a long time to the detriment of cooperation between the natlons of Centra! Europe. �SLOVAKIA 21 The majority of the Slovaks was definitely against the restoration of Czechoslovakla. Because the Slovak nation was not given an opportunity to express itself about i.ts own destlny, it felt and even today feels that lt was wrong, morally and otherwise, to destroy the independent State o! Slovakla, and that it was deprived of its rlght to ind ependence illegally and by vlolence. What happened in Slovakia s ince the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic has only steeled the Slovaks In thelr determination to revolt agains.t the Czech lmperialistic St.rute at the fil'st opportnne moment and 1-.estore their own S lovak State. F. A. VoigU had this to say a bout the Czech-Slovak relat!onship: "The conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks appears to be irreconcilable. lt would seem that the Czechoslovak State is, today, a fiction and that it will never again be a reality, for if RuHian overlordahip were removed, the Czechs could only reaHert their authority over the Slovaks by force of arms - and in this they would surely fail, for they have not one friend in Central Europe, whereas the Slovaks have many" (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Nov. 1945). As a result of the sltuation prevailing today, thousands of Slovak exiles in Europe, a million and a half Americans of Slovak descent, and many thousands of Slovaks in Canada, England, Argentína, Belgium, Spain, France, I,taly, Austria and Swltzerland, as well as an overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation at horne, are fighting for an Independent Slovak State, the only pol!tlcal formation which can guarantee their national existence and happlness According to the repo11t of the Prague Ministry of the Interi01•, there were uncovered 36 conspiracies in Slovakia against the Republic in Jess than two years. Thls reslstance against the State of the Czechs and Slovaks continues despite the fact that a large percentage of Slovak intellectuals has been cast into jall, tortured and exiled. and despite the fact that about 300,000 Slovaks have been transferred to the Czech-German border to weaken resistancP. in Slovakia. The logical concluslon to be drawn from all this is that from 1945 restored Czechoslovakia is belng preserved only by brute force and suppression of the most fundamental natlonal and indivldual rights, and that Czechoslovakla is a negation of all the rlghts which modern society has des igna.ted to a state for the purpose and lntent of its existence: to guarantee a free political and economical development of its people. II The Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to exist in a righteous arrangement of Europe from the viewpoint of European interests. While the Czechoslovak Republic, in the democratic sense, did not and does not fulfill the functlons of a state in relation to the majority of lts inhabitants, it is not difficult to find proofs that there ls no reason for this State to exist even as far as the interests of Europe are concerned, and much less so as far as the interests of Centra! Europe are concerned. At the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was formed with the intention that lt would perform the function of a defensive barrier �22 SLOVAKIA agalnst Germany and that it would be a part of the cordon sanitaire against Russla. Lloyd George wrote that Beneš assured the Peace Conference that "the Czecha were protectors of democracy against Germaniam" and that "it was their duty at all timea to fi ght the Germans" - (p. 932). Czechoslovakia, however, did not fulflll a slngle functlon it was supposed to, but conversely, wlth lts senseless policy towards the non-Czech majority of its lnhabitant.s, lt flrst weakened the proposed system of defense against Germany and then was the alibi and the cause for the collapse of thls system and, therefore, helped German aggression In Centra! Europe. Durlng all twenty years of its existence, the Czecbóslovak Repub• lic could not find a posltlve relationship toward even a slngle one ot its nelghbors. With its Interna! and forelgn policles, it actually prevented the consoUdat!on of the Oentro-European area and indirectly prepared the ground for the s uccess of the policy of Natlonal Sociallsm of Germany whlch, on the other hand, galned not only the mlnorlties of Czechoslovakia, but also the na.tions to which these mlnorltles belonged, by promislng to apply and abide by the natlonality prlnclple. And so, instead of becoming a barrler agalnst Germany, Czechoslovakia actually became the gate whereby Germany passed into the Danube area and southeastern Europe without any opposltion whatsoever. Instead of stopping German aggression and German im periallsm, Czechoslovakla substaf\tially facilitated the German "Drang nach Osten." And looktng from that va.ntage point, what is the situation slnce 1945? After 1-ts restoration in 1945, did the Czechoslovak State become a "bastlon o! democracy" as promis'E!d by the Czech pol!ticlans who requested the Allies to restore lt? Of course, we kno1~ that it did not. The fact 1s that it did not even become a brldge between the East and the West In the posltive sense, but only a brldge for the trafflc of the Soviet Union and lts satellltes. Over this brldge the Soviet Union went unlmpedéd into the heart of Europe. At the same Ume Czechoslovakla became the gate through which the Soviet Union and communlsm will attack the democratlc world. And who is to blame for that? In a large mea.sure all those who worked so energetioally for the restoration of Czechoslovakia In order to assure their "trlumphant" return home, the restoratlon of the Czechoslovak State w.hich collapsed so utterly in 1939, and also the assent of the Allles to expel the German and Magyar mlnorities, the Czech polltlcians, headed by Beneš, not only concluded an agreement wlth Moscow, whereby the Soviet Union w.as enabled to interfere In the affairs of Czechoslovakia, but also allowed the Soviet Union to take Ruthenia wlthout any regard for the will of the inhabltanta thereof and in violatlon of ~he Czechoslovak Con.stitutlon. Thus, Russla for the flrst tlme in its hlstory got a foothold in the Danube Basin only a few kllometers from Bu<lapest and Vlenna. The transfer of Ruthenla to the Soviet Union took place In the Sprlng of 19!l5--as compensatlon for the Sovleťs assent to expel the G-ermana .and -•Magyars from Czechoslovakla. From a polltlcal· and �SLOVAK.IA 23 strategic viewpoint, this was a great victory for the Soviet Union. Robert l ngrim had this to say about the matter: "The alliance with the Czechs who, wlthout Aussian aupport, would have been unable to re-establish their rule over a non-Czech majority of Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Authenians, is one prong of Stalin's great hayfork.... A look at the map of Europe showa the meaning of that hayfork. By including the eaatern part of formerly Auatrian Galícia in her Poliah booty, Ruaaia establishes territori al contact with the Czech satellite. The westernmoat tip of Bohernia is but 200 miles off the French border" (Op. cit. p. 181-182). Furthermore, Czech polltlclans under the leadershlp of Beneš not only prevented the possiblllty of harmonious cooperatlon of the nations of Centra! Europe, but wf.th the!r deportatlons evoked s-uch a fear of German retrlbution that they themselves see a guarantee of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia only In the politlcal and mil!tary support of the Soviet Union. In thls respect, note,.vorthy is the statement of Dr. Beneš hlmself, addressed In 1947 to a Slovak delegatlon headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich: " T he Czechs cannot accept under any circumstances an independent Slovakia i n the future •.• The Czechs, having on the one side 70 million Germans, must on the other side have Aussia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. This is a vítal problem for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and as a State" (Feb. 16, 1947). Consequently the inhabltants of Czechoslovak\a are forced to support the pollcles of the Soviet Union In the interest of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia, even though thelr polltlcal convictlons and sympathies are In dlametrical confllct wlth those pol!cles. On the otber hand, however, lt follow-s that the Czecboslovak State bases 1s exlstence only on the mllltary and pol!tlcal m1ght of a forelgn power; consequently lt has become a tool of that power and does not possess abll!ty and vítal force of !ts own to exlst as a sovereign state. T.bereln we must also seek the reason why the communist putsch of February 1948 dld not meet witb any reslstance even from the Czech nation. The very exdstence of the Czechoslovak State, whlch was not capable of exlstlng by ltself and was founded on the suppresslon of freedoms of other nat!ons, demanded the subjugat!on not only of the Czech people, hut also the Slovak natlon, w,h lch was over 70 per cent antl-communlst, by the commun!st totalltarian dlctatorshlp. The consequences of thla pollcy, whereby the so-called "raJson d'Etat" was placed before the interest of the freedom and the llfe of the lnhabltants, are lll-fated not only for the Czech and Slovak na• tions, but the Soviet Union, by means of th!s pollcy, got lnto the very heart of the E uropean contlnent and communlsm galned an important gateway through whi-ch lt can attack western Europe. Thus Czechoslovakla, twlce wlthln a slngle decade, made it posslble or substantlally easler for lmperlallsm to enter Europe and thréaten the freedoms of lts natlons: In 1938 the lmperlal!sm ot natlonally soclalistlc Germany and, In 1946-48, the lmper!allsm of communlst Russla. So, the functlon given the Czechoslovak Republlc, or that whlch !ts creators promlsed lt would perform. was not only not fulfllled, but, conversely, th!s State - besldes preventlng the coop- �24 SLOVAKIA eration of the nations of Centra! Europe and oppressing the majority of lts inhabitants - has cast Europe into dangerou.s crises twlce within a single decade and facilitated the victory of those forces, against wh1ch lt was supposed to serve, directly or indirectly, as a barrler. Therefore, it appears evldent that the exlstence of this State uot only does not have motivatlon, but that it is in the interest of Europe and its healthy organlzation that this synthetlc formatien. founded on violence and the suppression of the most fundamental freedoms of millions of human beings and existing only with the help oľ a foreign power, definitely disappear from the map of Europe. Such is the conviction not only of the absolute majoľ'ity of the S lovak nation and its true representatives, who never agreed with the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republlc, but also the convictlon of many upright and freedom-Jovlng Czechs, who fought on the side of the Allies during the past war for the creation of a separate Czech State and a separate Slovak State within a framework of a federated Centra) Europe. These Czechs have refused to return to the synthetic political creation which does not reflect the will of the majority or its !nha'bitants, but is in fact the tool of the policy and aims of the Soviet Union. 111 The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe or a federated C entral Europe. If the Czechoslovak Republic has no raison ďetre in a system of sovereign states fľom a standpoint of European interests - the securlty of Central Europe and a harmonious relationship of lts na• tions - then the existence of this unnatura! formation appears to be utterly useless and unjust in the case of federating Europe, or at least Central Europe. There are several logical and objective argu• ip.ents in support of this statement. The Czechoslovak Republic, as we have seen, was created wíth the intent of forming a barrier against German expansion, and in 1945 it was restored so it could be a bastion of democracy and a bridge be· tween the East and the West. In these functions !t falled miserably. And these motlves do not hold in the case of a federation of Europe, or at least Centra! Europe. Indivldual states, whlch could not stop aggression in Europe even with a system of alliances, certainly wlll not play the role, in a federated Europe, of preventlng a repetition of a German attack or Russlan hegemony; that wlll be the role of the federation of the Continent, or that of Centra! Europe. The argument that Czechoslovakia should be retained, because it is a larger unit than would ·be either a Czech or Slovak unit, cannot play a part in the case of a European or Centro-European federation. Strategic and economic arguments, which give priority to larger for· mations, have not proved themselves in the case of Czechoslovak!a even wlth a system of soverelgn states, because factually it could not defend ltself against any one of its neighbors. The lnclusion of the minorities and the creation of a Czechoslovakia wlth some 15 mill!on inhabitants would conmct w!th the basic principle of federalism and the expressed right of nations to self-determination. �SLOVAKIA 25 Furtherm ore the Czech nation, which has gone over to the cam p of the satelltes of the Soviet Union more or less wlllingly, cannot h31Ve any claims w hich would give it preference over all its other neighbors and allow the Czechs to annex territories occupied by nonCzech inh ab itants. After 1945, when Hungary and Germany were defeated States, and Cz~ hoslovakia - whether deservingly or not - was included a mong the victorious Allles, it was possible to restore Czechoslovakia with lts old borders, especially when Slovakia was to be punished for not being on the border of P ortugal, but on t he border of Germany, and, therefore, was included in the camp of the defeated. In a E urope liberated from t he hegemony of Moscow, not a single argument used to validate the orlgin or the restoration of -the Czechos lovak Re public wlll be aible to be used in the future, especially no t in the case of federalization of Europe or Centra! Europe. The feder• ative principle excludes hegemony of one nation over another. In the case of Slovakia, then, what logical argument can there be against the Slovak natlon h aving its own independen t State? 1s lt logical and just to say that every nation, no matter how small, EXCEPT THE SLOVAK NA'l'ION, has an inherent right to fr~dom and independence? What lnterest of the United States, England or France - or t hat of the Cent ro-European nations, wh o do not wlsh the exist· ence of the Czechoslovak Republic and already in 1939 r ecognized the righ t of th e Slov.aks to independence - could be served by such an arg ument? What loglcal arguments can there be against the just dem and of the Slovaks to be recognized legally as equal wHh other nations? In 1918 the Slovak nation was included in Czechoslovakia, by the great powers, because Dr. Edward Beneš, T. G. Masaryk and Czech propaganda claimed t hat Slovaks were Czechs who spoke a dialect o f the Czech language and, therefore, the principle of self-determination did no t a pply to them. W hen Andrew Hlinka wanted to expose this fah,e claim, he was expelled from P aris at the request of Dr. Beneš u nder th e pr etext that he was an agent of the Vatican and the Habsbu rgs. And Dr. Beneš was successful with bis "big lie" a bout the non-existence of the Slovak nation. The distinguished Eng lish historian, C. A. Macartney has this to say on the matt&r: "The story of the gradual adoption by the Allies of the theses of Masaryk and his group cannot and need not be reto ld here. By patient and indefatigable propaganda, they implanted their major postulatea - the existence of a "Czechoslovak nation" and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a part of Czechoslovak State- so firm ly in the minds of the Allies that they were never serious ly questioned at the Peace Conference. The "Czecho-Slovak" Govern ment had been recognized by a ll the princ ipal Allied and Assoc iated Powers even before the peace negotiations began -- an act whic h implied that the Slovak queation waa in principle already s ettled - while when t he moment arrived for settling a ll questions of detai l, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly establiahed as a negotiating party; indeed, in something like a priv ileged position" (HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 98). �26 SLOVAKIA Can the arguments of Masaryk and Beneš be appl!ed today or Iu the future? The fabrlcator ot that falsebood hlmself "had to" capltulate and recognlze the exlstence ot the Independent Slovak natlon. In the end Beneš was opposed to only "the proclalmlng and a manifestatlonal recognitlon of the Slovaks a.s a natlon wholly soverelgn," because, accordlng to bim, "any klnd of proclamation and manitestatlonal recognltlon of the Slovaks as a natlon totally soverelgn, not dependent on the Czechs, must lead firat to the deaire and then even to the realization of Slovak atatehood ltaelf" - (ÚVAHY O SLOVAN• STv1, p. 353). Beneš was not the only one who capltulated on that score. Other Czeohs and many Slovak adherents of the thesls o! a "unita.ry Czecboslova.k nation" - wbo made a good llvlng out of lt at the expense o! -the Slovak uation - also caplitulated. Is lt still posslble to prevent the Slovak natlon from passlng from the deslre to the "realizatlon of thelr own Slovak statehood"? What arguments are there to pre• vent thls? The argument that the Slovaks are not sufficiently mature to manage thelr own affalrs certalnly does not hold today. Even sucb a Cze-0hophlle as Dr. Mllan Hodža admltted tbat "Slovaki;i has reached if not paased the Central European's civilization level ... Some political writers in thia country used to be rather skeptical about Slova. kla and her position and even about her political ability to live. Today it is evidently proved that these doubts were unfounded" - (FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, Jarolds, London, 1942, p. 94). The Engllsh expert on Centro-European questlons, C. A. Macartney, stated that In Slovakia there exlsts "a distinctive Slovak nationalism as a factor of the Danubian situation" (PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN, London, 1942, p. 122). And let us ask a further question: Wlll lt be loglcally possible to use the argument that the Slovaks, whether in emlgratlon or at home, would not flght for thelr independence on the slde of the democracles? The Slovaks, who are dedlcated to an Independent Slovakla, are In thls !lght, wblch 1s being waged agalnst communist aggresslon, tor over a hundred years as a natlon and their past 1s not sullled by collaboratlon with communlsm. Could the western democracles, therefore, belleve the propaganda of a few Beneš Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) who collaborated with communls m and helped lt to power and then escaped abroad only when they could no Jonger hold government posltlons to enrich themselves - and dlsregard the will of the overwhelmlng majority of the Slovak natlon and lts representatlves In E>migratlon wbo stand for a separate, democratlc Slovak State witbln the framework of a federated Europe or Centra! EurQpe? ·. 1For what reasons? By an objectlve analysls, we can come to only one concluslon: in a federated Europe or Centra! Europe, the Czechoslovak Repub11c bas no rea:son to exlst and can exlst only by tbe grace of some greá.t power, just as lt dld up to 1938 by the grace of France and England, and just as lt does today by tbe grace of tbe Soviet Union. But outslde tbe Soviet Union, there ls no sucb great power whlch In tbe future would need a heterogenous Czechoslovak State founded on �BLOVAKIA 27 violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons. Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the Russlan occupation. Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In that area. • • • MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local patrlots and was maintalned by them. Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary progress of the !and. The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918. Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok, Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums are at Bratislava and at Kremnica. Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava, the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at Prešov. čiansky • • • WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected. l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism. I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944). � 16 SLOVAKIA WHY NO MORE CZEOHOSLOVAKIA ? DR. JOSEPH K I RSCHBAUM After the communist reglme Jn Bohemla and Slovakia came to power in February 1948, there appeared ln Europe, the Unlted States and In other non-European countrles a new "Czechoslovak" emlgration, conststlng of dlsmlssed diplomats and escaped politlcal leaders of the varlous Czech and Slovak civil partles. This emlgration, lf we are to appraise it by lts actlvlty, contlnues in the pollcles of Dr. Eward Beneš and hls followers, whlch means a contlnuatlon in the same mistakes and blunders whlch have evoked two dangerous crises in Europe durlng the past thlrty years. As a result of thls blundering policy more than half the population of the Czecboslovak Republic (Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Carpatho-Russlans) was elther deprlved of the most fundamental human and civil rlghts, or deslgnedly lmpeded In lts polltlcal and economical development. Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of tbe oldest families in Bohemia, had thls to say about Czech policy: "Even In norma! tlmes the double game of Czecb policy can be seen Quite clearly. As long as Czecboslovakia adopted the role of dependence on the West, Benes was at the helm and from 1945 onward prepared the dellvery of hls country to the Communists. Al! the mlndste-rs in hls Cablnet {there were about two dozen of them) worked with thelr ldollzed Presldent, and in a most masterly fashion steered thelr country lnto Communlsm, always hop!ng for a good job as a reward for thelr laudable work In the Bolshevist interest." NEW ENGLISH REVIEW MAGAZINE, 1949, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22). It is a fact that Czechoslovakia was re-establlshed at the end of World War II agalnst the w111 of the absolute majori ty of the Slovaks and the many mlll!ons of national minorltles by the polllical actlv!ty of a small group of Czech exiles, who were not concerned "·lth the lnterests of the Czech and Slovak nations, or the interests of the ,vbole of Europe, but were rather Jed by imperlallsm, their persona! amblt!ons and a des!re for revenge. And it ls a historical fact that the Czecboslovak State was surrendered, without res!stance, to the power of Mosoow by these pollticlans just as in 1938-1939, w!thout the least resistance, they surrendered it to Berlin. In tbe llgbt of these faots and In the interest of better organ!· zation and cooperatlon or the Centra! European natlons, as well as In the interest of trutb and justlce, lt appea:-s necessary to point out the arguments whlch speak agalnst the exlstence or the Czechoslovak Republlc. An analysis, lssuing from European and Centro-European points of vlew and not only from the lnterests of natlons and mlnorlt!es whlch were forced tnto the Czecboslovak Republ!c agalnst their wlll, is demanded In this connectlon by our slde, because !t !s based on the motlve contained In the Declaratlon o! Independence of the Unlted ~tates, In whlcb we read: " W hen in t he course of human events, it becomes necessary for �SLOVAKIA 17 one people to dissolve the political banda which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separated and equal station to whi ch the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opíníons of mankind requ ires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation." What are the causes which led the Slovaks and the minorities to demand the dlssolution of political ties with the Czech nation in t he Czechoslovak Republic? Generally speaking, we can mention, first of all, the following: 1. Tendencies for the preservatlon or restoration of the Czechos lovak Republic do not meet with the approval of the majority of lts inhabitants and the principle of democracy and the principles ex· pressed in the Atlantic Charter. 2. The Czechoslovak Republic has no cause to exist in a just arrangement of Europe even from the standpoint of European in· terests. 3. The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe or a federated Centra! Europe. More than thirty years of clever Czech propaganda migh t, at a first glance, contradict these allegations. There Js no argument ahout that. In the mirror of our experience with the propaganda of Goebels, and, today, that of Moscow, we see, however, that even a propaganda of falsehoods can be successful for a time, deceiving and convinclng many people. But the force of truth is eternal. By resorting to lies we may enjoy successes temporarily, but the truth shall prevail in the end. In the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, we are concerned witili nothing more than the truth. Tbat is why we are analyzing the above-mentioned arguments at least in their main outlines. And in dolng this, we pu.rposely refer to the testimonies of· objective, politlcal European observers, so that no one rnight say that the Slovak s truggle for freedom and independence issues from an exaggerated nationalism or natlonal intolerenace, as Cz&eh propaganda designedly claims that it does. The Slovaks were co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic and would have wished its preservation, if the Czechoslovak State would bave had possessed the prerequisites to fulfill the task that falls to a state in the sense of a modem, sociologlcal conception, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the standpolnt of European interests. The Czechoslovak Repu blic, however, diel not. The Slovaks, therefore, in the lntent of democracy, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter of the United Nations Organization, are demanding a new order of Centro-Eu.ropean relationships. to which the Czechoslovak Republic definitely 1s an obstacle, as shall be made clear in the arguments that follow. Are the tendenciea to preserve or restore the Czechoslovak Republic in harmony with the will of the majority of ita inhabítanta and the princ iples upon which a modern state ia founded ? �18 SLOVAKIA This question was already asked at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at whlch the Czechoslovak Republlc was born, as Lloyd George tells us in bis book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties": "Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians - is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech ban• ner, a new polyglot state in which six nations will be packed together, all filled with hatred of one against the other, arrested in their whole economic and social development and in the progress of their civilization by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning their whole public llfe? - How can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic community, geographical unity, or common history?" - {pp. 944, 946). Lloyd George evldently wa.s troubled wlth the prOl)osltion of setting up Czechoslovakia and stated bluntly: "The Czechs were specially favored by the Allies. The result was the recognition of the polyglot and incoherent state of Czechoslovakia." - (p. 948). We see, then, at the very beglnning of the Czechoslovak RepubJic, that nelther the lnterests o( the lnhabitants ot the newly-rlsing s tate, nor tbe prlnclple or the rlght of self-determlnation and of democratlc freedoms were tbe decldlng factors, but only the "special favor of tbe Allles." It was, tberefore, only natural tbat the Czecbo• slovak Republlc durlng al! lts 20 years was troubled with interna! controversles - cleverly masked abroad by a great propaganda apparatu.s - and that lt collapsed wltbout the least resistance of its populatlon with tbe flrst lmpact from outslde in 1938-1939. What is more, we can show that ,tbe majority of the inhabitants even deslred the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic by quotlng statements of Czech polltlclans themselves and recalllng those made durlng the polltlcal trlals of the "people's" democracy of Czechoslovakla versus the Slovaks, Germans and Magyars - the trials staged by the Czech Government after 1945. Why dld they deslre lts dlssolutlon? Indisputably because the Czechoslovak Republi c dld not satisfy the polltlcal and economlc !nterests and aspirations of its inhabitants, except those of the Czech minority which managed tbe State. Al the Par!s Peace Conference (1919), Dr. Edward Beneš declared that: "lt is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organlzatlon of tbe State by accepting as a basis of natural rights tbe prlnclples applled in the Constitutlon of tbe Swlss Republlc, tbat !s, to make the Czechoslovak Republlc a sor-t of Swltzerland . . ." Tbe Czecb governments, bowever, did not manage tbe Czechoslovak Republlc as Beneš had promlsed, but In sucb manner as Jf only an exclusive Czecb State was concerned, whose mission apparently wa,s to asslmilate the non-Czech populat!on, and espec!ally the Slovaks, and hold them in cbeck economlcally and soc!ally. Tbe resistance of the other lnhabltants and the support of tbe efforts whlch almed at the dlssolutlon of tbe Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, became an entlrely logical r~ult of the sltuation in whlcb tbe non-Czech inha.b!tants llved. Tbi.s was abundantly clear to objectlve observers already in 1938. Lloyd George said: "Had the Czech leaders, in tíme and without �SLOVAKIA 19 waiting for the menacing preasure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic on the llnes of the Swiu Confederation, the present troubles would (p. 952). Long before 1938, but especlally in the stlrr!ng months before MuniC'h and in the Sprlng of 1939, many dlscern!ng representatlves of the Czech and Slovak natlons were certaln that the Czechoslovak Republlc dld not develop into a forma,tion whlch could more lastlngly assure the secur!ty and the vltal !nterests of both these natlons wh!ch were the ethnlcal foundatlon of the Republlc. Ir the Czech natlon for a Ume enjoyed certa!n advantages because of the exlstence ot Czechoslovak!a, lt was only at the expense of the rest of the inhabitants. But the Czechs later had to pay dearly for those advantages and also had to become aware o[ the fact that the Czechoslovak State could not guarantee the securRy even or the Czech natlon agalnst a slngle nelghbor. As far as the S lovaks are conceTned, they could not resolve tbe ma,tter any other way, because the Slovak natlon In the Czechoslovak State - actually, however, in a CZECH State -· was In a posltlon altogether unbecomlng a cultured natlon, belng exposed to planned ass:lmllatlon and economical exploltatlon by the Czechs, wbom the whole state apparatus served. Here we are not even mentlon!ng th e status of the mlnorities as a problem, which occup!ed the League or Na.Uons for twenty years and, later, was an opportune alibi for the liquldation of the Cz-echoslovak Republ!c. Th!s problem, as well as t hat of the Slovak.s, was dealt with by such personallties as Lord Run• clman and C. A. Macartney. Rererrlng to Czechoslovak!a, the latter wrote: have been averted" - "The fact remains that the Government has been obliged more often than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its inhabltants, maintaining itself only by the expedienta of restrictlng the power, of the self-governing bodies to within the narrowest posslble limita, of filling the seats designated for 'experu' with its own nominees, and utilizing freely weapons of censorship and police supervision" (H UNGAIRY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 145). After completlng bis miss!on In 1938, Lord Runciman made even more unfavorable statements In reportlng on the status or the more than three and a half mlll!on German minority in the Republ!c. He said: " I have been left with the impreaaion that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discriminatio n, to a point where the resentment of the German populatlon was inevitably moving in the d irection of revolt. The Sudeten Germans fel>t, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by the Czechoslovak Government, but that llttle or no action had fol lowed these promises...." (Britlsh White Paper, Cmd. 5847). That is why the Republlc was not derended when Its in tegrity was threatened and, la,ter, not even when lts very exlstence was In danger. Not by a single nation of Czechoslovakia, not even the Czech natlon! �20 S LOVAKIA On the contrary, its dlssolutlon was made possible by its own inha.bitan,ts, the majority of whom could realize their natural right to freedom and their o wn State only by the destruction of Czechos lovakia. So it happened in the case of the Slovaks. W ri ting about the S lovaks in 1942, Macartney said: " ... most of them found themselves unable to accept the Peace Confe rence thesis of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. Some of them fe lt this to mean, in practice, domination by the economically and socially atronger Czecha, and they reacted in the form of a flamboyant Slovak nationalism which was the main reason for the absence of revolt with which they accepted the dissolution of the Czechos lovak State" (PRO BLEMS OF T HE DANUBE BASIN, p. 122). Dur ing the Second World War, a group of Czech exiles in London (The Czech Natio nal Commiltee) and Slovak exiles (The S lovak Na• tional Council in London), both fighting on the sid e of the Allies, tried to find a diťferent solutlon to the Czech and S lovak pr oblem than that which the fľamework of Czechoslovakia offered. Representatives of the Czech and Slovak natlons, in accord w ith the prlnciple of the right of self-determlnation and the r ight of every nation to independence, proposed ,the organlzing of a separate Slovak State and a separate Czech State within the framewo rk of a larger federalive Centro-European unit. Their efforts were prompted not only by t he interests of their own nations, but also by the interests of Eu ropean peace and prosperity, as well as by a sense for justice and the righ t. A g roup of Czech poli ticians headed by Ben eš, however, motivated by persona! prestige, by a desfre for revenge a nd the re newal of Czech i mperia'lism more than by t he interests of its own nation, did not hes.ltate to surrender the destiny of the Czech and Slovak natlons to the "tender" mercies of th~ Soviet Un ion. Unfortunately for the nations concerned, for Europe and the democratic world, this group of political madmen realized tbeir program. The Czechoslovak Republlc was restored by the grace of Moscow. Of course, no t in the interests of the Czecbs and the Slovaks, but, as it is abundantly clear today, in the interests of Moscow. Robert Ingrim, forelgn correspondent of leading European newspapers, wrote in 1946: " Russia's aim, when signing that t reaty against the wishes of Ame rica and Britain, was, of course, not to sec ure Czechia as an a ll y. They made use of Benes' fea r of a frontier revision in order to get a strong foothold in the he art of th e Continent" - (AFTER HITLER STALIN? - P. 180). What develo ped in the Czechoslovak Republic after 1945, and es pecially th e events of Feb ruary 1948, definitely prove that point. flut we must a lso state tbat restored Czechoslovakia realized it could exist only by having a Czecb majority assured. Beneš and his group were only too well aware of that and, therefore, promoted tbeir pian for ousting the Germans and Magyars trom Czechoslovakia. Because they were successful, over three million Germans and almost a half m illlon Magya rs were expelled from the ·Republic. Tbe consequences of thls " hum ane and orderly " expulsion by Beneš and bis regime will be feLt for a long time to the detriment of cooperation between the natlons of Centra! Europe. �SLOVAKIA 21 The majority of the Slovaks was definitely against the restoration of Czechoslovakla. Because the Slovak nation was not given an opportunity to express itself about i.ts own destlny, it felt and even today feels that lt was wrong, morally and otherwise, to destroy the independent State o! Slovakla, and that it was deprived of its rlght to ind ependence illegally and by vlolence. What happened in Slovakia s ince the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic has only steeled the Slovaks In thelr determination to revolt agains.t the Czech lmperialistic St.rute at the fil'st opportnne moment and 1-.estore their own S lovak State. F. A. VoigU had this to say a bout the Czech-Slovak relat!onship: "The conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks appears to be irreconcilable. lt would seem that the Czechoslovak State is, today, a fiction and that it will never again be a reality, for if RuHian overlordahip were removed, the Czechs could only reaHert their authority over the Slovaks by force of arms - and in this they would surely fail, for they have not one friend in Central Europe, whereas the Slovaks have many" (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Nov. 1945). As a result of the sltuation prevailing today, thousands of Slovak exiles in Europe, a million and a half Americans of Slovak descent, and many thousands of Slovaks in Canada, England, Argentína, Belgium, Spain, France, I,taly, Austria and Swltzerland, as well as an overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation at horne, are fighting for an Independent Slovak State, the only pol!tlcal formation which can guarantee their national existence and happlness According to the repo11t of the Prague Ministry of the Interi01•, there were uncovered 36 conspiracies in Slovakia against the Republic in Jess than two years. Thls reslstance against the State of the Czechs and Slovaks continues despite the fact that a large percentage of Slovak intellectuals has been cast into jall, tortured and exiled. and despite the fact that about 300,000 Slovaks have been transferred to the Czech-German border to weaken resistancP. in Slovakia. The logical concluslon to be drawn from all this is that from 1945 restored Czechoslovakia is belng preserved only by brute force and suppression of the most fundamental natlonal and indivldual rights, and that Czechoslovakla is a negation of all the rlghts which modern society has des igna.ted to a state for the purpose and lntent of its existence: to guarantee a free political and economical development of its people. II The Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to exist in a righteous arrangement of Europe from the viewpoint of European interests. While the Czechoslovak Republic, in the democratic sense, did not and does not fulfill the functlons of a state in relation to the majority of lts inhabitants, it is not difficult to find proofs that there ls no reason for this State to exist even as far as the interests of Europe are concerned, and much less so as far as the interests of Centra! Europe are concerned. At the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was formed with the intention that lt would perform the function of a defensive barrier �22 SLOVAKIA agalnst Germany and that it would be a part of the cordon sanitaire against Russla. Lloyd George wrote that Beneš assured the Peace Conference that "the Czecha were protectors of democracy against Germaniam" and that "it was their duty at all timea to fi ght the Germans" - (p. 932). Czechoslovakia, however, did not fulflll a slngle functlon it was supposed to, but conversely, wlth lts senseless policy towards the non-Czech majority of its lnhabitant.s, lt flrst weakened the proposed system of defense against Germany and then was the alibi and the cause for the collapse of thls system and, therefore, helped German aggression In Centra! Europe. Durlng all twenty years of its existence, the Czecbóslovak Repub• lic could not find a posltlve relationship toward even a slngle one ot its nelghbors. With its Interna! and forelgn policles, it actually prevented the consoUdat!on of the Oentro-European area and indirectly prepared the ground for the s uccess of the policy of Natlonal Sociallsm of Germany whlch, on the other hand, galned not only the mlnorlties of Czechoslovakia, but also the na.tions to which these mlnorltles belonged, by promislng to apply and abide by the natlonality prlnclple. And so, instead of becoming a barrler agalnst Germany, Czechoslovakia actually became the gate whereby Germany passed into the Danube area and southeastern Europe without any opposltion whatsoever. Instead of stopping German aggression and German im periallsm, Czechoslovakla substaf\tially facilitated the German "Drang nach Osten." And looktng from that va.ntage point, what is the situation slnce 1945? After 1-ts restoration in 1945, did the Czechoslovak State become a "bastlon o! democracy" as promis'E!d by the Czech pol!ticlans who requested the Allies to restore lt? Of course, we kno1~ that it did not. The fact 1s that it did not even become a brldge between the East and the West In the posltive sense, but only a brldge for the trafflc of the Soviet Union and lts satellltes. Over this brldge the Soviet Union went unlmpedéd into the heart of Europe. At the same Ume Czechoslovakla became the gate through which the Soviet Union and communlsm will attack the democratlc world. And who is to blame for that? In a large mea.sure all those who worked so energetioally for the restoration of Czechoslovakia In order to assure their "trlumphant" return home, the restoratlon of the Czechoslovak State w.hich collapsed so utterly in 1939, and also the assent of the Allles to expel the German and Magyar mlnorities, the Czech polltlcians, headed by Beneš, not only concluded an agreement wlth Moscow, whereby the Soviet Union w.as enabled to interfere In the affairs of Czechoslovakia, but also allowed the Soviet Union to take Ruthenia wlthout any regard for the will of the inhabltanta thereof and in violatlon of ~he Czechoslovak Con.stitutlon. Thus, Russla for the flrst tlme in its hlstory got a foothold in the Danube Basin only a few kllometers from Bu<lapest and Vlenna. The transfer of Ruthenla to the Soviet Union took place In the Sprlng of 19!l5--as compensatlon for the Sovleťs assent to expel the G-ermana .and -•Magyars from Czechoslovakla. From a polltlcal· and �SLOVAK.IA 23 strategic viewpoint, this was a great victory for the Soviet Union. Robert l ngrim had this to say about the matter: "The alliance with the Czechs who, wlthout Aussian aupport, would have been unable to re-establish their rule over a non-Czech majority of Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Authenians, is one prong of Stalin's great hayfork.... A look at the map of Europe showa the meaning of that hayfork. By including the eaatern part of formerly Auatrian Galícia in her Poliah booty, Ruaaia establishes territori al contact with the Czech satellite. The westernmoat tip of Bohernia is but 200 miles off the French border" (Op. cit. p. 181-182). Furthermore, Czech polltlclans under the leadershlp of Beneš not only prevented the possiblllty of harmonious cooperatlon of the nations of Centra! Europe, but wf.th the!r deportatlons evoked s-uch a fear of German retrlbution that they themselves see a guarantee of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia only In the politlcal and mil!tary support of the Soviet Union. In thls respect, note,.vorthy is the statement of Dr. Beneš hlmself, addressed In 1947 to a Slovak delegatlon headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich: " T he Czechs cannot accept under any circumstances an independent Slovakia i n the future •.• The Czechs, having on the one side 70 million Germans, must on the other side have Aussia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. This is a vítal problem for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and as a State" (Feb. 16, 1947). Consequently the inhabltants of Czechoslovak\a are forced to support the pollcles of the Soviet Union In the interest of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia, even though thelr polltlcal convictlons and sympathies are In dlametrical confllct wlth those pol!cles. On the otber hand, however, lt follow-s that the Czecboslovak State bases 1s exlstence only on the mllltary and pol!tlcal m1ght of a forelgn power; consequently lt has become a tool of that power and does not possess abll!ty and vítal force of !ts own to exlst as a sovereign state. T.bereln we must also seek the reason why the communist putsch of February 1948 dld not meet witb any reslstance even from the Czech nation. The very exdstence of the Czechoslovak State, whlch was not capable of exlstlng by ltself and was founded on the suppresslon of freedoms of other nat!ons, demanded the subjugat!on not only of the Czech people, hut also the Slovak natlon, w,h lch was over 70 per cent antl-communlst, by the commun!st totalltarian dlctatorshlp. The consequences of thla pollcy, whereby the so-called "raJson d'Etat" was placed before the interest of the freedom and the llfe of the lnhabltants, are lll-fated not only for the Czech and Slovak na• tions, but the Soviet Union, by means of th!s pollcy, got lnto the very heart of the E uropean contlnent and communlsm galned an important gateway through whi-ch lt can attack western Europe. Thus Czechoslovakla, twlce wlthln a slngle decade, made it posslble or substantlally easler for lmperlallsm to enter Europe and thréaten the freedoms of lts natlons: In 1938 the lmperlal!sm ot natlonally soclalistlc Germany and, In 1946-48, the lmper!allsm of communlst Russla. So, the functlon given the Czechoslovak Republlc, or that whlch !ts creators promlsed lt would perform. was not only not fulfllled, but, conversely, th!s State - besldes preventlng the coop- �24 SLOVAKIA eration of the nations of Centra! Europe and oppressing the majority of lts inhabitants - has cast Europe into dangerou.s crises twlce within a single decade and facilitated the victory of those forces, against wh1ch lt was supposed to serve, directly or indirectly, as a barrler. Therefore, it appears evldent that the exlstence of this State uot only does not have motivatlon, but that it is in the interest of Europe and its healthy organlzation that this synthetlc formatien. founded on violence and the suppression of the most fundamental freedoms of millions of human beings and existing only with the help oľ a foreign power, definitely disappear from the map of Europe. Such is the conviction not only of the absolute majoľ'ity of the S lovak nation and its true representatives, who never agreed with the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republlc, but also the convictlon of many upright and freedom-Jovlng Czechs, who fought on the side of the Allies during the past war for the creation of a separate Czech State and a separate Slovak State within a framework of a federated Centra) Europe. These Czechs have refused to return to the synthetic political creation which does not reflect the will of the majority or its !nha'bitants, but is in fact the tool of the policy and aims of the Soviet Union. 111 The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe or a federated C entral Europe. If the Czechoslovak Republic has no raison ďetre in a system of sovereign states fľom a standpoint of European interests - the securlty of Central Europe and a harmonious relationship of lts na• tions - then the existence of this unnatura! formation appears to be utterly useless and unjust in the case of federating Europe, or at least Central Europe. There are several logical and objective argu• ip.ents in support of this statement. The Czechoslovak Republic, as we have seen, was created wíth the intent of forming a barrier against German expansion, and in 1945 it was restored so it could be a bastion of democracy and a bridge be· tween the East and the West. In these functions !t falled miserably. And these motlves do not hold in the case of a federation of Europe, or at least Centra! Europe. Indivldual states, whlch could not stop aggression in Europe even with a system of alliances, certainly wlll not play the role, in a federated Europe, of preventlng a repetition of a German attack or Russlan hegemony; that wlll be the role of the federation of the Continent, or that of Centra! Europe. The argument that Czechoslovakia should be retained, because it is a larger unit than would ·be either a Czech or Slovak unit, cannot play a part in the case of a European or Centro-European federation. Strategic and economic arguments, which give priority to larger for· mations, have not proved themselves in the case of Czechoslovak!a even wlth a system of soverelgn states, because factually it could not defend ltself against any one of its neighbors. The lnclusion of the minorities and the creation of a Czechoslovakia wlth some 15 mill!on inhabitants would conmct w!th the basic principle of federalism and the expressed right of nations to self-determination. �SLOVAKIA 25 Furtherm ore the Czech nation, which has gone over to the cam p of the satelltes of the Soviet Union more or less wlllingly, cannot h31Ve any claims w hich would give it preference over all its other neighbors and allow the Czechs to annex territories occupied by nonCzech inh ab itants. After 1945, when Hungary and Germany were defeated States, and Cz~ hoslovakia - whether deservingly or not - was included a mong the victorious Allles, it was possible to restore Czechoslovakia with lts old borders, especially when Slovakia was to be punished for not being on the border of P ortugal, but on t he border of Germany, and, therefore, was included in the camp of the defeated. In a E urope liberated from t he hegemony of Moscow, not a single argument used to validate the orlgin or the restoration of -the Czechos lovak Re public wlll be aible to be used in the future, especially no t in the case of federalization of Europe or Centra! Europe. The feder• ative principle excludes hegemony of one nation over another. In the case of Slovakia, then, what logical argument can there be against the Slovak natlon h aving its own independen t State? 1s lt logical and just to say that every nation, no matter how small, EXCEPT THE SLOVAK NA'l'ION, has an inherent right to fr~dom and independence? What lnterest of the United States, England or France - or t hat of the Cent ro-European nations, wh o do not wlsh the exist· ence of the Czechoslovak Republic and already in 1939 r ecognized the righ t of th e Slov.aks to independence - could be served by such an arg ument? What loglcal arguments can there be against the just dem and of the Slovaks to be recognized legally as equal wHh other nations? In 1918 the Slovak nation was included in Czechoslovakia, by the great powers, because Dr. Edward Beneš, T. G. Masaryk and Czech propaganda claimed t hat Slovaks were Czechs who spoke a dialect o f the Czech language and, therefore, the principle of self-determination did no t a pply to them. W hen Andrew Hlinka wanted to expose this fah,e claim, he was expelled from P aris at the request of Dr. Beneš u nder th e pr etext that he was an agent of the Vatican and the Habsbu rgs. And Dr. Beneš was successful with bis "big lie" a bout the non-existence of the Slovak nation. The distinguished Eng lish historian, C. A. Macartney has this to say on the matt&r: "The story of the gradual adoption by the Allies of the theses of Masaryk and his group cannot and need not be reto ld here. By patient and indefatigable propaganda, they implanted their major postulatea - the existence of a "Czechoslovak nation" and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a part of Czechoslovak State- so firm ly in the minds of the Allies that they were never serious ly questioned at the Peace Conference. The "Czecho-Slovak" Govern ment had been recognized by a ll the princ ipal Allied and Assoc iated Powers even before the peace negotiations began -- an act whic h implied that the Slovak queation waa in principle already s ettled - while when t he moment arrived for settling a ll questions of detai l, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly establiahed as a negotiating party; indeed, in something like a priv ileged position" (HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 98). �26 SLOVAKIA Can the arguments of Masaryk and Beneš be appl!ed today or Iu the future? The fabrlcator ot that falsebood hlmself "had to" capltulate and recognlze the exlstence ot the Independent Slovak natlon. In the end Beneš was opposed to only "the proclalmlng and a manifestatlonal recognitlon of the Slovaks a.s a natlon wholly soverelgn," because, accordlng to bim, "any klnd of proclamation and manitestatlonal recognltlon of the Slovaks as a natlon totally soverelgn, not dependent on the Czechs, must lead firat to the deaire and then even to the realization of Slovak atatehood ltaelf" - (ÚVAHY O SLOVAN• STv1, p. 353). Beneš was not the only one who capltulated on that score. Other Czeohs and many Slovak adherents of the thesls o! a "unita.ry Czecboslova.k nation" - wbo made a good llvlng out of lt at the expense o! -the Slovak uation - also caplitulated. Is lt still posslble to prevent the Slovak natlon from passlng from the deslre to the "realizatlon of thelr own Slovak statehood"? What arguments are there to pre• vent thls? The argument that the Slovaks are not sufficiently mature to manage thelr own affalrs certalnly does not hold today. Even sucb a Cze-0hophlle as Dr. Mllan Hodža admltted tbat "Slovaki;i has reached if not paased the Central European's civilization level ... Some political writers in thia country used to be rather skeptical about Slova. kla and her position and even about her political ability to live. Today it is evidently proved that these doubts were unfounded" - (FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, Jarolds, London, 1942, p. 94). The Engllsh expert on Centro-European questlons, C. A. Macartney, stated that In Slovakia there exlsts "a distinctive Slovak nationalism as a factor of the Danubian situation" (PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN, London, 1942, p. 122). And let us ask a further question: Wlll lt be loglcally possible to use the argument that the Slovaks, whether in emlgratlon or at home, would not flght for thelr independence on the slde of the democracles? The Slovaks, who are dedlcated to an Independent Slovakla, are In thls !lght, wblch 1s being waged agalnst communist aggresslon, tor over a hundred years as a natlon and their past 1s not sullled by collaboratlon with communlsm. Could the western democracles, therefore, belleve the propaganda of a few Beneš Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) who collaborated with communls m and helped lt to power and then escaped abroad only when they could no Jonger hold government posltlons to enrich themselves - and dlsregard the will of the overwhelmlng majority of the Slovak natlon and lts representatlves In E>migratlon wbo stand for a separate, democratlc Slovak State witbln the framework of a federated Europe or Centra! EurQpe? ·. 1For what reasons? By an objectlve analysls, we can come to only one concluslon: in a federated Europe or Centra! Europe, the Czechoslovak Repub11c bas no rea:son to exlst and can exlst only by tbe grace of some greá.t power, just as lt dld up to 1938 by the grace of France and England, and just as lt does today by tbe grace of tbe Soviet Union. But outslde tbe Soviet Union, there ls no sucb great power whlch In tbe future would need a heterogenous Czechoslovak State founded on �BLOVAKIA 27 violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons. Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the Russlan occupation. Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In that area. • • • MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local patrlots and was maintalned by them. Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary progress of the !and. The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918. Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok, Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums are at Bratislava and at Kremnica. Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava, the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at Prešov. čiansky • • • WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected. l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism. I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 16 SLOVAKIA WHY NO MORE CZEOHOSLOVAKIA ? DR. JOSEPH K I RSCHBAUM After the communist reglme Jn Bohemla and Slovakia came to power in February 1948, there appeared ln Europe, the Unlted States and In other non-European countrles a new "Czechoslovak" emlgration, conststlng of dlsmlssed diplomats and escaped politlcal leaders of the varlous Czech and Slovak civil partles. This emlgration, lf we are to appraise it by lts actlvlty, contlnues in the pollcles of Dr. Eward Beneš and hls followers, whlch means a contlnuatlon in the same mistakes and blunders whlch have evoked two dangerous crises in Europe durlng the past thlrty years. As a result of thls blundering policy more than half the population of the Czecboslovak Republic (Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Carpatho-Russlans) was elther deprlved of the most fundamental human and civil rlghts, or deslgnedly lmpeded In lts polltlcal and economical development. Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of tbe oldest families in Bohemia, had thls to say about Czech policy: "Even In norma! tlmes the double game of Czecb policy can be seen Quite clearly. As long as Czecboslovakia adopted the role of dependence on the West, Benes was at the helm and from 1945 onward prepared the dellvery of hls country to the Communists. Al! the mlndste-rs in hls Cablnet {there were about two dozen of them) worked with thelr ldollzed Presldent, and in a most masterly fashion steered thelr country lnto Communlsm, always hop!ng for a good job as a reward for thelr laudable work In the Bolshevist interest." NEW ENGLISH REVIEW MAGAZINE, 1949, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22). It is a fact that Czechoslovakia was re-establlshed at the end of World War II agalnst the w111 of the absolute majori ty of the Slovaks and the many mlll!ons of national minorltles by the polllical actlv!ty of a small group of Czech exiles, who were not concerned "·lth the lnterests of the Czech and Slovak nations, or the interests of the ,vbole of Europe, but were rather Jed by imperlallsm, their persona! amblt!ons and a des!re for revenge. And it ls a historical fact that the Czecboslovak State was surrendered, without res!stance, to the power of Mosoow by these pollticlans just as in 1938-1939, w!thout the least resistance, they surrendered it to Berlin. In tbe llgbt of these faots and In the interest of better organ!· zation and cooperatlon or the Centra! European natlons, as well as In the interest of trutb and justlce, lt appea:-s necessary to point out the arguments whlch speak agalnst the exlstence or the Czechoslovak Republlc. An analysis, lssuing from European and Centro-European points of vlew and not only from the lnterests of natlons and mlnorlt!es whlch were forced tnto the Czecboslovak Republ!c agalnst their wlll, is demanded In this connectlon by our slde, because !t !s based on the motlve contained In the Declaratlon o! Independence of the Unlted ~tates, In whlcb we read: " W hen in t he course of human events, it becomes necessary for SLOVAKIA 17 one people to dissolve the political banda which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separated and equal station to whi ch the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opíníons of mankind requ ires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation." What are the causes which led the Slovaks and the minorities to demand the dlssolution of political ties with the Czech nation in t he Czechoslovak Republic? Generally speaking, we can mention, first of all, the following: 1. Tendencies for the preservatlon or restoration of the Czechos lovak Republic do not meet with the approval of the majority of lts inhabitants and the principle of democracy and the principles ex· pressed in the Atlantic Charter. 2. The Czechoslovak Republic has no cause to exist in a just arrangement of Europe even from the standpoint of European in· terests. 3. The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe or a federated Centra! Europe. More than thirty years of clever Czech propaganda migh t, at a first glance, contradict these allegations. There Js no argument ahout that. In the mirror of our experience with the propaganda of Goebels, and, today, that of Moscow, we see, however, that even a propaganda of falsehoods can be successful for a time, deceiving and convinclng many people. But the force of truth is eternal. By resorting to lies we may enjoy successes temporarily, but the truth shall prevail in the end. In the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, we are concerned witili nothing more than the truth. Tbat is why we are analyzing the above-mentioned arguments at least in their main outlines. And in dolng this, we pu.rposely refer to the testimonies of· objective, politlcal European observers, so that no one rnight say that the Slovak s truggle for freedom and independence issues from an exaggerated nationalism or natlonal intolerenace, as Cz&eh propaganda designedly claims that it does. The Slovaks were co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic and would have wished its preservation, if the Czechoslovak State would bave had possessed the prerequisites to fulfill the task that falls to a state in the sense of a modem, sociologlcal conception, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the standpolnt of European interests. The Czechoslovak Repu blic, however, diel not. The Slovaks, therefore, in the lntent of democracy, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter of the United Nations Organization, are demanding a new order of Centro-Eu.ropean relationships. to which the Czechoslovak Republic definitely 1s an obstacle, as shall be made clear in the arguments that follow. Are the tendenciea to preserve or restore the Czechoslovak Republic in harmony with the will of the majority of ita inhabítanta and the princ iples upon which a modern state ia founded ? 18 SLOVAKIA This question was already asked at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at whlch the Czechoslovak Republlc was born, as Lloyd George tells us in bis book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties": "Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians - is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech ban• ner, a new polyglot state in which six nations will be packed together, all filled with hatred of one against the other, arrested in their whole economic and social development and in the progress of their civilization by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning their whole public llfe? - How can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic community, geographical unity, or common history?" - {pp. 944, 946). Lloyd George evldently wa.s troubled wlth the prOl)osltion of setting up Czechoslovakia and stated bluntly: "The Czechs were specially favored by the Allies. The result was the recognition of the polyglot and incoherent state of Czechoslovakia." - (p. 948). We see, then, at the very beglnning of the Czechoslovak RepubJic, that nelther the lnterests o( the lnhabitants ot the newly-rlsing s tate, nor tbe prlnclple or the rlght of self-determlnation and of democratlc freedoms were tbe decldlng factors, but only the "special favor of tbe Allles." It was, tberefore, only natural tbat the Czecbo• slovak Republlc durlng al! lts 20 years was troubled with interna! controversles - cleverly masked abroad by a great propaganda apparatu.s - and that lt collapsed wltbout the least resistance of its populatlon with tbe flrst lmpact from outslde in 1938-1939. What is more, we can show that ,tbe majority of the inhabitants even deslred the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic by quotlng statements of Czech polltlclans themselves and recalllng those made durlng the polltlcal trlals of the "people's" democracy of Czechoslovakla versus the Slovaks, Germans and Magyars - the trials staged by the Czech Government after 1945. Why dld they deslre lts dlssolutlon? Indisputably because the Czechoslovak Republi c dld not satisfy the polltlcal and economlc !nterests and aspirations of its inhabitants, except those of the Czech minority which managed tbe State. Al the Par!s Peace Conference (1919), Dr. Edward Beneš declared that: "lt is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organlzatlon of tbe State by accepting as a basis of natural rights tbe prlnclples applled in the Constitutlon of tbe Swlss Republlc, tbat !s, to make the Czechoslovak Republlc a sor-t of Swltzerland . . ." Tbe Czecb governments, bowever, did not manage tbe Czechoslovak Republlc as Beneš had promlsed, but In sucb manner as Jf only an exclusive Czecb State was concerned, whose mission apparently wa,s to asslmilate the non-Czech populat!on, and espec!ally the Slovaks, and hold them in cbeck economlcally and soc!ally. Tbe resistance of the other lnhabltants and the support of tbe efforts whlch almed at the dlssolutlon of tbe Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, became an entlrely logical r~ult of the sltuation in whlcb tbe non-Czech inha.b!tants llved. Tbi.s was abundantly clear to objectlve observers already in 1938. Lloyd George said: "Had the Czech leaders, in tíme and without SLOVAKIA 19 waiting for the menacing preasure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic on the llnes of the Swiu Confederation, the present troubles would (p. 952). Long before 1938, but especlally in the stlrr!ng months before MuniC'h and in the Sprlng of 1939, many dlscern!ng representatlves of the Czech and Slovak natlons were certaln that the Czechoslovak Republlc dld not develop into a forma,tion whlch could more lastlngly assure the secur!ty and the vltal !nterests of both these natlons wh!ch were the ethnlcal foundatlon of the Republlc. Ir the Czech natlon for a Ume enjoyed certa!n advantages because of the exlstence ot Czechoslovak!a, lt was only at the expense of the rest of the inhabitants. But the Czechs later had to pay dearly for those advantages and also had to become aware o[ the fact that the Czechoslovak State could not guarantee the securRy even or the Czech natlon agalnst a slngle nelghbor. As far as the S lovaks are conceTned, they could not resolve tbe ma,tter any other way, because the Slovak natlon In the Czechoslovak State - actually, however, in a CZECH State -· was In a posltlon altogether unbecomlng a cultured natlon, belng exposed to planned ass:lmllatlon and economical exploltatlon by the Czechs, wbom the whole state apparatus served. Here we are not even mentlon!ng th e status of the mlnorities as a problem, which occup!ed the League or Na.Uons for twenty years and, later, was an opportune alibi for the liquldation of the Cz-echoslovak Republ!c. Th!s problem, as well as t hat of the Slovak.s, was dealt with by such personallties as Lord Run• clman and C. A. Macartney. Rererrlng to Czechoslovak!a, the latter wrote: have been averted" - "The fact remains that the Government has been obliged more often than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its inhabltants, maintaining itself only by the expedienta of restrictlng the power, of the self-governing bodies to within the narrowest posslble limita, of filling the seats designated for 'experu' with its own nominees, and utilizing freely weapons of censorship and police supervision" (H UNGAIRY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 145). After completlng bis miss!on In 1938, Lord Runciman made even more unfavorable statements In reportlng on the status or the more than three and a half mlll!on German minority in the Republ!c. He said: " I have been left with the impreaaion that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discriminatio n, to a point where the resentment of the German populatlon was inevitably moving in the d irection of revolt. The Sudeten Germans fel>t, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by the Czechoslovak Government, but that llttle or no action had fol lowed these promises...." (Britlsh White Paper, Cmd. 5847). That is why the Republlc was not derended when Its in tegrity was threatened and, la,ter, not even when lts very exlstence was In danger. Not by a single nation of Czechoslovakia, not even the Czech natlon! 20 S LOVAKIA On the contrary, its dlssolutlon was made possible by its own inha.bitan,ts, the majority of whom could realize their natural right to freedom and their o wn State only by the destruction of Czechos lovakia. So it happened in the case of the Slovaks. W ri ting about the S lovaks in 1942, Macartney said: " ... most of them found themselves unable to accept the Peace Confe rence thesis of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. Some of them fe lt this to mean, in practice, domination by the economically and socially atronger Czecha, and they reacted in the form of a flamboyant Slovak nationalism which was the main reason for the absence of revolt with which they accepted the dissolution of the Czechos lovak State" (PRO BLEMS OF T HE DANUBE BASIN, p. 122). Dur ing the Second World War, a group of Czech exiles in London (The Czech Natio nal Commiltee) and Slovak exiles (The S lovak Na• tional Council in London), both fighting on the sid e of the Allies, tried to find a diťferent solutlon to the Czech and S lovak pr oblem than that which the fľamework of Czechoslovakia offered. Representatives of the Czech and Slovak natlons, in accord w ith the prlnciple of the right of self-determlnation and the r ight of every nation to independence, proposed ,the organlzing of a separate Slovak State and a separate Czech State within the framewo rk of a larger federalive Centro-European unit. Their efforts were prompted not only by t he interests of their own nations, but also by the interests of Eu ropean peace and prosperity, as well as by a sense for justice and the righ t. A g roup of Czech poli ticians headed by Ben eš, however, motivated by persona! prestige, by a desfre for revenge a nd the re newal of Czech i mperia'lism more than by t he interests of its own nation, did not hes.ltate to surrender the destiny of the Czech and Slovak natlons to the "tender" mercies of th~ Soviet Un ion. Unfortunately for the nations concerned, for Europe and the democratic world, this group of political madmen realized tbeir program. The Czechoslovak Republlc was restored by the grace of Moscow. Of course, no t in the interests of the Czecbs and the Slovaks, but, as it is abundantly clear today, in the interests of Moscow. Robert Ingrim, forelgn correspondent of leading European newspapers, wrote in 1946: " Russia's aim, when signing that t reaty against the wishes of Ame rica and Britain, was, of course, not to sec ure Czechia as an a ll y. They made use of Benes' fea r of a frontier revision in order to get a strong foothold in the he art of th e Continent" - (AFTER HITLER STALIN? - P. 180). What develo ped in the Czechoslovak Republic after 1945, and es pecially th e events of Feb ruary 1948, definitely prove that point. flut we must a lso state tbat restored Czechoslovakia realized it could exist only by having a Czecb majority assured. Beneš and his group were only too well aware of that and, therefore, promoted tbeir pian for ousting the Germans and Magyars trom Czechoslovakia. Because they were successful, over three million Germans and almost a half m illlon Magya rs were expelled from the ·Republic. Tbe consequences of thls " hum ane and orderly " expulsion by Beneš and bis regime will be feLt for a long time to the detriment of cooperation between the natlons of Centra! Europe. SLOVAKIA 21 The majority of the Slovaks was definitely against the restoration of Czechoslovakla. Because the Slovak nation was not given an opportunity to express itself about i.ts own destlny, it felt and even today feels that lt was wrong, morally and otherwise, to destroy the independent State o! Slovakla, and that it was deprived of its rlght to ind ependence illegally and by vlolence. What happened in Slovakia s ince the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic has only steeled the Slovaks In thelr determination to revolt agains.t the Czech lmperialistic St.rute at the fil'st opportnne moment and 1-.estore their own S lovak State. F. A. VoigU had this to say a bout the Czech-Slovak relat!onship: "The conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks appears to be irreconcilable. lt would seem that the Czechoslovak State is, today, a fiction and that it will never again be a reality, for if RuHian overlordahip were removed, the Czechs could only reaHert their authority over the Slovaks by force of arms - and in this they would surely fail, for they have not one friend in Central Europe, whereas the Slovaks have many" (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Nov. 1945). As a result of the sltuation prevailing today, thousands of Slovak exiles in Europe, a million and a half Americans of Slovak descent, and many thousands of Slovaks in Canada, England, Argentína, Belgium, Spain, France, I,taly, Austria and Swltzerland, as well as an overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation at horne, are fighting for an Independent Slovak State, the only pol!tlcal formation which can guarantee their national existence and happlness According to the repo11t of the Prague Ministry of the Interi01•, there were uncovered 36 conspiracies in Slovakia against the Republic in Jess than two years. Thls reslstance against the State of the Czechs and Slovaks continues despite the fact that a large percentage of Slovak intellectuals has been cast into jall, tortured and exiled. and despite the fact that about 300,000 Slovaks have been transferred to the Czech-German border to weaken resistancP. in Slovakia. The logical concluslon to be drawn from all this is that from 1945 restored Czechoslovakia is belng preserved only by brute force and suppression of the most fundamental natlonal and indivldual rights, and that Czechoslovakla is a negation of all the rlghts which modern society has des igna.ted to a state for the purpose and lntent of its existence: to guarantee a free political and economical development of its people. II The Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to exist in a righteous arrangement of Europe from the viewpoint of European interests. While the Czechoslovak Republic, in the democratic sense, did not and does not fulfill the functlons of a state in relation to the majority of lts inhabitants, it is not difficult to find proofs that there ls no reason for this State to exist even as far as the interests of Europe are concerned, and much less so as far as the interests of Centra! Europe are concerned. At the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was formed with the intention that lt would perform the function of a defensive barrier 22 SLOVAKIA agalnst Germany and that it would be a part of the cordon sanitaire against Russla. Lloyd George wrote that Beneš assured the Peace Conference that "the Czecha were protectors of democracy against Germaniam" and that "it was their duty at all timea to fi ght the Germans" - (p. 932). Czechoslovakia, however, did not fulflll a slngle functlon it was supposed to, but conversely, wlth lts senseless policy towards the non-Czech majority of its lnhabitant.s, lt flrst weakened the proposed system of defense against Germany and then was the alibi and the cause for the collapse of thls system and, therefore, helped German aggression In Centra! Europe. Durlng all twenty years of its existence, the Czecbóslovak Repub• lic could not find a posltlve relationship toward even a slngle one ot its nelghbors. With its Interna! and forelgn policles, it actually prevented the consoUdat!on of the Oentro-European area and indirectly prepared the ground for the s uccess of the policy of Natlonal Sociallsm of Germany whlch, on the other hand, galned not only the mlnorlties of Czechoslovakia, but also the na.tions to which these mlnorltles belonged, by promislng to apply and abide by the natlonality prlnclple. And so, instead of becoming a barrler agalnst Germany, Czechoslovakia actually became the gate whereby Germany passed into the Danube area and southeastern Europe without any opposltion whatsoever. Instead of stopping German aggression and German im periallsm, Czechoslovakla substaf\tially facilitated the German "Drang nach Osten." And looktng from that va.ntage point, what is the situation slnce 1945? After 1-ts restoration in 1945, did the Czechoslovak State become a "bastlon o! democracy" as promis'E!d by the Czech pol!ticlans who requested the Allies to restore lt? Of course, we kno1~ that it did not. The fact 1s that it did not even become a brldge between the East and the West In the posltive sense, but only a brldge for the trafflc of the Soviet Union and lts satellltes. Over this brldge the Soviet Union went unlmpedéd into the heart of Europe. At the same Ume Czechoslovakla became the gate through which the Soviet Union and communlsm will attack the democratlc world. And who is to blame for that? In a large mea.sure all those who worked so energetioally for the restoration of Czechoslovakia In order to assure their "trlumphant" return home, the restoratlon of the Czechoslovak State w.hich collapsed so utterly in 1939, and also the assent of the Allles to expel the German and Magyar mlnorities, the Czech polltlcians, headed by Beneš, not only concluded an agreement wlth Moscow, whereby the Soviet Union w.as enabled to interfere In the affairs of Czechoslovakia, but also allowed the Soviet Union to take Ruthenia wlthout any regard for the will of the inhabltanta thereof and in violatlon of ~he Czechoslovak Con.stitutlon. Thus, Russla for the flrst tlme in its hlstory got a foothold in the Danube Basin only a few kllometers from Bu<lapest and Vlenna. The transfer of Ruthenla to the Soviet Union took place In the Sprlng of 19!l5--as compensatlon for the Sovleťs assent to expel the G-ermana .and -•Magyars from Czechoslovakla. From a polltlcal· and SLOVAK.IA 23 strategic viewpoint, this was a great victory for the Soviet Union. Robert l ngrim had this to say about the matter: "The alliance with the Czechs who, wlthout Aussian aupport, would have been unable to re-establish their rule over a non-Czech majority of Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Authenians, is one prong of Stalin's great hayfork.... A look at the map of Europe showa the meaning of that hayfork. By including the eaatern part of formerly Auatrian Galícia in her Poliah booty, Ruaaia establishes territori al contact with the Czech satellite. The westernmoat tip of Bohernia is but 200 miles off the French border" (Op. cit. p. 181-182). Furthermore, Czech polltlclans under the leadershlp of Beneš not only prevented the possiblllty of harmonious cooperatlon of the nations of Centra! Europe, but wf.th the!r deportatlons evoked s-uch a fear of German retrlbution that they themselves see a guarantee of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia only In the politlcal and mil!tary support of the Soviet Union. In thls respect, note,.vorthy is the statement of Dr. Beneš hlmself, addressed In 1947 to a Slovak delegatlon headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich: " T he Czechs cannot accept under any circumstances an independent Slovakia i n the future •.• The Czechs, having on the one side 70 million Germans, must on the other side have Aussia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. This is a vítal problem for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and as a State" (Feb. 16, 1947). Consequently the inhabltants of Czechoslovak\a are forced to support the pollcles of the Soviet Union In the interest of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia, even though thelr polltlcal convictlons and sympathies are In dlametrical confllct wlth those pol!cles. On the otber hand, however, lt follow-s that the Czecboslovak State bases 1s exlstence only on the mllltary and pol!tlcal m1ght of a forelgn power; consequently lt has become a tool of that power and does not possess abll!ty and vítal force of !ts own to exlst as a sovereign state. T.bereln we must also seek the reason why the communist putsch of February 1948 dld not meet witb any reslstance even from the Czech nation. The very exdstence of the Czechoslovak State, whlch was not capable of exlstlng by ltself and was founded on the suppresslon of freedoms of other nat!ons, demanded the subjugat!on not only of the Czech people, hut also the Slovak natlon, w,h lch was over 70 per cent antl-communlst, by the commun!st totalltarian dlctatorshlp. The consequences of thla pollcy, whereby the so-called "raJson d'Etat" was placed before the interest of the freedom and the llfe of the lnhabltants, are lll-fated not only for the Czech and Slovak na• tions, but the Soviet Union, by means of th!s pollcy, got lnto the very heart of the E uropean contlnent and communlsm galned an important gateway through whi-ch lt can attack western Europe. Thus Czechoslovakla, twlce wlthln a slngle decade, made it posslble or substantlally easler for lmperlallsm to enter Europe and thréaten the freedoms of lts natlons: In 1938 the lmperlal!sm ot natlonally soclalistlc Germany and, In 1946-48, the lmper!allsm of communlst Russla. So, the functlon given the Czechoslovak Republlc, or that whlch !ts creators promlsed lt would perform. was not only not fulfllled, but, conversely, th!s State - besldes preventlng the coop- 24 SLOVAKIA eration of the nations of Centra! Europe and oppressing the majority of lts inhabitants - has cast Europe into dangerou.s crises twlce within a single decade and facilitated the victory of those forces, against wh1ch lt was supposed to serve, directly or indirectly, as a barrler. Therefore, it appears evldent that the exlstence of this State uot only does not have motivatlon, but that it is in the interest of Europe and its healthy organlzation that this synthetlc formatien. founded on violence and the suppression of the most fundamental freedoms of millions of human beings and existing only with the help oľ a foreign power, definitely disappear from the map of Europe. Such is the conviction not only of the absolute majoľ'ity of the S lovak nation and its true representatives, who never agreed with the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republlc, but also the convictlon of many upright and freedom-Jovlng Czechs, who fought on the side of the Allies during the past war for the creation of a separate Czech State and a separate Slovak State within a framework of a federated Centra) Europe. These Czechs have refused to return to the synthetic political creation which does not reflect the will of the majority or its !nha'bitants, but is in fact the tool of the policy and aims of the Soviet Union. 111 The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe or a federated C entral Europe. If the Czechoslovak Republic has no raison ďetre in a system of sovereign states fľom a standpoint of European interests - the securlty of Central Europe and a harmonious relationship of lts na• tions - then the existence of this unnatura! formation appears to be utterly useless and unjust in the case of federating Europe, or at least Central Europe. There are several logical and objective argu• ip.ents in support of this statement. The Czechoslovak Republic, as we have seen, was created wíth the intent of forming a barrier against German expansion, and in 1945 it was restored so it could be a bastion of democracy and a bridge be· tween the East and the West. In these functions !t falled miserably. And these motlves do not hold in the case of a federation of Europe, or at least Centra! Europe. Indivldual states, whlch could not stop aggression in Europe even with a system of alliances, certainly wlll not play the role, in a federated Europe, of preventlng a repetition of a German attack or Russlan hegemony; that wlll be the role of the federation of the Continent, or that of Centra! Europe. The argument that Czechoslovakia should be retained, because it is a larger unit than would ·be either a Czech or Slovak unit, cannot play a part in the case of a European or Centro-European federation. Strategic and economic arguments, which give priority to larger for· mations, have not proved themselves in the case of Czechoslovak!a even wlth a system of soverelgn states, because factually it could not defend ltself against any one of its neighbors. The lnclusion of the minorities and the creation of a Czechoslovakia wlth some 15 mill!on inhabitants would conmct w!th the basic principle of federalism and the expressed right of nations to self-determination. SLOVAKIA 25 Furtherm ore the Czech nation, which has gone over to the cam p of the satelltes of the Soviet Union more or less wlllingly, cannot h31Ve any claims w hich would give it preference over all its other neighbors and allow the Czechs to annex territories occupied by nonCzech inh ab itants. After 1945, when Hungary and Germany were defeated States, and Cz~ hoslovakia - whether deservingly or not - was included a mong the victorious Allles, it was possible to restore Czechoslovakia with lts old borders, especially when Slovakia was to be punished for not being on the border of P ortugal, but on t he border of Germany, and, therefore, was included in the camp of the defeated. In a E urope liberated from t he hegemony of Moscow, not a single argument used to validate the orlgin or the restoration of -the Czechos lovak Re public wlll be aible to be used in the future, especially no t in the case of federalization of Europe or Centra! Europe. The feder• ative principle excludes hegemony of one nation over another. In the case of Slovakia, then, what logical argument can there be against the Slovak natlon h aving its own independen t State? 1s lt logical and just to say that every nation, no matter how small, EXCEPT THE SLOVAK NA'l'ION, has an inherent right to fr~dom and independence? What lnterest of the United States, England or France - or t hat of the Cent ro-European nations, wh o do not wlsh the exist· ence of the Czechoslovak Republic and already in 1939 r ecognized the righ t of th e Slov.aks to independence - could be served by such an arg ument? What loglcal arguments can there be against the just dem and of the Slovaks to be recognized legally as equal wHh other nations? In 1918 the Slovak nation was included in Czechoslovakia, by the great powers, because Dr. Edward Beneš, T. G. Masaryk and Czech propaganda claimed t hat Slovaks were Czechs who spoke a dialect o f the Czech language and, therefore, the principle of self-determination did no t a pply to them. W hen Andrew Hlinka wanted to expose this fah,e claim, he was expelled from P aris at the request of Dr. Beneš u nder th e pr etext that he was an agent of the Vatican and the Habsbu rgs. And Dr. Beneš was successful with bis "big lie" a bout the non-existence of the Slovak nation. The distinguished Eng lish historian, C. A. Macartney has this to say on the matt&r: "The story of the gradual adoption by the Allies of the theses of Masaryk and his group cannot and need not be reto ld here. By patient and indefatigable propaganda, they implanted their major postulatea - the existence of a "Czechoslovak nation" and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a part of Czechoslovak State- so firm ly in the minds of the Allies that they were never serious ly questioned at the Peace Conference. The "Czecho-Slovak" Govern ment had been recognized by a ll the princ ipal Allied and Assoc iated Powers even before the peace negotiations began -- an act whic h implied that the Slovak queation waa in principle already s ettled - while when t he moment arrived for settling a ll questions of detai l, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly establiahed as a negotiating party; indeed, in something like a priv ileged position" (HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 98). 26 SLOVAKIA Can the arguments of Masaryk and Beneš be appl!ed today or Iu the future? The fabrlcator ot that falsebood hlmself "had to" capltulate and recognlze the exlstence ot the Independent Slovak natlon. In the end Beneš was opposed to only "the proclalmlng and a manifestatlonal recognitlon of the Slovaks a.s a natlon wholly soverelgn," because, accordlng to bim, "any klnd of proclamation and manitestatlonal recognltlon of the Slovaks as a natlon totally soverelgn, not dependent on the Czechs, must lead firat to the deaire and then even to the realization of Slovak atatehood ltaelf" - (ÚVAHY O SLOVAN• STv1, p. 353). Beneš was not the only one who capltulated on that score. Other Czeohs and many Slovak adherents of the thesls o! a "unita.ry Czecboslova.k nation" - wbo made a good llvlng out of lt at the expense o! -the Slovak uation - also caplitulated. Is lt still posslble to prevent the Slovak natlon from passlng from the deslre to the "realizatlon of thelr own Slovak statehood"? What arguments are there to pre• vent thls? The argument that the Slovaks are not sufficiently mature to manage thelr own affalrs certalnly does not hold today. Even sucb a Cze-0hophlle as Dr. Mllan Hodža admltted tbat "Slovaki;i has reached if not paased the Central European's civilization level ... Some political writers in thia country used to be rather skeptical about Slova. kla and her position and even about her political ability to live. Today it is evidently proved that these doubts were unfounded" - (FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, Jarolds, London, 1942, p. 94). The Engllsh expert on Centro-European questlons, C. A. Macartney, stated that In Slovakia there exlsts "a distinctive Slovak nationalism as a factor of the Danubian situation" (PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN, London, 1942, p. 122). And let us ask a further question: Wlll lt be loglcally possible to use the argument that the Slovaks, whether in emlgratlon or at home, would not flght for thelr independence on the slde of the democracles? The Slovaks, who are dedlcated to an Independent Slovakla, are In thls !lght, wblch 1s being waged agalnst communist aggresslon, tor over a hundred years as a natlon and their past 1s not sullled by collaboratlon with communlsm. Could the western democracles, therefore, belleve the propaganda of a few Beneš Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) who collaborated with communls m and helped lt to power and then escaped abroad only when they could no Jonger hold government posltlons to enrich themselves - and dlsregard the will of the overwhelmlng majority of the Slovak natlon and lts representatlves In E>migratlon wbo stand for a separate, democratlc Slovak State witbln the framework of a federated Europe or Centra! EurQpe? ·. 1For what reasons? By an objectlve analysls, we can come to only one concluslon: in a federated Europe or Centra! Europe, the Czechoslovak Repub11c bas no rea:son to exlst and can exlst only by tbe grace of some greá.t power, just as lt dld up to 1938 by the grace of France and England, and just as lt does today by tbe grace of tbe Soviet Union. But outslde tbe Soviet Union, there ls no sucb great power whlch In tbe future would need a heterogenous Czechoslovak State founded on BLOVAKIA 27 violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons. Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the Russlan occupation. Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In that area. • • • MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local patrlots and was maintalned by them. Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary progress of the !and. The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918. Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok, Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums are at Bratislava and at Kremnica. Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava, the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at Prešov. čiansky • • • WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected. l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism. I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Why No More Czechoslovakia? Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 16-27 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2d812967aec21ecc4b3d1cd617c4b6c2.pdf 230ca8ed744f32fe091968328a55ad98 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 13 THE SWVAIK REPUBLIC - FRUIT OF HLINKA'S STRUGGLE Ka.rol Sidor (Preaident of the Slovak Natlonal Couneil Abroad) The great Polish phllosopher and polltlclan Roman Dmowski, who labored for the resurrection of Poland In 1918 and dled In 1939, wrote these noteworthy words: " Here in Poland we are tired of reading p0lemics on the theme: who, In recent Umes, flrst used the expression INDEl'ENDENCE and whlch polltlcal party flrst loudly proclalmed that lt wants state Inde• pendence. Thls makes a chlldlsh and unsavory dlscusslon. We have s tate lndependence not because some one repeated voclferously that he wanted lndependence. We have lt because there were people who worked systematlcally for lts attalnment, orlentated themselves well to cxlsting condltlons and knew how to use well all the clrcumstances leading to lndependence. People must know not only what they want, but also what they must do, what road they shall travel to reach the desired goal. Programs of wlshing are only empty and trultless mottoes." As in Poland, so also among the Slovaks in Slovakia much has already been written and sald about thls subject. But Slovaks at horne and abroad seem to be forgettlng that there would have been no Slovak State lndependence without the untirlng po\ltlcal labors of tbe thousands and thousands of outstanding and ordinai:y people of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party who worked for the polltlcal lndependence of thelr country slnce the inauguratlon of the party In 1905 untll Slovak lndependence Day, March 14, 1939. Wlthout Hlinka and his party the terrain would not have been prepared for independence. We can say wlthout fear of contradlction that the leaders of Hlinka's polltlcal party expressed the will and deslres of the Slovak people for an Independent Slovak llfe both durlng the exlstence of old Hungary and also durlng the llfe of the Czechoslovak Repul!llc. or course, always in a way sulted to condltlons, because cven an Idea has evolutionary forma. A dlfferent form for the cblldlsh age of a natlon and another for bis mature years. The followers of štar, Radllnský and Vajanský up to 1918 expressed themselves moderately In form but convlnclngly in substance. When lt came to the breaklng of bread In 1918, however, Andrew Hlinka, leader of bis party, proclalmed on May 24th at Turčiansky Svätý Martin: "The 1000-year-old marrlage with the Magyars was a tallure. We must part." Such a resolutlon of the Slovak program was both modern and s ultable to the tlmes. Thls sentiment was expressed more forcefully on October 19, 1918, In the Budapest parllament by Dr. Ferdl!'! Juriga, a depu ty of H llnka's Slovak Party, when he sald: "On the basls of natural and hlstorlcal rlghts we demand our right of self-determlnation so that we, as a natlonal entity, could form our own, separate community on tbe terrltory we bave settled." An~ on January 23, 1920, this same Juriga emphaslzed in the �14 SLOVAKIA Prague Parliament even the form of future Slovak life, when he said: "Federalism is the system of the future. The order of the future ís not centralism but federalism. We mu.st preserve our individuality and not let ourselves be absorbed. We must let every national unit crystalllze out into a Jegal personallty so that these various national units could then federalize into one great world republic. This would be only the hlghest idea! and only one road leads to it: federalism." Other deputies of Hlinka's party expressed themselves in a slmilar vein in the Prague Parllament until 1939. They demanded independent Slovak army units for Slovakia, with Slovak as the language of command, and separate Slovak diplomatic representation abroad. It is known that the most significant signs of sovereignty are: one's own natlonal army and national representatlon abroad. The climax for this whole endeavor for Slovak polit!cal independence was the Žilina proclamation of October 6, 1938, In which the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Trade Union Party, the Fascist Party, the National Sociallsts and the Slovak Natlonal Party (of Rázus) united on a slngle Slovak program. "We, the undersigned," says the document accepted and und"lrsigned by duly authorlzed representatives of the partles mentionerl. "adopt the motion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to lssue a constltutional Iaw apropos Slovak autonomy in such form as prE:sented in the As.sembly of Deputles and published in the perlodical SLOVÁK, No. 129, June 5, 1938. We promlse to use all our strengtb to have this mot!on accepted constitutionalJy by the National Assembly." "We demand that the Vice-Chairman of the Hlinka S lovak Peo• ple's Party, Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, lmmediately be authorlzed so that as chalrman-deslgnate he set up the first Slovak Government In agreement wlth the underslgned polltlcal partles." At that time (October 1938), ther~ were 45 Slovak deputies in the Prague Parllament: 19 representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, 11 Agrarlans, 5 Social Democrats, 5 Communists, 1 National Socialist, 1 National Unity member, 1 Trades Union member, 1 Fasclst, and 1 member ot the Natlonal Slovak Party. AII, · except thi> Communists and the Social Democrats · (10), signed the Žilina docu• ment of October 6, 1938. This was a unlfication ou program which eveu the Czechs respected. On November 22, 1938, a new constltutional document wns publlshed. Thls new Constitution was voted for by a fully qualifleď majority not only of the Slovak but also of the Czech deputies and senators. And in thls Const!tutlon the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parliament were already well anchored by flrm paragraphs. So it was that the future destlny of Slovakia - in a legal anď democratlc way - pas.sed over lnto the banda of the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parllament whlch was authorized by all Slovaks. This was the foundatlon on which the Slovaks cont!nued to build theirState and on March 14, 1939, this foundatlon served as a means to proclalm even the independence of the Slovak State -- again legally and demociatically. From this brie! sketch we see clearly that without the preparatory Iabors - ideological and organizational - of the Hlinka Slovak Peo �SLOVAKIA 15 ple's Party, fir.st in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia, the proclamation of Slovakia's independence on March 14, 1939, would not have been possible. For that reason, not indivldual persons, but whole generations of humble and forgotten Slovak patriots have merited recognitlon. The least we can do is honor them for working so assidiously and uncompromlslngly for the politlcal independence of the Slovaks. The spirit of Andrej Hlinka dominated all of them. In Andrej Hlinka all these indefatigable workers for freedom saw themselves. H linka was their leader and theh- idea!. When he was honored, they felt honored also. And so it was when the Slovak legislat!ve assem bly passed the law (No. 83) on Aprll 25, 1939, <to memorialize Hlinka and the generations of Slovak patriots who labored with him for Slovak freedom by placing a bust of Hlinka in the Slovak Nat!onal Assembly_ The Slovaks at horne and abroad shall never forget And rej Hlinka, his Slovak People's Party - the Slovak patriots who llved and died for the freedom of the Slovak nation. It is a fact that the Slovak Republic was the fruit of Hlinka's fight (or the inherent right o[ the Slovak people to polltical freedom . • • • WHO SAID IT? '"Today we have received from Alex Kendrick in Vienna the first solid explanation of what was behind the recent drastic shake-up in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and Government. Apparently what happened was that Slovakian autonomy, both political and eco· nomic, was wiped out. A considerable number of Slovak Party mem• bers were flung into jail. Bratislava, the capila! of Slovakla, was the real center of a separatist movem ent deeply influenced by Tlto's success. Czechoslovakia is Russia's most important satellite. But di ffe re nces between Czechs and S lova ks are much o lde r than co mmun ism. What Moscow decided to do was to destroy the independence of the Slovaklan communist party, and all hopes of economic and polltlcal independence for the Slovak.s. This is an effort by the Soviet Union to counteract the attractlon of Yugoslavia that ls felt by Czech and Slovak allke." - EDWARD IR. MURROW With the News, The Columbia Broadcasting System, Sept. 21, 1951. • "In complete harmony with the thinking or the Czech and Slovak nation, the agreemenl of frlendshlp, mutual aid a nd post-war cooperation between the ÔSR and tbe USSR was com pleted in Mosco\\· on December 12, 1943, for a period of 20 years. . . . This or ientat ion is an unchangable note eve n for our futu re politic al life." - Dr. Josepb Lettrich, ÔAS, 1-27-48. • " No ne of us has the r lght to obligate defin it e ly for the futu re our people and st at e in fundamental matters, i ntern a ! or inte rnational, t o anyth ing . . .. That holds for all of us and, above all, e ven for me personally. 1 t hlnk that it is necess ary that th is be altogethe r c lear. That is why from the beginnning I ha ve r efused to make any fundamental, interna! o r international, t ies ..... ." - (Dr. Edward Benes, to the Czechoslovak State Councll, Nov. 2:\, 19Hl. � SLOVAKIA 13 THE SWVAIK REPUBLIC - FRUIT OF HLINKA'S STRUGGLE Ka.rol Sidor (Preaident of the Slovak Natlonal Couneil Abroad) The great Polish phllosopher and polltlclan Roman Dmowski, who labored for the resurrection of Poland In 1918 and dled In 1939, wrote these noteworthy words: " Here in Poland we are tired of reading p0lemics on the theme: who, In recent Umes, flrst used the expression INDEl'ENDENCE and whlch polltlcal party flrst loudly proclalmed that lt wants state Inde• pendence. Thls makes a chlldlsh and unsavory dlscusslon. We have s tate lndependence not because some one repeated voclferously that he wanted lndependence. We have lt because there were people who worked systematlcally for lts attalnment, orlentated themselves well to cxlsting condltlons and knew how to use well all the clrcumstances leading to lndependence. People must know not only what they want, but also what they must do, what road they shall travel to reach the desired goal. Programs of wlshing are only empty and trultless mottoes." As in Poland, so also among the Slovaks in Slovakia much has already been written and sald about thls subject. But Slovaks at horne and abroad seem to be forgettlng that there would have been no Slovak State lndependence without the untirlng po\ltlcal labors of tbe thousands and thousands of outstanding and ordinai:y people of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party who worked for the polltlcal lndependence of thelr country slnce the inauguratlon of the party In 1905 untll Slovak lndependence Day, March 14, 1939. Wlthout Hlinka and his party the terrain would not have been prepared for independence. We can say wlthout fear of contradlction that the leaders of Hlinka's polltlcal party expressed the will and deslres of the Slovak people for an Independent Slovak llfe both durlng the exlstence of old Hungary and also durlng the llfe of the Czechoslovak Repul!llc. or course, always in a way sulted to condltlons, because cven an Idea has evolutionary forma. A dlfferent form for the cblldlsh age of a natlon and another for bis mature years. The followers of štar, Radllnský and Vajanský up to 1918 expressed themselves moderately In form but convlnclngly in substance. When lt came to the breaklng of bread In 1918, however, Andrew Hlinka, leader of bis party, proclalmed on May 24th at Turčiansky Svätý Martin: "The 1000-year-old marrlage with the Magyars was a tallure. We must part." Such a resolutlon of the Slovak program was both modern and s ultable to the tlmes. Thls sentiment was expressed more forcefully on October 19, 1918, In the Budapest parllament by Dr. Ferdl!'! Juriga, a depu ty of H llnka's Slovak Party, when he sald: "On the basls of natural and hlstorlcal rlghts we demand our right of self-determlnation so that we, as a natlonal entity, could form our own, separate community on tbe terrltory we bave settled." An~ on January 23, 1920, this same Juriga emphaslzed in the �14 SLOVAKIA Prague Parliament even the form of future Slovak life, when he said: "Federalism is the system of the future. The order of the future ís not centralism but federalism. We mu.st preserve our individuality and not let ourselves be absorbed. We must let every national unit crystalllze out into a Jegal personallty so that these various national units could then federalize into one great world republic. This would be only the hlghest idea! and only one road leads to it: federalism." Other deputies of Hlinka's party expressed themselves in a slmilar vein in the Prague Parllament until 1939. They demanded independent Slovak army units for Slovakia, with Slovak as the language of command, and separate Slovak diplomatic representation abroad. It is known that the most significant signs of sovereignty are: one's own natlonal army and national representatlon abroad. The climax for this whole endeavor for Slovak polit!cal independence was the Žilina proclamation of October 6, 1938, In which the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Trade Union Party, the Fascist Party, the National Sociallsts and the Slovak Natlonal Party (of Rázus) united on a slngle Slovak program. "We, the undersigned," says the document accepted and und"lrsigned by duly authorlzed representatives of the partles mentionerl. "adopt the motion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to lssue a constltutional Iaw apropos Slovak autonomy in such form as prE:sented in the As.sembly of Deputles and published in the perlodical SLOVÁK, No. 129, June 5, 1938. We promlse to use all our strengtb to have this mot!on accepted constitutionalJy by the National Assembly." "We demand that the Vice-Chairman of the Hlinka S lovak Peo• ple's Party, Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, lmmediately be authorlzed so that as chalrman-deslgnate he set up the first Slovak Government In agreement wlth the underslgned polltlcal partles." At that time (October 1938), ther~ were 45 Slovak deputies in the Prague Parllament: 19 representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, 11 Agrarlans, 5 Social Democrats, 5 Communists, 1 National Socialist, 1 National Unity member, 1 Trades Union member, 1 Fasclst, and 1 member ot the Natlonal Slovak Party. AII, · except thi> Communists and the Social Democrats · (10), signed the Žilina docu• ment of October 6, 1938. This was a unlfication ou program which eveu the Czechs respected. On November 22, 1938, a new constltutional document wns publlshed. Thls new Constitution was voted for by a fully qualifleď majority not only of the Slovak but also of the Czech deputies and senators. And in thls Const!tutlon the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parliament were already well anchored by flrm paragraphs. So it was that the future destlny of Slovakia - in a legal anď democratlc way - pas.sed over lnto the banda of the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parllament whlch was authorized by all Slovaks. This was the foundatlon on which the Slovaks cont!nued to build theirState and on March 14, 1939, this foundatlon served as a means to proclalm even the independence of the Slovak State -- again legally and demociatically. From this brie! sketch we see clearly that without the preparatory Iabors - ideological and organizational - of the Hlinka Slovak Peo �SLOVAKIA 15 ple's Party, fir.st in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia, the proclamation of Slovakia's independence on March 14, 1939, would not have been possible. For that reason, not indivldual persons, but whole generations of humble and forgotten Slovak patriots have merited recognitlon. The least we can do is honor them for working so assidiously and uncompromlslngly for the politlcal independence of the Slovaks. The spirit of Andrej Hlinka dominated all of them. In Andrej Hlinka all these indefatigable workers for freedom saw themselves. H linka was their leader and theh- idea!. When he was honored, they felt honored also. And so it was when the Slovak legislat!ve assem bly passed the law (No. 83) on Aprll 25, 1939, <to memorialize Hlinka and the generations of Slovak patriots who labored with him for Slovak freedom by placing a bust of Hlinka in the Slovak Nat!onal Assembly_ The Slovaks at horne and abroad shall never forget And rej Hlinka, his Slovak People's Party - the Slovak patriots who llved and died for the freedom of the Slovak nation. It is a fact that the Slovak Republic was the fruit of Hlinka's fight (or the inherent right o[ the Slovak people to polltical freedom . • • • WHO SAID IT? '"Today we have received from Alex Kendrick in Vienna the first solid explanation of what was behind the recent drastic shake-up in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and Government. Apparently what happened was that Slovakian autonomy, both political and eco· nomic, was wiped out. A considerable number of Slovak Party mem• bers were flung into jail. Bratislava, the capila! of Slovakla, was the real center of a separatist movem ent deeply influenced by Tlto's success. Czechoslovakia is Russia's most important satellite. But di ffe re nces between Czechs and S lova ks are much o lde r than co mmun ism. What Moscow decided to do was to destroy the independence of the Slovaklan communist party, and all hopes of economic and polltlcal independence for the Slovak.s. This is an effort by the Soviet Union to counteract the attractlon of Yugoslavia that ls felt by Czech and Slovak allke." - EDWARD IR. MURROW With the News, The Columbia Broadcasting System, Sept. 21, 1951. • "In complete harmony with the thinking or the Czech and Slovak nation, the agreemenl of frlendshlp, mutual aid a nd post-war cooperation between the ÔSR and tbe USSR was com pleted in Mosco\\· on December 12, 1943, for a period of 20 years. . . . This or ientat ion is an unchangable note eve n for our futu re politic al life." - Dr. Josepb Lettrich, ÔAS, 1-27-48. • " No ne of us has the r lght to obligate defin it e ly for the futu re our people and st at e in fundamental matters, i ntern a ! or inte rnational, t o anyth ing . . .. That holds for all of us and, above all, e ven for me personally. 1 t hlnk that it is necess ary that th is be altogethe r c lear. That is why from the beginnning I ha ve r efused to make any fundamental, interna! o r international, t ies ..... ." - (Dr. Edward Benes, to the Czechoslovak State Councll, Nov. 2:\, 19Hl. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 13 THE SWVAIK REPUBLIC - FRUIT OF HLINKA'S STRUGGLE Ka.rol Sidor (Preaident of the Slovak Natlonal Couneil Abroad) The great Polish phllosopher and polltlclan Roman Dmowski, who labored for the resurrection of Poland In 1918 and dled In 1939, wrote these noteworthy words: " Here in Poland we are tired of reading p0lemics on the theme: who, In recent Umes, flrst used the expression INDEl'ENDENCE and whlch polltlcal party flrst loudly proclalmed that lt wants state Inde• pendence. Thls makes a chlldlsh and unsavory dlscusslon. We have s tate lndependence not because some one repeated voclferously that he wanted lndependence. We have lt because there were people who worked systematlcally for lts attalnment, orlentated themselves well to cxlsting condltlons and knew how to use well all the clrcumstances leading to lndependence. People must know not only what they want, but also what they must do, what road they shall travel to reach the desired goal. Programs of wlshing are only empty and trultless mottoes." As in Poland, so also among the Slovaks in Slovakia much has already been written and sald about thls subject. But Slovaks at horne and abroad seem to be forgettlng that there would have been no Slovak State lndependence without the untirlng po\ltlcal labors of tbe thousands and thousands of outstanding and ordinai:y people of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party who worked for the polltlcal lndependence of thelr country slnce the inauguratlon of the party In 1905 untll Slovak lndependence Day, March 14, 1939. Wlthout Hlinka and his party the terrain would not have been prepared for independence. We can say wlthout fear of contradlction that the leaders of Hlinka's polltlcal party expressed the will and deslres of the Slovak people for an Independent Slovak llfe both durlng the exlstence of old Hungary and also durlng the llfe of the Czechoslovak Repul!llc. or course, always in a way sulted to condltlons, because cven an Idea has evolutionary forma. A dlfferent form for the cblldlsh age of a natlon and another for bis mature years. The followers of štar, Radllnský and Vajanský up to 1918 expressed themselves moderately In form but convlnclngly in substance. When lt came to the breaklng of bread In 1918, however, Andrew Hlinka, leader of bis party, proclalmed on May 24th at Turčiansky Svätý Martin: "The 1000-year-old marrlage with the Magyars was a tallure. We must part." Such a resolutlon of the Slovak program was both modern and s ultable to the tlmes. Thls sentiment was expressed more forcefully on October 19, 1918, In the Budapest parllament by Dr. Ferdl!'! Juriga, a depu ty of H llnka's Slovak Party, when he sald: "On the basls of natural and hlstorlcal rlghts we demand our right of self-determlnation so that we, as a natlonal entity, could form our own, separate community on tbe terrltory we bave settled." An~ on January 23, 1920, this same Juriga emphaslzed in the 14 SLOVAKIA Prague Parliament even the form of future Slovak life, when he said: "Federalism is the system of the future. The order of the future ís not centralism but federalism. We mu.st preserve our individuality and not let ourselves be absorbed. We must let every national unit crystalllze out into a Jegal personallty so that these various national units could then federalize into one great world republic. This would be only the hlghest idea! and only one road leads to it: federalism." Other deputies of Hlinka's party expressed themselves in a slmilar vein in the Prague Parllament until 1939. They demanded independent Slovak army units for Slovakia, with Slovak as the language of command, and separate Slovak diplomatic representation abroad. It is known that the most significant signs of sovereignty are: one's own natlonal army and national representatlon abroad. The climax for this whole endeavor for Slovak polit!cal independence was the Žilina proclamation of October 6, 1938, In which the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Trade Union Party, the Fascist Party, the National Sociallsts and the Slovak Natlonal Party (of Rázus) united on a slngle Slovak program. "We, the undersigned," says the document accepted and und"lrsigned by duly authorlzed representatives of the partles mentionerl. "adopt the motion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to lssue a constltutional Iaw apropos Slovak autonomy in such form as prE:sented in the As.sembly of Deputles and published in the perlodical SLOVÁK, No. 129, June 5, 1938. We promlse to use all our strengtb to have this mot!on accepted constitutionalJy by the National Assembly." "We demand that the Vice-Chairman of the Hlinka S lovak Peo• ple's Party, Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, lmmediately be authorlzed so that as chalrman-deslgnate he set up the first Slovak Government In agreement wlth the underslgned polltlcal partles." At that time (October 1938), ther~ were 45 Slovak deputies in the Prague Parllament: 19 representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, 11 Agrarlans, 5 Social Democrats, 5 Communists, 1 National Socialist, 1 National Unity member, 1 Trades Union member, 1 Fasclst, and 1 member ot the Natlonal Slovak Party. AII, · except thi> Communists and the Social Democrats · (10), signed the Žilina docu• ment of October 6, 1938. This was a unlfication ou program which eveu the Czechs respected. On November 22, 1938, a new constltutional document wns publlshed. Thls new Constitution was voted for by a fully qualifleď majority not only of the Slovak but also of the Czech deputies and senators. And in thls Const!tutlon the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parliament were already well anchored by flrm paragraphs. So it was that the future destlny of Slovakia - in a legal anď democratlc way - pas.sed over lnto the banda of the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parllament whlch was authorized by all Slovaks. This was the foundatlon on which the Slovaks cont!nued to build theirState and on March 14, 1939, this foundatlon served as a means to proclalm even the independence of the Slovak State -- again legally and demociatically. From this brie! sketch we see clearly that without the preparatory Iabors - ideological and organizational - of the Hlinka Slovak Peo SLOVAKIA 15 ple's Party, fir.st in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia, the proclamation of Slovakia's independence on March 14, 1939, would not have been possible. For that reason, not indivldual persons, but whole generations of humble and forgotten Slovak patriots have merited recognitlon. The least we can do is honor them for working so assidiously and uncompromlslngly for the politlcal independence of the Slovaks. The spirit of Andrej Hlinka dominated all of them. In Andrej Hlinka all these indefatigable workers for freedom saw themselves. H linka was their leader and theh- idea!. When he was honored, they felt honored also. And so it was when the Slovak legislat!ve assem bly passed the law (No. 83) on Aprll 25, 1939, <to memorialize Hlinka and the generations of Slovak patriots who labored with him for Slovak freedom by placing a bust of Hlinka in the Slovak Nat!onal Assembly_ The Slovaks at horne and abroad shall never forget And rej Hlinka, his Slovak People's Party - the Slovak patriots who llved and died for the freedom of the Slovak nation. It is a fact that the Slovak Republic was the fruit of Hlinka's fight (or the inherent right o[ the Slovak people to polltical freedom . • • • WHO SAID IT? '"Today we have received from Alex Kendrick in Vienna the first solid explanation of what was behind the recent drastic shake-up in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and Government. Apparently what happened was that Slovakian autonomy, both political and eco· nomic, was wiped out. A considerable number of Slovak Party mem• bers were flung into jail. Bratislava, the capila! of Slovakla, was the real center of a separatist movem ent deeply influenced by Tlto's success. Czechoslovakia is Russia's most important satellite. But di ffe re nces between Czechs and S lova ks are much o lde r than co mmun ism. What Moscow decided to do was to destroy the independence of the Slovaklan communist party, and all hopes of economic and polltlcal independence for the Slovak.s. This is an effort by the Soviet Union to counteract the attractlon of Yugoslavia that ls felt by Czech and Slovak allke." - EDWARD IR. MURROW With the News, The Columbia Broadcasting System, Sept. 21, 1951. • "In complete harmony with the thinking or the Czech and Slovak nation, the agreemenl of frlendshlp, mutual aid a nd post-war cooperation between the ÔSR and tbe USSR was com pleted in Mosco\\· on December 12, 1943, for a period of 20 years. . . . This or ientat ion is an unchangable note eve n for our futu re politic al life." - Dr. Josepb Lettrich, ÔAS, 1-27-48. • " No ne of us has the r lght to obligate defin it e ly for the futu re our people and st at e in fundamental matters, i ntern a ! or inte rnational, t o anyth ing . . .. That holds for all of us and, above all, e ven for me personally. 1 t hlnk that it is necess ary that th is be altogethe r c lear. That is why from the beginnning I ha ve r efused to make any fundamental, interna! o r international, t ies ..... ." - (Dr. Edward Benes, to the Czechoslovak State Councll, Nov. 2:\, 19Hl.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Republic - Fruit of Hlinka's Struggle Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 13-15 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/10029788e7f575435cf4af118dd06ced.pdf 5bb4e9251654dd57696a86b37ddefc5e PDF Text Text 8 SLOVAKIA T11E TWO EUROP:ES OR. JOSEPH CIEKER The divi:sion ot Europe is not only a military, political and social reality, but also a mora! and spiritual reality. The indlvislble body, ot Europe wa.s violeutly ,spllt into ,two parbs, each or which lives its own speclal llfe-it the mora! and material misery int.o which the ualtions of centra! and eastern Europe were cast can be called· Jifeat all. · The entire milltary and political effort ot the past war resulled in the terrible reality of two Europes which do not understand each other, which cannot and ,shall not b€' able to tind a form of cooperation and positive cohabitatlon, which .stand agalnst each other, and which one day, sooner or later, shall have to !lght the declsive battle which shall force common norms on the whole ot the European contln.eu t. The present s!tuation cannot be consldered a definite solution under any clrcumstance,s. Two Europes cannot exlst on the territory of the continent whlch creat.ed the idea of EUROPE, whlctt tormed its unity throughout the centuries, and the members of whlch cannot live without belng united. lndestructible torces are ever endeavorlng to unite that whlch was artitlcially dlvided, to eradii'ate that which was brought into being by force as a resull ot ignorance, illusions, cowardice, an1i treachery. We are witnesses ot a vlolent process whlch 1s being suffered by the fatally wounded Europe, wrlthing in a traglc effort to once agaln attaln its historlcal form, to reconstruot 11.<S centuries-old ,personality. There is no doubt that th<ese two Europes-the Jegitimate result or contemporary errors which hav-e been committed not only by pollticlans, diplomats and soldiers, but also by European lntellectualsshall cease to ex.lst and that there shall •be only one Europe, assumlng, however, that whatever takes th~ place of ithe present ,s ltuatlon shall be able to carry the name whlch symbolizes all that humanity has orealted throughout the centnrles. The divlsion of the European body wlll uot he able to be maintained forever. The maimed Idea of Europe shall !ose its historical sense, its mora! content and lts real mh,sion, 1f it cannot live and be enjoyed in !ts '8Iltire eX>tent. What 1s or the utmost im.portance to humanity is the question ot what forces shall brlng about the heal!ng of the div!ded parbs into one European body. Behind the boundary line, whlch once leadlng European factorsespecially forelgn factors--wanted tlo regard only as a symbolic boundary between mutual influences, there 1s now being bom a new world, an alien, terrlble world, a frankenstein world. On the rulns of th,e Chrlstlan countrles of eastern and centra! IEurope, Communi,sm 1s bulld!ng a new "humanity," a mon,strous humanity, whlch baslcally 1s in contlict wlth the prlnciples of ancloot and hlstorlcal Europe. The Soviet system-and in th!s name we need not see only a terr!ble police instrument, a vislble instrumoot !or physical tortureselzlng ,totally and without any llmltatlons whatsoever a half of Eu• �SLOVAKIA 9 rope, ia lnJectlng into the severe<! part of the European body new forms of llfe, a n-ew notlon of culture, a new ldeology, a new mlsslon. Communlsm, already partlally destroylng every1thlng which re• called the idea of anclent Europe, !.s forcing a new idea. which ls sev• erlng tradltlonal ties an<l lifting itselt a-s a legitimate resutt of the unfettered forces ot human periphery. This process of tundamental changes, made posslble by the use of cruel means of -violence, as well as the conscious or unconscious COII!Plicity of gullt of the west, is creating before ithe terrltled eyes of the western peoples "a humanity bereft of humanity" which is bendlng over the boundary line, is showing lts a.nti-Europea,n a.nd anti-Christian face and is causlng understandable cha.os a.nd uncertalnty In ,the west. To better understand the eX!tent of the da:nger whlch threatens the very idea of Europe, we would have to go on -the other slde or the Iron Curta.ln. What ls taklng place in that immense human IM:,oratory, in that area of mlsery and slav-ery, canno.t be fully real!z.ed by lndlvldual n&wspaper reports and reports or news agencles. The Soviet machine is exerting itself to the utmos,t. T,h ere is no rest. The process of change does not have t he character of development, because it is the most a.wful revolution whlch is shaklng the deepest fo1.1:ndatlons of this part of Europe. And thls Europe s,tands ta.ce to face with the forces which are incompatlble with the ma.nner of Evropean Jife. There is no competitlon of thoughts, there are no lntellectuals. There is no asslmilation between what represents tradition a.nd wbat brlngs somethlng new. lt would be a. big mlsta.ke, indeed, to suppose that this historlcal process can glve blrth to something new which might be acceptable to the Idea or Europe. Communism burns evolutlonary eras, destroys l!ves and kills ideas. What 1s ha,ppening behlnd the Iron Curtain is not a renaissance, a. rerorma.tion, a. klnd of enllghtenwent, or a llterary movement; a.nd it certainly is not an expression of Jlberallsm or constitut!onalism. But it is an aotual rlgh>t ,between llfe and death. If Communism were only a force which caused changes of a . political nature, if l!t requlred only a new ,social system, !! lt would want to reallze only the parcelling or large estates, if lt would only want to national!2e industry and economy, the danger of lt would not be or ,such historlcal dimen-slons. But Communlsm 1s much more tha.n a slmple, social reform. Those who vlew the phenomenon of Communism only from that vlewpolnt shall notlce only that whlch ls secondary in it, forgettlng at the same ,tlme to look at lts actual substance. The results attalned by Communism in tha,t part of Europe where it came !nto power by force relate not only to a polltlcal, social and ,physlcal change, but prlmarlly to a mora! a.nd splrltual change. Barbarians have inva.d-ed Uterature, culture, the sciences and arts and the tabernacles. They kllled crea.tive splrlts, or enslaved them, tran.sforming them into lntellectual automats. Poets, romance wrŕters, publlcists, sclentlfic worker,s, and proressors, wh0,; dld not. want to or could not orl~tate themsele,es to the brutlsh norms or ignorance and splrltual prosUtutlon, have elther dled or a.re dying. The schools are produclng a youth whlch 1s not allowed to know anythlng of the pa.st. Unlverslty halls are belng rmoo wtth th6 atmos• phere of Soviet factorles, where the product or Soviet dissolution )s �10 SLOVAKIA offered, where instructions are given to deform the youth morally and intellectually, where the culture of the periphery is forced upon iL This radical ľevolution which concerns fundamental human values, this sup,pression of the human person, thls eradication of everythlng Divine and -eternal, this materializing ot the noble deslres of mankind-all this is creatlng the new world, a steippe without a horizon, an earthly tlre-rulns, the splrltless, inhuman, fanatical, mechanlzed robot.s. To eJGpect such an environment a blessed productiveness of crea• tive s pirlts, works of real art, works of unlversal culture, to SIL{)pose that on this dead soli can grow intellectuals wlth a world-wide per• s~tive, with a European soul and a Christian love-that would mean as much as not to realize what Communlsm really 1.5. True it is that heroes of unattainable moral heights are !Íl existence and are being born, bu,t they are also dying like torches in the desert wbich the hurricane sweeping down fľom the steppes 1s ex.tlnguishlng. The division of Europe ls being deepened, systematized and widened. Everyit,hing is being destroyed so that a "new" Europe can be built. Things are belng produced not only in the pbyslcal, but also the splritual field in an environment of •terror, corporeal fear, in an environment of unceasing haste. Stachanov is the idea! not only for the manual worker, but also for the sp.rltual worker. And this new type of standardized intellectual works and produces like a machine filled with blood and spirit. U the w,,rth of moral and spirit-lial values would ,b e measured in terms of the number of books -published, fabrlcated artistic works, in .terms of their propagatlon, the creatlvE> ability of rthe tradltional and Chrlstian European world would be surpassed. But something that !s fundamental, et<Qornal and unlversally valid, is lacking in all thls produclion whlch was crea.ted and accumulated so feverlshly. On thls steppe of the world that is being born, gigantic pyramlds are rlslng which were ordered to be bullt by Pharaohs, but from them are blowlng the breezes of death. Robots cannot create, because they lack the divine spark and do not have any inspiration, either human or divine. They denied God and killed ,the man In themselves. Today there no longer exlst any llluslons about the inevitable and historlcal disentangllng of the tragedy of the two Europes. Only bltnd people and su\cides-and some of these still exlstdo not see the shadow which thls spectľe is casting over .the most distant corners of Europe, lf not the world, and ls making ready to take the flnal step to unlte dlvlded 1l)urope in tis own fashion. The forces of human perlphery, the forces of darkness and barbarism, organh:lng themselves accord!ng to the Jaws of the jungle, present t o 1the western world a concrete problem of European unlty. This 1s paradoxlcal, but it !s the truth. Barbarians . want to unite that which Europeans had divlded. A ·b oundary line ls not a barrÍ'er for them and it never was. \After swallowlng and digestlng a half or Europe they must thrust themselves on the second half and devoU1° lt, or perlsh in the atitempt. In the meantlme, whlle this barbarlsm-whlch untll recently was evaluated as a pos~tlve and ,equlvalent component ot Euro• peantsm, as a value comparable wlth mora! and splrltual no- �SLOVAKIA 11 blesse-:-is offering a pian ,for uuiting Europe, which in reality is already destroyed_ aQ.d dead Iu embryo and Iu its. very suQl}t.a.nce. the west, polsoned by the poison of dissolu.tlon, nE)glect an:d collective fear, ls wasting tim!l with formalltles and naivities, in con!erences and in solemn though frequent useless assembl!es, as it the lrreconcllable totalitarian beast sensed a duty or some klnd or necesslty to respect -these "European experiences," which it already had destroyed in a brutal manner In the countries behlnd the Iron Curtaiu. The uniflcation of divi-ded EuľoPe is not only a necessity for Communlsm, whlch it doouces ťrom the established progr8./1Il ot lts ideology, hu t also the result of persistent forces of the European whole whlch are calling for the unification of that which was dlvlded, that which was· cu,t off !rom it without analyzing the methods and forms. of thls u nlficatlon. This unlfication by Communism means dea.th for Europe. It 1s sad, indeed, even it 'not tragic, that this anti-European, anti-Chrlstian spectre holds the initiatlve of this unification in its 11ands. The western world would, perhaps, be satisfled with a maimed Europe, if that were ' posslble and if the barbarlans would allow it. Some IE}uropean-s m1ght consider it possible to live in a divlded Europe and probably would even be satlsfied with the loss -of the Chrlstian countries of central and eastern Europe, if at such a prlce they might gain weltare and comfort. This defensive stand, these methods to preserve what has remained of E urope, are the fundamental differences which distlngulsh the traditional world !rom the one which is belng born behind the boundary line or dlvldoo Euro,pe. Whlle it seemed that the west was no Ionger inteľested in rts indivisible part, the east-personlfied by the Sovleit spectres--was very muoh lnte-re-sted. This stand can be e xplained, but it can never l>e justifioo. lt ls slgnlflcan-t that it was the Europeans themselves who were abandoning the Idea of Europe. R seemed, as if the weariness caused by two successlve wars, had overwhelmed the very -substance of European sentiment. In European society there has appeared an une:x;pected phenomenon: the attempt to accustom itsel[ e=n to lrreparable losses. The mind was captured by the fiction that the questlon of the European idea would b e resol~ by the hauling of foodstufts and machlnery into Europe by both Americas. lt is, therefore, understandable that in such an envlroument there could not be and was not bom any force of unlversal grea,tness which could be vlctorlous over the forces of dissoluton which were ga;therlng strength from ·fäe east. The undertakings of European dimenslons- the Crusades, ,the herolsm of Lepant, the Tridentine Councll!-these joint efforts of European h e ro· ism, it seems, were all forgotten. In ,the face of the crude ln!tlatlve -of the east, the west created ,t he conditions for a gradual retreat. Even though the situatlon ls extremely grave, we must not de• s pair. The hlstorical forces of the west wlth thelľ vitality, with ,their mora) and spiritual designs, with thelr own orlgln, can and must excel over the forces that would destroy Europe. Europe can and must f!nd itself. Agalnst the concrete program proferred by Communism, Eu• rope must offer Lts own concrete program-not only a defens!ve one. but an offensive one as well. There !s no place, neither is thPre �12 SLOVAKIA much tlme, for hesitation, for useless phlloéophislng, for nalvltles, for half-way declslons, for neutrality. 'ľhe formula, which the -communistlc system offers the remalnder or Europe for European unlfication, !nevl.tably !ncludes all natlons, all ideologŇls, all confessions, aml. ' all peoples. In 1he cage ot the Soviet system there is room for everything: for materlal and splritual tn!ngs, for ordinary Ml well as sacred things, for the work&r and the lntellectual. Not to recognize rthis law ot Communlsm and attempt to argue lt away would mean to commrt an unpardonable and lrreparable blunder. Either all Eu ropean1 1hall aave themaelve- r elae alt ahall perlah. So that ,t he wesť could save !tself and not perlsh In 4he embrace ot the spectre, lt is being given a last opportunlty to rehablli.ta.te !t· self and ·perform !ts h!stor!cal m!sslon. On-e thl.ng, however, !s certain: l!t shall not be a-ble to fulflll th!s mlsslon by ,the me4hods it has used thus far, the methods w-hlch led to the dlvlslon of Europe. And lt certainly wlll not be able to do !t wlth ,people who have grown old morally a.nd splrLtually. It .ithe west w!shes •to avoid ,the fate ot centra! and ~ste~n Europe, !.f it w!shes to come to terms with the un!fy!ng spectre- of Commun!sm ln a dlgnltled manner, !t must revlve the permanent torces ot the west-ern natlon-s, !t must breathe in,to <the idea of Europe a real European and Chri-stlan content, !t must sleze the lnltiatlve ot un!fy!ng Europe. Even barbar!ans know how to produce and bu!l<i tactories, br!dges, great iron and steel entemprises, rallroads, airfields and bomba. Wha1 •they do not know, and what they shall never know !s how to glve materlal a breath ot humanity, subord!nate it t o the !nterests of the dlgn!ty ot mankind and glve the world a sense ot lts true mission. The positlons are well defined. The hour ha.s come to declde the fate of Europe. The sys tem ot two Europes, which arose and was malntalned by the tault ot the west, cannot last. The west is not Europe, and we cannot regard the east as Europe e•ther. The west cannot harbor bopes ithat lt shall avol-d an lnvaslon by the barbarians by toresaklng the east-ern part of Europe to Communlsm. Al!, long a s one substantlal portlon of Europe 1-s undergolng a feverlsh change. as long as everythlng there, which symbolized the Chrlstlan and European splr•t, is retreating before th-e aggresslveness of the barbarlan and is wlthdrawlng to the hlllsldes and int.o the catacombs, a s long as half of 1Europe -does not live, belleve and t~I accordlng to the thousand-year-old Chrl&tlan and Europeain laws, there shall be no contentmen,t ot •the spirit, ,n or shall th-ere be material welfare In the the west. Tbe Idea of Europe lncludes In itself tbe west as equally a s the ea st. lt -embraces 1he distant plalns of Poland, the Ukraine, White Russla, the Slovak and Rumanla,n valleys, as well as ,th& green fleld s ot France and Germany, and even the broad Iberlan horizons. We must resolve: There shall be only one Europe--a Chrlstlan, hlstorlcal Europe-a free and democratlc Europe. � 8 SLOVAKIA T11E TWO EUROP:ES OR. JOSEPH CIEKER The divi:sion ot Europe is not only a military, political and social reality, but also a mora! and spiritual reality. The indlvislble body, ot Europe wa.s violeutly ,spllt into ,two parbs, each or which lives its own speclal llfe-it the mora! and material misery int.o which the ualtions of centra! and eastern Europe were cast can be called· Jifeat all. · The entire milltary and political effort ot the past war resulled in the terrible reality of two Europes which do not understand each other, which cannot and ,shall not b€' able to tind a form of cooperation and positive cohabitatlon, which .stand agalnst each other, and which one day, sooner or later, shall have to !lght the declsive battle which shall force common norms on the whole ot the European contln.eu t. The present s!tuation cannot be consldered a definite solution under any clrcumstance,s. Two Europes cannot exlst on the territory of the continent whlch creat.ed the idea of EUROPE, whlctt tormed its unity throughout the centuries, and the members of whlch cannot live without belng united. lndestructible torces are ever endeavorlng to unite that whlch was artitlcially dlvided, to eradii'ate that which was brought into being by force as a resull ot ignorance, illusions, cowardice, an1i treachery. We are witnesses ot a vlolent process whlch 1s being suffered by the fatally wounded Europe, wrlthing in a traglc effort to once agaln attaln its historlcal form, to reconstruot 11.<S centuries-old ,personality. There is no doubt that th<ese two Europes-the Jegitimate result or contemporary errors which hav-e been committed not only by pollticlans, diplomats and soldiers, but also by European lntellectualsshall cease to ex.lst and that there shall •be only one Europe, assumlng, however, that whatever takes th~ place of ithe present ,s ltuatlon shall be able to carry the name whlch symbolizes all that humanity has orealted throughout the centnrles. The divlsion of the European body wlll uot he able to be maintained forever. The maimed Idea of Europe shall !ose its historical sense, its mora! content and lts real mh,sion, 1f it cannot live and be enjoyed in !ts '8Iltire eX>tent. What 1s or the utmost im.portance to humanity is the question ot what forces shall brlng about the heal!ng of the div!ded parbs into one European body. Behind the boundary line, whlch once leadlng European factorsespecially forelgn factors--wanted tlo regard only as a symbolic boundary between mutual influences, there 1s now being bom a new world, an alien, terrlble world, a frankenstein world. On the rulns of th,e Chrlstlan countrles of eastern and centra! IEurope, Communi,sm 1s bulld!ng a new "humanity," a mon,strous humanity, whlch baslcally 1s in contlict wlth the prlnciples of ancloot and hlstorlcal Europe. The Soviet system-and in th!s name we need not see only a terr!ble police instrument, a vislble instrumoot !or physical tortureselzlng ,totally and without any llmltatlons whatsoever a half of Eu• �SLOVAKIA 9 rope, ia lnJectlng into the severe<! part of the European body new forms of llfe, a n-ew notlon of culture, a new ldeology, a new mlsslon. Communlsm, already partlally destroylng every1thlng which re• called the idea of anclent Europe, !.s forcing a new idea. which ls sev• erlng tradltlonal ties an<l lifting itselt a-s a legitimate resutt of the unfettered forces ot human periphery. This process of tundamental changes, made posslble by the use of cruel means of -violence, as well as the conscious or unconscious COII!Plicity of gullt of the west, is creating before ithe terrltled eyes of the western peoples "a humanity bereft of humanity" which is bendlng over the boundary line, is showing lts a.nti-Europea,n a.nd anti-Christian face and is causlng understandable cha.os a.nd uncertalnty In ,the west. To better understand the eX!tent of the da:nger whlch threatens the very idea of Europe, we would have to go on -the other slde or the Iron Curta.ln. What ls taklng place in that immense human IM:,oratory, in that area of mlsery and slav-ery, canno.t be fully real!z.ed by lndlvldual n&wspaper reports and reports or news agencles. The Soviet machine is exerting itself to the utmos,t. T,h ere is no rest. The process of change does not have t he character of development, because it is the most a.wful revolution whlch is shaklng the deepest fo1.1:ndatlons of this part of Europe. And thls Europe s,tands ta.ce to face with the forces which are incompatlble with the ma.nner of Evropean Jife. There is no competitlon of thoughts, there are no lntellectuals. There is no asslmilation between what represents tradition a.nd wbat brlngs somethlng new. lt would be a. big mlsta.ke, indeed, to suppose that this historlcal process can glve blrth to something new which might be acceptable to the Idea or Europe. Communism burns evolutlonary eras, destroys l!ves and kills ideas. What 1s ha,ppening behlnd the Iron Curtain is not a renaissance, a. rerorma.tion, a. klnd of enllghtenwent, or a llterary movement; a.nd it certainly is not an expression of Jlberallsm or constitut!onalism. But it is an aotual rlgh>t ,between llfe and death. If Communism were only a force which caused changes of a . political nature, if l!t requlred only a new ,social system, !! lt would want to reallze only the parcelling or large estates, if lt would only want to national!2e industry and economy, the danger of lt would not be or ,such historlcal dimen-slons. But Communlsm 1s much more tha.n a slmple, social reform. Those who vlew the phenomenon of Communism only from that vlewpolnt shall notlce only that whlch ls secondary in it, forgettlng at the same ,tlme to look at lts actual substance. The results attalned by Communism in tha,t part of Europe where it came !nto power by force relate not only to a polltlcal, social and ,physlcal change, but prlmarlly to a mora! a.nd splrltual change. Barbarians have inva.d-ed Uterature, culture, the sciences and arts and the tabernacles. They kllled crea.tive splrlts, or enslaved them, tran.sforming them into lntellectual automats. Poets, romance wrŕters, publlcists, sclentlfic worker,s, and proressors, wh0,; dld not. want to or could not orl~tate themsele,es to the brutlsh norms or ignorance and splrltual prosUtutlon, have elther dled or a.re dying. The schools are produclng a youth whlch 1s not allowed to know anythlng of the pa.st. Unlverslty halls are belng rmoo wtth th6 atmos• phere of Soviet factorles, where the product or Soviet dissolution )s �10 SLOVAKIA offered, where instructions are given to deform the youth morally and intellectually, where the culture of the periphery is forced upon iL This radical ľevolution which concerns fundamental human values, this sup,pression of the human person, thls eradication of everythlng Divine and -eternal, this materializing ot the noble deslres of mankind-all this is creatlng the new world, a steippe without a horizon, an earthly tlre-rulns, the splrltless, inhuman, fanatical, mechanlzed robot.s. To eJGpect such an environment a blessed productiveness of crea• tive s pirlts, works of real art, works of unlversal culture, to SIL{)pose that on this dead soli can grow intellectuals wlth a world-wide per• s~tive, with a European soul and a Christian love-that would mean as much as not to realize what Communlsm really 1.5. True it is that heroes of unattainable moral heights are !Íl existence and are being born, bu,t they are also dying like torches in the desert wbich the hurricane sweeping down fľom the steppes 1s ex.tlnguishlng. The division of Europe ls being deepened, systematized and widened. Everyit,hing is being destroyed so that a "new" Europe can be built. Things are belng produced not only in the pbyslcal, but also the splritual field in an environment of •terror, corporeal fear, in an environment of unceasing haste. Stachanov is the idea! not only for the manual worker, but also for the sp.rltual worker. And this new type of standardized intellectual works and produces like a machine filled with blood and spirit. U the w,,rth of moral and spirit-lial values would ,b e measured in terms of the number of books -published, fabrlcated artistic works, in .terms of their propagatlon, the creatlvE> ability of rthe tradltional and Chrlstian European world would be surpassed. But something that !s fundamental, et<Qornal and unlversally valid, is lacking in all thls produclion whlch was crea.ted and accumulated so feverlshly. On thls steppe of the world that is being born, gigantic pyramlds are rlslng which were ordered to be bullt by Pharaohs, but from them are blowlng the breezes of death. Robots cannot create, because they lack the divine spark and do not have any inspiration, either human or divine. They denied God and killed ,the man In themselves. Today there no longer exlst any llluslons about the inevitable and historlcal disentangllng of the tragedy of the two Europes. Only bltnd people and su\cides-and some of these still exlstdo not see the shadow which thls spectľe is casting over .the most distant corners of Europe, lf not the world, and ls making ready to take the flnal step to unlte dlvlded 1l)urope in tis own fashion. The forces of human perlphery, the forces of darkness and barbarism, organh:lng themselves accord!ng to the Jaws of the jungle, present t o 1the western world a concrete problem of European unlty. This 1s paradoxlcal, but it !s the truth. Barbarians . want to unite that which Europeans had divlded. A ·b oundary line ls not a barrÍ'er for them and it never was. \After swallowlng and digestlng a half or Europe they must thrust themselves on the second half and devoU1° lt, or perlsh in the atitempt. In the meantlme, whlle this barbarlsm-whlch untll recently was evaluated as a pos~tlve and ,equlvalent component ot Euro• peantsm, as a value comparable wlth mora! and splrltual no- �SLOVAKIA 11 blesse-:-is offering a pian ,for uuiting Europe, which in reality is already destroyed_ aQ.d dead Iu embryo and Iu its. very suQl}t.a.nce. the west, polsoned by the poison of dissolu.tlon, nE)glect an:d collective fear, ls wasting tim!l with formalltles and naivities, in con!erences and in solemn though frequent useless assembl!es, as it the lrreconcllable totalitarian beast sensed a duty or some klnd or necesslty to respect -these "European experiences," which it already had destroyed in a brutal manner In the countries behlnd the Iron Curtaiu. The uniflcation of divi-ded EuľoPe is not only a necessity for Communlsm, whlch it doouces ťrom the established progr8./1Il ot lts ideology, hu t also the result of persistent forces of the European whole whlch are calling for the unification of that which was dlvlded, that which was· cu,t off !rom it without analyzing the methods and forms. of thls u nlficatlon. This unlfication by Communism means dea.th for Europe. It 1s sad, indeed, even it 'not tragic, that this anti-European, anti-Chrlstian spectre holds the initiatlve of this unification in its 11ands. The western world would, perhaps, be satisfled with a maimed Europe, if that were ' posslble and if the barbarlans would allow it. Some IE}uropean-s m1ght consider it possible to live in a divlded Europe and probably would even be satlsfied with the loss -of the Chrlstian countries of central and eastern Europe, if at such a prlce they might gain weltare and comfort. This defensive stand, these methods to preserve what has remained of E urope, are the fundamental differences which distlngulsh the traditional world !rom the one which is belng born behind the boundary line or dlvldoo Euro,pe. Whlle it seemed that the west was no Ionger inteľested in rts indivisible part, the east-personlfied by the Sovleit spectres--was very muoh lnte-re-sted. This stand can be e xplained, but it can never l>e justifioo. lt ls slgnlflcan-t that it was the Europeans themselves who were abandoning the Idea of Europe. R seemed, as if the weariness caused by two successlve wars, had overwhelmed the very -substance of European sentiment. In European society there has appeared an une:x;pected phenomenon: the attempt to accustom itsel[ e=n to lrreparable losses. The mind was captured by the fiction that the questlon of the European idea would b e resol~ by the hauling of foodstufts and machlnery into Europe by both Americas. lt is, therefore, understandable that in such an envlroument there could not be and was not bom any force of unlversal grea,tness which could be vlctorlous over the forces of dissoluton which were ga;therlng strength from ·fäe east. The undertakings of European dimenslons- the Crusades, ,the herolsm of Lepant, the Tridentine Councll!-these joint efforts of European h e ro· ism, it seems, were all forgotten. In ,the face of the crude ln!tlatlve -of the east, the west created ,t he conditions for a gradual retreat. Even though the situatlon ls extremely grave, we must not de• s pair. The hlstorical forces of the west wlth thelľ vitality, with ,their mora) and spiritual designs, with thelr own orlgln, can and must excel over the forces that would destroy Europe. Europe can and must f!nd itself. Agalnst the concrete program proferred by Communism, Eu• rope must offer Lts own concrete program-not only a defens!ve one. but an offensive one as well. There !s no place, neither is thPre �12 SLOVAKIA much tlme, for hesitation, for useless phlloéophislng, for nalvltles, for half-way declslons, for neutrality. 'ľhe formula, which the -communistlc system offers the remalnder or Europe for European unlfication, !nevl.tably !ncludes all natlons, all ideologŇls, all confessions, aml. ' all peoples. In 1he cage ot the Soviet system there is room for everything: for materlal and splritual tn!ngs, for ordinary Ml well as sacred things, for the work&r and the lntellectual. Not to recognize rthis law ot Communlsm and attempt to argue lt away would mean to commrt an unpardonable and lrreparable blunder. Either all Eu ropean1 1hall aave themaelve- r elae alt ahall perlah. So that ,t he wesť could save !tself and not perlsh In 4he embrace ot the spectre, lt is being given a last opportunlty to rehablli.ta.te !t· self and ·perform !ts h!stor!cal m!sslon. On-e thl.ng, however, !s certain: l!t shall not be a-ble to fulflll th!s mlsslon by ,the me4hods it has used thus far, the methods w-hlch led to the dlvlslon of Europe. And lt certainly wlll not be able to do !t wlth ,people who have grown old morally a.nd splrLtually. It .ithe west w!shes •to avoid ,the fate ot centra! and ~ste~n Europe, !.f it w!shes to come to terms with the un!fy!ng spectre- of Commun!sm ln a dlgnltled manner, !t must revlve the permanent torces ot the west-ern natlon-s, !t must breathe in,to <the idea of Europe a real European and Chri-stlan content, !t must sleze the lnltiatlve ot un!fy!ng Europe. Even barbar!ans know how to produce and bu!l<i tactories, br!dges, great iron and steel entemprises, rallroads, airfields and bomba. Wha1 •they do not know, and what they shall never know !s how to glve materlal a breath ot humanity, subord!nate it t o the !nterests of the dlgn!ty ot mankind and glve the world a sense ot lts true mission. The positlons are well defined. The hour ha.s come to declde the fate of Europe. The sys tem ot two Europes, which arose and was malntalned by the tault ot the west, cannot last. The west is not Europe, and we cannot regard the east as Europe e•ther. The west cannot harbor bopes ithat lt shall avol-d an lnvaslon by the barbarians by toresaklng the east-ern part of Europe to Communlsm. Al!, long a s one substantlal portlon of Europe 1-s undergolng a feverlsh change. as long as everythlng there, which symbolized the Chrlstlan and European splr•t, is retreating before th-e aggresslveness of the barbarlan and is wlthdrawlng to the hlllsldes and int.o the catacombs, a s long as half of 1Europe -does not live, belleve and t~I accordlng to the thousand-year-old Chrl&tlan and Europeain laws, there shall be no contentmen,t ot •the spirit, ,n or shall th-ere be material welfare In the the west. Tbe Idea of Europe lncludes In itself tbe west as equally a s the ea st. lt -embraces 1he distant plalns of Poland, the Ukraine, White Russla, the Slovak and Rumanla,n valleys, as well as ,th& green fleld s ot France and Germany, and even the broad Iberlan horizons. We must resolve: There shall be only one Europe--a Chrlstlan, hlstorlcal Europe-a free and democratlc Europe. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 8 SLOVAKIA T11E TWO EUROP:ES OR. JOSEPH CIEKER The divi:sion ot Europe is not only a military, political and social reality, but also a mora! and spiritual reality. The indlvislble body, ot Europe wa.s violeutly ,spllt into ,two parbs, each or which lives its own speclal llfe-it the mora! and material misery int.o which the ualtions of centra! and eastern Europe were cast can be called· Jifeat all. · The entire milltary and political effort ot the past war resulled in the terrible reality of two Europes which do not understand each other, which cannot and ,shall not b€' able to tind a form of cooperation and positive cohabitatlon, which .stand agalnst each other, and which one day, sooner or later, shall have to !lght the declsive battle which shall force common norms on the whole ot the European contln.eu t. The present s!tuation cannot be consldered a definite solution under any clrcumstance,s. Two Europes cannot exlst on the territory of the continent whlch creat.ed the idea of EUROPE, whlctt tormed its unity throughout the centuries, and the members of whlch cannot live without belng united. lndestructible torces are ever endeavorlng to unite that whlch was artitlcially dlvided, to eradii'ate that which was brought into being by force as a resull ot ignorance, illusions, cowardice, an1i treachery. We are witnesses ot a vlolent process whlch 1s being suffered by the fatally wounded Europe, wrlthing in a traglc effort to once agaln attaln its historlcal form, to reconstruot 11.<S centuries-old ,personality. There is no doubt that th<ese two Europes-the Jegitimate result or contemporary errors which hav-e been committed not only by pollticlans, diplomats and soldiers, but also by European lntellectualsshall cease to ex.lst and that there shall •be only one Europe, assumlng, however, that whatever takes th~ place of ithe present ,s ltuatlon shall be able to carry the name whlch symbolizes all that humanity has orealted throughout the centnrles. The divlsion of the European body wlll uot he able to be maintained forever. The maimed Idea of Europe shall !ose its historical sense, its mora! content and lts real mh,sion, 1f it cannot live and be enjoyed in !ts '8Iltire eX>tent. What 1s or the utmost im.portance to humanity is the question ot what forces shall brlng about the heal!ng of the div!ded parbs into one European body. Behind the boundary line, whlch once leadlng European factorsespecially forelgn factors--wanted tlo regard only as a symbolic boundary between mutual influences, there 1s now being bom a new world, an alien, terrlble world, a frankenstein world. On the rulns of th,e Chrlstlan countrles of eastern and centra! IEurope, Communi,sm 1s bulld!ng a new "humanity," a mon,strous humanity, whlch baslcally 1s in contlict wlth the prlnciples of ancloot and hlstorlcal Europe. The Soviet system-and in th!s name we need not see only a terr!ble police instrument, a vislble instrumoot !or physical tortureselzlng ,totally and without any llmltatlons whatsoever a half of Eu• SLOVAKIA 9 rope, ia lnJectlng into the severe<! part of the European body new forms of llfe, a n-ew notlon of culture, a new ldeology, a new mlsslon. Communlsm, already partlally destroylng every1thlng which re• called the idea of anclent Europe, !.s forcing a new idea. which ls sev• erlng tradltlonal ties an<l lifting itselt a-s a legitimate resutt of the unfettered forces ot human periphery. This process of tundamental changes, made posslble by the use of cruel means of -violence, as well as the conscious or unconscious COII!Plicity of gullt of the west, is creating before ithe terrltled eyes of the western peoples "a humanity bereft of humanity" which is bendlng over the boundary line, is showing lts a.nti-Europea,n a.nd anti-Christian face and is causlng understandable cha.os a.nd uncertalnty In ,the west. To better understand the eX!tent of the da:nger whlch threatens the very idea of Europe, we would have to go on -the other slde or the Iron Curta.ln. What ls taklng place in that immense human IM:,oratory, in that area of mlsery and slav-ery, canno.t be fully real!z.ed by lndlvldual n&wspaper reports and reports or news agencles. The Soviet machine is exerting itself to the utmos,t. T,h ere is no rest. The process of change does not have t he character of development, because it is the most a.wful revolution whlch is shaklng the deepest fo1.1:ndatlons of this part of Europe. And thls Europe s,tands ta.ce to face with the forces which are incompatlble with the ma.nner of Evropean Jife. There is no competitlon of thoughts, there are no lntellectuals. There is no asslmilation between what represents tradition a.nd wbat brlngs somethlng new. lt would be a. big mlsta.ke, indeed, to suppose that this historlcal process can glve blrth to something new which might be acceptable to the Idea or Europe. Communism burns evolutlonary eras, destroys l!ves and kills ideas. What 1s ha,ppening behlnd the Iron Curtain is not a renaissance, a. rerorma.tion, a. klnd of enllghtenwent, or a llterary movement; a.nd it certainly is not an expression of Jlberallsm or constitut!onalism. But it is an aotual rlgh>t ,between llfe and death. If Communism were only a force which caused changes of a . political nature, if l!t requlred only a new ,social system, !! lt would want to reallze only the parcelling or large estates, if lt would only want to national!2e industry and economy, the danger of lt would not be or ,such historlcal dimen-slons. But Communlsm 1s much more tha.n a slmple, social reform. Those who vlew the phenomenon of Communism only from that vlewpolnt shall notlce only that whlch ls secondary in it, forgettlng at the same ,tlme to look at lts actual substance. The results attalned by Communism in tha,t part of Europe where it came !nto power by force relate not only to a polltlcal, social and ,physlcal change, but prlmarlly to a mora! a.nd splrltual change. Barbarians have inva.d-ed Uterature, culture, the sciences and arts and the tabernacles. They kllled crea.tive splrlts, or enslaved them, tran.sforming them into lntellectual automats. Poets, romance wrŕters, publlcists, sclentlfic worker,s, and proressors, wh0,; dld not. want to or could not orl~tate themsele,es to the brutlsh norms or ignorance and splrltual prosUtutlon, have elther dled or a.re dying. The schools are produclng a youth whlch 1s not allowed to know anythlng of the pa.st. Unlverslty halls are belng rmoo wtth th6 atmos• phere of Soviet factorles, where the product or Soviet dissolution )s 10 SLOVAKIA offered, where instructions are given to deform the youth morally and intellectually, where the culture of the periphery is forced upon iL This radical ľevolution which concerns fundamental human values, this sup,pression of the human person, thls eradication of everythlng Divine and -eternal, this materializing ot the noble deslres of mankind-all this is creatlng the new world, a steippe without a horizon, an earthly tlre-rulns, the splrltless, inhuman, fanatical, mechanlzed robot.s. To eJGpect such an environment a blessed productiveness of crea• tive s pirlts, works of real art, works of unlversal culture, to SIL{)pose that on this dead soli can grow intellectuals wlth a world-wide per• s~tive, with a European soul and a Christian love-that would mean as much as not to realize what Communlsm really 1.5. True it is that heroes of unattainable moral heights are !Íl existence and are being born, bu,t they are also dying like torches in the desert wbich the hurricane sweeping down fľom the steppes 1s ex.tlnguishlng. The division of Europe ls being deepened, systematized and widened. Everyit,hing is being destroyed so that a "new" Europe can be built. Things are belng produced not only in the pbyslcal, but also the splritual field in an environment of •terror, corporeal fear, in an environment of unceasing haste. Stachanov is the idea! not only for the manual worker, but also for the sp.rltual worker. And this new type of standardized intellectual works and produces like a machine filled with blood and spirit. U the w,,rth of moral and spirit-lial values would ,b e measured in terms of the number of books -published, fabrlcated artistic works, in .terms of their propagatlon, the creatlvE> ability of rthe tradltional and Chrlstian European world would be surpassed. But something that !s fundamental, et<Qornal and unlversally valid, is lacking in all thls produclion whlch was crea.ted and accumulated so feverlshly. On thls steppe of the world that is being born, gigantic pyramlds are rlslng which were ordered to be bullt by Pharaohs, but from them are blowlng the breezes of death. Robots cannot create, because they lack the divine spark and do not have any inspiration, either human or divine. They denied God and killed ,the man In themselves. Today there no longer exlst any llluslons about the inevitable and historlcal disentangllng of the tragedy of the two Europes. Only bltnd people and su\cides-and some of these still exlstdo not see the shadow which thls spectľe is casting over .the most distant corners of Europe, lf not the world, and ls making ready to take the flnal step to unlte dlvlded 1l)urope in tis own fashion. The forces of human perlphery, the forces of darkness and barbarism, organh:lng themselves accord!ng to the Jaws of the jungle, present t o 1the western world a concrete problem of European unlty. This 1s paradoxlcal, but it !s the truth. Barbarians . want to unite that which Europeans had divlded. A ·b oundary line ls not a barrÍ'er for them and it never was. \After swallowlng and digestlng a half or Europe they must thrust themselves on the second half and devoU1° lt, or perlsh in the atitempt. In the meantlme, whlle this barbarlsm-whlch untll recently was evaluated as a pos~tlve and ,equlvalent component ot Euro• peantsm, as a value comparable wlth mora! and splrltual no- SLOVAKIA 11 blesse-:-is offering a pian ,for uuiting Europe, which in reality is already destroyed_ aQ.d dead Iu embryo and Iu its. very suQl}t.a.nce. the west, polsoned by the poison of dissolu.tlon, nE)glect an:d collective fear, ls wasting tim!l with formalltles and naivities, in con!erences and in solemn though frequent useless assembl!es, as it the lrreconcllable totalitarian beast sensed a duty or some klnd or necesslty to respect -these "European experiences," which it already had destroyed in a brutal manner In the countries behlnd the Iron Curtaiu. The uniflcation of divi-ded EuľoPe is not only a necessity for Communlsm, whlch it doouces ťrom the established progr8./1Il ot lts ideology, hu t also the result of persistent forces of the European whole whlch are calling for the unification of that which was dlvlded, that which was· cu,t off !rom it without analyzing the methods and forms. of thls u nlficatlon. This unlfication by Communism means dea.th for Europe. It 1s sad, indeed, even it 'not tragic, that this anti-European, anti-Chrlstian spectre holds the initiatlve of this unification in its 11ands. The western world would, perhaps, be satisfled with a maimed Europe, if that were ' posslble and if the barbarlans would allow it. Some IE}uropean-s m1ght consider it possible to live in a divlded Europe and probably would even be satlsfied with the loss -of the Chrlstian countries of central and eastern Europe, if at such a prlce they might gain weltare and comfort. This defensive stand, these methods to preserve what has remained of E urope, are the fundamental differences which distlngulsh the traditional world !rom the one which is belng born behind the boundary line or dlvldoo Euro,pe. Whlle it seemed that the west was no Ionger inteľested in rts indivisible part, the east-personlfied by the Sovleit spectres--was very muoh lnte-re-sted. This stand can be e xplained, but it can never l>e justifioo. lt ls slgnlflcan-t that it was the Europeans themselves who were abandoning the Idea of Europe. R seemed, as if the weariness caused by two successlve wars, had overwhelmed the very -substance of European sentiment. In European society there has appeared an une:x;pected phenomenon: the attempt to accustom itsel[ e=n to lrreparable losses. The mind was captured by the fiction that the questlon of the European idea would b e resol~ by the hauling of foodstufts and machlnery into Europe by both Americas. lt is, therefore, understandable that in such an envlroument there could not be and was not bom any force of unlversal grea,tness which could be vlctorlous over the forces of dissoluton which were ga;therlng strength from ·fäe east. The undertakings of European dimenslons- the Crusades, ,the herolsm of Lepant, the Tridentine Councll!-these joint efforts of European h e ro· ism, it seems, were all forgotten. In ,the face of the crude ln!tlatlve -of the east, the west created ,t he conditions for a gradual retreat. Even though the situatlon ls extremely grave, we must not de• s pair. The hlstorical forces of the west wlth thelľ vitality, with ,their mora) and spiritual designs, with thelr own orlgln, can and must excel over the forces that would destroy Europe. Europe can and must f!nd itself. Agalnst the concrete program proferred by Communism, Eu• rope must offer Lts own concrete program-not only a defens!ve one. but an offensive one as well. There !s no place, neither is thPre 12 SLOVAKIA much tlme, for hesitation, for useless phlloéophislng, for nalvltles, for half-way declslons, for neutrality. 'ľhe formula, which the -communistlc system offers the remalnder or Europe for European unlfication, !nevl.tably !ncludes all natlons, all ideologŇls, all confessions, aml. ' all peoples. In 1he cage ot the Soviet system there is room for everything: for materlal and splritual tn!ngs, for ordinary Ml well as sacred things, for the work&r and the lntellectual. Not to recognize rthis law ot Communlsm and attempt to argue lt away would mean to commrt an unpardonable and lrreparable blunder. Either all Eu ropean1 1hall aave themaelve- r elae alt ahall perlah. So that ,t he wesť could save !tself and not perlsh In 4he embrace ot the spectre, lt is being given a last opportunlty to rehablli.ta.te !t· self and ·perform !ts h!stor!cal m!sslon. On-e thl.ng, however, !s certain: l!t shall not be a-ble to fulflll th!s mlsslon by ,the me4hods it has used thus far, the methods w-hlch led to the dlvlslon of Europe. And lt certainly wlll not be able to do !t wlth ,people who have grown old morally a.nd splrLtually. It .ithe west w!shes •to avoid ,the fate ot centra! and ~ste~n Europe, !.f it w!shes to come to terms with the un!fy!ng spectre- of Commun!sm ln a dlgnltled manner, !t must revlve the permanent torces ot the west-ern natlon-s, !t must breathe in,to <the idea of Europe a real European and Chri-stlan content, !t must sleze the lnltiatlve ot un!fy!ng Europe. Even barbar!ans know how to produce and bu!l<i tactories, br!dges, great iron and steel entemprises, rallroads, airfields and bomba. Wha1 •they do not know, and what they shall never know !s how to glve materlal a breath ot humanity, subord!nate it t o the !nterests of the dlgn!ty ot mankind and glve the world a sense ot lts true mission. The positlons are well defined. The hour ha.s come to declde the fate of Europe. The sys tem ot two Europes, which arose and was malntalned by the tault ot the west, cannot last. The west is not Europe, and we cannot regard the east as Europe e•ther. The west cannot harbor bopes ithat lt shall avol-d an lnvaslon by the barbarians by toresaklng the east-ern part of Europe to Communlsm. Al!, long a s one substantlal portlon of Europe 1-s undergolng a feverlsh change. as long as everythlng there, which symbolized the Chrlstlan and European splr•t, is retreating before th-e aggresslveness of the barbarlan and is wlthdrawlng to the hlllsldes and int.o the catacombs, a s long as half of 1Europe -does not live, belleve and t~I accordlng to the thousand-year-old Chrl&tlan and Europeain laws, there shall be no contentmen,t ot •the spirit, ,n or shall th-ere be material welfare In the the west. Tbe Idea of Europe lncludes In itself tbe west as equally a s the ea st. lt -embraces 1he distant plalns of Poland, the Ukraine, White Russla, the Slovak and Rumanla,n valleys, as well as ,th& green fleld s ot France and Germany, and even the broad Iberlan horizons. We must resolve: There shall be only one Europe--a Chrlstlan, hlstorlcal Europe-a free and democratlc Europe.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Two Europes Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Cieker Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 8-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cieker, Jozef, 1907-1969 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/240911e14f80fa5ed63d8c7ff1008704.pdf 7da4603378f53dbfad11508d2b2dba57 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 1 THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA E DWARD L. DELANEY {Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla, Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana, Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln" teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.) T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity. Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an ignominlous endlng thirty years later. On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger· mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri· cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo• hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds. But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed. With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president, Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader• shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1 for an lndeflnite perlod. As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca and was therefore not blndlng. Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts �2 SLOVAKIA who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with 1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt !or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm. There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier, and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities. Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions. I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is ~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo• hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia was regarded as self-determinlng and independent. Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their pledges of military alliance. Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator. He was glven no alternative. He submitted. When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that •·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime. The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus cheatlng the Red gallows. For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two �SLOVAKIA 3 presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a. Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy. The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became a reality to them. Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new• bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles also recognlzed the fact that the state existed. Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage. Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels. Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism, natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots. Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un• dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since. Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre. He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In whatever he was rloing at the moment After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger• many. "No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com• �4 SLOV.AKIA pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy." ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the '·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on which they clashed. Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican. "The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect• ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church." Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the Czechs after the war? There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them. Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country. He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or their people in America than in their horne lands. "Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians, instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty. They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles. I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers? "True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man." That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal , rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted �SLOVAKIA 6 agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla. Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence, as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts. Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11 and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties. One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs. That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day. To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon. When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it. lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it. After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody by the Slovak mllltary authorltles. The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep them safe untll they could be freed after the war. The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene with Himmler. "We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler, "and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.'' The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant. �6 SLOVAKIA Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par• tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark· ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com· mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de• flance to thelr over-lords. The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April 6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague. Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re· volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys. women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague. The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels, the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln. On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned. The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness. But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia. Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph. �SLOVAKI.A. 7 Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre• dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth· les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela· tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing. The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng, Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au• thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon, also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven· year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had been imposed on them. Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding. New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace, we shall never know. In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow• managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals. Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of mine reached the American Legation. Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud. When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a fait accompll three years before. Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds. Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned. Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran. The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that Slovak patriot 1s on our heads. � SLOVAKIA 1 THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA E DWARD L. DELANEY {Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla, Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana, Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln" teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.) T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity. Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an ignominlous endlng thirty years later. On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger· mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri· cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo• hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds. But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed. With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president, Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader• shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1 for an lndeflnite perlod. As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca and was therefore not blndlng. Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts �2 SLOVAKIA who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with 1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt !or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm. There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier, and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities. Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions. I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is ~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo• hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia was regarded as self-determinlng and independent. Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their pledges of military alliance. Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator. He was glven no alternative. He submitted. When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that •·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime. The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus cheatlng the Red gallows. For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two �SLOVAKIA 3 presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a. Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy. The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became a reality to them. Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new• bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles also recognlzed the fact that the state existed. Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage. Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels. Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism, natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots. Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un• dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since. Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre. He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In whatever he was rloing at the moment After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger• many. "No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com• �4 SLOV.AKIA pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy." ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the '·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on which they clashed. Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican. "The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect• ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church." Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the Czechs after the war? There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them. Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country. He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or their people in America than in their horne lands. "Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians, instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty. They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles. I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers? "True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man." That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal , rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted �SLOVAKIA 6 agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla. Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence, as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts. Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11 and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties. One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs. That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day. To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon. When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it. lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it. After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody by the Slovak mllltary authorltles. The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep them safe untll they could be freed after the war. The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene with Himmler. "We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler, "and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.'' The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant. �6 SLOVAKIA Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par• tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark· ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com· mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de• flance to thelr over-lords. The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April 6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague. Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re· volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys. women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague. The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels, the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln. On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned. The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness. But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia. Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph. �SLOVAKI.A. 7 Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre• dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth· les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela· tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing. The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng, Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au• thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon, also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven· year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had been imposed on them. Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding. New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace, we shall never know. In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow• managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals. Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of mine reached the American Legation. Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud. When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a fait accompll three years before. Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds. Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned. Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran. The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that Slovak patriot 1s on our heads. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 1 THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA E DWARD L. DELANEY {Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla, Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana, Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln" teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.) T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity. Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an ignominlous endlng thirty years later. On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger· mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri· cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo• hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds. But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed. With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president, Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader• shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1 for an lndeflnite perlod. As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca and was therefore not blndlng. Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts 2 SLOVAKIA who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with 1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt !or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm. There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier, and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities. Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions. I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is ~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo• hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia was regarded as self-determinlng and independent. Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their pledges of military alliance. Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator. He was glven no alternative. He submitted. When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that •·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime. The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus cheatlng the Red gallows. For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two SLOVAKIA 3 presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a. Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy. The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became a reality to them. Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new• bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles also recognlzed the fact that the state existed. Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage. Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels. Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism, natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots. Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un• dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since. Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre. He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In whatever he was rloing at the moment After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger• many. "No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com• 4 SLOV.AKIA pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy." ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the '·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on which they clashed. Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican. "The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect• ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church." Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the Czechs after the war? There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them. Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country. He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or their people in America than in their horne lands. "Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians, instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty. They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles. I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers? "True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man." That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal , rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted SLOVAKIA 6 agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla. Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence, as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts. Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11 and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties. One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs. That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day. To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon. When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it. lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it. After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody by the Slovak mllltary authorltles. The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep them safe untll they could be freed after the war. The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene with Himmler. "We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler, "and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.'' The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant. 6 SLOVAKIA Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par• tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark· ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com· mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de• flance to thelr over-lords. The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April 6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague. Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re· volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys. women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague. The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels, the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln. On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned. The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness. But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia. Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph. SLOVAKI.A. 7 Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre• dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth· les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela· tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing. The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng, Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au• thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon, also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven· year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had been imposed on them. Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding. New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace, we shall never know. In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow• managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals. Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of mine reached the American Legation. Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud. When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a fait accompll three years before. Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds. Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned. Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran. The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that Slovak patriot 1s on our heads.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Betrayal of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Edward L. Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 1-7 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b72760b77ff4568a403a0d8dea2446bc.pdf bf73774357287baf814b134699c23b33 PDF Text Text �8LOYAK1A is published periodiéally by the Slovak L cague of America, a cnlturnl and eh ·i(' federnti011 oť Ame1·irans of Slovak des<·ent. 'ľhe ('hief pm·posc of SLOYAKIA is to lJťomote a better understanding and apprec·iation of the Slovak nation and its lon g sh-ug-gle foľ freeclom and incle penden('e. As Americ·ans, members of the 81ovak League of America firmly believe t hat the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given ľight to freedom and independence. 'Phe_\. aľe dedicatecl to the cause of the J\merican \\'U_\' of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose thľ plague oť Commnnism an d al! otlwr totalitarian political s_vstems. _\'t'H ľ Snbsc·ri ption to Slovakia $1.00 J)ťľ in thf' r. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewher e. Selld subscriptious to: SLOYAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PR ESS Middletown, Pa. � �8LOYAK1A is published periodiéally by the Slovak L cague of America, a cnlturnl and eh ·i(' federnti011 oť Ame1·irans of Slovak des<·ent. 'ľhe ('hief pm·posc of SLOYAKIA is to lJťomote a better understanding and apprec·iation of the Slovak nation and its lon g sh-ug-gle foľ freeclom and incle penden('e. As Americ·ans, members of the 81ovak League of America firmly believe t hat the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given ľight to freedom and independence. 'Phe_\. aľe dedicatecl to the cause of the J\merican \\'U_\' of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose thľ plague oť Commnnism an d al! otlwr totalitarian political s_vstems. _\'t'H ľ Snbsc·ri ption to Slovakia $1.00 J)ťľ in thf' r. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewher e. Selld subscriptious to: SLOYAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PR ESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f9b44a0bc9f2d8a6194cf8dc60d9da94.pdf 73c53258079388771e6c4b75ee4aad69 PDF Text Text Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.) • Honnraľy Preside nt Rev. John J . Lach 2006 Schrage Ave., Whiting, Ind. Or. Peter P. H letko Chicago, lllinois Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St.. Passaic, N. J. Pres ident Michae l Rehak Philip A . Hrobak 2738 W. 55th St., Chicago 32, 111. P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa. Vice-President ADVISORY COUNCIL Marti n Slimak Michael J . Vargovich 12511 Madison Avenue Lakewood 7, Ohio. National Pľesident First Catholic Slovak Union of U. S. A. Vice-Presideut Julia Krajcovic 1648 W. 18th Sl., Chicago 8, III. Helen Kocan Nationa I President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary Dr. Francis Hrusovsky 10510 Bu<:keye Road Cleve land 4, Ohio Frank Bobus National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Financial Secretary Stephen J. Tkach Frank J. Gurcak National President Peuna. Slovak Union 4755 Baptist Road Pittsburgh 27, Pa. Gabriela E. Vavrek Treasurer National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Union Stephen Skriba 3235 W. 26th St., Chicago 23, III. EXECU TIVE COMMITTEE Martin Cintula Natlonal P r esideut Slovak Wreath of the Free Eagle Dr. Peter P. Hletko F'iľst 1943 W. 48th St., Chicago 9, Jll. Paul P. Jamriska John Rozboril 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. National Presideut Slovak Catholic Cadet Un ion SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America) JEDNOTA SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA ŽENSKÁ JEDNOTA Middlet own, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohlo. BRATSTVO SLOVENSKÉ NOVINY ZORNIČKA Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Cle veland, Ohio. Wilkes-Barre, P a. KATOLÍCKY SOKOL SVORNOSŤ Whitaker, Pa. OSADNÉ HLASY Chicago, lll. Passaic, N. J. �0 šAšriw TRNAVA 0 � Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.) • Honnraľy Preside nt Rev. John J . Lach 2006 Schrage Ave., Whiting, Ind. Or. Peter P. H letko Chicago, lllinois Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St.. Passaic, N. J. Pres ident Michae l Rehak Philip A . Hrobak 2738 W. 55th St., Chicago 32, 111. P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa. Vice-President ADVISORY COUNCIL Marti n Slimak Michael J . Vargovich 12511 Madison Avenue Lakewood 7, Ohio. National Pľesident First Catholic Slovak Union of U. S. A. Vice-Presideut Julia Krajcovic 1648 W. 18th Sl., Chicago 8, III. Helen Kocan Nationa I President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary Dr. Francis Hrusovsky 10510 Bu<:keye Road Cleve land 4, Ohio Frank Bobus National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Financial Secretary Stephen J. Tkach Frank J. Gurcak National President Peuna. Slovak Union 4755 Baptist Road Pittsburgh 27, Pa. Gabriela E. Vavrek Treasurer National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Union Stephen Skriba 3235 W. 26th St., Chicago 23, III. EXECU TIVE COMMITTEE Martin Cintula Natlonal P r esideut Slovak Wreath of the Free Eagle Dr. Peter P. Hletko F'iľst 1943 W. 48th St., Chicago 9, Jll. Paul P. Jamriska John Rozboril 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. National Presideut Slovak Catholic Cadet Un ion SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America) JEDNOTA SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA ŽENSKÁ JEDNOTA Middlet own, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohlo. BRATSTVO SLOVENSKÉ NOVINY ZORNIČKA Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Cle veland, Ohio. Wilkes-Barre, P a. KATOLÍCKY SOKOL SVORNOSŤ Whitaker, Pa. OSADNÉ HLASY Chicago, lll. Passaic, N. J. �0 šAšriw TRNAVA 0 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5dd66bc6cf625bb29ac28ec7a9800065.pdf 0c3354164566bf13826593df39835ab0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 TRUTH AND LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZEOHO-SLOVA.KIA (Jk) On October 28th some ot the Bene§ Czechs and the so-calJed Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks ! ) celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Patrlotlc and democratlc Czechs and Slovaks, however, had nothlng to celebrate on that date. In fact, they were glad to forget about it. And yet, less than flfteen years ago that day was a Slovak holiday. Of course, the majority of the Slovak natlon already then dld not celebrate the event wlth enthusiasm, because the short-sighted policy of the Prague reglmes had been unbel!evably successful in making enemies of the entlre non-Czech populatlon - the majority of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - and especially of the Slovaks. But even under the prevailing clrcumstances, the Slovaks still were In favor of the Czechoslovak Republ!c. And it probably would b e safe to say that the Slovaks at home were as much for Czechoslovakia at that Ume as the Slovaks in the Unlted States, Russia, Italy and the AJUed fronts were in lts establishment durlng World War I. A State, however, is not the supreme value in the democratlc and Christlan books of values. It is, accordlng to modern, democratlc scl• ence on statecraft, only a means that 1s supposed to make posslble the physlcal and splrltual Ufe of a natlon. And a natlon must not dle wlth the support of lnstltutions whlch were ordained to preserve it. (vd. Paul Janet, HISTOIRE DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA MORALE, PARIS, 1887). But the Masaryk and Beneš reglmes did place the Czechoslovak State above the Slovak natlon. Thelr pol!cy did seek the destructlon of the Slovak nation. Such a policy certalnly could not be expected to galn the sympathy of the Slovak people. The Slova.ks reslsted lt resolutely. And that was only natural. The Czech professor, Dr. J. Bušek, sald the Slovak natlon was performing a mira.cle whlch in no small measure must be credlted to bad Czech pol!tlcs. The more Prague oppressed lt, the more self-consclous the Slovak natlon became. And thls enhanced the pol!tical development of the Slovaks. The Slovak nation, whlch Dr. Bušek claimed had developed more in the twenty years withln the framework of Czechoslovakla than 1t had in the entlre century of Magyar domination, could not be satlsfled wlth a solutlon that prevented its spirltual and materlal expansion. lt traveled the same path taken by other Central-European natlons and wended lts way from cohabltatlon In common unlts to autonomy and then to independence. When the Slova.ks proclalmed their independence, they were fully aware of the fact that lt was the result of a natural tendency of polltical development, and, therefore, that they were dolng what was rlght. October 28, 1918, was a mllestone in the national development of the Slovaks. But only one of the mllestones marking thelr hlstorlcal trek from !oss of thelr independence in the tenth century to tbe acqulsltlon of lt aga.In in 1939. March 14, 1939 - Slovak Independence Day - became the State hollday. The clrcnmstances under which the Slovak Republlc was born wlll not alter the slgnlficance of thls date in the least. In tbe la.st centuries, all the states ot centra! and �62 SLOVAKIA eastern Europe or!ginated In much the same way. And so dld the Czechoslovak Republlc. There exlsts a varlety of legends about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republ!c, but the truth !s only one. THE LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prof. T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Beneš created a legend about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republlc. Accordlng to that legend, the "Czechoslovak natlon" exlsted already ln the nlnth century. That natlon was overcome by the Germans and Hungarlans, and the Slovak "branch" was separated from the Czech natlon. After a thousand years of enslavement, during World War I, Czech Knlghts, led by Masaryk and Beneš, waged a hero!c struggle against the German and Magyar tyrants and liberated the "Czechoslovak nat!on" and reestabllshed its independence. Thls fable was propagated as the holy truth not only at horne, but also abroad. Here and there slight varlatlons were allowed, but the substance of the legend always had to remaln the same: the "Czechoslovak nat!on", after belng subjugated in the nlnth century, yearned for a thousand years to live In lts own State; lt was llberated by the two Czech heroes, Masaryk and Beneš, who fulfllled the anclent dream of the unlted "Czechoslovak natlon" for a common homeland. A cltlzen of Czechoslovakla doubt!ng thls fable was consldered a traltor and an enemy ot the State. In bis first publlcatlon for lnternatlonal consumptlon ("Détrulsez l'Autrlche"), Dr. Edward Beneš had stated that the Czechs and Slovaks were "ONE" natlon, the Slovaks were only a "BRANCH" of the Czech natlon and the Slovak language was only a "DIALECT" of the Czech language, and so it had to be, according to Masaryk and Beneš. To seek equallty and justlce for the Slovavks was punishable, because they were destlned - by Masaryk and Beneš - to strengthen the number of Czechs and perish in the Czech nation so that hlstory once might write another chapter about the heroic exploits of Masaryk and Beneš! Llfe, however, bls dlspelled that legend. Just as !t has the rest of the Czech attempts to falslfy history, whether "manuscripts" or any other famous deeds were concerned which were supposed to be the foundat!on of the greatness and clalms of some Czech generation. Llfe does not respect historical romantlclsms and does not confuse them with reality. It has its own laws and evolutionary ways, and these hold even in the case of Czechoslovakia. Truth has prevalled, lndeed, but lt was not the truth acclalmed by Masaryk, who even "orlginated" the wlsdom that "States are preserved by the ldeas whlch origlnated them" by borrowlng lt from Sallust! THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A part of the Czech emlgration - the Beneš Czechs and the Czech Slovaks - are trylng to revlve the fable of the orlgin of the Czechoslovak Republic, the mlsslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak Republlc, the misslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak natlon." But the truth remalns what lt was: t he Czechoslovak Republic did not come lnto being as the result of a 1000-year-old struggle of the " Czechoslovak natlon", because such a nation never �SLOVAK IA 63 existed. International conditio ns, and especially the intervention of France, were responslble for lts origin. Of course, smooth, perslstent propaganda has beclouded the truth and supported the legend. The same Dr. Edwar d Beneš - w ho in 1916 pr oposed to "Destroy Austria" and created t he fable th at Czechoslovakla was t h e result of a 1000-year-old struggle of the "Czechoslovak nat!on" - just a few years prior to that time wrote in his book "Le Probléme Autrich en et la Question Tcheque" that he dld not belleve Austria would collapse, b ecause In Bohemla " they saw in independence the greatest dange r to national existence and, with the exception of a few radicals, this was the opinion of all sensible (Czech ) politici.ins." This stand of the Czech natlon, no t even mentloníng that of the Slovak nation, did not change even after Masaryk and Beneš went ab road In 1916 to begin the cam paign for the creatlon of a Czechoslovak Republlc. During the entire first World War, Czech politlclans and cultural leaders contlnued to p roclaim thelr loyalty to Austria. "Närodni Listy," one of the leading Czech papers, wrote early in 1917: " lt is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile the honor of the Czec h nation. The enemies have lcarned that the love of a ll Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their Fatherland is firm and unshakab le. The enemies ha ve realized that those who abroad make contradictory statements are liars and impostors." Late in 1916, a ll the Czech par t!es In t he Austrlan parllament, without a slngle exception, lssued a solem n declaration: "The basis a nd guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." And in J anuary 1917, the assoclation of Czech members of par llament sent the following letter to the forelgn minister of AustriaH ungary: "In view of the Allied answer to Preside nt Wilson in which the liberatlon of the Czechs figures as a war aim, we reject this lnsinuation which is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous deve lopment only un der th e Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy." T he same part!es asked P rime Ministe r Clam-Mar tlnitz, a Czech hlmself, to arrange an audlence with the emperor, becau se "we want to teli His Majesty, that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our d emands shall a lways be compatible wlth the interests of the Habsburg dynasty and of the realm ; that we are loyal servants of King and Country, that our complaints have never s haken our belief that after victory the c laims of the Czech people shali find satisfaction w ithin the framework of the rea lm and under the Habsburg crown." Furthermore, the delegates of the Czech soclalists a t the Stockholm Conference or the Socialist In ternatlonal, In J u ne 1917, volced t heir demand for " a n indepe nde nt Czec h State w ithin a federated Austria-Hungary." AU this caused F. Peroutka, Czech journallst, to ,v-rlte the f ollowing sad commentary in bis book "Budováni státu" (Buildlng of the State): "In all these manlfestations the one essential lack ln g generally �64 S LOVAKIA. was: a clearly expre11ed w ill for freedom. T helr leading motlve was a perslstent effort to have the Austrlan Government recognlze the Joyalty of the Czech nation. During the three years (1914-1917), from what was resoundlng at home, lt was not possible to prove even weakly that the nation at home had any sympathies for the action abroad. lt would be muc h eaaler t o pr ove that t he a ction abroad w as repudiate d by th ese manifeatatlon1." Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, a representative of the younger Czech lntellectuals. states only an objectlve truth, the reality, when he says that the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic "was a rather unexpected event." Thomas Masaryk, contlnues Prof. Chudoba, contlnued to assure "the leadlng American personalltles as late as the summer of 1918 that there would not be any partltlon of the Habsburg monarchy. Even the manlfesto of the Czech wrlters, lssued In May, 1917, a very radlcal declaration, dld not mention an independent State. And the tenth of Presldent Wllson's famous fourteen polnts spoke only of an autonomous development of the peoples of AustrlaH ungary." And that !s how lt actually was. T he forelgn activlty of the Czechs and Slovaks, in whlch American Slovaks along wlth Gen. M. R. štefá.nlk and t he Slovak leglonalres played a major role, was not very successful as far as the matter of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon' 'was concerned. In the flrst place, there was no such nation and, secondly, the Czechs were voclferously proclalming thelr loyalty to Austria. In Slovakla there was pol!tlcal stagnatlon. The destructlon of the Habsburg Monarchy was favored by French polltlclans, especlally by Clemenceau. To weaken Germany and galn allles In centra! Europe In J uly 1918, the French supported the pian to establlsh natlonal States on the rulns of Austrla-Hungary. The prlnciple of the rlght of self-determlnatlon was supposed to be t he basis of thls dlv1slon of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thls, however, was not adhered to and the new organization of centra! Europe, ot whlch the Czechoslovak Republic and Yugoslavla were supposed to be the bulwark, proved ltself lncapable of preservatlon and collapsed wlth the flrst attack from the outslde. Czechoslovakla fell flrst. No one defended her. And when the Republlc was reestabllshed In 1945, by the grace ot Moscow, and annexed by the very same Moscow In 1948, agaln not a slngle shot was flred In her defense, nay, not even a slngle manly protest was made In the defense of Czechoslovakla. Why should the Slovaks want to live In such a State? And why 1Should they celebrate the annlversary of lts orlgin? In the Ufe of the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was an lmportant mllestone. They attalned much In Czechoslovakla, but never as much as they were entltled to and as much as they mlght attaln In thelr own Independent State In an European or Centra! European federatlon . • • • GET THE STORY ABOUT "CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY" FROM THE PIOOPLE WHO SU FFERED UNDER IT AND WERE PERSECUTED BY TT ! SUBSCRIBE TO T HE. SL OVA K NEWSLETTER AT ONCE ! � SLOVAKIA 61 TRUTH AND LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZEOHO-SLOVA.KIA (Jk) On October 28th some ot the Bene§ Czechs and the so-calJed Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks ! ) celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Patrlotlc and democratlc Czechs and Slovaks, however, had nothlng to celebrate on that date. In fact, they were glad to forget about it. And yet, less than flfteen years ago that day was a Slovak holiday. Of course, the majority of the Slovak natlon already then dld not celebrate the event wlth enthusiasm, because the short-sighted policy of the Prague reglmes had been unbel!evably successful in making enemies of the entlre non-Czech populatlon - the majority of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - and especially of the Slovaks. But even under the prevailing clrcumstances, the Slovaks still were In favor of the Czechoslovak Republ!c. And it probably would b e safe to say that the Slovaks at home were as much for Czechoslovakia at that Ume as the Slovaks in the Unlted States, Russia, Italy and the AJUed fronts were in lts establishment durlng World War I. A State, however, is not the supreme value in the democratlc and Christlan books of values. It is, accordlng to modern, democratlc scl• ence on statecraft, only a means that 1s supposed to make posslble the physlcal and splrltual Ufe of a natlon. And a natlon must not dle wlth the support of lnstltutions whlch were ordained to preserve it. (vd. Paul Janet, HISTOIRE DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA MORALE, PARIS, 1887). But the Masaryk and Beneš reglmes did place the Czechoslovak State above the Slovak natlon. Thelr pol!cy did seek the destructlon of the Slovak nation. Such a policy certalnly could not be expected to galn the sympathy of the Slovak people. The Slova.ks reslsted lt resolutely. And that was only natural. The Czech professor, Dr. J. Bušek, sald the Slovak natlon was performing a mira.cle whlch in no small measure must be credlted to bad Czech pol!tlcs. The more Prague oppressed lt, the more self-consclous the Slovak natlon became. And thls enhanced the pol!tical development of the Slovaks. The Slovak nation, whlch Dr. Bušek claimed had developed more in the twenty years withln the framework of Czechoslovakla than 1t had in the entlre century of Magyar domination, could not be satlsfled wlth a solutlon that prevented its spirltual and materlal expansion. lt traveled the same path taken by other Central-European natlons and wended lts way from cohabltatlon In common unlts to autonomy and then to independence. When the Slova.ks proclalmed their independence, they were fully aware of the fact that lt was the result of a natural tendency of polltical development, and, therefore, that they were dolng what was rlght. October 28, 1918, was a mllestone in the national development of the Slovaks. But only one of the mllestones marking thelr hlstorlcal trek from !oss of thelr independence in the tenth century to tbe acqulsltlon of lt aga.In in 1939. March 14, 1939 - Slovak Independence Day - became the State hollday. The clrcnmstances under which the Slovak Republlc was born wlll not alter the slgnlficance of thls date in the least. In tbe la.st centuries, all the states ot centra! and �62 SLOVAKIA eastern Europe or!ginated In much the same way. And so dld the Czechoslovak Republlc. There exlsts a varlety of legends about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republ!c, but the truth !s only one. THE LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prof. T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Beneš created a legend about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republlc. Accordlng to that legend, the "Czechoslovak natlon" exlsted already ln the nlnth century. That natlon was overcome by the Germans and Hungarlans, and the Slovak "branch" was separated from the Czech natlon. After a thousand years of enslavement, during World War I, Czech Knlghts, led by Masaryk and Beneš, waged a hero!c struggle against the German and Magyar tyrants and liberated the "Czechoslovak nat!on" and reestabllshed its independence. Thls fable was propagated as the holy truth not only at horne, but also abroad. Here and there slight varlatlons were allowed, but the substance of the legend always had to remaln the same: the "Czechoslovak nat!on", after belng subjugated in the nlnth century, yearned for a thousand years to live In lts own State; lt was llberated by the two Czech heroes, Masaryk and Beneš, who fulfllled the anclent dream of the unlted "Czechoslovak natlon" for a common homeland. A cltlzen of Czechoslovakla doubt!ng thls fable was consldered a traltor and an enemy ot the State. In bis first publlcatlon for lnternatlonal consumptlon ("Détrulsez l'Autrlche"), Dr. Edward Beneš had stated that the Czechs and Slovaks were "ONE" natlon, the Slovaks were only a "BRANCH" of the Czech natlon and the Slovak language was only a "DIALECT" of the Czech language, and so it had to be, according to Masaryk and Beneš. To seek equallty and justlce for the Slovavks was punishable, because they were destlned - by Masaryk and Beneš - to strengthen the number of Czechs and perish in the Czech nation so that hlstory once might write another chapter about the heroic exploits of Masaryk and Beneš! Llfe, however, bls dlspelled that legend. Just as !t has the rest of the Czech attempts to falslfy history, whether "manuscripts" or any other famous deeds were concerned which were supposed to be the foundat!on of the greatness and clalms of some Czech generation. Llfe does not respect historical romantlclsms and does not confuse them with reality. It has its own laws and evolutionary ways, and these hold even in the case of Czechoslovakia. Truth has prevalled, lndeed, but lt was not the truth acclalmed by Masaryk, who even "orlginated" the wlsdom that "States are preserved by the ldeas whlch origlnated them" by borrowlng lt from Sallust! THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A part of the Czech emlgration - the Beneš Czechs and the Czech Slovaks - are trylng to revlve the fable of the orlgin of the Czechoslovak Republic, the mlsslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak Republlc, the misslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak natlon." But the truth remalns what lt was: t he Czechoslovak Republic did not come lnto being as the result of a 1000-year-old struggle of the " Czechoslovak natlon", because such a nation never �SLOVAK IA 63 existed. International conditio ns, and especially the intervention of France, were responslble for lts origin. Of course, smooth, perslstent propaganda has beclouded the truth and supported the legend. The same Dr. Edwar d Beneš - w ho in 1916 pr oposed to "Destroy Austria" and created t he fable th at Czechoslovakla was t h e result of a 1000-year-old struggle of the "Czechoslovak nat!on" - just a few years prior to that time wrote in his book "Le Probléme Autrich en et la Question Tcheque" that he dld not belleve Austria would collapse, b ecause In Bohemla " they saw in independence the greatest dange r to national existence and, with the exception of a few radicals, this was the opinion of all sensible (Czech ) politici.ins." This stand of the Czech natlon, no t even mentloníng that of the Slovak nation, did not change even after Masaryk and Beneš went ab road In 1916 to begin the cam paign for the creatlon of a Czechoslovak Republlc. During the entire first World War, Czech politlclans and cultural leaders contlnued to p roclaim thelr loyalty to Austria. "Närodni Listy," one of the leading Czech papers, wrote early in 1917: " lt is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile the honor of the Czec h nation. The enemies have lcarned that the love of a ll Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their Fatherland is firm and unshakab le. The enemies ha ve realized that those who abroad make contradictory statements are liars and impostors." Late in 1916, a ll the Czech par t!es In t he Austrlan parllament, without a slngle exception, lssued a solem n declaration: "The basis a nd guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." And in J anuary 1917, the assoclation of Czech members of par llament sent the following letter to the forelgn minister of AustriaH ungary: "In view of the Allied answer to Preside nt Wilson in which the liberatlon of the Czechs figures as a war aim, we reject this lnsinuation which is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous deve lopment only un der th e Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy." T he same part!es asked P rime Ministe r Clam-Mar tlnitz, a Czech hlmself, to arrange an audlence with the emperor, becau se "we want to teli His Majesty, that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our d emands shall a lways be compatible wlth the interests of the Habsburg dynasty and of the realm ; that we are loyal servants of King and Country, that our complaints have never s haken our belief that after victory the c laims of the Czech people shali find satisfaction w ithin the framework of the rea lm and under the Habsburg crown." Furthermore, the delegates of the Czech soclalists a t the Stockholm Conference or the Socialist In ternatlonal, In J u ne 1917, volced t heir demand for " a n indepe nde nt Czec h State w ithin a federated Austria-Hungary." AU this caused F. Peroutka, Czech journallst, to ,v-rlte the f ollowing sad commentary in bis book "Budováni státu" (Buildlng of the State): "In all these manlfestations the one essential lack ln g generally �64 S LOVAKIA. was: a clearly expre11ed w ill for freedom. T helr leading motlve was a perslstent effort to have the Austrlan Government recognlze the Joyalty of the Czech nation. During the three years (1914-1917), from what was resoundlng at home, lt was not possible to prove even weakly that the nation at home had any sympathies for the action abroad. lt would be muc h eaaler t o pr ove that t he a ction abroad w as repudiate d by th ese manifeatatlon1." Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, a representative of the younger Czech lntellectuals. states only an objectlve truth, the reality, when he says that the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic "was a rather unexpected event." Thomas Masaryk, contlnues Prof. Chudoba, contlnued to assure "the leadlng American personalltles as late as the summer of 1918 that there would not be any partltlon of the Habsburg monarchy. Even the manlfesto of the Czech wrlters, lssued In May, 1917, a very radlcal declaration, dld not mention an independent State. And the tenth of Presldent Wllson's famous fourteen polnts spoke only of an autonomous development of the peoples of AustrlaH ungary." And that !s how lt actually was. T he forelgn activlty of the Czechs and Slovaks, in whlch American Slovaks along wlth Gen. M. R. štefá.nlk and t he Slovak leglonalres played a major role, was not very successful as far as the matter of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon' 'was concerned. In the flrst place, there was no such nation and, secondly, the Czechs were voclferously proclalming thelr loyalty to Austria. In Slovakla there was pol!tlcal stagnatlon. The destructlon of the Habsburg Monarchy was favored by French polltlclans, especlally by Clemenceau. To weaken Germany and galn allles In centra! Europe In J uly 1918, the French supported the pian to establlsh natlonal States on the rulns of Austrla-Hungary. The prlnciple of the rlght of self-determlnatlon was supposed to be t he basis of thls dlv1slon of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thls, however, was not adhered to and the new organization of centra! Europe, ot whlch the Czechoslovak Republic and Yugoslavla were supposed to be the bulwark, proved ltself lncapable of preservatlon and collapsed wlth the flrst attack from the outslde. Czechoslovakla fell flrst. No one defended her. And when the Republlc was reestabllshed In 1945, by the grace ot Moscow, and annexed by the very same Moscow In 1948, agaln not a slngle shot was flred In her defense, nay, not even a slngle manly protest was made In the defense of Czechoslovakla. Why should the Slovaks want to live In such a State? And why 1Should they celebrate the annlversary of lts orlgin? In the Ufe of the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was an lmportant mllestone. They attalned much In Czechoslovakla, but never as much as they were entltled to and as much as they mlght attaln In thelr own Independent State In an European or Centra! European federatlon . • • • GET THE STORY ABOUT "CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY" FROM THE PIOOPLE WHO SU FFERED UNDER IT AND WERE PERSECUTED BY TT ! SUBSCRIBE TO T HE. SL OVA K NEWSLETTER AT ONCE ! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 TRUTH AND LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZEOHO-SLOVA.KIA (Jk) On October 28th some ot the Bene§ Czechs and the so-calJed Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks ! ) celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Patrlotlc and democratlc Czechs and Slovaks, however, had nothlng to celebrate on that date. In fact, they were glad to forget about it. And yet, less than flfteen years ago that day was a Slovak holiday. Of course, the majority of the Slovak natlon already then dld not celebrate the event wlth enthusiasm, because the short-sighted policy of the Prague reglmes had been unbel!evably successful in making enemies of the entlre non-Czech populatlon - the majority of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - and especially of the Slovaks. But even under the prevailing clrcumstances, the Slovaks still were In favor of the Czechoslovak Republ!c. And it probably would b e safe to say that the Slovaks at home were as much for Czechoslovakia at that Ume as the Slovaks in the Unlted States, Russia, Italy and the AJUed fronts were in lts establishment durlng World War I. A State, however, is not the supreme value in the democratlc and Christlan books of values. It is, accordlng to modern, democratlc scl• ence on statecraft, only a means that 1s supposed to make posslble the physlcal and splrltual Ufe of a natlon. And a natlon must not dle wlth the support of lnstltutions whlch were ordained to preserve it. (vd. Paul Janet, HISTOIRE DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA MORALE, PARIS, 1887). But the Masaryk and Beneš reglmes did place the Czechoslovak State above the Slovak natlon. Thelr pol!cy did seek the destructlon of the Slovak nation. Such a policy certalnly could not be expected to galn the sympathy of the Slovak people. The Slova.ks reslsted lt resolutely. And that was only natural. The Czech professor, Dr. J. Bušek, sald the Slovak natlon was performing a mira.cle whlch in no small measure must be credlted to bad Czech pol!tlcs. The more Prague oppressed lt, the more self-consclous the Slovak natlon became. And thls enhanced the pol!tical development of the Slovaks. The Slovak nation, whlch Dr. Bušek claimed had developed more in the twenty years withln the framework of Czechoslovakla than 1t had in the entlre century of Magyar domination, could not be satlsfled wlth a solutlon that prevented its spirltual and materlal expansion. lt traveled the same path taken by other Central-European natlons and wended lts way from cohabltatlon In common unlts to autonomy and then to independence. When the Slova.ks proclalmed their independence, they were fully aware of the fact that lt was the result of a natural tendency of polltical development, and, therefore, that they were dolng what was rlght. October 28, 1918, was a mllestone in the national development of the Slovaks. But only one of the mllestones marking thelr hlstorlcal trek from !oss of thelr independence in the tenth century to tbe acqulsltlon of lt aga.In in 1939. March 14, 1939 - Slovak Independence Day - became the State hollday. The clrcnmstances under which the Slovak Republlc was born wlll not alter the slgnlficance of thls date in the least. In tbe la.st centuries, all the states ot centra! and 62 SLOVAKIA eastern Europe or!ginated In much the same way. And so dld the Czechoslovak Republlc. There exlsts a varlety of legends about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republ!c, but the truth !s only one. THE LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prof. T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Beneš created a legend about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republlc. Accordlng to that legend, the "Czechoslovak natlon" exlsted already ln the nlnth century. That natlon was overcome by the Germans and Hungarlans, and the Slovak "branch" was separated from the Czech natlon. After a thousand years of enslavement, during World War I, Czech Knlghts, led by Masaryk and Beneš, waged a hero!c struggle against the German and Magyar tyrants and liberated the "Czechoslovak nat!on" and reestabllshed its independence. Thls fable was propagated as the holy truth not only at horne, but also abroad. Here and there slight varlatlons were allowed, but the substance of the legend always had to remaln the same: the "Czechoslovak nat!on", after belng subjugated in the nlnth century, yearned for a thousand years to live In lts own State; lt was llberated by the two Czech heroes, Masaryk and Beneš, who fulfllled the anclent dream of the unlted "Czechoslovak natlon" for a common homeland. A cltlzen of Czechoslovakla doubt!ng thls fable was consldered a traltor and an enemy ot the State. In bis first publlcatlon for lnternatlonal consumptlon ("Détrulsez l'Autrlche"), Dr. Edward Beneš had stated that the Czechs and Slovaks were "ONE" natlon, the Slovaks were only a "BRANCH" of the Czech natlon and the Slovak language was only a "DIALECT" of the Czech language, and so it had to be, according to Masaryk and Beneš. To seek equallty and justlce for the Slovavks was punishable, because they were destlned - by Masaryk and Beneš - to strengthen the number of Czechs and perish in the Czech nation so that hlstory once might write another chapter about the heroic exploits of Masaryk and Beneš! Llfe, however, bls dlspelled that legend. Just as !t has the rest of the Czech attempts to falslfy history, whether "manuscripts" or any other famous deeds were concerned which were supposed to be the foundat!on of the greatness and clalms of some Czech generation. Llfe does not respect historical romantlclsms and does not confuse them with reality. It has its own laws and evolutionary ways, and these hold even in the case of Czechoslovakia. Truth has prevalled, lndeed, but lt was not the truth acclalmed by Masaryk, who even "orlginated" the wlsdom that "States are preserved by the ldeas whlch origlnated them" by borrowlng lt from Sallust! THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A part of the Czech emlgration - the Beneš Czechs and the Czech Slovaks - are trylng to revlve the fable of the orlgin of the Czechoslovak Republic, the mlsslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak Republlc, the misslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak natlon." But the truth remalns what lt was: t he Czechoslovak Republic did not come lnto being as the result of a 1000-year-old struggle of the " Czechoslovak natlon", because such a nation never SLOVAK IA 63 existed. International conditio ns, and especially the intervention of France, were responslble for lts origin. Of course, smooth, perslstent propaganda has beclouded the truth and supported the legend. The same Dr. Edwar d Beneš - w ho in 1916 pr oposed to "Destroy Austria" and created t he fable th at Czechoslovakla was t h e result of a 1000-year-old struggle of the "Czechoslovak nat!on" - just a few years prior to that time wrote in his book "Le Probléme Autrich en et la Question Tcheque" that he dld not belleve Austria would collapse, b ecause In Bohemla " they saw in independence the greatest dange r to national existence and, with the exception of a few radicals, this was the opinion of all sensible (Czech ) politici.ins." This stand of the Czech natlon, no t even mentloníng that of the Slovak nation, did not change even after Masaryk and Beneš went ab road In 1916 to begin the cam paign for the creatlon of a Czechoslovak Republlc. During the entire first World War, Czech politlclans and cultural leaders contlnued to p roclaim thelr loyalty to Austria. "Närodni Listy," one of the leading Czech papers, wrote early in 1917: " lt is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile the honor of the Czec h nation. The enemies have lcarned that the love of a ll Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their Fatherland is firm and unshakab le. The enemies ha ve realized that those who abroad make contradictory statements are liars and impostors." Late in 1916, a ll the Czech par t!es In t he Austrlan parllament, without a slngle exception, lssued a solem n declaration: "The basis a nd guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." And in J anuary 1917, the assoclation of Czech members of par llament sent the following letter to the forelgn minister of AustriaH ungary: "In view of the Allied answer to Preside nt Wilson in which the liberatlon of the Czechs figures as a war aim, we reject this lnsinuation which is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous deve lopment only un der th e Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy." T he same part!es asked P rime Ministe r Clam-Mar tlnitz, a Czech hlmself, to arrange an audlence with the emperor, becau se "we want to teli His Majesty, that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our d emands shall a lways be compatible wlth the interests of the Habsburg dynasty and of the realm ; that we are loyal servants of King and Country, that our complaints have never s haken our belief that after victory the c laims of the Czech people shali find satisfaction w ithin the framework of the rea lm and under the Habsburg crown." Furthermore, the delegates of the Czech soclalists a t the Stockholm Conference or the Socialist In ternatlonal, In J u ne 1917, volced t heir demand for " a n indepe nde nt Czec h State w ithin a federated Austria-Hungary." AU this caused F. Peroutka, Czech journallst, to ,v-rlte the f ollowing sad commentary in bis book "Budováni státu" (Buildlng of the State): "In all these manlfestations the one essential lack ln g generally 64 S LOVAKIA. was: a clearly expre11ed w ill for freedom. T helr leading motlve was a perslstent effort to have the Austrlan Government recognlze the Joyalty of the Czech nation. During the three years (1914-1917), from what was resoundlng at home, lt was not possible to prove even weakly that the nation at home had any sympathies for the action abroad. lt would be muc h eaaler t o pr ove that t he a ction abroad w as repudiate d by th ese manifeatatlon1." Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, a representative of the younger Czech lntellectuals. states only an objectlve truth, the reality, when he says that the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic "was a rather unexpected event." Thomas Masaryk, contlnues Prof. Chudoba, contlnued to assure "the leadlng American personalltles as late as the summer of 1918 that there would not be any partltlon of the Habsburg monarchy. Even the manlfesto of the Czech wrlters, lssued In May, 1917, a very radlcal declaration, dld not mention an independent State. And the tenth of Presldent Wllson's famous fourteen polnts spoke only of an autonomous development of the peoples of AustrlaH ungary." And that !s how lt actually was. T he forelgn activlty of the Czechs and Slovaks, in whlch American Slovaks along wlth Gen. M. R. štefá.nlk and t he Slovak leglonalres played a major role, was not very successful as far as the matter of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon' 'was concerned. In the flrst place, there was no such nation and, secondly, the Czechs were voclferously proclalming thelr loyalty to Austria. In Slovakla there was pol!tlcal stagnatlon. The destructlon of the Habsburg Monarchy was favored by French polltlclans, especlally by Clemenceau. To weaken Germany and galn allles In centra! Europe In J uly 1918, the French supported the pian to establlsh natlonal States on the rulns of Austrla-Hungary. The prlnciple of the rlght of self-determlnatlon was supposed to be t he basis of thls dlv1slon of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thls, however, was not adhered to and the new organization of centra! Europe, ot whlch the Czechoslovak Republic and Yugoslavla were supposed to be the bulwark, proved ltself lncapable of preservatlon and collapsed wlth the flrst attack from the outslde. Czechoslovakla fell flrst. No one defended her. And when the Republlc was reestabllshed In 1945, by the grace ot Moscow, and annexed by the very same Moscow In 1948, agaln not a slngle shot was flred In her defense, nay, not even a slngle manly protest was made In the defense of Czechoslovakla. Why should the Slovaks want to live In such a State? And why 1Should they celebrate the annlversary of lts orlgin? In the Ufe of the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was an lmportant mllestone. They attalned much In Czechoslovakla, but never as much as they were entltled to and as much as they mlght attaln In thelr own Independent State In an European or Centra! European federatlon . • • • GET THE STORY ABOUT "CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY" FROM THE PIOOPLE WHO SU FFERED UNDER IT AND WERE PERSECUTED BY TT ! SUBSCRIBE TO T HE. SL OVA K NEWSLETTER AT ONCE !  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Truth and Legend About the Origin of Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 61-64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/de135378ad4bce1b596e24d63b7d3cd6.pdf e9d2cd9f01c7062306feed2915186794 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 59 ABOUT THE COUNCll, OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ( J k) - Thirty years ago Czech political exiles adopted the motto: "Truth Prevails." At that tíme T. G. Masaryk led the fight to establish á common state of two legally equal natlons the Czechs and the Slovaks. ;Masaryk, we know, was successful, and Czecho•Slovakia was born after World War I. After Masaryk two generatlons went to battle under this motto. But the motto "Truth Prevails" has backflred on them. The truth did i,revail, but at the expense of Czech emigratlon and against its intentions. Recently it happened to the Czech emigranta and their Slovak fellow•travelers organized in tbe so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The institution was presented by lts founders as loyal to democracy and fighting for democracy, and lts members and dlrectors pose as martyrs of democracy.. Under tbls disguise they got into the USA. But tbe truth will out! Some of the more serious Czech emigranta, who do not have their hands sullied by collaborating wlth the Communistš, decided to tear the mask of lies from the faces of the leaders of the Council of Free Czecboslovakia. A leading Czech journalist, the eminent Dr. Helen Koželuh found that the CFC was an undemocratic and totalitarian lnstitution and its representatives were responsible for many crimes, as well as collaboring with Communism. She tells in detail why she did so in an article published in "Návrat" (THE RETURN), Paris. It would be interesting to reproduce the whole article, but space In the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER ls limited. A few paragraphs, that fully cliaracterlze the people and the policy of the Council, ought to convince our readers that the SN was right In its appraisal of the CFC right from the start. "The CFC (Council of Free Czechoslovakla) is a totalitarian and undemocratic instltutlon," writes Dr. Koželub. "1 am a conflrmed democrat. I have no right to remain in this organlzation. I had some justificatlon as long as I could have the lmpresslon that the will to amend its ways did exist. Evidently the CFC had no intentlons of amending its ways and I would have to Ile if I wanted to state that I belleve otherwise. Certainly I am sorry that I cannot recognlze the CFC as a uniform reslstance organ, because I know that lt would be well if a uniform reslstance organ could exist. However, I cannot give preference to unity before democracy, because experlence has 1aught us that we fled from uniformity and because of the loss of democracy." "I made a mistake - and this I confess openly - that I dld not at first deduce the consequences from the fact that the CFC is not a democratlc organ, but a seJf.appointed continuer of the NATIONAL FRONT, and that not only wlth lts representatives, but with lts ideology as well. The spirit of the Košice program, agalnst whlch I fought In valn at horne t.nd trom which I was fortunate to escape, has conquered In the CFC. It would be not only illogical, but also dlshonest to support that which I rightly cons!dered as the rulnation of any natlon." �60 SLOVAKIA That 1s wbat Dr. Koželuh thlnks of the CFC as an lnstltulton. She also had sometblng to say about lts representatlves: "I wanted to belleve that the people, wbo were members ot the Natlonal Front and had approved the Košice program, reallzed that tbey had blundered and committed many mlstakes and tbat tbey would endeavor to make amends for the crlmes whlch tbey h ad unanlmously a11proved elther because of thelr lnsurtlclency or thelr !nl:Ufflclent understandlng. lt is true that the full measure of responsibility for everything that has happened or is happening in our country falls on the government and polltieal faetors of the Natlonal Front. There ia no argument about the faet that the Communist Party at horne was in the minority and eould always have been outvoted. How- ever, tbat dld not happen, so, we can safely say that all laws, regul atlons and decrees were passed by non-Communist votes, tbat 1s the votes ot those (the CFC) who now want to rule here, judge us and make declslons over us." Dr. Helen Koželuh also says that the factors of the National F'ront "knew well tha.t t h elr own partles could oust them from the Jeadershlp ot th elr respectlve partles for their past catastrophic blunders and, so, they procla.lmed themselves as personalltles Independent of thelr parttes and, therefore, unsea.table. Thls ls perhaps the flrst ca.se In hlstory where people proclaimed themselves as personalities because thelr work proved to be bad and rulnous for the na.tlon. Undoubtedly, they could not expect others to do that for them and, therefore, these bunglers by mutual agreement elevated themselves mutually to the posltlon of personalltles. I proclalm wlth a full knowledge ot responslblllty that thls shady undertaklng ls the most foollsh and most transparent attempt to decelve thelr own and other polltlcal partles that has ever happenetl and only a fool would be taken In and belleve lt." The above should be sufflclent to condemn the lnstttutlon ot collaborators wlth Communlsm who are responslble for tbe bloody tragedy of the Czech and Slovak natlons, for all the crlmes and murders commltted In Bohemla and In Slovakla slnce 1945. • • • • WHO SAID IT? " Benei defends tie w i th Russla. - Dec. 2ó. - Presltlent Edward Beneš advlsed Czechos'ovak pollticians In a broad.cast last night to avold maklng a bitter parliamentary eampaign lssue of the nation's alllanee with Russia. The Pres!dent, relteratlng a promlse ot l'ree, sec• ret e lectlons next spr!ng, sa!d that alllan-ce w!th Russla should be regarded as a CORNERSTONE OF CZECH OSLOVAKIA'S POLICY." - NEW YORK TIMES, 12-26-4ó. • "Londo'n, Feb. 19. - The Czecboslovak Government In Exile w!ll leave London next week for Koelce In Slovak!a, wbere a temporary capltal wlll be establlshed unt!I Prague !s treed. The group wlll travel via MOSCOW. T bls fact gave rise to ERRONEOUS reports tbat wbile there P resldent Eduard Benes would consult the Soviet Government about the eompoaltlon of his Government. Thls was flatly denled by the Government bere." - NEW YORK TIMES. 2-20-46. � SLOVAKIA 59 ABOUT THE COUNCll, OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ( J k) - Thirty years ago Czech political exiles adopted the motto: "Truth Prevails." At that tíme T. G. Masaryk led the fight to establish á common state of two legally equal natlons the Czechs and the Slovaks. ;Masaryk, we know, was successful, and Czecho•Slovakia was born after World War I. After Masaryk two generatlons went to battle under this motto. But the motto "Truth Prevails" has backflred on them. The truth did i,revail, but at the expense of Czech emigratlon and against its intentions. Recently it happened to the Czech emigranta and their Slovak fellow•travelers organized in tbe so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The institution was presented by lts founders as loyal to democracy and fighting for democracy, and lts members and dlrectors pose as martyrs of democracy.. Under tbls disguise they got into the USA. But tbe truth will out! Some of the more serious Czech emigranta, who do not have their hands sullied by collaborating wlth the Communistš, decided to tear the mask of lies from the faces of the leaders of the Council of Free Czecboslovakia. A leading Czech journalist, the eminent Dr. Helen Koželuh found that the CFC was an undemocratic and totalitarian lnstitution and its representatives were responsible for many crimes, as well as collaboring with Communism. She tells in detail why she did so in an article published in "Návrat" (THE RETURN), Paris. It would be interesting to reproduce the whole article, but space In the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER ls limited. A few paragraphs, that fully cliaracterlze the people and the policy of the Council, ought to convince our readers that the SN was right In its appraisal of the CFC right from the start. "The CFC (Council of Free Czechoslovakla) is a totalitarian and undemocratic instltutlon," writes Dr. Koželub. "1 am a conflrmed democrat. I have no right to remain in this organlzation. I had some justificatlon as long as I could have the lmpresslon that the will to amend its ways did exist. Evidently the CFC had no intentlons of amending its ways and I would have to Ile if I wanted to state that I belleve otherwise. Certainly I am sorry that I cannot recognlze the CFC as a uniform reslstance organ, because I know that lt would be well if a uniform reslstance organ could exist. However, I cannot give preference to unity before democracy, because experlence has 1aught us that we fled from uniformity and because of the loss of democracy." "I made a mistake - and this I confess openly - that I dld not at first deduce the consequences from the fact that the CFC is not a democratlc organ, but a seJf.appointed continuer of the NATIONAL FRONT, and that not only wlth lts representatives, but with lts ideology as well. The spirit of the Košice program, agalnst whlch I fought In valn at horne t.nd trom which I was fortunate to escape, has conquered In the CFC. It would be not only illogical, but also dlshonest to support that which I rightly cons!dered as the rulnation of any natlon." �60 SLOVAKIA That 1s wbat Dr. Koželuh thlnks of the CFC as an lnstltulton. She also had sometblng to say about lts representatlves: "I wanted to belleve that the people, wbo were members ot the Natlonal Front and had approved the Košice program, reallzed that tbey had blundered and committed many mlstakes and tbat tbey would endeavor to make amends for the crlmes whlch tbey h ad unanlmously a11proved elther because of thelr lnsurtlclency or thelr !nl:Ufflclent understandlng. lt is true that the full measure of responsibility for everything that has happened or is happening in our country falls on the government and polltieal faetors of the Natlonal Front. There ia no argument about the faet that the Communist Party at horne was in the minority and eould always have been outvoted. How- ever, tbat dld not happen, so, we can safely say that all laws, regul atlons and decrees were passed by non-Communist votes, tbat 1s the votes ot those (the CFC) who now want to rule here, judge us and make declslons over us." Dr. Helen Koželuh also says that the factors of the National F'ront "knew well tha.t t h elr own partles could oust them from the Jeadershlp ot th elr respectlve partles for their past catastrophic blunders and, so, they procla.lmed themselves as personalltles Independent of thelr parttes and, therefore, unsea.table. Thls ls perhaps the flrst ca.se In hlstory where people proclaimed themselves as personalities because thelr work proved to be bad and rulnous for the na.tlon. Undoubtedly, they could not expect others to do that for them and, therefore, these bunglers by mutual agreement elevated themselves mutually to the posltlon of personalltles. I proclalm wlth a full knowledge ot responslblllty that thls shady undertaklng ls the most foollsh and most transparent attempt to decelve thelr own and other polltlcal partles that has ever happenetl and only a fool would be taken In and belleve lt." The above should be sufflclent to condemn the lnstttutlon ot collaborators wlth Communlsm who are responslble for tbe bloody tragedy of the Czech and Slovak natlons, for all the crlmes and murders commltted In Bohemla and In Slovakla slnce 1945. • • • • WHO SAID IT? " Benei defends tie w i th Russla. - Dec. 2ó. - Presltlent Edward Beneš advlsed Czechos'ovak pollticians In a broad.cast last night to avold maklng a bitter parliamentary eampaign lssue of the nation's alllanee with Russia. The Pres!dent, relteratlng a promlse ot l'ree, sec• ret e lectlons next spr!ng, sa!d that alllan-ce w!th Russla should be regarded as a CORNERSTONE OF CZECH OSLOVAKIA'S POLICY." - NEW YORK TIMES, 12-26-4ó. • "Londo'n, Feb. 19. - The Czecboslovak Government In Exile w!ll leave London next week for Koelce In Slovak!a, wbere a temporary capltal wlll be establlshed unt!I Prague !s treed. The group wlll travel via MOSCOW. T bls fact gave rise to ERRONEOUS reports tbat wbile there P resldent Eduard Benes would consult the Soviet Government about the eompoaltlon of his Government. Thls was flatly denled by the Government bere." - NEW YORK TIMES. 2-20-46. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 59 ABOUT THE COUNCll, OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ( J k) - Thirty years ago Czech political exiles adopted the motto: "Truth Prevails." At that tíme T. G. Masaryk led the fight to establish á common state of two legally equal natlons the Czechs and the Slovaks. ;Masaryk, we know, was successful, and Czecho•Slovakia was born after World War I. After Masaryk two generatlons went to battle under this motto. But the motto "Truth Prevails" has backflred on them. The truth did i,revail, but at the expense of Czech emigratlon and against its intentions. Recently it happened to the Czech emigranta and their Slovak fellow•travelers organized in tbe so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The institution was presented by lts founders as loyal to democracy and fighting for democracy, and lts members and dlrectors pose as martyrs of democracy.. Under tbls disguise they got into the USA. But tbe truth will out! Some of the more serious Czech emigranta, who do not have their hands sullied by collaborating wlth the Communistš, decided to tear the mask of lies from the faces of the leaders of the Council of Free Czecboslovakia. A leading Czech journalist, the eminent Dr. Helen Koželuh found that the CFC was an undemocratic and totalitarian lnstitution and its representatives were responsible for many crimes, as well as collaboring with Communism. She tells in detail why she did so in an article published in "Návrat" (THE RETURN), Paris. It would be interesting to reproduce the whole article, but space In the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER ls limited. A few paragraphs, that fully cliaracterlze the people and the policy of the Council, ought to convince our readers that the SN was right In its appraisal of the CFC right from the start. "The CFC (Council of Free Czechoslovakla) is a totalitarian and undemocratic instltutlon," writes Dr. Koželub. "1 am a conflrmed democrat. I have no right to remain in this organlzation. I had some justificatlon as long as I could have the lmpresslon that the will to amend its ways did exist. Evidently the CFC had no intentlons of amending its ways and I would have to Ile if I wanted to state that I belleve otherwise. Certainly I am sorry that I cannot recognlze the CFC as a uniform reslstance organ, because I know that lt would be well if a uniform reslstance organ could exist. However, I cannot give preference to unity before democracy, because experlence has 1aught us that we fled from uniformity and because of the loss of democracy." "I made a mistake - and this I confess openly - that I dld not at first deduce the consequences from the fact that the CFC is not a democratlc organ, but a seJf.appointed continuer of the NATIONAL FRONT, and that not only wlth lts representatives, but with lts ideology as well. The spirit of the Košice program, agalnst whlch I fought In valn at horne t.nd trom which I was fortunate to escape, has conquered In the CFC. It would be not only illogical, but also dlshonest to support that which I rightly cons!dered as the rulnation of any natlon." 60 SLOVAKIA That 1s wbat Dr. Koželuh thlnks of the CFC as an lnstltulton. She also had sometblng to say about lts representatlves: "I wanted to belleve that the people, wbo were members ot the Natlonal Front and had approved the Košice program, reallzed that tbey had blundered and committed many mlstakes and tbat tbey would endeavor to make amends for the crlmes whlch tbey h ad unanlmously a11proved elther because of thelr lnsurtlclency or thelr !nl:Ufflclent understandlng. lt is true that the full measure of responsibility for everything that has happened or is happening in our country falls on the government and polltieal faetors of the Natlonal Front. There ia no argument about the faet that the Communist Party at horne was in the minority and eould always have been outvoted. How- ever, tbat dld not happen, so, we can safely say that all laws, regul atlons and decrees were passed by non-Communist votes, tbat 1s the votes ot those (the CFC) who now want to rule here, judge us and make declslons over us." Dr. Helen Koželuh also says that the factors of the National F'ront "knew well tha.t t h elr own partles could oust them from the Jeadershlp ot th elr respectlve partles for their past catastrophic blunders and, so, they procla.lmed themselves as personalltles Independent of thelr parttes and, therefore, unsea.table. Thls ls perhaps the flrst ca.se In hlstory where people proclaimed themselves as personalities because thelr work proved to be bad and rulnous for the na.tlon. Undoubtedly, they could not expect others to do that for them and, therefore, these bunglers by mutual agreement elevated themselves mutually to the posltlon of personalltles. I proclalm wlth a full knowledge ot responslblllty that thls shady undertaklng ls the most foollsh and most transparent attempt to decelve thelr own and other polltlcal partles that has ever happenetl and only a fool would be taken In and belleve lt." The above should be sufflclent to condemn the lnstttutlon ot collaborators wlth Communlsm who are responslble for tbe bloody tragedy of the Czech and Slovak natlons, for all the crlmes and murders commltted In Bohemla and In Slovakla slnce 1945. • • • • WHO SAID IT? " Benei defends tie w i th Russla. - Dec. 2ó. - Presltlent Edward Beneš advlsed Czechos'ovak pollticians In a broad.cast last night to avold maklng a bitter parliamentary eampaign lssue of the nation's alllanee with Russia. The Pres!dent, relteratlng a promlse ot l'ree, sec• ret e lectlons next spr!ng, sa!d that alllan-ce w!th Russla should be regarded as a CORNERSTONE OF CZECH OSLOVAKIA'S POLICY." - NEW YORK TIMES, 12-26-4ó. • "Londo'n, Feb. 19. - The Czecboslovak Government In Exile w!ll leave London next week for Koelce In Slovak!a, wbere a temporary capltal wlll be establlshed unt!I Prague !s treed. The group wlll travel via MOSCOW. T bls fact gave rise to ERRONEOUS reports tbat wbile there P resldent Eduard Benes would consult the Soviet Government about the eompoaltlon of his Government. Thls was flatly denled by the Government bere." - NEW YORK TIMES. 2-20-46. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource About the Council of Free Czechoslovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 59-60 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0e288919931653c213b5dfb2bc8b66b7.pdf 5ecf60cf00d39a547b0345c02ae54c5a PDF Text Text 56 SLOVAKIA must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla. Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny. The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs. They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco· dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon. One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo• rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished. • • • OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q. Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso, fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm. lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled "antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939 or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc Slovak republlc. �SLOVAKIA 57 Many Slovaks In varlous Iands may be tempted to ask: How, then, 1s lt posslble to explaln thls relentless campalgn agalnst Slovak na· tlonals In emlgratlon, the attempts to smear and dlscredlt them In the eyes of the world? The answer 1s slmple. Thls whole undemocratlc assault agalnst patrlotlc Slovaks, flght• Ing In exile for an Independent Slovak State, emanates baslcally from two causes: 1. The "Czechoslovaks," servlng Czech imperlal lnterests by be• traylng the highest lnterests of thelr own people, wlsh to divert attention from thelr collaboratlon wlth communlsm by smearlng and vllifylng patrlotlc Slovaks. 2. By accuslng patrlotlc Slovaks In democratlc countrles of nazlsm and fascism, a part of the Czech emlgrants and the Slovak renegades collaboratlng wlth them, flgure that they can neutralize thelr flght for an Independent Slovak State and force the Slovaks agaln under Czech rule. Those Czech and Slovak emlgrants who clalm that Slovak na• tionals want a fasclst or nazl state know very well that 1s not true. They propagate thls Ile lntentlonally and systematlcally In the hope that by repeatlng lt thousands of tlmes they shall agaln succeed In convlnclng the world that the Slovak natlon does not want to live in a state of lts own, but only In thelr Czecho-Slovakia. They are '4etermined that the Slovaks shall be vlctlms of Czech lmperiallstic efforts and Slovakla shall be a colony of Bohemla. In short: al! Slovaks who belleve that Slovakla has a rlght to be free and Independent and seek to bave that rlght recognlzed and respected by all clvillzed natlons of the earth are, according to the Beneš Czechs and Czech Slovaks, "nazis, traltors, fasclsts, enemles or democracy," etc. In 1946, Dr. Edward Beneš frankly told a Slovak delegatlon why the Czechs are fightlng agalnst Slovak lndependence, when he sald: "The Czechs cannot accept under any circum1tance1 an independent Slovakla in the future . . . . The Czechs, having on the one side 70 million Germans, must on the other aide have Ru11ia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. Thia ia a vital problem for the exiatence of the Czechs as a nation and a state and that ia also the le11on of Munich..•." Czech emlgratlon, holding to thls polltlcal legacy of Beneš, reallzes that the greatest lmpedlment to lts efforts are patrlotlc Slo· vaks In exile. Slovaks can appreciate Benei's concern for the Czecha, but they, too, are concerned about thelr own national existence. The statement made by Beneš certalnly has nothlng In common with democracy. It remlnds us of Adolph Hitler who thought that all natlons of centra) and eastern Europe should be deprlved of freedom and In• dependence and forced to serve the lnterests of the German natlon. It also remlnds us of Stalln who would enslave the whole world and force all natlons to serve the lnterests of godless communlsm. Slovak patrlots stand In the way of thls Czech lmperlallst dream. so the followers or Beneš are determlned to annlhllate them at all costs. That explalns why they accuse the Slovaks of belng nazls and fasclsts. That also explains thelr rldlculous accus atlon that the Slo- �58 SLOVA:KIA vaks in exile are not fighting for democracy, but for the renewal ot fasclsm In centra! Europe. Undoubtedly it is not necessary to stress that thls flght agalnst Slovak emigrants 1s immoral and undemocratlc, because lts goal is immoral and undemocratlc. To want to deprive the S lovak nation of the right to freedom and independence because the interests of the Czechs "as a nation and a state" demand it, that is a manifestatlon of the most brutal lmperialism - such as even the Germans did not perpetrate against the Slovaks. Can anyone of sane mind expect the Slovaks In exile to agree to commit national sulclde? It !s not so much the past that separates the Slovaks and Czechs in emigration as the fact that while the Slovak exiles are fighting for freedom and democracy In centra! Europe, the Czech exlles headed by Zenkl, Ripka and Papánek are fighting, in the first place, to prevent the Slovaks from attaining freedom and independence. The main task of the Czech exiles is not the fight against Communism, but the fight against the Slovaks, who want the Slovak natlon to be fully free and happy in lts own democratic state. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Slmul<taneously we accepted the principle tha,t only our people e.t home have the righit to dedde the maln problems o! our Interne.! policy, and Lhat also the relation between the Cechs and Slovaks be decided in the future state only a,t home, based on the princíple of C.OMPLETE EQUALITY Of both Czechs and Slove.ka and that it be done in a free, democratic way and In complete brotherly agreement. These were the maln prlnciples on whlch we have bullt our movement for liberation. This ideology of our struggle !or Jiberat!on, CONNECTED WITH OUR COMPLETE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION, and our ideology or the second World War In general was one of the main causes !or the success or the entire 81.ruggle." - (Dr. Beneš, Broadcaat to the Czechoslovak people, Prague, May 16, 1946) . • There 1s no Russian "iron curtain" in Czechoslovakia. . . . Every. one is free to enter Czechoslovakia and to come and go as he pleases, to see what he wants to see and hear what he wants to hear. Further. more Czechs and Slovaks are MAST ERS in their own country. T here is no Russlan army on Czechoslovak soil and Moscow IS NOT INTERFERING with Czechoslovak interna! affairs. . . . The press, radio, the school and the church are FREE to carry on their activities AS BEFORE." - (Dr. Kenneth D. Milier, president o! the New Yvrk City Mlsslon Society, In an address at the weekly church nlght dinner at the First Presb)"tertan Church, 124 Henry Street, New York City, published In tihe BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 12, 1947) . • "I agree wlth you rully that our alllance with the SOVIET UNION will belp us to a better secur ity or FREEDOM in t he future, and I am happy to have seen our politlcal orlentatir FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS WAR and to have acted accordlngly." - (Dr. Beneš, Reply to a message from the Slov-ak Natlonal Council In Košice, London, March 2, 1946). � 56 SLOVAKIA must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla. Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny. The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs. They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco· dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon. One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo• rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished. • • • OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q. Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso, fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm. lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled "antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939 or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc Slovak republlc. �SLOVAKIA 57 Many Slovaks In varlous Iands may be tempted to ask: How, then, 1s lt posslble to explaln thls relentless campalgn agalnst Slovak na· tlonals In emlgratlon, the attempts to smear and dlscredlt them In the eyes of the world? The answer 1s slmple. Thls whole undemocratlc assault agalnst patrlotlc Slovaks, flght• Ing In exile for an Independent Slovak State, emanates baslcally from two causes: 1. The "Czechoslovaks," servlng Czech imperlal lnterests by be• traylng the highest lnterests of thelr own people, wlsh to divert attention from thelr collaboratlon wlth communlsm by smearlng and vllifylng patrlotlc Slovaks. 2. By accuslng patrlotlc Slovaks In democratlc countrles of nazlsm and fascism, a part of the Czech emlgrants and the Slovak renegades collaboratlng wlth them, flgure that they can neutralize thelr flght for an Independent Slovak State and force the Slovaks agaln under Czech rule. Those Czech and Slovak emlgrants who clalm that Slovak na• tionals want a fasclst or nazl state know very well that 1s not true. They propagate thls Ile lntentlonally and systematlcally In the hope that by repeatlng lt thousands of tlmes they shall agaln succeed In convlnclng the world that the Slovak natlon does not want to live in a state of lts own, but only In thelr Czecho-Slovakia. They are '4etermined that the Slovaks shall be vlctlms of Czech lmperiallstic efforts and Slovakla shall be a colony of Bohemla. In short: al! Slovaks who belleve that Slovakla has a rlght to be free and Independent and seek to bave that rlght recognlzed and respected by all clvillzed natlons of the earth are, according to the Beneš Czechs and Czech Slovaks, "nazis, traltors, fasclsts, enemles or democracy," etc. In 1946, Dr. Edward Beneš frankly told a Slovak delegatlon why the Czechs are fightlng agalnst Slovak lndependence, when he sald: "The Czechs cannot accept under any circum1tance1 an independent Slovakla in the future . . . . The Czechs, having on the one side 70 million Germans, must on the other aide have Ru11ia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. Thia ia a vital problem for the exiatence of the Czechs as a nation and a state and that ia also the le11on of Munich..•." Czech emlgratlon, holding to thls polltlcal legacy of Beneš, reallzes that the greatest lmpedlment to lts efforts are patrlotlc Slo· vaks In exile. Slovaks can appreciate Benei's concern for the Czecha, but they, too, are concerned about thelr own national existence. The statement made by Beneš certalnly has nothlng In common with democracy. It remlnds us of Adolph Hitler who thought that all natlons of centra) and eastern Europe should be deprlved of freedom and In• dependence and forced to serve the lnterests of the German natlon. It also remlnds us of Stalln who would enslave the whole world and force all natlons to serve the lnterests of godless communlsm. Slovak patrlots stand In the way of thls Czech lmperlallst dream. so the followers or Beneš are determlned to annlhllate them at all costs. That explalns why they accuse the Slovaks of belng nazls and fasclsts. That also explains thelr rldlculous accus atlon that the Slo- �58 SLOVA:KIA vaks in exile are not fighting for democracy, but for the renewal ot fasclsm In centra! Europe. Undoubtedly it is not necessary to stress that thls flght agalnst Slovak emigrants 1s immoral and undemocratlc, because lts goal is immoral and undemocratlc. To want to deprive the S lovak nation of the right to freedom and independence because the interests of the Czechs "as a nation and a state" demand it, that is a manifestatlon of the most brutal lmperialism - such as even the Germans did not perpetrate against the Slovaks. Can anyone of sane mind expect the Slovaks In exile to agree to commit national sulclde? It !s not so much the past that separates the Slovaks and Czechs in emigration as the fact that while the Slovak exiles are fighting for freedom and democracy In centra! Europe, the Czech exlles headed by Zenkl, Ripka and Papánek are fighting, in the first place, to prevent the Slovaks from attaining freedom and independence. The main task of the Czech exiles is not the fight against Communism, but the fight against the Slovaks, who want the Slovak natlon to be fully free and happy in lts own democratic state. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Slmul<taneously we accepted the principle tha,t only our people e.t home have the righit to dedde the maln problems o! our Interne.! policy, and Lhat also the relation between the Cechs and Slovaks be decided in the future state only a,t home, based on the princíple of C.OMPLETE EQUALITY Of both Czechs and Slove.ka and that it be done in a free, democratic way and In complete brotherly agreement. These were the maln prlnciples on whlch we have bullt our movement for liberation. This ideology of our struggle !or Jiberat!on, CONNECTED WITH OUR COMPLETE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION, and our ideology or the second World War In general was one of the main causes !or the success or the entire 81.ruggle." - (Dr. Beneš, Broadcaat to the Czechoslovak people, Prague, May 16, 1946) . • There 1s no Russian "iron curtain" in Czechoslovakia. . . . Every. one is free to enter Czechoslovakia and to come and go as he pleases, to see what he wants to see and hear what he wants to hear. Further. more Czechs and Slovaks are MAST ERS in their own country. T here is no Russlan army on Czechoslovak soil and Moscow IS NOT INTERFERING with Czechoslovak interna! affairs. . . . The press, radio, the school and the church are FREE to carry on their activities AS BEFORE." - (Dr. Kenneth D. Milier, president o! the New Yvrk City Mlsslon Society, In an address at the weekly church nlght dinner at the First Presb)"tertan Church, 124 Henry Street, New York City, published In tihe BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 12, 1947) . • "I agree wlth you rully that our alllance with the SOVIET UNION will belp us to a better secur ity or FREEDOM in t he future, and I am happy to have seen our politlcal orlentatir FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS WAR and to have acted accordlngly." - (Dr. Beneš, Reply to a message from the Slov-ak Natlonal Council In Košice, London, March 2, 1946). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 56 SLOVAKIA must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla. Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny. The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs. They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco· dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon. One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo• rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished. • • • OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q. Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso, fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm. lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled "antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939 or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc Slovak republlc. SLOVAKIA 57 Many Slovaks In varlous Iands may be tempted to ask: How, then, 1s lt posslble to explaln thls relentless campalgn agalnst Slovak na· tlonals In emlgratlon, the attempts to smear and dlscredlt them In the eyes of the world? The answer 1s slmple. Thls whole undemocratlc assault agalnst patrlotlc Slovaks, flght• Ing In exile for an Independent Slovak State, emanates baslcally from two causes: 1. The "Czechoslovaks," servlng Czech imperlal lnterests by be• traylng the highest lnterests of thelr own people, wlsh to divert attention from thelr collaboratlon wlth communlsm by smearlng and vllifylng patrlotlc Slovaks. 2. By accuslng patrlotlc Slovaks In democratlc countrles of nazlsm and fascism, a part of the Czech emlgrants and the Slovak renegades collaboratlng wlth them, flgure that they can neutralize thelr flght for an Independent Slovak State and force the Slovaks agaln under Czech rule. Those Czech and Slovak emlgrants who clalm that Slovak na• tionals want a fasclst or nazl state know very well that 1s not true. They propagate thls Ile lntentlonally and systematlcally In the hope that by repeatlng lt thousands of tlmes they shall agaln succeed In convlnclng the world that the Slovak natlon does not want to live in a state of lts own, but only In thelr Czecho-Slovakia. They are '4etermined that the Slovaks shall be vlctlms of Czech lmperiallstic efforts and Slovakla shall be a colony of Bohemla. In short: al! Slovaks who belleve that Slovakla has a rlght to be free and Independent and seek to bave that rlght recognlzed and respected by all clvillzed natlons of the earth are, according to the Beneš Czechs and Czech Slovaks, "nazis, traltors, fasclsts, enemles or democracy," etc. In 1946, Dr. Edward Beneš frankly told a Slovak delegatlon why the Czechs are fightlng agalnst Slovak lndependence, when he sald: "The Czechs cannot accept under any circum1tance1 an independent Slovakla in the future . . . . The Czechs, having on the one side 70 million Germans, must on the other aide have Ru11ia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. Thia ia a vital problem for the exiatence of the Czechs as a nation and a state and that ia also the le11on of Munich..•." Czech emlgratlon, holding to thls polltlcal legacy of Beneš, reallzes that the greatest lmpedlment to lts efforts are patrlotlc Slo· vaks In exile. Slovaks can appreciate Benei's concern for the Czecha, but they, too, are concerned about thelr own national existence. The statement made by Beneš certalnly has nothlng In common with democracy. It remlnds us of Adolph Hitler who thought that all natlons of centra) and eastern Europe should be deprlved of freedom and In• dependence and forced to serve the lnterests of the German natlon. It also remlnds us of Stalln who would enslave the whole world and force all natlons to serve the lnterests of godless communlsm. Slovak patrlots stand In the way of thls Czech lmperlallst dream. so the followers or Beneš are determlned to annlhllate them at all costs. That explalns why they accuse the Slovaks of belng nazls and fasclsts. That also explains thelr rldlculous accus atlon that the Slo- 58 SLOVA:KIA vaks in exile are not fighting for democracy, but for the renewal ot fasclsm In centra! Europe. Undoubtedly it is not necessary to stress that thls flght agalnst Slovak emigrants 1s immoral and undemocratlc, because lts goal is immoral and undemocratlc. To want to deprive the S lovak nation of the right to freedom and independence because the interests of the Czechs "as a nation and a state" demand it, that is a manifestatlon of the most brutal lmperialism - such as even the Germans did not perpetrate against the Slovaks. Can anyone of sane mind expect the Slovaks In exile to agree to commit national sulclde? It !s not so much the past that separates the Slovaks and Czechs in emigration as the fact that while the Slovak exiles are fighting for freedom and democracy In centra! Europe, the Czech exlles headed by Zenkl, Ripka and Papánek are fighting, in the first place, to prevent the Slovaks from attaining freedom and independence. The main task of the Czech exiles is not the fight against Communism, but the fight against the Slovaks, who want the Slovak natlon to be fully free and happy in lts own democratic state. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Slmul<taneously we accepted the principle tha,t only our people e.t home have the righit to dedde the maln problems o! our Interne.! policy, and Lhat also the relation between the Cechs and Slovaks be decided in the future state only a,t home, based on the princíple of C.OMPLETE EQUALITY Of both Czechs and Slove.ka and that it be done in a free, democratic way and In complete brotherly agreement. These were the maln prlnciples on whlch we have bullt our movement for liberation. This ideology of our struggle !or Jiberat!on, CONNECTED WITH OUR COMPLETE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION, and our ideology or the second World War In general was one of the main causes !or the success or the entire 81.ruggle." - (Dr. Beneš, Broadcaat to the Czechoslovak people, Prague, May 16, 1946) . • There 1s no Russian "iron curtain" in Czechoslovakia. . . . Every. one is free to enter Czechoslovakia and to come and go as he pleases, to see what he wants to see and hear what he wants to hear. Further. more Czechs and Slovaks are MAST ERS in their own country. T here is no Russlan army on Czechoslovak soil and Moscow IS NOT INTERFERING with Czechoslovak interna! affairs. . . . The press, radio, the school and the church are FREE to carry on their activities AS BEFORE." - (Dr. Kenneth D. Milier, president o! the New Yvrk City Mlsslon Society, In an address at the weekly church nlght dinner at the First Presb)"tertan Church, 124 Henry Street, New York City, published In tihe BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 12, 1947) . • "I agree wlth you rully that our alllance with the SOVIET UNION will belp us to a better secur ity or FREEDOM in t he future, and I am happy to have seen our politlcal orlentatir FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS WAR and to have acted accordlngly." - (Dr. Beneš, Reply to a message from the Slov-ak Natlonal Council In Košice, London, March 2, 1946).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Our Fight for Democracy and Independence Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 56-58 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/53e9ffe678915216b1f1018220699dbb.pdf 754e04f96045a8f0cca233d2c889e0e5 PDF Text Text 54 SLOVAKIA A FREE SWVAK.IA IN A FEDERATED EUROPE ( EZ) What chances have the Slovak s fo i- an indep en dent st at e? The answer to that question depends oh one's outlook, hls knowledge or the Slovak poople and his knowledge o! Europe as a whole The Slovak people think they have a fair chance to re-esttabllsh the Slovak Republic. The Slovaks at home and in emigration firruly belleve that their natlonal existence depends on establishing a free Slovakia in a federated Europe. It is sald that every natlon has as much treedom as lt deserves and as much as it can gain by flghtlng. Well, the Slova.ks ait home and a,broad are willing to fight Cor their freedom and independence. They want to prove it. But they want a llttle understandlng and encouragement !rom the democrat!c powers which have on so many occaslons proclaimed that all nations, both large and small, have a God-given and inherent rlght to freedom and statehood. In the first place, let u11 remember that the Slovaks already have had an independent state. The Slovak R epublic e:iG!sted from 1939 to 1945, of course w!th limitatlons. But they liked lt nevertheless. Slovakia has lts state tradition, even though lt be relatlvely a mergre one. The Slovak ,state was recognlzed by 27 nations. And it gave a good account of ltselr culturally, economically and socially. The Slovaks have proved to the Czechs and thelr neighbors that they are capable of managing their own afralrs. Every informed, objective and unprejudiced observer wlll admlt that the Slovak Republic wa.s democratlc, Christlan and subllme. Slovak national economy has forever refuted the thesis that the Slovaks could not maintain themselves economically_ What they did in six short years, but siic difficul t years, practically amounts to a miracle. A natlon which has tasted of the fruit of treedom wlll hardly be satlsfied with less thereafter. The Slovaks are no exception. They wlll fight to be free again ! They have been overpowered ond forced to retreat against terrible odds. What hurts most is that the powers who sought ,to liberate all natlons trom totalitarian tyranny arhitrarlly forced Slovakia under alien rule and the godless tyrauny of Moscow through the pseudodemocrat Beneš. The Slovak state wlth its ,positive achlevements has !nscnbed itself deeply on the soul of the whole Slovak nation. Many Stovaks who once were against Slovak statehood, (the Benes or Czech Slovaks: CZECHOSLOVAKS!) today are for an independent Slovak Repu bllc. If Slovaks could vote in freedom at the present time, there ls not the least doubt that at least 95% would vote for an independent Slovak State. Never before did the Slovak nation have such a large number of sons in exile as lt has today. It ls a flghtlng group of exlles, wlth lts ,sights on a free, democratlc Slovakla. These Slovak exlles are deeply grateful to Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak people at horne and non-part!san exiles In all parts of the world think hlghly of the work of the Slovak League of America, the organizatlon which represents a solid mora! and cultural value. When this material and spiritual potentlal is once put into motlon, lt undoubt· edly wlll lntervene effeotively at the decisive moment. The syste- �SLOVAKIA 55 matic work of the League in this direction and lts realistic Slovak ou tlook are more than a promise. What other facts portend the establishment of a Slova.k state? Old enemies of the Slovak people have been decimated by the bolshevik steam roller. In the second (some call it the thlrd) Czecho• slovak Republic, ihe Czech leadership commlited many blunders whlch have nothing in common with democracy, Christianity, humanity, and culture. Just a single example to !llustrate: the resolution of the Sudeten question ! Furthermore, the Czechs under Beneš's leadership set up Communism in Czechoslovakia. This is becoming increasingly clear to every obj-eetive observer. Beneš ,p repared the way for Moscow into Czechoslovakia. When Beneš died, the press of Switzerland, France and Italy described him as a ",traitor ot democracy, a seniLe politlcian who could not see clearly" and Jed not only his nation, but the Slovak people also lnto bolshev!k s lavery. The legend of Czech political reali.sm,'' on which the Czechs had counted so much, burst like a soap bubble. Colonies are not very fashionabLe today. Even the most backward countries are yearnlng for independellce, for statehood. De Gasperi, Italian P remier, has proclaimed more than once that the days of colonies are gone forever; Ita\y ls through with colonizing, be· cause it is against the spirit ot the tlmes. The Czechs have ,ex,ploited Slovakia as their colony. The Slovaks cannot be and do not want to be a Czech colony. The representatlves of c·entral European nations are work!ng for a federatlon, for a just and democratlc arrangement of the region between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment of an independent Slevakla. The Slovaks at horne and in exile are for such a federatlon of which Slovakla would be an integral part. Admlttlng Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a Just and democr atlc settlement of the problem of centra! Europe be• cause the Slovaks would contlnue to be exploited and gradually exterminated natlonally by the Czechs. Bolshevlsm is a world problem. The world will have to measure its strength with Commun!sm sooner or later. But the Slovaks know that they themselves must settle their problem with the Czechs and tbe so-called "Czech Slovaks." Experience tells them not to underrate the Czechs. The Slovaks have already been "taken in" by the Czechs several tlmes by trickery, clever propaganda and legal hypocrisy. Czech emigration is still aggressive and financially strong. Because of their many political, cultural and business connections, the Czechs stlll have access to high diplomatlc circles and influential people. They want to keep Slovakia, because it has been "such a good milch cow" ! The Czecbs do not openly clalm that they need Slovakia as a dumping ground for their "progressive intelligentsia, but the fact 1s tbat in their hearts they firmly believe it. They want Slovakia, be• cause of German pressure and fear of German reprisals for the brutalitles committed against the Sudetenlanders. The Czechs need to revitalize themselves with Slovak blood and the slnews of young Slovakla. Indeed, Beneš himself admitted that the continued existence of Czechoslovakia is a vital interest of the Czechs, hence the Czechs �56 SLOVAKIA must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla. Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny. The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs. They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco· dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon. One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo• rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished. • • • OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q. Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso, fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm. lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled "antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939 or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc Slovak republlc. � 54 SLOVAKIA A FREE SWVAK.IA IN A FEDERATED EUROPE ( EZ) What chances have the Slovak s fo i- an indep en dent st at e? The answer to that question depends oh one's outlook, hls knowledge or the Slovak poople and his knowledge o! Europe as a whole The Slovak people think they have a fair chance to re-esttabllsh the Slovak Republic. The Slovaks at home and in emigration firruly belleve that their natlonal existence depends on establishing a free Slovakia in a federated Europe. It is sald that every natlon has as much treedom as lt deserves and as much as it can gain by flghtlng. Well, the Slova.ks ait home and a,broad are willing to fight Cor their freedom and independence. They want to prove it. But they want a llttle understandlng and encouragement !rom the democrat!c powers which have on so many occaslons proclaimed that all nations, both large and small, have a God-given and inherent rlght to freedom and statehood. In the first place, let u11 remember that the Slovaks already have had an independent state. The Slovak R epublic e:iG!sted from 1939 to 1945, of course w!th limitatlons. But they liked lt nevertheless. Slovakia has lts state tradition, even though lt be relatlvely a mergre one. The Slovak ,state was recognlzed by 27 nations. And it gave a good account of ltselr culturally, economically and socially. The Slovaks have proved to the Czechs and thelr neighbors that they are capable of managing their own afralrs. Every informed, objective and unprejudiced observer wlll admlt that the Slovak Republic wa.s democratlc, Christlan and subllme. Slovak national economy has forever refuted the thesis that the Slovaks could not maintain themselves economically_ What they did in six short years, but siic difficul t years, practically amounts to a miracle. A natlon which has tasted of the fruit of treedom wlll hardly be satlsfied with less thereafter. The Slovaks are no exception. They wlll fight to be free again ! They have been overpowered ond forced to retreat against terrible odds. What hurts most is that the powers who sought ,to liberate all natlons trom totalitarian tyranny arhitrarlly forced Slovakia under alien rule and the godless tyrauny of Moscow through the pseudodemocrat Beneš. The Slovak state wlth its ,positive achlevements has !nscnbed itself deeply on the soul of the whole Slovak nation. Many Stovaks who once were against Slovak statehood, (the Benes or Czech Slovaks: CZECHOSLOVAKS!) today are for an independent Slovak Repu bllc. If Slovaks could vote in freedom at the present time, there ls not the least doubt that at least 95% would vote for an independent Slovak State. Never before did the Slovak nation have such a large number of sons in exile as lt has today. It ls a flghtlng group of exlles, wlth lts ,sights on a free, democratlc Slovakla. These Slovak exlles are deeply grateful to Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak people at horne and non-part!san exiles In all parts of the world think hlghly of the work of the Slovak League of America, the organizatlon which represents a solid mora! and cultural value. When this material and spiritual potentlal is once put into motlon, lt undoubt· edly wlll lntervene effeotively at the decisive moment. The syste- �SLOVAKIA 55 matic work of the League in this direction and lts realistic Slovak ou tlook are more than a promise. What other facts portend the establishment of a Slova.k state? Old enemies of the Slovak people have been decimated by the bolshevik steam roller. In the second (some call it the thlrd) Czecho• slovak Republic, ihe Czech leadership commlited many blunders whlch have nothing in common with democracy, Christianity, humanity, and culture. Just a single example to !llustrate: the resolution of the Sudeten question ! Furthermore, the Czechs under Beneš's leadership set up Communism in Czechoslovakia. This is becoming increasingly clear to every obj-eetive observer. Beneš ,p repared the way for Moscow into Czechoslovakia. When Beneš died, the press of Switzerland, France and Italy described him as a ",traitor ot democracy, a seniLe politlcian who could not see clearly" and Jed not only his nation, but the Slovak people also lnto bolshev!k s lavery. The legend of Czech political reali.sm,'' on which the Czechs had counted so much, burst like a soap bubble. Colonies are not very fashionabLe today. Even the most backward countries are yearnlng for independellce, for statehood. De Gasperi, Italian P remier, has proclaimed more than once that the days of colonies are gone forever; Ita\y ls through with colonizing, be· cause it is against the spirit ot the tlmes. The Czechs have ,ex,ploited Slovakia as their colony. The Slovaks cannot be and do not want to be a Czech colony. The representatlves of c·entral European nations are work!ng for a federatlon, for a just and democratlc arrangement of the region between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment of an independent Slevakla. The Slovaks at horne and in exile are for such a federatlon of which Slovakla would be an integral part. Admlttlng Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a Just and democr atlc settlement of the problem of centra! Europe be• cause the Slovaks would contlnue to be exploited and gradually exterminated natlonally by the Czechs. Bolshevlsm is a world problem. The world will have to measure its strength with Commun!sm sooner or later. But the Slovaks know that they themselves must settle their problem with the Czechs and tbe so-called "Czech Slovaks." Experience tells them not to underrate the Czechs. The Slovaks have already been "taken in" by the Czechs several tlmes by trickery, clever propaganda and legal hypocrisy. Czech emigration is still aggressive and financially strong. Because of their many political, cultural and business connections, the Czechs stlll have access to high diplomatlc circles and influential people. They want to keep Slovakia, because it has been "such a good milch cow" ! The Czecbs do not openly clalm that they need Slovakia as a dumping ground for their "progressive intelligentsia, but the fact 1s tbat in their hearts they firmly believe it. They want Slovakia, be• cause of German pressure and fear of German reprisals for the brutalitles committed against the Sudetenlanders. The Czechs need to revitalize themselves with Slovak blood and the slnews of young Slovakla. Indeed, Beneš himself admitted that the continued existence of Czechoslovakia is a vital interest of the Czechs, hence the Czechs �56 SLOVAKIA must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla. Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny. The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs. They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco· dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon. One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo• rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished. • • • OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q. Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso, fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm. lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled "antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939 or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc Slovak republlc. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 54 SLOVAKIA A FREE SWVAK.IA IN A FEDERATED EUROPE ( EZ) What chances have the Slovak s fo i- an indep en dent st at e? The answer to that question depends oh one's outlook, hls knowledge or the Slovak poople and his knowledge o! Europe as a whole The Slovak people think they have a fair chance to re-esttabllsh the Slovak Republic. The Slovaks at home and in emigration firruly belleve that their natlonal existence depends on establishing a free Slovakia in a federated Europe. It is sald that every natlon has as much treedom as lt deserves and as much as it can gain by flghtlng. Well, the Slova.ks ait home and a,broad are willing to fight Cor their freedom and independence. They want to prove it. But they want a llttle understandlng and encouragement !rom the democrat!c powers which have on so many occaslons proclaimed that all nations, both large and small, have a God-given and inherent rlght to freedom and statehood. In the first place, let u11 remember that the Slovaks already have had an independent state. The Slovak R epublic e:iG!sted from 1939 to 1945, of course w!th limitatlons. But they liked lt nevertheless. Slovakia has lts state tradition, even though lt be relatlvely a mergre one. The Slovak ,state was recognlzed by 27 nations. And it gave a good account of ltselr culturally, economically and socially. The Slovaks have proved to the Czechs and thelr neighbors that they are capable of managing their own afralrs. Every informed, objective and unprejudiced observer wlll admlt that the Slovak Republic wa.s democratlc, Christlan and subllme. Slovak national economy has forever refuted the thesis that the Slovaks could not maintain themselves economically_ What they did in six short years, but siic difficul t years, practically amounts to a miracle. A natlon which has tasted of the fruit of treedom wlll hardly be satlsfied with less thereafter. The Slovaks are no exception. They wlll fight to be free again ! They have been overpowered ond forced to retreat against terrible odds. What hurts most is that the powers who sought ,to liberate all natlons trom totalitarian tyranny arhitrarlly forced Slovakia under alien rule and the godless tyrauny of Moscow through the pseudodemocrat Beneš. The Slovak state wlth its ,positive achlevements has !nscnbed itself deeply on the soul of the whole Slovak nation. Many Stovaks who once were against Slovak statehood, (the Benes or Czech Slovaks: CZECHOSLOVAKS!) today are for an independent Slovak Repu bllc. If Slovaks could vote in freedom at the present time, there ls not the least doubt that at least 95% would vote for an independent Slovak State. Never before did the Slovak nation have such a large number of sons in exile as lt has today. It ls a flghtlng group of exlles, wlth lts ,sights on a free, democratlc Slovakla. These Slovak exlles are deeply grateful to Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak people at horne and non-part!san exiles In all parts of the world think hlghly of the work of the Slovak League of America, the organizatlon which represents a solid mora! and cultural value. When this material and spiritual potentlal is once put into motlon, lt undoubt· edly wlll lntervene effeotively at the decisive moment. The syste- SLOVAKIA 55 matic work of the League in this direction and lts realistic Slovak ou tlook are more than a promise. What other facts portend the establishment of a Slova.k state? Old enemies of the Slovak people have been decimated by the bolshevik steam roller. In the second (some call it the thlrd) Czecho• slovak Republic, ihe Czech leadership commlited many blunders whlch have nothing in common with democracy, Christianity, humanity, and culture. Just a single example to !llustrate: the resolution of the Sudeten question ! Furthermore, the Czechs under Beneš's leadership set up Communism in Czechoslovakia. This is becoming increasingly clear to every obj-eetive observer. Beneš ,p repared the way for Moscow into Czechoslovakia. When Beneš died, the press of Switzerland, France and Italy described him as a ",traitor ot democracy, a seniLe politlcian who could not see clearly" and Jed not only his nation, but the Slovak people also lnto bolshev!k s lavery. The legend of Czech political reali.sm,'' on which the Czechs had counted so much, burst like a soap bubble. Colonies are not very fashionabLe today. Even the most backward countries are yearnlng for independellce, for statehood. De Gasperi, Italian P remier, has proclaimed more than once that the days of colonies are gone forever; Ita\y ls through with colonizing, be· cause it is against the spirit ot the tlmes. The Czechs have ,ex,ploited Slovakia as their colony. The Slovaks cannot be and do not want to be a Czech colony. The representatlves of c·entral European nations are work!ng for a federatlon, for a just and democratlc arrangement of the region between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment of an independent Slevakla. The Slovaks at horne and in exile are for such a federatlon of which Slovakla would be an integral part. Admlttlng Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a Just and democr atlc settlement of the problem of centra! Europe be• cause the Slovaks would contlnue to be exploited and gradually exterminated natlonally by the Czechs. Bolshevlsm is a world problem. The world will have to measure its strength with Commun!sm sooner or later. But the Slovaks know that they themselves must settle their problem with the Czechs and tbe so-called "Czech Slovaks." Experience tells them not to underrate the Czechs. The Slovaks have already been "taken in" by the Czechs several tlmes by trickery, clever propaganda and legal hypocrisy. Czech emigration is still aggressive and financially strong. Because of their many political, cultural and business connections, the Czechs stlll have access to high diplomatlc circles and influential people. They want to keep Slovakia, because it has been "such a good milch cow" ! The Czecbs do not openly clalm that they need Slovakia as a dumping ground for their "progressive intelligentsia, but the fact 1s tbat in their hearts they firmly believe it. They want Slovakia, be• cause of German pressure and fear of German reprisals for the brutalitles committed against the Sudetenlanders. The Czechs need to revitalize themselves with Slovak blood and the slnews of young Slovakla. Indeed, Beneš himself admitted that the continued existence of Czechoslovakia is a vital interest of the Czechs, hence the Czechs 56 SLOVAKIA must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla. Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny. The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs. They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco· dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon. One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo• rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished. • • • OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q. Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso, fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm. lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled "antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939 or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc Slovak republlc.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Free Slovakia in a Federated Europe Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 54-56 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/36024209d0873742f12c32c149b2e72d.pdf caa74e09040271cf19ac65fd2adaa500 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA ABOUT THE SLOVAK STATE ( ks) - An anonymous Slovak had an article publlshed in a Czech paper about the origin or the Slovak State. Thaťs the way Czech Slo• vaks (CZECHOSLOVAKS!) do buslness, and the Czechs, o! course, gladly give them space in thelr papers. Phllosophlzlng on the subject or the origin of the Slovak Republlc, the author ot the artlcle asks several questlons: 1. Did the Slovak parliament decide freely (when it voted the independence of Slovakia in March 1939)? Yes, lt did. lt declded that freely and unanlmously. Not one Deputy of the Slovak parllament remalned seated; all stood up and so voted for Slovak state lndependence. No one forced them to stand up. At Ieast one could have remained seated and so lndlcate a negatlve vote; but, I repeat, not one Deputy remalned seated. 2. Was the "Berlin order" In line with the wlll of the nation? No "order" was concerned. Karol Sidor, as Premier of the Slovak Government, refused in the name of the Slovaks to execute an "order" at that time, when he told Keppler, Seys-lnquart and Biirckel - who had come to him to Bratislava on March 12, 1939, - that he would not go to Berlin or to Vlenna to proclaim the lndependence ot Slovakia by radlo. He told them that wa.s the function of the Party and the Slovak parliament. lf Sldor would have gone to Germany and there proclalmed the lndependence of Slovakia, that would bave been effected by German order. The Germans wanted the proclamatlon over the radlo, whereas the Slovaks wanted thelr parllament to do the proclalming. Two days later the Slovaks wllled lt that thelr parllament pro• clalm the lndependence of thelr country. The votlng in parllament on March 14, 1939, was no klnd ot "Berlin order." lt does not matter that the elected deputles voted for lt. That the deputies voted for it unanimously strongly emphaslzes the fact that the Slovak natlon as a whole, through its duly elected representatlves, voiced ltself for lts own state. 3. Did the deputies have any right to do what they did? The representatlves of a sovereign natlon have the rlght to do anythlng wlthin the llmlts of the laws of the land. The only thlng they probably could not do - as an old Slovak saylng states lt would be to make a boy out of a girl. They certainly had a greater rlght to speak for the natlon than dld the formulators of the Martin Declaration, the undenvrlters of the Pittsburgh Pact, or the deputles In the Revolutlonary Natlonal Assembly, who in 1920 voted tor the Constitutlon of the flrst Czechoslovak Republlc, or the self-styled "deputies" of Communlsts and Democrats of 1944-45, who dlvided up the power over Slovakia on a 50-50 basls In such a "brotherly" fashion In the forests or Banská Bystrica. 4. How is it possibfe even now to celebrate such sorrowful annlversarles of our recent past (as the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakla)? �63 SLOVAKIA There are, lndeed, "sorrowful anniversarles In our recent past," but the 14th of March, 1939, does not belong among them. Neither formally, nor by content. Among such sad annlversarles, however, do belong all those acts that Ued up wlth any collaboratlon with natlve Communlsm from Chrlstmas of 1943 and wlth Moscow collaboratlon slnce 1945. March 14, 1939, definltely is not responslble for the atrocitles and blunders commltted by and wlth the ald of Beneš and hls Red Prague reglme slnce 1945. Say what you wlll, In politics only successes count. The llfe of the Slovaks after 1945 1s replete wlth sufferlngs, deportations to the USSR, concentratlon ca.mps, dlsfranchlsements, dlspossesslons and pol!Ucal murders. Even the avowed enemies of Slovak freedom and lndependence former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakla (Lettrich, Zenkl, Heldrlch, Ducháček, etc.) - have admltted that condl· tlons In Slovakla are worse today than they were under the Nazis. The Czechs, too, are worse off now than they were under Hitler. And we belleve lt. But the Czechs have absolutely no rlght to deny the Slovaks the same freedom and lndependence and "llberatlon" that they themselves are clamorlng and plead!ng for today. The Slovaks have learnt thelr lesson well. T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš lgnored thelr just demands for twenty years. Today thelr followers stlll lnslst that the Slovaks have no right to thelr own natlonal exlstence and thelr own Independent state. So don't blame the Slovaks for proclalming: "NEVER DO WE WANT TO BE A PAR'ľ OF ANY OLD OR NEW CZECHOSLOVAKIA! " • • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Soviet Union SINCERELY deslres a strong, consolidated, fully homogeneous Czechoslovak republic which would be a truly good and strong frlend and a collaborator of the Soviet people In the future defenae of a lastlng peace In Europe. The same wish also applies to the future of Poland. The Soviet Union not only desires good and friendly relatlons wlth her but also a strong Pollsh-Czechoslovak frlendship and collaboratlon." TIMES, 12-23-43. Dr. Edward Beneš, THE NEW YORK • "The Czechoslovak republlc is, just a.s it had been, a democratlc state that respects freedom of convictlons and vlewpoints, a state that always respected and even In the future shall respect, above all else, freedom of rellgion, the church and religlous culture. lt ls an independent state and Independent it shall remaln. lt ls a state that has always u,pheld, above al! else, objectivlty and full tolerance toward the convlctlons and rellglous beller or all lts cltlzens. lt ls a state that has respected the well-known Four Freedoms of President F. D. Roosevelt and toí:iay 1s applylng them in a practlcal way In lts set-up. That 1s how lt 1s today and so shall lt be even In the future." - Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague, Aprll 8, 1946. (NÁROD, 4-17-46). � 52 SLOVAKIA ABOUT THE SLOVAK STATE ( ks) - An anonymous Slovak had an article publlshed in a Czech paper about the origin or the Slovak State. Thaťs the way Czech Slo• vaks (CZECHOSLOVAKS!) do buslness, and the Czechs, o! course, gladly give them space in thelr papers. Phllosophlzlng on the subject or the origin of the Slovak Republlc, the author ot the artlcle asks several questlons: 1. Did the Slovak parliament decide freely (when it voted the independence of Slovakia in March 1939)? Yes, lt did. lt declded that freely and unanlmously. Not one Deputy of the Slovak parllament remalned seated; all stood up and so voted for Slovak state lndependence. No one forced them to stand up. At Ieast one could have remained seated and so lndlcate a negatlve vote; but, I repeat, not one Deputy remalned seated. 2. Was the "Berlin order" In line with the wlll of the nation? No "order" was concerned. Karol Sidor, as Premier of the Slovak Government, refused in the name of the Slovaks to execute an "order" at that time, when he told Keppler, Seys-lnquart and Biirckel - who had come to him to Bratislava on March 12, 1939, - that he would not go to Berlin or to Vlenna to proclaim the lndependence ot Slovakia by radlo. He told them that wa.s the function of the Party and the Slovak parliament. lf Sldor would have gone to Germany and there proclalmed the lndependence of Slovakia, that would bave been effected by German order. The Germans wanted the proclamatlon over the radlo, whereas the Slovaks wanted thelr parllament to do the proclalming. Two days later the Slovaks wllled lt that thelr parllament pro• clalm the lndependence of thelr country. The votlng in parllament on March 14, 1939, was no klnd ot "Berlin order." lt does not matter that the elected deputles voted for lt. That the deputies voted for it unanimously strongly emphaslzes the fact that the Slovak natlon as a whole, through its duly elected representatlves, voiced ltself for lts own state. 3. Did the deputies have any right to do what they did? The representatlves of a sovereign natlon have the rlght to do anythlng wlthin the llmlts of the laws of the land. The only thlng they probably could not do - as an old Slovak saylng states lt would be to make a boy out of a girl. They certainly had a greater rlght to speak for the natlon than dld the formulators of the Martin Declaration, the undenvrlters of the Pittsburgh Pact, or the deputles In the Revolutlonary Natlonal Assembly, who in 1920 voted tor the Constitutlon of the flrst Czechoslovak Republlc, or the self-styled "deputies" of Communlsts and Democrats of 1944-45, who dlvided up the power over Slovakia on a 50-50 basls In such a "brotherly" fashion In the forests or Banská Bystrica. 4. How is it possibfe even now to celebrate such sorrowful annlversarles of our recent past (as the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakla)? �63 SLOVAKIA There are, lndeed, "sorrowful anniversarles In our recent past," but the 14th of March, 1939, does not belong among them. Neither formally, nor by content. Among such sad annlversarles, however, do belong all those acts that Ued up wlth any collaboratlon with natlve Communlsm from Chrlstmas of 1943 and wlth Moscow collaboratlon slnce 1945. March 14, 1939, definltely is not responslble for the atrocitles and blunders commltted by and wlth the ald of Beneš and hls Red Prague reglme slnce 1945. Say what you wlll, In politics only successes count. The llfe of the Slovaks after 1945 1s replete wlth sufferlngs, deportations to the USSR, concentratlon ca.mps, dlsfranchlsements, dlspossesslons and pol!Ucal murders. Even the avowed enemies of Slovak freedom and lndependence former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakla (Lettrich, Zenkl, Heldrlch, Ducháček, etc.) - have admltted that condl· tlons In Slovakla are worse today than they were under the Nazis. The Czechs, too, are worse off now than they were under Hitler. And we belleve lt. But the Czechs have absolutely no rlght to deny the Slovaks the same freedom and lndependence and "llberatlon" that they themselves are clamorlng and plead!ng for today. The Slovaks have learnt thelr lesson well. T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš lgnored thelr just demands for twenty years. Today thelr followers stlll lnslst that the Slovaks have no right to thelr own natlonal exlstence and thelr own Independent state. So don't blame the Slovaks for proclalming: "NEVER DO WE WANT TO BE A PAR'ľ OF ANY OLD OR NEW CZECHOSLOVAKIA! " • • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Soviet Union SINCERELY deslres a strong, consolidated, fully homogeneous Czechoslovak republic which would be a truly good and strong frlend and a collaborator of the Soviet people In the future defenae of a lastlng peace In Europe. The same wish also applies to the future of Poland. The Soviet Union not only desires good and friendly relatlons wlth her but also a strong Pollsh-Czechoslovak frlendship and collaboratlon." TIMES, 12-23-43. Dr. Edward Beneš, THE NEW YORK • "The Czechoslovak republlc is, just a.s it had been, a democratlc state that respects freedom of convictlons and vlewpoints, a state that always respected and even In the future shall respect, above all else, freedom of rellgion, the church and religlous culture. lt ls an independent state and Independent it shall remaln. lt ls a state that has always u,pheld, above al! else, objectivlty and full tolerance toward the convlctlons and rellglous beller or all lts cltlzens. lt ls a state that has respected the well-known Four Freedoms of President F. D. Roosevelt and toí:iay 1s applylng them in a practlcal way In lts set-up. That 1s how lt 1s today and so shall lt be even In the future." - Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague, Aprll 8, 1946. (NÁROD, 4-17-46). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA ABOUT THE SLOVAK STATE ( ks) - An anonymous Slovak had an article publlshed in a Czech paper about the origin or the Slovak State. Thaťs the way Czech Slo• vaks (CZECHOSLOVAKS!) do buslness, and the Czechs, o! course, gladly give them space in thelr papers. Phllosophlzlng on the subject or the origin of the Slovak Republlc, the author ot the artlcle asks several questlons: 1. Did the Slovak parliament decide freely (when it voted the independence of Slovakia in March 1939)? Yes, lt did. lt declded that freely and unanlmously. Not one Deputy of the Slovak parllament remalned seated; all stood up and so voted for Slovak state lndependence. No one forced them to stand up. At Ieast one could have remained seated and so lndlcate a negatlve vote; but, I repeat, not one Deputy remalned seated. 2. Was the "Berlin order" In line with the wlll of the nation? No "order" was concerned. Karol Sidor, as Premier of the Slovak Government, refused in the name of the Slovaks to execute an "order" at that time, when he told Keppler, Seys-lnquart and Biirckel - who had come to him to Bratislava on March 12, 1939, - that he would not go to Berlin or to Vlenna to proclaim the lndependence ot Slovakia by radlo. He told them that wa.s the function of the Party and the Slovak parliament. lf Sldor would have gone to Germany and there proclalmed the lndependence of Slovakia, that would bave been effected by German order. The Germans wanted the proclamatlon over the radlo, whereas the Slovaks wanted thelr parllament to do the proclalming. Two days later the Slovaks wllled lt that thelr parllament pro• clalm the lndependence of thelr country. The votlng in parllament on March 14, 1939, was no klnd ot "Berlin order." lt does not matter that the elected deputles voted for lt. That the deputies voted for it unanimously strongly emphaslzes the fact that the Slovak natlon as a whole, through its duly elected representatlves, voiced ltself for lts own state. 3. Did the deputies have any right to do what they did? The representatlves of a sovereign natlon have the rlght to do anythlng wlthin the llmlts of the laws of the land. The only thlng they probably could not do - as an old Slovak saylng states lt would be to make a boy out of a girl. They certainly had a greater rlght to speak for the natlon than dld the formulators of the Martin Declaration, the undenvrlters of the Pittsburgh Pact, or the deputles In the Revolutlonary Natlonal Assembly, who in 1920 voted tor the Constitutlon of the flrst Czechoslovak Republlc, or the self-styled "deputies" of Communlsts and Democrats of 1944-45, who dlvided up the power over Slovakia on a 50-50 basls In such a "brotherly" fashion In the forests or Banská Bystrica. 4. How is it possibfe even now to celebrate such sorrowful annlversarles of our recent past (as the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakla)? 63 SLOVAKIA There are, lndeed, "sorrowful anniversarles In our recent past," but the 14th of March, 1939, does not belong among them. Neither formally, nor by content. Among such sad annlversarles, however, do belong all those acts that Ued up wlth any collaboratlon with natlve Communlsm from Chrlstmas of 1943 and wlth Moscow collaboratlon slnce 1945. March 14, 1939, definltely is not responslble for the atrocitles and blunders commltted by and wlth the ald of Beneš and hls Red Prague reglme slnce 1945. Say what you wlll, In politics only successes count. The llfe of the Slovaks after 1945 1s replete wlth sufferlngs, deportations to the USSR, concentratlon ca.mps, dlsfranchlsements, dlspossesslons and pol!Ucal murders. Even the avowed enemies of Slovak freedom and lndependence former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakla (Lettrich, Zenkl, Heldrlch, Ducháček, etc.) - have admltted that condl· tlons In Slovakla are worse today than they were under the Nazis. The Czechs, too, are worse off now than they were under Hitler. And we belleve lt. But the Czechs have absolutely no rlght to deny the Slovaks the same freedom and lndependence and "llberatlon" that they themselves are clamorlng and plead!ng for today. The Slovaks have learnt thelr lesson well. T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš lgnored thelr just demands for twenty years. Today thelr followers stlll lnslst that the Slovaks have no right to thelr own natlonal exlstence and thelr own Independent state. So don't blame the Slovaks for proclalming: "NEVER DO WE WANT TO BE A PAR'ľ OF ANY OLD OR NEW CZECHOSLOVAKIA! " • • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Soviet Union SINCERELY deslres a strong, consolidated, fully homogeneous Czechoslovak republic which would be a truly good and strong frlend and a collaborator of the Soviet people In the future defenae of a lastlng peace In Europe. The same wish also applies to the future of Poland. The Soviet Union not only desires good and friendly relatlons wlth her but also a strong Pollsh-Czechoslovak frlendship and collaboratlon." TIMES, 12-23-43. Dr. Edward Beneš, THE NEW YORK • "The Czechoslovak republlc is, just a.s it had been, a democratlc state that respects freedom of convictlons and vlewpoints, a state that always respected and even In the future shall respect, above all else, freedom of rellgion, the church and religlous culture. lt ls an independent state and Independent it shall remaln. lt ls a state that has always u,pheld, above al! else, objectivlty and full tolerance toward the convlctlons and rellglous beller or all lts cltlzens. lt ls a state that has respected the well-known Four Freedoms of President F. D. Roosevelt and toí:iay 1s applylng them in a practlcal way In lts set-up. That 1s how lt 1s today and so shall lt be even In the future." - Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague, Aprll 8, 1946. (NÁROD, 4-17-46).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource About the Slovak State Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 52-53 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951