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JULY, 1953
SLOV.AKI.A
1
THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAK.IA
Joseph M. Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D.
There is a peculiar phenomenon in the political and historical works of American or English scholars about Slovakia. With the exception of the British author C. A. Macartney, followed to a certain extent by A. J. D. Taylor and professor Seton-Watson, the Anglo-Saxon history writers an:d
-p ublicists show not only a considerable lack of knowledge
of historical facts concerning Slovakia, but they serve,
probably unconsciously, the aims of imperialistic tendencies
of some Central-European ,peoples. For many of them "Slovak is the name given to the easternmost division of the
Czech speaking people" (1) and they seem to know nothing
about the fact that the Slovaks were among the first Slovanic
peoples converted to Christianity and that as early as the
ninth century they founded the first Slovanic state, known
in history under the name of the Great Moravian Empire (2); they also persistently present Slovakia as a backward agrarian country marked by illiteracy and poverty.
This misrepresentation happens especially when comparison is made between Slovaks and, in the Anglo-Saxon
world, the very favored Czechs who are, from the linguistic
point of view, quite close to the Slovaks, from the cultural
and historical standpoint, however, quite different. Or as
Wm. Diamond writes: "Slovakia and the Czech lands are
two areas speaking quite similar languages but having
different histories and political traditions. They have a
deep-rooted and intense distrust, sometimes amounting to
antipathy, for each other. A thousand years of separat~on,
during which ,p olitical and economic development went off
on different tracks, were neither forgotten nor overcome
after the establishment of the (Czecho-'Slovak) Republic."
The line followed by Anglo-Saxon writers when speaking about Slovakia is nearly the same as that expressed in
the books of J. S. Roucek (Eastern-Central Europe, crucible
of world wars, and Slavonic Encyclopedia) and R. J. Kerner
(Czechoslovakia), who as late as 1946-1949 presented Slovakia as follows:
�SLOVAKIA
1. "In the Slovak province of Czechoslovakia, for
instance, as many as 57 per cent could not read and
write. The (Czechoslovak) Republic esta:blished middleschool and university education in Slovakia, where it
was practically non-existent ,b efore 1918." - J. S.
Roucek (3).
2. "Wherea'S 1:Jhe standard of ,] iteracy among the
Czechs was high, the •p ercentage of Slovaks who could
read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason,
many officials, teachers and intellectuals from the Czech
regions had to be sent to Slovakia" - Kerner <4).
1
3. The Slovaks are according to Mr. Roucek "simple and pastoral" and in the opinion of Mr. Kerner "the
Slovaks remained agriculturists and under a Magyar
(that is, Eastern) type of culture."
This portrayal of Slovakia i,s so general in the American
and English ,p ress that to many people, who are not acquainted with the Slovak past and the actual circm;nstances, it
may appear not only probruble ,b ut true. Slovakia has been
presented in this light for about 35 years. The world is supposed to 'believe that culture, literacy and civilization were
brought into Slovakia only by the Czechs in 1918-19, according to these "scientific revelations", and that Slovakia remained even during the last 30 years predominantly agrarian,
pastoral and illiterate.
What is the truth?
Now, the truth is quite different. After having lost their
political independence in the tenth and definitely in the 13th
century in favor of the· Hungarians, the Slovaks did not
appear in European history as a political factor for many
centuries. Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, who in a common effort succeeded to disintegrate the first Slovak State,
could not, however, destroy the civilization which had already existed in that country. As a result Slovakia became
even under the Hungarian rule a first-rate cultural centre
in Ce11tral Europe with a university at Bratislava as early
as the 1'5th century and a Catholic university in the 17th
century at Trnava (5).
�SLOVAKIA
3
The culture spread from these universities developed,
naturally, not in the 'Slovak, but in the Latin language, a
general phenomenon at that time in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was a culture of the •p opulation of Slovakia which
at all times has been predominantly of Slovak origin, and
the archives prove that the majority of professors and
students was Slovak also.
The same rule can be applied to the epoch when, under
the influence of nationalism, the Hungarians began to demand the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin
and when expressions of growing national consciousness of
the non~Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased
attempt at Magyarization. It is true that .Slovak schools
were closed by the Hungarian regime in the last decades of
the 19th century, and nobody can deny the tendency of
Budapest to assimilate the Slovak population. On the other
hand, it is false and tendencious to say that Slova:kia before
1918 was a .b ackward and illiterate country and that culture
was brought into Slovakia by Czech teachers and intellectuals. If we can measure the cultural level of any country
by the number of schools, as it is generally done, then the
statistics regarding the number of schools in Slovakia at
the end of the Hungarian rule (1918) and at the end of the
Czech rule (1939) obviously deny the Czech .propaganda
about the illiteracy and the Czech cultural mission in Slovakia. The data pU!blished in this regard by a former member
of the Prague government, Prof. A. Stefanek (6) give us the
following picture:
A) Number of public schools in Slovakia
1917-18 1937-38
Schools administered by church ____ 2723
2487
Schools administered by state _____
797
1104
Total ________________ 3520
3591
B) Number of high schools in Slovakia
1918-19 1936-37
High schools ____________________ _
44
46
Teachers' schools ________________ _
15
16
Tot~ _________________ _
61
63
�4
SLOVAKIA
The number of students at the above schools in 1918
was 15,354; and in 1939 - 23,937; but only 20,018 of
them were of Slovak origin.
As far as the percentage of Slovaks who could not read
and write is concerned, the above quoted statement of Prof.
Roucek is obviously at odds with the truth. Unfortunately,
there are in exile no statistics available aJbout the situation
in this regard in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule.
But if we take into consideration the fact that according
to the official Czech statistics there were in 1930 only 6.8 %
inhabitants of Slovak origin who could not read and write
and the number of schools was as shown above, it may be
safely assumed that in 1919, when the number of schools
was nearly the same, the percentage of analphabets could
hardly be much different. Logic does not admit any doubt
in this regard. At present about 3 % of the inhabitants of
Slovakia cannot read and write, which means that Slovakia
comes not only before many Central-European countries,
but is much ahead of countries like Italy, Spain, etc.
II
As false at the presentation of Slovakia in the light of
illiteracy is also any talk about Slovakia's economic backwardness. After the first World War when the Slovaks and
Czechs came together, it was decided ,b y the Czech government that Slovakia must remain an agricultural complement
of the Czech lands. Consequently, the rise in the industrial
population of Slovakia which 1b egan in the 19th century,
when the industrial revolution took hold in Hungary, not
only began to slow down, but, according to Macartney, one
third of Slovakia's industry was dismantled and destroyed
by the Czech banks and industrialists who did not wish to
have any competition in Slovakia (7).
1
Despite these anti-Slovak economic measures of the
Prague government and Czech industrialists, the majority
of Slovakia's population was neither ",pastoral" nor agrarian.
According to Czech official statistics the percentage of Slovakia's population which gave their occupation as agriculture
was as follows (8) :
�SLOVAKIA
Year
1900
1921
1930
5
%
63.0
60.6
56.8
Measured by Central-European standards, Slovakia in
1930 was one of the well industrialized countries, since in
Poland, ,Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia the
percentage of agrarian population at that time was much
higher (Poland 69 % , Bulgaria 80 % , Romania 80% , etc.)
even according Mr. Roucek's "Central Eastern Europe".
Since 1930 the above percentage changed in Slovakia
to a considera'ble extent, especially during the years 19391945. Wm. Dia:mond in his book "Czechoslovakia between
East and West" - very favorable to the post-war Czechoslovakia and to Czechs writes in this regard:
"Slovakia's brief experience as an independent
state had a salutary effect on its industry, which expanded in an effort to replace products once obtained
from the factories of the Czech lands and, under German pressure, to increase the output of armaments.
The esta'blishment of new enteq,rises and the increase
in the number of industrial workers raised the importance of Slovak industry in the country as a whole. The
industrial ca:pacity of Slovakia increased particularly
in metal- and wood-working, mining, textiles, footwear,
and food processing" (9).
The Czech Minister on Industry described the situation
as follows:
•~on the whole, it may ,b e said of Slovak industry
that its development in the last few years, with the exception of armament production, was, comparatively
speaking, quick and sound. It is true that not many
new factories have been built, but many of the existing ones have been enlarged and modernized. The most
important structural change 'has :b een an increased emphasis on metallurgy, textiles and, to a certain extent,
on mining" (10).
�6
SLOVAKIA
The Communist regime in Slovakia did not stop this
development. On the contrary, if we can trust Communist
statistics, many new industries have been built in Slovakia
and the percentage of the population working in agriculture
should be only a,bout 35 % at the .present time. The regime is
inhuman, tyrannic and cruel, but it changes the social structure of Slovakia in favor of the industrial "proletariat" not
only in order to furnish Russia industrial products, ibut also
because of political reasons: a peasant is considered an
enemy of Communism.
III
· While, consciously or unconsciously, American authors
present, under the cover of "scientific" works, the Slovak
people as a part of the Czech nation and Slovakia as a backward country in order to support the Czech claim to rule
over Slovakia, life marks quite different tracks of evolution
in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks.
"Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Slovaks," writes Wm. Diamond and continues:
"So important was the Slovak problem in the minds
of both Czech and Slovak leaders, that it was a major
subject of study and debate during the war and has
continued to be ever since. An effort was made to solve
the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice .Programme, in which
Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations
united by common interest in a single state. This is in
itself a complete reversal of the ethni~ theory on which
the first Repubilc was built: the belief that Czechs
and Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kosice
Program further provided that "the Slovaks should :be
the masters in their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs
in their Czech homeland" and that the government "will
regard the Slovak National Council not only as the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation, but
also as the bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory" (11).
The same change as in the political relations between
Czechs and Slovaks was ,b rought a;bout in regard to the
�S LOVAKIA
7
general level of civilization in Slovakia. Already during the
Second World War there was no lack of trained and educateq.
officials, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc., but a constderable surplus. When the "Czechoslovak Republic" had been
restored against the wishes of the majority of Slovakia's
population in 1945 and a bout 5 thousand Slovak intellectuals
left the country and other thousands were jailed, deported to
Siberia, and confined in concentration camps for alleged
collaboration with Nazis, but in fact for their anti-Communism, there was no difficulty to replace them, ·b ecause the
trend of civilization and development, which, since the First
World War, brought to maturity and self-government about
30 former colonies and mandatory territories, did not stop in
Slovakia in order to fulfill the wishes of some Czech politicians who desired to see Slovakia as a backward country and
the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation.
Slovakia developed considerably not only economically
during its short separation from the Czech lands, but also
from the point of view of culture and civilization. This can
be seen again in the light of statistics concerning the number of university students during the Czech rule (1918--38)
and during the Slovakia's independence (1939-415) ,published
by Prof. Stefanek.
1
After 20 years of Czech rule in Slovakia, there were
at the University in Bratislava in the schoolyear 1938--39
only 153'5 students of Slovak origin, but this number increased to 4485 in the third year of Slovakia's independence
(1942-43), while aibout 500 others studied abroad. Altogether, during the five years of Slovakia's separation from
Czechs, 14,965 students studied at the University of Bratislava, which also became an attractive center for foreign
students. In the year 1941-42, for instance, there were 518
students from Bulgaria, 120 Czech students, 154 Germans,
106 Russians, 171 Hungarians and many others.
As far as the professors were concerned, out of a total
of 107 professors, 78 were of Slovak origin, 20 Czechs, 7
Russians, one German, one Italian; the 1'59 assistants and
lecturers were all of Slovak origin (12).
This is the true face of Slovakia, ,p resented by some
1
�SLOVAKIA
8
American writers and university professors as a backward
country of illiteracy and poverty. Do not American students
deserve professors and lecturers who respect facts and the
truth more objectively and more consistently?
(1) J. S. Roucek, Central Eastern Europe, New York, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1946, p. 353; 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe,
London, Jarolds, 1942, pp. 85-94, 104, 131, etc.; 3) Lbidem, p. 354;
4) "Czechoslovakia" edited by R. J. Kerner, University of California
Press, Berkeley, Cal. 1949, pp. 184-185; 5) Dr. M. Hodza, op. cit.; 6) Anton
Stefanek, Zur Sociographie Der Geistigen Kultur in der Slowakei, Academia Scientiarum et Artiurn Slovaca, Bratislava, 1944, pp. 40'4-405;
7) C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, London, 19·3 7; 8) Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tcheco,Slovaque, 1938, p. 15;
9) William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, London,
Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1947, p. 172; 10) Prumyslovy Vestnik, March 10,
1947, p. 180-1; 11) Ibidem, p. 50; 12) A. Stefanek, op. cit., ·p. 413-15.
WHO SAID IT? - "Basically our political program, our political
llne, completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak
Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there really was no difference
between an adherent of the Slovak Communist Party and an adherent
of the Democratic Party. When did this relationship deteriorate? I
t.hink it was after our complete liberation. Well, in general, there can
be no taJk about any great deterioration. But I think that if we let
ourselves get drunk by our present victory in the elections and if,
incidentally, even the effectiveness of the Slovak Communist Party
should decrease because of the factual failure in the elections, then we
would fall and the communists also would fail. I emphasize that we
must mutually help each other and th 'l-t all of us mu.st solve common
problems together, because onoe and for all time we must realize
that there is no fundamental difference between the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Differences have appeared
a.nd are appearing, but only In methods." (Dr. Joseph Lettrich,
former Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party and President of
the Slovak National Council and now Y.ice-Preeident of the Council of
Free Czechoslovakia: "My 46" - No. 23, June 8, 1946 - Prague) .
WHO SAID IT? -
•
•
•
"The religious cleft (between the Slovaks ana
the Czechs) is deep. For the Czechs, Master John Hus was and is not
only a religious but essentially a national figure; and, if the nation
returned to Catholicism under the pressure of the Counter-Reformation, it is a truism that every Czech is a H ussite at heart - a Hussfte
in the wider sense of the term, denoting a blend of somewhat selfassertive nationalism with a "Protestant" attitude towards all authority,
social, national, or religious, which is felt to be in any way alien.
For the Slovaks, Hussitism was the alien doctrine, Catholicism the
natural faith." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937).
�
JULY, 1953
SLOV.AKI.A
1
THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAK.IA
Joseph M. Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D.
There is a peculiar phenomenon in the political and historical works of American or English scholars about Slovakia. With the exception of the British author C. A. Macartney, followed to a certain extent by A. J. D. Taylor and professor Seton-Watson, the Anglo-Saxon history writers an:d
-p ublicists show not only a considerable lack of knowledge
of historical facts concerning Slovakia, but they serve,
probably unconsciously, the aims of imperialistic tendencies
of some Central-European ,peoples. For many of them "Slovak is the name given to the easternmost division of the
Czech speaking people" (1) and they seem to know nothing
about the fact that the Slovaks were among the first Slovanic
peoples converted to Christianity and that as early as the
ninth century they founded the first Slovanic state, known
in history under the name of the Great Moravian Empire (2); they also persistently present Slovakia as a backward agrarian country marked by illiteracy and poverty.
This misrepresentation happens especially when comparison is made between Slovaks and, in the Anglo-Saxon
world, the very favored Czechs who are, from the linguistic
point of view, quite close to the Slovaks, from the cultural
and historical standpoint, however, quite different. Or as
Wm. Diamond writes: "Slovakia and the Czech lands are
two areas speaking quite similar languages but having
different histories and political traditions. They have a
deep-rooted and intense distrust, sometimes amounting to
antipathy, for each other. A thousand years of separat~on,
during which ,p olitical and economic development went off
on different tracks, were neither forgotten nor overcome
after the establishment of the (Czecho-'Slovak) Republic."
The line followed by Anglo-Saxon writers when speaking about Slovakia is nearly the same as that expressed in
the books of J. S. Roucek (Eastern-Central Europe, crucible
of world wars, and Slavonic Encyclopedia) and R. J. Kerner
(Czechoslovakia), who as late as 1946-1949 presented Slovakia as follows:
�SLOVAKIA
1. "In the Slovak province of Czechoslovakia, for
instance, as many as 57 per cent could not read and
write. The (Czechoslovak) Republic esta:blished middleschool and university education in Slovakia, where it
was practically non-existent ,b efore 1918." - J. S.
Roucek (3).
2. "Wherea'S 1:Jhe standard of ,] iteracy among the
Czechs was high, the •p ercentage of Slovaks who could
read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason,
many officials, teachers and intellectuals from the Czech
regions had to be sent to Slovakia" - Kerner <4).
1
3. The Slovaks are according to Mr. Roucek "simple and pastoral" and in the opinion of Mr. Kerner "the
Slovaks remained agriculturists and under a Magyar
(that is, Eastern) type of culture."
This portrayal of Slovakia i,s so general in the American
and English ,p ress that to many people, who are not acquainted with the Slovak past and the actual circm;nstances, it
may appear not only probruble ,b ut true. Slovakia has been
presented in this light for about 35 years. The world is supposed to 'believe that culture, literacy and civilization were
brought into Slovakia only by the Czechs in 1918-19, according to these "scientific revelations", and that Slovakia remained even during the last 30 years predominantly agrarian,
pastoral and illiterate.
What is the truth?
Now, the truth is quite different. After having lost their
political independence in the tenth and definitely in the 13th
century in favor of the· Hungarians, the Slovaks did not
appear in European history as a political factor for many
centuries. Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, who in a common effort succeeded to disintegrate the first Slovak State,
could not, however, destroy the civilization which had already existed in that country. As a result Slovakia became
even under the Hungarian rule a first-rate cultural centre
in Ce11tral Europe with a university at Bratislava as early
as the 1'5th century and a Catholic university in the 17th
century at Trnava (5).
�SLOVAKIA
3
The culture spread from these universities developed,
naturally, not in the 'Slovak, but in the Latin language, a
general phenomenon at that time in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was a culture of the •p opulation of Slovakia which
at all times has been predominantly of Slovak origin, and
the archives prove that the majority of professors and
students was Slovak also.
The same rule can be applied to the epoch when, under
the influence of nationalism, the Hungarians began to demand the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin
and when expressions of growing national consciousness of
the non~Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased
attempt at Magyarization. It is true that .Slovak schools
were closed by the Hungarian regime in the last decades of
the 19th century, and nobody can deny the tendency of
Budapest to assimilate the Slovak population. On the other
hand, it is false and tendencious to say that Slova:kia before
1918 was a .b ackward and illiterate country and that culture
was brought into Slovakia by Czech teachers and intellectuals. If we can measure the cultural level of any country
by the number of schools, as it is generally done, then the
statistics regarding the number of schools in Slovakia at
the end of the Hungarian rule (1918) and at the end of the
Czech rule (1939) obviously deny the Czech .propaganda
about the illiteracy and the Czech cultural mission in Slovakia. The data pU!blished in this regard by a former member
of the Prague government, Prof. A. Stefanek (6) give us the
following picture:
A) Number of public schools in Slovakia
1917-18 1937-38
Schools administered by church ____ 2723
2487
Schools administered by state _____
797
1104
Total ________________ 3520
3591
B) Number of high schools in Slovakia
1918-19 1936-37
High schools ____________________ _
44
46
Teachers' schools ________________ _
15
16
Tot~ _________________ _
61
63
�4
SLOVAKIA
The number of students at the above schools in 1918
was 15,354; and in 1939 - 23,937; but only 20,018 of
them were of Slovak origin.
As far as the percentage of Slovaks who could not read
and write is concerned, the above quoted statement of Prof.
Roucek is obviously at odds with the truth. Unfortunately,
there are in exile no statistics available aJbout the situation
in this regard in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule.
But if we take into consideration the fact that according
to the official Czech statistics there were in 1930 only 6.8 %
inhabitants of Slovak origin who could not read and write
and the number of schools was as shown above, it may be
safely assumed that in 1919, when the number of schools
was nearly the same, the percentage of analphabets could
hardly be much different. Logic does not admit any doubt
in this regard. At present about 3 % of the inhabitants of
Slovakia cannot read and write, which means that Slovakia
comes not only before many Central-European countries,
but is much ahead of countries like Italy, Spain, etc.
II
As false at the presentation of Slovakia in the light of
illiteracy is also any talk about Slovakia's economic backwardness. After the first World War when the Slovaks and
Czechs came together, it was decided ,b y the Czech government that Slovakia must remain an agricultural complement
of the Czech lands. Consequently, the rise in the industrial
population of Slovakia which 1b egan in the 19th century,
when the industrial revolution took hold in Hungary, not
only began to slow down, but, according to Macartney, one
third of Slovakia's industry was dismantled and destroyed
by the Czech banks and industrialists who did not wish to
have any competition in Slovakia (7).
1
Despite these anti-Slovak economic measures of the
Prague government and Czech industrialists, the majority
of Slovakia's population was neither ",pastoral" nor agrarian.
According to Czech official statistics the percentage of Slovakia's population which gave their occupation as agriculture
was as follows (8) :
�SLOVAKIA
Year
1900
1921
1930
5
%
63.0
60.6
56.8
Measured by Central-European standards, Slovakia in
1930 was one of the well industrialized countries, since in
Poland, ,Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia the
percentage of agrarian population at that time was much
higher (Poland 69 % , Bulgaria 80 % , Romania 80% , etc.)
even according Mr. Roucek's "Central Eastern Europe".
Since 1930 the above percentage changed in Slovakia
to a considera'ble extent, especially during the years 19391945. Wm. Dia:mond in his book "Czechoslovakia between
East and West" - very favorable to the post-war Czechoslovakia and to Czechs writes in this regard:
"Slovakia's brief experience as an independent
state had a salutary effect on its industry, which expanded in an effort to replace products once obtained
from the factories of the Czech lands and, under German pressure, to increase the output of armaments.
The esta'blishment of new enteq,rises and the increase
in the number of industrial workers raised the importance of Slovak industry in the country as a whole. The
industrial ca:pacity of Slovakia increased particularly
in metal- and wood-working, mining, textiles, footwear,
and food processing" (9).
The Czech Minister on Industry described the situation
as follows:
•~on the whole, it may ,b e said of Slovak industry
that its development in the last few years, with the exception of armament production, was, comparatively
speaking, quick and sound. It is true that not many
new factories have been built, but many of the existing ones have been enlarged and modernized. The most
important structural change 'has :b een an increased emphasis on metallurgy, textiles and, to a certain extent,
on mining" (10).
�6
SLOVAKIA
The Communist regime in Slovakia did not stop this
development. On the contrary, if we can trust Communist
statistics, many new industries have been built in Slovakia
and the percentage of the population working in agriculture
should be only a,bout 35 % at the .present time. The regime is
inhuman, tyrannic and cruel, but it changes the social structure of Slovakia in favor of the industrial "proletariat" not
only in order to furnish Russia industrial products, ibut also
because of political reasons: a peasant is considered an
enemy of Communism.
III
· While, consciously or unconsciously, American authors
present, under the cover of "scientific" works, the Slovak
people as a part of the Czech nation and Slovakia as a backward country in order to support the Czech claim to rule
over Slovakia, life marks quite different tracks of evolution
in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks.
"Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Slovaks," writes Wm. Diamond and continues:
"So important was the Slovak problem in the minds
of both Czech and Slovak leaders, that it was a major
subject of study and debate during the war and has
continued to be ever since. An effort was made to solve
the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice .Programme, in which
Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations
united by common interest in a single state. This is in
itself a complete reversal of the ethni~ theory on which
the first Repubilc was built: the belief that Czechs
and Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kosice
Program further provided that "the Slovaks should :be
the masters in their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs
in their Czech homeland" and that the government "will
regard the Slovak National Council not only as the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation, but
also as the bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory" (11).
The same change as in the political relations between
Czechs and Slovaks was ,b rought a;bout in regard to the
�S LOVAKIA
7
general level of civilization in Slovakia. Already during the
Second World War there was no lack of trained and educateq.
officials, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc., but a constderable surplus. When the "Czechoslovak Republic" had been
restored against the wishes of the majority of Slovakia's
population in 1945 and a bout 5 thousand Slovak intellectuals
left the country and other thousands were jailed, deported to
Siberia, and confined in concentration camps for alleged
collaboration with Nazis, but in fact for their anti-Communism, there was no difficulty to replace them, ·b ecause the
trend of civilization and development, which, since the First
World War, brought to maturity and self-government about
30 former colonies and mandatory territories, did not stop in
Slovakia in order to fulfill the wishes of some Czech politicians who desired to see Slovakia as a backward country and
the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation.
Slovakia developed considerably not only economically
during its short separation from the Czech lands, but also
from the point of view of culture and civilization. This can
be seen again in the light of statistics concerning the number of university students during the Czech rule (1918--38)
and during the Slovakia's independence (1939-415) ,published
by Prof. Stefanek.
1
After 20 years of Czech rule in Slovakia, there were
at the University in Bratislava in the schoolyear 1938--39
only 153'5 students of Slovak origin, but this number increased to 4485 in the third year of Slovakia's independence
(1942-43), while aibout 500 others studied abroad. Altogether, during the five years of Slovakia's separation from
Czechs, 14,965 students studied at the University of Bratislava, which also became an attractive center for foreign
students. In the year 1941-42, for instance, there were 518
students from Bulgaria, 120 Czech students, 154 Germans,
106 Russians, 171 Hungarians and many others.
As far as the professors were concerned, out of a total
of 107 professors, 78 were of Slovak origin, 20 Czechs, 7
Russians, one German, one Italian; the 1'59 assistants and
lecturers were all of Slovak origin (12).
This is the true face of Slovakia, ,p resented by some
1
�SLOVAKIA
8
American writers and university professors as a backward
country of illiteracy and poverty. Do not American students
deserve professors and lecturers who respect facts and the
truth more objectively and more consistently?
(1) J. S. Roucek, Central Eastern Europe, New York, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1946, p. 353; 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe,
London, Jarolds, 1942, pp. 85-94, 104, 131, etc.; 3) Lbidem, p. 354;
4) "Czechoslovakia" edited by R. J. Kerner, University of California
Press, Berkeley, Cal. 1949, pp. 184-185; 5) Dr. M. Hodza, op. cit.; 6) Anton
Stefanek, Zur Sociographie Der Geistigen Kultur in der Slowakei, Academia Scientiarum et Artiurn Slovaca, Bratislava, 1944, pp. 40'4-405;
7) C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, London, 19·3 7; 8) Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tcheco,Slovaque, 1938, p. 15;
9) William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, London,
Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1947, p. 172; 10) Prumyslovy Vestnik, March 10,
1947, p. 180-1; 11) Ibidem, p. 50; 12) A. Stefanek, op. cit., ·p. 413-15.
WHO SAID IT? - "Basically our political program, our political
llne, completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak
Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there really was no difference
between an adherent of the Slovak Communist Party and an adherent
of the Democratic Party. When did this relationship deteriorate? I
t.hink it was after our complete liberation. Well, in general, there can
be no taJk about any great deterioration. But I think that if we let
ourselves get drunk by our present victory in the elections and if,
incidentally, even the effectiveness of the Slovak Communist Party
should decrease because of the factual failure in the elections, then we
would fall and the communists also would fail. I emphasize that we
must mutually help each other and th 'l-t all of us mu.st solve common
problems together, because onoe and for all time we must realize
that there is no fundamental difference between the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Differences have appeared
a.nd are appearing, but only In methods." (Dr. Joseph Lettrich,
former Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party and President of
the Slovak National Council and now Y.ice-Preeident of the Council of
Free Czechoslovakia: "My 46" - No. 23, June 8, 1946 - Prague) .
WHO SAID IT? -
•
•
•
"The religious cleft (between the Slovaks ana
the Czechs) is deep. For the Czechs, Master John Hus was and is not
only a religious but essentially a national figure; and, if the nation
returned to Catholicism under the pressure of the Counter-Reformation, it is a truism that every Czech is a H ussite at heart - a Hussfte
in the wider sense of the term, denoting a blend of somewhat selfassertive nationalism with a "Protestant" attitude towards all authority,
social, national, or religious, which is felt to be in any way alien.
For the Slovaks, Hussitism was the alien doctrine, Catholicism the
natural faith." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937).
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
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JULY, 1953
SLOV.AKI.A
1
THE TRUE FACE OF SLOVAK.IA
Joseph M. Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D.
There is a peculiar phenomenon in the political and historical works of American or English scholars about Slovakia. With the exception of the British author C. A. Macartney, followed to a certain extent by A. J. D. Taylor and professor Seton-Watson, the Anglo-Saxon history writers an:d
-p ublicists show not only a considerable lack of knowledge
of historical facts concerning Slovakia, but they serve,
probably unconsciously, the aims of imperialistic tendencies
of some Central-European ,peoples. For many of them "Slovak is the name given to the easternmost division of the
Czech speaking people" (1) and they seem to know nothing
about the fact that the Slovaks were among the first Slovanic
peoples converted to Christianity and that as early as the
ninth century they founded the first Slovanic state, known
in history under the name of the Great Moravian Empire (2); they also persistently present Slovakia as a backward agrarian country marked by illiteracy and poverty.
This misrepresentation happens especially when comparison is made between Slovaks and, in the Anglo-Saxon
world, the very favored Czechs who are, from the linguistic
point of view, quite close to the Slovaks, from the cultural
and historical standpoint, however, quite different. Or as
Wm. Diamond writes: "Slovakia and the Czech lands are
two areas speaking quite similar languages but having
different histories and political traditions. They have a
deep-rooted and intense distrust, sometimes amounting to
antipathy, for each other. A thousand years of separat~on,
during which ,p olitical and economic development went off
on different tracks, were neither forgotten nor overcome
after the establishment of the (Czecho-'Slovak) Republic."
The line followed by Anglo-Saxon writers when speaking about Slovakia is nearly the same as that expressed in
the books of J. S. Roucek (Eastern-Central Europe, crucible
of world wars, and Slavonic Encyclopedia) and R. J. Kerner
(Czechoslovakia), who as late as 1946-1949 presented Slovakia as follows:
SLOVAKIA
1. "In the Slovak province of Czechoslovakia, for
instance, as many as 57 per cent could not read and
write. The (Czechoslovak) Republic esta:blished middleschool and university education in Slovakia, where it
was practically non-existent ,b efore 1918." - J. S.
Roucek (3).
2. "Wherea'S 1:Jhe standard of ,] iteracy among the
Czechs was high, the •p ercentage of Slovaks who could
read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason,
many officials, teachers and intellectuals from the Czech
regions had to be sent to Slovakia" - Kerner <4).
1
3. The Slovaks are according to Mr. Roucek "simple and pastoral" and in the opinion of Mr. Kerner "the
Slovaks remained agriculturists and under a Magyar
(that is, Eastern) type of culture."
This portrayal of Slovakia i,s so general in the American
and English ,p ress that to many people, who are not acquainted with the Slovak past and the actual circm;nstances, it
may appear not only probruble ,b ut true. Slovakia has been
presented in this light for about 35 years. The world is supposed to 'believe that culture, literacy and civilization were
brought into Slovakia only by the Czechs in 1918-19, according to these "scientific revelations", and that Slovakia remained even during the last 30 years predominantly agrarian,
pastoral and illiterate.
What is the truth?
Now, the truth is quite different. After having lost their
political independence in the tenth and definitely in the 13th
century in favor of the· Hungarians, the Slovaks did not
appear in European history as a political factor for many
centuries. Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, who in a common effort succeeded to disintegrate the first Slovak State,
could not, however, destroy the civilization which had already existed in that country. As a result Slovakia became
even under the Hungarian rule a first-rate cultural centre
in Ce11tral Europe with a university at Bratislava as early
as the 1'5th century and a Catholic university in the 17th
century at Trnava (5).
SLOVAKIA
3
The culture spread from these universities developed,
naturally, not in the 'Slovak, but in the Latin language, a
general phenomenon at that time in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was a culture of the •p opulation of Slovakia which
at all times has been predominantly of Slovak origin, and
the archives prove that the majority of professors and
students was Slovak also.
The same rule can be applied to the epoch when, under
the influence of nationalism, the Hungarians began to demand the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin
and when expressions of growing national consciousness of
the non~Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased
attempt at Magyarization. It is true that .Slovak schools
were closed by the Hungarian regime in the last decades of
the 19th century, and nobody can deny the tendency of
Budapest to assimilate the Slovak population. On the other
hand, it is false and tendencious to say that Slova:kia before
1918 was a .b ackward and illiterate country and that culture
was brought into Slovakia by Czech teachers and intellectuals. If we can measure the cultural level of any country
by the number of schools, as it is generally done, then the
statistics regarding the number of schools in Slovakia at
the end of the Hungarian rule (1918) and at the end of the
Czech rule (1939) obviously deny the Czech .propaganda
about the illiteracy and the Czech cultural mission in Slovakia. The data pU!blished in this regard by a former member
of the Prague government, Prof. A. Stefanek (6) give us the
following picture:
A) Number of public schools in Slovakia
1917-18 1937-38
Schools administered by church ____ 2723
2487
Schools administered by state _____
797
1104
Total ________________ 3520
3591
B) Number of high schools in Slovakia
1918-19 1936-37
High schools ____________________ _
44
46
Teachers' schools ________________ _
15
16
Tot~ _________________ _
61
63
4
SLOVAKIA
The number of students at the above schools in 1918
was 15,354; and in 1939 - 23,937; but only 20,018 of
them were of Slovak origin.
As far as the percentage of Slovaks who could not read
and write is concerned, the above quoted statement of Prof.
Roucek is obviously at odds with the truth. Unfortunately,
there are in exile no statistics available aJbout the situation
in this regard in Slovakia at the end of the Hungarian rule.
But if we take into consideration the fact that according
to the official Czech statistics there were in 1930 only 6.8 %
inhabitants of Slovak origin who could not read and write
and the number of schools was as shown above, it may be
safely assumed that in 1919, when the number of schools
was nearly the same, the percentage of analphabets could
hardly be much different. Logic does not admit any doubt
in this regard. At present about 3 % of the inhabitants of
Slovakia cannot read and write, which means that Slovakia
comes not only before many Central-European countries,
but is much ahead of countries like Italy, Spain, etc.
II
As false at the presentation of Slovakia in the light of
illiteracy is also any talk about Slovakia's economic backwardness. After the first World War when the Slovaks and
Czechs came together, it was decided ,b y the Czech government that Slovakia must remain an agricultural complement
of the Czech lands. Consequently, the rise in the industrial
population of Slovakia which 1b egan in the 19th century,
when the industrial revolution took hold in Hungary, not
only began to slow down, but, according to Macartney, one
third of Slovakia's industry was dismantled and destroyed
by the Czech banks and industrialists who did not wish to
have any competition in Slovakia (7).
1
Despite these anti-Slovak economic measures of the
Prague government and Czech industrialists, the majority
of Slovakia's population was neither ",pastoral" nor agrarian.
According to Czech official statistics the percentage of Slovakia's population which gave their occupation as agriculture
was as follows (8) :
SLOVAKIA
Year
1900
1921
1930
5
%
63.0
60.6
56.8
Measured by Central-European standards, Slovakia in
1930 was one of the well industrialized countries, since in
Poland, ,Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia the
percentage of agrarian population at that time was much
higher (Poland 69 % , Bulgaria 80 % , Romania 80% , etc.)
even according Mr. Roucek's "Central Eastern Europe".
Since 1930 the above percentage changed in Slovakia
to a considera'ble extent, especially during the years 19391945. Wm. Dia:mond in his book "Czechoslovakia between
East and West" - very favorable to the post-war Czechoslovakia and to Czechs writes in this regard:
"Slovakia's brief experience as an independent
state had a salutary effect on its industry, which expanded in an effort to replace products once obtained
from the factories of the Czech lands and, under German pressure, to increase the output of armaments.
The esta'blishment of new enteq,rises and the increase
in the number of industrial workers raised the importance of Slovak industry in the country as a whole. The
industrial ca:pacity of Slovakia increased particularly
in metal- and wood-working, mining, textiles, footwear,
and food processing" (9).
The Czech Minister on Industry described the situation
as follows:
•~on the whole, it may ,b e said of Slovak industry
that its development in the last few years, with the exception of armament production, was, comparatively
speaking, quick and sound. It is true that not many
new factories have been built, but many of the existing ones have been enlarged and modernized. The most
important structural change 'has :b een an increased emphasis on metallurgy, textiles and, to a certain extent,
on mining" (10).
6
SLOVAKIA
The Communist regime in Slovakia did not stop this
development. On the contrary, if we can trust Communist
statistics, many new industries have been built in Slovakia
and the percentage of the population working in agriculture
should be only a,bout 35 % at the .present time. The regime is
inhuman, tyrannic and cruel, but it changes the social structure of Slovakia in favor of the industrial "proletariat" not
only in order to furnish Russia industrial products, ibut also
because of political reasons: a peasant is considered an
enemy of Communism.
III
· While, consciously or unconsciously, American authors
present, under the cover of "scientific" works, the Slovak
people as a part of the Czech nation and Slovakia as a backward country in order to support the Czech claim to rule
over Slovakia, life marks quite different tracks of evolution
in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks.
"Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Slovaks," writes Wm. Diamond and continues:
"So important was the Slovak problem in the minds
of both Czech and Slovak leaders, that it was a major
subject of study and debate during the war and has
continued to be ever since. An effort was made to solve
the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice .Programme, in which
Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations
united by common interest in a single state. This is in
itself a complete reversal of the ethni~ theory on which
the first Repubilc was built: the belief that Czechs
and Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kosice
Program further provided that "the Slovaks should :be
the masters in their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs
in their Czech homeland" and that the government "will
regard the Slovak National Council not only as the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation, but
also as the bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory" (11).
The same change as in the political relations between
Czechs and Slovaks was ,b rought a;bout in regard to the
S LOVAKIA
7
general level of civilization in Slovakia. Already during the
Second World War there was no lack of trained and educateq.
officials, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc., but a constderable surplus. When the "Czechoslovak Republic" had been
restored against the wishes of the majority of Slovakia's
population in 1945 and a bout 5 thousand Slovak intellectuals
left the country and other thousands were jailed, deported to
Siberia, and confined in concentration camps for alleged
collaboration with Nazis, but in fact for their anti-Communism, there was no difficulty to replace them, ·b ecause the
trend of civilization and development, which, since the First
World War, brought to maturity and self-government about
30 former colonies and mandatory territories, did not stop in
Slovakia in order to fulfill the wishes of some Czech politicians who desired to see Slovakia as a backward country and
the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation.
Slovakia developed considerably not only economically
during its short separation from the Czech lands, but also
from the point of view of culture and civilization. This can
be seen again in the light of statistics concerning the number of university students during the Czech rule (1918--38)
and during the Slovakia's independence (1939-415) ,published
by Prof. Stefanek.
1
After 20 years of Czech rule in Slovakia, there were
at the University in Bratislava in the schoolyear 1938--39
only 153'5 students of Slovak origin, but this number increased to 4485 in the third year of Slovakia's independence
(1942-43), while aibout 500 others studied abroad. Altogether, during the five years of Slovakia's separation from
Czechs, 14,965 students studied at the University of Bratislava, which also became an attractive center for foreign
students. In the year 1941-42, for instance, there were 518
students from Bulgaria, 120 Czech students, 154 Germans,
106 Russians, 171 Hungarians and many others.
As far as the professors were concerned, out of a total
of 107 professors, 78 were of Slovak origin, 20 Czechs, 7
Russians, one German, one Italian; the 1'59 assistants and
lecturers were all of Slovak origin (12).
This is the true face of Slovakia, ,p resented by some
1
SLOVAKIA
8
American writers and university professors as a backward
country of illiteracy and poverty. Do not American students
deserve professors and lecturers who respect facts and the
truth more objectively and more consistently?
(1) J. S. Roucek, Central Eastern Europe, New York, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1946, p. 353; 2) Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe,
London, Jarolds, 1942, pp. 85-94, 104, 131, etc.; 3) Lbidem, p. 354;
4) "Czechoslovakia" edited by R. J. Kerner, University of California
Press, Berkeley, Cal. 1949, pp. 184-185; 5) Dr. M. Hodza, op. cit.; 6) Anton
Stefanek, Zur Sociographie Der Geistigen Kultur in der Slowakei, Academia Scientiarum et Artiurn Slovaca, Bratislava, 1944, pp. 40'4-405;
7) C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, London, 19·3 7; 8) Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tcheco,Slovaque, 1938, p. 15;
9) William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, London,
Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1947, p. 172; 10) Prumyslovy Vestnik, March 10,
1947, p. 180-1; 11) Ibidem, p. 50; 12) A. Stefanek, op. cit., ·p. 413-15.
WHO SAID IT? - "Basically our political program, our political
llne, completely agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak
Communist Party. Up to the rebellion there really was no difference
between an adherent of the Slovak Communist Party and an adherent
of the Democratic Party. When did this relationship deteriorate? I
t.hink it was after our complete liberation. Well, in general, there can
be no taJk about any great deterioration. But I think that if we let
ourselves get drunk by our present victory in the elections and if,
incidentally, even the effectiveness of the Slovak Communist Party
should decrease because of the factual failure in the elections, then we
would fall and the communists also would fail. I emphasize that we
must mutually help each other and th 'l-t all of us mu.st solve common
problems together, because onoe and for all time we must realize
that there is no fundamental difference between the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Differences have appeared
a.nd are appearing, but only In methods." (Dr. Joseph Lettrich,
former Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party and President of
the Slovak National Council and now Y.ice-Preeident of the Council of
Free Czechoslovakia: "My 46" - No. 23, June 8, 1946 - Prague) .
WHO SAID IT? -
•
•
•
"The religious cleft (between the Slovaks ana
the Czechs) is deep. For the Czechs, Master John Hus was and is not
only a religious but essentially a national figure; and, if the nation
returned to Catholicism under the pressure of the Counter-Reformation, it is a truism that every Czech is a H ussite at heart - a Hussfte
in the wider sense of the term, denoting a blend of somewhat selfassertive nationalism with a "Protestant" attitude towards all authority,
social, national, or religious, which is felt to be in any way alien.
For the Slovaks, Hussitism was the alien doctrine, Catholicism the
natural faith." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS - London, 1937).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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The True Face of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Kirschbaum, M. A., LL. D.
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 1-8
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2c82a300fcc80b3010544178ccc6c9e4.pdf
57656682930c6a62eefb3d76cdf36399
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
9
BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE?
Genera,l Lev :PIIX:'ha'la, head of the Czech Nationa'l Committee in London, broke ,wiltfh lli. Edwaxd Benes /When he
could no longer ,surfifer in silenice ,his dildtatorial, :imperiom;
and pro-lSOVliet 1po1'icy. ]t hruppened in London during the
wair. Prchala fost .his lave for Benes in 1938, when he oapitullarted to the M1.midh Alg;reemen't witlhourt 1the consent of
the 0zecho~Slovruk Prurliarrnent, .then resigned ifrom :the Presidency, thus surrendering his coll!Iltry, lodk, stock and ba,rrel, :to HiltJler w.iithout -Olffering tJhe slightest physical resistance, and then cowardly fled rto London.
From thrut time on, Prchwla re.gamded Benes and his
political clii.que - .the Czech NaJtional Socialists, or Ozedh
N aizis, as they axe .referred to - as hypocrites and frauds
who h elched forth volumes of democratic slogans and
S'peeches, bwt kept idiri'Vliing Czooho-iSlovrukia and tlhe who-le of
Erurope inito ,t he dultldhe:s af -Moscow.
In the Fcllruacy . 9, 19153, ,i ssue of the "<Ceske Listy"
(Ozech News), .t he oflfilcial organ of ,B rehala's ·giroll!p, the
General .reilates ,a nother inciderut to ,p rove the ,hy;pocrisy of
the (in)lfamous ,bridge-ib-ui[der, Dr. Edward Benes, who
brought Communism into Ozecho-Slovakia and Centrail Eu•r ope to threaJten ,tJhe secudty and democraitlic ,l:tfe of the entire Euiropean contilllerut. 'Dhe i'Il!ci:dent goes baok to ,tfue time
of the :presidenltial elec'tlionlS in 1935.
Uncertam of the swpport of ,the Caitholics in the various
par.ties, especially ,t he support of tlhe Slovalks, ibecause Dr.
Edwar.d Benes dlid cOiilltrilbute many articles to "f.ree-thinkriillg" iperiodica!lis and iwas a Freemason even before World
War I, lri's followers (,rut his 1b ehest) suddenly ,d iscovered
that Benes was a "loyall SOIIl of the Roman Catholic Ohurdh
since the dlay he was lbarn." Monsignor John Sraimek',s caiptains in his 0zech People's Party tooik up the cry, even
though Sramek .knew 1betlter, and used every me·a ns to convince the Vatican that Benes •reruJily was a "loyal son" of the
Catholic Church.
Prc,hal-a -clai.!ffis thaJt eventll!ally the Sramek Czechs put
their: story across and Rome urgently requested the CaJt!ho-
�10
SLOVAKIA
l:i!c members of the Ozecho-'SlovaJk National Assemlbly to
vote and wonk for !the election of Dr. Edward iBenes. We
know thalt Benes ,was eleclted. lwen the Sfova'ks 'Voted for
brim wilthout a dissenlt!ing vote, · !beoamse Dr. Joseph Tiso
had cornrinced them ito do so on the stTeng:th of the piromise
m'ade iby Benes that :Slovruk!ia wowld ibe granted full au'tonom~
wiitihin a yerur. We :know ,tlhaJt Benes never fulfilled it!hat ipromi'se, or eiven meant to fulifiM ilt. And he ireipaid iDr. J ·O'Seplh
Ti:so in 1947 by senldling him to .the igallows. That's the kind
of man Benes was.
W:hat hruppened after ,t he elections of 1935, aJs told lby
Prchala, wfillJ. oorlou\btedily •s hook €/Ven the most ardent admiireirs of Benes, General Lev Prcha.O.a says:
"Alflter ithe presidential elections, jjt was by sheer
a.ocidenit that tlhe edge of the curtain, which had hid'den
the 1rea;lrity, was rai!sed. Alf1teir the elootion of Benes as
'Presidenlt, I wa·s just leaving the Vladis1av Hill in the
Brag,ue Castle, when suddenllY I overheard a very familiar voiice sing olllt in open •rrupture: 'Well, we put it
across, didn't we? !' The senltenice wais spoken in godd
Russian. I was right - it .rea:Hy was A lexandrovsky,
the Russian ambassadw, who was joyously swinging
his amns. The inlto~ication over the sU1CCeSIS was
stronger than the diplom!atic resei,ve for wlhich I had
previiously known him. Those Russian words opened
my eyes.
"When I iresigned .firom the .:£unction of Vke-Commander of ithe Czed'no-Sl'ovak General Staff in 1933 and
went to eastern SlovaJkia, I was quft.te a di stan1Ce from
eveirything that was 1::a.king jplace in P,r ague I wrus a soldier and not a poilitician; I did not belong to any panty,
bl.lit inlterna1 and foreign. deve'loipments. did interest me.
AB I traveled by tra:in :frrom Kosi'Ce to Praigue, I met
the Slova'k depulties and senaJtors. I learned that Hlinka's party probaJbly woulltl ivote for Benes in the presidentia:1 elections. This su!I1prised rme a:nd, therefore, after my arrival in Brague I soug1ht the .reason for ffiinka''S turning over to the Castle and to Benes. I found
ouJt tih at tJhe V:aJt~can had recommended Benes to Hlinlka.
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
11
"However, after accidentally oivezfuearing the words
of .Am'baJSador Afex:andirovsky, it was c[ear to me ,t hat
· Benes was Sta'1in's candidaite ! I was aware that the
V a,tJican knowin,gJy ,coll!ld nOlt recommend a candidate
of the Bolshewks. '.Dhe exp1anaitioin was simple: tlhe V:atican wias a vtl.dtim of an unheard af hoax!"
It is very mudh ;possi!ble tha;t even now some of the
Benes "Ozechosloviaik!s" rure lbrying rto dece'i!ve tJhe Vatican.
'llhe .puiblfuhers of i'bhe "Tribuna" (The Tribune), the official
organ of itlhe •~Ozeclloslovalk Foreign Institute in Exile" pub:J.ished in .Paris, do nolt say so directly, but their articles
tend in thaJt di-rect_ion. The socialists writing for the '":Dribuna" keep on bringmg Ulp T. G. Masaryk and hils statement
that tihe proiblem of the sigmficance of Czech hristory is a
religfoUJS qu~on. Of course, they oonvenientliy forget to
mention that T. G. MasaJr!Ylk ,had ,1!he Ozeoh Reifonmaation ,in
mind ·a nd tJhat ait ,t he time he :had sai'd those words, he was
the Jeader of tJhe mti-Caitholic firght in Czedho-!SlovaJlda.
Ag:ain it is evident ltJhaJt the Benes sociaAi'sts thriive on
frauds, deceiits and initmig!ll'e. Referring to the itrend lin the
"Tri!bU111a," General P'lrohala says:
"By means of this ,t rick, however, the 'Dribuna is
endeavoring to realize a muich greater firaJUd. It is try.
ing to evdke in the high Roman Caitlholic Hierarclhy
a faJVOraJble impression for itself and iits cmn political
ends. 'Jlhis time, however, uninformed .readers and tlh.e
'Czechoslovak' exi:les in genera;! are ·swppo.sed to bre inspked to ~buikl a 1brid!ge' to Rome. It wi!H not sw-prise
me ,i f this is being done by atlteimpting a f1raudlulent explanaJtion Olf Masary1k's thesis, becM1se every one knows
that the peopl'e in t:Jh.e 'Councii of Free ~echo-SIJ.01Vakiiia.'
are not interested m princi~es, hut only in tactics, aJltoget'her an:ording to the reci,pe of old MachiavelJi anrl
his modern a<lmilrer'S."
We rure inclined to lbelieve General .Brohala. Enough
damage and suffering has been inflidted by the lfoHowers of
Benes and his ruinous poHcy of "CzechOislovaklism" and pro.
SO'V'ietism on the Czech and Slovak nations, nay, on the
�12
SLOVAKIA
whcle of tJhe EU1ropean conrtinent. '.Dhe former Ozecll National !Socialists - all memlbers of the Communist-dominated
"Naltional F1ront" ,go;vernmenlt of Benes and Gottwald s'hou[(i not 1b e tir:u1sted, 1b ut releg.aJted ,to the po[iibi.cal rubbish
herup. Today theli,r ,l eaders (Zenkll, Rilpka) a.re disc:redi1ted
and disowned ,b y the Ozecihs at home and aJbroad and represenlt no one hut themselves and their mercenrury clique. The
saime may be said for lthe "Wlindow-dressin,g " Slovak renegades in tile ,servJce am:l 1pay of t;he Benes CzecihlS. (Leittricli,
Sla:vilk, OsUJSky, Kocivara), ,w ho spealk for and represent oniy
themseilves and not tlhe Slovaik nation. Under the leadership
of Dr EdwaTd Benes they lb uilt the "lb;rM1ge" between the
Ewst and the West, over wlhiich oame ,S talin's h-011des into
Central Europe. They must not be given the chance to build
S'lllc:h "bridges" to Rome, or ,b etween the USA and Moscow.
•
•
•
"The story of the gradual adoption by ·the
Allies of the (Czechoslovak) theses of Mas aryk and his group cannot
and need not be retold h ere. By patient and lndefatiga.ble propaganda
they Implanted their major postulates - the existence of a 'CzechoSlovak nation ' and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a
part of a Czechoslovak State - so firmly in the minds of the Allies
that they were never seriously questioned at the Peace Conference.
The 'Czecho-Slovak' Govern ment h ad b een recognized by all the
Principal Allied a nd Ass o ciated Powers even BEFORE the peace
negotiations began - an act which implied that the Slovak question
was in principle already settled - while when the moment arrived
for settling all questions of de tail, including the drafting of a frontier,
it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly established as a :negotiating party; Indeed, in something like a privileged position." ~A . Mac a rtney: HUNGA'RY AND HER SUCCESSORS, London, 1937,
page 98) .
WHO SAID IT? -
•
WHO SAi D IT? -
•
•
" If a single dynasty h ad united both peoples
(Czechs and Slovaks) in a permanent, or at least an enduring union,
a Czechoslovak nationality would assuredly have been formed and
with ft ···a Czechoslovak lang uage any minor dialectal differences
which existed would have been smoothed out. This did not happen;
and w hil e t he Slavs of Bohemia developed the Czech nationality and
language, to which the intermediate dialects of Moravia graiitated,
the Slovaks, under l,lungarian rule, not only developed along different lines from the ·czechs, but were not even able to form a single
literary language with them." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND
HER SUCCESSORS.::..:_ London, 1937).
�
SLOVAKIA
9
BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE?
Genera,l Lev :PIIX:'ha'la, head of the Czech Nationa'l Committee in London, broke ,wiltfh lli. Edwaxd Benes /When he
could no longer ,surfifer in silenice ,his dildtatorial, :imperiom;
and pro-lSOVliet 1po1'icy. ]t hruppened in London during the
wair. Prchala fost .his lave for Benes in 1938, when he oapitullarted to the M1.midh Alg;reemen't witlhourt 1the consent of
the 0zecho~Slovruk Prurliarrnent, .then resigned ifrom :the Presidency, thus surrendering his coll!Iltry, lodk, stock and ba,rrel, :to HiltJler w.iithout -Olffering tJhe slightest physical resistance, and then cowardly fled rto London.
From thrut time on, Prchwla re.gamded Benes and his
political clii.que - .the Czech NaJtional Socialists, or Ozedh
N aizis, as they axe .referred to - as hypocrites and frauds
who h elched forth volumes of democratic slogans and
S'peeches, bwt kept idiri'Vliing Czooho-iSlovrukia and tlhe who-le of
Erurope inito ,t he dultldhe:s af -Moscow.
In the Fcllruacy . 9, 19153, ,i ssue of the "<Ceske Listy"
(Ozech News), .t he oflfilcial organ of ,B rehala's ·giroll!p, the
General .reilates ,a nother inciderut to ,p rove the ,hy;pocrisy of
the (in)lfamous ,bridge-ib-ui[der, Dr. Edward Benes, who
brought Communism into Ozecho-Slovakia and Centrail Eu•r ope to threaJten ,tJhe secudty and democraitlic ,l:tfe of the entire Euiropean contilllerut. 'Dhe i'Il!ci:dent goes baok to ,tfue time
of the :presidenltial elec'tlionlS in 1935.
Uncertam of the swpport of ,the Caitholics in the various
par.ties, especially ,t he support of tlhe Slovalks, ibecause Dr.
Edwar.d Benes dlid cOiilltrilbute many articles to "f.ree-thinkriillg" iperiodica!lis and iwas a Freemason even before World
War I, lri's followers (,rut his 1b ehest) suddenly ,d iscovered
that Benes was a "loyall SOIIl of the Roman Catholic Ohurdh
since the dlay he was lbarn." Monsignor John Sraimek',s caiptains in his 0zech People's Party tooik up the cry, even
though Sramek .knew 1betlter, and used every me·a ns to convince the Vatican that Benes •reruJily was a "loyal son" of the
Catholic Church.
Prc,hal-a -clai.!ffis thaJt eventll!ally the Sramek Czechs put
their: story across and Rome urgently requested the CaJt!ho-
�10
SLOVAKIA
l:i!c members of the Ozecho-'SlovaJk National Assemlbly to
vote and wonk for !the election of Dr. Edward iBenes. We
know thalt Benes ,was eleclted. lwen the Sfova'ks 'Voted for
brim wilthout a dissenlt!ing vote, · !beoamse Dr. Joseph Tiso
had cornrinced them ito do so on the stTeng:th of the piromise
m'ade iby Benes that :Slovruk!ia wowld ibe granted full au'tonom~
wiitihin a yerur. We :know ,tlhaJt Benes never fulfilled it!hat ipromi'se, or eiven meant to fulifiM ilt. And he ireipaid iDr. J ·O'Seplh
Ti:so in 1947 by senldling him to .the igallows. That's the kind
of man Benes was.
W:hat hruppened after ,t he elections of 1935, aJs told lby
Prchala, wfillJ. oorlou\btedily •s hook €/Ven the most ardent admiireirs of Benes, General Lev Prcha.O.a says:
"Alflter ithe presidential elections, jjt was by sheer
a.ocidenit that tlhe edge of the curtain, which had hid'den
the 1rea;lrity, was rai!sed. Alf1teir the elootion of Benes as
'Presidenlt, I wa·s just leaving the Vladis1av Hill in the
Brag,ue Castle, when suddenllY I overheard a very familiar voiice sing olllt in open •rrupture: 'Well, we put it
across, didn't we? !' The senltenice wais spoken in godd
Russian. I was right - it .rea:Hy was A lexandrovsky,
the Russian ambassadw, who was joyously swinging
his amns. The inlto~ication over the sU1CCeSIS was
stronger than the diplom!atic resei,ve for wlhich I had
previiously known him. Those Russian words opened
my eyes.
"When I iresigned .firom the .:£unction of Vke-Commander of ithe Czed'no-Sl'ovak General Staff in 1933 and
went to eastern SlovaJkia, I was quft.te a di stan1Ce from
eveirything that was 1::a.king jplace in P,r ague I wrus a soldier and not a poilitician; I did not belong to any panty,
bl.lit inlterna1 and foreign. deve'loipments. did interest me.
AB I traveled by tra:in :frrom Kosi'Ce to Praigue, I met
the Slova'k depulties and senaJtors. I learned that Hlinka's party probaJbly woulltl ivote for Benes in the presidentia:1 elections. This su!I1prised rme a:nd, therefore, after my arrival in Brague I soug1ht the .reason for ffiinka''S turning over to the Castle and to Benes. I found
ouJt tih at tJhe V:aJt~can had recommended Benes to Hlinlka.
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
11
"However, after accidentally oivezfuearing the words
of .Am'baJSador Afex:andirovsky, it was c[ear to me ,t hat
· Benes was Sta'1in's candidaite ! I was aware that the
V a,tJican knowin,gJy ,coll!ld nOlt recommend a candidate
of the Bolshewks. '.Dhe exp1anaitioin was simple: tlhe V:atican wias a vtl.dtim of an unheard af hoax!"
It is very mudh ;possi!ble tha;t even now some of the
Benes "Ozechosloviaik!s" rure lbrying rto dece'i!ve tJhe Vatican.
'llhe .puiblfuhers of i'bhe "Tribuna" (The Tribune), the official
organ of itlhe •~Ozeclloslovalk Foreign Institute in Exile" pub:J.ished in .Paris, do nolt say so directly, but their articles
tend in thaJt di-rect_ion. The socialists writing for the '":Dribuna" keep on bringmg Ulp T. G. Masaryk and hils statement
that tihe proiblem of the sigmficance of Czech hristory is a
religfoUJS qu~on. Of course, they oonvenientliy forget to
mention that T. G. MasaJr!Ylk ,had ,1!he Ozeoh Reifonmaation ,in
mind ·a nd tJhat ait ,t he time he :had sai'd those words, he was
the Jeader of tJhe mti-Caitholic firght in Czedho-!SlovaJlda.
Ag:ain it is evident ltJhaJt the Benes sociaAi'sts thriive on
frauds, deceiits and initmig!ll'e. Referring to the itrend lin the
"Tri!bU111a," General P'lrohala says:
"By means of this ,t rick, however, the 'Dribuna is
endeavoring to realize a muich greater firaJUd. It is try.
ing to evdke in the high Roman Caitlholic Hierarclhy
a faJVOraJble impression for itself and iits cmn political
ends. 'Jlhis time, however, uninformed .readers and tlh.e
'Czechoslovak' exi:les in genera;! are ·swppo.sed to bre inspked to ~buikl a 1brid!ge' to Rome. It wi!H not sw-prise
me ,i f this is being done by atlteimpting a f1raudlulent explanaJtion Olf Masary1k's thesis, becM1se every one knows
that the peopl'e in t:Jh.e 'Councii of Free ~echo-SIJ.01Vakiiia.'
are not interested m princi~es, hut only in tactics, aJltoget'her an:ording to the reci,pe of old MachiavelJi anrl
his modern a<lmilrer'S."
We rure inclined to lbelieve General .Brohala. Enough
damage and suffering has been inflidted by the lfoHowers of
Benes and his ruinous poHcy of "CzechOislovaklism" and pro.
SO'V'ietism on the Czech and Slovak nations, nay, on the
�12
SLOVAKIA
whcle of tJhe EU1ropean conrtinent. '.Dhe former Ozecll National !Socialists - all memlbers of the Communist-dominated
"Naltional F1ront" ,go;vernmenlt of Benes and Gottwald s'hou[(i not 1b e tir:u1sted, 1b ut releg.aJted ,to the po[iibi.cal rubbish
herup. Today theli,r ,l eaders (Zenkll, Rilpka) a.re disc:redi1ted
and disowned ,b y the Ozecihs at home and aJbroad and represenlt no one hut themselves and their mercenrury clique. The
saime may be said for lthe "Wlindow-dressin,g " Slovak renegades in tile ,servJce am:l 1pay of t;he Benes CzecihlS. (Leittricli,
Sla:vilk, OsUJSky, Kocivara), ,w ho spealk for and represent oniy
themseilves and not tlhe Slovaik nation. Under the leadership
of Dr EdwaTd Benes they lb uilt the "lb;rM1ge" between the
Ewst and the West, over wlhiich oame ,S talin's h-011des into
Central Europe. They must not be given the chance to build
S'lllc:h "bridges" to Rome, or ,b etween the USA and Moscow.
•
•
•
"The story of the gradual adoption by ·the
Allies of the (Czechoslovak) theses of Mas aryk and his group cannot
and need not be retold h ere. By patient and lndefatiga.ble propaganda
they Implanted their major postulates - the existence of a 'CzechoSlovak nation ' and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a
part of a Czechoslovak State - so firmly in the minds of the Allies
that they were never seriously questioned at the Peace Conference.
The 'Czecho-Slovak' Govern ment h ad b een recognized by all the
Principal Allied a nd Ass o ciated Powers even BEFORE the peace
negotiations began - an act which implied that the Slovak question
was in principle already settled - while when the moment arrived
for settling all questions of de tail, including the drafting of a frontier,
it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly established as a :negotiating party; Indeed, in something like a privileged position." ~A . Mac a rtney: HUNGA'RY AND HER SUCCESSORS, London, 1937,
page 98) .
WHO SAID IT? -
•
WHO SAi D IT? -
•
•
" If a single dynasty h ad united both peoples
(Czechs and Slovaks) in a permanent, or at least an enduring union,
a Czechoslovak nationality would assuredly have been formed and
with ft ···a Czechoslovak lang uage any minor dialectal differences
which existed would have been smoothed out. This did not happen;
and w hil e t he Slavs of Bohemia developed the Czech nationality and
language, to which the intermediate dialects of Moravia graiitated,
the Slovaks, under l,lungarian rule, not only developed along different lines from the ·czechs, but were not even able to form a single
literary language with them." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND
HER SUCCESSORS.::..:_ London, 1937).
�
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1953
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SLOVAKIA
9
BUILDING ANOTHER BRIDGE?
Genera,l Lev :PIIX:'ha'la, head of the Czech Nationa'l Committee in London, broke ,wiltfh lli. Edwaxd Benes /When he
could no longer ,surfifer in silenice ,his dildtatorial, :imperiom;
and pro-lSOVliet 1po1'icy. ]t hruppened in London during the
wair. Prchala fost .his lave for Benes in 1938, when he oapitullarted to the M1.midh Alg;reemen't witlhourt 1the consent of
the 0zecho~Slovruk Prurliarrnent, .then resigned ifrom :the Presidency, thus surrendering his coll!Iltry, lodk, stock and ba,rrel, :to HiltJler w.iithout -Olffering tJhe slightest physical resistance, and then cowardly fled rto London.
From thrut time on, Prchwla re.gamded Benes and his
political clii.que - .the Czech NaJtional Socialists, or Ozedh
N aizis, as they axe .referred to - as hypocrites and frauds
who h elched forth volumes of democratic slogans and
S'peeches, bwt kept idiri'Vliing Czooho-iSlovrukia and tlhe who-le of
Erurope inito ,t he dultldhe:s af -Moscow.
In the Fcllruacy . 9, 19153, ,i ssue of the "<Ceske Listy"
(Ozech News), .t he oflfilcial organ of ,B rehala's ·giroll!p, the
General .reilates ,a nother inciderut to ,p rove the ,hy;pocrisy of
the (in)lfamous ,bridge-ib-ui[der, Dr. Edward Benes, who
brought Communism into Ozecho-Slovakia and Centrail Eu•r ope to threaJten ,tJhe secudty and democraitlic ,l:tfe of the entire Euiropean contilllerut. 'Dhe i'Il!ci:dent goes baok to ,tfue time
of the :presidenltial elec'tlionlS in 1935.
Uncertam of the swpport of ,the Caitholics in the various
par.ties, especially ,t he support of tlhe Slovalks, ibecause Dr.
Edwar.d Benes dlid cOiilltrilbute many articles to "f.ree-thinkriillg" iperiodica!lis and iwas a Freemason even before World
War I, lri's followers (,rut his 1b ehest) suddenly ,d iscovered
that Benes was a "loyall SOIIl of the Roman Catholic Ohurdh
since the dlay he was lbarn." Monsignor John Sraimek',s caiptains in his 0zech People's Party tooik up the cry, even
though Sramek .knew 1betlter, and used every me·a ns to convince the Vatican that Benes •reruJily was a "loyal son" of the
Catholic Church.
Prc,hal-a -clai.!ffis thaJt eventll!ally the Sramek Czechs put
their: story across and Rome urgently requested the CaJt!ho-
10
SLOVAKIA
l:i!c members of the Ozecho-'SlovaJk National Assemlbly to
vote and wonk for !the election of Dr. Edward iBenes. We
know thalt Benes ,was eleclted. lwen the Sfova'ks 'Voted for
brim wilthout a dissenlt!ing vote, · !beoamse Dr. Joseph Tiso
had cornrinced them ito do so on the stTeng:th of the piromise
m'ade iby Benes that :Slovruk!ia wowld ibe granted full au'tonom~
wiitihin a yerur. We :know ,tlhaJt Benes never fulfilled it!hat ipromi'se, or eiven meant to fulifiM ilt. And he ireipaid iDr. J ·O'Seplh
Ti:so in 1947 by senldling him to .the igallows. That's the kind
of man Benes was.
W:hat hruppened after ,t he elections of 1935, aJs told lby
Prchala, wfillJ. oorlou\btedily •s hook €/Ven the most ardent admiireirs of Benes, General Lev Prcha.O.a says:
"Alflter ithe presidential elections, jjt was by sheer
a.ocidenit that tlhe edge of the curtain, which had hid'den
the 1rea;lrity, was rai!sed. Alf1teir the elootion of Benes as
'Presidenlt, I wa·s just leaving the Vladis1av Hill in the
Brag,ue Castle, when suddenllY I overheard a very familiar voiice sing olllt in open •rrupture: 'Well, we put it
across, didn't we? !' The senltenice wais spoken in godd
Russian. I was right - it .rea:Hy was A lexandrovsky,
the Russian ambassadw, who was joyously swinging
his amns. The inlto~ication over the sU1CCeSIS was
stronger than the diplom!atic resei,ve for wlhich I had
previiously known him. Those Russian words opened
my eyes.
"When I iresigned .firom the .:£unction of Vke-Commander of ithe Czed'no-Sl'ovak General Staff in 1933 and
went to eastern SlovaJkia, I was quft.te a di stan1Ce from
eveirything that was 1::a.king jplace in P,r ague I wrus a soldier and not a poilitician; I did not belong to any panty,
bl.lit inlterna1 and foreign. deve'loipments. did interest me.
AB I traveled by tra:in :frrom Kosi'Ce to Praigue, I met
the Slova'k depulties and senaJtors. I learned that Hlinka's party probaJbly woulltl ivote for Benes in the presidentia:1 elections. This su!I1prised rme a:nd, therefore, after my arrival in Brague I soug1ht the .reason for ffiinka''S turning over to the Castle and to Benes. I found
ouJt tih at tJhe V:aJt~can had recommended Benes to Hlinlka.
1
1
SLOVAKIA
11
"However, after accidentally oivezfuearing the words
of .Am'baJSador Afex:andirovsky, it was c[ear to me ,t hat
· Benes was Sta'1in's candidaite ! I was aware that the
V a,tJican knowin,gJy ,coll!ld nOlt recommend a candidate
of the Bolshewks. '.Dhe exp1anaitioin was simple: tlhe V:atican wias a vtl.dtim of an unheard af hoax!"
It is very mudh ;possi!ble tha;t even now some of the
Benes "Ozechosloviaik!s" rure lbrying rto dece'i!ve tJhe Vatican.
'llhe .puiblfuhers of i'bhe "Tribuna" (The Tribune), the official
organ of itlhe •~Ozeclloslovalk Foreign Institute in Exile" pub:J.ished in .Paris, do nolt say so directly, but their articles
tend in thaJt di-rect_ion. The socialists writing for the '":Dribuna" keep on bringmg Ulp T. G. Masaryk and hils statement
that tihe proiblem of the sigmficance of Czech hristory is a
religfoUJS qu~on. Of course, they oonvenientliy forget to
mention that T. G. MasaJr!Ylk ,had ,1!he Ozeoh Reifonmaation ,in
mind ·a nd tJhat ait ,t he time he :had sai'd those words, he was
the Jeader of tJhe mti-Caitholic firght in Czedho-!SlovaJlda.
Ag:ain it is evident ltJhaJt the Benes sociaAi'sts thriive on
frauds, deceiits and initmig!ll'e. Referring to the itrend lin the
"Tri!bU111a," General P'lrohala says:
"By means of this ,t rick, however, the 'Dribuna is
endeavoring to realize a muich greater firaJUd. It is try.
ing to evdke in the high Roman Caitlholic Hierarclhy
a faJVOraJble impression for itself and iits cmn political
ends. 'Jlhis time, however, uninformed .readers and tlh.e
'Czechoslovak' exi:les in genera;! are ·swppo.sed to bre inspked to ~buikl a 1brid!ge' to Rome. It wi!H not sw-prise
me ,i f this is being done by atlteimpting a f1raudlulent explanaJtion Olf Masary1k's thesis, becM1se every one knows
that the peopl'e in t:Jh.e 'Councii of Free ~echo-SIJ.01Vakiiia.'
are not interested m princi~es, hut only in tactics, aJltoget'her an:ording to the reci,pe of old MachiavelJi anrl
his modern a<lmilrer'S."
We rure inclined to lbelieve General .Brohala. Enough
damage and suffering has been inflidted by the lfoHowers of
Benes and his ruinous poHcy of "CzechOislovaklism" and pro.
SO'V'ietism on the Czech and Slovak nations, nay, on the
12
SLOVAKIA
whcle of tJhe EU1ropean conrtinent. '.Dhe former Ozecll National !Socialists - all memlbers of the Communist-dominated
"Naltional F1ront" ,go;vernmenlt of Benes and Gottwald s'hou[(i not 1b e tir:u1sted, 1b ut releg.aJted ,to the po[iibi.cal rubbish
herup. Today theli,r ,l eaders (Zenkll, Rilpka) a.re disc:redi1ted
and disowned ,b y the Ozecihs at home and aJbroad and represenlt no one hut themselves and their mercenrury clique. The
saime may be said for lthe "Wlindow-dressin,g " Slovak renegades in tile ,servJce am:l 1pay of t;he Benes CzecihlS. (Leittricli,
Sla:vilk, OsUJSky, Kocivara), ,w ho spealk for and represent oniy
themseilves and not tlhe Slovaik nation. Under the leadership
of Dr EdwaTd Benes they lb uilt the "lb;rM1ge" between the
Ewst and the West, over wlhiich oame ,S talin's h-011des into
Central Europe. They must not be given the chance to build
S'lllc:h "bridges" to Rome, or ,b etween the USA and Moscow.
•
•
•
"The story of the gradual adoption by ·the
Allies of the (Czechoslovak) theses of Mas aryk and his group cannot
and need not be retold h ere. By patient and lndefatiga.ble propaganda
they Implanted their major postulates - the existence of a 'CzechoSlovak nation ' and the desire of the Slovak branch of it to form a
part of a Czechoslovak State - so firmly in the minds of the Allies
that they were never seriously questioned at the Peace Conference.
The 'Czecho-Slovak' Govern ment h ad b een recognized by all the
Principal Allied a nd Ass o ciated Powers even BEFORE the peace
negotiations began - an act which implied that the Slovak question
was in principle already settled - while when the moment arrived
for settling all questions of de tail, including the drafting of a frontier,
it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly established as a :negotiating party; Indeed, in something like a privileged position." ~A . Mac a rtney: HUNGA'RY AND HER SUCCESSORS, London, 1937,
page 98) .
WHO SAID IT? -
•
WHO SAi D IT? -
•
•
" If a single dynasty h ad united both peoples
(Czechs and Slovaks) in a permanent, or at least an enduring union,
a Czechoslovak nationality would assuredly have been formed and
with ft ···a Czechoslovak lang uage any minor dialectal differences
which existed would have been smoothed out. This did not happen;
and w hil e t he Slavs of Bohemia developed the Czech nationality and
language, to which the intermediate dialects of Moravia graiitated,
the Slovaks, under l,lungarian rule, not only developed along different lines from the ·czechs, but were not even able to form a single
literary language with them." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND
HER SUCCESSORS.::..:_ London, 1937).
Dublin Core
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Title
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Building Another Bridge?
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 9-12
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
-
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fff1cd896634d603fd9f016a79e43d98
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
13
INTERVIEW
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and_ the Slovak Aviators
(Broadcast by the B.B.C. May 8 at 7 p. m. EST and May 9 at 2:45
p. m. EST. Released on May 8, 1953, 7 p. m. EST.)
Tlh e thrree Slovak avfatars, Lieutenant Kmrnan, Sergeant
FleiS'Clhhacker and Sergeant Momar, who .fiew, Mrurch 13,
1953, from Piest'.amy into the Brr,i'tish 2i0Ile 'in Austria, are
now in London. Sill' Robert Bruce Locldlardlt had an interview ,wJtJh them there whiicll was brooo'casit by the B.B.C.
into Czecho-Slovrukfo.. Sir Robert Bruce Loci{hardt, former
di'Plomat in Pirague, spoke in Czech while the three aviaJtors
answered in Sfovak.
Sir Robert: Tell me, plea;se, the reason foir yoUJr courageouis escaipe :Erorn Ozeicfuo~Slovakia? Have you fled beca UJSe ()(f rpoJi'tiK!a,l or ooonomiic motives, or ibecause of both?
Krman: We .fled Czech·o~Slovrukiia because of pdli'tical
and economic reasons. Our 1poli.tical convictions have never
been along Communist lines and our sympathies went to the
Western AJI:li~s. To .remain in Communist Czecho,Slovalkda
when we had the ;pos!silbility of flying abroad wou!ld have
been equal to giviing Ulp living. Any acti:viity against the
Communist regime at lbhe pr~enrt time ~ing irmpossllble,
theire is now ibult one opportuni,'ty to work for our people
and !this oppontunilty lies outside of the lron Curtain. For
these reasons we had no pers_peotirve in"' Ozec'llo,SlovaJkia.
01.l1I' officers reproached U'S many times on. accoun/t of our
political ind;tfference. FuPthermore, conditions in a:11 branches
of life were tenrilble, impossible to imrugine for people in the
Western World.
Sir Robert: What diflference did you olbserwe after your
escape between the life in Ozecllo-Slovakia and tJhaJt ilil Wes.tern IDurope? War imltance, what do people on the stre~s looik
Hke or what !kind of .artilcles are being sold in ,t he stores?
Fleischhacker: After my escaipe I wa·s sU1I1prised to see
how many rtJhings people were a!ble to buy for a small
amount of money . For example, I had to spend my two
month's salary to get a decent suit, while here a worker can
�14
SLOVAKIA
bu~ a silt with one week of worik. Freedom of speec'h impressed me deeply and I was immensely sur,pziised to see in
a London ,prur'k a crowd which any one, wlho desilred to do
so, icowld address on a sulbject of hiis f.ree choice. I was most
impressed by ,t he faces of the persons -:- wilbh whom I am
not yet aJble to speak -- which reflected satisfaction and
poise. ENery one is rwel.1.iJ. dressed and every(bodiy belhaves
nicely with one andt:Jher. Motorists rure very courteous to pedestrians, and waiitJin,g lfoc the buses - in so orderly a manner rwi'bhou't even one pushing - seems to me ailmost unbelievaible.
Sir Robert: Blow st-rong is rt'he anti-communist feeling
in Czecho-Slovakia:? Couid you tell me, Wlhat is, in _your ~
timation, the per,centage of the po,p ulation whiic'h adheres
to Communi,s m?
Molnar: W!hait ,t he conditions are in this respect in
Czechia, I do not ,knorw. As for Slo'Vakia, .the anti-Comunist attitude of tlhe ipopu4ation e~ends all over the counltry.
Resistance a;ga'ioot the regime is 'Very strong. Every person
who follows with open eyes the activities of the :regume is, as
a matter of prin!Ciiple, a,gaiilllst it. Expressed in .p ercentage,
the ,situa;tion [odk•s ld!ke this: eighty per cent of tlle Slovaks
are not memb~rs of tlle Communist Party, neiJther a;re they
adherents of Communism. The o.v erwhelmmg majority of
them are against Communism wilbh tlhei:r wiho1e hearts and
souJs. Twenty per cenlt are Communists, but even ha1:f of
tllese are only because they w,ant ,t o keep theilr jobs or get
better ones.
Sir Robert: Do you mean t:haJt the Communist regime
is more hated now ltJhan it was in 1948?
Krman: I know that in Slovaikia resistance to Communism is of an older date. Alf1ter the First World War, OU!l' fatillers tasted of Communism during the strug.gle against the
Bo:lshevism of Bella lfohn in Hungary. So, the dldest generation have inifornned us very we1'1 '3J'bout this danger. During
the Hife of the Slovak State, W1hen Slovak soldiers fOU!ght
against Coonmun:ism on Soviet temitory, they had tlle oppoa:-tunilty to e,operience fiirst 'hand what Oommtmism is. T,here-
�SLOVAKIA
15
fore, I am coiwinced .fuaJt in S'loIValkia there was from tihe beginning of fue Comlmltmist dominamion greater and moire
decisive oppO'siltion aigainst the regime than in Ozechiia. T,he
Red A'I1my, aJt tlhe ti!me of ' 11:iJberaticm" of our cotm'try, only
conf:iimned whait our soldiera saw in Sovti.et Russia.
Sir Robert: Wlhat is the alttitude of the non-Communist
population towa,rd foz,mer ipolitical parties and refugees?
Molnar: The non-Communist population of SlovaJkia
condemns these parties and bhcir leading personaJltities who
fled to the Western coU!Illtries. 'Dhe reason for bb/is attitude
is that in 'Spite of the fact that t!hey have had a greater
percentage of people on theiir side, they weire unable to check
the expansion of the CommU!Ilist reg1ime and ,t o prevent its
taking over of the ,w'hole Government.
Sir Robert: Iis the anti-CommUillisit attiltulde stronger
among fuose who are ll!Ildeir 30 years of age or among the
older ones·?
Fleischlt3(cker: The anltli..Communist feeling is stronger
among ·people more than 30 yeairs old, because, s1ionce tlhe end
of fue Second Wo,r,ld War, the youth is educ-aJted in the Communist spirilt in tlhe sohools, in the factories, in the military
servke. There are many yOU!Il.g men of 25 wiho fall for Communist promises. The majo:rd.ty of men of 30, however, still
remembers well the times of lilberty, the times when food
and cl·o thes were not rationed and wlhen there was a great
possilbility for everylbod,y to get a job.
Sir Robert: Do the Czechs and S1oivaks stiH remember
the great men like T. G. Masairyk, Milan Steifanrnk, Edward
Benes, Jan Masa.iryik, and Alrchlbishop Beram.? Are these personalities known ,b y the young generaJtion?
Krman: '11he young ,p eople know very little o!f ,tihese men,
because the Commll!Ilist regime - wifuout any consideraition
for theli,r merilts - is ipresenlting them in a very bad 1ight.
Neverth~less, Milan Ra'stislav Stefanik enjo,yetl the fame of
a national saint in Slovakia. Lately, however, tJhe Communists in our country try to destroy everything which draws
the attention of our people to his memory.
�16
SLOVAKIA
In Bohemia and Moraivia the names Olf T. G. Masaryk,
Edward Benes and Archbishop Beran axe still. quite popuiar, but not m S1ovaJkia, where the names of Hlinka, Tiso,
Stefanik preva,i'l.
Sir Robert: How do the anti-Communist Czecho~Slovalks im~,gii,ne lbhe ,1ilberation of Ozecho-Siovrukia. and the future of their Staite in a li!beraited Elllrope?
Molnar: The majorilty of the anti-Communist Slovaks
i:. for a Central-European federaJtion of peoples, in which
every nation wi.N decide its. own af,fa:II'ls and wihere every
memlber whlll have equal,i ty o,f r~ghrts wtiith oither pairtners.
But :t!he main task i'S to be seen in the common decision o!f
all these peoip[e,s - Czeclhs, S1ovaJks, Magyars and alt.hens to destroy the Communist tyranny. - ('Slovruk League PTess
BU!reau by pemnission of the BBC, London, and ,t he interviewed).
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"I fully understand the reasons which led France and Great Britain to demand that we should not fight in September 1938 • . . . In
that year, I think the only countries in Europe prepared for the war
were GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
I had no doubts whatever about Czechoslovak preparedness. Our
resources were great and they were fully mobilized. From 1933, when
Hitler took the whole power in Germany into his hands, I WAS SU RE
that Europe was moving rapidly towards a great and terrible crisis . . . . In 1938 in September we had ONE MILLION AND A HALF
splendidly equipped soldiers. They were at the disposal of the struggle
for democracy and freedom together with all our powerful industries.
The events in 1938 prevented it.' Nazi Germany disbanded and destroyed this splendid army. Only a very small part of it succeeded In
reaching the Allied countries."
Dr. Benes, Speech, New York,
May 26, 1943).
•
•
•
"Czecho-Slovakia and Germany were the only two countries in
Europe, which, in the September 1938 crisis, were TOTALLY PREPARED FOR WAR. As for us, our resources were mobilized to the
highest degree. And these resources were very great! • . • Had not
PRAGUE adopted during the September crisis a passive attitude, Hitler would have unleashed the war then • • • . WE, therefore, under
irresistible pressure submitted to the decision which had been made.
I RESIGNED THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, made preparations in
the country for a struggle against Naziism in the event of war, and
went into exile. The whole nation very soon understood." - Dr. Edward
Benes, Central European Observer, 1-17-41) .
�
SLOVAKIA
13
INTERVIEW
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and_ the Slovak Aviators
(Broadcast by the B.B.C. May 8 at 7 p. m. EST and May 9 at 2:45
p. m. EST. Released on May 8, 1953, 7 p. m. EST.)
Tlh e thrree Slovak avfatars, Lieutenant Kmrnan, Sergeant
FleiS'Clhhacker and Sergeant Momar, who .fiew, Mrurch 13,
1953, from Piest'.amy into the Brr,i'tish 2i0Ile 'in Austria, are
now in London. Sill' Robert Bruce Locldlardlt had an interview ,wJtJh them there whiicll was brooo'casit by the B.B.C.
into Czecho-Slovrukfo.. Sir Robert Bruce Loci{hardt, former
di'Plomat in Pirague, spoke in Czech while the three aviaJtors
answered in Sfovak.
Sir Robert: Tell me, plea;se, the reason foir yoUJr courageouis escaipe :Erorn Ozeicfuo~Slovakia? Have you fled beca UJSe ()(f rpoJi'tiK!a,l or ooonomiic motives, or ibecause of both?
Krman: We .fled Czech·o~Slovrukiia because of pdli'tical
and economic reasons. Our 1poli.tical convictions have never
been along Communist lines and our sympathies went to the
Western AJI:li~s. To .remain in Communist Czecho,Slovalkda
when we had the ;pos!silbility of flying abroad wou!ld have
been equal to giviing Ulp living. Any acti:viity against the
Communist regime at lbhe pr~enrt time ~ing irmpossllble,
theire is now ibult one opportuni,'ty to work for our people
and !this oppontunilty lies outside of the lron Curtain. For
these reasons we had no pers_peotirve in"' Ozec'llo,SlovaJkia.
01.l1I' officers reproached U'S many times on. accoun/t of our
political ind;tfference. FuPthermore, conditions in a:11 branches
of life were tenrilble, impossible to imrugine for people in the
Western World.
Sir Robert: What diflference did you olbserwe after your
escape between the life in Ozecllo-Slovakia and tJhaJt ilil Wes.tern IDurope? War imltance, what do people on the stre~s looik
Hke or what !kind of .artilcles are being sold in ,t he stores?
Fleischhacker: After my escaipe I wa·s sU1I1prised to see
how many rtJhings people were a!ble to buy for a small
amount of money . For example, I had to spend my two
month's salary to get a decent suit, while here a worker can
�14
SLOVAKIA
bu~ a silt with one week of worik. Freedom of speec'h impressed me deeply and I was immensely sur,pziised to see in
a London ,prur'k a crowd which any one, wlho desilred to do
so, icowld address on a sulbject of hiis f.ree choice. I was most
impressed by ,t he faces of the persons -:- wilbh whom I am
not yet aJble to speak -- which reflected satisfaction and
poise. ENery one is rwel.1.iJ. dressed and every(bodiy belhaves
nicely with one andt:Jher. Motorists rure very courteous to pedestrians, and waiitJin,g lfoc the buses - in so orderly a manner rwi'bhou't even one pushing - seems to me ailmost unbelievaible.
Sir Robert: Blow st-rong is rt'he anti-communist feeling
in Czecho-Slovakia:? Couid you tell me, Wlhat is, in _your ~
timation, the per,centage of the po,p ulation whiic'h adheres
to Communi,s m?
Molnar: W!hait ,t he conditions are in this respect in
Czechia, I do not ,knorw. As for Slo'Vakia, .the anti-Comunist attitude of tlhe ipopu4ation e~ends all over the counltry.
Resistance a;ga'ioot the regime is 'Very strong. Every person
who follows with open eyes the activities of the :regume is, as
a matter of prin!Ciiple, a,gaiilllst it. Expressed in .p ercentage,
the ,situa;tion [odk•s ld!ke this: eighty per cent of tlle Slovaks
are not memb~rs of tlle Communist Party, neiJther a;re they
adherents of Communism. The o.v erwhelmmg majority of
them are against Communism wilbh tlhei:r wiho1e hearts and
souJs. Twenty per cenlt are Communists, but even ha1:f of
tllese are only because they w,ant ,t o keep theilr jobs or get
better ones.
Sir Robert: Do you mean t:haJt the Communist regime
is more hated now ltJhan it was in 1948?
Krman: I know that in Slovaikia resistance to Communism is of an older date. Alf1ter the First World War, OU!l' fatillers tasted of Communism during the strug.gle against the
Bo:lshevism of Bella lfohn in Hungary. So, the dldest generation have inifornned us very we1'1 '3J'bout this danger. During
the Hife of the Slovak State, W1hen Slovak soldiers fOU!ght
against Coonmun:ism on Soviet temitory, they had tlle oppoa:-tunilty to e,operience fiirst 'hand what Oommtmism is. T,here-
�SLOVAKIA
15
fore, I am coiwinced .fuaJt in S'loIValkia there was from tihe beginning of fue Comlmltmist dominamion greater and moire
decisive oppO'siltion aigainst the regime than in Ozechiia. T,he
Red A'I1my, aJt tlhe ti!me of ' 11:iJberaticm" of our cotm'try, only
conf:iimned whait our soldiera saw in Sovti.et Russia.
Sir Robert: Wlhat is the alttitude of the non-Communist
population towa,rd foz,mer ipolitical parties and refugees?
Molnar: The non-Communist population of SlovaJkia
condemns these parties and bhcir leading personaJltities who
fled to the Western coU!Illtries. 'Dhe reason for bb/is attitude
is that in 'Spite of the fact that t!hey have had a greater
percentage of people on theiir side, they weire unable to check
the expansion of the CommU!Ilist reg1ime and ,t o prevent its
taking over of the ,w'hole Government.
Sir Robert: Iis the anti-CommUillisit attiltulde stronger
among fuose who are ll!Ildeir 30 years of age or among the
older ones·?
Fleischlt3(cker: The anltli..Communist feeling is stronger
among ·people more than 30 yeairs old, because, s1ionce tlhe end
of fue Second Wo,r,ld War, the youth is educ-aJted in the Communist spirilt in tlhe sohools, in the factories, in the military
servke. There are many yOU!Il.g men of 25 wiho fall for Communist promises. The majo:rd.ty of men of 30, however, still
remembers well the times of lilberty, the times when food
and cl·o thes were not rationed and wlhen there was a great
possilbility for everylbod,y to get a job.
Sir Robert: Do the Czechs and S1oivaks stiH remember
the great men like T. G. Masairyk, Milan Steifanrnk, Edward
Benes, Jan Masa.iryik, and Alrchlbishop Beram.? Are these personalities known ,b y the young generaJtion?
Krman: '11he young ,p eople know very little o!f ,tihese men,
because the Commll!Ilist regime - wifuout any consideraition
for theli,r merilts - is ipresenlting them in a very bad 1ight.
Neverth~less, Milan Ra'stislav Stefanik enjo,yetl the fame of
a national saint in Slovakia. Lately, however, tJhe Communists in our country try to destroy everything which draws
the attention of our people to his memory.
�16
SLOVAKIA
In Bohemia and Moraivia the names Olf T. G. Masaryk,
Edward Benes and Archbishop Beran axe still. quite popuiar, but not m S1ovaJkia, where the names of Hlinka, Tiso,
Stefanik preva,i'l.
Sir Robert: How do the anti-Communist Czecho~Slovalks im~,gii,ne lbhe ,1ilberation of Ozecho-Siovrukia. and the future of their Staite in a li!beraited Elllrope?
Molnar: The majorilty of the anti-Communist Slovaks
i:. for a Central-European federaJtion of peoples, in which
every nation wi.N decide its. own af,fa:II'ls and wihere every
memlber whlll have equal,i ty o,f r~ghrts wtiith oither pairtners.
But :t!he main task i'S to be seen in the common decision o!f
all these peoip[e,s - Czeclhs, S1ovaJks, Magyars and alt.hens to destroy the Communist tyranny. - ('Slovruk League PTess
BU!reau by pemnission of the BBC, London, and ,t he interviewed).
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"I fully understand the reasons which led France and Great Britain to demand that we should not fight in September 1938 • . . . In
that year, I think the only countries in Europe prepared for the war
were GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
I had no doubts whatever about Czechoslovak preparedness. Our
resources were great and they were fully mobilized. From 1933, when
Hitler took the whole power in Germany into his hands, I WAS SU RE
that Europe was moving rapidly towards a great and terrible crisis . . . . In 1938 in September we had ONE MILLION AND A HALF
splendidly equipped soldiers. They were at the disposal of the struggle
for democracy and freedom together with all our powerful industries.
The events in 1938 prevented it.' Nazi Germany disbanded and destroyed this splendid army. Only a very small part of it succeeded In
reaching the Allied countries."
Dr. Benes, Speech, New York,
May 26, 1943).
•
•
•
"Czecho-Slovakia and Germany were the only two countries in
Europe, which, in the September 1938 crisis, were TOTALLY PREPARED FOR WAR. As for us, our resources were mobilized to the
highest degree. And these resources were very great! • . • Had not
PRAGUE adopted during the September crisis a passive attitude, Hitler would have unleashed the war then • • • . WE, therefore, under
irresistible pressure submitted to the decision which had been made.
I RESIGNED THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, made preparations in
the country for a struggle against Naziism in the event of war, and
went into exile. The whole nation very soon understood." - Dr. Edward
Benes, Central European Observer, 1-17-41) .
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
13
INTERVIEW
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and_ the Slovak Aviators
(Broadcast by the B.B.C. May 8 at 7 p. m. EST and May 9 at 2:45
p. m. EST. Released on May 8, 1953, 7 p. m. EST.)
Tlh e thrree Slovak avfatars, Lieutenant Kmrnan, Sergeant
FleiS'Clhhacker and Sergeant Momar, who .fiew, Mrurch 13,
1953, from Piest'.amy into the Brr,i'tish 2i0Ile 'in Austria, are
now in London. Sill' Robert Bruce Locldlardlt had an interview ,wJtJh them there whiicll was brooo'casit by the B.B.C.
into Czecho-Slovrukfo.. Sir Robert Bruce Loci{hardt, former
di'Plomat in Pirague, spoke in Czech while the three aviaJtors
answered in Sfovak.
Sir Robert: Tell me, plea;se, the reason foir yoUJr courageouis escaipe :Erorn Ozeicfuo~Slovakia? Have you fled beca UJSe ()(f rpoJi'tiK!a,l or ooonomiic motives, or ibecause of both?
Krman: We .fled Czech·o~Slovrukiia because of pdli'tical
and economic reasons. Our 1poli.tical convictions have never
been along Communist lines and our sympathies went to the
Western AJI:li~s. To .remain in Communist Czecho,Slovalkda
when we had the ;pos!silbility of flying abroad wou!ld have
been equal to giviing Ulp living. Any acti:viity against the
Communist regime at lbhe pr~enrt time ~ing irmpossllble,
theire is now ibult one opportuni,'ty to work for our people
and !this oppontunilty lies outside of the lron Curtain. For
these reasons we had no pers_peotirve in"' Ozec'llo,SlovaJkia.
01.l1I' officers reproached U'S many times on. accoun/t of our
political ind;tfference. FuPthermore, conditions in a:11 branches
of life were tenrilble, impossible to imrugine for people in the
Western World.
Sir Robert: What diflference did you olbserwe after your
escape between the life in Ozecllo-Slovakia and tJhaJt ilil Wes.tern IDurope? War imltance, what do people on the stre~s looik
Hke or what !kind of .artilcles are being sold in ,t he stores?
Fleischhacker: After my escaipe I wa·s sU1I1prised to see
how many rtJhings people were a!ble to buy for a small
amount of money . For example, I had to spend my two
month's salary to get a decent suit, while here a worker can
14
SLOVAKIA
bu~ a silt with one week of worik. Freedom of speec'h impressed me deeply and I was immensely sur,pziised to see in
a London ,prur'k a crowd which any one, wlho desilred to do
so, icowld address on a sulbject of hiis f.ree choice. I was most
impressed by ,t he faces of the persons -:- wilbh whom I am
not yet aJble to speak -- which reflected satisfaction and
poise. ENery one is rwel.1.iJ. dressed and every(bodiy belhaves
nicely with one andt:Jher. Motorists rure very courteous to pedestrians, and waiitJin,g lfoc the buses - in so orderly a manner rwi'bhou't even one pushing - seems to me ailmost unbelievaible.
Sir Robert: Blow st-rong is rt'he anti-communist feeling
in Czecho-Slovakia:? Couid you tell me, Wlhat is, in _your ~
timation, the per,centage of the po,p ulation whiic'h adheres
to Communi,s m?
Molnar: W!hait ,t he conditions are in this respect in
Czechia, I do not ,knorw. As for Slo'Vakia, .the anti-Comunist attitude of tlhe ipopu4ation e~ends all over the counltry.
Resistance a;ga'ioot the regime is 'Very strong. Every person
who follows with open eyes the activities of the :regume is, as
a matter of prin!Ciiple, a,gaiilllst it. Expressed in .p ercentage,
the ,situa;tion [odk•s ld!ke this: eighty per cent of tlle Slovaks
are not memb~rs of tlle Communist Party, neiJther a;re they
adherents of Communism. The o.v erwhelmmg majority of
them are against Communism wilbh tlhei:r wiho1e hearts and
souJs. Twenty per cenlt are Communists, but even ha1:f of
tllese are only because they w,ant ,t o keep theilr jobs or get
better ones.
Sir Robert: Do you mean t:haJt the Communist regime
is more hated now ltJhan it was in 1948?
Krman: I know that in Slovaikia resistance to Communism is of an older date. Alf1ter the First World War, OU!l' fatillers tasted of Communism during the strug.gle against the
Bo:lshevism of Bella lfohn in Hungary. So, the dldest generation have inifornned us very we1'1 '3J'bout this danger. During
the Hife of the Slovak State, W1hen Slovak soldiers fOU!ght
against Coonmun:ism on Soviet temitory, they had tlle oppoa:-tunilty to e,operience fiirst 'hand what Oommtmism is. T,here-
SLOVAKIA
15
fore, I am coiwinced .fuaJt in S'loIValkia there was from tihe beginning of fue Comlmltmist dominamion greater and moire
decisive oppO'siltion aigainst the regime than in Ozechiia. T,he
Red A'I1my, aJt tlhe ti!me of ' 11:iJberaticm" of our cotm'try, only
conf:iimned whait our soldiera saw in Sovti.et Russia.
Sir Robert: Wlhat is the alttitude of the non-Communist
population towa,rd foz,mer ipolitical parties and refugees?
Molnar: The non-Communist population of SlovaJkia
condemns these parties and bhcir leading personaJltities who
fled to the Western coU!Illtries. 'Dhe reason for bb/is attitude
is that in 'Spite of the fact that t!hey have had a greater
percentage of people on theiir side, they weire unable to check
the expansion of the CommU!Ilist reg1ime and ,t o prevent its
taking over of the ,w'hole Government.
Sir Robert: Iis the anti-CommUillisit attiltulde stronger
among fuose who are ll!Ildeir 30 years of age or among the
older ones·?
Fleischlt3(cker: The anltli..Communist feeling is stronger
among ·people more than 30 yeairs old, because, s1ionce tlhe end
of fue Second Wo,r,ld War, the youth is educ-aJted in the Communist spirilt in tlhe sohools, in the factories, in the military
servke. There are many yOU!Il.g men of 25 wiho fall for Communist promises. The majo:rd.ty of men of 30, however, still
remembers well the times of lilberty, the times when food
and cl·o thes were not rationed and wlhen there was a great
possilbility for everylbod,y to get a job.
Sir Robert: Do the Czechs and S1oivaks stiH remember
the great men like T. G. Masairyk, Milan Steifanrnk, Edward
Benes, Jan Masa.iryik, and Alrchlbishop Beram.? Are these personalities known ,b y the young generaJtion?
Krman: '11he young ,p eople know very little o!f ,tihese men,
because the Commll!Ilist regime - wifuout any consideraition
for theli,r merilts - is ipresenlting them in a very bad 1ight.
Neverth~less, Milan Ra'stislav Stefanik enjo,yetl the fame of
a national saint in Slovakia. Lately, however, tJhe Communists in our country try to destroy everything which draws
the attention of our people to his memory.
16
SLOVAKIA
In Bohemia and Moraivia the names Olf T. G. Masaryk,
Edward Benes and Archbishop Beran axe still. quite popuiar, but not m S1ovaJkia, where the names of Hlinka, Tiso,
Stefanik preva,i'l.
Sir Robert: How do the anti-Communist Czecho~Slovalks im~,gii,ne lbhe ,1ilberation of Ozecho-Siovrukia. and the future of their Staite in a li!beraited Elllrope?
Molnar: The majorilty of the anti-Communist Slovaks
i:. for a Central-European federaJtion of peoples, in which
every nation wi.N decide its. own af,fa:II'ls and wihere every
memlber whlll have equal,i ty o,f r~ghrts wtiith oither pairtners.
But :t!he main task i'S to be seen in the common decision o!f
all these peoip[e,s - Czeclhs, S1ovaJks, Magyars and alt.hens to destroy the Communist tyranny. - ('Slovruk League PTess
BU!reau by pemnission of the BBC, London, and ,t he interviewed).
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"I fully understand the reasons which led France and Great Britain to demand that we should not fight in September 1938 • . . . In
that year, I think the only countries in Europe prepared for the war
were GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
I had no doubts whatever about Czechoslovak preparedness. Our
resources were great and they were fully mobilized. From 1933, when
Hitler took the whole power in Germany into his hands, I WAS SU RE
that Europe was moving rapidly towards a great and terrible crisis . . . . In 1938 in September we had ONE MILLION AND A HALF
splendidly equipped soldiers. They were at the disposal of the struggle
for democracy and freedom together with all our powerful industries.
The events in 1938 prevented it.' Nazi Germany disbanded and destroyed this splendid army. Only a very small part of it succeeded In
reaching the Allied countries."
Dr. Benes, Speech, New York,
May 26, 1943).
•
•
•
"Czecho-Slovakia and Germany were the only two countries in
Europe, which, in the September 1938 crisis, were TOTALLY PREPARED FOR WAR. As for us, our resources were mobilized to the
highest degree. And these resources were very great! • . • Had not
PRAGUE adopted during the September crisis a passive attitude, Hitler would have unleashed the war then • • • . WE, therefore, under
irresistible pressure submitted to the decision which had been made.
I RESIGNED THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, made preparations in
the country for a struggle against Naziism in the event of war, and
went into exile. The whole nation very soon understood." - Dr. Edward
Benes, Central European Observer, 1-17-41) .
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Sir Robert Bruce Lockhardt and the Slovak Aviators
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 13-16
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
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SLOVAKIA
17
OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY
By Kurt Gl.a ser
" Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could
be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an
ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia,
Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944.
"He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying.
In this vital area, American policy has been built around
a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the
Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from
1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to
American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never
told us.
When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who
gained support for the idea at home only after they had
sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six
and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and
three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a
crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but
with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other
centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had
been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had
more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and
some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the
U.S.S.R. in 1945.
The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by
the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them
absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with
Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919.
Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal
rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in
Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in
business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu-
�18
SLOVAKIA
cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in
a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly
anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by
them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives)
were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy.
The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party
was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within
Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a
majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate
with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become
dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in
1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led
Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas
to Germany.
Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis
forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the
Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso,
occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new
Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler
as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which
the Slovaks neither requested or suggested.
It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible
the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not
make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland
nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the
Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet
Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso
and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the
Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized
by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of
terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941,
but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks
�SLOVAKIA
19
repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over
their country.
Although President Benes, who had resigned after the
Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor
Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He
and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation
Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in
1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak
Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact
that the Czech population at home was not particularly
anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the
Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they
were actually distributed (which was not always the case
in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the
Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered
for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of
World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with
which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and
his followers were determined to pursue their policy of
Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not
count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance
of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to
expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be
executed with outside assistance, and the only government
which could give effective support was that of the Soviet
Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government
permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American
policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the
Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in
1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not
changed their policies in the slightest.
�20
SLOVAKIA
The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in
the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from
1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the
United States under State Department protection, was that
of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter
Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the
temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally
conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their
own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!"
Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a
professor at the New School for Social Research in New
York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book
East and West (London, 1944):
"Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible
moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with
that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even
in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and
exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere."
Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic
exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of
this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who
were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the
United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak "
service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken
over by Communists; others worked for the Communist
party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le.
Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book
I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration
�SLOVAKIA
21
involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily
Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us:
"Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in
touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us
mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles.
"Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign
Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of
his Government would willing put their names."
• The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as
the Chicago professor of rthat name.
The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by
Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the
British Broadcasting Company, in which he said:
" ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the
strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts
than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the
wide masses of the Soviet peoples ...
"Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human
ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men
from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the
French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution
strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution
try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality."
The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the
State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off
on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with
Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and
to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted
by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not
in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those
political parties which would join a United Front under
Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties
were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration
camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948.
�22
SLOVAKJA
"Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National
Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946.
"Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the
same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party.
"Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today
eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G.
Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?"
Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet
arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947.
"Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of
socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch.
Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has
not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the
oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak
("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8.
"In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come
to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist
Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even
a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is
t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka,
writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48.
Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the
wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people.
They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day
Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies
no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia
had been completed.
After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the
leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States.
�SLOVAKIA
23
The State Department received them as "democratic exiles"
and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for
helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was
employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka,
who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be
"unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war
with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by
the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants
were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak"
staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until
1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the
"Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are
to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December
1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty.
The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter
Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice
on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United
States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to
publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing
socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known
anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of
those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell
speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for
America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic
system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are
exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will
help the Americans to reshape their history!"
As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the
nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The
�24
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would
not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation
so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin,
a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration.
The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum
granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker
at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered
the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the
"Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the
formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of
Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in
advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial
murder.
After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed
by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the
Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized
'. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against
patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and
Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were
nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there
is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York
Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed,
about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed.
Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party"
headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was
created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties
with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In
the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which
�SLOVAKIA
25
non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux)
received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per
cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their
actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as
Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as
"anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia.
The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the
Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors
which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians
in the United States to re.turn to power with American
assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent
on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object
to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the
police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the
United States Government maintains its unholy alliance
with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or
consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.)
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations
of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks
inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo·
vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and
religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their
national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination
over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national
existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien
domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their
Inherent right to free development and political independence will
be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent
who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence
as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least
an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its
long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak,
M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51)
�
SLOVAKIA
17
OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY
By Kurt Gl.a ser
" Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could
be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an
ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia,
Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944.
"He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying.
In this vital area, American policy has been built around
a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the
Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from
1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to
American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never
told us.
When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who
gained support for the idea at home only after they had
sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six
and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and
three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a
crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but
with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other
centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had
been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had
more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and
some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the
U.S.S.R. in 1945.
The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by
the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them
absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with
Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919.
Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal
rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in
Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in
business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu-
�18
SLOVAKIA
cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in
a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly
anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by
them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives)
were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy.
The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party
was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within
Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a
majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate
with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become
dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in
1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led
Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas
to Germany.
Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis
forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the
Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso,
occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new
Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler
as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which
the Slovaks neither requested or suggested.
It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible
the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not
make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland
nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the
Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet
Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso
and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the
Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized
by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of
terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941,
but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks
�SLOVAKIA
19
repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over
their country.
Although President Benes, who had resigned after the
Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor
Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He
and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation
Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in
1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak
Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact
that the Czech population at home was not particularly
anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the
Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they
were actually distributed (which was not always the case
in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the
Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered
for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of
World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with
which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and
his followers were determined to pursue their policy of
Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not
count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance
of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to
expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be
executed with outside assistance, and the only government
which could give effective support was that of the Soviet
Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government
permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American
policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the
Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in
1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not
changed their policies in the slightest.
�20
SLOVAKIA
The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in
the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from
1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the
United States under State Department protection, was that
of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter
Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the
temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally
conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their
own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!"
Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a
professor at the New School for Social Research in New
York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book
East and West (London, 1944):
"Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible
moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with
that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even
in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and
exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere."
Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic
exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of
this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who
were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the
United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak "
service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken
over by Communists; others worked for the Communist
party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le.
Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book
I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration
�SLOVAKIA
21
involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily
Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us:
"Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in
touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us
mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles.
"Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign
Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of
his Government would willing put their names."
• The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as
the Chicago professor of rthat name.
The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by
Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the
British Broadcasting Company, in which he said:
" ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the
strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts
than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the
wide masses of the Soviet peoples ...
"Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human
ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men
from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the
French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution
strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution
try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality."
The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the
State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off
on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with
Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and
to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted
by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not
in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those
political parties which would join a United Front under
Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties
were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration
camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948.
�22
SLOVAKJA
"Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National
Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946.
"Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the
same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party.
"Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today
eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G.
Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?"
Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet
arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947.
"Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of
socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch.
Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has
not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the
oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak
("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8.
"In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come
to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist
Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even
a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is
t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka,
writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48.
Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the
wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people.
They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day
Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies
no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia
had been completed.
After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the
leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States.
�SLOVAKIA
23
The State Department received them as "democratic exiles"
and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for
helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was
employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka,
who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be
"unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war
with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by
the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants
were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak"
staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until
1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the
"Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are
to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December
1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty.
The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter
Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice
on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United
States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to
publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing
socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known
anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of
those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell
speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for
America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic
system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are
exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will
help the Americans to reshape their history!"
As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the
nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The
�24
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would
not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation
so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin,
a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration.
The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum
granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker
at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered
the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the
"Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the
formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of
Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in
advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial
murder.
After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed
by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the
Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized
'. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against
patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and
Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were
nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there
is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York
Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed,
about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed.
Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party"
headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was
created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties
with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In
the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which
�SLOVAKIA
25
non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux)
received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per
cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their
actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as
Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as
"anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia.
The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the
Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors
which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians
in the United States to re.turn to power with American
assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent
on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object
to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the
police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the
United States Government maintains its unholy alliance
with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or
consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.)
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations
of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks
inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo·
vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and
religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their
national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination
over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national
existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien
domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their
Inherent right to free development and political independence will
be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent
who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence
as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least
an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its
long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak,
M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51)
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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SLOVAKIA
17
OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY
By Kurt Gl.a ser
" Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could
be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an
ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia,
Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944.
"He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying.
In this vital area, American policy has been built around
a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the
Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from
1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to
American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never
told us.
When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who
gained support for the idea at home only after they had
sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six
and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and
three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a
crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but
with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other
centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had
been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had
more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and
some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the
U.S.S.R. in 1945.
The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by
the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them
absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with
Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919.
Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal
rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in
Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in
business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu-
18
SLOVAKIA
cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in
a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly
anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by
them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives)
were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy.
The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party
was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within
Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a
majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate
with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become
dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in
1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led
Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas
to Germany.
Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis
forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the
Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso,
occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new
Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler
as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which
the Slovaks neither requested or suggested.
It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible
the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not
make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland
nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the
Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet
Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso
and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the
Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized
by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of
terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941,
but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks
SLOVAKIA
19
repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over
their country.
Although President Benes, who had resigned after the
Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor
Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He
and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation
Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in
1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak
Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact
that the Czech population at home was not particularly
anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the
Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they
were actually distributed (which was not always the case
in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the
Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered
for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of
World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with
which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and
his followers were determined to pursue their policy of
Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not
count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance
of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to
expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be
executed with outside assistance, and the only government
which could give effective support was that of the Soviet
Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government
permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American
policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the
Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in
1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not
changed their policies in the slightest.
20
SLOVAKIA
The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in
the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from
1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the
United States under State Department protection, was that
of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter
Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the
temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally
conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their
own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!"
Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a
professor at the New School for Social Research in New
York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book
East and West (London, 1944):
"Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible
moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with
that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even
in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and
exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere."
Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic
exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of
this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who
were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the
United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak "
service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken
over by Communists; others worked for the Communist
party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le.
Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book
I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration
SLOVAKIA
21
involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily
Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us:
"Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in
touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us
mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles.
"Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign
Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of
his Government would willing put their names."
• The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as
the Chicago professor of rthat name.
The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by
Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the
British Broadcasting Company, in which he said:
" ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the
strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts
than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the
wide masses of the Soviet peoples ...
"Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human
ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men
from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the
French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution
strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution
try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality."
The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the
State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off
on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with
Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and
to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted
by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not
in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those
political parties which would join a United Front under
Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties
were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration
camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948.
22
SLOVAKJA
"Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National
Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946.
"Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the
same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party.
"Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today
eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G.
Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?"
Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet
arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947.
"Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of
socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch.
Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has
not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the
oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak
("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8.
"In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come
to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist
Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even
a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is
t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka,
writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48.
Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the
wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people.
They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day
Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies
no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia
had been completed.
After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the
leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States.
SLOVAKIA
23
The State Department received them as "democratic exiles"
and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for
helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was
employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka,
who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be
"unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war
with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by
the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants
were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak"
staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until
1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the
"Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are
to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December
1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty.
The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter
Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice
on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United
States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to
publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing
socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known
anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of
those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell
speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for
America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic
system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are
exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will
help the Americans to reshape their history!"
As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the
nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The
24
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would
not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation
so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin,
a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration.
The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum
granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker
at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered
the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the
"Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the
formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of
Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in
advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial
murder.
After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed
by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the
Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized
'. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against
patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and
Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were
nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there
is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York
Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed,
about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed.
Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party"
headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was
created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties
with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In
the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which
SLOVAKIA
25
non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux)
received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per
cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their
actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as
Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as
"anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia.
The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the
Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors
which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians
in the United States to re.turn to power with American
assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent
on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object
to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the
police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the
United States Government maintains its unholy alliance
with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or
consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.)
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations
of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks
inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo·
vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and
religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their
national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination
over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national
existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien
domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their
Inherent right to free development and political independence will
be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent
who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence
as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least
an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its
long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak,
M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51)
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Title
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Our Blundering Czecho-Slovakia Policy
Description
An account of the resource
Kurt Glaser
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 17-25
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Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993
Date
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July 1953
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Text
26
SLOVAKIA
THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION
Joseph Pauco, Ph.D.
I
Eastern Europe provides a political observer with a
motley mosaic of opinions. Living here are many nations
and ra.c es which even a Central European does not properly
recognize and many times does not know whether to classify them with European nations or with the Asiatics. Whoever searches more profoundly into their history and studies their political struggles at least cursorily will notice
that in many regards their history and their programs are
very similar to those of every p.ation in Central or Western
Europe. You will find smaller and larger groups; small nations bound to the destiny of great ones, and their mutual
relationship is manifested nearly always by the same complaints as those of other nations-suppressi on, imperialism,
wars, revolutions, heroic deeds of national leaders, etc.
In general, it is said that the East-European nations
a.re politically less developed. Enemies of their freedom say
that they are the more primitive nations and, therefore,
certain slogans and principles of program are more highly
spirited and sometimes sound like a voice from the romantic times of the past century. One thing is certain, that
generally in almost all East-European nations, as can be
seen from the course of their emigration, there is a great
deal of conservatism both with regard to the form of warfare as well as the peaceful arrangement of Eastern Europe,
or the territory of Asia Minor.
Usually in all ideological proclamations, which are designated not only for the limited domestic public, but also
for foreign countries, the stereotyped assertion is re-iterated that it is imperative to build national states in the whole
of Eastern Europe. They promote not only the disintegration of Soviet Russia, but also oppose every form of a
greater Russian empire. And systematically they oppose the
much used Russian thesis about several Russian nations,
incidentally, the false naming of some non-Russian nations
(Little Russia, correctly the Ukrainia, etc.).
�SLOVAKIA
27
Taken <Ybjectively, these nations must be fully understood. Not only small nations, that is tribes (as for example,
of the Upper Caucasus), but also large nations (forty million Ukrainian and eighteen million Byelorussian people)
did not have their own state for long centuries. Then in
this conglomeration of East-European nations there also
are such that cannot at all claim that they are building
upon their own state traditions. And we may go even farther. Not until the twentieth century did small tribes or
groups begin to create individual units which claimed national rights as nations with all the attributes of culturally
and politically mature nations to manage their own destiny
(Upper Caucasus). It was, for example, quite unknown to
Europeans and less so to Americans that the Cossacks declared themselves an independent nation. History discloses
that the Cossacks were in the service of Russian Czars and
one part of them was inclined towards the Ukrainians;
their language is Russian and Ukrainian. But we were acquainted only with legendary Cossack heroes. We knew
very little about their political endeavors. But now there
exists a strong movement for a Cossackia, i. e. an independent Cossack state.
Besides all this, many of the East-European nations
experienced a transfer process, especially during the Soviet
reign of terror. The Ceceni (Tchetchene) of the Upper Caucasus are no longer in their original place. They were spread
over the entire Soviet Union simply because they were a
healthy and belligerent nation. A similar fate befell the
small (two hundred thousands) Kalmuck nation and many
other small nations. Transfer or resettling of nations is the
best tactic of the Soviet. Already a whole million inhabitants of the Baltic states has been forcefully transferred
to the Soviet interior and to Siberia; Russi.ans, Tartars,
Uzbcks, and many others have supplanted them. It is no
wonder then that all the nations of Eastern Europe and
Asia Minor nations from an instinct of self-preservation
insist on national independent states. Naturally, these tendencies manifest themselves most acutely within the strong
nations, as for example, the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian
�28
SLOVAKIA
emigration is divided into at least ten political parties: from
the most extreme rightists to socialists. But there is hardly
one Ukrainian factor in emigration who does not favor an
independent Great Ukrainia.
Many times it appears that it is impossible to speak
with East-European representatives about any other type
of political organization other than national states. Fear of
the entire future arrangement is often responsible for this.
But all things considered, there is no fundamental aversion toward fedemlistic endeavors. True, the East-European
is little interested in a West-European federation, because
he is convinced that Western Europe has an insignificant
interest in the correct solution of the Eastern question. But,
inadvertantly, all thoughts and manifestations, which come
to light in connection with either a West-European or a
federation involving the whole of Europe, affect also the
spiritual stratum of East-European emigration. And so, in
their club meetings and their reviews, periodicals, and newspapers, they often discuss this most recent political problem
seriously and minutely. This is not merely a confirmation
of what has already been done in this matter, but learned
East-European professors, politicians and publicists have
the courage to draw a parallel between the West and East,
between the intellectual efforts for a federation in the West
and the practical ,possibilities in the East. Few are those
who will analyze all the problems publicly. However, we
have found many instances of debates concerning a European and a. regional Central-European and East-EuropeanAsia Minor federation. And it was not always a voice from
the East which took a negative stand to the conception of
a federation itself. Finally, even exclusive, nationalistic, international emigrant organizations allow for a closer or
liberal relationship of individual nations. Such an International of Freedom, consisting of twenty one Central and
East-European emigrations, bases its fundamental program
on an inter-continental confederation of states, including
all of Eastern Europe, except Russia and all of Asia Minor.
The Anti-Bolshevik Block of nations, building exclusively on
national states, has within its Constitution a clause which
�SLOVAKIA
29
speaks of the possibility of creating smaller or larger units
and co-states. The oldest East-European anti-bolshevik international emigrant organization, Prometheus, working already twenty eight years, receives most sympathetically
the trends which favor a European federation and a regional federation.
Therefore, the idea of federalism is not foreign to the
East-European peoples, nor to those who never had their
own state and who yearn to be free. In comparing these
efforts from the East, undoubtedly the thought arises with
regard to Central Europe where the Slov,a ks dwell. What
is the situation there?
II
One argument against Slovak persistence and perseverance in the struggle for an indpendent state usually is
its national "youthfulness". This argument was used especially during the years following World War I, when the
struggle of the Slovaks began to be serious both in form
and intensivity, and opponents of Slovak freedom had to
resort to all kinds of, and many times, less successful arguments. This argument could have been valid to a certain
extent only until Slovak intellectuals refuted the false legend that the Slovak nation has no history and until the
Slovaks themselves proved by their creative spirit that their
naJt:ion can ad~pt itself m a'Il!y period to its neiighibors in
all fields and that its cultural endeavors are not more inferior, but in many respects the Slovak genius surpasses
its partners and becomes distinctly original.
Therefore, such an argument could not carry weight
for very long. It lost in realism very quickly with the Slo•
vak people, and it was the spirit of the Slovaks that proved
it is possible to create a new Slovak environement in the
spiritual and national-political regard without lures and
snares, without thorough saturation from secondary sources. The "youthful" Slovak nation had chosen its own
course so that it could live its own national life.
Against facts, and particularly the vitality of all the
component parts of the Slovak nation, it was difficult to
�30
SLOVAKIA
keep on using endlessly the arguments used during the first
few years following World War I. Quickly, therefore, as the
views of the Slovak people began to change, and as the
course of the policy of "lures" was changed by facts, the
very same people suddenly ascertained that the Slovak nation is biologically so strong that its neighbors will have
to draw from this healthy blood bank to preserve themselves, to revive, and also become stronger. This was an immoral attempt to destroy the national Slovak body. After
drawing upon the biological vitality, a degeneration of spiritual values among the Slovak nation would be inevitable.
It was not possible, therefore, from motives of self-preservation, to agree with such "allurements."
From this theory our Czech neighbors moved further.
Not only biologically were we supposed to save one of our
neighbors, but we were also supposed to contribute to its
cultural and religious revival. These voices were heard frequently after World War II.
All this is defective and for the Slovaks extremely
dangerous. Surely, to save, let us say, a nation twice as
large, from certain ruin, is a beautiful and historically valuable sacrifice. But nothing more or less than a sacrifice.
Probably, our investments would be faulty and all our magnanimity could once avenge itself on our nation. By our
own efforts we would be perhaps the cause of new dramas
in the years to come, similar to the various struggles of
the past. On the surface, it would 'be a sublime act, but in
reality the murder of our own nation. We would in fact
be guilty of perpetrating national suicide.
We admit that we feel sorry for the decline and demise
of any nation and its culture. Higher motives and self-love
prevent us from pouring into the disintegrating body of
our neighbor - even if he asks us to do so - all that God
has given us as a manifestation of our own strength and
cultural development.
We realize that our development was hampered, that
we are just beginning to live, that the culmination of our
life is yet to come. Because of this motive -- that we would
not collapse before we present evidence of our spiritual and
�SLOVAKIA
31
national-political heroism to the world - there is for us no
enticement which would lead us from the path of our very
own interests.
True, this is not an egotistic and selfish course. We
have the highest interest in this only because we do not
want to fall and perish under the guise of such dangerous
and, frequently, even enticing allurements. On the other
hand, we are fully convinced that in a more extensive Central and All-European society we will be able to do more
even from the spiritual and material viewpoints. Binding
ourselves exclusively to the interests of just one neighbor
would mean our gradual extinction and destruction. Even
if we were the center of attraction for a definite time, this
would be a very narrow circle and our rapid exhaustion
would soon turn away the attention of all friends. Nevertheless, natural development can be assured to us only in
a healthy competition in a normal advancement which is
not weighed down with too great a burden. An alliance, let
us say, with the Czechs - an alliance of complete biological
and spiritual growing-together - would stifle within us all
manifestations of individuality exclusively for the benefit
of the larger Czech nation.
We are for co-operation, but we wish to put it on a
real foundation of as extensive a co-operation as possible.
If it is true that we are still a "youthful" nation, immature, but full of life and having all the prerequisites for the
restoration of biological and cultural life of a certain nation, then the realistic hypothesis is more valid, that is,
that all the energy which we should invest in behalf of one
of our neighbors, in time will uphold the Slovak nation
much longer as an individual factor within the Central
European family of nations, healthy and capable of its own
undertakings. The healthy Slovak nation, being fully willing to accept the closest co-operation within the framework
of an European federation, wants to be equal with its political and cultural sense to the most serious factors of
world political planning.
The health and resources in which the Slovak nation
abounds - and in this respect it has many preferences
�32
SLOVAKIA
over some European nations - assures it of all suppositions, that it will know how to maintain itself in the European family of states. And, of course, everything it produces with its intellect and hands above the average and
above its living standards, it will gladly let its partners
have. There is a great difference whether the healthy and
elementally powerful expressions of the Slovaks, about
which many do not doubt, should benefit one of our neighbors exclusively, or whether we should share them with
the whole of Europe. Definitely, we shall choose the latter
course. It is direct, logical and free of allurements.
We do not fear a contest, competition, or spiritual rivalry. Our healthy construction, which others envy, certainly will overcome all remnants of prejudice and, above
all, will convince all the other European partners that they
can count on the Slovak nation in every field of endeavor
that this nation is aware of its duty not only to itself, but
also to others. It is not envious, or even hazardous.
III
There is no doUJbt ,t hat the time will come for the creation of larige staite unilts even in the Old World. Europe already has '1:a,id 1Jhe fourndat'ions of a .federation which, in the
eyes of 1Jheori1S1ts - the mo·s t oUJtstanding contemporrury
politicians oif :Eill!rope - ii.,s. dea;r f.ro:rn almost every side.
Oillly groUJps nolt ,i nterested in the welfare of Europe tum
away fll'om tMs ,i,d'ea. We SlcwaJks cannot but be interested
even in the pracllical side of the maJtter, i'nasmruch as we
wolllld liike to see ouriselves, on the one hand, among the independent naltiorrs of Centra'l Europe, who are waiting for
the creation of a European f ederrution, anld, on the other,
we do not wamrt ,t o stand unipreprured .toward aJll those facto1rs, who rure placing obstacles in the way of Slovakia beco ming a member of sUldh a European federrution.
One of tlhe most serious rea!sons why some groups op,pose our diredt pairbic~pation in the European federaJtion,
and at best wish to see us in it only through the medium
of Czecho..Slovakia, usually is an alleged extreme Slovak
nrutionali:s m. Pruradoxically as it sounds, this allegation
�SLOVAKIA
33
is not casua!l, ,b ut is used systemaiticruly as a seriOUJS rurgu,men,t ·a gainst us. ]t simply d0€S not sound naJtuiral and
serious that the Slovaks come w.iith the thawght of mer,ginig
Slovakia, as an ,i ndependent state unit, into run EUII'Opean
federaltion. Many SJlo;v,aJk politicians aire figihting very effectively for this idea already sevarall decades.
Dr. M,;IJ.an Ho~a was noit an extreme Slovak naMonalist,
even though he we:nit tJhrough a CO!Ill/Paratiively motley degree
of .poilitical thoughit. Thiis MiJan Hlod:za dedicated all h~s
intelilect Ito the federalistic idea and, therefore, belongs
among tihe most s,i,g,n!iificant figwres in this modern movement not on!ly in owr Slovak enVliromnent, but in relation
to Central Emrope as well. Even though he was a ceilltra[ist
in the Ozec!ho-Slo:vaik Republic, nevertheless, with the
greater pairt of hlis spirilt he belonged .to the broader CentralEJuropean environment.
Olther Sl01Vak politicians also emerged and aTe still
emer,gi,rug wiith the ildea o!f a fedarrutJion. The Ptresidenlt of
the Slovak Repulb1:ic, Dr. Joseph 'Dirso, did not conceal his
convicltion tihat evolution coU!ld not proceed otfherwise than
in the sipinit of federa[iization. In his ,pUlbli'C wtterances he
made several allusions to .this grave pr-ob'lem as if to prepare tlhe Slo,v~k puibHc for a new epoch of national and
state life.
Kairol Sidor, lfo11mer .Sl'ovak ambassador, does noit deny
his conception of federal,i'SIID. Even the officia,l program of
the Sllova!k NaJtiona1 Oouncil Abroad, which Karol Sidor
heads, is ma;rked as a pro·g ram for an independent Slovak
State within a framework Olf an EurQpean federation.
Per'hrups, the moslt pr6dluotive ,t heol'ist, in the ranks of
those ,w ho comprise the .Slovak NaJtional Com11ci1 and are
coming on the scene from the young Slo,vaJk generation to
take the responsiJM.lity for trhe devel01p.merut of affairs, is Dr.
Joseph Kinschlbamn. Not only firom the view.point of evo[utionary necessity, bwt chiefly because he grrusped 1:!his complex of questions sensibly and soientificahly, KiTsch!baum,
since the end of World War II, prepared and pu.fbliished numemus d.Jisserta;tions and studies which aiim to prove to the
wor+ld that Sfova:ks have t!heir own modern poilitica,l con-
�34
SLOVAKIA
ceiption amJd also people who display an animruted an:d
interest ~111 the problem of a fedel'a!lirzed ffiurolpe.
'Siimill'a dy, other SIJ.avak ipoliltical wOII1kers, publ!idats and
wriiters, tea/Che.rs a!Ild iinltellootuals are worlmnig for a federation (Dr. Iilin.amJUel Bohm, Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, Reiv.
Niicho'las Siprinc, Dr. Joseph Mi!lrus, Dr. JO'Seph Cieker, Tu-.
Imrrich KrUIZlia:k, Dr . .A;r.ved Grr-ebert., Louis IVcmdra and
many othem).
In contemporary trends of Sllorvaik politics the most
foscinalting connedt:ling lilnk is the idea of federa,tion. Thruruk. !imig in a pradtiicaJl way, i1t is imipossiible to picture a Slovalk
p,oliitician or pol'ilticaJ theorist who seriiously de<~ls wiltih the
idea of lar,ge un1its, s'U/Ch as a Cerubrrul-Ewropeam or Eiulropean federation WOllfild be, and wOllNd wish to lead his nation
along the path oif inltoierance and of nationally scOIUTg'ed
p8JSISions.
Therefore, tJhe Slovaks and t!heir politiicrul and oUJlrtural
representatives are not ibwillding a diam on the poinlted edge
of chaUMiin:iSlm, but adhere to the notion of a futm-·e EUTopean federation.
IV
U'IllU'Sual
]t is interesting to note that it was chiefly rthe Czech
Socialistic pam'ties wlhreh both in Czechia and Siovalkia ooleashed the most saiv-age conflict about the unfilty of the
"Czeclhoslavialk" langwa.ge. 'Dhe same parties who diid not
forget to pdse even in our country as progressive prurties.
in oocoirdlalllCe to Marxislt ideolo.g y. Iif tJhe Slov3/k naltion
opposed this the'ir "progress," then it was in a lar,ge meaiswre becaJUJse they ibrOll.lglht confusion inlto the tiundamenitaJ
oonceipts of polliitiiJool Iiife, and, in fact, reaction which excludes aiN criticism. Czech socl,rulism has shown ilbself as the
pioneer of f,r ustrruted thinking, and if we tiram:sfer i'ts conception to a practlicall field, we see that it has 1,i1dikuled iltself
as has no otller move1ment whiibh had anything to do, directly or indirectly, wti.th the SlO!Vak natioo..
For twenty fuM yerurs, Ozecll poliitiios tenaciously held
to ''OzoohO'SlovaikiSin" as a sally bridge into S'lov:alkia. Other
Ozedh parties ad/Opted thlis slogan from the socirulists. Scientists seized wpon i1t and were fuhlowed by OI.ech journalists.
�SLOVAKIA
35
And thus, in fact, a period ensued when representatirves of
Ozech spirit and prruatioa1 pdliitircs were more enraged in
gaining a position for the artificial construdtion of "OzechiQslavaJkism" than a real settlement of relaitionshi1ps among
'the minorilties Indisputably we muist thank their inC'ons!i.derate, one-si'ded and undemocratic pol1'tiicail program fo:r
the faot 1:hat Prague centralism found irt:se'lf in ruirrs wilt!h
the first thrust.
The so-called "Czechoslovaks" have denied the Slovaiks the right to self-existence. The Slo,v ak naltion, nevertheless, persistently fought for the recognition otf this most
naturaJl right. And it did so in harmony witlh cmltural
Europe, which no one, except the Communhrts labeled as
reactionary or backward. In politica! morals, tile stirug,gle
for the recognition of the suptreme riig1hlts of a nation signifies, in ,t he .p ositive sense d:f the ward, the most noble expression of progressiveness. The Slovaks, therefore, a.ire ahead
of the Ozetdhs in thlis re~ard by t!hirtty years.
Many exipeniments were .necessary to reform. the "Czechoslovruks" rut least prurtliail'1.y. There had to be a war - for
tfrlem new exiperieniceis both on the domestic and fureig.n
fronts. Once moce they had ,t o ascertain the mmd of the
S'lO,VM{ nation, to scrutinize the trends of European and nonIDuropean politilc's, so that rome of them ta:o'tica.1.[,y, others
per1haps sincerely, woulld rubandon the ruinous policy of
•~czeichosllO'V'alkifum." After WoI"ld War H, less was said albout
"OzeclhO's:lovaJk" unity and, partliculrurly, about a united lan.guiage. It mu'Slt be mentioned again, tha.'t :the most Ulillprog.ressirve of all in this regarrtl were the ~etch Socialists. The
otfrler Czech polrnicians and theiT Slovak a.Hies rewgn.ized the
right of the Sfovruk nation to its own existence .
But at that time the Slovaks were more advanced. They
had gone through the hist.orically rich segment of their own
state. ft is certain that there is a greait deaft of difference
between "Oze1ehosi1ova'k" comprehension - it stilil is bound
Uip with a joint state aind the standipdinrt: of t!he Slovaks.
To get ruhead by means oif a steady for-warn effort and in aiM
farms - to find what benefi't!s best t!he 11:fe am.d development
of the nation - the SlovaJks provoo that they rure marehing
�36
SLOVAKIA
in 1:Jhe spirit of the ,t imes and, as an independenlt ,and competitiive ,_po1fficai unit, seek to persevere aloll!gside the most
cmltwred European naltions.
Toda,y, ffiurope ,is ffillllch frul"bher a'long t'he way than the
"0zec'ho,SilovaJks." Theorelti.cafily and practica'lliy it i,s prepa,r ed
for a federation of ai1l nations. The so-caUed "Czecihoslova'k1s " are ait tJhe crossroa;dis. Some a~ere to the form of the
fiirt;t Ozecho-!SlovaJk Repuiblic, while others rure silent and
say nolt!hlil!g a!boult a forurtlh or fitfth Czecho-Slova.!k Repulblic
for whiich they would want to fight. StillJ. others ta:l:k obscurely about the possibillity of a federafted Czecho·~SIJ.oivakia.
There i's allso a founth 0zech g,r1oop whi'ch does not wish to
interfere in Slova!k affaiiI"S and i's f[gh'ting for a CentralEuropean or IDwopean federation in w'hiich it reckons wilth
an inde,pendent Czech Ulnit and a separate Sloivaik unilt.
On tlhe ort:her hand, conltemporary SIJ.ovak ,p oHtits is following clearly and .ll!nreserveidly whait is best for an inde,pendenrt Sl01Vak State wli:thin the framework of a European
federation. Compari.Il!g 1:Jhe effort's of t'he "Czechoslava1ki:;"
wi'bh those of the Sl0iv-alks, we see, that even now there is a
brusiic dliifrferenice b.e'tween them and that "CzechoSl01Va:k,i sm"
wppears in the role of the mo'sit reactionary factor in Central
Ewrope.
But, willy-nilly, some of its representatiives have come
oloser to the tlhinking of the .S1'oivaJk nati:on and ,g radually
are rcliinquish~n,g their b1goited and ar,chaii.c views. Hoiweiver,
t'here stiifl remains the difference of thirty yerurs.
We can, therefore, clearly see from these .s imply-staited
realities thaJt llhe sen:se of SlovaJk pol,i rtks tended toward
a broader lilirI10ipean and worM society. There its a basic
diffeirence whether we get into tJhi,s broader so'o iety of nations throrugh owr OiWll doors, or wihether we shalJ.l be led
m'to it throrugh foreign dooirs wiit!h those of others; whether
we wm lodk ,pa.ssi.rvely lllpOn the work, or whether we shali
talke part in ilt w~tJh joint forces.
A IDuropean fed:era/tlion will bring run end to these
mistaJkes. We are det:inilteliy decfarin1g for a European associatioo, becruuse, rucicording to moral,s , ciulltll!re and p<Ylitical
ma!tuirity, we rightfully beloD!g in it.
�
26
SLOVAKIA
THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION
Joseph Pauco, Ph.D.
I
Eastern Europe provides a political observer with a
motley mosaic of opinions. Living here are many nations
and ra.c es which even a Central European does not properly
recognize and many times does not know whether to classify them with European nations or with the Asiatics. Whoever searches more profoundly into their history and studies their political struggles at least cursorily will notice
that in many regards their history and their programs are
very similar to those of every p.ation in Central or Western
Europe. You will find smaller and larger groups; small nations bound to the destiny of great ones, and their mutual
relationship is manifested nearly always by the same complaints as those of other nations-suppressi on, imperialism,
wars, revolutions, heroic deeds of national leaders, etc.
In general, it is said that the East-European nations
a.re politically less developed. Enemies of their freedom say
that they are the more primitive nations and, therefore,
certain slogans and principles of program are more highly
spirited and sometimes sound like a voice from the romantic times of the past century. One thing is certain, that
generally in almost all East-European nations, as can be
seen from the course of their emigration, there is a great
deal of conservatism both with regard to the form of warfare as well as the peaceful arrangement of Eastern Europe,
or the territory of Asia Minor.
Usually in all ideological proclamations, which are designated not only for the limited domestic public, but also
for foreign countries, the stereotyped assertion is re-iterated that it is imperative to build national states in the whole
of Eastern Europe. They promote not only the disintegration of Soviet Russia, but also oppose every form of a
greater Russian empire. And systematically they oppose the
much used Russian thesis about several Russian nations,
incidentally, the false naming of some non-Russian nations
(Little Russia, correctly the Ukrainia, etc.).
�SLOVAKIA
27
Taken <Ybjectively, these nations must be fully understood. Not only small nations, that is tribes (as for example,
of the Upper Caucasus), but also large nations (forty million Ukrainian and eighteen million Byelorussian people)
did not have their own state for long centuries. Then in
this conglomeration of East-European nations there also
are such that cannot at all claim that they are building
upon their own state traditions. And we may go even farther. Not until the twentieth century did small tribes or
groups begin to create individual units which claimed national rights as nations with all the attributes of culturally
and politically mature nations to manage their own destiny
(Upper Caucasus). It was, for example, quite unknown to
Europeans and less so to Americans that the Cossacks declared themselves an independent nation. History discloses
that the Cossacks were in the service of Russian Czars and
one part of them was inclined towards the Ukrainians;
their language is Russian and Ukrainian. But we were acquainted only with legendary Cossack heroes. We knew
very little about their political endeavors. But now there
exists a strong movement for a Cossackia, i. e. an independent Cossack state.
Besides all this, many of the East-European nations
experienced a transfer process, especially during the Soviet
reign of terror. The Ceceni (Tchetchene) of the Upper Caucasus are no longer in their original place. They were spread
over the entire Soviet Union simply because they were a
healthy and belligerent nation. A similar fate befell the
small (two hundred thousands) Kalmuck nation and many
other small nations. Transfer or resettling of nations is the
best tactic of the Soviet. Already a whole million inhabitants of the Baltic states has been forcefully transferred
to the Soviet interior and to Siberia; Russi.ans, Tartars,
Uzbcks, and many others have supplanted them. It is no
wonder then that all the nations of Eastern Europe and
Asia Minor nations from an instinct of self-preservation
insist on national independent states. Naturally, these tendencies manifest themselves most acutely within the strong
nations, as for example, the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian
�28
SLOVAKIA
emigration is divided into at least ten political parties: from
the most extreme rightists to socialists. But there is hardly
one Ukrainian factor in emigration who does not favor an
independent Great Ukrainia.
Many times it appears that it is impossible to speak
with East-European representatives about any other type
of political organization other than national states. Fear of
the entire future arrangement is often responsible for this.
But all things considered, there is no fundamental aversion toward fedemlistic endeavors. True, the East-European
is little interested in a West-European federation, because
he is convinced that Western Europe has an insignificant
interest in the correct solution of the Eastern question. But,
inadvertantly, all thoughts and manifestations, which come
to light in connection with either a West-European or a
federation involving the whole of Europe, affect also the
spiritual stratum of East-European emigration. And so, in
their club meetings and their reviews, periodicals, and newspapers, they often discuss this most recent political problem
seriously and minutely. This is not merely a confirmation
of what has already been done in this matter, but learned
East-European professors, politicians and publicists have
the courage to draw a parallel between the West and East,
between the intellectual efforts for a federation in the West
and the practical ,possibilities in the East. Few are those
who will analyze all the problems publicly. However, we
have found many instances of debates concerning a European and a. regional Central-European and East-EuropeanAsia Minor federation. And it was not always a voice from
the East which took a negative stand to the conception of
a federation itself. Finally, even exclusive, nationalistic, international emigrant organizations allow for a closer or
liberal relationship of individual nations. Such an International of Freedom, consisting of twenty one Central and
East-European emigrations, bases its fundamental program
on an inter-continental confederation of states, including
all of Eastern Europe, except Russia and all of Asia Minor.
The Anti-Bolshevik Block of nations, building exclusively on
national states, has within its Constitution a clause which
�SLOVAKIA
29
speaks of the possibility of creating smaller or larger units
and co-states. The oldest East-European anti-bolshevik international emigrant organization, Prometheus, working already twenty eight years, receives most sympathetically
the trends which favor a European federation and a regional federation.
Therefore, the idea of federalism is not foreign to the
East-European peoples, nor to those who never had their
own state and who yearn to be free. In comparing these
efforts from the East, undoubtedly the thought arises with
regard to Central Europe where the Slov,a ks dwell. What
is the situation there?
II
One argument against Slovak persistence and perseverance in the struggle for an indpendent state usually is
its national "youthfulness". This argument was used especially during the years following World War I, when the
struggle of the Slovaks began to be serious both in form
and intensivity, and opponents of Slovak freedom had to
resort to all kinds of, and many times, less successful arguments. This argument could have been valid to a certain
extent only until Slovak intellectuals refuted the false legend that the Slovak nation has no history and until the
Slovaks themselves proved by their creative spirit that their
naJt:ion can ad~pt itself m a'Il!y period to its neiighibors in
all fields and that its cultural endeavors are not more inferior, but in many respects the Slovak genius surpasses
its partners and becomes distinctly original.
Therefore, such an argument could not carry weight
for very long. It lost in realism very quickly with the Slo•
vak people, and it was the spirit of the Slovaks that proved
it is possible to create a new Slovak environement in the
spiritual and national-political regard without lures and
snares, without thorough saturation from secondary sources. The "youthful" Slovak nation had chosen its own
course so that it could live its own national life.
Against facts, and particularly the vitality of all the
component parts of the Slovak nation, it was difficult to
�30
SLOVAKIA
keep on using endlessly the arguments used during the first
few years following World War I. Quickly, therefore, as the
views of the Slovak people began to change, and as the
course of the policy of "lures" was changed by facts, the
very same people suddenly ascertained that the Slovak nation is biologically so strong that its neighbors will have
to draw from this healthy blood bank to preserve themselves, to revive, and also become stronger. This was an immoral attempt to destroy the national Slovak body. After
drawing upon the biological vitality, a degeneration of spiritual values among the Slovak nation would be inevitable.
It was not possible, therefore, from motives of self-preservation, to agree with such "allurements."
From this theory our Czech neighbors moved further.
Not only biologically were we supposed to save one of our
neighbors, but we were also supposed to contribute to its
cultural and religious revival. These voices were heard frequently after World War II.
All this is defective and for the Slovaks extremely
dangerous. Surely, to save, let us say, a nation twice as
large, from certain ruin, is a beautiful and historically valuable sacrifice. But nothing more or less than a sacrifice.
Probably, our investments would be faulty and all our magnanimity could once avenge itself on our nation. By our
own efforts we would be perhaps the cause of new dramas
in the years to come, similar to the various struggles of
the past. On the surface, it would 'be a sublime act, but in
reality the murder of our own nation. We would in fact
be guilty of perpetrating national suicide.
We admit that we feel sorry for the decline and demise
of any nation and its culture. Higher motives and self-love
prevent us from pouring into the disintegrating body of
our neighbor - even if he asks us to do so - all that God
has given us as a manifestation of our own strength and
cultural development.
We realize that our development was hampered, that
we are just beginning to live, that the culmination of our
life is yet to come. Because of this motive -- that we would
not collapse before we present evidence of our spiritual and
�SLOVAKIA
31
national-political heroism to the world - there is for us no
enticement which would lead us from the path of our very
own interests.
True, this is not an egotistic and selfish course. We
have the highest interest in this only because we do not
want to fall and perish under the guise of such dangerous
and, frequently, even enticing allurements. On the other
hand, we are fully convinced that in a more extensive Central and All-European society we will be able to do more
even from the spiritual and material viewpoints. Binding
ourselves exclusively to the interests of just one neighbor
would mean our gradual extinction and destruction. Even
if we were the center of attraction for a definite time, this
would be a very narrow circle and our rapid exhaustion
would soon turn away the attention of all friends. Nevertheless, natural development can be assured to us only in
a healthy competition in a normal advancement which is
not weighed down with too great a burden. An alliance, let
us say, with the Czechs - an alliance of complete biological
and spiritual growing-together - would stifle within us all
manifestations of individuality exclusively for the benefit
of the larger Czech nation.
We are for co-operation, but we wish to put it on a
real foundation of as extensive a co-operation as possible.
If it is true that we are still a "youthful" nation, immature, but full of life and having all the prerequisites for the
restoration of biological and cultural life of a certain nation, then the realistic hypothesis is more valid, that is,
that all the energy which we should invest in behalf of one
of our neighbors, in time will uphold the Slovak nation
much longer as an individual factor within the Central
European family of nations, healthy and capable of its own
undertakings. The healthy Slovak nation, being fully willing to accept the closest co-operation within the framework
of an European federation, wants to be equal with its political and cultural sense to the most serious factors of
world political planning.
The health and resources in which the Slovak nation
abounds - and in this respect it has many preferences
�32
SLOVAKIA
over some European nations - assures it of all suppositions, that it will know how to maintain itself in the European family of states. And, of course, everything it produces with its intellect and hands above the average and
above its living standards, it will gladly let its partners
have. There is a great difference whether the healthy and
elementally powerful expressions of the Slovaks, about
which many do not doubt, should benefit one of our neighbors exclusively, or whether we should share them with
the whole of Europe. Definitely, we shall choose the latter
course. It is direct, logical and free of allurements.
We do not fear a contest, competition, or spiritual rivalry. Our healthy construction, which others envy, certainly will overcome all remnants of prejudice and, above
all, will convince all the other European partners that they
can count on the Slovak nation in every field of endeavor
that this nation is aware of its duty not only to itself, but
also to others. It is not envious, or even hazardous.
III
There is no doUJbt ,t hat the time will come for the creation of larige staite unilts even in the Old World. Europe already has '1:a,id 1Jhe fourndat'ions of a .federation which, in the
eyes of 1Jheori1S1ts - the mo·s t oUJtstanding contemporrury
politicians oif :Eill!rope - ii.,s. dea;r f.ro:rn almost every side.
Oillly groUJps nolt ,i nterested in the welfare of Europe tum
away fll'om tMs ,i,d'ea. We SlcwaJks cannot but be interested
even in the pracllical side of the maJtter, i'nasmruch as we
wolllld liike to see ouriselves, on the one hand, among the independent naltiorrs of Centra'l Europe, who are waiting for
the creation of a European f ederrution, anld, on the other,
we do not wamrt ,t o stand unipreprured .toward aJll those facto1rs, who rure placing obstacles in the way of Slovakia beco ming a member of sUldh a European federrution.
One of tlhe most serious rea!sons why some groups op,pose our diredt pairbic~pation in the European federaJtion,
and at best wish to see us in it only through the medium
of Czecho..Slovakia, usually is an alleged extreme Slovak
nrutionali:s m. Pruradoxically as it sounds, this allegation
�SLOVAKIA
33
is not casua!l, ,b ut is used systemaiticruly as a seriOUJS rurgu,men,t ·a gainst us. ]t simply d0€S not sound naJtuiral and
serious that the Slovaks come w.iith the thawght of mer,ginig
Slovakia, as an ,i ndependent state unit, into run EUII'Opean
federaltion. Many SJlo;v,aJk politicians aire figihting very effectively for this idea already sevarall decades.
Dr. M,;IJ.an Ho~a was noit an extreme Slovak naMonalist,
even though he we:nit tJhrough a CO!Ill/Paratiively motley degree
of .poilitical thoughit. Thiis MiJan Hlod:za dedicated all h~s
intelilect Ito the federalistic idea and, therefore, belongs
among tihe most s,i,g,n!iificant figwres in this modern movement not on!ly in owr Slovak enVliromnent, but in relation
to Central Emrope as well. Even though he was a ceilltra[ist
in the Ozec!ho-Slo:vaik Republic, nevertheless, with the
greater pairt of hlis spirilt he belonged .to the broader CentralEJuropean environment.
Olther Sl01Vak politicians also emerged and aTe still
emer,gi,rug wiith the ildea o!f a fedarrutJion. The Ptresidenlt of
the Slovak Repulb1:ic, Dr. Joseph 'Dirso, did not conceal his
convicltion tihat evolution coU!ld not proceed otfherwise than
in the sipinit of federa[iization. In his ,pUlbli'C wtterances he
made several allusions to .this grave pr-ob'lem as if to prepare tlhe Slo,v~k puibHc for a new epoch of national and
state life.
Kairol Sidor, lfo11mer .Sl'ovak ambassador, does noit deny
his conception of federal,i'SIID. Even the officia,l program of
the Sllova!k NaJtiona1 Oouncil Abroad, which Karol Sidor
heads, is ma;rked as a pro·g ram for an independent Slovak
State within a framework Olf an EurQpean federation.
Per'hrups, the moslt pr6dluotive ,t heol'ist, in the ranks of
those ,w ho comprise the .Slovak NaJtional Com11ci1 and are
coming on the scene from the young Slo,vaJk generation to
take the responsiJM.lity for trhe devel01p.merut of affairs, is Dr.
Joseph Kinschlbamn. Not only firom the view.point of evo[utionary necessity, bwt chiefly because he grrusped 1:!his complex of questions sensibly and soientificahly, KiTsch!baum,
since the end of World War II, prepared and pu.fbliished numemus d.Jisserta;tions and studies which aiim to prove to the
wor+ld that Sfova:ks have t!heir own modern poilitica,l con-
�34
SLOVAKIA
ceiption amJd also people who display an animruted an:d
interest ~111 the problem of a fedel'a!lirzed ffiurolpe.
'Siimill'a dy, other SIJ.avak ipoliltical wOII1kers, publ!idats and
wriiters, tea/Che.rs a!Ild iinltellootuals are worlmnig for a federation (Dr. Iilin.amJUel Bohm, Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, Reiv.
Niicho'las Siprinc, Dr. Joseph Mi!lrus, Dr. JO'Seph Cieker, Tu-.
Imrrich KrUIZlia:k, Dr . .A;r.ved Grr-ebert., Louis IVcmdra and
many othem).
In contemporary trends of Sllorvaik politics the most
foscinalting connedt:ling lilnk is the idea of federa,tion. Thruruk. !imig in a pradtiicaJl way, i1t is imipossiible to picture a Slovalk
p,oliitician or pol'ilticaJ theorist who seriiously de<~ls wiltih the
idea of lar,ge un1its, s'U/Ch as a Cerubrrul-Ewropeam or Eiulropean federation WOllfild be, and wOllNd wish to lead his nation
along the path oif inltoierance and of nationally scOIUTg'ed
p8JSISions.
Therefore, tJhe Slovaks and t!heir politiicrul and oUJlrtural
representatives are not ibwillding a diam on the poinlted edge
of chaUMiin:iSlm, but adhere to the notion of a futm-·e EUTopean federation.
IV
U'IllU'Sual
]t is interesting to note that it was chiefly rthe Czech
Socialistic pam'ties wlhreh both in Czechia and Siovalkia ooleashed the most saiv-age conflict about the unfilty of the
"Czeclhoslavialk" langwa.ge. 'Dhe same parties who diid not
forget to pdse even in our country as progressive prurties.
in oocoirdlalllCe to Marxislt ideolo.g y. Iif tJhe Slov3/k naltion
opposed this the'ir "progress," then it was in a lar,ge meaiswre becaJUJse they ibrOll.lglht confusion inlto the tiundamenitaJ
oonceipts of polliitiiJool Iiife, and, in fact, reaction which excludes aiN criticism. Czech socl,rulism has shown ilbself as the
pioneer of f,r ustrruted thinking, and if we tiram:sfer i'ts conception to a practlicall field, we see that it has 1,i1dikuled iltself
as has no otller move1ment whiibh had anything to do, directly or indirectly, wti.th the SlO!Vak natioo..
For twenty fuM yerurs, Ozecll poliitiios tenaciously held
to ''OzoohO'SlovaikiSin" as a sally bridge into S'lov:alkia. Other
Ozedh parties ad/Opted thlis slogan from the socirulists. Scientists seized wpon i1t and were fuhlowed by OI.ech journalists.
�SLOVAKIA
35
And thus, in fact, a period ensued when representatirves of
Ozech spirit and prruatioa1 pdliitircs were more enraged in
gaining a position for the artificial construdtion of "OzechiQslavaJkism" than a real settlement of relaitionshi1ps among
'the minorilties Indisputably we muist thank their inC'ons!i.derate, one-si'ded and undemocratic pol1'tiicail program fo:r
the faot 1:hat Prague centralism found irt:se'lf in ruirrs wilt!h
the first thrust.
The so-called "Czechoslovaks" have denied the Slovaiks the right to self-existence. The Slo,v ak naltion, nevertheless, persistently fought for the recognition otf this most
naturaJl right. And it did so in harmony witlh cmltural
Europe, which no one, except the Communhrts labeled as
reactionary or backward. In politica! morals, tile stirug,gle
for the recognition of the suptreme riig1hlts of a nation signifies, in ,t he .p ositive sense d:f the ward, the most noble expression of progressiveness. The Slovaks, therefore, a.ire ahead
of the Ozetdhs in thlis re~ard by t!hirtty years.
Many exipeniments were .necessary to reform. the "Czechoslovruks" rut least prurtliail'1.y. There had to be a war - for
tfrlem new exiperieniceis both on the domestic and fureig.n
fronts. Once moce they had ,t o ascertain the mmd of the
S'lO,VM{ nation, to scrutinize the trends of European and nonIDuropean politilc's, so that rome of them ta:o'tica.1.[,y, others
per1haps sincerely, woulld rubandon the ruinous policy of
•~czeichosllO'V'alkifum." After WoI"ld War H, less was said albout
"OzeclhO's:lovaJk" unity and, partliculrurly, about a united lan.guiage. It mu'Slt be mentioned again, tha.'t :the most Ulillprog.ressirve of all in this regarrtl were the ~etch Socialists. The
otfrler Czech polrnicians and theiT Slovak a.Hies rewgn.ized the
right of the Sfovruk nation to its own existence .
But at that time the Slovaks were more advanced. They
had gone through the hist.orically rich segment of their own
state. ft is certain that there is a greait deaft of difference
between "Oze1ehosi1ova'k" comprehension - it stilil is bound
Uip with a joint state aind the standipdinrt: of t!he Slovaks.
To get ruhead by means oif a steady for-warn effort and in aiM
farms - to find what benefi't!s best t!he 11:fe am.d development
of the nation - the SlovaJks provoo that they rure marehing
�36
SLOVAKIA
in 1:Jhe spirit of the ,t imes and, as an independenlt ,and competitiive ,_po1fficai unit, seek to persevere aloll!gside the most
cmltwred European naltions.
Toda,y, ffiurope ,is ffillllch frul"bher a'long t'he way than the
"0zec'ho,SilovaJks." Theorelti.cafily and practica'lliy it i,s prepa,r ed
for a federation of ai1l nations. The so-caUed "Czecihoslova'k1s " are ait tJhe crossroa;dis. Some a~ere to the form of the
fiirt;t Ozecho-!SlovaJk Repuiblic, while others rure silent and
say nolt!hlil!g a!boult a forurtlh or fitfth Czecho-Slova.!k Repulblic
for whiich they would want to fight. StillJ. others ta:l:k obscurely about the possibillity of a federafted Czecho·~SIJ.oivakia.
There i's allso a founth 0zech g,r1oop whi'ch does not wish to
interfere in Slova!k affaiiI"S and i's f[gh'ting for a CentralEuropean or IDwopean federation in w'hiich it reckons wilth
an inde,pendent Czech Ulnit and a separate Sloivaik unilt.
On tlhe ort:her hand, conltemporary SIJ.ovak ,p oHtits is following clearly and .ll!nreserveidly whait is best for an inde,pendenrt Sl01Vak State wli:thin the framework of a European
federation. Compari.Il!g 1:Jhe effort's of t'he "Czechoslava1ki:;"
wi'bh those of the Sl0iv-alks, we see, that even now there is a
brusiic dliifrferenice b.e'tween them and that "CzechoSl01Va:k,i sm"
wppears in the role of the mo'sit reactionary factor in Central
Ewrope.
But, willy-nilly, some of its representatiives have come
oloser to the tlhinking of the .S1'oivaJk nati:on and ,g radually
are rcliinquish~n,g their b1goited and ar,chaii.c views. Hoiweiver,
t'here stiifl remains the difference of thirty yerurs.
We can, therefore, clearly see from these .s imply-staited
realities thaJt llhe sen:se of SlovaJk pol,i rtks tended toward
a broader lilirI10ipean and worM society. There its a basic
diffeirence whether we get into tJhi,s broader so'o iety of nations throrugh owr OiWll doors, or wihether we shalJ.l be led
m'to it throrugh foreign dooirs wiit!h those of others; whether
we wm lodk ,pa.ssi.rvely lllpOn the work, or whether we shali
talke part in ilt w~tJh joint forces.
A IDuropean fed:era/tlion will bring run end to these
mistaJkes. We are det:inilteliy decfarin1g for a European associatioo, becruuse, rucicording to moral,s , ciulltll!re and p<Ylitical
ma!tuirity, we rightfully beloD!g in it.
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1953
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26
SLOVAKIA
THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF A FEDERATION
Joseph Pauco, Ph.D.
I
Eastern Europe provides a political observer with a
motley mosaic of opinions. Living here are many nations
and ra.c es which even a Central European does not properly
recognize and many times does not know whether to classify them with European nations or with the Asiatics. Whoever searches more profoundly into their history and studies their political struggles at least cursorily will notice
that in many regards their history and their programs are
very similar to those of every p.ation in Central or Western
Europe. You will find smaller and larger groups; small nations bound to the destiny of great ones, and their mutual
relationship is manifested nearly always by the same complaints as those of other nations-suppressi on, imperialism,
wars, revolutions, heroic deeds of national leaders, etc.
In general, it is said that the East-European nations
a.re politically less developed. Enemies of their freedom say
that they are the more primitive nations and, therefore,
certain slogans and principles of program are more highly
spirited and sometimes sound like a voice from the romantic times of the past century. One thing is certain, that
generally in almost all East-European nations, as can be
seen from the course of their emigration, there is a great
deal of conservatism both with regard to the form of warfare as well as the peaceful arrangement of Eastern Europe,
or the territory of Asia Minor.
Usually in all ideological proclamations, which are designated not only for the limited domestic public, but also
for foreign countries, the stereotyped assertion is re-iterated that it is imperative to build national states in the whole
of Eastern Europe. They promote not only the disintegration of Soviet Russia, but also oppose every form of a
greater Russian empire. And systematically they oppose the
much used Russian thesis about several Russian nations,
incidentally, the false naming of some non-Russian nations
(Little Russia, correctly the Ukrainia, etc.).
SLOVAKIA
27
Taken <Ybjectively, these nations must be fully understood. Not only small nations, that is tribes (as for example,
of the Upper Caucasus), but also large nations (forty million Ukrainian and eighteen million Byelorussian people)
did not have their own state for long centuries. Then in
this conglomeration of East-European nations there also
are such that cannot at all claim that they are building
upon their own state traditions. And we may go even farther. Not until the twentieth century did small tribes or
groups begin to create individual units which claimed national rights as nations with all the attributes of culturally
and politically mature nations to manage their own destiny
(Upper Caucasus). It was, for example, quite unknown to
Europeans and less so to Americans that the Cossacks declared themselves an independent nation. History discloses
that the Cossacks were in the service of Russian Czars and
one part of them was inclined towards the Ukrainians;
their language is Russian and Ukrainian. But we were acquainted only with legendary Cossack heroes. We knew
very little about their political endeavors. But now there
exists a strong movement for a Cossackia, i. e. an independent Cossack state.
Besides all this, many of the East-European nations
experienced a transfer process, especially during the Soviet
reign of terror. The Ceceni (Tchetchene) of the Upper Caucasus are no longer in their original place. They were spread
over the entire Soviet Union simply because they were a
healthy and belligerent nation. A similar fate befell the
small (two hundred thousands) Kalmuck nation and many
other small nations. Transfer or resettling of nations is the
best tactic of the Soviet. Already a whole million inhabitants of the Baltic states has been forcefully transferred
to the Soviet interior and to Siberia; Russi.ans, Tartars,
Uzbcks, and many others have supplanted them. It is no
wonder then that all the nations of Eastern Europe and
Asia Minor nations from an instinct of self-preservation
insist on national independent states. Naturally, these tendencies manifest themselves most acutely within the strong
nations, as for example, the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian
28
SLOVAKIA
emigration is divided into at least ten political parties: from
the most extreme rightists to socialists. But there is hardly
one Ukrainian factor in emigration who does not favor an
independent Great Ukrainia.
Many times it appears that it is impossible to speak
with East-European representatives about any other type
of political organization other than national states. Fear of
the entire future arrangement is often responsible for this.
But all things considered, there is no fundamental aversion toward fedemlistic endeavors. True, the East-European
is little interested in a West-European federation, because
he is convinced that Western Europe has an insignificant
interest in the correct solution of the Eastern question. But,
inadvertantly, all thoughts and manifestations, which come
to light in connection with either a West-European or a
federation involving the whole of Europe, affect also the
spiritual stratum of East-European emigration. And so, in
their club meetings and their reviews, periodicals, and newspapers, they often discuss this most recent political problem
seriously and minutely. This is not merely a confirmation
of what has already been done in this matter, but learned
East-European professors, politicians and publicists have
the courage to draw a parallel between the West and East,
between the intellectual efforts for a federation in the West
and the practical ,possibilities in the East. Few are those
who will analyze all the problems publicly. However, we
have found many instances of debates concerning a European and a. regional Central-European and East-EuropeanAsia Minor federation. And it was not always a voice from
the East which took a negative stand to the conception of
a federation itself. Finally, even exclusive, nationalistic, international emigrant organizations allow for a closer or
liberal relationship of individual nations. Such an International of Freedom, consisting of twenty one Central and
East-European emigrations, bases its fundamental program
on an inter-continental confederation of states, including
all of Eastern Europe, except Russia and all of Asia Minor.
The Anti-Bolshevik Block of nations, building exclusively on
national states, has within its Constitution a clause which
SLOVAKIA
29
speaks of the possibility of creating smaller or larger units
and co-states. The oldest East-European anti-bolshevik international emigrant organization, Prometheus, working already twenty eight years, receives most sympathetically
the trends which favor a European federation and a regional federation.
Therefore, the idea of federalism is not foreign to the
East-European peoples, nor to those who never had their
own state and who yearn to be free. In comparing these
efforts from the East, undoubtedly the thought arises with
regard to Central Europe where the Slov,a ks dwell. What
is the situation there?
II
One argument against Slovak persistence and perseverance in the struggle for an indpendent state usually is
its national "youthfulness". This argument was used especially during the years following World War I, when the
struggle of the Slovaks began to be serious both in form
and intensivity, and opponents of Slovak freedom had to
resort to all kinds of, and many times, less successful arguments. This argument could have been valid to a certain
extent only until Slovak intellectuals refuted the false legend that the Slovak nation has no history and until the
Slovaks themselves proved by their creative spirit that their
naJt:ion can ad~pt itself m a'Il!y period to its neiighibors in
all fields and that its cultural endeavors are not more inferior, but in many respects the Slovak genius surpasses
its partners and becomes distinctly original.
Therefore, such an argument could not carry weight
for very long. It lost in realism very quickly with the Slo•
vak people, and it was the spirit of the Slovaks that proved
it is possible to create a new Slovak environement in the
spiritual and national-political regard without lures and
snares, without thorough saturation from secondary sources. The "youthful" Slovak nation had chosen its own
course so that it could live its own national life.
Against facts, and particularly the vitality of all the
component parts of the Slovak nation, it was difficult to
30
SLOVAKIA
keep on using endlessly the arguments used during the first
few years following World War I. Quickly, therefore, as the
views of the Slovak people began to change, and as the
course of the policy of "lures" was changed by facts, the
very same people suddenly ascertained that the Slovak nation is biologically so strong that its neighbors will have
to draw from this healthy blood bank to preserve themselves, to revive, and also become stronger. This was an immoral attempt to destroy the national Slovak body. After
drawing upon the biological vitality, a degeneration of spiritual values among the Slovak nation would be inevitable.
It was not possible, therefore, from motives of self-preservation, to agree with such "allurements."
From this theory our Czech neighbors moved further.
Not only biologically were we supposed to save one of our
neighbors, but we were also supposed to contribute to its
cultural and religious revival. These voices were heard frequently after World War II.
All this is defective and for the Slovaks extremely
dangerous. Surely, to save, let us say, a nation twice as
large, from certain ruin, is a beautiful and historically valuable sacrifice. But nothing more or less than a sacrifice.
Probably, our investments would be faulty and all our magnanimity could once avenge itself on our nation. By our
own efforts we would be perhaps the cause of new dramas
in the years to come, similar to the various struggles of
the past. On the surface, it would 'be a sublime act, but in
reality the murder of our own nation. We would in fact
be guilty of perpetrating national suicide.
We admit that we feel sorry for the decline and demise
of any nation and its culture. Higher motives and self-love
prevent us from pouring into the disintegrating body of
our neighbor - even if he asks us to do so - all that God
has given us as a manifestation of our own strength and
cultural development.
We realize that our development was hampered, that
we are just beginning to live, that the culmination of our
life is yet to come. Because of this motive -- that we would
not collapse before we present evidence of our spiritual and
SLOVAKIA
31
national-political heroism to the world - there is for us no
enticement which would lead us from the path of our very
own interests.
True, this is not an egotistic and selfish course. We
have the highest interest in this only because we do not
want to fall and perish under the guise of such dangerous
and, frequently, even enticing allurements. On the other
hand, we are fully convinced that in a more extensive Central and All-European society we will be able to do more
even from the spiritual and material viewpoints. Binding
ourselves exclusively to the interests of just one neighbor
would mean our gradual extinction and destruction. Even
if we were the center of attraction for a definite time, this
would be a very narrow circle and our rapid exhaustion
would soon turn away the attention of all friends. Nevertheless, natural development can be assured to us only in
a healthy competition in a normal advancement which is
not weighed down with too great a burden. An alliance, let
us say, with the Czechs - an alliance of complete biological
and spiritual growing-together - would stifle within us all
manifestations of individuality exclusively for the benefit
of the larger Czech nation.
We are for co-operation, but we wish to put it on a
real foundation of as extensive a co-operation as possible.
If it is true that we are still a "youthful" nation, immature, but full of life and having all the prerequisites for the
restoration of biological and cultural life of a certain nation, then the realistic hypothesis is more valid, that is,
that all the energy which we should invest in behalf of one
of our neighbors, in time will uphold the Slovak nation
much longer as an individual factor within the Central
European family of nations, healthy and capable of its own
undertakings. The healthy Slovak nation, being fully willing to accept the closest co-operation within the framework
of an European federation, wants to be equal with its political and cultural sense to the most serious factors of
world political planning.
The health and resources in which the Slovak nation
abounds - and in this respect it has many preferences
32
SLOVAKIA
over some European nations - assures it of all suppositions, that it will know how to maintain itself in the European family of states. And, of course, everything it produces with its intellect and hands above the average and
above its living standards, it will gladly let its partners
have. There is a great difference whether the healthy and
elementally powerful expressions of the Slovaks, about
which many do not doubt, should benefit one of our neighbors exclusively, or whether we should share them with
the whole of Europe. Definitely, we shall choose the latter
course. It is direct, logical and free of allurements.
We do not fear a contest, competition, or spiritual rivalry. Our healthy construction, which others envy, certainly will overcome all remnants of prejudice and, above
all, will convince all the other European partners that they
can count on the Slovak nation in every field of endeavor
that this nation is aware of its duty not only to itself, but
also to others. It is not envious, or even hazardous.
III
There is no doUJbt ,t hat the time will come for the creation of larige staite unilts even in the Old World. Europe already has '1:a,id 1Jhe fourndat'ions of a .federation which, in the
eyes of 1Jheori1S1ts - the mo·s t oUJtstanding contemporrury
politicians oif :Eill!rope - ii.,s. dea;r f.ro:rn almost every side.
Oillly groUJps nolt ,i nterested in the welfare of Europe tum
away fll'om tMs ,i,d'ea. We SlcwaJks cannot but be interested
even in the pracllical side of the maJtter, i'nasmruch as we
wolllld liike to see ouriselves, on the one hand, among the independent naltiorrs of Centra'l Europe, who are waiting for
the creation of a European f ederrution, anld, on the other,
we do not wamrt ,t o stand unipreprured .toward aJll those facto1rs, who rure placing obstacles in the way of Slovakia beco ming a member of sUldh a European federrution.
One of tlhe most serious rea!sons why some groups op,pose our diredt pairbic~pation in the European federaJtion,
and at best wish to see us in it only through the medium
of Czecho..Slovakia, usually is an alleged extreme Slovak
nrutionali:s m. Pruradoxically as it sounds, this allegation
SLOVAKIA
33
is not casua!l, ,b ut is used systemaiticruly as a seriOUJS rurgu,men,t ·a gainst us. ]t simply d0€S not sound naJtuiral and
serious that the Slovaks come w.iith the thawght of mer,ginig
Slovakia, as an ,i ndependent state unit, into run EUII'Opean
federaltion. Many SJlo;v,aJk politicians aire figihting very effectively for this idea already sevarall decades.
Dr. M,;IJ.an Ho~a was noit an extreme Slovak naMonalist,
even though he we:nit tJhrough a CO!Ill/Paratiively motley degree
of .poilitical thoughit. Thiis MiJan Hlod:za dedicated all h~s
intelilect Ito the federalistic idea and, therefore, belongs
among tihe most s,i,g,n!iificant figwres in this modern movement not on!ly in owr Slovak enVliromnent, but in relation
to Central Emrope as well. Even though he was a ceilltra[ist
in the Ozec!ho-Slo:vaik Republic, nevertheless, with the
greater pairt of hlis spirilt he belonged .to the broader CentralEJuropean environment.
Olther Sl01Vak politicians also emerged and aTe still
emer,gi,rug wiith the ildea o!f a fedarrutJion. The Ptresidenlt of
the Slovak Repulb1:ic, Dr. Joseph 'Dirso, did not conceal his
convicltion tihat evolution coU!ld not proceed otfherwise than
in the sipinit of federa[iization. In his ,pUlbli'C wtterances he
made several allusions to .this grave pr-ob'lem as if to prepare tlhe Slo,v~k puibHc for a new epoch of national and
state life.
Kairol Sidor, lfo11mer .Sl'ovak ambassador, does noit deny
his conception of federal,i'SIID. Even the officia,l program of
the Sllova!k NaJtiona1 Oouncil Abroad, which Karol Sidor
heads, is ma;rked as a pro·g ram for an independent Slovak
State within a framework Olf an EurQpean federation.
Per'hrups, the moslt pr6dluotive ,t heol'ist, in the ranks of
those ,w ho comprise the .Slovak NaJtional Com11ci1 and are
coming on the scene from the young Slo,vaJk generation to
take the responsiJM.lity for trhe devel01p.merut of affairs, is Dr.
Joseph Kinschlbamn. Not only firom the view.point of evo[utionary necessity, bwt chiefly because he grrusped 1:!his complex of questions sensibly and soientificahly, KiTsch!baum,
since the end of World War II, prepared and pu.fbliished numemus d.Jisserta;tions and studies which aiim to prove to the
wor+ld that Sfova:ks have t!heir own modern poilitica,l con-
34
SLOVAKIA
ceiption amJd also people who display an animruted an:d
interest ~111 the problem of a fedel'a!lirzed ffiurolpe.
'Siimill'a dy, other SIJ.avak ipoliltical wOII1kers, publ!idats and
wriiters, tea/Che.rs a!Ild iinltellootuals are worlmnig for a federation (Dr. Iilin.amJUel Bohm, Dr. Francis Hrusovsky, Reiv.
Niicho'las Siprinc, Dr. Joseph Mi!lrus, Dr. JO'Seph Cieker, Tu-.
Imrrich KrUIZlia:k, Dr . .A;r.ved Grr-ebert., Louis IVcmdra and
many othem).
In contemporary trends of Sllorvaik politics the most
foscinalting connedt:ling lilnk is the idea of federa,tion. Thruruk. !imig in a pradtiicaJl way, i1t is imipossiible to picture a Slovalk
p,oliitician or pol'ilticaJ theorist who seriiously de<~ls wiltih the
idea of lar,ge un1its, s'U/Ch as a Cerubrrul-Ewropeam or Eiulropean federation WOllfild be, and wOllNd wish to lead his nation
along the path oif inltoierance and of nationally scOIUTg'ed
p8JSISions.
Therefore, tJhe Slovaks and t!heir politiicrul and oUJlrtural
representatives are not ibwillding a diam on the poinlted edge
of chaUMiin:iSlm, but adhere to the notion of a futm-·e EUTopean federation.
IV
U'IllU'Sual
]t is interesting to note that it was chiefly rthe Czech
Socialistic pam'ties wlhreh both in Czechia and Siovalkia ooleashed the most saiv-age conflict about the unfilty of the
"Czeclhoslavialk" langwa.ge. 'Dhe same parties who diid not
forget to pdse even in our country as progressive prurties.
in oocoirdlalllCe to Marxislt ideolo.g y. Iif tJhe Slov3/k naltion
opposed this the'ir "progress," then it was in a lar,ge meaiswre becaJUJse they ibrOll.lglht confusion inlto the tiundamenitaJ
oonceipts of polliitiiJool Iiife, and, in fact, reaction which excludes aiN criticism. Czech socl,rulism has shown ilbself as the
pioneer of f,r ustrruted thinking, and if we tiram:sfer i'ts conception to a practlicall field, we see that it has 1,i1dikuled iltself
as has no otller move1ment whiibh had anything to do, directly or indirectly, wti.th the SlO!Vak natioo..
For twenty fuM yerurs, Ozecll poliitiios tenaciously held
to ''OzoohO'SlovaikiSin" as a sally bridge into S'lov:alkia. Other
Ozedh parties ad/Opted thlis slogan from the socirulists. Scientists seized wpon i1t and were fuhlowed by OI.ech journalists.
SLOVAKIA
35
And thus, in fact, a period ensued when representatirves of
Ozech spirit and prruatioa1 pdliitircs were more enraged in
gaining a position for the artificial construdtion of "OzechiQslavaJkism" than a real settlement of relaitionshi1ps among
'the minorilties Indisputably we muist thank their inC'ons!i.derate, one-si'ded and undemocratic pol1'tiicail program fo:r
the faot 1:hat Prague centralism found irt:se'lf in ruirrs wilt!h
the first thrust.
The so-called "Czechoslovaks" have denied the Slovaiks the right to self-existence. The Slo,v ak naltion, nevertheless, persistently fought for the recognition otf this most
naturaJl right. And it did so in harmony witlh cmltural
Europe, which no one, except the Communhrts labeled as
reactionary or backward. In politica! morals, tile stirug,gle
for the recognition of the suptreme riig1hlts of a nation signifies, in ,t he .p ositive sense d:f the ward, the most noble expression of progressiveness. The Slovaks, therefore, a.ire ahead
of the Ozetdhs in thlis re~ard by t!hirtty years.
Many exipeniments were .necessary to reform. the "Czechoslovruks" rut least prurtliail'1.y. There had to be a war - for
tfrlem new exiperieniceis both on the domestic and fureig.n
fronts. Once moce they had ,t o ascertain the mmd of the
S'lO,VM{ nation, to scrutinize the trends of European and nonIDuropean politilc's, so that rome of them ta:o'tica.1.[,y, others
per1haps sincerely, woulld rubandon the ruinous policy of
•~czeichosllO'V'alkifum." After WoI"ld War H, less was said albout
"OzeclhO's:lovaJk" unity and, partliculrurly, about a united lan.guiage. It mu'Slt be mentioned again, tha.'t :the most Ulillprog.ressirve of all in this regarrtl were the ~etch Socialists. The
otfrler Czech polrnicians and theiT Slovak a.Hies rewgn.ized the
right of the Sfovruk nation to its own existence .
But at that time the Slovaks were more advanced. They
had gone through the hist.orically rich segment of their own
state. ft is certain that there is a greait deaft of difference
between "Oze1ehosi1ova'k" comprehension - it stilil is bound
Uip with a joint state aind the standipdinrt: of t!he Slovaks.
To get ruhead by means oif a steady for-warn effort and in aiM
farms - to find what benefi't!s best t!he 11:fe am.d development
of the nation - the SlovaJks provoo that they rure marehing
36
SLOVAKIA
in 1:Jhe spirit of the ,t imes and, as an independenlt ,and competitiive ,_po1fficai unit, seek to persevere aloll!gside the most
cmltwred European naltions.
Toda,y, ffiurope ,is ffillllch frul"bher a'long t'he way than the
"0zec'ho,SilovaJks." Theorelti.cafily and practica'lliy it i,s prepa,r ed
for a federation of ai1l nations. The so-caUed "Czecihoslova'k1s " are ait tJhe crossroa;dis. Some a~ere to the form of the
fiirt;t Ozecho-!SlovaJk Repuiblic, while others rure silent and
say nolt!hlil!g a!boult a forurtlh or fitfth Czecho-Slova.!k Repulblic
for whiich they would want to fight. StillJ. others ta:l:k obscurely about the possibillity of a federafted Czecho·~SIJ.oivakia.
There i's allso a founth 0zech g,r1oop whi'ch does not wish to
interfere in Slova!k affaiiI"S and i's f[gh'ting for a CentralEuropean or IDwopean federation in w'hiich it reckons wilth
an inde,pendent Czech Ulnit and a separate Sloivaik unilt.
On tlhe ort:her hand, conltemporary SIJ.ovak ,p oHtits is following clearly and .ll!nreserveidly whait is best for an inde,pendenrt Sl01Vak State wli:thin the framework of a European
federation. Compari.Il!g 1:Jhe effort's of t'he "Czechoslava1ki:;"
wi'bh those of the Sl0iv-alks, we see, that even now there is a
brusiic dliifrferenice b.e'tween them and that "CzechoSl01Va:k,i sm"
wppears in the role of the mo'sit reactionary factor in Central
Ewrope.
But, willy-nilly, some of its representatiives have come
oloser to the tlhinking of the .S1'oivaJk nati:on and ,g radually
are rcliinquish~n,g their b1goited and ar,chaii.c views. Hoiweiver,
t'here stiifl remains the difference of thirty yerurs.
We can, therefore, clearly see from these .s imply-staited
realities thaJt llhe sen:se of SlovaJk pol,i rtks tended toward
a broader lilirI10ipean and worM society. There its a basic
diffeirence whether we get into tJhi,s broader so'o iety of nations throrugh owr OiWll doors, or wihether we shalJ.l be led
m'to it throrugh foreign dooirs wiit!h those of others; whether
we wm lodk ,pa.ssi.rvely lllpOn the work, or whether we shali
talke part in ilt w~tJh joint forces.
A IDuropean fed:era/tlion will bring run end to these
mistaJkes. We are det:inilteliy decfarin1g for a European associatioo, becruuse, rucicording to moral,s , ciulltll!re and p<Ylitical
ma!tuirity, we rightfully beloD!g in it.
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Title
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The Practical Aspect of a Federation
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Pauco, Ph. D.
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 26-36
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Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975
Date
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July 1953
SNK
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/897116960dab5f9b4d9855af6c6c4ab7.pdf
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Text
SLOVAKIA
37
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
HRICOV
The ruins of Hni 001v (IHiritcllov) Castle m the Trencin
Distriot aire the smallest orf thO'se which stud the Vah vialley. At ()IIl.e time it was connected with the Sul'O!V Castle by a
road whildh sna'ked i'ts way over tlhe ,rMJge:s of mountains.
The ruins of Hiri.1co,v rest on a steep roc:k wit!h whi:c!h the rem'a ins of the waJ111s are. grown toge'fuer. The rulins are almlQls't ih'atelcess;iJble. The s,u mmiit on which the :mins rest is
one of the last sipll'I's orf the St'.rl'ov Roiciks, and tlhe castle
reaUy loolks like a ,rOlbber's hideout.
1
Hric·ov, it seems did not m'8Jke history, thoUJgh a document from 1'265 mentions it and chronicles say that the
castle wa'S buHt iby one Kia1i:jan, .the manager of the Bytca
Castile. The story goes tihia t t!he Lehar robber clan took it
from Kriliijan arud held it for many years. When the widOIW
of the la;st ~har d!ied, the caJSt'le rpassed on to her adopted
son, Franiciis Thur,zo. ~rom rtJhe time of Blazej Podmanin
(1496) 1Jhe f1ate of Htiicloiv was closely tied up wi'th 1Jhat of
Byitca and: the Lieitav<a Castle.
After the deatih of the 1'ast Lehar, his widow ,r emained
in SO'l'rOW for three years, as. it wrus ouistorrl'ary in those
time!S. Hricoiv was a s;aJd and mournfu1l place. But rufter three
years the gates orf Hricoiv weire thrown open to receive
guests. Among the hopeifo1 caillers, who exipeeted to wed the
widow of Hriicov, was Frandis Tht1ir210, t!he you~g and gallant
owner of ithe neig1hlbo,r ing Lietaiva •s ltronghold. Thrur,zo had
his eye on Hricov for some time and wrus de'term'ine'd to get
i,t even if 'he had to marry the aging Leharr wiidow. The widow took a f1aney to 'Dhruirz•o, ,b ut told him t!hait marriage
was out af the questi'()IIl becalllSe orf her age. But she did
ad'opt him as her son and maJde him heir of her possessions .
'DhuJ:1zo, it seeims, soon became tired of waiting for hi's "mother" to die, so he decided to truke possession of Hricov by
foul means.
One ni.ghlt he oirdered his men to seize her and imprison her in the dungeon. The following morning Francis an-
�38
SLOVAKIA
nOUDJCed that the wlidow had become mental11y unbalanced
and had ito be placed in the dungeon. But Ftranci's Thurzo,
to keep his evil deed wvered Ulp at all times, had to be oo
glll'ard am.d ,t hat v.irtuiailly made him a prisoner in the castle
also. And so the years roB.e!d. on.
The legend has it thait a monk approached the castle
pO!rtaJls, made knolW'Il his ,p resence with his stafd', and begged
a mght''S lodging. Thwrzo ordered the monk away. The latter ,t urned Ulpon Thuma and threatened to di,sdose th€
haugfu..ty lard's orime. Thu11"2Jo flared up and 'Set his dogs on
the monk. Bult the moolk returned and toid Thurzo to do
penance. Thunzo, in turn, ordered his men to seize the monk,
beat him Ulp, cast lhfilll into the dungeon and starved him to
death. In the meantime fea:r .ruled Hlrifov and Thurao himself was losing his nerwe. While ,t he monlk was starving, his
ima;ge ilil stone ,beg,an to grow before the castle entrance.
Thwrzo had the petrified monk smashed to bits, but the
following mornmg the same petrified monk stood guard at
his door. This was too mucih even for Tihuirzo. Overcome by
compurnc,tion and fear, he decided to iet the Lehar widow
h•aive !her freediom. He set out for the dungeon with hisserv,anits - on1y to find the widow dead.
Thurno .became 1Jhe sole owner of Hricov at last. But
he did not stay for 1ong; his servants fled one by one and,
fina['ly, evern 'J:1hurzo aibantloned the haunlted castle. In time
H11icov foll into de-caiy. Bu:t the legend goes on to say th'at
the peitrifd.ed monlk stilil stands witness to 1:Jhe crime of F,rancis Thuirzo at the castle entrance. The S1~wa:ks liiV'i!ng in the
vioiruty of HricolV, however, say that Thurzo did not get
away so easily with hls crime. T.hey claim that he actually
did lO'Se his mind and committed suicide by jumipin!g off the
ca$tle wa'tl into the precipice below. At nd,g1ht the pitifll!l
cries anrl screams cxf tJhe imprisoned widow coulld be heard
by the V'fill:agers below. And Thnrr:z:o, beca:u:se o,f his crime,
evern rur.ter death wandered restlessly aJbout the vicinri:ty od'
Hr.icov . .Alf1ter Tihurno's death, the 1100k on whkh Hricov was
built burst into flames which ruined everything. That is the
st'Olry being passed on by generrutlions of Slovaks from
Hrioov.
�
SLOVAKIA
37
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
HRICOV
The ruins of Hni 001v (IHiritcllov) Castle m the Trencin
Distriot aire the smallest orf thO'se which stud the Vah vialley. At ()IIl.e time it was connected with the Sul'O!V Castle by a
road whildh sna'ked i'ts way over tlhe ,rMJge:s of mountains.
The ruins of Hiri.1co,v rest on a steep roc:k wit!h whi:c!h the rem'a ins of the waJ111s are. grown toge'fuer. The rulins are almlQls't ih'atelcess;iJble. The s,u mmiit on which the :mins rest is
one of the last sipll'I's orf the St'.rl'ov Roiciks, and tlhe castle
reaUy loolks like a ,rOlbber's hideout.
1
Hric·ov, it seems did not m'8Jke history, thoUJgh a document from 1'265 mentions it and chronicles say that the
castle wa'S buHt iby one Kia1i:jan, .the manager of the Bytca
Castile. The story goes tihia t t!he Lehar robber clan took it
from Kriliijan arud held it for many years. When the widOIW
of the la;st ~har d!ied, the caJSt'le rpassed on to her adopted
son, Franiciis Thur,zo. ~rom rtJhe time of Blazej Podmanin
(1496) 1Jhe f1ate of Htiicloiv was closely tied up wi'th 1Jhat of
Byitca and: the Lieitav<a Castle.
After the deatih of the 1'ast Lehar, his widow ,r emained
in SO'l'rOW for three years, as. it wrus ouistorrl'ary in those
time!S. Hricoiv was a s;aJd and mournfu1l place. But rufter three
years the gates orf Hricoiv weire thrown open to receive
guests. Among the hopeifo1 caillers, who exipeeted to wed the
widow of Hriicov, was Frandis Tht1ir210, t!he you~g and gallant
owner of ithe neig1hlbo,r ing Lietaiva •s ltronghold. Thrur,zo had
his eye on Hricov for some time and wrus de'term'ine'd to get
i,t even if 'he had to marry the aging Leharr wiidow. The widow took a f1aney to 'Dhruirz•o, ,b ut told him t!hait marriage
was out af the questi'()IIl becalllSe orf her age. But she did
ad'opt him as her son and maJde him heir of her possessions .
'DhuJ:1zo, it seeims, soon became tired of waiting for hi's "mother" to die, so he decided to truke possession of Hricov by
foul means.
One ni.ghlt he oirdered his men to seize her and imprison her in the dungeon. The following morning Francis an-
�38
SLOVAKIA
nOUDJCed that the wlidow had become mental11y unbalanced
and had ito be placed in the dungeon. But Ftranci's Thurzo,
to keep his evil deed wvered Ulp at all times, had to be oo
glll'ard am.d ,t hat v.irtuiailly made him a prisoner in the castle
also. And so the years roB.e!d. on.
The legend has it thait a monk approached the castle
pO!rtaJls, made knolW'Il his ,p resence with his stafd', and begged
a mght''S lodging. Thwrzo ordered the monk away. The latter ,t urned Ulpon Thuma and threatened to di,sdose th€
haugfu..ty lard's orime. Thu11"2Jo flared up and 'Set his dogs on
the monk. Bult the moolk returned and toid Thurzo to do
penance. Thunzo, in turn, ordered his men to seize the monk,
beat him Ulp, cast lhfilll into the dungeon and starved him to
death. In the meantime fea:r .ruled Hlrifov and Thurao himself was losing his nerwe. While ,t he monlk was starving, his
ima;ge ilil stone ,beg,an to grow before the castle entrance.
Thwrzo had the petrified monk smashed to bits, but the
following mornmg the same petrified monk stood guard at
his door. This was too mucih even for Tihuirzo. Overcome by
compurnc,tion and fear, he decided to iet the Lehar widow
h•aive !her freediom. He set out for the dungeon with hisserv,anits - on1y to find the widow dead.
Thurno .became 1Jhe sole owner of Hricov at last. But
he did not stay for 1ong; his servants fled one by one and,
fina['ly, evern 'J:1hurzo aibantloned the haunlted castle. In time
H11icov foll into de-caiy. Bu:t the legend goes on to say th'at
the peitrifd.ed monlk stilil stands witness to 1:Jhe crime of F,rancis Thuirzo at the castle entrance. The S1~wa:ks liiV'i!ng in the
vioiruty of HricolV, however, say that Thurzo did not get
away so easily with hls crime. T.hey claim that he actually
did lO'Se his mind and committed suicide by jumipin!g off the
ca$tle wa'tl into the precipice below. At nd,g1ht the pitifll!l
cries anrl screams cxf tJhe imprisoned widow coulld be heard
by the V'fill:agers below. And Thnrr:z:o, beca:u:se o,f his crime,
evern rur.ter death wandered restlessly aJbout the vicinri:ty od'
Hr.icov . .Alf1ter Tihurno's death, the 1100k on whkh Hricov was
built burst into flames which ruined everything. That is the
st'Olry being passed on by generrutlions of Slovaks from
Hrioov.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
37
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
HRICOV
The ruins of Hni 001v (IHiritcllov) Castle m the Trencin
Distriot aire the smallest orf thO'se which stud the Vah vialley. At ()IIl.e time it was connected with the Sul'O!V Castle by a
road whildh sna'ked i'ts way over tlhe ,rMJge:s of mountains.
The ruins of Hiri.1co,v rest on a steep roc:k wit!h whi:c!h the rem'a ins of the waJ111s are. grown toge'fuer. The rulins are almlQls't ih'atelcess;iJble. The s,u mmiit on which the :mins rest is
one of the last sipll'I's orf the St'.rl'ov Roiciks, and tlhe castle
reaUy loolks like a ,rOlbber's hideout.
1
Hric·ov, it seems did not m'8Jke history, thoUJgh a document from 1'265 mentions it and chronicles say that the
castle wa'S buHt iby one Kia1i:jan, .the manager of the Bytca
Castile. The story goes tihia t t!he Lehar robber clan took it
from Kriliijan arud held it for many years. When the widOIW
of the la;st ~har d!ied, the caJSt'le rpassed on to her adopted
son, Franiciis Thur,zo. ~rom rtJhe time of Blazej Podmanin
(1496) 1Jhe f1ate of Htiicloiv was closely tied up wi'th 1Jhat of
Byitca and: the Lieitav<a Castle.
After the deatih of the 1'ast Lehar, his widow ,r emained
in SO'l'rOW for three years, as. it wrus ouistorrl'ary in those
time!S. Hricoiv was a s;aJd and mournfu1l place. But rufter three
years the gates orf Hricoiv weire thrown open to receive
guests. Among the hopeifo1 caillers, who exipeeted to wed the
widow of Hriicov, was Frandis Tht1ir210, t!he you~g and gallant
owner of ithe neig1hlbo,r ing Lietaiva •s ltronghold. Thrur,zo had
his eye on Hricov for some time and wrus de'term'ine'd to get
i,t even if 'he had to marry the aging Leharr wiidow. The widow took a f1aney to 'Dhruirz•o, ,b ut told him t!hait marriage
was out af the questi'()IIl becalllSe orf her age. But she did
ad'opt him as her son and maJde him heir of her possessions .
'DhuJ:1zo, it seeims, soon became tired of waiting for hi's "mother" to die, so he decided to truke possession of Hricov by
foul means.
One ni.ghlt he oirdered his men to seize her and imprison her in the dungeon. The following morning Francis an-
38
SLOVAKIA
nOUDJCed that the wlidow had become mental11y unbalanced
and had ito be placed in the dungeon. But Ftranci's Thurzo,
to keep his evil deed wvered Ulp at all times, had to be oo
glll'ard am.d ,t hat v.irtuiailly made him a prisoner in the castle
also. And so the years roB.e!d. on.
The legend has it thait a monk approached the castle
pO!rtaJls, made knolW'Il his ,p resence with his stafd', and begged
a mght''S lodging. Thwrzo ordered the monk away. The latter ,t urned Ulpon Thuma and threatened to di,sdose th€
haugfu..ty lard's orime. Thu11"2Jo flared up and 'Set his dogs on
the monk. Bult the moolk returned and toid Thurzo to do
penance. Thunzo, in turn, ordered his men to seize the monk,
beat him Ulp, cast lhfilll into the dungeon and starved him to
death. In the meantime fea:r .ruled Hlrifov and Thurao himself was losing his nerwe. While ,t he monlk was starving, his
ima;ge ilil stone ,beg,an to grow before the castle entrance.
Thwrzo had the petrified monk smashed to bits, but the
following mornmg the same petrified monk stood guard at
his door. This was too mucih even for Tihuirzo. Overcome by
compurnc,tion and fear, he decided to iet the Lehar widow
h•aive !her freediom. He set out for the dungeon with hisserv,anits - on1y to find the widow dead.
Thurno .became 1Jhe sole owner of Hricov at last. But
he did not stay for 1ong; his servants fled one by one and,
fina['ly, evern 'J:1hurzo aibantloned the haunlted castle. In time
H11icov foll into de-caiy. Bu:t the legend goes on to say th'at
the peitrifd.ed monlk stilil stands witness to 1:Jhe crime of F,rancis Thuirzo at the castle entrance. The S1~wa:ks liiV'i!ng in the
vioiruty of HricolV, however, say that Thurzo did not get
away so easily with hls crime. T.hey claim that he actually
did lO'Se his mind and committed suicide by jumipin!g off the
ca$tle wa'tl into the precipice below. At nd,g1ht the pitifll!l
cries anrl screams cxf tJhe imprisoned widow coulld be heard
by the V'fill:agers below. And Thnrr:z:o, beca:u:se o,f his crime,
evern rur.ter death wandered restlessly aJbout the vicinri:ty od'
Hr.icov . .Alf1ter Tihurno's death, the 1100k on whkh Hricov was
built burst into flames which ruined everything. That is the
st'Olry being passed on by generrutlions of Slovaks from
Hrioov.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Hričov
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 37-38
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a15debfb5d6d1ab2940f0d9a0159c322.pdf
764e50b948cc470aff2359cbfcb1c1bd
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
39
THREE MONTHS IN "LIBERAT ED" BRATISLA VA
BY: AN EYEWITNES S
Urut'hl 1944 tJhe capiW city of S10V1akira, Bralbis1ava, lived
far remoived from mililtaey operations. Ltfe wars a,,1together
nor,ma;J. both c1.1llltmraUy and sodaiJ.l.y. 'Dhe siltuation dhanged.
sU!bstantli.la!ley after Italy wars occuipied, when Bratislava came
withi111 the range of the alliied air :f.iorce.
Mirl itary oib'jeldt:s of Bratisl ruva were first bombed rby the
al'lied aiir force in the focenooo. of June 16, 1944. The "ApO'llo" ref.inery, the adjacenit faotory and lha!1bor quarters we.re
hit. But indrirscriminaite Russian 1b om11:iing was more fatal.
Soviet flliers did not specialize on miiitairy objects, but let
bombs loose anyiw\here in the city. They ce11ba:irillry did not
glorify themselves witih the 1bombing of SpitMsrka street,
where tlhey destroyed a church, a convent and the hospital
of St. EliizaJbeth. Sorviet planes ruppea:red aibove Braitislava
on Holy Satu,rdary and peppered the civi[fans on the crowded
streets with tlherir deck guns. The front had moved up consideraJblly and Soviielt p:lranes were comin,g over practically
every houir to drop their b.ombs into the streets.
1
Easter 1945 in Bratislava
During Holy Weelk it. was evident to most of us that
the Germa'I1S were preparing ,t o defend Bratisfav.a. The streets
were emptied, bM'ricades were constructed , huge g'uns were
put u,p The Germans themsel;ves, '.however, did not appear
to be very interested in tlhe defense of our ctity and hauled
whaitever they couftd out of it. 'Dhe units whkJh remained
were to be used to c01Ver the retrea,ting Germans. The Ger-•
man com.man.der urged the Slovak Governmen t to leave Bratislava. Since only a small number of Germans remained,
it was ~rieved that tJhey were not going to defend the city
very lon.g. The poipuilation co'l.tld not decide whether to leave
tbe ciity or stay putt. Sa.Jturday evening everything was being
taiken into cel10Jrs and hritl!ing places. The monotonou s bomibing of the Russian air force, the ofose booming of cannons
annOIUll1Ced that the Russians we.re a:pproachin g steadily U111spea.JkaJble ne:rrV'O!U'Sness gr.~pped the crirty. AH the men h~d
�40
SLOVAKIA
themselves, booaiuse iJt was said thait the Germans were going
to taJke rull 1!he men out of Braitislava.
On Easter Sunday, at nine o'dock in the morning, Soviet fliers aigain ffilade them- appearance and in the afternoon huge Russian g,uns were 'bombarding Bralti:slava. The
we'l!l-.Jmown Ruissian "Kaltuse", also da!lled "1Sta~ iln'is organs,"
began to pJ.ay the following day, i.e., Easter Monday. Every.
thiinig shook to the foundatio!l'S and fires hroike out in many
p'lia;ces. T,h e retreating Germans fired the SloV'ak University
and ala the reserwe piiles of food and war maJterials. Thick
smoike rose from Bratiis'lruva for three days and three niighlbs,
and the fire sprerud because there were neither waiter nor the
pe01ple to f,i ght tlhe fires. The heaviiest fii:ghting took place in
the ea'S'tern paJI't of the cilty, where praeitiic~ly every factory
quariter wrus ruined, the stireets of Trnruva and Krizna,
Stein's Brewery and the viJcinity.
On 'l'uesday tlhe Gemnans began to f11ee, destroying
every;th'i ng that had n~t a-lre'ad,y <been desitvoyed. They blew
u1p the bridge ,to PetrizJalka and the last g,rowp bariricruded iltself in the Braitis,la,va Castrle. The Russians aiready were in
the sulburbs of Bratislava, when the Germans in the western
hil!J.s of the c1ty began cannonading it. Thiis hurl BTati'slava
the moist. On Thursday morning fue first Russian d'i•visions
were in the very heart oif the city. Graduailly the booming
died aiway and the streets began to be filled w1th Russian
soldiers.
The "Liberation" Begins
1
The SolV'iet soldiers first Hib.e.rated us from our watches
with their well-tlmown "Davaj easy" (Give your waltches).
EX!cept for solldiers, tlhe streets were empty; on1y coz,pses
were being b alked in .the sipring sun. After a few days, when
we cra.,wled out of our bunlkers and cellairs., we saiw the
ghastly pioture of ruin anld desolation.
Sffiloke s,tii-1 ro!Hed out of buildings and 1:lhe atmosphere
was. satwrated Wli'th dust and gunpowder. Glass wa·s ground
under foolt. Rdl::fueries were in fU'l'l swing. Soviet soidiers
brdke windows of business places with their rule butts and
sa-cked and pitMaiged everything. A few dats later, not a
sitIJ.g1le shop remamed whO'le. Wh'atever could rrot be taken
�SLOVAKIA
41
was knocked to pieces. Of course, the l'a wless mob helped
very efferdtive1y in thi's work. Reports. olf the raping of
women began coming in. It was nothing um.t'sua!l to see
franltic W()lffien rUIUNng wildly from their aJttaokeirs; they
sm-eamed, k'iciked and fought, -but to no avail. The 'hordes
of the RUJSsii'an steppe's were on the loose. Who shall desc,dbe the sta.rk terror- in the eyes of the Slo;v:ak women and
girls who 00U!l.1d not get away f,r -()lffi the beasts olf Moscow?
Even ii£ I tmoo, I believe that my pen woul:d have to blush
if it had to detail the brutalities and abroc'~ties committed.
There is no need to exipand on :the fate of many, many women,
who remained lya.ng in their bllood aflter such a ba'I1barian
shaw of "a!f.feotion" of the Sov,i et soldiers. They to,l d us
that it was the "nationa!l duty" o.f the S1avaJk women to repay the So'Vliet arimies rih love!
Vinko, Vinko, Vinko Cervene
We thOUJght that SlovaJk wiine would not attract the Soviets after tJhey had tasted of strong Tokay in Hurngary.
Bult we were mi!stJaken even tJhis time (as usu:a1). Slovak
wine memhanits di:d not wanit to sel'l us wine since January,
becau:se they had 'hiOiped to sell it at a high price to the Soviet sohliers. But how quijic,k1ly they soibered UJP, when, instead of the jingle-jangle of gCJld 11ulbles, they he:ard shots
from rifiles anld. aUlbomaitics in their otherwise irnmcessible
ceUars. Barrels were shot wp and the precious liquid o.f the
Slova1k earth began flowing; first into pitchers an'<i all so!'ts
of containers, dean and uncilean, even bernzine cans. When aU
these were fi'1le'd, tlhe wine t11ic'k:led iruto soLdieirs' boots, then
flowed over the cellars and vestilbll!les an'<i finaliy onto. the
streets. Tos strong aroma mixed w1th the gih:astly stench of
decayiing cO'l",pses, whk:h even after a week were stili lying
on the sidewaiJ.ks. of the city. The soldiers drank and so d<id
the civilians; ch!iMren drank and so did the oldsters. It
seemed that the barrels were bottomless. "Viniko, vinko, vinko cerivene" (Wtine, wine, red wine - a popclaT Slovak
drinlking song) !
I shail1l never forget tJhe tovaris-comrade who had two
botJtles of reld. champaigne stucik in his fuT crup, a bottle in
�42
SLOVAKIA
eadh. pocket and his hands full. He was approached by another comrade whn .rolblbed hiim on the street of his precious
bu.Tden in broad d'a.yuilghlt. The two lashed at each other
li'ke antlmals and drew blood on the 'ha.rd pavement of Kapitulska street.
Bratishwa wine merchants. 'loolk ed on stupidly and
si.'lently ait this Sodiomic destruction of their cellars, and the
SO!Ulr odor of the wine reminded them of the old times, when
they were s'till:l. bosses of their wine and thought that they
themselrves wolU.ld ·haive the honor to treat the "liberat0rs."
They rea[irz;eJd tlhe bitter truth that they we·r e "liberated," i.e.
comip1etely roiblbed of all their world!ly possessions on the
very threshold of a neiw life, the new order promised by the
men of the K.re:rnUn.
Where Do You Stay, Tovaris?
If you were in the aI1II1y, you know w'hat obedience and
di'Scilplme means. Withoult bhe:rn, there hardly could be an
effecltiive rurmy. A soldier beil.ong,s to some particular company or di'Vlisi:on, must haJVe his gear, be fed and quartered,
even th<Ylligh it be under a tent or in a barn. Bult the Soviet
soltl!iers wlho swa:runed iiruto Bratislava had no definite quarters and, hence, were everywhere. Usuany aJbout midnight
it occurred to· tihe:rn that they had to get some sleep, so the,y
began to looik for shelter. Door:s and lodks and bars were no
hindrance. Wihether of glass or wood, doors were booted in
or smasheJd wiitJh rifile butts, if they were niot opened immediately.
"You, bourgeoisie, you did not fighlt ... "
Threatened, 1:Jhere wa·s nothing one cou[d c1o bult flee
from .h is own home and consider himse1f liUCky if he was
not shot- A soldier does not undress for sleep very oflte:n
at the fuiont, bult Ivan the RUJSsian never ll!Ildressed even
when he had a bed, bwt simply piled on the bed f.wl1y g,ar,bed,
'boots, rifle, pi•s tols, grena:des and a:M. And the frolllt was
sixty miles away from us.
Investigation After Investigation
We thought the war was over when the slh!ooting subsided and the boomdng resounded f.rom a dristanice. We began
�SLOVAKIA
43
to clean the streets, coll!lect the dead, and put whatever was
left oif ,ouir homes in order. A ,penson slO!Wly fongets what he
lost, because onlly then, when he did not die during the
bomfbardment, does he reaili.ize that it is beaultiifiu[ to live,
even tJhoug'h in feaJr, hunger rund thirst, and in raJgs. Things
tha,t were a.ire no more, and other things tfhat were not will
oome into being. L'iife is all that matters. On'l,y he knows the
reail meamng of water and light who has li,v ed thI10UJgh the
terror of the front in hiding wilthoult light and water. I.Me
will returm to iits dld ways and time wiH heal aJhl wounds ()If
the soiwl a,nd bod,y ()If inld.wii.dUJaJl's and nations.
Well, wlh,y shoUJld nO/t a person a:gaJin imagine that liJfe
can be beruuttilfiull, when he is sitting on tile 'l'Uins ()If his home
~nd the ashes of hi1s dreams? Why, there is no more bc»nibing and even the streets are lighted up in the evenings.
Buit empty a.ire the inns, empty are the ce11'3JI"s, empty
are tJhe stores and shops Brolken windows and smashed
doors attest tJo the min which the Soviet soldiers had
WOOU1ght. But the wihl to live r,i,ses alb,ove all this. We must
forget everyttJhing thaJt pruined us, a.IN the in:justi<Ces, subdue
om thd,r st for blood, when the sap of a new spring is
awakening, when everythfun.g is being ren01Vateld, everything
is in bloom, the thrush sings and the chiildren play.
Burt aH this is but a dream, an ~lluision. '.Dhe 'b attle has
ended on the streets, but just the sa:me a mare fiurious invi:siib1e baittle is going on. As you step out of your home, you
are co,nrfronlted with tJhe bayonet o;f a Russian soldier or the
various "safety" ciommittees. You look a:rO'llnd and notice
that yornr home, nay the whole street is sUJITounded by
guards. You re'tl.l!rn h'llITTriedly to your room and wait to see
what wiM h'appen. Y.ou wait and wait and waJit unti[ the sUISpense aJlrrnost d11ives you mad. Your blood thins in your veins
and you look sadly aJbowt you - and wait! F'iinaMy they
came, sO'l1d iers and civiili ians: they go through the house and
take whatever they want. '.Dhey ask you whether you are a
GeI1IDan or not, whebher any Germans or "coll'<llbaratilonists"
a,re in your house. You lod.k them icily in the face. 'Tihey depart but only to come rugruin.
�44
SLOVAKIA
Organs of Security
Mter two weeks oif the Russian occupation everything
was phmdered. People had no more than they had buried or
secreted in such a place where even the Russian hunters and t,hey are eXlpe'tUy schooled in the art of flinding wailled-in
objects - would not come. There was a clirth oif everything,
even a serforus lack of bread. But we had plenty o.f police!
They sprang Ulp like m:ushrnoms aflter a rain. In t'he first
place, ,t he dreaded NKVD (OGPU), the Secret So,vi•e t Police, n10toirioo~ for its birurt:al and ghasitl;y crimes. Woe to him
that faHis intto its hanids. The NiKViD goes from home to
home, drags peoipile aiway and nolbody ever hears of their
fate. Fvom eastern S'JO'V'aJkia alone more tihan 4,000 peo~e
were draigiged oiff into Siiberia.
I was fonbunate to be 'home during the investigation.
AU the en'tralllces to the 'bwil.ding were covered by soldiers
wit!h a:utomattics. I •t r:wersed my room ne.rvous•ly. A'lthough
I had a c:leair clon1science, yet I was di-squited. (No one is sufficiently olear or safe with the Soviet Po[ice) . Finally I
wenlt into the haiJ.llway. I was greeted by a soMier and a civilian. A IDQlfilenrt later came the caiptain. He asked me my
naJme, what I wa:s doing here, what my profession was, and
wheither I was a mem1ber orf IIlin:ka's People'1s Parity.
A mac1hinist l,iived on the same floo,r. His room was
locketl. Tlhe caiptain OII'<lered me to open it. "I haven't the
key," I told hlm. The maic!hini.st had the key and the soldiers had him in hand alt the gate. I ran to the gate. The
NKVD g,u1a rd had an a.ultomatti~ on the machinist. I approached him and said that tlhe c~pta;in wants to open the
machinist's room, but the madh~nrist had the key. The latter alre'ardy wanted to hand it to me, when the s:o'ldier suddenly tuirned the aurt:omatiic on me and said: "You ha.ve the
key" - "'BUit I dlo not have t'he key, the madhinlist has it"
- "No, you will 'h,ruve it, if the caiptain says so." - "But I
do not have it; loolk, tovaris, the machimst has. it." - "No,
I have a.Qready told you that you wi-11 have the key and will
open the door, when the captam orders you to do so."
I was dumlbfounded by the profound stU1piclilty and returned without t1he key. I told the captain thait the to:varis
�SLOVAKIA
45
wowd not let me take the key from the machinist because,
he said, the captain had ordered me and not the machinist
to open the room. I also was a sOJldier and I know whait military dbedience means. Bult this cannot be called obedience,
but some kind of unmentionaJble stupidilty or i!Illfbecility
which wouid be capable of sticking pins under my fingernails just to find a key on me whirch I do not haive. I realized
then wlhy people, during the investigaltions in tJhe tortrure
cha.im!bers of the NKVD, confess to things which they never
committed.
The invest1gation began at seven in the morning and
lasted un1ti'l nine. I went to town on business arrd returned
a1boU1t eleven. Upon my arr,ivai the building was a·gai,n surrounded biy guards, but this time by the Prurtisans Security
c:1it.
I wanted to enter the bui'1ding, but they wouid not let
me. I identified myse1f and said that I ld.ved there. Finailly
a boy, about 17, wit:Jh an automatic in his hands, let me
enter. It was very liive:ly in the hallways. The partrsa,n captain was giving orders. I did not know wh1at they were seeiking. I went through the investigation tortures again, but
qUJite fortunately. Again aftl the rooms, closets, desks, and
dressing cabinets were opened. The investigation was over at
about one o'ciock. Again some innocent peoiple were taken.
But that was not alt That was onJy t'he beginning.
Night feJ.,l and the stars shone brighUy over Br.atislava.
Finany, a lilttle rest, I thought But there is no restful or
peaceful night duiring a Russian occl..llpaition. A'boUJt midnight I was awa.ikened by some one pounding on my door.
Another investigaition !
I was on my feet in an instant and <jpened the door.
Before me in the semidankness stood a man and a lady. Instead of identifying themselves, t!hey opened their short
coats so that I could see the revolvers in leather 'holsters.
"But, but, this is a spe:cia l visit, and so laite at night!"
"Your documents," said the man.
"Here they a,re, t:hank you."
"Were you a memlber of IDinka's Party?" - "I was."
"Since when?" - "From 1933." - "Were you in the
1
�46
SLOVAKIA
Hlinka Guards?" - "I was not." - "Did you be'1ong to
Hlinlka's Youth?" - "No." - "Are you a So'ld!ieir?" - "I
am an oftfircer in the Sloivalk airnny." - "Did you ta.Ike pa.rt
in the revollit ?" - "No." - "Why not?" - "I was on druty in
Nitra." - "Are you a Slova;k ?" - "I am."
Then they entered my room. On my taJble was a small
bust o{ Andrew Hlin!k'a.
"And .t his?" - "That is a bust of Andrew Hilinlka."
"Hman., we adivi,se you, to destroy irt." - "I don't understand, whiy?" - "Welil, may!be tomorrow you will understand."
Wilth that t'.hey depa,rited. Ait thrr-ee in the morning the
inrve-stigat'ion olf .tlhe secret police was completed.
At eight in the morn.mg came the olffictaJl police, the
so-calied "Naitiona1 Secruritiy" po~ice, to find out who i,t was
thaJt a1hlowro an in1VestigaJtion at mghit when the ipolice knew
nothing aJbout it. "What kind o{ peop1e were they, how did
they look, w:hiat did they want?" I was asked. This then was
the new oroer - so ter:rrilbly dangerous because iit had so
many .srufety biU1reaus thalt one dlid not know aibout the other!
Or did they?
The Bratislava Commander Complains
A month had already passed since the occ'Ulpation of
Bratisla1Va , but the streets were stilil wn:swept; dirt and
ruiblble were everywhere; liice and infectious diseases were
spreading rapidly. 'Ilhe local "National Oommittee" had a
loog session to decirle what to do with the riwbbish and
rull:fule clutterinig and burning in the streets. But how was
the mess to be C'leared ruway, wlhen the Ru'Ssians took an
the city dump trucks, a1l pri,v ate cars and al,l wagons and
horse's ?
Typhoid fever spread danger01Us ly; the numibers of inflicted increased. The Office of P.ropruganda, or, as it was
then called, the "Commissary of InfoTfl'nation" pfa'stered the
city witJh huge plaic-ards depio'ting a s'keleton poUII"iing lice
over BraJtis lava and t'.he wairning : "WATCH THID LICE,
THEY SPREAD TYPHOID. ''
People stared at the placarids and barked: "Bwt who in
�SLOVAKIA
47
tarnation broughlt lice here? Send the lousy Russians baok
to their lousy ooumrtey !"
'I.1he first plwcards had liiittle e.fifoot. Severrul druys later
new ones appeared: Origanilze energeti'C brig,ades of clearuiness ! But Il!cibodiy paid any atJtenMon. The :riUJbbish iblliI'Iled on
and spread its poisonous fiumes over the .popuil.<ati.on. There
were no autos, no wrugons wiith which to do the hau[ing.
Hiarses, oows and siheeip were kept in the panks. The hot
sun blruzeid away and laughingJy loolked at the me!SS, which
the "new" government prdbalbly did not dear aJWay to this
day. And so the skeleton keipt pouring the lice, and t:Jhe placaros aJb,o ut the brig,a des. of cleanliness were covered witlh
new red ones, whicih unged us to attend lec!tUll'es on the
moraie of the SoVli.et man, So:vieit woman, and the Soviet
youth. The Soviet Russians wasted no time in edlucating the
masses accordtinlg to the dootrines orf Marx and Lenin.
A Soviet Soldier Confesses
lit wrus a bea:urtri.:titd June afternoon in K 1rurl'ova Ves near
Bratislava, when a Riu'SSian sOlldier rupproacihed us and struclk
up a oonvwsaiti.on. He reproved us saying tha.Jt we Slovruks
were Ullldiscipllined amid un.gratefUll. We shOIUJd not siay OII' believe tJhat t:Jhe RJussi,ans rure taikin.g everything that can be
ha'l.lll€1d aJWay, booau1se thaJt is only ibrud propaganda. Since
he was in a t~aJtiive mood', and did not have a revolver, we
dooided to malke WIOrds with him.
He spdke at length albout d!i.scipil[n.e in RUISSia, both in
thiin.lk.ing and in spealk~ng. In Slovaki·a, he said, everyone says
whatever he 'Pleases. "ThaJt does not exist in Ruissia. One
must hiO:ld to what St-a!lin says. That is the truth and a.Ill
else is ,proprugantla. Sta!lin to-Id UIS thaJt in Russia everything
iis fine a!nd dandy, everyrtJhin,g is beaut.if.td, that we have
enoUJgh to eait. And even though we know that everything i:s
not fine and dan:dy, be.mt'i:fiul, and thtat we do not ha;ve
enough to eaJt, yet we must say that everythmg is f,i ne and
dandy, and thaJt we have plenty to ea.t. Stalin has so ordered! Stalin has so spdken!"
He bec'ame so excited trying to prove his impossible
stand that I reaHy pit'ioo. him. I s:m:il.ed and sa,id softly:
�48
SLOVAKIA
"My dear tovaris! We're a different kind of people,
strange to you, indeed. When a tihinrg is white, we say it is
white; when it is bladk, we say iJt is black. When we have
nothing to eat, we say thaJt we a~ hungry oir that we are
starving And if anyone orders us to speak otheirwise, we
still. say the truth. Stra'lin telJs you different, so be hruppy in
your belief. We believe in God, too, but with reason, never
against reason."
But our tovaris seemed to be far away; his mouth
opened, but he said nothing further. Shaiking hiis head, he
pwlled at his ear as he slowly wa;llked away.
The Soviet Lady Doct.or
We weire oirdered to hand 01Ver the miili'ta,r y hospdital in
Bratishwa to the RUJSsians. As we were preparing inventory
lists, a Rmlssilan l'ady doctor stepped iruto .the room. After
talking for a time, we struck upon religion, belieif in God,
and other ba.pics. But my Russian colleague, a lieutenant,
!)TOclaimetl thait it was in vain we were trying to convince
her, becruuse she wm.tltl nort believe l1'S no matter what the
airgumenlts. I assured her that she had nothing to fear, because I had no ruposJtoilic intentions.
"Why do we write 1945," I asked her.
"I know but I won't tell you!"
"Burt even you designalte this year by thaJt numlber."
"You won't oon'V'ince me "
"I db not want to. But even the unbelieving world
admits that Christ was born."
"I heard rubout that also; burt I do not believe i,t."
"Why?"
"Becruuse in the history of the Communist Party there
isn't anything aJbout it."
"Alh, so!"
WhaJt is the use of debating? We looked at each other
srgnifioa,ntly, smiled, and talked aibout otheir things.
"How long did you study medicine?"
"I finished the course during the wair in a year and a
haJlf. In peaceful times the study takes aliJ. of two and a half
years."
�SLOVAKIA
49
We 1,amghed loud1iy amd pitied the prutients who happened
to get under her kmfe.
Placards: Religious Freedom
DtN-ing the veriy first weelk:s of occupatfon the Slovak
Communist Party posted placiar:ds everywhere, arnnlQuncing
that the ComJmuni'Slts wiant to respect the relii.g,ioos feelings
of a!hl the SloviaJk people and, therefore, are c,alloog aU Slovaks, regardless of the:ir religious convictions, into the
Party. Nay, eiven Catho'l:ic priests coul'd and shlOuiltl join the
party, we were to1ld. People sing a nfoe tune, when they
want to catch a biro!
But wlhrut if a mira'Cle had rea!Uy happened? Suppose
Comrm.mism had made a tll!I"11 for the ,better? May/be Commun:ism was no longer so excilusive; perhrups it was even
reipernting and had decided to let itself be baptized in Christian SlO'V'a'l da! We knew that the Communists were not sincere, but the fact is thaJt oultwarilly they did try tb deal humanely with the peopie for a wht[e to convince them that
Communism was not as bad as they thought. It was evident
that they were instiru~teld not to insult the sacred and traditionai feel'ings of the SlOIVak ,peop1e. But the pretense soon
wore off and the Reds opecl,y a1:>t8iC'ked a11 ece'lesfastical instilbutions.
Catholic Schools in Nationalized Slovakia
lf there were some Sloivaiks who had iHu'Sions a,bout
the Communists going sofit., thek tllu1sions eJOPloded like
b,u!bbles, W:hen Laoo Novomesky, Commissar ('br:ulsitee) of
Exiucation, annOlmceld that ai11 Catholic scbioo[,s m Slovakia
were to be aJbo:Iished and their property was to be taken over
iby t!he Stale. He was leld to this action, he said, because it
wais inadimissaJble that the Ohiurich should o!ffer a different
kind of education than the State. The unity of the nation,
sa•: d No;voimesky, required a unifo:r,m eduicaJtiona1 system,
cultural and religious st!'.ife must cease, etc.
What could not be accomplished even during the first
Ozooho.jSloV'ruk republk, was done now with one stroke of the
pen · in tJhe shadow of Russi8JI1 bayionets. The Cat'ho[ic institrntions were hit first for ob:vious reasoos. The Reds had
�50
SLOVAKIA
little dififiicuM.y in getting the badking of the non-Caitholiic
Christians. Al!l they ha:d to dt> was promise them that they
w()IU[d get the CaJthoiJ.ii:c Churelh proiperrt:.ies. So-cailled followers oif Christ a1Jtadking and despoiling the fo1lowers of
Christ! The Reds knew what they were doing, but evidently
the non.CathoJic Christians did not, because they tooik the
bait. Slovaik IJuithera.ns, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, etic , expected to gain by the deail against the Catho[ic Slovaks (80
per cent oif tJhe poipuliaibi.on) and, therefore, went a'long with
the Reds.
!Ton mrust be forged while it is hot. After publishing
the decree, all diredtors of Cruthoiic sciho01ls were dismissed.
Their places were taken over by so-ca;Ued "Czechoslovaks"
and Lwtherans. That was done e:spe'Cially in gymna'Sit1ms
managed by the reJl'igiorus <YI'ders, for example, alt the UrS'llline s:c!hools in BrrutislJ.ava and Tuna.va. It was done designecily and systemaiticaHy. Fists were clenched and hearts
were steeled. Freedom, freedom! The Slova!k Catholic public
becrume extremely inili.gnarnt. People were saying that the
women of Tmava were getting ready to storm the Ursuline
institution there and throw oot tlhe new di!rectre'SIS, who was
perseC'lllting and intimidating the reiigioruis Sisters there.
The Bishops of Slovakia Protest
E:ven though Siova..ks knew that nothing would be accomplished by protests, neverthe'Jess ail Catholics we.re
a.rgreed that they simply coufttl ndt a!hlow the fundamental
right of the Ohurch to iits own school's be taken away from
them without uttering a word. The peopile had to make
thernse1ves heard, or else the stones wmcld complain.
The CaithOllic Bishop's Collliloil presented a memorandll!In to the government and the Central Cat holic Chancery
was organizing a si-grratn.ure C·Mnipaign against the nationaHzing of scllodls. Lerufllets were distmi.lb uted, and on July 8,
1945, 1!he protest aigainst the confiscrution of the schools
was read from ahl puipiits.
1
Well, alter Ju:ly 8, the Bratislava radio was heard from.
It blasted and attacked the Bishop's Council, using the wellknown phrase: The parish church belongs to the Church,
�SLOVAKIA
51
Mlld the school to the StaJte ! Things came to a head and the
resrullt Olf the ,protest was that the dirootors Olf the Central
Cath~lic Bureau, who teohmca;Ny organi!Zed the action, were
jailed. We were again gilven prood' thaJt we were living in a
"democracy" and thiaJt the people were dooiding their own
fOiitunes. Wlhat a modkery !
Catholic Bishops Imprisoned
The ffrst wa,s Hlis ExicellJency John Vojtassak, bjshop of
Spis. Hailf of Slwaikia was a'1ready occupied by the Russian
rumy. The Sl'O!VaJk National Council was already giving orders from Kosice. At the end of .AipriJ, Dr. Vav,r o Srobar,
chalirma.n of the S1ov,aik NaJtiorra1 CouncH at that time, came
to the Spisslka Ifupiroula (ISpis Chapter) to gain Bishop Vojtassak for the Slov:aJk Na.lbiona:l COIUnoil and for Dr. Edwa..ro
Benes. Srobar wanted ,t hat prilze catch, bec'ause he knew
that Bishop Vojttassa'k was an old and 'hard Slovak.
As they meit in the corri'd.10r of the bi,s hop's residence,
Dr. Srolbar explained why he came and then asked the bishO!p to back the new government. The bishop eyed him
co:l d[y for a moment and then srud:
"I do nolt reoogni ze any S'1ovruk Nationall Council and
president Benes. My government is stilil in Bratislava, and
as president of the SlrovaJks I recognize oruy the Siovak,
Ms.g r. Dr. Tiso!"
The ~ytihe stmrok upon a stone. Dr. Srobar departed,
and bishop John VojtassaJk went to his room. Several days
later when the bishop received an order from the Slovak
N atiorral OownJCirl to beget himsellif to his p1race of confinement i-n Stl,ruvru:k, Vojtassaik replied energetica.!Uy: "I do not
have an auto, nor any means of transportation, not even a
horse. They -took ever.yrthing from me. I wi'M yie[d only to
force."
On May 5, 1945, an auto stopped in front oif the Kaipitula; it was a,mned with machine guns and severrul men with
auito:matiJc:s. The wovds of Ohris't again rang ou't: You are
come out as it were aigain,st a robber with clubs. The good
bishop of Spis was forcefuilily talken to Stiaivnik and, later,
to the jaml of the federal court in Bratislava.
1
�52
SLOVAKIA
What hruppened to him? A1[ I knew at that time was
that the commwn1i1,it "Plravd'a" of Bramislava was inciting
aigainst h!im., head!linirrug its avticleis thus: "The Lord Bishop
is against chi:ldren of tJhe wmikers." It was a brazen lie, designed to U!Ilderunine the 1:Jrnst of the fovthfol in the social
ideO'logy of iits bishop, who during hd:s whole life proved himself to be the most social o,f alil episcopa:l dignitaries in
Sl0V1aikia.
Soon aflter the OOOU1pation of Bratislava by the Russians, the bishoip Ol.f Trnava, Mii.H'.tary Vicar and Rector of
the BraJtislaiva seminary, J. E. BwzaLka, was ja1iled. F\irst he
wais lodged in the pohce stati'On and tJhen transferred to the
federail prison where "heiavy offenders" weire penned. He
slept on a spring, no m'aJttress ,b eing availaJble, and the siliveT-haired poet, Va'lentine Beniruk, slept alongside him on
the bare stone :flloor.
After the bishops, t:he Slwialk National Co'Ullcil "took
care" of the oonons and other pre1'aJtes. Among the first to
be truken was Joseph Srobar of BraJti.sl'a:va, brother of Dr.
Vaviro Srdbar. The old churehman, ail heart, would never
hairun even a fly. But bo[shev,rk justice did not consider that.
In him it sa,w an "enem:y of the people" and inrcaTcerated
him.
.
Ma:nry othevs foHowed him, among them Dr. Charles
Kovper, weH-iknown among .American S:lova\ks, former editor of a Cathoi1'i'c neWS1pruper. Monsignor Marsina of Trenci.n cO'llild not even OOJt for nothing in the jail, but had to
work. And what work! He was forced to dig c011pses wit!h
his bare hand's firom ma$$ graves, then forced to wash and
·k!iss each one. I have a strong su1S1pidon thalt those mass
graives were made lby the Russians and not by the Germans
as claimed by the So:vie'ts.
"Fascist Post.enyi Arrest.ed"
That's what a heai!'line said in the communist "Pravda."
And it stumned just albout the whole of Slo.vrukila. The discovery of America O!I' the Law of GI"avitation was no more
sensationall. Up to that time nobody knew that Monsignor
Postenyi was a fascilSt. Aime11ida,ri Slovaks know Msgr.
�SLOVAKIA
53
Postenyi very weiN. He visiited America in the interests of
the S't Ada!llbert Society, pulljlisher of Catholiic literature
and inrf.cmmat<ion, an origanwation equiivalent to the Book of
the Month 01wbs in Amerti!C'a. The Reds knew that his Slovak ,paltriotism was beyond question and that his merits, as
far as the l31rgesit CIUll,bural, Slovak, Catholk institution was
concerned, were greaJt. Monsignoir Po:s tenyi is an exemplary
priest of Gad, a S1ovaik hough and through, and an indefatfJi,gruble worlcer for the common people of his nation. He
was pe!I1S€Kmted for his Slovak ,p atriotism when the Commumst leaders and editors of the "Pravda" were strn in the
bOSOIIn of Albraham.
Never aclmvel.l,y interested in politics, Msg,r. Postenyi
sUldden!ly became a "fascist!" We knew whalt the C01Inmunisits wanted to aJOcorrniplish. 'Do put Posteny,i out of the way
woold me'an to destroy the Society of St. Ad•rutbert with iJts
libraries, priillt sh01ps and origan.izationrul appruratus. And so
the SlOViaJk N ationa;l CO'U!Ilici1 appointed the fina.ncirul secretary of the Sooiety, a Ozedh named Wa;gner, as the commissary of the Society. A few days l1ater a new management
was named, one that was rucceptaJble to the spirit and program of tJhe C01Inmunist-idk>minia.ted SlovaJk NaJtional Cooncil.
This institution which was bui[it by generations of Slov,a ks inrto a going cultural concern wrus wiped oult in a momenit by the ruthilegs Reds The 150.000 members of the
Society of St. Ada1be,rtt co:uM not say a word against the action without inviting punishment, either inciariceration or
exile into Silberia. That is how the "people's demooracy" of
the Soviets operates.
Charit,a,ble Ecclesiastical Institutions
The la;rgesit oharitalble ooganization in Slovrukia wa,s the
Central Charity (Ustredna Karita), the central Catho1.ic institute of al'l the welfare, socitail, anld religious societi'es. It
ha;d its own hea11th cenltets, hospiita!ls for incuraJbO.es, children's nurseries, etc. The women'1s "Charilta:s" was a'1so a
mem~ of tJhe organi.<Za,tion. 'Dhe CommUll!ists took (Wer ruH
soci:ail insbitiuttions of the Church. Some weeks after the ocCUipation, tihe Communist Union of Sloviak Women confi:s-
�54
SLOVAKIA
cated the children's nuTsery of the Ustredna ~arita in Dornk~le, BraJtislava, and the Union of SloivaJk Y ouith toolk
over the ·b oarding sch06l nea,r the forestry school in Koliba,
Braltislavia.
The hwmanitari.an division oif the city o.f Bratislava
comisoated the estate of "Oharitas" in Braltisfava near the
Red Bridge. For the women's home of "Charitas" the commissari'at foT Social Welifare named as commissary the Communist Fla:TIIIly Hirusovsky. Dr. Ivan Horvath, the commissary
for sooiall welfare, prod.aimed that a:1'1 the charitable, social
instituJtions of the Church would be taken over by the state.
Protests clid not mean a thing, as usual.
"Freedom" of the Press
One of the first ,a cts of the Commissariat for Initernal
AffaiTs was the suppression o;f aM news,prupers. With th~s
general order all Oathollic newpaJpers and :periodicais weTe
wiped out aultomalt!roally; noit only cruturrul and literrury periodicals, such as the "Ku!litura" (a.rl.,tmre.) and the "Obroda"
(Rffi"ilvaJl), but even an the religious and educational periodicals, such as The MessengeT of the Srucred Heart, The
Holy Family, The Queen of May, etc. And, ]ater the only
Caltholk Sloivruk weeldy "Katolicke Noviny" (The Catholic
News), which had a suibscription of 170,000, was also swppressed and ta:ken 01Ver by 1:!he Reds.
Cathollics protested to the authorities, but in. vadn. The
Catholic press was gone. Attaclks against the Church and
its priests increased daily, but they could not defend themselves; it was an unequa:l strwggk The enemy fought wfth
powerfU!l we8lpons, whi[e the Catholics had none.
"Freedom" of Conscience
The wax was fought, we were told, aga.inst the suppressi~n of consoien.ce by imperial~stic means, and we haJVe lived
to see sucll a diclatorship and s:uch a barbaric viOllia.tion of
conscience and its inlterrra:l freedom, the likes of whl'C'h perhrups not even the most frurious f:aslci'Slt ever dreamed of. On
aH fronts of tlhis terrible wrur died the best sons of humanity for the rigih:t to speak free'ly about the most fundamental questions of 1iife against tlhe fascist terror. Men
�SLOVAKIA
55
shed their blood so that concentration camps, wiith all theiT
horrors, might never a:ga:in operaJte. But soon aif.ter the war's
end aN dliistriot cities in SlovaJlda were ordered to set up a
concent.Taition camp and jaill. The war was fol.light for the
freed'Olffi of poilft.ic-aiJ. conviotlions, but in Sl'OVlalkia today there
are not enOUJgh jai!ls to talke care of aH those, whose only
gui,It is that they wilM not swear on the Siclcl.e anld: Hammer,
but prefer to rematin loyal to the fupal eneyclilc'als and the
fiUJnd:amen'ta:l princiiples of demooraJCy. ln a wore, the Slovaks want to be demO!crat:s and not 'boisiheviks.
What has rea;filry changed? Every ni!ght we waited
tensely to see whether they were coming for us. We had
no peace duirmg the day or night. Forever they were screening and investiigaJting UIS just 'becaUJSe we haippened to live
during the past era, and had to wor1k and keeip OUir families.
They perseouted us for "co'l:1-aborating" because we recorded oftficiail writings, in some office, or because we were
insigruffoant wiheells in the great machinery of life.
In Conclusion
If I had not seen it, I would not hruve be'liieived it. Those
first three months in "l~beraJted" Bra;tislruva were a nightmare. It .st;ilfil hamnts me. The S[ovalk people dild not ha,ve a
clharuce. The,i r country was overrun bry bar:barians whom the
.AilHes had Wlken on as pa:rtners. Slovalkia was ru!led bry terror and violence f.rom the moment it was "rnberaJted" lby the
so-calil ed "Uniiteld Nations," which placed it in the Soviet
sphere o!f irufiluence. ]t was ruied 'by the Communist-dominated regime o!f the man who r~gned the presitleTIJCy in 1938
and returned as president..a.venger behind the Soviet ho:rdes
in 1945. 'Dhe independenJt Slo.ivaJk Repull:Afc, established by the
dully eledted representatives olf t!he Slovak people in 1939
and reoognlizetl by 27 countries, including GreaJt Britain and
F,r ance, was wanton!ly destroyed against the wiili of the
Slova:k people.
The vast majority of the Slovaik nation, the Catholics
of Slovakia - representing 80 per cent of the poipll1ation was oulUawed. No politioail parities, newspaipers, organizations, and eilltenprises cou~d exist, except th()[se aUowed by
�56
SLOVAKIA
Dr. IDdwa,rd Benes and his Communist-dominated regime.
The non-Catholic minority in Slovakia - including aN those
who ca;Ned t!hemsetlives "Christians" - hel,p ed Benes and the
Co!Ir.JII1UJill1S'ts ruin Ca1fud1irc Slovrukia and so helped to ruin
themseilves and thetk in:stilbulticms. Whereas, in the beginning,
only Crutholics were perisem.uted and onily Cathol'i:c institUJtion:s
and enter,prises were nabion:a,lized, laJter the foNowers of ail
Christian faiths were crucified and their institulti'ons confiscalted b;y the State. Hi:istor:y repeateld itseJ.if. But ha,tred
of the Cathohc Ch'l11l'ch in S'lovakia did n01t solive any of the
social or economic probllems, bult oll!l.y aggrawated them; in
faot, it only he'lped the Communists realize their ends all the
more speedilly. It is high time thait a'11 Christians realized
this an:d aoted accordmgly.
In Slovalkia tihere sha/U be no rea;l peace, no flI'eedom,
as long 3IS 1t is governed by peopte wlho are hostile to the
nationa1 traditions of the Slovak nation and its rel:i!gious and
political convictions and, hence, are bent on the destru<:tion of the SIJ.O'Vruk people. Slovaikia, one of the oldest Christian countries of Centra1 :Eiu!rope, never sho:uil(l. haive been desbroyed as an independent StaJte. That is more evident today
than it was in 1945. No nrution has fought Coonmunism more
pel'.sistentily and consistently than the Slovaik nation It's
time that this trutlh was recognized by a.Ill freedom-rl<wing,
a:ruti-Com:rrmmist coll!Il1Jri-es and that they adj1U1st theiir pOllicies to,w ard the Slovaks to fit the present siitU1aition. Even
today the people of Slovruk.ia find iJt ha~d to belrieve that they
were sdld oUJt to the men of the Kremlin with the help of
file United StaJtes and Great Britain, the great sym'bols of
freedom and demooraicy. But they stitl exipect to be liberated
by them.
•
•
•
"THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is an American institu-
tion. Its primary interest is America. As an American of Slovak descent, I say again and again that it ls in the interest of Amerlc-a and
the democratic world at large to work for the freedom and Independence of Slovakia. The Individuals and organizations affiliated with
the Slovak League of America - as true Americans - cannot wish
their brethren in Slovakia less fre edom than they themselves enjoy
in the U. S. A. We say: Give Slovakia back to the Slovak people!"
- (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit. Mich., 11-18-51)
�
SLOVAKIA
39
THREE MONTHS IN "LIBERAT ED" BRATISLA VA
BY: AN EYEWITNES S
Urut'hl 1944 tJhe capiW city of S10V1akira, Bralbis1ava, lived
far remoived from mililtaey operations. Ltfe wars a,,1together
nor,ma;J. both c1.1llltmraUy and sodaiJ.l.y. 'Dhe siltuation dhanged.
sU!bstantli.la!ley after Italy wars occuipied, when Bratislava came
withi111 the range of the alliied air :f.iorce.
Mirl itary oib'jeldt:s of Bratisl ruva were first bombed rby the
al'lied aiir force in the focenooo. of June 16, 1944. The "ApO'llo" ref.inery, the adjacenit faotory and lha!1bor quarters we.re
hit. But indrirscriminaite Russian 1b om11:iing was more fatal.
Soviet flliers did not specialize on miiitairy objects, but let
bombs loose anyiw\here in the city. They ce11ba:irillry did not
glorify themselves witih the 1bombing of SpitMsrka street,
where tlhey destroyed a church, a convent and the hospital
of St. EliizaJbeth. Sorviet planes ruppea:red aibove Braitislava
on Holy Satu,rdary and peppered the civi[fans on the crowded
streets with tlherir deck guns. The front had moved up consideraJblly and Soviielt p:lranes were comin,g over practically
every houir to drop their b.ombs into the streets.
1
Easter 1945 in Bratislava
During Holy Weelk it. was evident to most of us that
the Germa'I1S were preparing ,t o defend Bratisfav.a. The streets
were emptied, bM'ricades were constructed , huge g'uns were
put u,p The Germans themsel;ves, '.however, did not appear
to be very interested in tlhe defense of our ctity and hauled
whaitever they couftd out of it. 'Dhe units whkJh remained
were to be used to c01Ver the retrea,ting Germans. The Ger-•
man com.man.der urged the Slovak Governmen t to leave Bratislava. Since only a small number of Germans remained,
it was ~rieved that tJhey were not going to defend the city
very lon.g. The poipuilation co'l.tld not decide whether to leave
tbe ciity or stay putt. Sa.Jturday evening everything was being
taiken into cel10Jrs and hritl!ing places. The monotonou s bomibing of the Russian air force, the ofose booming of cannons
annOIUll1Ced that the Russians we.re a:pproachin g steadily U111spea.JkaJble ne:rrV'O!U'Sness gr.~pped the crirty. AH the men h~d
�40
SLOVAKIA
themselves, booaiuse iJt was said thait the Germans were going
to taJke rull 1!he men out of Braitislava.
On Easter Sunday, at nine o'dock in the morning, Soviet fliers aigain ffilade them- appearance and in the afternoon huge Russian g,uns were 'bombarding Bralti:slava. The
we'l!l-.Jmown Ruissian "Kaltuse", also da!lled "1Sta~ iln'is organs,"
began to pJ.ay the following day, i.e., Easter Monday. Every.
thiinig shook to the foundatio!l'S and fires hroike out in many
p'lia;ces. T,h e retreating Germans fired the SloV'ak University
and ala the reserwe piiles of food and war maJterials. Thick
smoike rose from Bratiis'lruva for three days and three niighlbs,
and the fire sprerud because there were neither waiter nor the
pe01ple to f,i ght tlhe fires. The heaviiest fii:ghting took place in
the ea'S'tern paJI't of the cilty, where praeitiic~ly every factory
quariter wrus ruined, the stireets of Trnruva and Krizna,
Stein's Brewery and the viJcinity.
On 'l'uesday tlhe Gemnans began to f11ee, destroying
every;th'i ng that had n~t a-lre'ad,y <been desitvoyed. They blew
u1p the bridge ,to PetrizJalka and the last g,rowp bariricruded iltself in the Braitis,la,va Castrle. The Russians aiready were in
the sulburbs of Bratislava, when the Germans in the western
hil!J.s of the c1ty began cannonading it. Thiis hurl BTati'slava
the moist. On Thursday morning fue first Russian d'i•visions
were in the very heart oif the city. Graduailly the booming
died aiway and the streets began to be filled w1th Russian
soldiers.
The "Liberation" Begins
1
The SolV'iet soldiers first Hib.e.rated us from our watches
with their well-tlmown "Davaj easy" (Give your waltches).
EX!cept for solldiers, tlhe streets were empty; on1y coz,pses
were being b alked in .the sipring sun. After a few days, when
we cra.,wled out of our bunlkers and cellairs., we saiw the
ghastly pioture of ruin anld desolation.
Sffiloke s,tii-1 ro!Hed out of buildings and 1:lhe atmosphere
was. satwrated Wli'th dust and gunpowder. Glass wa·s ground
under foolt. Rdl::fueries were in fU'l'l swing. Soviet soidiers
brdke windows of business places with their rule butts and
sa-cked and pitMaiged everything. A few dats later, not a
sitIJ.g1le shop remamed whO'le. Wh'atever could rrot be taken
�SLOVAKIA
41
was knocked to pieces. Of course, the l'a wless mob helped
very efferdtive1y in thi's work. Reports. olf the raping of
women began coming in. It was nothing um.t'sua!l to see
franltic W()lffien rUIUNng wildly from their aJttaokeirs; they
sm-eamed, k'iciked and fought, -but to no avail. The 'hordes
of the RUJSsii'an steppe's were on the loose. Who shall desc,dbe the sta.rk terror- in the eyes of the Slo;v:ak women and
girls who 00U!l.1d not get away f,r -()lffi the beasts olf Moscow?
Even ii£ I tmoo, I believe that my pen woul:d have to blush
if it had to detail the brutalities and abroc'~ties committed.
There is no need to exipand on :the fate of many, many women,
who remained lya.ng in their bllood aflter such a ba'I1barian
shaw of "a!f.feotion" of the Sov,i et soldiers. They to,l d us
that it was the "nationa!l duty" o.f the S1avaJk women to repay the So'Vliet arimies rih love!
Vinko, Vinko, Vinko Cervene
We thOUJght that SlovaJk wiine would not attract the Soviets after tJhey had tasted of strong Tokay in Hurngary.
Bult we were mi!stJaken even tJhis time (as usu:a1). Slovak
wine memhanits di:d not wanit to sel'l us wine since January,
becau:se they had 'hiOiped to sell it at a high price to the Soviet sohliers. But how quijic,k1ly they soibered UJP, when, instead of the jingle-jangle of gCJld 11ulbles, they he:ard shots
from rifiles anld. aUlbomaitics in their otherwise irnmcessible
ceUars. Barrels were shot wp and the precious liquid o.f the
Slova1k earth began flowing; first into pitchers an'<i all so!'ts
of containers, dean and uncilean, even bernzine cans. When aU
these were fi'1le'd, tlhe wine t11ic'k:led iruto soLdieirs' boots, then
flowed over the cellars and vestilbll!les an'<i finaliy onto. the
streets. Tos strong aroma mixed w1th the gih:astly stench of
decayiing cO'l",pses, whk:h even after a week were stili lying
on the sidewaiJ.ks. of the city. The soldiers drank and so d<id
the civilians; ch!iMren drank and so did the oldsters. It
seemed that the barrels were bottomless. "Viniko, vinko, vinko cerivene" (Wtine, wine, red wine - a popclaT Slovak
drinlking song) !
I shail1l never forget tJhe tovaris-comrade who had two
botJtles of reld. champaigne stucik in his fuT crup, a bottle in
�42
SLOVAKIA
eadh. pocket and his hands full. He was approached by another comrade whn .rolblbed hiim on the street of his precious
bu.Tden in broad d'a.yuilghlt. The two lashed at each other
li'ke antlmals and drew blood on the 'ha.rd pavement of Kapitulska street.
Bratishwa wine merchants. 'loolk ed on stupidly and
si.'lently ait this Sodiomic destruction of their cellars, and the
SO!Ulr odor of the wine reminded them of the old times, when
they were s'till:l. bosses of their wine and thought that they
themselrves wolU.ld ·haive the honor to treat the "liberat0rs."
They rea[irz;eJd tlhe bitter truth that they we·r e "liberated," i.e.
comip1etely roiblbed of all their world!ly possessions on the
very threshold of a neiw life, the new order promised by the
men of the K.re:rnUn.
Where Do You Stay, Tovaris?
If you were in the aI1II1y, you know w'hat obedience and
di'Scilplme means. Withoult bhe:rn, there hardly could be an
effecltiive rurmy. A soldier beil.ong,s to some particular company or di'Vlisi:on, must haJVe his gear, be fed and quartered,
even th<Ylligh it be under a tent or in a barn. Bult the Soviet
soltl!iers wlho swa:runed iiruto Bratislava had no definite quarters and, hence, were everywhere. Usuany aJbout midnight
it occurred to· tihe:rn that they had to get some sleep, so the,y
began to looik for shelter. Door:s and lodks and bars were no
hindrance. Wihether of glass or wood, doors were booted in
or smasheJd wiitJh rifile butts, if they were niot opened immediately.
"You, bourgeoisie, you did not fighlt ... "
Threatened, 1:Jhere wa·s nothing one cou[d c1o bult flee
from .h is own home and consider himse1f liUCky if he was
not shot- A soldier does not undress for sleep very oflte:n
at the fuiont, bult Ivan the RUJSsian never ll!Ildressed even
when he had a bed, bwt simply piled on the bed f.wl1y g,ar,bed,
'boots, rifle, pi•s tols, grena:des and a:M. And the frolllt was
sixty miles away from us.
Investigation After Investigation
We thought the war was over when the slh!ooting subsided and the boomdng resounded f.rom a dristanice. We began
�SLOVAKIA
43
to clean the streets, coll!lect the dead, and put whatever was
left oif ,ouir homes in order. A ,penson slO!Wly fongets what he
lost, because onlly then, when he did not die during the
bomfbardment, does he reaili.ize that it is beaultiifiu[ to live,
even tJhoug'h in feaJr, hunger rund thirst, and in raJgs. Things
tha,t were a.ire no more, and other things tfhat were not will
oome into being. L'iife is all that matters. On'l,y he knows the
reail meamng of water and light who has li,v ed thI10UJgh the
terror of the front in hiding wilthoult light and water. I.Me
will returm to iits dld ways and time wiH heal aJhl wounds ()If
the soiwl a,nd bod,y ()If inld.wii.dUJaJl's and nations.
Well, wlh,y shoUJld nO/t a person a:gaJin imagine that liJfe
can be beruuttilfiull, when he is sitting on tile 'l'Uins ()If his home
~nd the ashes of hi1s dreams? Why, there is no more bc»nibing and even the streets are lighted up in the evenings.
Buit empty a.ire the inns, empty are the ce11'3JI"s, empty
are tJhe stores and shops Brolken windows and smashed
doors attest tJo the min which the Soviet soldiers had
WOOU1ght. But the wihl to live r,i,ses alb,ove all this. We must
forget everyttJhing thaJt pruined us, a.IN the in:justi<Ces, subdue
om thd,r st for blood, when the sap of a new spring is
awakening, when everythfun.g is being ren01Vateld, everything
is in bloom, the thrush sings and the chiildren play.
Burt aH this is but a dream, an ~lluision. '.Dhe 'b attle has
ended on the streets, but just the sa:me a mare fiurious invi:siib1e baittle is going on. As you step out of your home, you
are co,nrfronlted with tJhe bayonet o;f a Russian soldier or the
various "safety" ciommittees. You look a:rO'llnd and notice
that yornr home, nay the whole street is sUJITounded by
guards. You re'tl.l!rn h'llITTriedly to your room and wait to see
what wiM h'appen. Y.ou wait and wait and waJit unti[ the sUISpense aJlrrnost d11ives you mad. Your blood thins in your veins
and you look sadly aJbowt you - and wait! F'iinaMy they
came, sO'l1d iers and civiili ians: they go through the house and
take whatever they want. '.Dhey ask you whether you are a
GeI1IDan or not, whebher any Germans or "coll'<llbaratilonists"
a,re in your house. You lod.k them icily in the face. 'Tihey depart but only to come rugruin.
�44
SLOVAKIA
Organs of Security
Mter two weeks oif the Russian occupation everything
was phmdered. People had no more than they had buried or
secreted in such a place where even the Russian hunters and t,hey are eXlpe'tUy schooled in the art of flinding wailled-in
objects - would not come. There was a clirth oif everything,
even a serforus lack of bread. But we had plenty o.f police!
They sprang Ulp like m:ushrnoms aflter a rain. In t'he first
place, ,t he dreaded NKVD (OGPU), the Secret So,vi•e t Police, n10toirioo~ for its birurt:al and ghasitl;y crimes. Woe to him
that faHis intto its hanids. The NiKViD goes from home to
home, drags peoipile aiway and nolbody ever hears of their
fate. Fvom eastern S'JO'V'aJkia alone more tihan 4,000 peo~e
were draigiged oiff into Siiberia.
I was fonbunate to be 'home during the investigation.
AU the en'tralllces to the 'bwil.ding were covered by soldiers
wit!h a:utomattics. I •t r:wersed my room ne.rvous•ly. A'lthough
I had a c:leair clon1science, yet I was di-squited. (No one is sufficiently olear or safe with the Soviet Po[ice) . Finally I
wenlt into the haiJ.llway. I was greeted by a soMier and a civilian. A IDQlfilenrt later came the caiptain. He asked me my
naJme, what I wa:s doing here, what my profession was, and
wheither I was a mem1ber orf IIlin:ka's People'1s Parity.
A mac1hinist l,iived on the same floo,r. His room was
locketl. Tlhe caiptain OII'<lered me to open it. "I haven't the
key," I told hlm. The maic!hini.st had the key and the soldiers had him in hand alt the gate. I ran to the gate. The
NKVD g,u1a rd had an a.ultomatti~ on the machinist. I approached him and said that tlhe c~pta;in wants to open the
machinist's room, but the madh~nrist had the key. The latter alre'ardy wanted to hand it to me, when the s:o'ldier suddenly tuirned the aurt:omatiic on me and said: "You ha.ve the
key" - "'BUit I dlo not have t'he key, the madhinlist has it"
- "No, you will 'h,ruve it, if the caiptain says so." - "But I
do not have it; loolk, tovaris, the machimst has. it." - "No,
I have a.Qready told you that you wi-11 have the key and will
open the door, when the captam orders you to do so."
I was dumlbfounded by the profound stU1piclilty and returned without t1he key. I told the captain thait the to:varis
�SLOVAKIA
45
wowd not let me take the key from the machinist because,
he said, the captain had ordered me and not the machinist
to open the room. I also was a sOJldier and I know whait military dbedience means. Bult this cannot be called obedience,
but some kind of unmentionaJble stupidilty or i!Illfbecility
which wouid be capable of sticking pins under my fingernails just to find a key on me whirch I do not haive. I realized
then wlhy people, during the investigaltions in tJhe tortrure
cha.im!bers of the NKVD, confess to things which they never
committed.
The invest1gation began at seven in the morning and
lasted un1ti'l nine. I went to town on business arrd returned
a1boU1t eleven. Upon my arr,ivai the building was a·gai,n surrounded biy guards, but this time by the Prurtisans Security
c:1it.
I wanted to enter the bui'1ding, but they wouid not let
me. I identified myse1f and said that I ld.ved there. Finailly
a boy, about 17, wit:Jh an automatic in his hands, let me
enter. It was very liive:ly in the hallways. The partrsa,n captain was giving orders. I did not know wh1at they were seeiking. I went through the investigation tortures again, but
qUJite fortunately. Again aftl the rooms, closets, desks, and
dressing cabinets were opened. The investigation was over at
about one o'ciock. Again some innocent peoiple were taken.
But that was not alt That was onJy t'he beginning.
Night feJ.,l and the stars shone brighUy over Br.atislava.
Finany, a lilttle rest, I thought But there is no restful or
peaceful night duiring a Russian occl..llpaition. A'boUJt midnight I was awa.ikened by some one pounding on my door.
Another investigaition !
I was on my feet in an instant and <jpened the door.
Before me in the semidankness stood a man and a lady. Instead of identifying themselves, t!hey opened their short
coats so that I could see the revolvers in leather 'holsters.
"But, but, this is a spe:cia l visit, and so laite at night!"
"Your documents," said the man.
"Here they a,re, t:hank you."
"Were you a memlber of IDinka's Party?" - "I was."
"Since when?" - "From 1933." - "Were you in the
1
�46
SLOVAKIA
Hlinka Guards?" - "I was not." - "Did you be'1ong to
Hlinlka's Youth?" - "No." - "Are you a So'ld!ieir?" - "I
am an oftfircer in the Sloivalk airnny." - "Did you ta.Ike pa.rt
in the revollit ?" - "No." - "Why not?" - "I was on druty in
Nitra." - "Are you a Slova;k ?" - "I am."
Then they entered my room. On my taJble was a small
bust o{ Andrew Hlin!k'a.
"And .t his?" - "That is a bust of Andrew Hilinlka."
"Hman., we adivi,se you, to destroy irt." - "I don't understand, whiy?" - "Welil, may!be tomorrow you will understand."
Wilth that t'.hey depa,rited. Ait thrr-ee in the morning the
inrve-stigat'ion olf .tlhe secret police was completed.
At eight in the morn.mg came the olffictaJl police, the
so-calied "Naitiona1 Secruritiy" po~ice, to find out who i,t was
thaJt a1hlowro an in1VestigaJtion at mghit when the ipolice knew
nothing aJbout it. "What kind o{ peop1e were they, how did
they look, w:hiat did they want?" I was asked. This then was
the new oroer - so ter:rrilbly dangerous because iit had so
many .srufety biU1reaus thalt one dlid not know aibout the other!
Or did they?
The Bratislava Commander Complains
A month had already passed since the occ'Ulpation of
Bratisla1Va , but the streets were stilil wn:swept; dirt and
ruiblble were everywhere; liice and infectious diseases were
spreading rapidly. 'Ilhe local "National Oommittee" had a
loog session to decirle what to do with the riwbbish and
rull:fule clutterinig and burning in the streets. But how was
the mess to be C'leared ruway, wlhen the Ru'Ssians took an
the city dump trucks, a1l pri,v ate cars and al,l wagons and
horse's ?
Typhoid fever spread danger01Us ly; the numibers of inflicted increased. The Office of P.ropruganda, or, as it was
then called, the "Commissary of InfoTfl'nation" pfa'stered the
city witJh huge plaic-ards depio'ting a s'keleton poUII"iing lice
over BraJtis lava and t'.he wairning : "WATCH THID LICE,
THEY SPREAD TYPHOID. ''
People stared at the placarids and barked: "Bwt who in
�SLOVAKIA
47
tarnation broughlt lice here? Send the lousy Russians baok
to their lousy ooumrtey !"
'I.1he first plwcards had liiittle e.fifoot. Severrul druys later
new ones appeared: Origanilze energeti'C brig,ades of clearuiness ! But Il!cibodiy paid any atJtenMon. The :riUJbbish iblliI'Iled on
and spread its poisonous fiumes over the .popuil.<ati.on. There
were no autos, no wrugons wiith which to do the hau[ing.
Hiarses, oows and siheeip were kept in the panks. The hot
sun blruzeid away and laughingJy loolked at the me!SS, which
the "new" government prdbalbly did not dear aJWay to this
day. And so the skeleton keipt pouring the lice, and t:Jhe placaros aJb,o ut the brig,a des. of cleanliness were covered witlh
new red ones, whicih unged us to attend lec!tUll'es on the
moraie of the SoVli.et man, So:vieit woman, and the Soviet
youth. The Soviet Russians wasted no time in edlucating the
masses accordtinlg to the dootrines orf Marx and Lenin.
A Soviet Soldier Confesses
lit wrus a bea:urtri.:titd June afternoon in K 1rurl'ova Ves near
Bratislava, when a Riu'SSian sOlldier rupproacihed us and struclk
up a oonvwsaiti.on. He reproved us saying tha.Jt we Slovruks
were Ullldiscipllined amid un.gratefUll. We shOIUJd not siay OII' believe tJhat t:Jhe RJussi,ans rure taikin.g everything that can be
ha'l.lll€1d aJWay, booau1se thaJt is only ibrud propaganda. Since
he was in a t~aJtiive mood', and did not have a revolver, we
dooided to malke WIOrds with him.
He spdke at length albout d!i.scipil[n.e in RUISSia, both in
thiin.lk.ing and in spealk~ng. In Slovaki·a, he said, everyone says
whatever he 'Pleases. "ThaJt does not exist in Ruissia. One
must hiO:ld to what St-a!lin says. That is the truth and a.Ill
else is ,proprugantla. Sta!lin to-Id UIS thaJt in Russia everything
iis fine a!nd dandy, everyrtJhin,g is beaut.if.td, that we have
enoUJgh to eait. And even though we know that everything i:s
not fine and dan:dy, be.mt'i:fiul, and thtat we do not ha;ve
enough to eaJt, yet we must say that everythmg is f,i ne and
dandy, and thaJt we have plenty to ea.t. Stalin has so ordered! Stalin has so spdken!"
He bec'ame so excited trying to prove his impossible
stand that I reaHy pit'ioo. him. I s:m:il.ed and sa,id softly:
�48
SLOVAKIA
"My dear tovaris! We're a different kind of people,
strange to you, indeed. When a tihinrg is white, we say it is
white; when it is bladk, we say iJt is black. When we have
nothing to eat, we say thaJt we a~ hungry oir that we are
starving And if anyone orders us to speak otheirwise, we
still. say the truth. Stra'lin telJs you different, so be hruppy in
your belief. We believe in God, too, but with reason, never
against reason."
But our tovaris seemed to be far away; his mouth
opened, but he said nothing further. Shaiking hiis head, he
pwlled at his ear as he slowly wa;llked away.
The Soviet Lady Doct.or
We weire oirdered to hand 01Ver the miili'ta,r y hospdital in
Bratishwa to the RUJSsians. As we were preparing inventory
lists, a Rmlssilan l'ady doctor stepped iruto .the room. After
talking for a time, we struck upon religion, belieif in God,
and other ba.pics. But my Russian colleague, a lieutenant,
!)TOclaimetl thait it was in vain we were trying to convince
her, becruuse she wm.tltl nort believe l1'S no matter what the
airgumenlts. I assured her that she had nothing to fear, because I had no ruposJtoilic intentions.
"Why do we write 1945," I asked her.
"I know but I won't tell you!"
"Burt even you designalte this year by thaJt numlber."
"You won't oon'V'ince me "
"I db not want to. But even the unbelieving world
admits that Christ was born."
"I heard rubout that also; burt I do not believe i,t."
"Why?"
"Becruuse in the history of the Communist Party there
isn't anything aJbout it."
"Alh, so!"
WhaJt is the use of debating? We looked at each other
srgnifioa,ntly, smiled, and talked aibout otheir things.
"How long did you study medicine?"
"I finished the course during the wair in a year and a
haJlf. In peaceful times the study takes aliJ. of two and a half
years."
�SLOVAKIA
49
We 1,amghed loud1iy amd pitied the prutients who happened
to get under her kmfe.
Placards: Religious Freedom
DtN-ing the veriy first weelk:s of occupatfon the Slovak
Communist Party posted placiar:ds everywhere, arnnlQuncing
that the ComJmuni'Slts wiant to respect the relii.g,ioos feelings
of a!hl the SloviaJk people and, therefore, are c,alloog aU Slovaks, regardless of the:ir religious convictions, into the
Party. Nay, eiven Catho'l:ic priests coul'd and shlOuiltl join the
party, we were to1ld. People sing a nfoe tune, when they
want to catch a biro!
But wlhrut if a mira'Cle had rea!Uy happened? Suppose
Comrm.mism had made a tll!I"11 for the ,better? May/be Commun:ism was no longer so excilusive; perhrups it was even
reipernting and had decided to let itself be baptized in Christian SlO'V'a'l da! We knew that the Communists were not sincere, but the fact is thaJt oultwarilly they did try tb deal humanely with the peopie for a wht[e to convince them that
Communism was not as bad as they thought. It was evident
that they were instiru~teld not to insult the sacred and traditionai feel'ings of the SlOIVak ,peop1e. But the pretense soon
wore off and the Reds opecl,y a1:>t8iC'ked a11 ece'lesfastical instilbutions.
Catholic Schools in Nationalized Slovakia
lf there were some Sloivaiks who had iHu'Sions a,bout
the Communists going sofit., thek tllu1sions eJOPloded like
b,u!bbles, W:hen Laoo Novomesky, Commissar ('br:ulsitee) of
Exiucation, annOlmceld that ai11 Catholic scbioo[,s m Slovakia
were to be aJbo:Iished and their property was to be taken over
iby t!he Stale. He was leld to this action, he said, because it
wais inadimissaJble that the Ohiurich should o!ffer a different
kind of education than the State. The unity of the nation,
sa•: d No;voimesky, required a unifo:r,m eduicaJtiona1 system,
cultural and religious st!'.ife must cease, etc.
What could not be accomplished even during the first
Ozooho.jSloV'ruk republk, was done now with one stroke of the
pen · in tJhe shadow of Russi8JI1 bayionets. The Cat'ho[ic institrntions were hit first for ob:vious reasoos. The Reds had
�50
SLOVAKIA
little dififiicuM.y in getting the badking of the non-Caitholiic
Christians. Al!l they ha:d to dt> was promise them that they
w()IU[d get the CaJthoiJ.ii:c Churelh proiperrt:.ies. So-cailled followers oif Christ a1Jtadking and despoiling the fo1lowers of
Christ! The Reds knew what they were doing, but evidently
the non.CathoJic Christians did not, because they tooik the
bait. Slovaik IJuithera.ns, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, etic , expected to gain by the deail against the Catho[ic Slovaks (80
per cent oif tJhe poipuliaibi.on) and, therefore, went a'long with
the Reds.
!Ton mrust be forged while it is hot. After publishing
the decree, all diredtors of Cruthoiic sciho01ls were dismissed.
Their places were taken over by so-ca;Ued "Czechoslovaks"
and Lwtherans. That was done e:spe'Cially in gymna'Sit1ms
managed by the reJl'igiorus <YI'ders, for example, alt the UrS'llline s:c!hools in BrrutislJ.ava and Tuna.va. It was done designecily and systemaiticaHy. Fists were clenched and hearts
were steeled. Freedom, freedom! The Slova!k Catholic public
becrume extremely inili.gnarnt. People were saying that the
women of Tmava were getting ready to storm the Ursuline
institution there and throw oot tlhe new di!rectre'SIS, who was
perseC'lllting and intimidating the reiigioruis Sisters there.
The Bishops of Slovakia Protest
E:ven though Siova..ks knew that nothing would be accomplished by protests, neverthe'Jess ail Catholics we.re
a.rgreed that they simply coufttl ndt a!hlow the fundamental
right of the Ohurch to iits own school's be taken away from
them without uttering a word. The peopile had to make
thernse1ves heard, or else the stones wmcld complain.
The CaithOllic Bishop's Collliloil presented a memorandll!In to the government and the Central Cat holic Chancery
was organizing a si-grratn.ure C·Mnipaign against the nationaHzing of scllodls. Lerufllets were distmi.lb uted, and on July 8,
1945, 1!he protest aigainst the confiscrution of the schools
was read from ahl puipiits.
1
Well, alter Ju:ly 8, the Bratislava radio was heard from.
It blasted and attacked the Bishop's Council, using the wellknown phrase: The parish church belongs to the Church,
�SLOVAKIA
51
Mlld the school to the StaJte ! Things came to a head and the
resrullt Olf the ,protest was that the dirootors Olf the Central
Cath~lic Bureau, who teohmca;Ny organi!Zed the action, were
jailed. We were again gilven prood' thaJt we were living in a
"democracy" and thiaJt the people were dooiding their own
fOiitunes. Wlhat a modkery !
Catholic Bishops Imprisoned
The ffrst wa,s Hlis ExicellJency John Vojtassak, bjshop of
Spis. Hailf of Slwaikia was a'1ready occupied by the Russian
rumy. The Sl'O!VaJk National Council was already giving orders from Kosice. At the end of .AipriJ, Dr. Vav,r o Srobar,
chalirma.n of the S1ov,aik NaJtiorra1 CouncH at that time, came
to the Spisslka Ifupiroula (ISpis Chapter) to gain Bishop Vojtassak for the Slov:aJk Na.lbiona:l COIUnoil and for Dr. Edwa..ro
Benes. Srobar wanted ,t hat prilze catch, bec'ause he knew
that Bishop Vojttassa'k was an old and 'hard Slovak.
As they meit in the corri'd.10r of the bi,s hop's residence,
Dr. Srolbar explained why he came and then asked the bishO!p to back the new government. The bishop eyed him
co:l d[y for a moment and then srud:
"I do nolt reoogni ze any S'1ovruk Nationall Council and
president Benes. My government is stilil in Bratislava, and
as president of the SlrovaJks I recognize oruy the Siovak,
Ms.g r. Dr. Tiso!"
The ~ytihe stmrok upon a stone. Dr. Srobar departed,
and bishop John VojtassaJk went to his room. Several days
later when the bishop received an order from the Slovak
N atiorral OownJCirl to beget himsellif to his p1race of confinement i-n Stl,ruvru:k, Vojtassaik replied energetica.!Uy: "I do not
have an auto, nor any means of transportation, not even a
horse. They -took ever.yrthing from me. I wi'M yie[d only to
force."
On May 5, 1945, an auto stopped in front oif the Kaipitula; it was a,mned with machine guns and severrul men with
auito:matiJc:s. The wovds of Ohris't again rang ou't: You are
come out as it were aigain,st a robber with clubs. The good
bishop of Spis was forcefuilily talken to Stiaivnik and, later,
to the jaml of the federal court in Bratislava.
1
�52
SLOVAKIA
What hruppened to him? A1[ I knew at that time was
that the commwn1i1,it "Plravd'a" of Bramislava was inciting
aigainst h!im., head!linirrug its avticleis thus: "The Lord Bishop
is against chi:ldren of tJhe wmikers." It was a brazen lie, designed to U!Ilderunine the 1:Jrnst of the fovthfol in the social
ideO'logy of iits bishop, who during hd:s whole life proved himself to be the most social o,f alil episcopa:l dignitaries in
Sl0V1aikia.
Soon aflter the OOOU1pation of Bratislava by the Russians, the bishoip Ol.f Trnava, Mii.H'.tary Vicar and Rector of
the BraJtislaiva seminary, J. E. BwzaLka, was ja1iled. F\irst he
wais lodged in the pohce stati'On and tJhen transferred to the
federail prison where "heiavy offenders" weire penned. He
slept on a spring, no m'aJttress ,b eing availaJble, and the siliveT-haired poet, Va'lentine Beniruk, slept alongside him on
the bare stone :flloor.
After the bishops, t:he Slwialk National Co'Ullcil "took
care" of the oonons and other pre1'aJtes. Among the first to
be truken was Joseph Srobar of BraJti.sl'a:va, brother of Dr.
Vaviro Srdbar. The old churehman, ail heart, would never
hairun even a fly. But bo[shev,rk justice did not consider that.
In him it sa,w an "enem:y of the people" and inrcaTcerated
him.
.
Ma:nry othevs foHowed him, among them Dr. Charles
Kovper, weH-iknown among .American S:lova\ks, former editor of a Cathoi1'i'c neWS1pruper. Monsignor Marsina of Trenci.n cO'llild not even OOJt for nothing in the jail, but had to
work. And what work! He was forced to dig c011pses wit!h
his bare hand's firom ma$$ graves, then forced to wash and
·k!iss each one. I have a strong su1S1pidon thalt those mass
graives were made lby the Russians and not by the Germans
as claimed by the So:vie'ts.
"Fascist Post.enyi Arrest.ed"
That's what a heai!'line said in the communist "Pravda."
And it stumned just albout the whole of Slo.vrukila. The discovery of America O!I' the Law of GI"avitation was no more
sensationall. Up to that time nobody knew that Monsignor
Postenyi was a fascilSt. Aime11ida,ri Slovaks know Msgr.
�SLOVAKIA
53
Postenyi very weiN. He visiited America in the interests of
the S't Ada!llbert Society, pulljlisher of Catholiic literature
and inrf.cmmat<ion, an origanwation equiivalent to the Book of
the Month 01wbs in Amerti!C'a. The Reds knew that his Slovak ,paltriotism was beyond question and that his merits, as
far as the l31rgesit CIUll,bural, Slovak, Catholk institution was
concerned, were greaJt. Monsignoir Po:s tenyi is an exemplary
priest of Gad, a S1ovaik hough and through, and an indefatfJi,gruble worlcer for the common people of his nation. He
was pe!I1S€Kmted for his Slovak ,p atriotism when the Commumst leaders and editors of the "Pravda" were strn in the
bOSOIIn of Albraham.
Never aclmvel.l,y interested in politics, Msg,r. Postenyi
sUldden!ly became a "fascist!" We knew whalt the C01Inmunisits wanted to aJOcorrniplish. 'Do put Posteny,i out of the way
woold me'an to destroy the Society of St. Ad•rutbert with iJts
libraries, priillt sh01ps and origan.izationrul appruratus. And so
the SlOViaJk N ationa;l CO'U!Ilici1 appointed the fina.ncirul secretary of the Sooiety, a Ozedh named Wa;gner, as the commissary of the Society. A few days l1ater a new management
was named, one that was rucceptaJble to the spirit and program of tJhe C01Inmunist-idk>minia.ted SlovaJk NaJtional Cooncil.
This institution which was bui[it by generations of Slov,a ks inrto a going cultural concern wrus wiped oult in a momenit by the ruthilegs Reds The 150.000 members of the
Society of St. Ada1be,rtt co:uM not say a word against the action without inviting punishment, either inciariceration or
exile into Silberia. That is how the "people's demooracy" of
the Soviets operates.
Charit,a,ble Ecclesiastical Institutions
The la;rgesit oharitalble ooganization in Slovrukia wa,s the
Central Charity (Ustredna Karita), the central Catho1.ic institute of al'l the welfare, socitail, anld religious societi'es. It
ha;d its own hea11th cenltets, hospiita!ls for incuraJbO.es, children's nurseries, etc. The women'1s "Charilta:s" was a'1so a
mem~ of tJhe organi.<Za,tion. 'Dhe CommUll!ists took (Wer ruH
soci:ail insbitiuttions of the Church. Some weeks after the ocCUipation, tihe Communist Union of Sloviak Women confi:s-
�54
SLOVAKIA
cated the children's nuTsery of the Ustredna ~arita in Dornk~le, BraJtislava, and the Union of SloivaJk Y ouith toolk
over the ·b oarding sch06l nea,r the forestry school in Koliba,
Braltislavia.
The hwmanitari.an division oif the city o.f Bratislava
comisoated the estate of "Oharitas" in Braltisfava near the
Red Bridge. For the women's home of "Charitas" the commissari'at foT Social Welifare named as commissary the Communist Fla:TIIIly Hirusovsky. Dr. Ivan Horvath, the commissary
for sooiall welfare, prod.aimed that a:1'1 the charitable, social
instituJtions of the Church would be taken over by the state.
Protests clid not mean a thing, as usual.
"Freedom" of the Press
One of the first ,a cts of the Commissariat for Initernal
AffaiTs was the suppression o;f aM news,prupers. With th~s
general order all Oathollic newpaJpers and :periodicais weTe
wiped out aultomalt!roally; noit only cruturrul and literrury periodicals, such as the "Ku!litura" (a.rl.,tmre.) and the "Obroda"
(Rffi"ilvaJl), but even an the religious and educational periodicals, such as The MessengeT of the Srucred Heart, The
Holy Family, The Queen of May, etc. And, ]ater the only
Caltholk Sloivruk weeldy "Katolicke Noviny" (The Catholic
News), which had a suibscription of 170,000, was also swppressed and ta:ken 01Ver by 1:!he Reds.
Cathollics protested to the authorities, but in. vadn. The
Catholic press was gone. Attaclks against the Church and
its priests increased daily, but they could not defend themselves; it was an unequa:l strwggk The enemy fought wfth
powerfU!l we8lpons, whi[e the Catholics had none.
"Freedom" of Conscience
The wax was fought, we were told, aga.inst the suppressi~n of consoien.ce by imperial~stic means, and we haJVe lived
to see sucll a diclatorship and s:uch a barbaric viOllia.tion of
conscience and its inlterrra:l freedom, the likes of whl'C'h perhrups not even the most frurious f:aslci'Slt ever dreamed of. On
aH fronts of tlhis terrible wrur died the best sons of humanity for the rigih:t to speak free'ly about the most fundamental questions of 1iife against tlhe fascist terror. Men
�SLOVAKIA
55
shed their blood so that concentration camps, wiith all theiT
horrors, might never a:ga:in operaJte. But soon aif.ter the war's
end aN dliistriot cities in SlovaJlda were ordered to set up a
concent.Taition camp and jaill. The war was fol.light for the
freed'Olffi of poilft.ic-aiJ. conviotlions, but in Sl'OVlalkia today there
are not enOUJgh jai!ls to talke care of aH those, whose only
gui,It is that they wilM not swear on the Siclcl.e anld: Hammer,
but prefer to rematin loyal to the fupal eneyclilc'als and the
fiUJnd:amen'ta:l princiiples of demooraJCy. ln a wore, the Slovaks want to be demO!crat:s and not 'boisiheviks.
What has rea;filry changed? Every ni!ght we waited
tensely to see whether they were coming for us. We had
no peace duirmg the day or night. Forever they were screening and investiigaJting UIS just 'becaUJSe we haippened to live
during the past era, and had to wor1k and keeip OUir families.
They perseouted us for "co'l:1-aborating" because we recorded oftficiail writings, in some office, or because we were
insigruffoant wiheells in the great machinery of life.
In Conclusion
If I had not seen it, I would not hruve be'liieived it. Those
first three months in "l~beraJted" Bra;tislruva were a nightmare. It .st;ilfil hamnts me. The S[ovalk people dild not ha,ve a
clharuce. The,i r country was overrun bry bar:barians whom the
.AilHes had Wlken on as pa:rtners. Slovalkia was ru!led bry terror and violence f.rom the moment it was "rnberaJted" lby the
so-calil ed "Uniiteld Nations," which placed it in the Soviet
sphere o!f irufiluence. ]t was ruied 'by the Communist-dominated regime o!f the man who r~gned the presitleTIJCy in 1938
and returned as president..a.venger behind the Soviet ho:rdes
in 1945. 'Dhe independenJt Slo.ivaJk Repull:Afc, established by the
dully eledted representatives olf t!he Slovak people in 1939
and reoognlizetl by 27 countries, including GreaJt Britain and
F,r ance, was wanton!ly destroyed against the wiili of the
Slova:k people.
The vast majority of the Slovaik nation, the Catholics
of Slovakia - representing 80 per cent of the poipll1ation was oulUawed. No politioail parities, newspaipers, organizations, and eilltenprises cou~d exist, except th()[se aUowed by
�56
SLOVAKIA
Dr. IDdwa,rd Benes and his Communist-dominated regime.
The non-Catholic minority in Slovakia - including aN those
who ca;Ned t!hemsetlives "Christians" - hel,p ed Benes and the
Co!Ir.JII1UJill1S'ts ruin Ca1fud1irc Slovrukia and so helped to ruin
themseilves and thetk in:stilbulticms. Whereas, in the beginning,
only Crutholics were perisem.uted and onily Cathol'i:c institUJtion:s
and enter,prises were nabion:a,lized, laJter the foNowers of ail
Christian faiths were crucified and their institulti'ons confiscalted b;y the State. Hi:istor:y repeateld itseJ.if. But ha,tred
of the Cathohc Ch'l11l'ch in S'lovakia did n01t solive any of the
social or economic probllems, bult oll!l.y aggrawated them; in
faot, it only he'lped the Communists realize their ends all the
more speedilly. It is high time thait a'11 Christians realized
this an:d aoted accordmgly.
In Slovalkia tihere sha/U be no rea;l peace, no flI'eedom,
as long 3IS 1t is governed by peopte wlho are hostile to the
nationa1 traditions of the Slovak nation and its rel:i!gious and
political convictions and, hence, are bent on the destru<:tion of the SIJ.O'Vruk people. Slovaikia, one of the oldest Christian countries of Centra1 :Eiu!rope, never sho:uil(l. haive been desbroyed as an independent StaJte. That is more evident today
than it was in 1945. No nrution has fought Coonmunism more
pel'.sistentily and consistently than the Slovaik nation It's
time that this trutlh was recognized by a.Ill freedom-rl<wing,
a:ruti-Com:rrmmist coll!Il1Jri-es and that they adj1U1st theiir pOllicies to,w ard the Slovaks to fit the present siitU1aition. Even
today the people of Slovruk.ia find iJt ha~d to belrieve that they
were sdld oUJt to the men of the Kremlin with the help of
file United StaJtes and Great Britain, the great sym'bols of
freedom and demooraicy. But they stitl exipect to be liberated
by them.
•
•
•
"THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is an American institu-
tion. Its primary interest is America. As an American of Slovak descent, I say again and again that it ls in the interest of Amerlc-a and
the democratic world at large to work for the freedom and Independence of Slovakia. The Individuals and organizations affiliated with
the Slovak League of America - as true Americans - cannot wish
their brethren in Slovakia less fre edom than they themselves enjoy
in the U. S. A. We say: Give Slovakia back to the Slovak people!"
- (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit. Mich., 11-18-51)
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1953
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SLOVAKIA
39
THREE MONTHS IN "LIBERAT ED" BRATISLA VA
BY: AN EYEWITNES S
Urut'hl 1944 tJhe capiW city of S10V1akira, Bralbis1ava, lived
far remoived from mililtaey operations. Ltfe wars a,,1together
nor,ma;J. both c1.1llltmraUy and sodaiJ.l.y. 'Dhe siltuation dhanged.
sU!bstantli.la!ley after Italy wars occuipied, when Bratislava came
withi111 the range of the alliied air :f.iorce.
Mirl itary oib'jeldt:s of Bratisl ruva were first bombed rby the
al'lied aiir force in the focenooo. of June 16, 1944. The "ApO'llo" ref.inery, the adjacenit faotory and lha!1bor quarters we.re
hit. But indrirscriminaite Russian 1b om11:iing was more fatal.
Soviet flliers did not specialize on miiitairy objects, but let
bombs loose anyiw\here in the city. They ce11ba:irillry did not
glorify themselves witih the 1bombing of SpitMsrka street,
where tlhey destroyed a church, a convent and the hospital
of St. EliizaJbeth. Sorviet planes ruppea:red aibove Braitislava
on Holy Satu,rdary and peppered the civi[fans on the crowded
streets with tlherir deck guns. The front had moved up consideraJblly and Soviielt p:lranes were comin,g over practically
every houir to drop their b.ombs into the streets.
1
Easter 1945 in Bratislava
During Holy Weelk it. was evident to most of us that
the Germa'I1S were preparing ,t o defend Bratisfav.a. The streets
were emptied, bM'ricades were constructed , huge g'uns were
put u,p The Germans themsel;ves, '.however, did not appear
to be very interested in tlhe defense of our ctity and hauled
whaitever they couftd out of it. 'Dhe units whkJh remained
were to be used to c01Ver the retrea,ting Germans. The Ger-•
man com.man.der urged the Slovak Governmen t to leave Bratislava. Since only a small number of Germans remained,
it was ~rieved that tJhey were not going to defend the city
very lon.g. The poipuilation co'l.tld not decide whether to leave
tbe ciity or stay putt. Sa.Jturday evening everything was being
taiken into cel10Jrs and hritl!ing places. The monotonou s bomibing of the Russian air force, the ofose booming of cannons
annOIUll1Ced that the Russians we.re a:pproachin g steadily U111spea.JkaJble ne:rrV'O!U'Sness gr.~pped the crirty. AH the men h~d
40
SLOVAKIA
themselves, booaiuse iJt was said thait the Germans were going
to taJke rull 1!he men out of Braitislava.
On Easter Sunday, at nine o'dock in the morning, Soviet fliers aigain ffilade them- appearance and in the afternoon huge Russian g,uns were 'bombarding Bralti:slava. The
we'l!l-.Jmown Ruissian "Kaltuse", also da!lled "1Sta~ iln'is organs,"
began to pJ.ay the following day, i.e., Easter Monday. Every.
thiinig shook to the foundatio!l'S and fires hroike out in many
p'lia;ces. T,h e retreating Germans fired the SloV'ak University
and ala the reserwe piiles of food and war maJterials. Thick
smoike rose from Bratiis'lruva for three days and three niighlbs,
and the fire sprerud because there were neither waiter nor the
pe01ple to f,i ght tlhe fires. The heaviiest fii:ghting took place in
the ea'S'tern paJI't of the cilty, where praeitiic~ly every factory
quariter wrus ruined, the stireets of Trnruva and Krizna,
Stein's Brewery and the viJcinity.
On 'l'uesday tlhe Gemnans began to f11ee, destroying
every;th'i ng that had n~t a-lre'ad,y <been desitvoyed. They blew
u1p the bridge ,to PetrizJalka and the last g,rowp bariricruded iltself in the Braitis,la,va Castrle. The Russians aiready were in
the sulburbs of Bratislava, when the Germans in the western
hil!J.s of the c1ty began cannonading it. Thiis hurl BTati'slava
the moist. On Thursday morning fue first Russian d'i•visions
were in the very heart oif the city. Graduailly the booming
died aiway and the streets began to be filled w1th Russian
soldiers.
The "Liberation" Begins
1
The SolV'iet soldiers first Hib.e.rated us from our watches
with their well-tlmown "Davaj easy" (Give your waltches).
EX!cept for solldiers, tlhe streets were empty; on1y coz,pses
were being b alked in .the sipring sun. After a few days, when
we cra.,wled out of our bunlkers and cellairs., we saiw the
ghastly pioture of ruin anld desolation.
Sffiloke s,tii-1 ro!Hed out of buildings and 1:lhe atmosphere
was. satwrated Wli'th dust and gunpowder. Glass wa·s ground
under foolt. Rdl::fueries were in fU'l'l swing. Soviet soidiers
brdke windows of business places with their rule butts and
sa-cked and pitMaiged everything. A few dats later, not a
sitIJ.g1le shop remamed whO'le. Wh'atever could rrot be taken
SLOVAKIA
41
was knocked to pieces. Of course, the l'a wless mob helped
very efferdtive1y in thi's work. Reports. olf the raping of
women began coming in. It was nothing um.t'sua!l to see
franltic W()lffien rUIUNng wildly from their aJttaokeirs; they
sm-eamed, k'iciked and fought, -but to no avail. The 'hordes
of the RUJSsii'an steppe's were on the loose. Who shall desc,dbe the sta.rk terror- in the eyes of the Slo;v:ak women and
girls who 00U!l.1d not get away f,r -()lffi the beasts olf Moscow?
Even ii£ I tmoo, I believe that my pen woul:d have to blush
if it had to detail the brutalities and abroc'~ties committed.
There is no need to exipand on :the fate of many, many women,
who remained lya.ng in their bllood aflter such a ba'I1barian
shaw of "a!f.feotion" of the Sov,i et soldiers. They to,l d us
that it was the "nationa!l duty" o.f the S1avaJk women to repay the So'Vliet arimies rih love!
Vinko, Vinko, Vinko Cervene
We thOUJght that SlovaJk wiine would not attract the Soviets after tJhey had tasted of strong Tokay in Hurngary.
Bult we were mi!stJaken even tJhis time (as usu:a1). Slovak
wine memhanits di:d not wanit to sel'l us wine since January,
becau:se they had 'hiOiped to sell it at a high price to the Soviet sohliers. But how quijic,k1ly they soibered UJP, when, instead of the jingle-jangle of gCJld 11ulbles, they he:ard shots
from rifiles anld. aUlbomaitics in their otherwise irnmcessible
ceUars. Barrels were shot wp and the precious liquid o.f the
Slova1k earth began flowing; first into pitchers an'<i all so!'ts
of containers, dean and uncilean, even bernzine cans. When aU
these were fi'1le'd, tlhe wine t11ic'k:led iruto soLdieirs' boots, then
flowed over the cellars and vestilbll!les an'<i finaliy onto. the
streets. Tos strong aroma mixed w1th the gih:astly stench of
decayiing cO'l",pses, whk:h even after a week were stili lying
on the sidewaiJ.ks. of the city. The soldiers drank and so d<id
the civilians; ch!iMren drank and so did the oldsters. It
seemed that the barrels were bottomless. "Viniko, vinko, vinko cerivene" (Wtine, wine, red wine - a popclaT Slovak
drinlking song) !
I shail1l never forget tJhe tovaris-comrade who had two
botJtles of reld. champaigne stucik in his fuT crup, a bottle in
42
SLOVAKIA
eadh. pocket and his hands full. He was approached by another comrade whn .rolblbed hiim on the street of his precious
bu.Tden in broad d'a.yuilghlt. The two lashed at each other
li'ke antlmals and drew blood on the 'ha.rd pavement of Kapitulska street.
Bratishwa wine merchants. 'loolk ed on stupidly and
si.'lently ait this Sodiomic destruction of their cellars, and the
SO!Ulr odor of the wine reminded them of the old times, when
they were s'till:l. bosses of their wine and thought that they
themselrves wolU.ld ·haive the honor to treat the "liberat0rs."
They rea[irz;eJd tlhe bitter truth that they we·r e "liberated," i.e.
comip1etely roiblbed of all their world!ly possessions on the
very threshold of a neiw life, the new order promised by the
men of the K.re:rnUn.
Where Do You Stay, Tovaris?
If you were in the aI1II1y, you know w'hat obedience and
di'Scilplme means. Withoult bhe:rn, there hardly could be an
effecltiive rurmy. A soldier beil.ong,s to some particular company or di'Vlisi:on, must haJVe his gear, be fed and quartered,
even th<Ylligh it be under a tent or in a barn. Bult the Soviet
soltl!iers wlho swa:runed iiruto Bratislava had no definite quarters and, hence, were everywhere. Usuany aJbout midnight
it occurred to· tihe:rn that they had to get some sleep, so the,y
began to looik for shelter. Door:s and lodks and bars were no
hindrance. Wihether of glass or wood, doors were booted in
or smasheJd wiitJh rifile butts, if they were niot opened immediately.
"You, bourgeoisie, you did not fighlt ... "
Threatened, 1:Jhere wa·s nothing one cou[d c1o bult flee
from .h is own home and consider himse1f liUCky if he was
not shot- A soldier does not undress for sleep very oflte:n
at the fuiont, bult Ivan the RUJSsian never ll!Ildressed even
when he had a bed, bwt simply piled on the bed f.wl1y g,ar,bed,
'boots, rifle, pi•s tols, grena:des and a:M. And the frolllt was
sixty miles away from us.
Investigation After Investigation
We thought the war was over when the slh!ooting subsided and the boomdng resounded f.rom a dristanice. We began
SLOVAKIA
43
to clean the streets, coll!lect the dead, and put whatever was
left oif ,ouir homes in order. A ,penson slO!Wly fongets what he
lost, because onlly then, when he did not die during the
bomfbardment, does he reaili.ize that it is beaultiifiu[ to live,
even tJhoug'h in feaJr, hunger rund thirst, and in raJgs. Things
tha,t were a.ire no more, and other things tfhat were not will
oome into being. L'iife is all that matters. On'l,y he knows the
reail meamng of water and light who has li,v ed thI10UJgh the
terror of the front in hiding wilthoult light and water. I.Me
will returm to iits dld ways and time wiH heal aJhl wounds ()If
the soiwl a,nd bod,y ()If inld.wii.dUJaJl's and nations.
Well, wlh,y shoUJld nO/t a person a:gaJin imagine that liJfe
can be beruuttilfiull, when he is sitting on tile 'l'Uins ()If his home
~nd the ashes of hi1s dreams? Why, there is no more bc»nibing and even the streets are lighted up in the evenings.
Buit empty a.ire the inns, empty are the ce11'3JI"s, empty
are tJhe stores and shops Brolken windows and smashed
doors attest tJo the min which the Soviet soldiers had
WOOU1ght. But the wihl to live r,i,ses alb,ove all this. We must
forget everyttJhing thaJt pruined us, a.IN the in:justi<Ces, subdue
om thd,r st for blood, when the sap of a new spring is
awakening, when everythfun.g is being ren01Vateld, everything
is in bloom, the thrush sings and the chiildren play.
Burt aH this is but a dream, an ~lluision. '.Dhe 'b attle has
ended on the streets, but just the sa:me a mare fiurious invi:siib1e baittle is going on. As you step out of your home, you
are co,nrfronlted with tJhe bayonet o;f a Russian soldier or the
various "safety" ciommittees. You look a:rO'llnd and notice
that yornr home, nay the whole street is sUJITounded by
guards. You re'tl.l!rn h'llITTriedly to your room and wait to see
what wiM h'appen. Y.ou wait and wait and waJit unti[ the sUISpense aJlrrnost d11ives you mad. Your blood thins in your veins
and you look sadly aJbowt you - and wait! F'iinaMy they
came, sO'l1d iers and civiili ians: they go through the house and
take whatever they want. '.Dhey ask you whether you are a
GeI1IDan or not, whebher any Germans or "coll'<llbaratilonists"
a,re in your house. You lod.k them icily in the face. 'Tihey depart but only to come rugruin.
44
SLOVAKIA
Organs of Security
Mter two weeks oif the Russian occupation everything
was phmdered. People had no more than they had buried or
secreted in such a place where even the Russian hunters and t,hey are eXlpe'tUy schooled in the art of flinding wailled-in
objects - would not come. There was a clirth oif everything,
even a serforus lack of bread. But we had plenty o.f police!
They sprang Ulp like m:ushrnoms aflter a rain. In t'he first
place, ,t he dreaded NKVD (OGPU), the Secret So,vi•e t Police, n10toirioo~ for its birurt:al and ghasitl;y crimes. Woe to him
that faHis intto its hanids. The NiKViD goes from home to
home, drags peoipile aiway and nolbody ever hears of their
fate. Fvom eastern S'JO'V'aJkia alone more tihan 4,000 peo~e
were draigiged oiff into Siiberia.
I was fonbunate to be 'home during the investigation.
AU the en'tralllces to the 'bwil.ding were covered by soldiers
wit!h a:utomattics. I •t r:wersed my room ne.rvous•ly. A'lthough
I had a c:leair clon1science, yet I was di-squited. (No one is sufficiently olear or safe with the Soviet Po[ice) . Finally I
wenlt into the haiJ.llway. I was greeted by a soMier and a civilian. A IDQlfilenrt later came the caiptain. He asked me my
naJme, what I wa:s doing here, what my profession was, and
wheither I was a mem1ber orf IIlin:ka's People'1s Parity.
A mac1hinist l,iived on the same floo,r. His room was
locketl. Tlhe caiptain OII'<lered me to open it. "I haven't the
key," I told hlm. The maic!hini.st had the key and the soldiers had him in hand alt the gate. I ran to the gate. The
NKVD g,u1a rd had an a.ultomatti~ on the machinist. I approached him and said that tlhe c~pta;in wants to open the
machinist's room, but the madh~nrist had the key. The latter alre'ardy wanted to hand it to me, when the s:o'ldier suddenly tuirned the aurt:omatiic on me and said: "You ha.ve the
key" - "'BUit I dlo not have t'he key, the madhinlist has it"
- "No, you will 'h,ruve it, if the caiptain says so." - "But I
do not have it; loolk, tovaris, the machimst has. it." - "No,
I have a.Qready told you that you wi-11 have the key and will
open the door, when the captam orders you to do so."
I was dumlbfounded by the profound stU1piclilty and returned without t1he key. I told the captain thait the to:varis
SLOVAKIA
45
wowd not let me take the key from the machinist because,
he said, the captain had ordered me and not the machinist
to open the room. I also was a sOJldier and I know whait military dbedience means. Bult this cannot be called obedience,
but some kind of unmentionaJble stupidilty or i!Illfbecility
which wouid be capable of sticking pins under my fingernails just to find a key on me whirch I do not haive. I realized
then wlhy people, during the investigaltions in tJhe tortrure
cha.im!bers of the NKVD, confess to things which they never
committed.
The invest1gation began at seven in the morning and
lasted un1ti'l nine. I went to town on business arrd returned
a1boU1t eleven. Upon my arr,ivai the building was a·gai,n surrounded biy guards, but this time by the Prurtisans Security
c:1it.
I wanted to enter the bui'1ding, but they wouid not let
me. I identified myse1f and said that I ld.ved there. Finailly
a boy, about 17, wit:Jh an automatic in his hands, let me
enter. It was very liive:ly in the hallways. The partrsa,n captain was giving orders. I did not know wh1at they were seeiking. I went through the investigation tortures again, but
qUJite fortunately. Again aftl the rooms, closets, desks, and
dressing cabinets were opened. The investigation was over at
about one o'ciock. Again some innocent peoiple were taken.
But that was not alt That was onJy t'he beginning.
Night feJ.,l and the stars shone brighUy over Br.atislava.
Finany, a lilttle rest, I thought But there is no restful or
peaceful night duiring a Russian occl..llpaition. A'boUJt midnight I was awa.ikened by some one pounding on my door.
Another investigaition !
I was on my feet in an instant and <jpened the door.
Before me in the semidankness stood a man and a lady. Instead of identifying themselves, t!hey opened their short
coats so that I could see the revolvers in leather 'holsters.
"But, but, this is a spe:cia l visit, and so laite at night!"
"Your documents," said the man.
"Here they a,re, t:hank you."
"Were you a memlber of IDinka's Party?" - "I was."
"Since when?" - "From 1933." - "Were you in the
1
46
SLOVAKIA
Hlinka Guards?" - "I was not." - "Did you be'1ong to
Hlinlka's Youth?" - "No." - "Are you a So'ld!ieir?" - "I
am an oftfircer in the Sloivalk airnny." - "Did you ta.Ike pa.rt
in the revollit ?" - "No." - "Why not?" - "I was on druty in
Nitra." - "Are you a Slova;k ?" - "I am."
Then they entered my room. On my taJble was a small
bust o{ Andrew Hlin!k'a.
"And .t his?" - "That is a bust of Andrew Hilinlka."
"Hman., we adivi,se you, to destroy irt." - "I don't understand, whiy?" - "Welil, may!be tomorrow you will understand."
Wilth that t'.hey depa,rited. Ait thrr-ee in the morning the
inrve-stigat'ion olf .tlhe secret police was completed.
At eight in the morn.mg came the olffictaJl police, the
so-calied "Naitiona1 Secruritiy" po~ice, to find out who i,t was
thaJt a1hlowro an in1VestigaJtion at mghit when the ipolice knew
nothing aJbout it. "What kind o{ peop1e were they, how did
they look, w:hiat did they want?" I was asked. This then was
the new oroer - so ter:rrilbly dangerous because iit had so
many .srufety biU1reaus thalt one dlid not know aibout the other!
Or did they?
The Bratislava Commander Complains
A month had already passed since the occ'Ulpation of
Bratisla1Va , but the streets were stilil wn:swept; dirt and
ruiblble were everywhere; liice and infectious diseases were
spreading rapidly. 'Ilhe local "National Oommittee" had a
loog session to decirle what to do with the riwbbish and
rull:fule clutterinig and burning in the streets. But how was
the mess to be C'leared ruway, wlhen the Ru'Ssians took an
the city dump trucks, a1l pri,v ate cars and al,l wagons and
horse's ?
Typhoid fever spread danger01Us ly; the numibers of inflicted increased. The Office of P.ropruganda, or, as it was
then called, the "Commissary of InfoTfl'nation" pfa'stered the
city witJh huge plaic-ards depio'ting a s'keleton poUII"iing lice
over BraJtis lava and t'.he wairning : "WATCH THID LICE,
THEY SPREAD TYPHOID. ''
People stared at the placarids and barked: "Bwt who in
SLOVAKIA
47
tarnation broughlt lice here? Send the lousy Russians baok
to their lousy ooumrtey !"
'I.1he first plwcards had liiittle e.fifoot. Severrul druys later
new ones appeared: Origanilze energeti'C brig,ades of clearuiness ! But Il!cibodiy paid any atJtenMon. The :riUJbbish iblliI'Iled on
and spread its poisonous fiumes over the .popuil.<ati.on. There
were no autos, no wrugons wiith which to do the hau[ing.
Hiarses, oows and siheeip were kept in the panks. The hot
sun blruzeid away and laughingJy loolked at the me!SS, which
the "new" government prdbalbly did not dear aJWay to this
day. And so the skeleton keipt pouring the lice, and t:Jhe placaros aJb,o ut the brig,a des. of cleanliness were covered witlh
new red ones, whicih unged us to attend lec!tUll'es on the
moraie of the SoVli.et man, So:vieit woman, and the Soviet
youth. The Soviet Russians wasted no time in edlucating the
masses accordtinlg to the dootrines orf Marx and Lenin.
A Soviet Soldier Confesses
lit wrus a bea:urtri.:titd June afternoon in K 1rurl'ova Ves near
Bratislava, when a Riu'SSian sOlldier rupproacihed us and struclk
up a oonvwsaiti.on. He reproved us saying tha.Jt we Slovruks
were Ullldiscipllined amid un.gratefUll. We shOIUJd not siay OII' believe tJhat t:Jhe RJussi,ans rure taikin.g everything that can be
ha'l.lll€1d aJWay, booau1se thaJt is only ibrud propaganda. Since
he was in a t~aJtiive mood', and did not have a revolver, we
dooided to malke WIOrds with him.
He spdke at length albout d!i.scipil[n.e in RUISSia, both in
thiin.lk.ing and in spealk~ng. In Slovaki·a, he said, everyone says
whatever he 'Pleases. "ThaJt does not exist in Ruissia. One
must hiO:ld to what St-a!lin says. That is the truth and a.Ill
else is ,proprugantla. Sta!lin to-Id UIS thaJt in Russia everything
iis fine a!nd dandy, everyrtJhin,g is beaut.if.td, that we have
enoUJgh to eait. And even though we know that everything i:s
not fine and dan:dy, be.mt'i:fiul, and thtat we do not ha;ve
enough to eaJt, yet we must say that everythmg is f,i ne and
dandy, and thaJt we have plenty to ea.t. Stalin has so ordered! Stalin has so spdken!"
He bec'ame so excited trying to prove his impossible
stand that I reaHy pit'ioo. him. I s:m:il.ed and sa,id softly:
48
SLOVAKIA
"My dear tovaris! We're a different kind of people,
strange to you, indeed. When a tihinrg is white, we say it is
white; when it is bladk, we say iJt is black. When we have
nothing to eat, we say thaJt we a~ hungry oir that we are
starving And if anyone orders us to speak otheirwise, we
still. say the truth. Stra'lin telJs you different, so be hruppy in
your belief. We believe in God, too, but with reason, never
against reason."
But our tovaris seemed to be far away; his mouth
opened, but he said nothing further. Shaiking hiis head, he
pwlled at his ear as he slowly wa;llked away.
The Soviet Lady Doct.or
We weire oirdered to hand 01Ver the miili'ta,r y hospdital in
Bratishwa to the RUJSsians. As we were preparing inventory
lists, a Rmlssilan l'ady doctor stepped iruto .the room. After
talking for a time, we struck upon religion, belieif in God,
and other ba.pics. But my Russian colleague, a lieutenant,
!)TOclaimetl thait it was in vain we were trying to convince
her, becruuse she wm.tltl nort believe l1'S no matter what the
airgumenlts. I assured her that she had nothing to fear, because I had no ruposJtoilic intentions.
"Why do we write 1945," I asked her.
"I know but I won't tell you!"
"Burt even you designalte this year by thaJt numlber."
"You won't oon'V'ince me "
"I db not want to. But even the unbelieving world
admits that Christ was born."
"I heard rubout that also; burt I do not believe i,t."
"Why?"
"Becruuse in the history of the Communist Party there
isn't anything aJbout it."
"Alh, so!"
WhaJt is the use of debating? We looked at each other
srgnifioa,ntly, smiled, and talked aibout otheir things.
"How long did you study medicine?"
"I finished the course during the wair in a year and a
haJlf. In peaceful times the study takes aliJ. of two and a half
years."
SLOVAKIA
49
We 1,amghed loud1iy amd pitied the prutients who happened
to get under her kmfe.
Placards: Religious Freedom
DtN-ing the veriy first weelk:s of occupatfon the Slovak
Communist Party posted placiar:ds everywhere, arnnlQuncing
that the ComJmuni'Slts wiant to respect the relii.g,ioos feelings
of a!hl the SloviaJk people and, therefore, are c,alloog aU Slovaks, regardless of the:ir religious convictions, into the
Party. Nay, eiven Catho'l:ic priests coul'd and shlOuiltl join the
party, we were to1ld. People sing a nfoe tune, when they
want to catch a biro!
But wlhrut if a mira'Cle had rea!Uy happened? Suppose
Comrm.mism had made a tll!I"11 for the ,better? May/be Commun:ism was no longer so excilusive; perhrups it was even
reipernting and had decided to let itself be baptized in Christian SlO'V'a'l da! We knew that the Communists were not sincere, but the fact is thaJt oultwarilly they did try tb deal humanely with the peopie for a wht[e to convince them that
Communism was not as bad as they thought. It was evident
that they were instiru~teld not to insult the sacred and traditionai feel'ings of the SlOIVak ,peop1e. But the pretense soon
wore off and the Reds opecl,y a1:>t8iC'ked a11 ece'lesfastical instilbutions.
Catholic Schools in Nationalized Slovakia
lf there were some Sloivaiks who had iHu'Sions a,bout
the Communists going sofit., thek tllu1sions eJOPloded like
b,u!bbles, W:hen Laoo Novomesky, Commissar ('br:ulsitee) of
Exiucation, annOlmceld that ai11 Catholic scbioo[,s m Slovakia
were to be aJbo:Iished and their property was to be taken over
iby t!he Stale. He was leld to this action, he said, because it
wais inadimissaJble that the Ohiurich should o!ffer a different
kind of education than the State. The unity of the nation,
sa•: d No;voimesky, required a unifo:r,m eduicaJtiona1 system,
cultural and religious st!'.ife must cease, etc.
What could not be accomplished even during the first
Ozooho.jSloV'ruk republk, was done now with one stroke of the
pen · in tJhe shadow of Russi8JI1 bayionets. The Cat'ho[ic institrntions were hit first for ob:vious reasoos. The Reds had
50
SLOVAKIA
little dififiicuM.y in getting the badking of the non-Caitholiic
Christians. Al!l they ha:d to dt> was promise them that they
w()IU[d get the CaJthoiJ.ii:c Churelh proiperrt:.ies. So-cailled followers oif Christ a1Jtadking and despoiling the fo1lowers of
Christ! The Reds knew what they were doing, but evidently
the non.CathoJic Christians did not, because they tooik the
bait. Slovaik IJuithera.ns, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, etic , expected to gain by the deail against the Catho[ic Slovaks (80
per cent oif tJhe poipuliaibi.on) and, therefore, went a'long with
the Reds.
!Ton mrust be forged while it is hot. After publishing
the decree, all diredtors of Cruthoiic sciho01ls were dismissed.
Their places were taken over by so-ca;Ued "Czechoslovaks"
and Lwtherans. That was done e:spe'Cially in gymna'Sit1ms
managed by the reJl'igiorus <YI'ders, for example, alt the UrS'llline s:c!hools in BrrutislJ.ava and Tuna.va. It was done designecily and systemaiticaHy. Fists were clenched and hearts
were steeled. Freedom, freedom! The Slova!k Catholic public
becrume extremely inili.gnarnt. People were saying that the
women of Tmava were getting ready to storm the Ursuline
institution there and throw oot tlhe new di!rectre'SIS, who was
perseC'lllting and intimidating the reiigioruis Sisters there.
The Bishops of Slovakia Protest
E:ven though Siova..ks knew that nothing would be accomplished by protests, neverthe'Jess ail Catholics we.re
a.rgreed that they simply coufttl ndt a!hlow the fundamental
right of the Ohurch to iits own school's be taken away from
them without uttering a word. The peopile had to make
thernse1ves heard, or else the stones wmcld complain.
The CaithOllic Bishop's Collliloil presented a memorandll!In to the government and the Central Cat holic Chancery
was organizing a si-grratn.ure C·Mnipaign against the nationaHzing of scllodls. Lerufllets were distmi.lb uted, and on July 8,
1945, 1!he protest aigainst the confiscrution of the schools
was read from ahl puipiits.
1
Well, alter Ju:ly 8, the Bratislava radio was heard from.
It blasted and attacked the Bishop's Council, using the wellknown phrase: The parish church belongs to the Church,
SLOVAKIA
51
Mlld the school to the StaJte ! Things came to a head and the
resrullt Olf the ,protest was that the dirootors Olf the Central
Cath~lic Bureau, who teohmca;Ny organi!Zed the action, were
jailed. We were again gilven prood' thaJt we were living in a
"democracy" and thiaJt the people were dooiding their own
fOiitunes. Wlhat a modkery !
Catholic Bishops Imprisoned
The ffrst wa,s Hlis ExicellJency John Vojtassak, bjshop of
Spis. Hailf of Slwaikia was a'1ready occupied by the Russian
rumy. The Sl'O!VaJk National Council was already giving orders from Kosice. At the end of .AipriJ, Dr. Vav,r o Srobar,
chalirma.n of the S1ov,aik NaJtiorra1 CouncH at that time, came
to the Spisslka Ifupiroula (ISpis Chapter) to gain Bishop Vojtassak for the Slov:aJk Na.lbiona:l COIUnoil and for Dr. Edwa..ro
Benes. Srobar wanted ,t hat prilze catch, bec'ause he knew
that Bishop Vojttassa'k was an old and 'hard Slovak.
As they meit in the corri'd.10r of the bi,s hop's residence,
Dr. Srolbar explained why he came and then asked the bishO!p to back the new government. The bishop eyed him
co:l d[y for a moment and then srud:
"I do nolt reoogni ze any S'1ovruk Nationall Council and
president Benes. My government is stilil in Bratislava, and
as president of the SlrovaJks I recognize oruy the Siovak,
Ms.g r. Dr. Tiso!"
The ~ytihe stmrok upon a stone. Dr. Srobar departed,
and bishop John VojtassaJk went to his room. Several days
later when the bishop received an order from the Slovak
N atiorral OownJCirl to beget himsellif to his p1race of confinement i-n Stl,ruvru:k, Vojtassaik replied energetica.!Uy: "I do not
have an auto, nor any means of transportation, not even a
horse. They -took ever.yrthing from me. I wi'M yie[d only to
force."
On May 5, 1945, an auto stopped in front oif the Kaipitula; it was a,mned with machine guns and severrul men with
auito:matiJc:s. The wovds of Ohris't again rang ou't: You are
come out as it were aigain,st a robber with clubs. The good
bishop of Spis was forcefuilily talken to Stiaivnik and, later,
to the jaml of the federal court in Bratislava.
1
52
SLOVAKIA
What hruppened to him? A1[ I knew at that time was
that the commwn1i1,it "Plravd'a" of Bramislava was inciting
aigainst h!im., head!linirrug its avticleis thus: "The Lord Bishop
is against chi:ldren of tJhe wmikers." It was a brazen lie, designed to U!Ilderunine the 1:Jrnst of the fovthfol in the social
ideO'logy of iits bishop, who during hd:s whole life proved himself to be the most social o,f alil episcopa:l dignitaries in
Sl0V1aikia.
Soon aflter the OOOU1pation of Bratislava by the Russians, the bishoip Ol.f Trnava, Mii.H'.tary Vicar and Rector of
the BraJtislaiva seminary, J. E. BwzaLka, was ja1iled. F\irst he
wais lodged in the pohce stati'On and tJhen transferred to the
federail prison where "heiavy offenders" weire penned. He
slept on a spring, no m'aJttress ,b eing availaJble, and the siliveT-haired poet, Va'lentine Beniruk, slept alongside him on
the bare stone :flloor.
After the bishops, t:he Slwialk National Co'Ullcil "took
care" of the oonons and other pre1'aJtes. Among the first to
be truken was Joseph Srobar of BraJti.sl'a:va, brother of Dr.
Vaviro Srdbar. The old churehman, ail heart, would never
hairun even a fly. But bo[shev,rk justice did not consider that.
In him it sa,w an "enem:y of the people" and inrcaTcerated
him.
.
Ma:nry othevs foHowed him, among them Dr. Charles
Kovper, weH-iknown among .American S:lova\ks, former editor of a Cathoi1'i'c neWS1pruper. Monsignor Marsina of Trenci.n cO'llild not even OOJt for nothing in the jail, but had to
work. And what work! He was forced to dig c011pses wit!h
his bare hand's firom ma$$ graves, then forced to wash and
·k!iss each one. I have a strong su1S1pidon thalt those mass
graives were made lby the Russians and not by the Germans
as claimed by the So:vie'ts.
"Fascist Post.enyi Arrest.ed"
That's what a heai!'line said in the communist "Pravda."
And it stumned just albout the whole of Slo.vrukila. The discovery of America O!I' the Law of GI"avitation was no more
sensationall. Up to that time nobody knew that Monsignor
Postenyi was a fascilSt. Aime11ida,ri Slovaks know Msgr.
SLOVAKIA
53
Postenyi very weiN. He visiited America in the interests of
the S't Ada!llbert Society, pulljlisher of Catholiic literature
and inrf.cmmat<ion, an origanwation equiivalent to the Book of
the Month 01wbs in Amerti!C'a. The Reds knew that his Slovak ,paltriotism was beyond question and that his merits, as
far as the l31rgesit CIUll,bural, Slovak, Catholk institution was
concerned, were greaJt. Monsignoir Po:s tenyi is an exemplary
priest of Gad, a S1ovaik hough and through, and an indefatfJi,gruble worlcer for the common people of his nation. He
was pe!I1S€Kmted for his Slovak ,p atriotism when the Commumst leaders and editors of the "Pravda" were strn in the
bOSOIIn of Albraham.
Never aclmvel.l,y interested in politics, Msg,r. Postenyi
sUldden!ly became a "fascist!" We knew whalt the C01Inmunisits wanted to aJOcorrniplish. 'Do put Posteny,i out of the way
woold me'an to destroy the Society of St. Ad•rutbert with iJts
libraries, priillt sh01ps and origan.izationrul appruratus. And so
the SlOViaJk N ationa;l CO'U!Ilici1 appointed the fina.ncirul secretary of the Sooiety, a Ozedh named Wa;gner, as the commissary of the Society. A few days l1ater a new management
was named, one that was rucceptaJble to the spirit and program of tJhe C01Inmunist-idk>minia.ted SlovaJk NaJtional Cooncil.
This institution which was bui[it by generations of Slov,a ks inrto a going cultural concern wrus wiped oult in a momenit by the ruthilegs Reds The 150.000 members of the
Society of St. Ada1be,rtt co:uM not say a word against the action without inviting punishment, either inciariceration or
exile into Silberia. That is how the "people's demooracy" of
the Soviets operates.
Charit,a,ble Ecclesiastical Institutions
The la;rgesit oharitalble ooganization in Slovrukia wa,s the
Central Charity (Ustredna Karita), the central Catho1.ic institute of al'l the welfare, socitail, anld religious societi'es. It
ha;d its own hea11th cenltets, hospiita!ls for incuraJbO.es, children's nurseries, etc. The women'1s "Charilta:s" was a'1so a
mem~ of tJhe organi.<Za,tion. 'Dhe CommUll!ists took (Wer ruH
soci:ail insbitiuttions of the Church. Some weeks after the ocCUipation, tihe Communist Union of Sloviak Women confi:s-
54
SLOVAKIA
cated the children's nuTsery of the Ustredna ~arita in Dornk~le, BraJtislava, and the Union of SloivaJk Y ouith toolk
over the ·b oarding sch06l nea,r the forestry school in Koliba,
Braltislavia.
The hwmanitari.an division oif the city o.f Bratislava
comisoated the estate of "Oharitas" in Braltisfava near the
Red Bridge. For the women's home of "Charitas" the commissari'at foT Social Welifare named as commissary the Communist Fla:TIIIly Hirusovsky. Dr. Ivan Horvath, the commissary
for sooiall welfare, prod.aimed that a:1'1 the charitable, social
instituJtions of the Church would be taken over by the state.
Protests clid not mean a thing, as usual.
"Freedom" of the Press
One of the first ,a cts of the Commissariat for Initernal
AffaiTs was the suppression o;f aM news,prupers. With th~s
general order all Oathollic newpaJpers and :periodicais weTe
wiped out aultomalt!roally; noit only cruturrul and literrury periodicals, such as the "Ku!litura" (a.rl.,tmre.) and the "Obroda"
(Rffi"ilvaJl), but even an the religious and educational periodicals, such as The MessengeT of the Srucred Heart, The
Holy Family, The Queen of May, etc. And, ]ater the only
Caltholk Sloivruk weeldy "Katolicke Noviny" (The Catholic
News), which had a suibscription of 170,000, was also swppressed and ta:ken 01Ver by 1:!he Reds.
Cathollics protested to the authorities, but in. vadn. The
Catholic press was gone. Attaclks against the Church and
its priests increased daily, but they could not defend themselves; it was an unequa:l strwggk The enemy fought wfth
powerfU!l we8lpons, whi[e the Catholics had none.
"Freedom" of Conscience
The wax was fought, we were told, aga.inst the suppressi~n of consoien.ce by imperial~stic means, and we haJVe lived
to see sucll a diclatorship and s:uch a barbaric viOllia.tion of
conscience and its inlterrra:l freedom, the likes of whl'C'h perhrups not even the most frurious f:aslci'Slt ever dreamed of. On
aH fronts of tlhis terrible wrur died the best sons of humanity for the rigih:t to speak free'ly about the most fundamental questions of 1iife against tlhe fascist terror. Men
SLOVAKIA
55
shed their blood so that concentration camps, wiith all theiT
horrors, might never a:ga:in operaJte. But soon aif.ter the war's
end aN dliistriot cities in SlovaJlda were ordered to set up a
concent.Taition camp and jaill. The war was fol.light for the
freed'Olffi of poilft.ic-aiJ. conviotlions, but in Sl'OVlalkia today there
are not enOUJgh jai!ls to talke care of aH those, whose only
gui,It is that they wilM not swear on the Siclcl.e anld: Hammer,
but prefer to rematin loyal to the fupal eneyclilc'als and the
fiUJnd:amen'ta:l princiiples of demooraJCy. ln a wore, the Slovaks want to be demO!crat:s and not 'boisiheviks.
What has rea;filry changed? Every ni!ght we waited
tensely to see whether they were coming for us. We had
no peace duirmg the day or night. Forever they were screening and investiigaJting UIS just 'becaUJSe we haippened to live
during the past era, and had to wor1k and keeip OUir families.
They perseouted us for "co'l:1-aborating" because we recorded oftficiail writings, in some office, or because we were
insigruffoant wiheells in the great machinery of life.
In Conclusion
If I had not seen it, I would not hruve be'liieived it. Those
first three months in "l~beraJted" Bra;tislruva were a nightmare. It .st;ilfil hamnts me. The S[ovalk people dild not ha,ve a
clharuce. The,i r country was overrun bry bar:barians whom the
.AilHes had Wlken on as pa:rtners. Slovalkia was ru!led bry terror and violence f.rom the moment it was "rnberaJted" lby the
so-calil ed "Uniiteld Nations," which placed it in the Soviet
sphere o!f irufiluence. ]t was ruied 'by the Communist-dominated regime o!f the man who r~gned the presitleTIJCy in 1938
and returned as president..a.venger behind the Soviet ho:rdes
in 1945. 'Dhe independenJt Slo.ivaJk Repull:Afc, established by the
dully eledted representatives olf t!he Slovak people in 1939
and reoognlizetl by 27 countries, including GreaJt Britain and
F,r ance, was wanton!ly destroyed against the wiili of the
Slova:k people.
The vast majority of the Slovaik nation, the Catholics
of Slovakia - representing 80 per cent of the poipll1ation was oulUawed. No politioail parities, newspaipers, organizations, and eilltenprises cou~d exist, except th()[se aUowed by
56
SLOVAKIA
Dr. IDdwa,rd Benes and his Communist-dominated regime.
The non-Catholic minority in Slovakia - including aN those
who ca;Ned t!hemsetlives "Christians" - hel,p ed Benes and the
Co!Ir.JII1UJill1S'ts ruin Ca1fud1irc Slovrukia and so helped to ruin
themseilves and thetk in:stilbulticms. Whereas, in the beginning,
only Crutholics were perisem.uted and onily Cathol'i:c institUJtion:s
and enter,prises were nabion:a,lized, laJter the foNowers of ail
Christian faiths were crucified and their institulti'ons confiscalted b;y the State. Hi:istor:y repeateld itseJ.if. But ha,tred
of the Cathohc Ch'l11l'ch in S'lovakia did n01t solive any of the
social or economic probllems, bult oll!l.y aggrawated them; in
faot, it only he'lped the Communists realize their ends all the
more speedilly. It is high time thait a'11 Christians realized
this an:d aoted accordmgly.
In Slovalkia tihere sha/U be no rea;l peace, no flI'eedom,
as long 3IS 1t is governed by peopte wlho are hostile to the
nationa1 traditions of the Slovak nation and its rel:i!gious and
political convictions and, hence, are bent on the destru<:tion of the SIJ.O'Vruk people. Slovaikia, one of the oldest Christian countries of Centra1 :Eiu!rope, never sho:uil(l. haive been desbroyed as an independent StaJte. That is more evident today
than it was in 1945. No nrution has fought Coonmunism more
pel'.sistentily and consistently than the Slovaik nation It's
time that this trutlh was recognized by a.Ill freedom-rl<wing,
a:ruti-Com:rrmmist coll!Il1Jri-es and that they adj1U1st theiir pOllicies to,w ard the Slovaks to fit the present siitU1aition. Even
today the people of Slovruk.ia find iJt ha~d to belrieve that they
were sdld oUJt to the men of the Kremlin with the help of
file United StaJtes and Great Britain, the great sym'bols of
freedom and demooraicy. But they stitl exipect to be liberated
by them.
•
•
•
"THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is an American institu-
tion. Its primary interest is America. As an American of Slovak descent, I say again and again that it ls in the interest of Amerlc-a and
the democratic world at large to work for the freedom and Independence of Slovakia. The Individuals and organizations affiliated with
the Slovak League of America - as true Americans - cannot wish
their brethren in Slovakia less fre edom than they themselves enjoy
in the U. S. A. We say: Give Slovakia back to the Slovak people!"
- (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit. Mich., 11-18-51)
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Three Months in "Liberated" Bratislava
Description
An account of the resource
By: An Eyewitness
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 39-56
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
-
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Text
57
SLOVAKIA
PAST AND PRESENT OF
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA
JOSEPH A. MIKUS
Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak
Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious
from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in
1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty
in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the
great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew
Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy.
As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader,
Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian
demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God
and the nation." - What did it mean?
From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against
a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted
to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle
Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the
State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored
the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought
to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y
as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence.
1
From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party
defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which
were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be-
�58
SLOVAKIA
tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and
SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs
ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a
strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the
Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on
the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government.
In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed
the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the
right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by
adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which
indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So,
"OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State.
For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and
the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik
League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a
dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of
equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of
Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was
not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in
favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism.
From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik
Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance
which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet
Union.
After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a
fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small
1
�SLOVAKIA
59
nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as
Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless,
recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War
II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his
rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government,
represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister
and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach,
the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip
to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso
and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their
place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon
by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso
..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end.
Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his
people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned
by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg
trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition
goes back to the eighth century.
But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest
task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the
Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government
forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical
pressure from t he outside.
In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by
their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political
disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party,
which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for
the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of
the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we .
the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though
territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus-
see
�60
SLOVAKIA
sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the
immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the
Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this
altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore,
decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow.
In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing
a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked
- not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic
par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover
from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny,
Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment
of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With
this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic
Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that
country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their
strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition,
shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that
of the "M_a rxist majority."
Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book
"Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no
revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a
change in the internal structure of the government.
'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact.
This resistance is both religious and national.
Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to
Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr.
V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping
in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it
icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire
several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay
elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy
as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie
neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd
have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than
�61
SLOVAKIA
sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State
police.
From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national
'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is
simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in
the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed
by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is
only one possible solution to the situation: the application
of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the
Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world.
Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a
nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United
.Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue
Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John
Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr.
Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr.
J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists
George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine
Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen,
John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles
Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as
a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it
wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength,
to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most
willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the
h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it
1
WHO SAi D IT? -
•
•
•
"The importance of our trea ty with the U. S.
S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from
Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and
Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud
to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading
role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News
Agency," February 6, 1944) .
�
57
SLOVAKIA
PAST AND PRESENT OF
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA
JOSEPH A. MIKUS
Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak
Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious
from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in
1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty
in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the
great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew
Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy.
As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader,
Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian
demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God
and the nation." - What did it mean?
From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against
a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted
to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle
Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the
State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored
the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought
to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y
as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence.
1
From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party
defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which
were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be-
�58
SLOVAKIA
tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and
SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs
ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a
strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the
Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on
the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government.
In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed
the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the
right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by
adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which
indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So,
"OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State.
For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and
the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik
League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a
dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of
equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of
Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was
not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in
favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism.
From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik
Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance
which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet
Union.
After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a
fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small
1
�SLOVAKIA
59
nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as
Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless,
recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War
II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his
rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government,
represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister
and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach,
the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip
to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso
and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their
place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon
by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso
..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end.
Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his
people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned
by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg
trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition
goes back to the eighth century.
But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest
task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the
Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government
forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical
pressure from t he outside.
In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by
their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political
disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party,
which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for
the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of
the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we .
the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though
territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus-
see
�60
SLOVAKIA
sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the
immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the
Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this
altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore,
decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow.
In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing
a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked
- not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic
par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover
from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny,
Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment
of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With
this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic
Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that
country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their
strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition,
shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that
of the "M_a rxist majority."
Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book
"Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no
revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a
change in the internal structure of the government.
'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact.
This resistance is both religious and national.
Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to
Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr.
V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping
in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it
icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire
several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay
elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy
as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie
neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd
have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than
�61
SLOVAKIA
sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State
police.
From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national
'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is
simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in
the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed
by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is
only one possible solution to the situation: the application
of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the
Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world.
Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a
nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United
.Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue
Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John
Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr.
Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr.
J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists
George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine
Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen,
John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles
Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as
a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it
wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength,
to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most
willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the
h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it
1
WHO SAi D IT? -
•
•
•
"The importance of our trea ty with the U. S.
S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from
Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and
Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud
to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading
role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News
Agency," February 6, 1944) .
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
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Text
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57
SLOVAKIA
PAST AND PRESENT OF
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA
JOSEPH A. MIKUS
Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak
Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious
from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in
1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty
in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the
great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew
Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy.
As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader,
Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian
demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God
and the nation." - What did it mean?
From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against
a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted
to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle
Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the
State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored
the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought
to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y
as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence.
1
From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party
defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which
were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be-
58
SLOVAKIA
tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and
SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs
ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a
strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the
Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on
the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government.
In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed
the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the
right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by
adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which
indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So,
"OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State.
For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and
the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik
League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a
dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of
equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of
Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was
not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in
favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism.
From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik
Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance
which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet
Union.
After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a
fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small
1
SLOVAKIA
59
nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as
Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless,
recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War
II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his
rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government,
represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister
and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach,
the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip
to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso
and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their
place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon
by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso
..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end.
Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his
people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned
by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg
trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition
goes back to the eighth century.
But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest
task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the
Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government
forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical
pressure from t he outside.
In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by
their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political
disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party,
which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for
the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of
the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we .
the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though
territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus-
see
60
SLOVAKIA
sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the
immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the
Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this
altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore,
decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow.
In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing
a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked
- not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic
par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover
from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny,
Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment
of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With
this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic
Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that
country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their
strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition,
shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that
of the "M_a rxist majority."
Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book
"Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no
revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a
change in the internal structure of the government.
'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact.
This resistance is both religious and national.
Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to
Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr.
V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping
in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it
icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire
several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay
elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy
as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie
neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd
have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than
61
SLOVAKIA
sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State
police.
From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national
'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is
simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in
the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed
by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is
only one possible solution to the situation: the application
of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the
Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world.
Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a
nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United
.Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue
Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John
Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr.
Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr.
J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists
George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine
Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen,
John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles
Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as
a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it
wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength,
to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most
willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the
h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it
1
WHO SAi D IT? -
•
•
•
"The importance of our trea ty with the U. S.
S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from
Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and
Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud
to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading
role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News
Agency," February 6, 1944) .
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Christian Democracy in Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph A. Mikuš
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 57-61
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c068f9fc7cd4a586d430a70de3f6c892.pdf
0ad587cb3ca08c1b499e0ec4d59b5d33
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
62
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
THE DEVIl, HAS TO WORK
One .poor woodkmtter went into the mountains with his
last piece of ibread, which he ca:rried in a small d:ooh bag.
It was to 1ast him t!he wh<ile diay. When he came into the
mountams, he hung the bag on a •b ranch and went to worik.
The poor fellow choipped. and ch'Opped and split thick oaks
until stirerums of sweat flowed from his. brow. Suddenly out
of nowhere a blaick, dirty devil oame unawares f.rom the
deepest depths of hades and stdl.e the last ,piece of bread
fr·om the woodcutter's brug.
When ,he returned to hades, the horny rascal boasted
of his deed to his comrades.. "Look, 'bhi•s was supposed to last
one woodcutter a who'le d:ay and I stole it from him."
"What',s that, wihat's that?" roared Lulcifer himself.
Wihen Luicifer heard the sto~y, he became very angry
at the horny litble thief for having drured to steal the last
piece of ,b read from a poor man.
"And for that," said Lucifer, "you win have to serve
that poor man for a whole yerur, commencing forthwith."
The next day, as the woodcuitter was a:gain preparing to
go into the hills with his ax on his shoU!lder, the door suddenly opened and a strong young man entered tlhe room.
"Good day, .b oss!" the stranger said, "how albout letting me wo:rik for you?"
"Aoh, my son, what would I do with you?" replied the
woodcutter. "I have nothing to eat myse1f and, as you see,
in that corner al[ my chil.dren a:re weeping ibecaooe they
are hung-r y."
"Well, just taike me on a:nyway. For my services you
shall owe me nothing, and I assure you that you wiU be
completely satisfied with me."
"Well, ,t hen, come with me to chop trees, if that is
what you want," said the woodcutter handing him an ax
Before three days had passed, the hill, which the woodcutter wOUJld not have out in a year by himself, was aJlmos,t
bare of brees, and the rows and rows of cord wood made the
old woodoutter hruppy. From t!hait time on our woodcutter
�SLOVAKIA
6::1
got along very wal!l, 8.!lld his chikliren no longer cried in the
corner from huniger; they were ,h appy and healthy, because
they were satfated.
"Well, ,b oss," began :the servant, "you just keep on
chopping little 1b y litJtle while l ,g o athreshing somewhere so
that you might have bread and enoUJgh of everything in the
howse for the wh'ole winter."
"Go ahead, just go ahead," replied the woodcutter,
"and whi1le you're gone, I',11 out as many trees as l can."
In a g,r eat wN~erness dlweUed a wealthy man. Three
hundred stooks of g,rain were in his fields and in his pens
he had three htliildreld steers and tllree hundred ipigs. The
woodicmrtter's serwant oarrne to this weaiLthy man and offered to thresh his graJin.
"But wihere are you,r companions?" asked the man.
"Do not worry abol.lit my compan~ons, just let me know
whether you want yOU'r grain threshed."
"Of coorse, I ,a m going to hawe it threshed, but don't
tell me that you are going to d'O it yourrelf ?"
"Whether I do it or not, yoo sha:N see the jdb done."
"And w'haJt do you want for the threshing?"
"Nothing my lorn, e:ireept whaJt I can carry away at one
time," answered the serivant.
"We11," the wea,l'thy man mused, "you will not be able
to truke ten kilos away, so go to it."
When it was .midnighlt, three thousand flails suddenly
reso,u,ntled a,round the .stoclks of grain with a: whis:h, whash,
whees'h, whoosh! The devils from the fires of hades came to
helip their comrade By morni.intg the whole jdb of threshing
was comp'leted and the grain stored in lra:rge saclks.
Dawn was just .brealking as the thresher cruNed on the
wea:lthy man to come out and see the jdb he had done. The
man oo,tili:l not believe his eyes. The threshing was finished
and the rich man was glad it was done so quickly.
"Welil done, my lad," said the weialthy man, "and now
you may taike whalt is y01UJrs for the threshing."
Therewpon the disguised little devil ordered the lcmi's
servants to plaJCe sa:clks of grain upon his shoU!l.ders. After
ten kilos of wheat were 1plaieed upon his sh.ouJlders, the master smi>led and said: "WeN, young man, is that enough?"
�64
SLOVAKIA
"What do you mean encrugh ?" laughed ,t he thresher.
"Ju.st keep pi'l.ing it on; look I can still hop around with it
spryly.''
So the servants kept :p iling the saJoks of grain on the
thresher's baok ,u ntil lib.ere were no more left. The wealthy
man's hairr stood 'Uip from fear.
"Well, w-eJl-1, now do ydu thinlk you have enough?" he
asked.
But the thresher let out a roar of laugihter, saying:
"Not quite enOill!gh, my lord, just keep ptling on whatever
you hruve. You see I .can stm dance around wit'h this stwflf "
A huniclTed fattened ho,g s were taken out of their pens
and pu<t on the bhres:her's .baok. The rich man was stupefied.
"WeH, now perha•ps yoiu il:m'Ve enough?" he stuttered.
But the ,l ittle devil danced around gayly and howled with
giee: "J.ust keep ,pi.'ling it on!"
The wealthy man was bUTsting with aD!ger, but he kept
his word. "Let ouit a hundred fattened steers," he bar,ked at
his senvants, "these he certainly ,wi!i not be able to carry."
But the devil-thresher todk even the hundred steers,
laughed in the master's face and then ran off to his boss
as if he carried nothing at all.
"WeH, boss, this is for y01U," said the servant ,ooiburdenh11g himself in t!he woodcutter's yard. "Now, even if I do
leaive you, I do not thinlk that you shaM haive to fear hunger
any more. My year is u1p, you know, but say, do you know
who I am? Do you remember the day when yowr last piece
of bread disappeared in the mountain?"
The woodcutter shook his head and said: "I remember, yes, I do remem1ber."
"Well, now I'U tell you who I am. I am a devil. It was I
who stole your last piece of bread and as punishment I had
to work for you one whole year Now my time is up. Fareweill."
At that very moment the woodcutter's home was surrounded by laughter as if three thousand horses had brayed.
It was the deviils who laughed at their comrade because he
had to work for a poor woodcutter.
�
SLOVAKIA
62
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
THE DEVIl, HAS TO WORK
One .poor woodkmtter went into the mountains with his
last piece of ibread, which he ca:rried in a small d:ooh bag.
It was to 1ast him t!he wh<ile diay. When he came into the
mountams, he hung the bag on a •b ranch and went to worik.
The poor fellow choipped. and ch'Opped and split thick oaks
until stirerums of sweat flowed from his. brow. Suddenly out
of nowhere a blaick, dirty devil oame unawares f.rom the
deepest depths of hades and stdl.e the last ,piece of bread
fr·om the woodcutter's brug.
When ,he returned to hades, the horny rascal boasted
of his deed to his comrades.. "Look, 'bhi•s was supposed to last
one woodcutter a who'le d:ay and I stole it from him."
"What',s that, wihat's that?" roared Lulcifer himself.
Wihen Luicifer heard the sto~y, he became very angry
at the horny litble thief for having drured to steal the last
piece of ,b read from a poor man.
"And for that," said Lucifer, "you win have to serve
that poor man for a whole yerur, commencing forthwith."
The next day, as the woodcuitter was a:gain preparing to
go into the hills with his ax on his shoU!lder, the door suddenly opened and a strong young man entered tlhe room.
"Good day, .b oss!" the stranger said, "how albout letting me wo:rik for you?"
"Aoh, my son, what would I do with you?" replied the
woodcutter. "I have nothing to eat myse1f and, as you see,
in that corner al[ my chil.dren a:re weeping ibecaooe they
are hung-r y."
"Well, just taike me on a:nyway. For my services you
shall owe me nothing, and I assure you that you wiU be
completely satisfied with me."
"Well, ,t hen, come with me to chop trees, if that is
what you want," said the woodcutter handing him an ax
Before three days had passed, the hill, which the woodcutter wOUJld not have out in a year by himself, was aJlmos,t
bare of brees, and the rows and rows of cord wood made the
old woodoutter hruppy. From t!hait time on our woodcutter
�SLOVAKIA
6::1
got along very wal!l, 8.!lld his chikliren no longer cried in the
corner from huniger; they were ,h appy and healthy, because
they were satfated.
"Well, ,b oss," began :the servant, "you just keep on
chopping little 1b y litJtle while l ,g o athreshing somewhere so
that you might have bread and enoUJgh of everything in the
howse for the wh'ole winter."
"Go ahead, just go ahead," replied the woodcutter,
"and whi1le you're gone, I',11 out as many trees as l can."
In a g,r eat wN~erness dlweUed a wealthy man. Three
hundred stooks of g,rain were in his fields and in his pens
he had three htliildreld steers and tllree hundred ipigs. The
woodicmrtter's serwant oarrne to this weaiLthy man and offered to thresh his graJin.
"But wihere are you,r companions?" asked the man.
"Do not worry abol.lit my compan~ons, just let me know
whether you want yOU'r grain threshed."
"Of coorse, I ,a m going to hawe it threshed, but don't
tell me that you are going to d'O it yourrelf ?"
"Whether I do it or not, yoo sha:N see the jdb done."
"And w'haJt do you want for the threshing?"
"Nothing my lorn, e:ireept whaJt I can carry away at one
time," answered the serivant.
"We11," the wea,l'thy man mused, "you will not be able
to truke ten kilos away, so go to it."
When it was .midnighlt, three thousand flails suddenly
reso,u,ntled a,round the .stoclks of grain with a: whis:h, whash,
whees'h, whoosh! The devils from the fires of hades came to
helip their comrade By morni.intg the whole jdb of threshing
was comp'leted and the grain stored in lra:rge saclks.
Dawn was just .brealking as the thresher cruNed on the
wea:lthy man to come out and see the jdb he had done. The
man oo,tili:l not believe his eyes. The threshing was finished
and the rich man was glad it was done so quickly.
"Welil done, my lad," said the weialthy man, "and now
you may taike whalt is y01UJrs for the threshing."
Therewpon the disguised little devil ordered the lcmi's
servants to plaJCe sa:clks of grain upon his shoU!l.ders. After
ten kilos of wheat were 1plaieed upon his sh.ouJlders, the master smi>led and said: "WeN, young man, is that enough?"
�64
SLOVAKIA
"What do you mean encrugh ?" laughed ,t he thresher.
"Ju.st keep pi'l.ing it on; look I can still hop around with it
spryly.''
So the servants kept :p iling the saJoks of grain on the
thresher's baok ,u ntil lib.ere were no more left. The wealthy
man's hairr stood 'Uip from fear.
"Well, w-eJl-1, now do ydu thinlk you have enough?" he
asked.
But the thresher let out a roar of laugihter, saying:
"Not quite enOill!gh, my lord, just keep ptling on whatever
you hruve. You see I .can stm dance around wit'h this stwflf "
A huniclTed fattened ho,g s were taken out of their pens
and pu<t on the bhres:her's .baok. The rich man was stupefied.
"WeH, now perha•ps yoiu il:m'Ve enough?" he stuttered.
But the ,l ittle devil danced around gayly and howled with
giee: "J.ust keep ,pi.'ling it on!"
The wealthy man was bUTsting with aD!ger, but he kept
his word. "Let ouit a hundred fattened steers," he bar,ked at
his senvants, "these he certainly ,wi!i not be able to carry."
But the devil-thresher todk even the hundred steers,
laughed in the master's face and then ran off to his boss
as if he carried nothing at all.
"WeH, boss, this is for y01U," said the servant ,ooiburdenh11g himself in t!he woodcutter's yard. "Now, even if I do
leaive you, I do not thinlk that you shaM haive to fear hunger
any more. My year is u1p, you know, but say, do you know
who I am? Do you remember the day when yowr last piece
of bread disappeared in the mountain?"
The woodcutter shook his head and said: "I remember, yes, I do remem1ber."
"Well, now I'U tell you who I am. I am a devil. It was I
who stole your last piece of bread and as punishment I had
to work for you one whole year Now my time is up. Fareweill."
At that very moment the woodcutter's home was surrounded by laughter as if three thousand horses had brayed.
It was the deviils who laughed at their comrade because he
had to work for a poor woodcutter.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
62
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
THE DEVIl, HAS TO WORK
One .poor woodkmtter went into the mountains with his
last piece of ibread, which he ca:rried in a small d:ooh bag.
It was to 1ast him t!he wh<ile diay. When he came into the
mountams, he hung the bag on a •b ranch and went to worik.
The poor fellow choipped. and ch'Opped and split thick oaks
until stirerums of sweat flowed from his. brow. Suddenly out
of nowhere a blaick, dirty devil oame unawares f.rom the
deepest depths of hades and stdl.e the last ,piece of bread
fr·om the woodcutter's brug.
When ,he returned to hades, the horny rascal boasted
of his deed to his comrades.. "Look, 'bhi•s was supposed to last
one woodcutter a who'le d:ay and I stole it from him."
"What',s that, wihat's that?" roared Lulcifer himself.
Wihen Luicifer heard the sto~y, he became very angry
at the horny litble thief for having drured to steal the last
piece of ,b read from a poor man.
"And for that," said Lucifer, "you win have to serve
that poor man for a whole yerur, commencing forthwith."
The next day, as the woodcuitter was a:gain preparing to
go into the hills with his ax on his shoU!lder, the door suddenly opened and a strong young man entered tlhe room.
"Good day, .b oss!" the stranger said, "how albout letting me wo:rik for you?"
"Aoh, my son, what would I do with you?" replied the
woodcutter. "I have nothing to eat myse1f and, as you see,
in that corner al[ my chil.dren a:re weeping ibecaooe they
are hung-r y."
"Well, just taike me on a:nyway. For my services you
shall owe me nothing, and I assure you that you wiU be
completely satisfied with me."
"Well, ,t hen, come with me to chop trees, if that is
what you want," said the woodcutter handing him an ax
Before three days had passed, the hill, which the woodcutter wOUJld not have out in a year by himself, was aJlmos,t
bare of brees, and the rows and rows of cord wood made the
old woodoutter hruppy. From t!hait time on our woodcutter
SLOVAKIA
6::1
got along very wal!l, 8.!lld his chikliren no longer cried in the
corner from huniger; they were ,h appy and healthy, because
they were satfated.
"Well, ,b oss," began :the servant, "you just keep on
chopping little 1b y litJtle while l ,g o athreshing somewhere so
that you might have bread and enoUJgh of everything in the
howse for the wh'ole winter."
"Go ahead, just go ahead," replied the woodcutter,
"and whi1le you're gone, I',11 out as many trees as l can."
In a g,r eat wN~erness dlweUed a wealthy man. Three
hundred stooks of g,rain were in his fields and in his pens
he had three htliildreld steers and tllree hundred ipigs. The
woodicmrtter's serwant oarrne to this weaiLthy man and offered to thresh his graJin.
"But wihere are you,r companions?" asked the man.
"Do not worry abol.lit my compan~ons, just let me know
whether you want yOU'r grain threshed."
"Of coorse, I ,a m going to hawe it threshed, but don't
tell me that you are going to d'O it yourrelf ?"
"Whether I do it or not, yoo sha:N see the jdb done."
"And w'haJt do you want for the threshing?"
"Nothing my lorn, e:ireept whaJt I can carry away at one
time," answered the serivant.
"We11," the wea,l'thy man mused, "you will not be able
to truke ten kilos away, so go to it."
When it was .midnighlt, three thousand flails suddenly
reso,u,ntled a,round the .stoclks of grain with a: whis:h, whash,
whees'h, whoosh! The devils from the fires of hades came to
helip their comrade By morni.intg the whole jdb of threshing
was comp'leted and the grain stored in lra:rge saclks.
Dawn was just .brealking as the thresher cruNed on the
wea:lthy man to come out and see the jdb he had done. The
man oo,tili:l not believe his eyes. The threshing was finished
and the rich man was glad it was done so quickly.
"Welil done, my lad," said the weialthy man, "and now
you may taike whalt is y01UJrs for the threshing."
Therewpon the disguised little devil ordered the lcmi's
servants to plaJCe sa:clks of grain upon his shoU!l.ders. After
ten kilos of wheat were 1plaieed upon his sh.ouJlders, the master smi>led and said: "WeN, young man, is that enough?"
64
SLOVAKIA
"What do you mean encrugh ?" laughed ,t he thresher.
"Ju.st keep pi'l.ing it on; look I can still hop around with it
spryly.''
So the servants kept :p iling the saJoks of grain on the
thresher's baok ,u ntil lib.ere were no more left. The wealthy
man's hairr stood 'Uip from fear.
"Well, w-eJl-1, now do ydu thinlk you have enough?" he
asked.
But the thresher let out a roar of laugihter, saying:
"Not quite enOill!gh, my lord, just keep ptling on whatever
you hruve. You see I .can stm dance around wit'h this stwflf "
A huniclTed fattened ho,g s were taken out of their pens
and pu<t on the bhres:her's .baok. The rich man was stupefied.
"WeH, now perha•ps yoiu il:m'Ve enough?" he stuttered.
But the ,l ittle devil danced around gayly and howled with
giee: "J.ust keep ,pi.'ling it on!"
The wealthy man was bUTsting with aD!ger, but he kept
his word. "Let ouit a hundred fattened steers," he bar,ked at
his senvants, "these he certainly ,wi!i not be able to carry."
But the devil-thresher todk even the hundred steers,
laughed in the master's face and then ran off to his boss
as if he carried nothing at all.
"WeH, boss, this is for y01U," said the servant ,ooiburdenh11g himself in t!he woodcutter's yard. "Now, even if I do
leaive you, I do not thinlk that you shaM haive to fear hunger
any more. My year is u1p, you know, but say, do you know
who I am? Do you remember the day when yowr last piece
of bread disappeared in the mountain?"
The woodcutter shook his head and said: "I remember, yes, I do remem1ber."
"Well, now I'U tell you who I am. I am a devil. It was I
who stole your last piece of bread and as punishment I had
to work for you one whole year Now my time is up. Fareweill."
At that very moment the woodcutter's home was surrounded by laughter as if three thousand horses had brayed.
It was the deviils who laughed at their comrade because he
had to work for a poor woodcutter.
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Slovak Folklore: The Devil Has to Work
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953
pp. 62-64
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/31f6bdae7735eaa1e341e18e7d571f61.pdf
dad8a00651f64e8e41d04ea0d96d617d
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YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK
as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOVAl( LESSONS
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92
lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a
brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY
by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff;
a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from:
P.A.HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�PRINCE PRIBINA,
the first Slovak prince mentioned in history, resided in
Nitra, Slovakia, where he built a Christian church in 830.
The Slovaks are one of the oldest Christian nations of
Central Europe.
�
YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK
as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOVAl( LESSONS
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92
lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a
brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY
by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff;
a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from:
P.A.HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�PRINCE PRIBINA,
the first Slovak prince mentioned in history, resided in
Nitra, Slovakia, where he built a Christian church in 830.
The Slovaks are one of the oldest Christian nations of
Central Europe.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
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PRINCE PRIBINA,
the first Slovak prince mentioned in history, resided in
Nitra, Slovakia, where he built a Christian church in 830.
The Slovaks are one of the oldest Christian nations of
Central Europe.
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Title
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Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7)
Description
An account of the resource
includes bust of Prince Pribina
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
July 1953
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/99390e5254760796a92608d0eccdcbbf.pdf
af051250952e6ff94281853f1da67576
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SEPTEMBER 1953
VOL. Ill
IN THJS ISSUE :
WAS
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
A
DEMOCRACY ?
OCTOBER 6, 1938
BERNOLAK ' S INFLUENCE ON SLOVAK LITERATURE
SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM
RIPKA ON THE " PUTSCH " IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
CASTLES
DR . JOSEPH
OF
SLOVAKIA :
LETTRICH
BECKOV
IN RETROSPECT
WHO SAID IT ?: 12, 17, 64
• • •
Edi t ed and co m pi l ed by
P HI LI P A . HROBA K
Pub lish ed by
THE SLOV A K L EAGUE OF AMERICA
NO. 3
�Sl. OV AKL\ is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
'l'he chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
1s to promote a better understanding
an<l appreciation of the Slovak nation
a11<l its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
3ltiv~k League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
----------------------------- ---Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
SEPTEMBER 1953
VOL. Ill
IN THJS ISSUE :
WAS
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
A
DEMOCRACY ?
OCTOBER 6, 1938
BERNOLAK ' S INFLUENCE ON SLOVAK LITERATURE
SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM
RIPKA ON THE " PUTSCH " IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
CASTLES
DR . JOSEPH
OF
SLOVAKIA :
LETTRICH
BECKOV
IN RETROSPECT
WHO SAID IT ?: 12, 17, 64
• • •
Edi t ed and co m pi l ed by
P HI LI P A . HROBA K
Pub lish ed by
THE SLOV A K L EAGUE OF AMERICA
NO. 3
�Sl. OV AKL\ is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
'l'he chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
1s to promote a better understanding
an<l appreciation of the Slovak nation
a11<l its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
3ltiv~k League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
----------------------------- ---Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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Title
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Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
-
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0b7385f1831145e9c99e09d87a7bbd09
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SEPT~MBER, 1953
SLOVAKIA
1
WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY?
Dr. Arved Grebert
The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe.
From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the
world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other
hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and
judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came
of it.
In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2
1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter,
in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it
may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was.
The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia
T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break
up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I
in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~
sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature
they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right
of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech
independence.
As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right
of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a
state which in suibstance became only a small and bad
copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This
newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame
1
�2
SLOV.AKil
u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the
Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this
synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000
Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of
their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination.
The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the
framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed
will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million
SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the
State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full
autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to
the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to
be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence
of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the
Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated
the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- .
mination of nations - the very principle which brought
it into being.
We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech
lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will
of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization
of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed
by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March
4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded
over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns
for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were
130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the
Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in
territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles.
Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and
a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e
roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when
Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements
made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the
principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied
�SLOVAKIA
3
practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000),
M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000),
Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire
popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as,
for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo.
So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these
realities, we must recall that at that very same time when
Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small
independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a
far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR
(160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders
or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less
inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans
who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And
on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their
right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion.
In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous
Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and
Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not
permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they
h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation
(3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the
Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic.
Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also
refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the
Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of
that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn
devoid of content and foundation.
A Dict.at.ed Constitution
The foundations oif the political structure of every
state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin-
�SLOVAKIA
ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is
quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is
concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of
the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk
and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State
In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there
was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans,
not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not
a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the
people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done
in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even
though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif
SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism
and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as
re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward
Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When
Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived
in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered
as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia.
In the twentieth century, when the solution or the
granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated,
it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population
spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded
the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations,
because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the
Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were
practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak
1
�SLOVAKIA
5
peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes
had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament"
there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this
number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore,
there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst
bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly.
And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that
the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the
leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most
eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against
Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech
prison.
1
The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so
unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out
of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time
that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would
be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not
continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded
him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in
the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a
close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain
extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And
Now" - ipg. 12).
Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution
that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in
the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal
system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the
Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore
dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the
7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a
half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to
half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political,
economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are
overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious
talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the
�G
SLOVAKIA
Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought
against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even
if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they
had created under Masa.ryik and Benes.
Centralism vs. Federalism
The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged
centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key
political positions and all power rested in Czech hands.
Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states
belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual
states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is,
with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since
it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice
in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the
state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted
a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed
to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime
which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism.
To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into
the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a
change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was
thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech
p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the
Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could
never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional
or parliamentary manner.
The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony
emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of
March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on
the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their
rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their
�SLOVAKIA
7
right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the
Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech
Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got
hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later,
in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power
in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way.
Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No.
201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and
dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously
endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional
unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a
joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by
the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright
for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against
the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently
demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May
30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action;
the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf
the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such
action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed
10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show
the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law.
Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech
centn1.lists.
The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony
. Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series
of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech
popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the
notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic
sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end,
from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~
�SLOVAKIA
tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the
Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction
of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a
nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also
the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the
"CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a
special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In
prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech
languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the
lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a
part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a
higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling"
Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued
from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak
language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the
Reiplllblic.
Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was
maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of
these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government
nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18
ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule
"democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority
against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with
the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the
help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and
·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure.
With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the
Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district,
only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to
pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian
and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for
one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to
attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had
an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state
�SLOVAKIA
9
nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered
more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic
officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests
against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in
1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated
by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more
Il/UmerOUS.
In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this
regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs
as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the
maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the
State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and
absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks,
for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague
Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin
Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the
Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do
have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is
the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are
the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation."
OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the
country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled
with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve
character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also
that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as
equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic;
f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs
would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in
Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State
in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated
�10
SLOVAKIA
their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed
to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the
hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a
symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the
thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of
the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the
State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles,
Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but
not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in
parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~
µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And
it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without
the hyphen.
·
so
Rights of Minorities Repudiated
The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had
ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other
nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with
~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by
the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1
between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more
than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs:
During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking
woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate
to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United
States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium.
In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs
moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~
larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians
were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example,
who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the
Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<};
ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s·
only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service.
�SLOVAKIA
11
In the central offices, ministries, the highest control
offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of
the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless
of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations,
but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better
opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in
the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other
nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic
ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at
all costs.
"Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the
Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists
was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of
history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that
the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the
same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting
all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these
facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a
strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech
inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their
hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented
it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The
non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic
obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy
equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that
came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape
from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy."
.. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud
In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the
aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic.
That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~
nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of
�12
SLOVAKIA
man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so
general that many pruges would be needed to delineate
only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of
the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands
of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many
unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who
to<lay pose as champions of democracy.
It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even
today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that
responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue
to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated
"National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who
Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a
great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of
the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a
true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy.
That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the
first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a
single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the
will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are
kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer
S01Ineiwhere!
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for
longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~
worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of
(T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could
not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No.
2, p. 33, Feib. 1951).
�
SEPT~MBER, 1953
SLOVAKIA
1
WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY?
Dr. Arved Grebert
The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe.
From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the
world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other
hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and
judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came
of it.
In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2
1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter,
in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it
may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was.
The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia
T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break
up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I
in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~
sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature
they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right
of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech
independence.
As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right
of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a
state which in suibstance became only a small and bad
copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This
newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame
1
�2
SLOV.AKil
u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the
Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this
synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000
Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of
their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination.
The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the
framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed
will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million
SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the
State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full
autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to
the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to
be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence
of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the
Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated
the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- .
mination of nations - the very principle which brought
it into being.
We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech
lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will
of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization
of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed
by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March
4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded
over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns
for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were
130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the
Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in
territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles.
Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and
a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e
roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when
Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements
made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the
principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied
�SLOVAKIA
3
practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000),
M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000),
Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire
popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as,
for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo.
So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these
realities, we must recall that at that very same time when
Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small
independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a
far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR
(160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders
or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less
inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans
who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And
on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their
right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion.
In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous
Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and
Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not
permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they
h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation
(3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the
Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic.
Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also
refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the
Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of
that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn
devoid of content and foundation.
A Dict.at.ed Constitution
The foundations oif the political structure of every
state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin-
�SLOVAKIA
ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is
quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is
concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of
the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk
and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State
In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there
was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans,
not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not
a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the
people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done
in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even
though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif
SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism
and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as
re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward
Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When
Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived
in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered
as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia.
In the twentieth century, when the solution or the
granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated,
it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population
spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded
the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations,
because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the
Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were
practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak
1
�SLOVAKIA
5
peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes
had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament"
there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this
number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore,
there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst
bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly.
And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that
the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the
leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most
eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against
Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech
prison.
1
The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so
unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out
of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time
that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would
be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not
continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded
him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in
the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a
close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain
extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And
Now" - ipg. 12).
Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution
that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in
the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal
system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the
Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore
dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the
7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a
half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to
half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political,
economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are
overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious
talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the
�G
SLOVAKIA
Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought
against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even
if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they
had created under Masa.ryik and Benes.
Centralism vs. Federalism
The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged
centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key
political positions and all power rested in Czech hands.
Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states
belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual
states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is,
with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since
it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice
in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the
state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted
a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed
to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime
which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism.
To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into
the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a
change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was
thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech
p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the
Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could
never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional
or parliamentary manner.
The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony
emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of
March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on
the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their
rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their
�SLOVAKIA
7
right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the
Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech
Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got
hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later,
in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power
in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way.
Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No.
201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and
dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously
endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional
unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a
joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by
the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright
for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against
the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently
demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May
30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action;
the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf
the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such
action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed
10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show
the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law.
Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech
centn1.lists.
The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony
. Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series
of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech
popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the
notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic
sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end,
from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~
�SLOVAKIA
tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the
Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction
of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a
nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also
the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the
"CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a
special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In
prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech
languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the
lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a
part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a
higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling"
Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued
from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak
language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the
Reiplllblic.
Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was
maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of
these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government
nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18
ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule
"democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority
against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with
the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the
help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and
·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure.
With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the
Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district,
only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to
pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian
and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for
one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to
attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had
an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state
�SLOVAKIA
9
nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered
more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic
officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests
against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in
1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated
by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more
Il/UmerOUS.
In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this
regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs
as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the
maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the
State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and
absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks,
for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague
Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin
Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the
Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do
have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is
the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are
the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation."
OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the
country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled
with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve
character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also
that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as
equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic;
f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs
would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in
Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State
in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated
�10
SLOVAKIA
their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed
to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the
hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a
symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the
thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of
the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the
State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles,
Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but
not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in
parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~
µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And
it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without
the hyphen.
·
so
Rights of Minorities Repudiated
The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had
ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other
nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with
~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by
the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1
between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more
than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs:
During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking
woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate
to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United
States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium.
In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs
moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~
larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians
were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example,
who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the
Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<};
ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s·
only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service.
�SLOVAKIA
11
In the central offices, ministries, the highest control
offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of
the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless
of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations,
but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better
opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in
the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other
nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic
ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at
all costs.
"Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the
Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists
was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of
history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that
the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the
same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting
all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these
facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a
strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech
inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their
hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented
it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The
non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic
obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy
equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that
came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape
from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy."
.. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud
In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the
aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic.
That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~
nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of
�12
SLOVAKIA
man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so
general that many pruges would be needed to delineate
only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of
the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands
of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many
unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who
to<lay pose as champions of democracy.
It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even
today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that
responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue
to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated
"National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who
Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a
great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of
the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a
true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy.
That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the
first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a
single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the
will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are
kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer
S01Ineiwhere!
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for
longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~
worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of
(T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could
not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No.
2, p. 33, Feib. 1951).
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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SEPT~MBER, 1953
SLOVAKIA
1
WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY?
Dr. Arved Grebert
The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe.
From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the
world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other
hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and
judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came
of it.
In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2
1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter,
in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it
may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was.
The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia
T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break
up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I
in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~
sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature
they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right
of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech
independence.
As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right
of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a
state which in suibstance became only a small and bad
copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This
newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame
1
2
SLOV.AKil
u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the
Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this
synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000
Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of
their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination.
The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the
framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed
will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million
SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the
State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full
autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to
the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to
be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence
of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the
Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated
the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- .
mination of nations - the very principle which brought
it into being.
We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech
lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will
of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization
of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed
by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March
4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded
over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns
for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were
130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the
Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in
territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles.
Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and
a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e
roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when
Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements
made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the
principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied
SLOVAKIA
3
practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000),
M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000),
Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire
popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as,
for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo.
So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these
realities, we must recall that at that very same time when
Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small
independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a
far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR
(160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders
or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less
inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans
who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And
on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their
right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion.
In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous
Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and
Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not
permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they
h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation
(3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the
Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic.
Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also
refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the
Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of
that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn
devoid of content and foundation.
A Dict.at.ed Constitution
The foundations oif the political structure of every
state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin-
SLOVAKIA
ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is
quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is
concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of
the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk
and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State
In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there
was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans,
not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not
a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the
people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done
in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even
though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif
SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism
and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as
re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward
Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When
Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived
in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered
as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia.
In the twentieth century, when the solution or the
granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated,
it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population
spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded
the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations,
because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the
Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were
practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak
1
SLOVAKIA
5
peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes
had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament"
there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this
number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore,
there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst
bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly.
And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that
the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the
leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most
eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against
Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech
prison.
1
The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so
unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out
of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time
that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would
be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not
continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded
him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in
the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a
close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain
extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And
Now" - ipg. 12).
Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution
that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in
the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal
system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the
Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore
dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the
7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a
half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to
half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political,
economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are
overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious
talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the
G
SLOVAKIA
Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought
against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even
if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they
had created under Masa.ryik and Benes.
Centralism vs. Federalism
The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged
centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key
political positions and all power rested in Czech hands.
Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states
belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual
states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is,
with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since
it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice
in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the
state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted
a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed
to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime
which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism.
To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into
the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a
change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was
thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech
p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the
Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could
never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional
or parliamentary manner.
The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony
emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of
March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on
the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their
rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their
SLOVAKIA
7
right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the
Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech
Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got
hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later,
in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power
in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way.
Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No.
201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and
dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously
endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional
unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a
joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by
the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright
for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against
the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently
demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May
30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action;
the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf
the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such
action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed
10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show
the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law.
Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech
centn1.lists.
The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony
. Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series
of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech
popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the
notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic
sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end,
from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~
SLOVAKIA
tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the
Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction
of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a
nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also
the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the
"CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a
special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In
prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech
languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the
lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a
part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a
higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling"
Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued
from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak
language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the
Reiplllblic.
Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was
maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of
these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government
nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18
ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule
"democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority
against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with
the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the
help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and
·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure.
With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the
Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district,
only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to
pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian
and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for
one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to
attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had
an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state
SLOVAKIA
9
nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered
more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic
officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests
against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in
1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated
by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more
Il/UmerOUS.
In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this
regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs
as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the
maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the
State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and
absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks,
for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague
Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin
Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the
Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do
have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is
the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are
the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation."
OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the
country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled
with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve
character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also
that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as
equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic;
f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs
would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in
Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State
in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated
10
SLOVAKIA
their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed
to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the
hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a
symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the
thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of
the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the
State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles,
Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but
not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in
parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~
µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And
it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without
the hyphen.
·
so
Rights of Minorities Repudiated
The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had
ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other
nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with
~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by
the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1
between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more
than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs:
During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking
woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate
to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United
States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium.
In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs
moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~
larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians
were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example,
who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the
Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<};
ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s·
only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service.
SLOVAKIA
11
In the central offices, ministries, the highest control
offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of
the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless
of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations,
but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better
opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in
the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other
nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic
ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at
all costs.
"Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the
Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists
was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of
history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that
the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the
same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting
all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these
facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a
strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech
inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their
hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented
it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The
non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic
obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy
equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that
came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape
from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy."
.. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud
In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the
aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic.
That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~
nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of
12
SLOVAKIA
man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so
general that many pruges would be needed to delineate
only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of
the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands
of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many
unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who
to<lay pose as champions of democracy.
It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even
today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that
responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue
to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated
"National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who
Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a
great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of
the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a
true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy.
That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the
first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a
single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the
will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are
kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer
S01Ineiwhere!
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for
longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~
worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of
(T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could
not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No.
2, p. 33, Feib. 1951).
Dublin Core
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Title
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Was Czecho-Slovakia a Democracy?
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Arvéd Grébert
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
pp. 1-12
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Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001
Date
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September 1953
LCNAF+dates
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c261397e85eed23c862735032fef621e.pdf
4100e82bdcd463eb507b52bc5b6fb54f
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
13
MILESTONES OF SLOVAK HISTORY
OCTOBER 6, 1938
The Slovaik nation, one olf the olde.st Christian nations
in Central Europe, decided to fonm a c01mmon political state
with the Czech nation during World War I. Equality in all
matters ,w as the basis Ol:f that decision. Slovakia ,w as to be
governed as a state of the Ozech-Slova:k federation by the
Slovruks and the Czech lands by the Ozechs. The Pittsburgh
Pact of May 30, 1918, drawn UJP and signed by T. G. Masarylk and irepresentati'Ves of the Czechs and the •S lovaks of
America, guaranteed Sloivakia complete autonomy, i e.,
home rule or states rights. Unfortunately, T. G. Masaryk
repudiated the pruct and condemned the very state he prop8!gated to premature ruin.
For twenty years the. Slovaks kerpt clamoring for recognition of and respect for their inherent rights, for the fulfillment of the ,b argain they had concluded with T. G. Masaryk, but to .no avail. The Ruthe1I1ians,, who had voluntarily
entered the political state of Czeicho~Slovakia on the basis
of an autonomous region, were also sadly disaippointed by
the regime olf T. G. Masaryik and his underst/Udy, Dr. Edward Benes. The forceful inchtsion of 3,500,000 Sudeten
Germans in the Ozecho~lo:vaik Repulbliic did not help relieve
the tensiOIIlS or to consolidate the state, burt rather aggravated the situation. The regimes of T. G. Masaryk and Dr.
Edward Benes antrugonized the non-Czech majority of the
population against the Czechs and doomed the Republic to
an early death. When the first major crisis stmmk, there
was no one to defend the ill~fated Ozecho~SlovaJkia and it
collapsed like a house ibuilt of cards.
On October 6, 193,8, the Slo1V1aiks mrude a great step forward toward urufiying their fOiI1Ces in their struggle for
state independence. All paTties, except the .Social Democrats and the Communists, accepted the principle of an autonomous SlovaJkia in the spirit of the draft of a bill, which
was prepared by the ID:inka Slovak People's Party and
made pU!blic Jun€ 5, 1938. The result of the October meet~
�14
SLOVAKIA
ing,s oif the representatives of all Slovak parties in Zilina,,
S1ovalkia, was that "the Government of the Ozecho..slovalk
Repulblic named, in the p1ruce of the President of the RepuJblic (a paragrruph of the Constitutional Document), deputy
Dr. Joseph Tiso, the executive vice-president of the SlO'Vak
POOlple's Party, as mii.nister for the administration of SloV'a!kia. By a supplement to this law, the Government requested Dr. Tiso to name other SlovaJk ministers to execute
governmental power in Slovakia. From this it is evident
that the Prague Government had accepted the fundamental
propositions of the Slo:vaJk People's Party and the other
participating parties" (A-l~ET, official organ of Dr. Benes's
National Socialistic Party, Octolber 7, 1938). Dr. Edward
Benes, as is iknown, resigned the presidency of the Republic
V1oluntarily on Octolber 5, 1938.
The first Slovak ruutonomous government oif Slova.kia
was composed oif the following: Dr. Joseph Tiso, Premier
and Minister O'f Interior; ,professor Matthew Cernak, Minister oif Education and National Enlightenment; Dr. Ferdinand DUT'canSlky, Minister of Justl!ce, Social Welfare and
Health; Paul TeplanSlky, Minister of Agriculture,, Prublic
WOTks, Commerce, Business and Finance; John Lichner,
Minister of the Mail and the Railroads. ( Slovensky mas,
Dr. Milan Hodza's 1pulblication, October 8, 1938).
Dr. J,o seph Tiso, •CernaJk and :Dwcansky were representatives of the Hlinka Slovalk PeQple's Party, while Teplans:ky and Lkhner represented the party oif Slovak republicans, since there really were only two genuine Slovak parties in Slovakia - the People's Party and the National
$loiv~k Party. All the other parties were only affiliates
of the ;variOUJs Ozeich and so-<Called "Czechoslovak" ,p arties;
the representatives of these parties sp0ike of the Slova;k
coalition ,parties, as 1s attested to by the "A-~ET" article
of Emil Boleslav Lukac orf October 7, 193'8. Analy~g and
evaluating the Zilina events, LuJkac wrote:
"It was ,plainly necessary that the Slovalk People's
Party pass over from the ,position of opposition to a responsible position, one commensu,r ate with its strength, to
a leading position. It was necessary that it use its strength
�SLOVAKIA
15
especially today to protect Slovak national interests inside
and outside its territory. Even the cbalition parties of Slova1da haJVe united on its main demand - the decentralization of pulbliic administraA:ion and a ,b road autonomy for
SlovaJkia. And it was aecepted even by the Governrment of
the Repulblic. SlovaJkia shall hruve its legislaitive assembly,
a Slovruk government of all resorts, except finances , national defense, and ,f oreign affairs - whi-ch are common resorts. Today all S-loivaJk parties stand behind this agreement,
behind this new arrangement of Slovruk afrfairs, and, hence,
even our Nationai Socialistic Party in Slovakia. We shall
stand by it loyally and responsibly."
The republicans (agrarians) welcomed the first .SlovaJk
Autonomous Government even more enthusiasticaH y. In
their '"SLOVENSK Y TY~DEJNNfK." (Slovalk Weekly) of
OctOlber 13, 1938, their leadiillg editorial "M8JIIle Slovensku
Vladiu" (We Have a Sloivak Goivernment) , contained the
following:
"We recall that the ('IDinka Sl01VaJk) ·People's Party not
so long ago thought and appeared to 1b e sufficient of itself
for such a role. But when it actuaHy came to the brealking
of bread, it realized what a great responstbility it is before
the nation ·a nd how much woirk must 1b e aocompUshed to
organize Slo.'V'aik statehood and an autonomous, independent
Slovruk life. Under these circumstances and dtflficulties it
was a real blessing that the Republican ,P arty of Slovakia
was deternnined rwith all its forces to build a Slovak autonomous state unit. . . "
SlovaJk centralists - the so~a,lled "Ozechoslova,ks" who
had defended .and propagated a strong, centralized Prague
government - openly and enthusiastkal ly spoke out not
only for a;utonomy, but for SlovaJk statehood after October
6,. 1938. Their -w illingness to wor,k with the SloivaJk People's
Party was not only evident, but also quite convincing, as
demonstrawd by their manifestation s and the ,parti~ipation
of the RepU'blican Party in the Slovak Government.
Analyzing the whole brucikgro.und of these events, we
find that the representative s of the political parties in Slovakia did nothing in 2ilina which was not approved of by
�16
SLOVAKIA
Prague. And the Prague leadership oif the coalition iparties
even gaive pU!blic testimoniy of this on October 8, 193'8, by
stating:
''The undersigned representatiive s of the Crech political
parties declare that - in the sense of the 2ilina agreement of Octolber 6, 1938 - we adopt the ,proiposition of
the Hlinika .SlovaJk People's Party to issue a Constitutiona l
law in regard to the autonomy of SlovaJkia as ~t was presented in the .Asoornlbly of Deputies in 1938 and pulblished
in the SLOVAK, No. 129, of Jrune 5, 1938, and we ibind
ourselves that we shal,l endeavor to have it acted on and
aoceipted as soon as possilble."
The statement was, signed .by: Deputy Rudoliph Beran,
chairman of the Repulbli<can Party; Deputy Anthony Hampl.
chairman of the ,Social Democratic Party; Deputy Dr. Klaipka for the National Socialist Party; Deputy Monsignor Stasetk for the 0ze:ch Poople's Parly; Dr. Franicis Hodac.
vice-ichairman oif the Party of Unity; and De:puty Rudolph
Mlcoch, chail'lffian of Tradesman's Party. (!SLOVAK, October 9, 1938).
Here we harve proof that even the leadership of the
Social Democrati1c Party in Prague fully approrved the Zilina
.A!greement, despite the fad that the Slovak Pe01ple's Party
did not come to an:y agreement with the Slovruk Socialists.
It is quite obvious, therefore, that October 6, 1938 Slova!k Autonomy Day - was baoked not only by the
H1inka Slovak People's Party, but also the rest of the Slovak civk parties then in existence. All went along with the
Peoiple's Party willingly and spontaneously and accepted
the resiponsilbility for the future development of Sloiva!lda.
Whether they were sincere 8'bout it or not is questionable
in the light of what transpireid later, but the fact is that
all ·political parties operating in Slova·k ia in 1938 - except
the Social Demdcrats and the Communists - realized ,t he
necessity od' uniting in the common interests oif .Slovakia, in
fact in the interests of the national existence of the SlOIVruk
nation itself. They were not re$ponsihle for the tense international political situation of that time, but were sufficiently intelligent to adapt themselves accordingly and save
�SLOVAKIA
17
whatever could ,b e saved under the given cir~umstances.
It was, in fact, the old Btory Oi:f history repeating its.elf all poJitioal leaders wo11king together for the benefit of all
the people of Slovakia, or hanging separately.
On October 6, 1938, the just demands of. the Slovak nation,; so aiptly e~ressed by the Pittsiburgh Pact of May 30,
191'8, were finally recognized and fulfilled by the recalcitrant gorvernment of Prague. As we looik bruclk in retrospect
today, we can only say that lruok of foresi:ght, statesmansMp, Christian charity and democracy on the part of Dr.
Edward Benes and his National Socialists and other Ozech
leftist - so...called "progressive" - growps prevented the
realization o;f Slovak autonomy sooner and ,p recipatated
the collapse of the Czecho,. Slova:k Repll!blic. October 6, 1938,
no matter how enemies o;f Slovaik freedom and indeipendenoe
may look ,wpon it, was a milestone in Slovak history, maI1king another lap olf the march of the Slovak nation to free dom and complete political independence.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"After the Turkish invasion came tile religious wars
which many historians made the mistake orf regarding as
manifestaJtions of nationaJ1. resistance against Germanism.
Here in Cenltrai Europe the conflicts were identical with
those taJking plaice in other prurts o:f the Continent at the
same time. The struggle Oi:f the Huguenots against Henry IV
was no more -a nationaJl. conflict than the share of the
Czechs in the Thi.irty Years.' War was a radal fight against
Germanism. They fought against the HaJbsboogs beeause the
latter were Catholks, _and the Battle of the White Mountain
(1620) the Ozechs, together with their German rully, Prince
Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, were !b eaten 1by the
Catholic tro01ps of the Austrian emperor. The legend about
the Mountain is an outstanding exMn.ple Off historical forgery, for it was. a purely religious and dynastic affaiir." (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONA L SURREND@R, p. 71; Faber and Fruber, Ltd., London).
�
SLOVAKIA
13
MILESTONES OF SLOVAK HISTORY
OCTOBER 6, 1938
The Slovaik nation, one olf the olde.st Christian nations
in Central Europe, decided to fonm a c01mmon political state
with the Czech nation during World War I. Equality in all
matters ,w as the basis Ol:f that decision. Slovakia ,w as to be
governed as a state of the Ozech-Slova:k federation by the
Slovruks and the Czech lands by the Ozechs. The Pittsburgh
Pact of May 30, 1918, drawn UJP and signed by T. G. Masarylk and irepresentati'Ves of the Czechs and the •S lovaks of
America, guaranteed Sloivakia complete autonomy, i e.,
home rule or states rights. Unfortunately, T. G. Masaryk
repudiated the pruct and condemned the very state he prop8!gated to premature ruin.
For twenty years the. Slovaks kerpt clamoring for recognition of and respect for their inherent rights, for the fulfillment of the ,b argain they had concluded with T. G. Masaryk, but to .no avail. The Ruthe1I1ians,, who had voluntarily
entered the political state of Czeicho~Slovakia on the basis
of an autonomous region, were also sadly disaippointed by
the regime olf T. G. Masaryik and his underst/Udy, Dr. Edward Benes. The forceful inchtsion of 3,500,000 Sudeten
Germans in the Ozecho~lo:vaik Repulbliic did not help relieve
the tensiOIIlS or to consolidate the state, burt rather aggravated the situation. The regimes of T. G. Masaryk and Dr.
Edward Benes antrugonized the non-Czech majority of the
population against the Czechs and doomed the Republic to
an early death. When the first major crisis stmmk, there
was no one to defend the ill~fated Ozecho~SlovaJkia and it
collapsed like a house ibuilt of cards.
On October 6, 193,8, the Slo1V1aiks mrude a great step forward toward urufiying their fOiI1Ces in their struggle for
state independence. All paTties, except the .Social Democrats and the Communists, accepted the principle of an autonomous SlovaJkia in the spirit of the draft of a bill, which
was prepared by the ID:inka Slovak People's Party and
made pU!blic Jun€ 5, 1938. The result of the October meet~
�14
SLOVAKIA
ing,s oif the representatives of all Slovak parties in Zilina,,
S1ovalkia, was that "the Government of the Ozecho..slovalk
Repulblic named, in the p1ruce of the President of the RepuJblic (a paragrruph of the Constitutional Document), deputy
Dr. Joseph Tiso, the executive vice-president of the SlO'Vak
POOlple's Party, as mii.nister for the administration of SloV'a!kia. By a supplement to this law, the Government requested Dr. Tiso to name other SlovaJk ministers to execute
governmental power in Slovakia. From this it is evident
that the Prague Government had accepted the fundamental
propositions of the Slo:vaJk People's Party and the other
participating parties" (A-l~ET, official organ of Dr. Benes's
National Socialistic Party, Octolber 7, 1938). Dr. Edward
Benes, as is iknown, resigned the presidency of the Republic
V1oluntarily on Octolber 5, 1938.
The first Slovak ruutonomous government oif Slova.kia
was composed oif the following: Dr. Joseph Tiso, Premier
and Minister O'f Interior; ,professor Matthew Cernak, Minister oif Education and National Enlightenment; Dr. Ferdinand DUT'canSlky, Minister of Justl!ce, Social Welfare and
Health; Paul TeplanSlky, Minister of Agriculture,, Prublic
WOTks, Commerce, Business and Finance; John Lichner,
Minister of the Mail and the Railroads. ( Slovensky mas,
Dr. Milan Hodza's 1pulblication, October 8, 1938).
Dr. J,o seph Tiso, •CernaJk and :Dwcansky were representatives of the Hlinka Slovalk PeQple's Party, while Teplans:ky and Lkhner represented the party oif Slovak republicans, since there really were only two genuine Slovak parties in Slovakia - the People's Party and the National
$loiv~k Party. All the other parties were only affiliates
of the ;variOUJs Ozeich and so-<Called "Czechoslovak" ,p arties;
the representatives of these parties sp0ike of the Slova;k
coalition ,parties, as 1s attested to by the "A-~ET" article
of Emil Boleslav Lukac orf October 7, 193'8. Analy~g and
evaluating the Zilina events, LuJkac wrote:
"It was ,plainly necessary that the Slovalk People's
Party pass over from the ,position of opposition to a responsible position, one commensu,r ate with its strength, to
a leading position. It was necessary that it use its strength
�SLOVAKIA
15
especially today to protect Slovak national interests inside
and outside its territory. Even the cbalition parties of Slova1da haJVe united on its main demand - the decentralization of pulbliic administraA:ion and a ,b road autonomy for
SlovaJkia. And it was aecepted even by the Governrment of
the Repulblic. SlovaJkia shall hruve its legislaitive assembly,
a Slovruk government of all resorts, except finances , national defense, and ,f oreign affairs - whi-ch are common resorts. Today all S-loivaJk parties stand behind this agreement,
behind this new arrangement of Slovruk afrfairs, and, hence,
even our Nationai Socialistic Party in Slovakia. We shall
stand by it loyally and responsibly."
The republicans (agrarians) welcomed the first .SlovaJk
Autonomous Government even more enthusiasticaH y. In
their '"SLOVENSK Y TY~DEJNNfK." (Slovalk Weekly) of
OctOlber 13, 1938, their leadiillg editorial "M8JIIle Slovensku
Vladiu" (We Have a Sloivak Goivernment) , contained the
following:
"We recall that the ('IDinka Sl01VaJk) ·People's Party not
so long ago thought and appeared to 1b e sufficient of itself
for such a role. But when it actuaHy came to the brealking
of bread, it realized what a great responstbility it is before
the nation ·a nd how much woirk must 1b e aocompUshed to
organize Slo.'V'aik statehood and an autonomous, independent
Slovruk life. Under these circumstances and dtflficulties it
was a real blessing that the Republican ,P arty of Slovakia
was deternnined rwith all its forces to build a Slovak autonomous state unit. . . "
SlovaJk centralists - the so~a,lled "Ozechoslova,ks" who
had defended .and propagated a strong, centralized Prague
government - openly and enthusiastkal ly spoke out not
only for a;utonomy, but for SlovaJk statehood after October
6,. 1938. Their -w illingness to wor,k with the SloivaJk People's
Party was not only evident, but also quite convincing, as
demonstrawd by their manifestation s and the ,parti~ipation
of the RepU'blican Party in the Slovak Government.
Analyzing the whole brucikgro.und of these events, we
find that the representative s of the political parties in Slovakia did nothing in 2ilina which was not approved of by
�16
SLOVAKIA
Prague. And the Prague leadership oif the coalition iparties
even gaive pU!blic testimoniy of this on October 8, 193'8, by
stating:
''The undersigned representatiive s of the Crech political
parties declare that - in the sense of the 2ilina agreement of Octolber 6, 1938 - we adopt the ,proiposition of
the Hlinika .SlovaJk People's Party to issue a Constitutiona l
law in regard to the autonomy of SlovaJkia as ~t was presented in the .Asoornlbly of Deputies in 1938 and pulblished
in the SLOVAK, No. 129, of Jrune 5, 1938, and we ibind
ourselves that we shal,l endeavor to have it acted on and
aoceipted as soon as possilble."
The statement was, signed .by: Deputy Rudoliph Beran,
chairman of the Repulbli<can Party; Deputy Anthony Hampl.
chairman of the ,Social Democratic Party; Deputy Dr. Klaipka for the National Socialist Party; Deputy Monsignor Stasetk for the 0ze:ch Poople's Parly; Dr. Franicis Hodac.
vice-ichairman oif the Party of Unity; and De:puty Rudolph
Mlcoch, chail'lffian of Tradesman's Party. (!SLOVAK, October 9, 1938).
Here we harve proof that even the leadership of the
Social Democrati1c Party in Prague fully approrved the Zilina
.A!greement, despite the fad that the Slovak Pe01ple's Party
did not come to an:y agreement with the Slovruk Socialists.
It is quite obvious, therefore, that October 6, 1938 Slova!k Autonomy Day - was baoked not only by the
H1inka Slovak People's Party, but also the rest of the Slovak civk parties then in existence. All went along with the
Peoiple's Party willingly and spontaneously and accepted
the resiponsilbility for the future development of Sloiva!lda.
Whether they were sincere 8'bout it or not is questionable
in the light of what transpireid later, but the fact is that
all ·political parties operating in Slova·k ia in 1938 - except
the Social Demdcrats and the Communists - realized ,t he
necessity od' uniting in the common interests oif .Slovakia, in
fact in the interests of the national existence of the SlOIVruk
nation itself. They were not re$ponsihle for the tense international political situation of that time, but were sufficiently intelligent to adapt themselves accordingly and save
�SLOVAKIA
17
whatever could ,b e saved under the given cir~umstances.
It was, in fact, the old Btory Oi:f history repeating its.elf all poJitioal leaders wo11king together for the benefit of all
the people of Slovakia, or hanging separately.
On October 6, 1938, the just demands of. the Slovak nation,; so aiptly e~ressed by the Pittsiburgh Pact of May 30,
191'8, were finally recognized and fulfilled by the recalcitrant gorvernment of Prague. As we looik bruclk in retrospect
today, we can only say that lruok of foresi:ght, statesmansMp, Christian charity and democracy on the part of Dr.
Edward Benes and his National Socialists and other Ozech
leftist - so...called "progressive" - growps prevented the
realization o;f Slovak autonomy sooner and ,p recipatated
the collapse of the Czecho,. Slova:k Repll!blic. October 6, 1938,
no matter how enemies o;f Slovaik freedom and indeipendenoe
may look ,wpon it, was a milestone in Slovak history, maI1king another lap olf the march of the Slovak nation to free dom and complete political independence.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"After the Turkish invasion came tile religious wars
which many historians made the mistake orf regarding as
manifestaJtions of nationaJ1. resistance against Germanism.
Here in Cenltrai Europe the conflicts were identical with
those taJking plaice in other prurts o:f the Continent at the
same time. The struggle Oi:f the Huguenots against Henry IV
was no more -a nationaJl. conflict than the share of the
Czechs in the Thi.irty Years.' War was a radal fight against
Germanism. They fought against the HaJbsboogs beeause the
latter were Catholks, _and the Battle of the White Mountain
(1620) the Ozechs, together with their German rully, Prince
Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, were !b eaten 1by the
Catholic tro01ps of the Austrian emperor. The legend about
the Mountain is an outstanding exMn.ple Off historical forgery, for it was. a purely religious and dynastic affaiir." (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONA L SURREND@R, p. 71; Faber and Fruber, Ltd., London).
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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SLOVAKIA
13
MILESTONES OF SLOVAK HISTORY
OCTOBER 6, 1938
The Slovaik nation, one olf the olde.st Christian nations
in Central Europe, decided to fonm a c01mmon political state
with the Czech nation during World War I. Equality in all
matters ,w as the basis Ol:f that decision. Slovakia ,w as to be
governed as a state of the Ozech-Slova:k federation by the
Slovruks and the Czech lands by the Ozechs. The Pittsburgh
Pact of May 30, 1918, drawn UJP and signed by T. G. Masarylk and irepresentati'Ves of the Czechs and the •S lovaks of
America, guaranteed Sloivakia complete autonomy, i e.,
home rule or states rights. Unfortunately, T. G. Masaryk
repudiated the pruct and condemned the very state he prop8!gated to premature ruin.
For twenty years the. Slovaks kerpt clamoring for recognition of and respect for their inherent rights, for the fulfillment of the ,b argain they had concluded with T. G. Masaryk, but to .no avail. The Ruthe1I1ians,, who had voluntarily
entered the political state of Czeicho~Slovakia on the basis
of an autonomous region, were also sadly disaippointed by
the regime olf T. G. Masaryik and his underst/Udy, Dr. Edward Benes. The forceful inchtsion of 3,500,000 Sudeten
Germans in the Ozecho~lo:vaik Repulbliic did not help relieve
the tensiOIIlS or to consolidate the state, burt rather aggravated the situation. The regimes of T. G. Masaryk and Dr.
Edward Benes antrugonized the non-Czech majority of the
population against the Czechs and doomed the Republic to
an early death. When the first major crisis stmmk, there
was no one to defend the ill~fated Ozecho~SlovaJkia and it
collapsed like a house ibuilt of cards.
On October 6, 193,8, the Slo1V1aiks mrude a great step forward toward urufiying their fOiI1Ces in their struggle for
state independence. All paTties, except the .Social Democrats and the Communists, accepted the principle of an autonomous SlovaJkia in the spirit of the draft of a bill, which
was prepared by the ID:inka Slovak People's Party and
made pU!blic Jun€ 5, 1938. The result of the October meet~
14
SLOVAKIA
ing,s oif the representatives of all Slovak parties in Zilina,,
S1ovalkia, was that "the Government of the Ozecho..slovalk
Repulblic named, in the p1ruce of the President of the RepuJblic (a paragrruph of the Constitutional Document), deputy
Dr. Joseph Tiso, the executive vice-president of the SlO'Vak
POOlple's Party, as mii.nister for the administration of SloV'a!kia. By a supplement to this law, the Government requested Dr. Tiso to name other SlovaJk ministers to execute
governmental power in Slovakia. From this it is evident
that the Prague Government had accepted the fundamental
propositions of the Slo:vaJk People's Party and the other
participating parties" (A-l~ET, official organ of Dr. Benes's
National Socialistic Party, Octolber 7, 1938). Dr. Edward
Benes, as is iknown, resigned the presidency of the Republic
V1oluntarily on Octolber 5, 1938.
The first Slovak ruutonomous government oif Slova.kia
was composed oif the following: Dr. Joseph Tiso, Premier
and Minister O'f Interior; ,professor Matthew Cernak, Minister oif Education and National Enlightenment; Dr. Ferdinand DUT'canSlky, Minister of Justl!ce, Social Welfare and
Health; Paul TeplanSlky, Minister of Agriculture,, Prublic
WOTks, Commerce, Business and Finance; John Lichner,
Minister of the Mail and the Railroads. ( Slovensky mas,
Dr. Milan Hodza's 1pulblication, October 8, 1938).
Dr. J,o seph Tiso, •CernaJk and :Dwcansky were representatives of the Hlinka Slovalk PeQple's Party, while Teplans:ky and Lkhner represented the party oif Slovak republicans, since there really were only two genuine Slovak parties in Slovakia - the People's Party and the National
$loiv~k Party. All the other parties were only affiliates
of the ;variOUJs Ozeich and so-<Called "Czechoslovak" ,p arties;
the representatives of these parties sp0ike of the Slova;k
coalition ,parties, as 1s attested to by the "A-~ET" article
of Emil Boleslav Lukac orf October 7, 193'8. Analy~g and
evaluating the Zilina events, LuJkac wrote:
"It was ,plainly necessary that the Slovalk People's
Party pass over from the ,position of opposition to a responsible position, one commensu,r ate with its strength, to
a leading position. It was necessary that it use its strength
SLOVAKIA
15
especially today to protect Slovak national interests inside
and outside its territory. Even the cbalition parties of Slova1da haJVe united on its main demand - the decentralization of pulbliic administraA:ion and a ,b road autonomy for
SlovaJkia. And it was aecepted even by the Governrment of
the Repulblic. SlovaJkia shall hruve its legislaitive assembly,
a Slovruk government of all resorts, except finances , national defense, and ,f oreign affairs - whi-ch are common resorts. Today all S-loivaJk parties stand behind this agreement,
behind this new arrangement of Slovruk afrfairs, and, hence,
even our Nationai Socialistic Party in Slovakia. We shall
stand by it loyally and responsibly."
The republicans (agrarians) welcomed the first .SlovaJk
Autonomous Government even more enthusiasticaH y. In
their '"SLOVENSK Y TY~DEJNNfK." (Slovalk Weekly) of
OctOlber 13, 1938, their leadiillg editorial "M8JIIle Slovensku
Vladiu" (We Have a Sloivak Goivernment) , contained the
following:
"We recall that the ('IDinka Sl01VaJk) ·People's Party not
so long ago thought and appeared to 1b e sufficient of itself
for such a role. But when it actuaHy came to the brealking
of bread, it realized what a great responstbility it is before
the nation ·a nd how much woirk must 1b e aocompUshed to
organize Slo.'V'aik statehood and an autonomous, independent
Slovruk life. Under these circumstances and dtflficulties it
was a real blessing that the Republican ,P arty of Slovakia
was deternnined rwith all its forces to build a Slovak autonomous state unit. . . "
SlovaJk centralists - the so~a,lled "Ozechoslova,ks" who
had defended .and propagated a strong, centralized Prague
government - openly and enthusiastkal ly spoke out not
only for a;utonomy, but for SlovaJk statehood after October
6,. 1938. Their -w illingness to wor,k with the SloivaJk People's
Party was not only evident, but also quite convincing, as
demonstrawd by their manifestation s and the ,parti~ipation
of the RepU'blican Party in the Slovak Government.
Analyzing the whole brucikgro.und of these events, we
find that the representative s of the political parties in Slovakia did nothing in 2ilina which was not approved of by
16
SLOVAKIA
Prague. And the Prague leadership oif the coalition iparties
even gaive pU!blic testimoniy of this on October 8, 193'8, by
stating:
''The undersigned representatiive s of the Crech political
parties declare that - in the sense of the 2ilina agreement of Octolber 6, 1938 - we adopt the ,proiposition of
the Hlinika .SlovaJk People's Party to issue a Constitutiona l
law in regard to the autonomy of SlovaJkia as ~t was presented in the .Asoornlbly of Deputies in 1938 and pulblished
in the SLOVAK, No. 129, of Jrune 5, 1938, and we ibind
ourselves that we shal,l endeavor to have it acted on and
aoceipted as soon as possilble."
The statement was, signed .by: Deputy Rudoliph Beran,
chairman of the Repulbli<can Party; Deputy Anthony Hampl.
chairman of the ,Social Democratic Party; Deputy Dr. Klaipka for the National Socialist Party; Deputy Monsignor Stasetk for the 0ze:ch Poople's Parly; Dr. Franicis Hodac.
vice-ichairman oif the Party of Unity; and De:puty Rudolph
Mlcoch, chail'lffian of Tradesman's Party. (!SLOVAK, October 9, 1938).
Here we harve proof that even the leadership of the
Social Democrati1c Party in Prague fully approrved the Zilina
.A!greement, despite the fad that the Slovak Pe01ple's Party
did not come to an:y agreement with the Slovruk Socialists.
It is quite obvious, therefore, that October 6, 1938 Slova!k Autonomy Day - was baoked not only by the
H1inka Slovak People's Party, but also the rest of the Slovak civk parties then in existence. All went along with the
Peoiple's Party willingly and spontaneously and accepted
the resiponsilbility for the future development of Sloiva!lda.
Whether they were sincere 8'bout it or not is questionable
in the light of what transpireid later, but the fact is that
all ·political parties operating in Slova·k ia in 1938 - except
the Social Demdcrats and the Communists - realized ,t he
necessity od' uniting in the common interests oif .Slovakia, in
fact in the interests of the national existence of the SlOIVruk
nation itself. They were not re$ponsihle for the tense international political situation of that time, but were sufficiently intelligent to adapt themselves accordingly and save
SLOVAKIA
17
whatever could ,b e saved under the given cir~umstances.
It was, in fact, the old Btory Oi:f history repeating its.elf all poJitioal leaders wo11king together for the benefit of all
the people of Slovakia, or hanging separately.
On October 6, 1938, the just demands of. the Slovak nation,; so aiptly e~ressed by the Pittsiburgh Pact of May 30,
191'8, were finally recognized and fulfilled by the recalcitrant gorvernment of Prague. As we looik bruclk in retrospect
today, we can only say that lruok of foresi:ght, statesmansMp, Christian charity and democracy on the part of Dr.
Edward Benes and his National Socialists and other Ozech
leftist - so...called "progressive" - growps prevented the
realization o;f Slovak autonomy sooner and ,p recipatated
the collapse of the Czecho,. Slova:k Repll!blic. October 6, 1938,
no matter how enemies o;f Slovaik freedom and indeipendenoe
may look ,wpon it, was a milestone in Slovak history, maI1king another lap olf the march of the Slovak nation to free dom and complete political independence.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"After the Turkish invasion came tile religious wars
which many historians made the mistake orf regarding as
manifestaJtions of nationaJ1. resistance against Germanism.
Here in Cenltrai Europe the conflicts were identical with
those taJking plaice in other prurts o:f the Continent at the
same time. The struggle Oi:f the Huguenots against Henry IV
was no more -a nationaJl. conflict than the share of the
Czechs in the Thi.irty Years.' War was a radal fight against
Germanism. They fought against the HaJbsboogs beeause the
latter were Catholks, _and the Battle of the White Mountain
(1620) the Ozechs, together with their German rully, Prince
Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, were !b eaten 1by the
Catholic tro01ps of the Austrian emperor. The legend about
the Mountain is an outstanding exMn.ple Off historical forgery, for it was. a purely religious and dynastic affaiir." (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONA L SURREND@R, p. 71; Faber and Fruber, Ltd., London).
Dublin Core
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Title
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Milestones of Slovak History: October 6, 1938
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
pp. 13-17
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b5cbfdd20f357ed8329aae999cb2576f.pdf
a243bef75596fc23bed53bced6ba65b0
PDF Text
Text
18
SLOVAKIA
THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE
ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE
By Eleonor Podkrivacky
There still are some people who believe erroneously
that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo
change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of
today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also
the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study
of their language.
Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied
external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find
that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that
in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late
se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For
example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main
had
literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both
their languages; during the eighteenth century after the
reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for
the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as
used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the
eastern dialect as the literary language.
Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to
explore its baJClk,ground briefly.
After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril
prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth
century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in
the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth
literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language
used in documents in central Europe for several centuries.
R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states
�SLOVAKIA
19
that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some
documents.
·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of
religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of
Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a
religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka
in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth
or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in
Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language
made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in
Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents
in addition to La-tin and Germ an.
German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special
prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections
of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either
because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept
in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three
cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business
and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home.
Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and
occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia.
Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r,
quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia,
when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of
Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King
oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland
�20
SLOVAlGA
from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold
on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the
death of King Ladislav in 14'57.
The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their
mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the
Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which
give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the
country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and
literary material perished in the ipilla:ging.
Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage
and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks.
Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which
was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where
the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655,
among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a
leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their
native tongue was as important as other languages. The
needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters.
Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that
language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented
for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring
towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned
fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century.
At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the
Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books.
With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical
consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number
�SLOVAKIA
21
and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a,
in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak
language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak.
By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political
oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s
of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h
Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the
empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the
official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe
Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to
this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other
language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and
non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also
rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the
Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king
and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century.
It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language.
Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat
of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their
family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town
Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4,
1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive
northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where
he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical
high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were
recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in
Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and
he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred
to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more
years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went
to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph
II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his
reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen-
�22
SLOVAKIA
eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle
at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration.
Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn
of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete.
While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his
own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis
of literary Slovak.
In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica
de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to
write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting
the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the
basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge.
To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak
which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae
Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk
which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous
Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states
that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in
the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and
Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century,
and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to
be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work
was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y
Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed
the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western
dialect.
The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the
death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately
five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The
interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu-
�SLOVAKIA
dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And
their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men
of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors.
While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in
1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in
their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka
Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di·
tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main
dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the
most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs
and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for
"j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was
aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel.
In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop
in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued
in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky,
where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15,
1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not
pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not
to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi
PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the
sixth volume.
During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded
in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene
Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was
to further the advancement of education and culture of the
SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority
of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun-
�SLOVAKIA
dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak
bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature.
Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout
Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where
literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three
towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near
Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two
last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on
to state that the society was represented also in other lands.
In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary
there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not
lirving in their homeland .
.A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in
addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated
the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many
semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l
and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater
aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the
first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language
and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society.
Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses
on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic
works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies.
· ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy
of admiration for the great love for their language and the
efforts they put forth for its sake.
�SLOVAKIA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS :
\J
Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia,
Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906.
\J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges.
London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P.
Dutton and Co., Inc.)
Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J
tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition).
Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921.
Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943.
Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905.
Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944.
Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z
roku 1890) 1923.
PERIODICALS :
Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51.
Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana,
August 3, 1937.
Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike,
May 9, 1933.
Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak,
date unknown.
�
18
SLOVAKIA
THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE
ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE
By Eleonor Podkrivacky
There still are some people who believe erroneously
that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo
change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of
today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also
the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study
of their language.
Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied
external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find
that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that
in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late
se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For
example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main
had
literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both
their languages; during the eighteenth century after the
reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for
the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as
used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the
eastern dialect as the literary language.
Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to
explore its baJClk,ground briefly.
After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril
prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth
century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in
the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth
literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language
used in documents in central Europe for several centuries.
R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states
�SLOVAKIA
19
that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some
documents.
·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of
religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of
Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a
religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka
in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth
or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in
Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language
made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in
Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents
in addition to La-tin and Germ an.
German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special
prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections
of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either
because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept
in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three
cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business
and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home.
Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and
occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia.
Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r,
quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia,
when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of
Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King
oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland
�20
SLOVAlGA
from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold
on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the
death of King Ladislav in 14'57.
The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their
mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the
Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which
give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the
country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and
literary material perished in the ipilla:ging.
Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage
and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks.
Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which
was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where
the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655,
among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a
leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their
native tongue was as important as other languages. The
needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters.
Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that
language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented
for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring
towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned
fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century.
At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the
Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books.
With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical
consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number
�SLOVAKIA
21
and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a,
in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak
language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak.
By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political
oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s
of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h
Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the
empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the
official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe
Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to
this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other
language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and
non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also
rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the
Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king
and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century.
It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language.
Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat
of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their
family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town
Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4,
1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive
northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where
he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical
high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were
recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in
Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and
he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred
to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more
years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went
to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph
II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his
reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen-
�22
SLOVAKIA
eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle
at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration.
Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn
of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete.
While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his
own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis
of literary Slovak.
In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica
de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to
write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting
the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the
basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge.
To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak
which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae
Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk
which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous
Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states
that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in
the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and
Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century,
and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to
be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work
was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y
Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed
the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western
dialect.
The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the
death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately
five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The
interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu-
�SLOVAKIA
dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And
their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men
of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors.
While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in
1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in
their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka
Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di·
tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main
dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the
most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs
and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for
"j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was
aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel.
In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop
in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued
in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky,
where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15,
1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not
pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not
to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi
PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the
sixth volume.
During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded
in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene
Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was
to further the advancement of education and culture of the
SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority
of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun-
�SLOVAKIA
dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak
bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature.
Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout
Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where
literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three
towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near
Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two
last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on
to state that the society was represented also in other lands.
In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary
there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not
lirving in their homeland .
.A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in
addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated
the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many
semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l
and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater
aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the
first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language
and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society.
Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses
on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic
works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies.
· ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy
of admiration for the great love for their language and the
efforts they put forth for its sake.
�SLOVAKIA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS :
\J
Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia,
Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906.
\J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges.
London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P.
Dutton and Co., Inc.)
Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J
tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition).
Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921.
Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943.
Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905.
Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944.
Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z
roku 1890) 1923.
PERIODICALS :
Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51.
Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana,
August 3, 1937.
Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike,
May 9, 1933.
Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak,
date unknown.
�
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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18
SLOVAKIA
THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE
ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE
By Eleonor Podkrivacky
There still are some people who believe erroneously
that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo
change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of
today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also
the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study
of their language.
Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied
external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find
that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that
in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late
se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For
example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main
had
literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both
their languages; during the eighteenth century after the
reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for
the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as
used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the
eastern dialect as the literary language.
Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to
explore its baJClk,ground briefly.
After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril
prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth
century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in
the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth
literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language
used in documents in central Europe for several centuries.
R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states
SLOVAKIA
19
that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some
documents.
·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of
religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of
Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a
religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka
in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth
or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in
Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language
made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in
Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents
in addition to La-tin and Germ an.
German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special
prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections
of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either
because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept
in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three
cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business
and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home.
Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and
occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia.
Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r,
quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia,
when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of
Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King
oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland
20
SLOVAlGA
from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold
on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the
death of King Ladislav in 14'57.
The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their
mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the
Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which
give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the
country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and
literary material perished in the ipilla:ging.
Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage
and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks.
Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which
was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where
the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655,
among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a
leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their
native tongue was as important as other languages. The
needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters.
Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that
language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented
for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring
towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned
fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century.
At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the
Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books.
With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical
consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number
SLOVAKIA
21
and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a,
in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak
language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak.
By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political
oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s
of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h
Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the
empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the
official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe
Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to
this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other
language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and
non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also
rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the
Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king
and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century.
It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language.
Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat
of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their
family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town
Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4,
1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive
northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where
he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical
high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were
recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in
Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and
he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred
to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more
years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went
to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph
II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his
reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen-
22
SLOVAKIA
eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle
at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration.
Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn
of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete.
While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his
own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis
of literary Slovak.
In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica
de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to
write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting
the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the
basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge.
To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak
which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae
Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk
which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous
Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states
that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in
the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and
Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century,
and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to
be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work
was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y
Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed
the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western
dialect.
The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the
death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately
five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The
interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu-
SLOVAKIA
dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And
their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men
of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors.
While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in
1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in
their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka
Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di·
tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main
dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the
most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs
and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for
"j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was
aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel.
In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop
in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued
in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky,
where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15,
1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not
pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not
to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi
PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the
sixth volume.
During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded
in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene
Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was
to further the advancement of education and culture of the
SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority
of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun-
SLOVAKIA
dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak
bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature.
Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout
Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where
literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three
towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near
Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two
last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on
to state that the society was represented also in other lands.
In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary
there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not
lirving in their homeland .
.A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in
addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated
the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many
semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l
and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater
aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the
first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language
and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society.
Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses
on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic
works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies.
· ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy
of admiration for the great love for their language and the
efforts they put forth for its sake.
SLOVAKIA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS :
\J
Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia,
Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906.
\J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges.
London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P.
Dutton and Co., Inc.)
Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J
tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition).
Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921.
Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943.
Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905.
Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944.
Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z
roku 1890) 1923.
PERIODICALS :
Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51.
Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana,
August 3, 1937.
Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike,
May 9, 1933.
Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak,
date unknown.
Dublin Core
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Title
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Anton Bernolak's Influence on Slovak Literature
Description
An account of the resource
Eleonor Podkrivacký
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
pp. 18-25
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Podkrivacký, Eleonor
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September 1953
name
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26
SLOVAKIA
SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM
(AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR)
Joseph A. Mikus
"The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central
Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs,
in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors.
In order to infornn Americans that there was a large
and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired
to have direct contact with political personalities in the
free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day
in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the
American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris.
· Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on
F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was
welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my
hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot,
he greeted me with the words:
"So you are that Sloivruk separatist!"
''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed
by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; .
"Well, welicome and haive a chair!"
"'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will
exiplain our stand on thi,s matter."
"I aim very curious," he said.
In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat
down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the
easy c•h air opposite him.
"The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference
,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between
any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not
think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship
between you and me that could be designated as separatism.
We are two different pel"SOns, not?"
�SLOVAKIA
27
"That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain
that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs
one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State."
"That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true,"
I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic
individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia
and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a
mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations
within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That
is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But,
sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original
pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the
SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own."
"These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks
to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired.
"Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there
,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism.
It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a
breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one
nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors;
they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship,
and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that
international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its
peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so
fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by
a flood."
"Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor.
"Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty
with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed
on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put
it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and
they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to
accept the delivery."
1
�2·8
S LOVAKIA
"What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that
the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _
. '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks
of all . national rights," I explained.
"How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much
surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic
state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment."
"In regard to the first point, there are democracies
and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was,
then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In
regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it
was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the
Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and
adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it."
•~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?"
asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment.
"It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of
place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell
you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that
revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other
Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument."
"Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. "
''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well
as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a
terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by
�SLOVAKIA
29
Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech
pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this
period."
·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr.
M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination
with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of
the Czecho..,Slovalk State."
"I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West
is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their
struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the
struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power,
the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle
for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a
state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even
Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said:
'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence
and are attempting to break up states in which they have
until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who
used the states for an artificial levelling of the status
among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the
independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'."
"That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor.
"Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk
said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled
politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was
explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be
bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an
unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national
separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point."
"Then you do admit that there are separatists among
·
the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly.
'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is,
who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs
claim."
�30
SLOVAKIA
"Then who can they ~ ?"
"They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the
so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'."
"Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me."
"Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But
it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a
political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al
standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their
nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will.,
formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and,
so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation
from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of
separatiSIID."
."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever
heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like
you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists."
"I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until
they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the
Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to
strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are
setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing
host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them
they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from
the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly
collalPse."
"You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."?
"No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily.
"I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc."
"I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation
of a:ffairs."
"It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint
IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean
Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a
IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to
see such a development. He continues to see another Ver-
�SLOVAKIA
31
sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let
the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would
hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the
'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs
and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for
a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if
the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and
to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o,
right in the heart of the United States."
"I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become
bolder as you continue."
"That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless,
one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not
tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council
of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is
for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and
separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for
a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored
by America.
•
•
•
As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the
door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment:
''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of
SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has
troubled many of my current views. I must give it more
thought.''
"Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified.
Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor."
Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal
for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today,
her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be
directed ,b y political conformists."
But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor.
�
26
SLOVAKIA
SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM
(AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR)
Joseph A. Mikus
"The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central
Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs,
in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors.
In order to infornn Americans that there was a large
and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired
to have direct contact with political personalities in the
free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day
in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the
American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris.
· Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on
F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was
welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my
hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot,
he greeted me with the words:
"So you are that Sloivruk separatist!"
''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed
by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; .
"Well, welicome and haive a chair!"
"'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will
exiplain our stand on thi,s matter."
"I aim very curious," he said.
In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat
down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the
easy c•h air opposite him.
"The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference
,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between
any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not
think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship
between you and me that could be designated as separatism.
We are two different pel"SOns, not?"
�SLOVAKIA
27
"That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain
that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs
one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State."
"That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true,"
I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic
individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia
and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a
mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations
within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That
is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But,
sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original
pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the
SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own."
"These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks
to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired.
"Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there
,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism.
It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a
breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one
nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors;
they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship,
and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that
international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its
peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so
fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by
a flood."
"Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor.
"Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty
with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed
on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put
it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and
they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to
accept the delivery."
1
�2·8
S LOVAKIA
"What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that
the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _
. '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks
of all . national rights," I explained.
"How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much
surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic
state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment."
"In regard to the first point, there are democracies
and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was,
then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In
regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it
was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the
Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and
adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it."
•~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?"
asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment.
"It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of
place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell
you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that
revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other
Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument."
"Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. "
''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well
as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a
terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by
�SLOVAKIA
29
Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech
pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this
period."
·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr.
M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination
with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of
the Czecho..,Slovalk State."
"I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West
is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their
struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the
struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power,
the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle
for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a
state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even
Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said:
'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence
and are attempting to break up states in which they have
until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who
used the states for an artificial levelling of the status
among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the
independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'."
"That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor.
"Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk
said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled
politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was
explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be
bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an
unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national
separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point."
"Then you do admit that there are separatists among
·
the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly.
'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is,
who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs
claim."
�30
SLOVAKIA
"Then who can they ~ ?"
"They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the
so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'."
"Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me."
"Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But
it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a
political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al
standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their
nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will.,
formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and,
so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation
from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of
separatiSIID."
."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever
heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like
you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists."
"I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until
they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the
Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to
strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are
setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing
host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them
they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from
the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly
collalPse."
"You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."?
"No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily.
"I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc."
"I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation
of a:ffairs."
"It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint
IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean
Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a
IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to
see such a development. He continues to see another Ver-
�SLOVAKIA
31
sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let
the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would
hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the
'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs
and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for
a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if
the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and
to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o,
right in the heart of the United States."
"I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become
bolder as you continue."
"That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless,
one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not
tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council
of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is
for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and
separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for
a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored
by America.
•
•
•
As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the
door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment:
''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of
SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has
troubled many of my current views. I must give it more
thought.''
"Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified.
Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor."
Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal
for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today,
her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be
directed ,b y political conformists."
But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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26
SLOVAKIA
SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM
(AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR)
Joseph A. Mikus
"The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central
Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs,
in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors.
In order to infornn Americans that there was a large
and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired
to have direct contact with political personalities in the
free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day
in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the
American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris.
· Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on
F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was
welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my
hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot,
he greeted me with the words:
"So you are that Sloivruk separatist!"
''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed
by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; .
"Well, welicome and haive a chair!"
"'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will
exiplain our stand on thi,s matter."
"I aim very curious," he said.
In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat
down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the
easy c•h air opposite him.
"The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference
,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between
any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not
think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship
between you and me that could be designated as separatism.
We are two different pel"SOns, not?"
SLOVAKIA
27
"That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain
that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs
one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State."
"That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true,"
I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic
individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia
and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a
mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations
within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That
is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But,
sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original
pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the
SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own."
"These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks
to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired.
"Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there
,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism.
It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a
breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one
nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors;
they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship,
and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that
international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its
peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so
fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by
a flood."
"Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor.
"Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty
with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed
on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put
it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and
they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to
accept the delivery."
1
2·8
S LOVAKIA
"What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that
the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _
. '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks
of all . national rights," I explained.
"How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much
surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic
state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment."
"In regard to the first point, there are democracies
and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was,
then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In
regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it
was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the
Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and
adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it."
•~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?"
asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment.
"It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of
place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell
you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that
revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other
Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument."
"Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. "
''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well
as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a
terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by
SLOVAKIA
29
Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech
pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this
period."
·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr.
M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination
with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of
the Czecho..,Slovalk State."
"I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West
is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their
struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the
struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power,
the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle
for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a
state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even
Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said:
'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence
and are attempting to break up states in which they have
until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who
used the states for an artificial levelling of the status
among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the
independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'."
"That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor.
"Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk
said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled
politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was
explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be
bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an
unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national
separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point."
"Then you do admit that there are separatists among
·
the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly.
'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is,
who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs
claim."
30
SLOVAKIA
"Then who can they ~ ?"
"They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the
so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'."
"Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me."
"Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But
it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a
political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al
standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their
nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will.,
formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and,
so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation
from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of
separatiSIID."
."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever
heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like
you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists."
"I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until
they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the
Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to
strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are
setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing
host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them
they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from
the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly
collalPse."
"You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."?
"No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily.
"I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc."
"I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation
of a:ffairs."
"It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint
IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean
Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a
IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to
see such a development. He continues to see another Ver-
SLOVAKIA
31
sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let
the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would
hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the
'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs
and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for
a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if
the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and
to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o,
right in the heart of the United States."
"I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become
bolder as you continue."
"That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless,
one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not
tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council
of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is
for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and
separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for
a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored
by America.
•
•
•
As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the
door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment:
''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of
SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has
troubled many of my current views. I must give it more
thought.''
"Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified.
Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor."
Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal
for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today,
her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be
directed ,b y political conformists."
But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Slovak and European Separatism: An Interview with the Late Royal Taylor
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph A. Mikus
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
pp. 26-31
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/208254f95568e58a0bb64b8eba392d53.pdf
745c5ac46407f7c329eb3082fa1b68d6
PDF Text
Text
32
SLOVAKIA
DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF
THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
Karol Sidor
Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series
o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling
what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies.
Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version
of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does
not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to
do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was
the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the
daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and
during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda
- and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing.
The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to
Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last
February's putsch"!
Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know
that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the
Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s
"Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They
all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes
sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR.
It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible
putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout
this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of
�SLOVAKIA
33
September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that
so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands
of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly
escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with
Comrade Gottwald.
Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that
Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky.
What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad
politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or
that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On
the contrary, Ripka wrote:
"Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing
that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only
in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and
Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the
events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of
national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949).
Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different
tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking
they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his
articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in
the name of Czecho-Slovakia.
R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt.
He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the
West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he
sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was
equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with
the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if
they would have been allowed to keep their ministries.
But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe
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SLOVAKIA
"Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight
against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful
mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against
Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was
undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either.
What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the
Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are
still patiently waiting for it to start!
It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the
right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to
carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify
them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and
their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks,
aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites,
Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists."
Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom,
the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no
right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined
to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.''
Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents
of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y
other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one
who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little
difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and
Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the
�SLOVAKIA
35
latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis.
Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs.
Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and
eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka,"
Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the
Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old
West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union."
Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really
got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were
given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful
they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed
to collaborate with the Communists!
In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into
Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central
Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm
a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r
government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in
Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the
Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many
votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they
were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate.
1
Such was the political line of Benes and his followers.
In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in
creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old
West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared
for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming
�SLOVAKIA
36
with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their
political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in
internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the
votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The
C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition
that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not
verify and approve, would be approved as members of the
Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing
and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of
par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and
later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the
presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for
everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the
budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all
other items of the State budget.
1
When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia
in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the
Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and
mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties
belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate
with the Communists for many years. That collaboration
did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with
us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can
even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us,
and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you."
"The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his
article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy
welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935."
In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There
are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t
to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions.
And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in
193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted
altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular
�SLOVAKIA
37
joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together
they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union.
Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of
the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization
on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long
as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old"
civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by
Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in
C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could
go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised
highly and recommended so zealously not only to the
Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well.
Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was
happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there
were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian
emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not
~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their
old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of
1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a
system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples
aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars,
but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time.
Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only
in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled
before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And
yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating
with the UISSR.
so
Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs
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made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion
aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always
emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus'
character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result
large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics
at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH
the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka
said was being born in the Soviet Union.
Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left
explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with
Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in
Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist
Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia.
But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge
economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian,
Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848:
"The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only
to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to
all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author
of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have
to create it."
Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk,
"Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307)
·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions
of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.''
This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg
a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in
Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna
and ac:corddng to her laws.
During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward
Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them
�SLOVAKIA
39
with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks
to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the
framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other
things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own
,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his
signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain
Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their
solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled
Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians
were guaranteed autonomy.
Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars,
SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by
the Prague parliament when that body did not have a
single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars
and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented
not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward
Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen
of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8.
It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of
the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will
of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves
knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and
political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them.
They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and
that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech
leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union
which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to
tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a
Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and
(
1
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SLOVAKIA
defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German
aggression was being born there.
This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet
Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast
expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally
and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs.
The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the
Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the
Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top
even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even
sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the
Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind.
Slovaik national development went along a completely
different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the
treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it
through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament.
The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on
its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It
was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and
the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political
or religious beliefs.
The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak
patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in
his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate
itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The
Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his
deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day:
''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and
the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim
through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every
fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the
most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend
in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples
share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys-
�SLOVAKIA
41
tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among
the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created
by the human mind."
The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870)
wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In
it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see
it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the
direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n
Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM
rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever
come under the rule of the Russians.
The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919),
a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War
in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw
Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele.
graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path
of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism
in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics."
On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand
against Communism. It was built on the foundations of
Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation
whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism.
The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and
that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does
not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing.
In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part
of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's
treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on
the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's
Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while
the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the
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SLOVAKIA
party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total
Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically
and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the
first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On
November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e
of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament.
In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes,
I said:
"Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward
Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations
and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies.
IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking
the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague
government already conoluded various rugreements with the
bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union.
"The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory
of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as
its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates
the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course
that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of
War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally
different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours
have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following
the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for
the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with
fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny
with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un.
der made by our present foreign policy.
"We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political
mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr.
Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the
Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the
�SLOVAKIA
43
State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built
on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with
the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force
us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present
leailersh'ip of our foreign policy."
Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that
the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he
said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned
with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The
Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed
by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted
against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso
attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very
different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent.
1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes
and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in
the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet
to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal
affairs."
"That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka
is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded
against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted
to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment
swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of
Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red
Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in
1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at
least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds,
and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in
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SLOVAKIA
the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the
internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false!
Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of
Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr.
HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr.
Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet
Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to
strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to
suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the
countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of
intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The
treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to
present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again
binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall
not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds
iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was
confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so
much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any
others to the Soviet framework."
Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and
Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c .
ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same
thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia?
But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which
Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only
did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As
a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach
other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction:
"Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a
clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re-
�SLOVAKIA
45
liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence
of every country, namely, the countries of Central and
Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with
which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it
certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and
independence."
Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943
about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that
trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility,
nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree!
The years have proved that the Slovaks were right
when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union
of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder
ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The
blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way.
On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose
presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the
hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister
voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and
Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were
ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell
Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the
·
Marshall Plan.
Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV··
ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech
delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist,
unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald,
just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to
Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at
this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr.
Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and
presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C.
Capitulation!
1
�4-6
SLOVAKIA
The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated
and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and
Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is
their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie
fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp
they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the
Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The
Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that
they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with
Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in
his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) ,
when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former
provisions of the Czech government in London."
To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees
and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed
before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills.
Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those
laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of
Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators.
All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater
Czech power, greater than it really was.
We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech
government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed
itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent
newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the
Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now
began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan.
Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that
same time.
Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947
went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which
lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia ,
�SLOVAKIA
47
Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to
spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same
Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947,
after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple
thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing
SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as
a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha.
The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia
there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home.
Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The
Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land,
in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless
mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year.
In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks
loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them
the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass
political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their
ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims.
But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break
her resistance.
1
Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to
frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue
to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced
to live together with the Czechs in a common state against
their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on
March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more
tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted
th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~
nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~
returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk
�48
SLOVAKIA
State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement
of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the
integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as
the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow,
Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was
not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin.
1
Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic
disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE
Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria
did go.
With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others
only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It
never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso,
but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along
with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per
cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known
that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their
loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the
Slovak nation.
This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political
consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean
and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs
were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia
not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for
Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady,
where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided,
voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their
wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers
wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their
lands.
In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism
was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo.
�SLOVAKIA
49
and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened
that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to
grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka
wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism,
were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak
Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the
Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia.
At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl,
the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together
at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak
Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the
anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative
to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The
Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with
words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in
Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man
without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his
o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them,
as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were
in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our-
cansky."
Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two
Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries
of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr.
Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the
"plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this
was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none.
But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia.
And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within
the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work.
�50
SLOVAKIA
They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest
anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in
the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the
Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N.
Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in
194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of
non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have
ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to
sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter
Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity.
Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on
sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting
in their ministerial chairs in Prague.
In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the
only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of
the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had
enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent
were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano
concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the
freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and
Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive
against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in
this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at
stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened.
But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the
Benes Czechs.
True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind
were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of
Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even
their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and
Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was
�SLOVAKIA
51
the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost
in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first
fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by
olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an.
Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and
according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National
Socialists.
We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and
vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from
1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the
State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain
his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident.
Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that
in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into
opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward
Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign
his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader.
Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist
ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the
crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's
assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert
them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that
he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that
he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the
Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction.
In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen
their positions, the key positions in the government which
Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these
positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald,
Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min-
�1i2
SLOVAKIA
ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance;
Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal,
Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of
Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what
was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did
loyally and thoroughly.
The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of
all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places
with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned
it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole
Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the
people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of
the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But
this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers.
Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives
of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka,
Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the
masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting
them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse
the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were
fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty
journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But
Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the
peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms,
wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a
"graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated.
On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist
ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry
of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The
�SLOVAKIA
53
government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but
in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald
agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether
they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they
would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the
National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to
Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign
and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he
asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what
happens!''
Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the
Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party,
and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from
the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the
National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone :
"Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!"
Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers
that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and
so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who
did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,.
nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists,
Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the
!Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29):
"Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as
well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted
himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his
irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he
expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it
was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man.
In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave
fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and
�54
SLOVAKIA
whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well
considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he
dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially."
In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand
the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was
known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great
reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then,
did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when
Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their
resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic
before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness
was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them
concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed
in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague
that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?!
The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of
workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe.
They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had
the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo
vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald
should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew
Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of
Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce
and, then, in Prrugue.
Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that
filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were
the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers
who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as
.rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a
puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to
Ado1ph Hitler.
And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~
�SLOVAKIA
55
teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in
which Benes conferred with the Communists. President
Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police
without Benes's knoiwledige."
Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in
being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead
of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was
vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran.
sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two
ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that
conversation:
Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic
cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to
Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate,
for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized
: by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his
Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without
mincing words: "That which you are preparing is
another Munkh."
The President's face grew serious. He said to us:
"You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they
do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns.
We must be ·prepared for anything."
There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told
the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied
to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that
' might result - Russia would not decide on a single
military intemrention.
The president listened with great attention. Then
· he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think
that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean
· military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude
the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our
· ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?"
1
�56
SLOVAKIA
"What would we do?" - repeated the president,
looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would
you do?"
I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world
would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be
known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us,
that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack,
agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory.
A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is
not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t."
Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes
said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I
had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you
have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and
their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke.
They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They
thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as
it did wlith Hitler."
Stransky who never heard the president speak so,
cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done
more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?"
,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I
have already told you: I shall not yield! You may
rest assured on that!"
With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could
know that we shall never again see him.
So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes.
The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet
factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet,
he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt
and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that
the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet
�SLOVAKIA
57
propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to
the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against
the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He
had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger
knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that."
Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit,
that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did
give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist
minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated!
And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers
who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr.
:&!ward Benes?
On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina,
Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it
says literally:
"On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National
Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political
adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the
President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not
receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka
asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers
who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr.
Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so
closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience
to e:,cplain his stand."
Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign,
then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and,
in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to
tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes
no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its
�58
S LOVAKIA
four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power.
On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald
gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By
doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the
Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. ·
..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan."
That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia.
After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into
tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek :
"Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and
that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged."
But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp•
prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed
to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have
an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an
automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~
thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to
do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~
mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists!
At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle
of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They
could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons,
he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in
and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities.
"After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet
a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what
the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May
15, 1949) . .
Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army;
�SLOVAKIA
59
The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically.
While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation"
from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed
that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946
committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed
Slovak men and women.
1
Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who
played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain
- with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save
not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified
.
SloviaJkia.
We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the
ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and
Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The
Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the
pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue
with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency.
Let us quote at least a few sentences from it:
"The president does not want to tell the Communists
to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder
them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It
is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president
again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs.
The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the
Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity
�60
SL OV AK IA
and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the
end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the
Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the
President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would
be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime
Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the
President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He
says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He
knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them
aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they
would want to part as friends. The President answers, that
he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that
they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'!
that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his
own State, that he will not go against the Communists and
he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l
against the Soviet Union."
That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against
the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere
desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over
everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And
he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward
Benes got full pay "for life," too.
Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that
the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs,
who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be
on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors"
from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be
a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole
civilized Christian world.
�
32
SLOVAKIA
DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF
THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
Karol Sidor
Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series
o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling
what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies.
Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version
of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does
not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to
do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was
the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the
daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and
during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda
- and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing.
The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to
Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last
February's putsch"!
Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know
that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the
Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s
"Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They
all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes
sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR.
It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible
putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout
this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of
�SLOVAKIA
33
September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that
so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands
of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly
escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with
Comrade Gottwald.
Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that
Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky.
What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad
politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or
that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On
the contrary, Ripka wrote:
"Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing
that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only
in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and
Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the
events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of
national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949).
Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different
tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking
they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his
articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in
the name of Czecho-Slovakia.
R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt.
He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the
West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he
sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was
equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with
the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if
they would have been allowed to keep their ministries.
But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe
�34
SLOVAKIA
"Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight
against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful
mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against
Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was
undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either.
What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the
Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are
still patiently waiting for it to start!
It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the
right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to
carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify
them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and
their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks,
aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites,
Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists."
Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom,
the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no
right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined
to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.''
Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents
of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y
other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one
who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little
difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and
Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the
�SLOVAKIA
35
latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis.
Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs.
Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and
eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka,"
Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the
Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old
West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union."
Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really
got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were
given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful
they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed
to collaborate with the Communists!
In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into
Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central
Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm
a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r
government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in
Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the
Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many
votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they
were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate.
1
Such was the political line of Benes and his followers.
In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in
creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old
West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared
for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming
�SLOVAKIA
36
with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their
political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in
internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the
votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The
C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition
that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not
verify and approve, would be approved as members of the
Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing
and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of
par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and
later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the
presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for
everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the
budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all
other items of the State budget.
1
When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia
in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the
Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and
mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties
belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate
with the Communists for many years. That collaboration
did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with
us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can
even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us,
and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you."
"The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his
article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy
welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935."
In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There
are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t
to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions.
And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in
193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted
altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular
�SLOVAKIA
37
joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together
they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union.
Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of
the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization
on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long
as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old"
civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by
Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in
C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could
go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised
highly and recommended so zealously not only to the
Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well.
Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was
happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there
were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian
emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not
~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their
old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of
1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a
system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples
aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars,
but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time.
Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only
in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled
before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And
yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating
with the UISSR.
so
Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs
�38
::,LOVAKIA
made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion
aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always
emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus'
character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result
large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics
at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH
the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka
said was being born in the Soviet Union.
Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left
explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with
Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in
Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist
Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia.
But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge
economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian,
Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848:
"The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only
to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to
all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author
of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have
to create it."
Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk,
"Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307)
·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions
of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.''
This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg
a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in
Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna
and ac:corddng to her laws.
During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward
Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them
�SLOVAKIA
39
with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks
to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the
framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other
things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own
,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his
signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain
Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their
solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled
Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians
were guaranteed autonomy.
Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars,
SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by
the Prague parliament when that body did not have a
single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars
and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented
not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward
Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen
of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8.
It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of
the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will
of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves
knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and
political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them.
They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and
that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech
leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union
which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to
tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a
Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and
(
1
�40
SLOVAKIA
defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German
aggression was being born there.
This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet
Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast
expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally
and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs.
The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the
Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the
Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top
even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even
sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the
Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind.
Slovaik national development went along a completely
different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the
treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it
through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament.
The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on
its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It
was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and
the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political
or religious beliefs.
The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak
patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in
his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate
itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The
Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his
deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day:
''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and
the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim
through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every
fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the
most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend
in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples
share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys-
�SLOVAKIA
41
tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among
the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created
by the human mind."
The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870)
wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In
it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see
it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the
direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n
Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM
rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever
come under the rule of the Russians.
The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919),
a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War
in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw
Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele.
graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path
of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism
in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics."
On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand
against Communism. It was built on the foundations of
Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation
whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism.
The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and
that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does
not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing.
In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part
of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's
treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on
the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's
Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while
the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the
�42
SLOVAKIA
party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total
Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically
and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the
first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On
November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e
of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament.
In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes,
I said:
"Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward
Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations
and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies.
IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking
the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague
government already conoluded various rugreements with the
bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union.
"The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory
of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as
its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates
the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course
that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of
War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally
different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours
have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following
the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for
the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with
fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny
with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un.
der made by our present foreign policy.
"We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political
mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr.
Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the
Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the
�SLOVAKIA
43
State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built
on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with
the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force
us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present
leailersh'ip of our foreign policy."
Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that
the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he
said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned
with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The
Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed
by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted
against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso
attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very
different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent.
1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes
and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in
the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet
to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal
affairs."
"That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka
is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded
against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted
to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment
swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of
Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red
Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in
1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at
least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds,
and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in
�44
SLOVAKIA
the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the
internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false!
Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of
Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr.
HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr.
Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet
Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to
strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to
suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the
countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of
intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The
treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to
present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again
binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall
not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds
iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was
confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so
much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any
others to the Soviet framework."
Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and
Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c .
ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same
thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia?
But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which
Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only
did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As
a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach
other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction:
"Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a
clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re-
�SLOVAKIA
45
liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence
of every country, namely, the countries of Central and
Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with
which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it
certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and
independence."
Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943
about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that
trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility,
nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree!
The years have proved that the Slovaks were right
when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union
of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder
ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The
blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way.
On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose
presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the
hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister
voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and
Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were
ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell
Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the
·
Marshall Plan.
Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV··
ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech
delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist,
unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald,
just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to
Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at
this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr.
Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and
presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C.
Capitulation!
1
�4-6
SLOVAKIA
The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated
and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and
Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is
their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie
fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp
they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the
Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The
Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that
they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with
Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in
his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) ,
when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former
provisions of the Czech government in London."
To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees
and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed
before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills.
Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those
laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of
Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators.
All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater
Czech power, greater than it really was.
We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech
government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed
itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent
newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the
Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now
began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan.
Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that
same time.
Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947
went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which
lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia ,
�SLOVAKIA
47
Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to
spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same
Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947,
after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple
thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing
SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as
a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha.
The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia
there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home.
Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The
Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land,
in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless
mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year.
In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks
loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them
the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass
political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their
ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims.
But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break
her resistance.
1
Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to
frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue
to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced
to live together with the Czechs in a common state against
their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on
March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more
tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted
th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~
nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~
returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk
�48
SLOVAKIA
State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement
of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the
integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as
the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow,
Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was
not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin.
1
Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic
disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE
Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria
did go.
With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others
only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It
never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso,
but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along
with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per
cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known
that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their
loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the
Slovak nation.
This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political
consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean
and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs
were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia
not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for
Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady,
where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided,
voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their
wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers
wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their
lands.
In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism
was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo.
�SLOVAKIA
49
and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened
that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to
grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka
wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism,
were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak
Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the
Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia.
At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl,
the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together
at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak
Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the
anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative
to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The
Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with
words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in
Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man
without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his
o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them,
as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were
in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our-
cansky."
Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two
Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries
of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr.
Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the
"plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this
was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none.
But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia.
And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within
the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work.
�50
SLOVAKIA
They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest
anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in
the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the
Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N.
Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in
194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of
non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have
ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to
sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter
Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity.
Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on
sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting
in their ministerial chairs in Prague.
In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the
only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of
the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had
enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent
were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano
concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the
freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and
Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive
against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in
this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at
stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened.
But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the
Benes Czechs.
True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind
were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of
Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even
their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and
Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was
�SLOVAKIA
51
the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost
in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first
fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by
olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an.
Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and
according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National
Socialists.
We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and
vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from
1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the
State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain
his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident.
Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that
in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into
opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward
Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign
his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader.
Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist
ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the
crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's
assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert
them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that
he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that
he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the
Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction.
In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen
their positions, the key positions in the government which
Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these
positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald,
Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min-
�1i2
SLOVAKIA
ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance;
Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal,
Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of
Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what
was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did
loyally and thoroughly.
The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of
all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places
with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned
it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole
Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the
people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of
the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But
this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers.
Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives
of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka,
Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the
masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting
them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse
the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were
fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty
journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But
Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the
peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms,
wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a
"graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated.
On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist
ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry
of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The
�SLOVAKIA
53
government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but
in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald
agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether
they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they
would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the
National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to
Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign
and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he
asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what
happens!''
Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the
Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party,
and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from
the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the
National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone :
"Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!"
Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers
that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and
so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who
did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,.
nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists,
Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the
!Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29):
"Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as
well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted
himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his
irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he
expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it
was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man.
In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave
fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and
�54
SLOVAKIA
whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well
considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he
dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially."
In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand
the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was
known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great
reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then,
did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when
Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their
resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic
before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness
was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them
concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed
in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague
that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?!
The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of
workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe.
They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had
the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo
vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald
should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew
Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of
Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce
and, then, in Prrugue.
Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that
filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were
the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers
who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as
.rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a
puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to
Ado1ph Hitler.
And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~
�SLOVAKIA
55
teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in
which Benes conferred with the Communists. President
Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police
without Benes's knoiwledige."
Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in
being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead
of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was
vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran.
sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two
ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that
conversation:
Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic
cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to
Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate,
for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized
: by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his
Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without
mincing words: "That which you are preparing is
another Munkh."
The President's face grew serious. He said to us:
"You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they
do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns.
We must be ·prepared for anything."
There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told
the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied
to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that
' might result - Russia would not decide on a single
military intemrention.
The president listened with great attention. Then
· he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think
that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean
· military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude
the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our
· ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?"
1
�56
SLOVAKIA
"What would we do?" - repeated the president,
looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would
you do?"
I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world
would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be
known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us,
that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack,
agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory.
A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is
not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t."
Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes
said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I
had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you
have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and
their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke.
They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They
thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as
it did wlith Hitler."
Stransky who never heard the president speak so,
cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done
more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?"
,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I
have already told you: I shall not yield! You may
rest assured on that!"
With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could
know that we shall never again see him.
So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes.
The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet
factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet,
he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt
and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that
the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet
�SLOVAKIA
57
propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to
the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against
the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He
had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger
knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that."
Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit,
that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did
give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist
minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated!
And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers
who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr.
:&!ward Benes?
On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina,
Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it
says literally:
"On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National
Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political
adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the
President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not
receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka
asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers
who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr.
Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so
closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience
to e:,cplain his stand."
Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign,
then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and,
in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to
tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes
no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its
�58
S LOVAKIA
four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power.
On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald
gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By
doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the
Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. ·
..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan."
That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia.
After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into
tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek :
"Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and
that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged."
But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp•
prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed
to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have
an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an
automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~
thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to
do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~
mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists!
At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle
of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They
could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons,
he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in
and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities.
"After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet
a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what
the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May
15, 1949) . .
Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army;
�SLOVAKIA
59
The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically.
While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation"
from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed
that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946
committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed
Slovak men and women.
1
Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who
played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain
- with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save
not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified
.
SloviaJkia.
We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the
ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and
Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The
Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the
pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue
with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency.
Let us quote at least a few sentences from it:
"The president does not want to tell the Communists
to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder
them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It
is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president
again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs.
The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the
Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity
�60
SL OV AK IA
and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the
end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the
Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the
President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would
be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime
Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the
President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He
says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He
knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them
aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they
would want to part as friends. The President answers, that
he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that
they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'!
that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his
own State, that he will not go against the Communists and
he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l
against the Soviet Union."
That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against
the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere
desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over
everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And
he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward
Benes got full pay "for life," too.
Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that
the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs,
who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be
on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors"
from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be
a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole
civilized Christian world.
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1953
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32
SLOVAKIA
DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF
THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
Karol Sidor
Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series
o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling
what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies.
Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version
of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does
not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to
do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was
the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the
daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and
during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda
- and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing.
The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to
Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last
February's putsch"!
Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know
that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the
Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s
"Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They
all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes
sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR.
It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible
putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout
this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of
SLOVAKIA
33
September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that
so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands
of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly
escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with
Comrade Gottwald.
Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that
Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky.
What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad
politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or
that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On
the contrary, Ripka wrote:
"Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing
that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only
in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and
Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the
events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of
national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949).
Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different
tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking
they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his
articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in
the name of Czecho-Slovakia.
R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt.
He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the
West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he
sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was
equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with
the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if
they would have been allowed to keep their ministries.
But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe
34
SLOVAKIA
"Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight
against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful
mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against
Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was
undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either.
What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the
Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are
still patiently waiting for it to start!
It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the
right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to
carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify
them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and
their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks,
aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites,
Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists."
Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom,
the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no
right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined
to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.''
Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents
of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y
other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one
who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little
difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and
Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the
SLOVAKIA
35
latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis.
Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs.
Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and
eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka,"
Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the
Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old
West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union."
Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really
got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were
given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful
they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed
to collaborate with the Communists!
In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into
Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central
Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm
a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r
government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in
Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the
Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many
votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they
were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate.
1
Such was the political line of Benes and his followers.
In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in
creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old
West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared
for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming
SLOVAKIA
36
with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their
political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in
internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the
votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The
C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition
that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not
verify and approve, would be approved as members of the
Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing
and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of
par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and
later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the
presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for
everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the
budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all
other items of the State budget.
1
When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia
in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the
Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and
mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties
belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate
with the Communists for many years. That collaboration
did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with
us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can
even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us,
and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you."
"The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his
article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy
welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935."
In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There
are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t
to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions.
And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in
193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted
altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular
SLOVAKIA
37
joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together
they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union.
Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of
the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization
on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long
as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old"
civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by
Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in
C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could
go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised
highly and recommended so zealously not only to the
Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well.
Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was
happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there
were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian
emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not
~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their
old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of
1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a
system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples
aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars,
but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time.
Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only
in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled
before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And
yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating
with the UISSR.
so
Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs
38
::,LOVAKIA
made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion
aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always
emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus'
character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result
large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics
at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH
the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka
said was being born in the Soviet Union.
Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left
explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with
Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in
Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist
Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia.
But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge
economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian,
Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848:
"The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only
to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to
all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author
of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have
to create it."
Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk,
"Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307)
·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions
of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.''
This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg
a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in
Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna
and ac:corddng to her laws.
During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward
Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them
SLOVAKIA
39
with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks
to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the
framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other
things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own
,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his
signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain
Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their
solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled
Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians
were guaranteed autonomy.
Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars,
SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by
the Prague parliament when that body did not have a
single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars
and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented
not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward
Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen
of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8.
It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of
the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will
of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves
knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and
political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them.
They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and
that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech
leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union
which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to
tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a
Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and
(
1
40
SLOVAKIA
defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German
aggression was being born there.
This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet
Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast
expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally
and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs.
The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the
Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the
Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top
even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even
sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the
Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind.
Slovaik national development went along a completely
different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the
treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it
through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament.
The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on
its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It
was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and
the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political
or religious beliefs.
The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak
patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in
his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate
itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The
Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his
deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day:
''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and
the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim
through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every
fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the
most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend
in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples
share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys-
SLOVAKIA
41
tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among
the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created
by the human mind."
The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870)
wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In
it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see
it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the
direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n
Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM
rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever
come under the rule of the Russians.
The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919),
a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War
in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw
Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele.
graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path
of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism
in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics."
On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand
against Communism. It was built on the foundations of
Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation
whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism.
The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and
that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does
not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing.
In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part
of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's
treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on
the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's
Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while
the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the
42
SLOVAKIA
party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total
Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically
and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the
first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On
November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e
of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament.
In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes,
I said:
"Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward
Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations
and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies.
IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking
the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague
government already conoluded various rugreements with the
bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union.
"The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory
of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as
its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates
the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course
that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of
War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally
different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours
have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following
the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for
the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with
fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny
with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un.
der made by our present foreign policy.
"We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political
mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr.
Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the
Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the
SLOVAKIA
43
State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built
on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with
the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force
us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present
leailersh'ip of our foreign policy."
Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that
the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he
said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned
with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The
Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed
by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted
against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso
attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very
different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent.
1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes
and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in
the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet
to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal
affairs."
"That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka
is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded
against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted
to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment
swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of
Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red
Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in
1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at
least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds,
and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in
44
SLOVAKIA
the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the
internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false!
Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of
Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr.
HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr.
Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet
Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to
strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to
suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the
countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of
intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The
treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to
present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again
binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall
not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds
iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was
confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so
much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any
others to the Soviet framework."
Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and
Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c .
ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same
thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia?
But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which
Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only
did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As
a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach
other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction:
"Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a
clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re-
SLOVAKIA
45
liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence
of every country, namely, the countries of Central and
Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with
which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it
certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and
independence."
Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943
about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that
trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility,
nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree!
The years have proved that the Slovaks were right
when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union
of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder
ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The
blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way.
On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose
presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the
hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister
voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and
Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were
ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell
Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the
·
Marshall Plan.
Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV··
ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech
delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist,
unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald,
just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to
Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at
this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr.
Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and
presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C.
Capitulation!
1
4-6
SLOVAKIA
The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated
and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and
Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is
their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie
fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp
they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the
Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The
Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that
they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with
Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in
his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) ,
when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former
provisions of the Czech government in London."
To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees
and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed
before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills.
Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those
laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of
Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators.
All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater
Czech power, greater than it really was.
We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech
government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed
itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent
newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the
Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now
began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan.
Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that
same time.
Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947
went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which
lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia ,
SLOVAKIA
47
Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to
spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same
Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947,
after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple
thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing
SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as
a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha.
The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia
there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home.
Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The
Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land,
in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless
mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year.
In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks
loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them
the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass
political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their
ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims.
But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break
her resistance.
1
Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to
frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue
to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced
to live together with the Czechs in a common state against
their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on
March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more
tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted
th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~
nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~
returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk
48
SLOVAKIA
State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement
of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the
integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as
the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow,
Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was
not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin.
1
Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic
disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE
Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria
did go.
With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others
only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It
never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso,
but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along
with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per
cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known
that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their
loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the
Slovak nation.
This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political
consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean
and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs
were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia
not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for
Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady,
where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided,
voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their
wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers
wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their
lands.
In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism
was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo.
SLOVAKIA
49
and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened
that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to
grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka
wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism,
were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak
Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the
Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia.
At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl,
the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together
at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak
Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the
anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative
to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The
Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with
words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in
Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man
without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his
o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them,
as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were
in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our-
cansky."
Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two
Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries
of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr.
Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the
"plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this
was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none.
But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia.
And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within
the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work.
50
SLOVAKIA
They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest
anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in
the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the
Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N.
Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in
194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of
non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have
ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to
sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter
Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity.
Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on
sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting
in their ministerial chairs in Prague.
In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the
only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of
the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had
enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent
were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano
concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the
freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and
Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive
against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in
this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at
stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened.
But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the
Benes Czechs.
True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind
were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of
Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even
their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and
Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was
SLOVAKIA
51
the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost
in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first
fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by
olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an.
Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and
according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National
Socialists.
We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and
vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from
1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the
State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain
his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident.
Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that
in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into
opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward
Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign
his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader.
Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist
ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the
crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's
assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert
them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that
he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that
he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the
Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction.
In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen
their positions, the key positions in the government which
Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these
positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald,
Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min-
1i2
SLOVAKIA
ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance;
Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal,
Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of
Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what
was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did
loyally and thoroughly.
The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of
all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places
with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned
it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole
Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the
people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of
the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But
this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers.
Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives
of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka,
Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the
masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting
them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse
the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were
fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty
journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But
Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the
peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms,
wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a
"graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated.
On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist
ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry
of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The
SLOVAKIA
53
government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but
in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald
agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether
they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they
would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the
National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to
Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign
and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he
asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what
happens!''
Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the
Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party,
and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from
the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the
National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone :
"Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!"
Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers
that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and
so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who
did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,.
nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists,
Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the
!Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29):
"Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as
well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted
himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his
irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he
expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it
was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man.
In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave
fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and
54
SLOVAKIA
whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well
considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he
dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially."
In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand
the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was
known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great
reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then,
did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when
Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their
resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic
before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness
was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them
concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed
in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague
that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?!
The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of
workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe.
They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had
the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo
vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald
should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew
Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of
Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce
and, then, in Prrugue.
Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that
filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were
the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers
who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as
.rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a
puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to
Ado1ph Hitler.
And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~
SLOVAKIA
55
teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in
which Benes conferred with the Communists. President
Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police
without Benes's knoiwledige."
Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in
being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead
of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was
vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran.
sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two
ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that
conversation:
Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic
cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to
Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate,
for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized
: by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his
Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without
mincing words: "That which you are preparing is
another Munkh."
The President's face grew serious. He said to us:
"You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they
do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns.
We must be ·prepared for anything."
There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told
the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied
to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that
' might result - Russia would not decide on a single
military intemrention.
The president listened with great attention. Then
· he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think
that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean
· military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude
the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our
· ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?"
1
56
SLOVAKIA
"What would we do?" - repeated the president,
looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would
you do?"
I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world
would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be
known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us,
that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack,
agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory.
A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is
not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t."
Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes
said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I
had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you
have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and
their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke.
They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They
thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as
it did wlith Hitler."
Stransky who never heard the president speak so,
cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done
more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?"
,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I
have already told you: I shall not yield! You may
rest assured on that!"
With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could
know that we shall never again see him.
So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes.
The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet
factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet,
he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt
and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that
the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet
SLOVAKIA
57
propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to
the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against
the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He
had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger
knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that."
Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit,
that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did
give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist
minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated!
And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers
who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr.
:&!ward Benes?
On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina,
Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it
says literally:
"On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National
Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political
adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the
President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not
receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka
asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers
who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr.
Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so
closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience
to e:,cplain his stand."
Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign,
then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and,
in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to
tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes
no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its
58
S LOVAKIA
four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power.
On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald
gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By
doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the
Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. ·
..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan."
That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia.
After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into
tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek :
"Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and
that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged."
But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp•
prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed
to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have
an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an
automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~
thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to
do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~
mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists!
At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle
of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They
could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons,
he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in
and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities.
"After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet
a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what
the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May
15, 1949) . .
Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army;
SLOVAKIA
59
The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically.
While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation"
from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed
that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946
committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed
Slovak men and women.
1
Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who
played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain
- with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save
not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified
.
SloviaJkia.
We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the
ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and
Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The
Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the
pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue
with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency.
Let us quote at least a few sentences from it:
"The president does not want to tell the Communists
to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder
them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It
is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president
again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs.
The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the
Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity
60
SL OV AK IA
and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the
end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the
Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the
President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would
be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime
Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the
President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He
says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He
knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them
aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they
would want to part as friends. The President answers, that
he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that
they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'!
that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his
own State, that he will not go against the Communists and
he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l
against the Soviet Union."
That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against
the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere
desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over
everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And
he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward
Benes got full pay "for life," too.
Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that
the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs,
who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be
on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors"
from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be
a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole
civilized Christian world.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dr. Hubert Ripka's Version of the Communist "Putsch" in Czecho-Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Karol Sidor
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
pp. 32-60
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fffb2baa8fcbabe8af38a838ff5d3dfb.pdf
9ddca8ebd9a2c57f524a16334c4c7b13
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
61
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BECKOV
Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the
Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the
left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old
military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main
Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv
Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora.
vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis.
Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop
of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the
wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity
of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v
"Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called
it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal
military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded
by fortifications.
Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the
Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the
rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the
hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought
men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received
extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the
Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was
�62
SLOVAKIA
the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later,
the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his
wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396.
OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use
and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from
Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad
Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many
other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His
oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor
III inherited his father's properties and led his people in
the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's
v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the
r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy
family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this
clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While
the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~
missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons,
known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus
prepared the way for the Retformatioo.
When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took
with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country
and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought
refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the
TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle.
Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives
aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod).
Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the
castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others
say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that
the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of
Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle.
The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the
Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the
c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the
legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after
�S LOVAKIA
63
a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made
cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins
of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After
eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs
of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a
joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor
and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted
his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him:
"Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you
will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall
grant it."
Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had
ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above
and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me,
if you please, a castle upon that rook!"
The crowd roared with laughter, because every one
thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock,
rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall
have it!"
The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the
new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p
all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle
and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle
was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison.
Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But
Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend,
Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles.
The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph
MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March
19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion
against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere.
1
�
SLOVAKIA
61
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BECKOV
Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the
Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the
left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old
military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main
Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv
Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora.
vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis.
Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop
of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the
wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity
of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v
"Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called
it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal
military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded
by fortifications.
Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the
Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the
rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the
hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought
men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received
extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the
Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was
�62
SLOVAKIA
the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later,
the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his
wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396.
OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use
and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from
Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad
Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many
other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His
oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor
III inherited his father's properties and led his people in
the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's
v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the
r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy
family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this
clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While
the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~
missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons,
known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus
prepared the way for the Retformatioo.
When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took
with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country
and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought
refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the
TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle.
Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives
aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod).
Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the
castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others
say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that
the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of
Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle.
The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the
Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the
c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the
legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after
�S LOVAKIA
63
a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made
cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins
of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After
eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs
of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a
joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor
and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted
his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him:
"Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you
will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall
grant it."
Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had
ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above
and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me,
if you please, a castle upon that rook!"
The crowd roared with laughter, because every one
thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock,
rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall
have it!"
The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the
new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p
all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle
and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle
was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison.
Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But
Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend,
Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles.
The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph
MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March
19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion
against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere.
1
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
61
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BECKOV
Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the
Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the
left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old
military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main
Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv
Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora.
vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis.
Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop
of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the
wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity
of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v
"Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called
it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal
military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded
by fortifications.
Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the
Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the
rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the
hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought
men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received
extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the
Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was
62
SLOVAKIA
the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later,
the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his
wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396.
OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use
and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from
Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad
Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many
other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His
oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor
III inherited his father's properties and led his people in
the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's
v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the
r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy
family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this
clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While
the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~
missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons,
known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus
prepared the way for the Retformatioo.
When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took
with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country
and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought
refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the
TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle.
Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives
aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod).
Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the
castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others
say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that
the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of
Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle.
The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the
Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the
c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the
legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after
S LOVAKIA
63
a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made
cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins
of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After
eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs
of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a
joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor
and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted
his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him:
"Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you
will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall
grant it."
Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had
ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above
and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me,
if you please, a castle upon that rook!"
The crowd roared with laughter, because every one
thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock,
rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall
have it!"
The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the
new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p
all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle
and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle
was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison.
Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But
Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend,
Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles.
The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph
MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March
19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion
against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere.
1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Beckov
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
pp. 61-63
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cd17d0344bde42a0a0e78c075006252.pdf
1bc6bb2984939dcd15a5a6d7a8eae570
PDF Text
Text
64
SLOVAKIA
DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH
was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National
Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated
"National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today
ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former
Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in
the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of
February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own
country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a
"democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did
many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.''
What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually
was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and
speeches:
"We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t
the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to
meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and
efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political
freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif
our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g
ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 .
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which
are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived
in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic
Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia,
have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento
unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by
common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon
enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew
in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm
convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party
that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly,
ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) .
"Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny
fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom
f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) .
�
64
SLOVAKIA
DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH
was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National
Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated
"National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today
ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former
Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in
the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of
February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own
country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a
"democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did
many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.''
What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually
was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and
speeches:
"We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t
the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to
meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and
efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political
freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif
our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g
ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 .
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which
are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived
in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic
Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia,
have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento
unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by
common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon
enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew
in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm
convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party
that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly,
ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) .
"Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny
fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom
f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) .
�
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
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Text
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64
SLOVAKIA
DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH
was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National
Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated
"National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today
ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former
Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in
the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of
February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own
country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a
"democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did
many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.''
What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually
was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and
speeches:
"We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t
the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to
meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and
efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political
freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif
our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g
ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 .
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which
are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived
in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic
Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia,
have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento
unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by
common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon
enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew
in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm
convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party
that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly,
ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) .
"Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny
fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom
f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) .
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Title
A name given to the resource
Dr. Joseph Lettrich in Retrospect
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953
p. 64
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cb18e5e0a77ab067de6c9a0fae8cb11.pdf
1e20dc5f9190e730a960390f4bf3731d
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Text
YOU CAN LEARN SLOV Al(
as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOVAK LESSONS
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 9'.2
lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English ;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of it s kind; 702 pages with a
brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY
by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff;
a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from :
P.A.HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov
castle, the story of which is told in this issue
�
YOU CAN LEARN SLOV Al(
as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOVAK LESSONS
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 9'.2
lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English ;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of it s kind; 702 pages with a
brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY
by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff;
a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from :
P.A.HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov
castle, the story of which is told in this issue
�
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
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Text
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SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov
castle, the story of which is told in this issue
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Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8)
Description
An account of the resource
includes photo of Beckov Castle
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September 1953
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb03e26aa3acb215579376ed63028435.pdf
f040d644392e73fd9863035830cbd646
PDF Text
Text
DECEMBER 1953
VQL. Ill
NO. 4
IN THIS ISSUE:
INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY ON
SLOVAK LIF E
CHRISTMAS IN THE LOW TATRA REGION .
SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST
THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION ?
SLOVAKIA' S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
s
SLOVAKIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
SLOVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA:
BUDATIN
LETTRICH ' S REGIME IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH
WHO SAID IT ? -
PP. 15, 21 , 26, 54, 61
• • •
Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Pub I ished by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�SLOV A.KIA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of S.LOV AK.IA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
DECEMBER 1953
VQL. Ill
NO. 4
IN THIS ISSUE:
INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY ON
SLOVAK LIF E
CHRISTMAS IN THE LOW TATRA REGION .
SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST
THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION ?
SLOVAKIA' S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
s
SLOVAKIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
SLOVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA:
BUDATIN
LETTRICH ' S REGIME IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH
WHO SAID IT ? -
PP. 15, 21 , 26, 54, 61
• • •
Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Pub I ished by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�SLOV A.KIA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of S.LOV AK.IA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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Title
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Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6394be7187e3ab8f7c136ae6bea94f28.pdf
9ba5b71db2ea2fc1783abb5eab2fc013
PDF Text
Text
DECEMBER, 1953
SLOVAKIA
1
INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON
SWVAK LIFE
Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in
the new warild, especially in the United States oif America,
were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which
was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the
first world war. The natural temperament of the average
Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign
nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia
found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical
meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered
from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty.
The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi.
cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding
that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural
lot on earth.
Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely
difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national
patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak
society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism,
because the average Slovak was hampered at every step
by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept
of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to
the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he
was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of
nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism
and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had
to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen
and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of
the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he
�2
SLOVA-IHA
failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own
government in power and one's own native language as the
official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age
Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate
freedom and democra;cy.
Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed
human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were
truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of
political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to
his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom,
for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a
higher power.
This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who
came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement
upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the
New World were so diametrically different from his life
in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras.
He was amazed by the vast difference between life at
home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited
opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond
nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home
to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been
limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man
of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail
to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could
only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance
for improvement; here in America he could look forward
to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in
the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams.
No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration
was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak
went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which
were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would
rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter
�SLOVAKIA
3
how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft
promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that
tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he
had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well
worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$
in the old country and improved his own condition.
America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills
and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated,
though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers
of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate
new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good
moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field
for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from
it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will
in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:.
niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an
unending stream of goods for human consumption and
welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political
bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for
his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated
to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant
inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a
never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~
mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an
elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable
giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty.
Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative
success in America.
The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was
confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~
toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity
of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted ·
himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~
riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too,
�4
SLOVAKIA
·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and
ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for
their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself
as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but
with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized
citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware
of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him
and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his
fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious
inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to
his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great
majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of
a democratic way of life in the United States.
Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant
struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to
the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps
of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed
to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born.
If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong
struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for
him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by
ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his
patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his
ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native
ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to
succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The
a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and
social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and
Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something
worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance
further on the road to Americanization, a process that
�SLOVAKIA
5
brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing
his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry.
The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various
races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and
he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him
in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks
who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it
was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own
kind for companionship and understanding.
All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they
went, being drawn to each other by their common longing
for the homes they had but recently left behind across the
sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became
the centers of their activities. This association kept them
closely united and helped them to protect and enhance
their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national
consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought
refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories
and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of
every nation on earth.
Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express
their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in
America they were free to profess their patriotism and
write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of
Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage
publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious
of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his
fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and
politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins.
A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did ·
not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while
pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source
�SLOVAKIA
of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths
their own for many centuries. They cherished the national
traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them
in this new land of freedom.
In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America
· teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he
could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak
organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the
keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could
·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable
school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became
well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted
-country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the
·land of their forefathers.
The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget
the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms
childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he
hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to
be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe.
He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to
the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the
deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once
of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope.
The church, located in the center of Slovak village life,
with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in
whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in
his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence.
The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace
in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his
qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would,
indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able
to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di-
�SLOVAKIA
7
vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer
at all times.
Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak
prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak
immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a
compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church,
then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation,
the Slovak in America maintained his national character and
expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It
was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions,
preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak
prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her
single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured
memories of Slovakia.
Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school
buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are.
concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd·
cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are
monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored
institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his
forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial.
At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and
organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned
were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests
that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in
some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in
America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the
.spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home,
burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The
Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy
whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily
life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He
was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t
he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home·
enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life.
�8
SLOVAKIA
Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling
atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring,
made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native
land, where the people were submissive and demoralized,
nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their
nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an
active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but
failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various
occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to
work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion.
Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was
caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social
intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks
were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented
them from developing their native culture and realizing
their right to self-government and independence. Internally,
the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped
natural resources, but needed an external force to set it
free. And this dynamic force came from America.
Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what
extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled
in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to
what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country.
Even without this material, however, w~ are able to
mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned
home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter
of fact, remained in America and made their permanent
home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome
the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land
�SLOVAKIA
9
and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their
relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke
their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch
w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some
contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances
of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and
lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so
rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive
at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks
on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh.
The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic
texture and blend, effected several significant changes on
home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of
~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no
doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their
labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of
a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount
of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak
emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall
which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life.
Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new
capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak
to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and
to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to
live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer
subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have
.his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of
a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order,
Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national
life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though
�10
SLOVAKIA
lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect
their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily
~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it
freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal
system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's
;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its
,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i
aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing
more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of
their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household.
Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by
birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale
pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of
Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were
Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies
were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in
modern times, many large estates came into the hands of
fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests
and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the
Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country.
There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the
majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of
the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most
precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up
their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population,
:I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to
make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all
land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least
mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop
fai-lure.
Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were
out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which
the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy
estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were
�SLOVAKIA
11
1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished
greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land
and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their
country forever.
The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp
decline.
Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk
nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and
stability, was its independent gentry which had been close
.to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group
be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia
was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul
domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution
would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded
one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware.
1
America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The
many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world
offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~
tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and
almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with
high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years,
many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared,
old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were
purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national
economy was once more in the hands of iits own native
population.
ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale
from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre-
�12
SLOVAKIA
:voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful
ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants
manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels
pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership.
Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour
mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-,
nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises.
These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien
interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields,
but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of
rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match
for them.
Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity
to acquire a high school and college training. The need was
both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in
public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed,
to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien
camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their
training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades.
Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools
turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the
Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty
in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them.
Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for
the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes
that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy
and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This
is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to
a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself
from foreign domination.
An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines
�SLOVAKIA
13
and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of
a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were
published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The
masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were
impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long
time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to
their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society).
The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics,
for he had become accustomed to the view that this was
a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The
Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view,
and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside
the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to
them from across the sea. From their pages they learned
for the first time how grave the situation was in reality
in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they
were informed of things that happened right at home by
receiving newspapers, published in their own language and
spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned
to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which
was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of
publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants
strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close
touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their
membership in American Slovak societies for several years
after coming back to Slovakia.
Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented
to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive
country, not only because they brought their savings, but
also because these men had learned much by their new
experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and
which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning
her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy.
�14
SLOVAKIA
In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual,
for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri
of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of
others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover,
as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to
work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In
fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his
own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true
democracy.
Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget
his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers
in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched
from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden
bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of
these rights to his people back home inspired him to work
for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the
fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness
and freedom.
Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain
aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the
thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the
common man, for, after learning the democratic technique
of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage
and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man.
While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there
was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles
in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried
to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in
order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications
�SLOVAKIA
15
betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America
were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in
the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in
which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch
with their brothers across the sea.
Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from
Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well
in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins
its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce,
the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~
rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and
hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has
happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the
priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and
independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true
democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an
countries of the world.
The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had
their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at
home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The
Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the
scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic
way of life - Communism .
1
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the
idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk
people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks.
Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy
the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation)
can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0.
Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London).
�
DECEMBER, 1953
SLOVAKIA
1
INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON
SWVAK LIFE
Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in
the new warild, especially in the United States oif America,
were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which
was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the
first world war. The natural temperament of the average
Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign
nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia
found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical
meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered
from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty.
The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi.
cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding
that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural
lot on earth.
Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely
difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national
patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak
society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism,
because the average Slovak was hampered at every step
by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept
of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to
the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he
was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of
nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism
and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had
to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen
and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of
the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he
�2
SLOVA-IHA
failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own
government in power and one's own native language as the
official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age
Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate
freedom and democra;cy.
Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed
human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were
truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of
political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to
his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom,
for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a
higher power.
This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who
came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement
upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the
New World were so diametrically different from his life
in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras.
He was amazed by the vast difference between life at
home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited
opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond
nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home
to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been
limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man
of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail
to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could
only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance
for improvement; here in America he could look forward
to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in
the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams.
No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration
was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak
went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which
were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would
rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter
�SLOVAKIA
3
how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft
promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that
tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he
had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well
worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$
in the old country and improved his own condition.
America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills
and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated,
though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers
of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate
new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good
moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field
for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from
it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will
in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:.
niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an
unending stream of goods for human consumption and
welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political
bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for
his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated
to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant
inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a
never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~
mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an
elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable
giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty.
Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative
success in America.
The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was
confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~
toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity
of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted ·
himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~
riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too,
�4
SLOVAKIA
·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and
ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for
their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself
as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but
with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized
citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware
of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him
and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his
fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious
inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to
his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great
majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of
a democratic way of life in the United States.
Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant
struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to
the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps
of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed
to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born.
If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong
struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for
him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by
ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his
patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his
ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native
ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to
succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The
a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and
social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and
Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something
worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance
further on the road to Americanization, a process that
�SLOVAKIA
5
brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing
his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry.
The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various
races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and
he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him
in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks
who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it
was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own
kind for companionship and understanding.
All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they
went, being drawn to each other by their common longing
for the homes they had but recently left behind across the
sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became
the centers of their activities. This association kept them
closely united and helped them to protect and enhance
their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national
consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought
refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories
and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of
every nation on earth.
Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express
their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in
America they were free to profess their patriotism and
write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of
Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage
publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious
of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his
fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and
politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins.
A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did ·
not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while
pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source
�SLOVAKIA
of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths
their own for many centuries. They cherished the national
traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them
in this new land of freedom.
In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America
· teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he
could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak
organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the
keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could
·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable
school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became
well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted
-country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the
·land of their forefathers.
The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget
the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms
childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he
hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to
be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe.
He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to
the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the
deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once
of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope.
The church, located in the center of Slovak village life,
with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in
whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in
his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence.
The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace
in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his
qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would,
indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able
to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di-
�SLOVAKIA
7
vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer
at all times.
Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak
prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak
immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a
compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church,
then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation,
the Slovak in America maintained his national character and
expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It
was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions,
preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak
prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her
single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured
memories of Slovakia.
Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school
buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are.
concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd·
cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are
monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored
institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his
forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial.
At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and
organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned
were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests
that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in
some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in
America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the
.spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home,
burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The
Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy
whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily
life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He
was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t
he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home·
enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life.
�8
SLOVAKIA
Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling
atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring,
made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native
land, where the people were submissive and demoralized,
nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their
nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an
active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but
failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various
occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to
work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion.
Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was
caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social
intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks
were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented
them from developing their native culture and realizing
their right to self-government and independence. Internally,
the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped
natural resources, but needed an external force to set it
free. And this dynamic force came from America.
Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what
extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled
in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to
what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country.
Even without this material, however, w~ are able to
mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned
home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter
of fact, remained in America and made their permanent
home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome
the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land
�SLOVAKIA
9
and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their
relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke
their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch
w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some
contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances
of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and
lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so
rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive
at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks
on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh.
The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic
texture and blend, effected several significant changes on
home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of
~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no
doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their
labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of
a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount
of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak
emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall
which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life.
Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new
capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak
to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and
to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to
live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer
subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have
.his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of
a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order,
Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national
life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though
�10
SLOVAKIA
lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect
their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily
~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it
freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal
system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's
;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its
,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i
aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing
more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of
their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household.
Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by
birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale
pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of
Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were
Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies
were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in
modern times, many large estates came into the hands of
fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests
and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the
Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country.
There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the
majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of
the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most
precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up
their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population,
:I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to
make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all
land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least
mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop
fai-lure.
Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were
out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which
the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy
estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were
�SLOVAKIA
11
1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished
greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land
and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their
country forever.
The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp
decline.
Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk
nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and
stability, was its independent gentry which had been close
.to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group
be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia
was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul
domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution
would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded
one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware.
1
America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The
many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world
offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~
tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and
almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with
high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years,
many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared,
old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were
purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national
economy was once more in the hands of iits own native
population.
ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale
from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre-
�12
SLOVAKIA
:voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful
ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants
manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels
pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership.
Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour
mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-,
nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises.
These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien
interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields,
but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of
rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match
for them.
Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity
to acquire a high school and college training. The need was
both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in
public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed,
to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien
camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their
training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades.
Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools
turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the
Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty
in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them.
Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for
the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes
that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy
and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This
is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to
a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself
from foreign domination.
An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines
�SLOVAKIA
13
and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of
a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were
published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The
masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were
impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long
time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to
their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society).
The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics,
for he had become accustomed to the view that this was
a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The
Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view,
and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside
the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to
them from across the sea. From their pages they learned
for the first time how grave the situation was in reality
in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they
were informed of things that happened right at home by
receiving newspapers, published in their own language and
spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned
to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which
was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of
publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants
strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close
touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their
membership in American Slovak societies for several years
after coming back to Slovakia.
Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented
to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive
country, not only because they brought their savings, but
also because these men had learned much by their new
experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and
which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning
her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy.
�14
SLOVAKIA
In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual,
for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri
of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of
others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover,
as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to
work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In
fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his
own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true
democracy.
Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget
his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers
in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched
from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden
bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of
these rights to his people back home inspired him to work
for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the
fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness
and freedom.
Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain
aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the
thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the
common man, for, after learning the democratic technique
of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage
and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man.
While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there
was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles
in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried
to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in
order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications
�SLOVAKIA
15
betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America
were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in
the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in
which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch
with their brothers across the sea.
Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from
Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well
in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins
its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce,
the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~
rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and
hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has
happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the
priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and
independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true
democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an
countries of the world.
The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had
their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at
home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The
Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the
scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic
way of life - Communism .
1
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the
idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk
people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks.
Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy
the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation)
can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0.
Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London).
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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DECEMBER, 1953
SLOVAKIA
1
INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON
SWVAK LIFE
Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in
the new warild, especially in the United States oif America,
were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which
was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the
first world war. The natural temperament of the average
Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign
nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia
found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical
meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered
from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty.
The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi.
cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding
that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural
lot on earth.
Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely
difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national
patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak
society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism,
because the average Slovak was hampered at every step
by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept
of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to
the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he
was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of
nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism
and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had
to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen
and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of
the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he
2
SLOVA-IHA
failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own
government in power and one's own native language as the
official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age
Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate
freedom and democra;cy.
Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed
human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were
truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of
political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to
his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom,
for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a
higher power.
This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who
came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement
upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the
New World were so diametrically different from his life
in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras.
He was amazed by the vast difference between life at
home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited
opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond
nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home
to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been
limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man
of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail
to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could
only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance
for improvement; here in America he could look forward
to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in
the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams.
No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration
was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak
went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which
were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would
rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter
SLOVAKIA
3
how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft
promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that
tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he
had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well
worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$
in the old country and improved his own condition.
America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills
and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated,
though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers
of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate
new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good
moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field
for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from
it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will
in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:.
niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an
unending stream of goods for human consumption and
welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political
bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for
his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated
to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant
inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a
never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~
mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an
elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable
giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty.
Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative
success in America.
The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was
confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~
toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity
of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted ·
himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~
riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too,
4
SLOVAKIA
·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and
ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for
their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself
as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but
with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized
citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware
of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him
and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his
fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious
inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to
his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great
majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of
a democratic way of life in the United States.
Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant
struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to
the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps
of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed
to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born.
If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong
struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for
him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by
ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his
patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his
ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native
ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to
succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The
a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and
social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and
Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something
worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance
further on the road to Americanization, a process that
SLOVAKIA
5
brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing
his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry.
The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various
races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and
he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him
in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks
who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it
was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own
kind for companionship and understanding.
All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they
went, being drawn to each other by their common longing
for the homes they had but recently left behind across the
sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became
the centers of their activities. This association kept them
closely united and helped them to protect and enhance
their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national
consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought
refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories
and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of
every nation on earth.
Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express
their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in
America they were free to profess their patriotism and
write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of
Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage
publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious
of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his
fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and
politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins.
A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did ·
not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while
pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source
SLOVAKIA
of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths
their own for many centuries. They cherished the national
traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them
in this new land of freedom.
In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America
· teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he
could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak
organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the
keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could
·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable
school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became
well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted
-country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the
·land of their forefathers.
The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget
the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms
childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he
hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to
be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe.
He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to
the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the
deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once
of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope.
The church, located in the center of Slovak village life,
with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in
whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in
his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence.
The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace
in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his
qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would,
indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able
to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di-
SLOVAKIA
7
vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer
at all times.
Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak
prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak
immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a
compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church,
then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation,
the Slovak in America maintained his national character and
expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It
was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions,
preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak
prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her
single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured
memories of Slovakia.
Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school
buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are.
concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd·
cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are
monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored
institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his
forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial.
At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and
organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned
were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests
that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in
some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in
America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the
.spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home,
burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The
Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy
whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily
life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He
was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t
he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home·
enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life.
8
SLOVAKIA
Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling
atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring,
made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native
land, where the people were submissive and demoralized,
nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their
nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an
active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but
failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various
occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to
work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion.
Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was
caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social
intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks
were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented
them from developing their native culture and realizing
their right to self-government and independence. Internally,
the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped
natural resources, but needed an external force to set it
free. And this dynamic force came from America.
Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what
extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled
in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to
what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country.
Even without this material, however, w~ are able to
mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned
home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter
of fact, remained in America and made their permanent
home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome
the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land
SLOVAKIA
9
and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their
relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke
their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch
w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some
contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances
of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and
lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so
rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive
at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks
on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh.
The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic
texture and blend, effected several significant changes on
home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of
~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no
doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their
labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of
a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount
of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak
emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall
which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life.
Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new
capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak
to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and
to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to
live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer
subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have
.his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of
a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order,
Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national
life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though
10
SLOVAKIA
lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect
their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily
~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it
freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal
system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's
;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its
,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i
aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing
more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of
their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household.
Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by
birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale
pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of
Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were
Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies
were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in
modern times, many large estates came into the hands of
fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests
and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the
Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country.
There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the
majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of
the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most
precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up
their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population,
:I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to
make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all
land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least
mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop
fai-lure.
Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were
out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which
the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy
estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were
SLOVAKIA
11
1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished
greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land
and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their
country forever.
The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp
decline.
Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk
nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and
stability, was its independent gentry which had been close
.to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group
be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia
was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul
domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution
would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded
one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware.
1
America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The
many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world
offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~
tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and
almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with
high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years,
many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared,
old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were
purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national
economy was once more in the hands of iits own native
population.
ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale
from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre-
12
SLOVAKIA
:voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful
ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants
manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels
pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership.
Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour
mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-,
nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises.
These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien
interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields,
but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of
rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match
for them.
Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity
to acquire a high school and college training. The need was
both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in
public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed,
to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien
camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their
training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades.
Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools
turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the
Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty
in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them.
Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for
the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes
that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy
and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This
is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to
a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself
from foreign domination.
An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines
SLOVAKIA
13
and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of
a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were
published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The
masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were
impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long
time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to
their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society).
The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics,
for he had become accustomed to the view that this was
a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The
Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view,
and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside
the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to
them from across the sea. From their pages they learned
for the first time how grave the situation was in reality
in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they
were informed of things that happened right at home by
receiving newspapers, published in their own language and
spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned
to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which
was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of
publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants
strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close
touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their
membership in American Slovak societies for several years
after coming back to Slovakia.
Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented
to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive
country, not only because they brought their savings, but
also because these men had learned much by their new
experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and
which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning
her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy.
14
SLOVAKIA
In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual,
for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri
of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of
others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover,
as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to
work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In
fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his
own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true
democracy.
Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget
his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers
in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched
from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden
bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of
these rights to his people back home inspired him to work
for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the
fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness
and freedom.
Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain
aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the
thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the
common man, for, after learning the democratic technique
of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage
and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man.
While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there
was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles
in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried
to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in
order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications
SLOVAKIA
15
betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America
were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in
the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in
which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch
with their brothers across the sea.
Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from
Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well
in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins
its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce,
the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~
rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and
hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has
happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the
priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and
independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true
democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an
countries of the world.
The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had
their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at
home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The
Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the
scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic
way of life - Communism .
1
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the
idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk
people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks.
Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy
the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation)
can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0.
Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London).
Dublin Core
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Title
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Influence of American Democracy on Slovak Life
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Francis Hrušovský
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 1-15
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrušovský, František, 1903-1956
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
LCNAF
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Text
16
SLOVAKIA
CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION
By Robert A. Heckert
A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the
Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia.
A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in
Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of
spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to
come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted.
That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important
that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people,
all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical
horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys
in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they
wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and
the family hearth.
It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the
Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a
large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere.
Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but
most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost
everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this
part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis.
As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the
ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early
morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain
vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village
station a proud peasant father and mother were there to
welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away.
Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a
scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent
maTk on this olbserver.
�SLOVAKIA
17
It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of
Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at
on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were
mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were
snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower
altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this
magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I
U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The
spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle
aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses,
all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream
world.
/My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put
me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the
nig,ht before .
.A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by
the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly
made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas
Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered
into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with
candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was
Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood
the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children.
They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion.
We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal
dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the
Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper
the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld
exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols
and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the
father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until
albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night.
Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw
that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This
�18
SLOVAKIA
made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would
be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine
when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow
thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves
as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke
the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·.
Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to
.
a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from
the
center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when
we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on
skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage.
In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and
motheT, and the chilidren.
L
'.. -·
• -l,.
You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen
we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in
air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little
strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their
gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked
peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round
her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress
that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her
dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather
boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled
by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w,
with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels.
We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air,
coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the
town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too
bea:urtiiful to be true.
One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles
away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of
sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that
we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike
through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country
roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they
would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which
many of them earned their living in the towns. On and
�SLOVAKIA
19
on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a
hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved,
wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue
sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind
sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart,
the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came
home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through
the snow.
Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main
street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs
came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity.
The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they
and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the
centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like
wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as
most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike"
people.
When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer.
ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America
a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore
the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an
old man now and had already been baok in his homeland
for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America,
but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work,
of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill
at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had
to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania
some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I
had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia
into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his
cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in
his natiive villruge on his native soiJ.
We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of
the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds
�20
SLOVAKIA
-and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one
corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung
on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father
was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that
morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father
had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us
fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht
along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He
asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone
to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard
from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and
places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he
fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my
extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America .
Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village
wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d
upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one
village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht
debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular
villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village.
The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market
town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name
the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the
disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume.
Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we
started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the
peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along
through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had
walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very
early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was
wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had
bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she
crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full
of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to
teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her
baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes,
waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road
toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our
hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not
�SLOVAKIA
21
say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will
remain with me fur a, long while.
The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the
last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe
North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded
moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain
and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a
light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch
bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard
only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile
we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of
God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere.
A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus
ended our druy's pilgrimage.
Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S
ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season
spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers,
m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve.
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary,
and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d
a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia.
Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian
federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would
simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated
from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld
cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails
to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity."
- F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London).
�
16
SLOVAKIA
CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION
By Robert A. Heckert
A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the
Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia.
A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in
Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of
spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to
come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted.
That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important
that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people,
all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical
horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys
in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they
wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and
the family hearth.
It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the
Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a
large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere.
Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but
most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost
everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this
part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis.
As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the
ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early
morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain
vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village
station a proud peasant father and mother were there to
welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away.
Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a
scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent
maTk on this olbserver.
�SLOVAKIA
17
It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of
Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at
on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were
mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were
snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower
altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this
magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I
U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The
spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle
aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses,
all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream
world.
/My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put
me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the
nig,ht before .
.A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by
the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly
made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas
Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered
into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with
candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was
Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood
the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children.
They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion.
We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal
dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the
Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper
the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld
exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols
and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the
father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until
albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night.
Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw
that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This
�18
SLOVAKIA
made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would
be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine
when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow
thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves
as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke
the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·.
Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to
.
a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from
the
center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when
we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on
skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage.
In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and
motheT, and the chilidren.
L
'.. -·
• -l,.
You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen
we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in
air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little
strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their
gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked
peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round
her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress
that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her
dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather
boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled
by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w,
with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels.
We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air,
coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the
town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too
bea:urtiiful to be true.
One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles
away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of
sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that
we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike
through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country
roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they
would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which
many of them earned their living in the towns. On and
�SLOVAKIA
19
on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a
hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved,
wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue
sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind
sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart,
the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came
home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through
the snow.
Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main
street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs
came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity.
The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they
and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the
centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like
wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as
most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike"
people.
When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer.
ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America
a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore
the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an
old man now and had already been baok in his homeland
for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America,
but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work,
of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill
at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had
to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania
some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I
had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia
into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his
cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in
his natiive villruge on his native soiJ.
We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of
the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds
�20
SLOVAKIA
-and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one
corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung
on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father
was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that
morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father
had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us
fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht
along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He
asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone
to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard
from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and
places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he
fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my
extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America .
Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village
wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d
upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one
village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht
debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular
villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village.
The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market
town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name
the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the
disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume.
Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we
started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the
peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along
through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had
walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very
early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was
wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had
bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she
crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full
of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to
teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her
baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes,
waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road
toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our
hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not
�SLOVAKIA
21
say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will
remain with me fur a, long while.
The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the
last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe
North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded
moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain
and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a
light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch
bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard
only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile
we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of
God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere.
A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus
ended our druy's pilgrimage.
Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S
ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season
spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers,
m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve.
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary,
and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d
a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia.
Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian
federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would
simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated
from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld
cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails
to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity."
- F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London).
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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16
SLOVAKIA
CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION
By Robert A. Heckert
A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the
Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia.
A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in
Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of
spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to
come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted.
That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important
that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people,
all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical
horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys
in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they
wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and
the family hearth.
It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the
Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a
large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere.
Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but
most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost
everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this
part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis.
As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the
ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early
morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain
vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village
station a proud peasant father and mother were there to
welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away.
Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a
scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent
maTk on this olbserver.
SLOVAKIA
17
It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of
Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at
on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were
mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were
snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower
altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this
magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I
U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The
spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle
aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses,
all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream
world.
/My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put
me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the
nig,ht before .
.A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by
the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly
made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas
Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered
into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with
candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was
Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood
the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children.
They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion.
We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal
dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the
Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper
the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld
exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols
and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the
father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until
albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night.
Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw
that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This
18
SLOVAKIA
made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would
be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine
when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow
thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves
as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke
the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·.
Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to
.
a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from
the
center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when
we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on
skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage.
In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and
motheT, and the chilidren.
L
'.. -·
• -l,.
You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen
we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in
air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little
strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their
gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked
peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round
her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress
that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her
dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather
boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled
by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w,
with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels.
We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air,
coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the
town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too
bea:urtiiful to be true.
One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles
away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of
sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that
we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike
through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country
roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they
would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which
many of them earned their living in the towns. On and
SLOVAKIA
19
on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a
hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved,
wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue
sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind
sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart,
the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came
home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through
the snow.
Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main
street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs
came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity.
The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they
and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the
centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like
wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as
most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike"
people.
When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer.
ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America
a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore
the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an
old man now and had already been baok in his homeland
for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America,
but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work,
of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill
at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had
to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania
some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I
had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia
into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his
cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in
his natiive villruge on his native soiJ.
We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of
the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds
20
SLOVAKIA
-and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one
corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung
on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father
was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that
morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father
had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us
fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht
along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He
asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone
to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard
from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and
places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he
fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my
extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America .
Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village
wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d
upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one
village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht
debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular
villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village.
The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market
town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name
the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the
disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume.
Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we
started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the
peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along
through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had
walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very
early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was
wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had
bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she
crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full
of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to
teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her
baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes,
waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road
toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our
hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not
SLOVAKIA
21
say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will
remain with me fur a, long while.
The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the
last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe
North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded
moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain
and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a
light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch
bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard
only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile
we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of
God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere.
A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus
ended our druy's pilgrimage.
Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S
ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season
spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers,
m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve.
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary,
and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d
a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia.
Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian
federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would
simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated
from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld
cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails
to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity."
- F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London).
Dublin Core
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Title
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Christmas in the Low Tatra Region
Description
An account of the resource
Robert A. Heckert
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 16-21
Creator
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Heckert, Robert A.
Date
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December 1953
name
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/761361c5f6afeaf3ae1ee90f14ad507b.pdf
7512a9c9e50f4c3d9f0f6d1232487783
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Text
22
SLOVAK.IA
SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST
Dr. Andrew Dubina
The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What
has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the
propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons
could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks.
'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights
in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a
Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes
a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists,
\VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had
to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy.
Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic
wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who
held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists.
Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy
no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European
nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being
exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them?
What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once
'.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous
and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire
of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken
in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was
gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or
the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the
Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years
It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the
SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the
1
�23
SLOVAKIA
famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if
not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic
nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~,"
but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a
Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of
Slovruk. patriots.
When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the
creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule
over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg
to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks
made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted
that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh
Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few
i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward
Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans
in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w
f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic.
As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was
not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well
protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta
did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia,
because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech
MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic,
but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of
greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided
the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into
the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be
kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and
vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And
these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire
1
1
�24
SLOVAKIA
SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to
stem., f:rom the East to. the West.
While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence
of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal
a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this
laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure
Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they
were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct
that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the
more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make
them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed
among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of
the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout
the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States
allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's
Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that
is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve
at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance.
The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy,
which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter
extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed
by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte"
within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble
plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy.
One can see the meaning of political development in the
world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls
or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for
a greater rreedom af nations and individuals.
nes
Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the
international :recognition of their right to self-determination.
The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national
government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the
motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world.
�SLOVAKIA
25
While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their
demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones
- the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to
their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their
own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present
Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually
with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even
by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which
weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in
central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own
state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and
more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example,
the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the
name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in
the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd,
and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit :
"We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men
are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc
with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are
Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish
it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness."
Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle
of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations
t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in
t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence
t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe,
�26
SLOVAKIA
for the recognition of their right to national existence. The
Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more:
Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies
deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and
,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question.
The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to
force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed
to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally
was no argument that could not be settled without the use
of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily
mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in
the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of
Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny
of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic
West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the
poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty
years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the
West persists in taking adJv,k e from them .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his
latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance
with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and
nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the
democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our
friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too,
wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to
the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept
away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.
�
22
SLOVAK.IA
SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST
Dr. Andrew Dubina
The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What
has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the
propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons
could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks.
'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights
in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a
Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes
a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists,
\VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had
to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy.
Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic
wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who
held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists.
Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy
no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European
nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being
exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them?
What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once
'.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous
and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire
of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken
in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was
gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or
the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the
Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years
It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the
SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the
1
�23
SLOVAKIA
famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if
not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic
nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~,"
but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a
Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of
Slovruk. patriots.
When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the
creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule
over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg
to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks
made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted
that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh
Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few
i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward
Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans
in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w
f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic.
As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was
not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well
protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta
did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia,
because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech
MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic,
but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of
greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided
the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into
the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be
kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and
vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And
these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire
1
1
�24
SLOVAKIA
SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to
stem., f:rom the East to. the West.
While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence
of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal
a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this
laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure
Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they
were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct
that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the
more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make
them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed
among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of
the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout
the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States
allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's
Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that
is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve
at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance.
The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy,
which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter
extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed
by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte"
within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble
plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy.
One can see the meaning of political development in the
world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls
or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for
a greater rreedom af nations and individuals.
nes
Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the
international :recognition of their right to self-determination.
The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national
government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the
motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world.
�SLOVAKIA
25
While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their
demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones
- the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to
their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their
own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present
Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually
with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even
by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which
weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in
central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own
state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and
more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example,
the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the
name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in
the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd,
and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit :
"We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men
are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc
with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are
Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish
it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness."
Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle
of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations
t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in
t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence
t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe,
�26
SLOVAKIA
for the recognition of their right to national existence. The
Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more:
Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies
deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and
,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question.
The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to
force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed
to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally
was no argument that could not be settled without the use
of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily
mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in
the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of
Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny
of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic
West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the
poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty
years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the
West persists in taking adJv,k e from them .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his
latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance
with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and
nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the
democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our
friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too,
wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to
the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept
away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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22
SLOVAK.IA
SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST
Dr. Andrew Dubina
The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What
has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the
propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons
could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks.
'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights
in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a
Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes
a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists,
\VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had
to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy.
Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic
wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who
held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists.
Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy
no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European
nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being
exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them?
What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once
'.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous
and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire
of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken
in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was
gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or
the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the
Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years
It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the
SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the
1
23
SLOVAKIA
famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if
not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic
nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~,"
but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a
Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of
Slovruk. patriots.
When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the
creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule
over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg
to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks
made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted
that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh
Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few
i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward
Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans
in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w
f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic.
As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was
not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well
protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta
did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia,
because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech
MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic,
but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of
greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided
the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into
the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be
kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and
vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And
these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire
1
1
24
SLOVAKIA
SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to
stem., f:rom the East to. the West.
While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence
of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal
a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this
laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure
Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they
were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct
that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the
more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make
them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed
among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of
the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout
the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States
allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's
Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that
is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve
at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance.
The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy,
which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter
extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed
by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte"
within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble
plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy.
One can see the meaning of political development in the
world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls
or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for
a greater rreedom af nations and individuals.
nes
Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the
international :recognition of their right to self-determination.
The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national
government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the
motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world.
SLOVAKIA
25
While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their
demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones
- the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to
their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their
own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present
Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually
with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even
by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which
weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in
central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own
state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and
more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example,
the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the
name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in
the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd,
and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit :
"We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men
are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc
with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are
Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish
it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness."
Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle
of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations
t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in
t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence
t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe,
26
SLOVAKIA
for the recognition of their right to national existence. The
Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more:
Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies
deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and
,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question.
The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to
force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed
to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally
was no argument that could not be settled without the use
of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily
mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in
the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of
Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny
of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic
West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the
poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty
years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the
West persists in taking adJv,k e from them .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his
latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance
with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and
nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the
democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our
friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too,
wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to
the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept
away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Slovakia and the West
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Andrew Dubina
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 22-26
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Dubina, Andrew
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ae5428178125aeb910bcd7dd99c6ef17.pdf
fa604aa054ec872cd30311720bd3078d
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
27
THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN
FEDERATION?
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is
called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con..
sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown
newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's
ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published
am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It
g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr.
Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of
those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the
Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives
his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo
of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does
express the tendency of a great part of it.
In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy
statement:
"During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses
none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us
by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which
would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic
world. That idea is the idea Oif federation."
And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that
the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states
is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement
of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in
his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber
1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together.
Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of
free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform
itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished
�28
SLOVAKIA
in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years
1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism.
"These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey
UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in
cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose
any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony."
Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not
ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-.
Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of
the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of
the f ederatilve idea."
Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has
thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -·
am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can
really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce.
Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa
scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation.
The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever
is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from
the views m other central European nations and deviates
especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation.
In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the
~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans
from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years.
None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand
was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic
principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to
1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands."
'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some
sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
29
date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in
the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a
land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help
them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt
from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his
rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of
the federation.
That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and
SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental
princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated
from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national,
cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their
traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt.
Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does
not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~,
federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of
i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial
development."
A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the
principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka
thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation,"
then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a
federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~
vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in
the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges.
A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily
that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs
- is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia
in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in
the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which
one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l
location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds
itself in today?
�30
SLOVAKIA
But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak
State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And
this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce,
when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of
a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in
Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And
we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by
pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence
of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The
Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans
and have emphatically stated and proved time and again
that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They
proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14,
'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak
State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to?
In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact
that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated
centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions
and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in
IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the
idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person
was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding,
I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o
SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central
European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such
politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or
some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would
be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the
surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some
kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947).
Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central
.European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that
1
�31
SLOVAKIA
would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in
which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes:
If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY
put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world
for the CZECH caJuse."
The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all
forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced
into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent
ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an
equal among equals.
1
•
•
•
SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Ann Su Cardwell
The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in
the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That
struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I
know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years
when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic
was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed
oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of
experience.
It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that
Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia
and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and
if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of
Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all
Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon
pens or
the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days,
does
�
SLOVAKIA
27
THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN
FEDERATION?
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is
called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con..
sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown
newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's
ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published
am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It
g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr.
Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of
those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the
Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives
his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo
of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does
express the tendency of a great part of it.
In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy
statement:
"During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses
none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us
by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which
would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic
world. That idea is the idea Oif federation."
And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that
the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states
is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement
of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in
his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber
1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together.
Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of
free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform
itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished
�28
SLOVAKIA
in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years
1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism.
"These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey
UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in
cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose
any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony."
Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not
ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-.
Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of
the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of
the f ederatilve idea."
Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has
thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -·
am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can
really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce.
Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa
scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation.
The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever
is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from
the views m other central European nations and deviates
especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation.
In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the
~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans
from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years.
None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand
was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic
principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to
1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands."
'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some
sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
29
date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in
the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a
land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help
them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt
from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his
rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of
the federation.
That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and
SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental
princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated
from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national,
cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their
traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt.
Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does
not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~,
federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of
i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial
development."
A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the
principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka
thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation,"
then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a
federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~
vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in
the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges.
A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily
that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs
- is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia
in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in
the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which
one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l
location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds
itself in today?
�30
SLOVAKIA
But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak
State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And
this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce,
when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of
a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in
Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And
we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by
pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence
of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The
Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans
and have emphatically stated and proved time and again
that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They
proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14,
'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak
State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to?
In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact
that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated
centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions
and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in
IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the
idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person
was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding,
I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o
SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central
European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such
politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or
some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would
be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the
surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some
kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947).
Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central
.European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that
1
�31
SLOVAKIA
would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in
which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes:
If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY
put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world
for the CZECH caJuse."
The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all
forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced
into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent
ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an
equal among equals.
1
•
•
•
SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Ann Su Cardwell
The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in
the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That
struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I
know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years
when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic
was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed
oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of
experience.
It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that
Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia
and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and
if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of
Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all
Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon
pens or
the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days,
does
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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Text
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SLOVAKIA
27
THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN
FEDERATION?
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is
called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con..
sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown
newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's
ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published
am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It
g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr.
Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of
those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the
Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives
his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo
of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does
express the tendency of a great part of it.
In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy
statement:
"During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses
none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us
by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which
would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic
world. That idea is the idea Oif federation."
And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that
the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states
is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement
of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in
his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber
1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together.
Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of
free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform
itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished
28
SLOVAKIA
in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years
1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism.
"These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey
UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in
cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose
any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony."
Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not
ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-.
Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of
the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of
the f ederatilve idea."
Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has
thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -·
am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can
really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce.
Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa
scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation.
The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever
is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from
the views m other central European nations and deviates
especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation.
In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the
~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans
from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years.
None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand
was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic
principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to
1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands."
'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some
sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent
1
1
SLOVAKIA
29
date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in
the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a
land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help
them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt
from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his
rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of
the federation.
That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and
SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental
princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated
from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national,
cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their
traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt.
Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does
not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~,
federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of
i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial
development."
A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the
principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka
thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation,"
then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a
federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~
vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in
the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges.
A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily
that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs
- is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia
in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in
the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which
one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l
location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds
itself in today?
30
SLOVAKIA
But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak
State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And
this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce,
when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of
a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in
Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And
we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by
pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence
of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The
Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans
and have emphatically stated and proved time and again
that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They
proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14,
'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak
State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to?
In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact
that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated
centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions
and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in
IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the
idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person
was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding,
I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o
SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central
European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such
politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or
some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would
be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the
surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some
kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947).
Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central
.European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that
1
31
SLOVAKIA
would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in
which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes:
If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY
put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world
for the CZECH caJuse."
The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all
forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced
into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent
ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an
equal among equals.
1
•
•
•
SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Ann Su Cardwell
The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in
the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That
struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I
know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years
when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic
was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed
oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of
experience.
It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that
Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia
and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and
if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of
Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all
Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon
pens or
the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days,
does
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Title
A name given to the resource
The Czechs for a Central European Federation?
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 27-31
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/48db9010a51e0e44c7a014041b30abb2.pdf
66222c37f0096df9ae1815c9fccf02c0
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Text
31
SLOVAKIA
would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in
which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes:
If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY
put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world
for the CZECH caJuse."
The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all
forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced
into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent
ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an
equal among equals.
1
•
•
•
SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Ann Su Cardwell
The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in
the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That
struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I
know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years
when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic
was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed
oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of
experience.
It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that
Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia
and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and
if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of
Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all
Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon
pens or
the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days,
does
�32
SLOVAKIA
when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great
camps.
[ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on
Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had
a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions.
That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant
costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason
why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples.
Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers
quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon
on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of
cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb
when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the
phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally
interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll
world.
The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the
creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware
of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something
in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else
of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups,
and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned
as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live
neighbor to that new state for 17 years.
I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it
comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In
1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was
loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves
established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell
is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My
husband had /been over there but a short time when the
�SLOVAKIA
33
Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA.
He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a
temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed
the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were
in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months
before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance.
We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and
that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We
had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived
ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It
was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our
ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with
Em-ope.
One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to
simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin,
whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong.
I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul
things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery.
I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one
blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country
than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked.
From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that
jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The
names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I
was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the
beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever.
Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well
a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that
these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity?
Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say
precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain
as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1
�34
SLOVAKIA
mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from
the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik
population has not 'been too seriously affected.
But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic
knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding
World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the
i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate
sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American
schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's
history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and
chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould
compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on
Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the
world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the
entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers,
rather than for informative purposes, on the history and
problems orf the Slova;ks.
Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who
had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free
Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought
through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw
off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them.
We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to
loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold
in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing
of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the
never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German
domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless
struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And
how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today
against the tools orf Moscow?
I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out
of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult
it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks
�SLOVAKIA
35
never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for
Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr.
Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun.
friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no
chan'Ce to recommend it.
Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that
it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in
all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was
little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame.
How many Americans know the story of the prirvate
schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was
not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the
Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the
vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn,
and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for
remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee:
and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms?
Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest
was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes
won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The
Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes
conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for
fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against
ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee?
Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is
the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of
the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true
America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia.
m.
�36
SLOVAKIA
BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased
to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout
as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed
the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the
minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their
bid for freedom.
But there is another higihly important factor that,
while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into
the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such
a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian
movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the
country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries.
And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate
included eiconomic resources.
Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite
to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in
Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget
that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a
few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the
hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these
revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the
West does not talke fu,am theiir good will.
The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it
wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed
there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either
side. Little countries lying between them rwould always
tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm.
them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to
get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation.
lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs,
straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to
gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them.
�SLOVAKIA
37
There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a
demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was
to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular
to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that
union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of
the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed
by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted
by each as the foundation upon which the new state would
1
rest.
I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia
and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest
statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these
three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a
great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a
SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects.
But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the
Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh
Agreement it got all too little notice.
'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals,
a state compairaJble in admirustratirve
f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak
brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked
at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests
it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end.
It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we
must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved
that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very
valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were
07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation
of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men
launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union.
How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for
power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American
�SLOVAKIA
38
praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the
Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer
and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit.
They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which
the state had been estaJblished.
They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a
Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no
crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose
peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too
blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure;
that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions,
and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth
and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its
those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~.
All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many
Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in
Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of
his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But
IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He
was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the
cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only
too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of
democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew
that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be.
But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed
of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their
swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry
ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT
know.
1
Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they
had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits
in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that
most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than
when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule,
saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw
and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was
�SLOVAKIA
39
as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were
E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion
of themselives?
Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And
Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek
mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely
no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening
confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet
traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death
ifilter;vened.
But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern.
We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is
farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk
betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia?
The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends
upon them.
SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no
question. But then what?
· · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the
time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was
soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and
other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There
is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude
to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international
and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion.
One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin
to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak
state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced
to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders.
· Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is
oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is
the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat
�40
SLOVAKIA
that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove
the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic,
and the Black seas.
There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our
Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to
re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and
Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that
area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on,
a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some
kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and
whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon
while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs,
that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction.
There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied
adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation.
Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but
what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day
of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king
togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those
lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until
after liberation to get r eady.
I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks
hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans
might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the
ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up
their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them.
They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few.
From what country do we get news of more effective
guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part
of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making
t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than
one .
I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central
�SLOVAKIA
41
and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and
persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that
area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm
t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last
b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the
horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive
set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free!
•
•
•
SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
Joseph Kirschbaum
From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty
entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about
which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite
partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the
Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for
Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative
problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak
problem.
Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians
were not mentioned in international official documents until
the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and
Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak
State, came to the forefront of European interests. This
happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in
accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives
of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save
Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak
Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost
simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the
one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or
�
31
SLOVAKIA
would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in
which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes:
If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY
put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world
for the CZECH caJuse."
The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all
forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced
into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent
ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an
equal among equals.
1
•
•
•
SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Ann Su Cardwell
The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in
the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That
struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I
know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years
when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic
was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed
oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of
experience.
It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that
Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia
and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and
if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of
Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all
Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon
pens or
the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days,
does
�32
SLOVAKIA
when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great
camps.
[ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on
Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had
a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions.
That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant
costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason
why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples.
Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers
quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon
on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of
cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb
when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the
phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally
interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll
world.
The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the
creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware
of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something
in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else
of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups,
and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned
as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live
neighbor to that new state for 17 years.
I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it
comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In
1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was
loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves
established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell
is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My
husband had /been over there but a short time when the
�SLOVAKIA
33
Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA.
He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a
temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed
the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were
in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months
before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance.
We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and
that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We
had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived
ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It
was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our
ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with
Em-ope.
One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to
simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin,
whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong.
I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul
things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery.
I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one
blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country
than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked.
From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that
jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The
names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I
was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the
beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever.
Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well
a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that
these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity?
Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say
precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain
as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1
�34
SLOVAKIA
mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from
the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik
population has not 'been too seriously affected.
But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic
knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding
World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the
i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate
sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American
schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's
history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and
chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould
compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on
Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the
world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the
entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers,
rather than for informative purposes, on the history and
problems orf the Slova;ks.
Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who
had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free
Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought
through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw
off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them.
We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to
loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold
in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing
of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the
never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German
domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless
struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And
how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today
against the tools orf Moscow?
I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out
of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult
it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks
�SLOVAKIA
35
never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for
Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr.
Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun.
friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no
chan'Ce to recommend it.
Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that
it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in
all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was
little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame.
How many Americans know the story of the prirvate
schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was
not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the
Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the
vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn,
and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for
remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee:
and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms?
Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest
was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes
won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The
Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes
conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for
fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against
ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee?
Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is
the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of
the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true
America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia.
m.
�36
SLOVAKIA
BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased
to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout
as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed
the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the
minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their
bid for freedom.
But there is another higihly important factor that,
while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into
the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such
a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian
movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the
country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries.
And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate
included eiconomic resources.
Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite
to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in
Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget
that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a
few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the
hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these
revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the
West does not talke fu,am theiir good will.
The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it
wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed
there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either
side. Little countries lying between them rwould always
tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm.
them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to
get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation.
lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs,
straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to
gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them.
�SLOVAKIA
37
There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a
demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was
to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular
to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that
union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of
the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed
by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted
by each as the foundation upon which the new state would
1
rest.
I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia
and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest
statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these
three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a
great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a
SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects.
But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the
Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh
Agreement it got all too little notice.
'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals,
a state compairaJble in admirustratirve
f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak
brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked
at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests
it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end.
It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we
must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved
that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very
valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were
07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation
of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men
launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union.
How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for
power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American
�SLOVAKIA
38
praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the
Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer
and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit.
They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which
the state had been estaJblished.
They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a
Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no
crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose
peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too
blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure;
that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions,
and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth
and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its
those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~.
All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many
Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in
Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of
his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But
IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He
was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the
cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only
too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of
democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew
that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be.
But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed
of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their
swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry
ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT
know.
1
Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they
had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits
in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that
most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than
when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule,
saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw
and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was
�SLOVAKIA
39
as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were
E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion
of themselives?
Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And
Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek
mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely
no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening
confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet
traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death
ifilter;vened.
But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern.
We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is
farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk
betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia?
The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends
upon them.
SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no
question. But then what?
· · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the
time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was
soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and
other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There
is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude
to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international
and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion.
One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin
to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak
state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced
to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders.
· Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is
oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is
the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat
�40
SLOVAKIA
that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove
the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic,
and the Black seas.
There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our
Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to
re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and
Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that
area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on,
a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some
kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and
whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon
while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs,
that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction.
There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied
adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation.
Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but
what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day
of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king
togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those
lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until
after liberation to get r eady.
I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks
hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans
might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the
ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up
their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them.
They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few.
From what country do we get news of more effective
guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part
of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making
t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than
one .
I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central
�SLOVAKIA
41
and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and
persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that
area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm
t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last
b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the
horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive
set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free!
•
•
•
SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
Joseph Kirschbaum
From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty
entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about
which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite
partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the
Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for
Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative
problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak
problem.
Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians
were not mentioned in international official documents until
the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and
Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak
State, came to the forefront of European interests. This
happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in
accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives
of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save
Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak
Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost
simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the
one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1953
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31
SLOVAKIA
would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in
which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes:
If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY
put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world
for the CZECH caJuse."
The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all
forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced
into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent
ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an
equal among equals.
1
•
•
•
SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Ann Su Cardwell
The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in
the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That
struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I
know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years
when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic
was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed
oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of
experience.
It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that
Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia
and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and
if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of
Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all
Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon
pens or
the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days,
does
32
SLOVAKIA
when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great
camps.
[ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on
Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had
a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions.
That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant
costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason
why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples.
Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers
quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon
on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of
cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb
when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the
phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally
interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll
world.
The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the
creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware
of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something
in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else
of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups,
and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned
as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live
neighbor to that new state for 17 years.
I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it
comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In
1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was
loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves
established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell
is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My
husband had /been over there but a short time when the
SLOVAKIA
33
Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA.
He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a
temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed
the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were
in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months
before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance.
We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and
that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We
had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived
ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It
was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our
ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with
Em-ope.
One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to
simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin,
whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong.
I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul
things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery.
I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one
blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country
than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked.
From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that
jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The
names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I
was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the
beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever.
Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well
a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that
these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity?
Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say
precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain
as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1
34
SLOVAKIA
mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from
the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik
population has not 'been too seriously affected.
But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic
knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding
World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the
i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate
sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American
schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's
history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and
chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould
compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on
Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the
world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the
entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers,
rather than for informative purposes, on the history and
problems orf the Slova;ks.
Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who
had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free
Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought
through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw
off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them.
We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to
loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold
in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing
of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the
never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German
domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless
struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And
how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today
against the tools orf Moscow?
I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out
of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult
it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks
SLOVAKIA
35
never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for
Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr.
Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun.
friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no
chan'Ce to recommend it.
Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that
it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in
all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was
little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame.
How many Americans know the story of the prirvate
schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was
not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the
Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the
vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn,
and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for
remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee:
and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms?
Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest
was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes
won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The
Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes
conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for
fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against
ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee?
Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is
the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of
the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true
America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia.
m.
36
SLOVAKIA
BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased
to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout
as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed
the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the
minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their
bid for freedom.
But there is another higihly important factor that,
while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into
the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such
a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian
movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the
country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries.
And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate
included eiconomic resources.
Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite
to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in
Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget
that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a
few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the
hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these
revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the
West does not talke fu,am theiir good will.
The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it
wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed
there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either
side. Little countries lying between them rwould always
tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm.
them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to
get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation.
lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs,
straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to
gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them.
SLOVAKIA
37
There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a
demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was
to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular
to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that
union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of
the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed
by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted
by each as the foundation upon which the new state would
1
rest.
I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia
and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest
statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these
three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a
great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a
SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects.
But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the
Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh
Agreement it got all too little notice.
'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals,
a state compairaJble in admirustratirve
f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak
brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked
at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests
it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end.
It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we
must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved
that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very
valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were
07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation
of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men
launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union.
How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for
power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American
SLOVAKIA
38
praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the
Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer
and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit.
They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which
the state had been estaJblished.
They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a
Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no
crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose
peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too
blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure;
that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions,
and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth
and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its
those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~.
All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many
Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in
Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of
his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But
IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He
was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the
cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only
too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of
democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew
that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be.
But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed
of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their
swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry
ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT
know.
1
Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they
had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits
in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that
most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than
when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule,
saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw
and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was
SLOVAKIA
39
as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were
E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion
of themselives?
Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And
Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek
mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely
no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening
confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet
traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death
ifilter;vened.
But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern.
We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is
farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk
betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia?
The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends
upon them.
SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no
question. But then what?
· · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the
time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was
soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and
other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There
is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude
to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international
and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion.
One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin
to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak
state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced
to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders.
· Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is
oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is
the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat
40
SLOVAKIA
that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove
the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic,
and the Black seas.
There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our
Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to
re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and
Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that
area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on,
a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some
kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and
whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon
while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs,
that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction.
There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied
adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation.
Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but
what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day
of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king
togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those
lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until
after liberation to get r eady.
I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks
hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans
might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the
ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up
their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them.
They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few.
From what country do we get news of more effective
guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part
of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making
t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than
one .
I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central
SLOVAKIA
41
and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and
persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that
area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm
t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last
b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the
horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive
set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free!
•
•
•
SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
Joseph Kirschbaum
From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty
entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about
which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite
partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the
Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for
Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative
problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak
problem.
Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians
were not mentioned in international official documents until
the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and
Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak
State, came to the forefront of European interests. This
happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in
accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives
of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save
Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak
Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost
simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the
one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Slovakia's Right to Be Heard
Description
An account of the resource
Ann Su Cardwell
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 31-41
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cardwell, Ann Su
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
LCNAF
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0861438e95b1cf0142c007040c57cb37
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
41
and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and
persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that
area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm
t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last
b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the
horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive
set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free!
•
•
•
SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
Joseph Kirschbaum
From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty
entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about
which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite
partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the
Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for
Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative
problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak
problem.
Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians
were not mentioned in international official documents until
the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and
Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak
State, came to the forefront of European interests. This
happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in
accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives
of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save
Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak
Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost
simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the
one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or
�42
SLOVAKIA
Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef
Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor,
Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought
for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom.
Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with
in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by
the British and American governments under the title
"Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV,
Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence
of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework
of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia
orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2).
Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands
were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome.
German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however,
did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri
1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of
the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did
not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly
and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most
important are:
a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent:
"Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia
should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but
should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German
influence" (3).
b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7,
1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells
about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after
the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak
Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum
stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages
compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues
that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the
�SLOVAKIA
43
solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of
achievement" ( 4).
c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign
Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard
to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the
Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward
Prague)" (5).
This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of
course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak
political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy.
It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed
it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that
the development that took place in Slovakia later might
better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain
independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler
through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the
Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague.
In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak
representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia,
in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north.
And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged
by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which
the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech
factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague,
but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak
cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that
time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that
Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the
fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak
territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the
Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first
meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous
government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky,
Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the
Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). '
1
�44
SLOVAKIA
According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told
Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and
wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed,"
said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when
Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language
and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft
law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the
army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all
Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their
own hands."
After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question
of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to
use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that
the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ;
furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000
more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr.
1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support
their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially
for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons.
Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said
that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak
problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak
people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very
simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of
independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for
peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately
added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the
Hungarians."
It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments
that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that
"they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra,
Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital
�SLOVAKIA
45
for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days."
That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them
for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place
not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this
meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing
-events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its
-entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated
in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows:
"MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF
Munich, October 19, 1938
At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again
received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister,
and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that
he had invited them quite unofficially and privately
in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague.
Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of
an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky
seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with
Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have
to steer developments slowly and methodically. At
Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move.
If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which
had been made regarding complete autonomy, with
the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the
administrative side of finance had already been taken
over, so that joint control remained only in the State
finances. In the army, too, agreement had been
reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments,
but this had not yet been put into practice.
�46
SLOVAKIA
In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister,
Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was,
of course, impossible for her to form a modern army
for the defense of her frontiers. There were three
possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest
to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically
weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw
material resources, was also economically the equal
of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians
were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of
these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people
at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff
demands, he did not think that there would be much
sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing
in their lot with the Magyars.
In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that
he was naturally interested in the development of
their country, and he asked them to apply directly to
him if they ever · had any particular or economic
Hewel." (7)
problems.
After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand
:Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak
factors did not have any contacts with representatives of
the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor
reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to
Goering, according to the official record, but also according
to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin
to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring
to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts
with Germany directly.
�SI.;OVAKIA
47
The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this
matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the
point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence
of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic
monument and that all Slovak history books would have to
be burned if the castle were lost."
Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia
should remain united with Prague. According to the record,
"the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak
and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within
the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany,
therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland
and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which
threatened it in 1938.
· How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In
the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the
German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation
was described as follows:
"According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining
ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded
by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A
tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence.
"Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would
regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the
Slovak question.
"Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea
of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the
possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9).
References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40;
4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign
Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the
Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge
d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32.
�
SLOVAKIA
41
and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and
persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that
area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm
t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last
b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the
horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive
set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free!
•
•
•
SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
Joseph Kirschbaum
From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty
entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about
which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite
partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the
Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for
Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative
problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak
problem.
Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians
were not mentioned in international official documents until
the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and
Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak
State, came to the forefront of European interests. This
happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in
accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives
of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save
Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak
Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost
simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the
one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or
�42
SLOVAKIA
Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef
Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor,
Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought
for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom.
Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with
in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by
the British and American governments under the title
"Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV,
Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence
of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework
of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia
orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2).
Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands
were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome.
German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however,
did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri
1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of
the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did
not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly
and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most
important are:
a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent:
"Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia
should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but
should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German
influence" (3).
b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7,
1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells
about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after
the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak
Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum
stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages
compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues
that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the
�SLOVAKIA
43
solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of
achievement" ( 4).
c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign
Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard
to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the
Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward
Prague)" (5).
This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of
course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak
political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy.
It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed
it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that
the development that took place in Slovakia later might
better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain
independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler
through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the
Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague.
In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak
representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia,
in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north.
And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged
by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which
the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech
factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague,
but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak
cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that
time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that
Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the
fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak
territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the
Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first
meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous
government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky,
Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the
Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). '
1
�44
SLOVAKIA
According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told
Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and
wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed,"
said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when
Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language
and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft
law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the
army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all
Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their
own hands."
After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question
of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to
use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that
the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ;
furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000
more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr.
1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support
their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially
for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons.
Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said
that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak
problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak
people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very
simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of
independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for
peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately
added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the
Hungarians."
It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments
that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that
"they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra,
Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital
�SLOVAKIA
45
for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days."
That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them
for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place
not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this
meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing
-events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its
-entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated
in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows:
"MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF
Munich, October 19, 1938
At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again
received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister,
and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that
he had invited them quite unofficially and privately
in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague.
Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of
an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky
seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with
Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have
to steer developments slowly and methodically. At
Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move.
If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which
had been made regarding complete autonomy, with
the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the
administrative side of finance had already been taken
over, so that joint control remained only in the State
finances. In the army, too, agreement had been
reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments,
but this had not yet been put into practice.
�46
SLOVAKIA
In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister,
Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was,
of course, impossible for her to form a modern army
for the defense of her frontiers. There were three
possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest
to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically
weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw
material resources, was also economically the equal
of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians
were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of
these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people
at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff
demands, he did not think that there would be much
sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing
in their lot with the Magyars.
In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that
he was naturally interested in the development of
their country, and he asked them to apply directly to
him if they ever · had any particular or economic
Hewel." (7)
problems.
After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand
:Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak
factors did not have any contacts with representatives of
the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor
reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to
Goering, according to the official record, but also according
to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin
to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring
to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts
with Germany directly.
�SI.;OVAKIA
47
The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this
matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the
point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence
of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic
monument and that all Slovak history books would have to
be burned if the castle were lost."
Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia
should remain united with Prague. According to the record,
"the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak
and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within
the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany,
therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland
and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which
threatened it in 1938.
· How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In
the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the
German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation
was described as follows:
"According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining
ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded
by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A
tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence.
"Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would
regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the
Slovak question.
"Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea
of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the
possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9).
References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40;
4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign
Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the
Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge
d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32.
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
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A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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SLOVAKIA
41
and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and
persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that
area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm
t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last
b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the
horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive
set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free!
•
•
•
SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938
Joseph Kirschbaum
From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty
entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about
which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite
partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the
Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for
Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative
problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak
problem.
Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians
were not mentioned in international official documents until
the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and
Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak
State, came to the forefront of European interests. This
happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in
accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives
of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save
Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak
Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost
simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the
one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or
42
SLOVAKIA
Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef
Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor,
Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought
for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom.
Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with
in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by
the British and American governments under the title
"Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV,
Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence
of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework
of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia
orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2).
Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands
were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome.
German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however,
did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri
1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of
the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did
not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly
and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most
important are:
a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent:
"Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia
should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but
should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German
influence" (3).
b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7,
1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells
about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after
the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak
Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum
stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages
compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues
that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the
SLOVAKIA
43
solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of
achievement" ( 4).
c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign
Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard
to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the
Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward
Prague)" (5).
This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of
course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak
political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy.
It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed
it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that
the development that took place in Slovakia later might
better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain
independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler
through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the
Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague.
In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak
representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia,
in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north.
And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged
by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which
the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech
factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague,
but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak
cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that
time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that
Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the
fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak
territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the
Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first
meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous
government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky,
Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the
Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). '
1
44
SLOVAKIA
According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told
Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and
wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed,"
said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when
Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language
and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft
law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the
army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all
Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their
own hands."
After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question
of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to
use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that
the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ;
furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000
more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr.
1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support
their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially
for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons.
Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said
that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak
problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak
people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very
simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of
independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for
peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately
added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the
Hungarians."
It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments
that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that
"they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra,
Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital
SLOVAKIA
45
for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days."
That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them
for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place
not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this
meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing
-events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its
-entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated
in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows:
"MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF
Munich, October 19, 1938
At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again
received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister,
and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that
he had invited them quite unofficially and privately
in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague.
Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of
an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky
seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with
Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have
to steer developments slowly and methodically. At
Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move.
If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which
had been made regarding complete autonomy, with
the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the
administrative side of finance had already been taken
over, so that joint control remained only in the State
finances. In the army, too, agreement had been
reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments,
but this had not yet been put into practice.
46
SLOVAKIA
In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister,
Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was,
of course, impossible for her to form a modern army
for the defense of her frontiers. There were three
possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest
to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically
weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw
material resources, was also economically the equal
of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians
were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of
these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people
at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff
demands, he did not think that there would be much
sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing
in their lot with the Magyars.
In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that
he was naturally interested in the development of
their country, and he asked them to apply directly to
him if they ever · had any particular or economic
Hewel." (7)
problems.
After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand
:Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak
factors did not have any contacts with representatives of
the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor
reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to
Goering, according to the official record, but also according
to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin
to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring
to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts
with Germany directly.
SI.;OVAKIA
47
The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this
matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the
point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence
of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic
monument and that all Slovak history books would have to
be burned if the castle were lost."
Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia
should remain united with Prague. According to the record,
"the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak
and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within
the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany,
therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland
and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which
threatened it in 1938.
· How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In
the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the
German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation
was described as follows:
"According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining
ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded
by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A
tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence.
"Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would
regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the
Slovak question.
"Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea
of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the
possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9).
References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40;
4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign
Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the
Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge
d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32.
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Title
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Slovakia and International Interests in 1938
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Kirschbaum
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 41-47
Creator
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Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
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December 1953
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4bf24b14b55c8c7c700a20bc2f0f46d7.pdf
9916fb9c6316cbdb4d95d65106f1cd09
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Text
48
SLOVAKIA
WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
Dr. Arved Grebert
The Slovaks entered into a common state with the
Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia
would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that
it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own
state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the
people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~
mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their
own destiny.
Czech Promises and Fulfillment
I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia.
During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland
and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state
administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy."
The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T.
G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its
own administration, its own legislature and its own courts"
and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language
in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad."
In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6.
1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with
the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration;
I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the
scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere."
fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the
Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be
Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo-
�SLOVAKIA
49
va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand
each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there
be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the
Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we
shaH be masters of ours."
Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the
entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall
not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself."
But even if such agreements and promises were not
made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal
and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of
life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the
sixth century.
Slovakia Flooded By Czechs
But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k
RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was
annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into
Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course,
that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state
administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had
sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech
officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives,
ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters,
mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved
the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland.
In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the
first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921,
twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished,
Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21
hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools
ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ;
many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular
joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930,
twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were
�SLOVAKIA
50
still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their
State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921!
Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout
200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had
to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more
distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918.
After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the
Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of
Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands
ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t
least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see
hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy."
Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the
lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions
that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who
had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of
State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by
57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ;
in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their
nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the
estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the
srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration
iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category
of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the
heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent.
A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have
used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions
in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1
�SLOVAKIA
51
niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as
ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[
NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague,
1935).
Slovakia - A Czech Colony
SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od:
Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in
1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from
Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it
were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit
it."
Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a
Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who
held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918:
"From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple
we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties"
(S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437).
Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also
found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r
(l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he
complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in
Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought
tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are
plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to
serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!"
But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia
really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving
the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will
ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use
those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come
to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of
�f>2
SLOVAKIA
livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite
plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our
colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia."
Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes
threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933:
''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political
fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which,
speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and
Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints
the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia):
"We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but
also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in
Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there
would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees,
for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery
and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased."
The Outflow of Slovak Blood
While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe
Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to
France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and
the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs
in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the
ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared
well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the
forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines
of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after
large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires
were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and
forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil.
�SLOVAKIA
53
So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of
Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period
from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per
cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d
14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6
per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent
emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what
do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring
on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from
Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and
from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but
12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de
la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33).
We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not
Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia,
503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them
in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187).
In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the
United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42
Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the
Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total
Cze~ho.JSlova!kia.
per cent were
per cent, and in
latter year, the
emi·g ration from
This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of
Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with
Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than
that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the
actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The
200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers,
tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia,
which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion.
The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a
single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er
S'lova>kia.
�54
SLOVAKIA
It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself
from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the
outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were
18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930
thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most
part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands.
In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k
gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks
were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key
posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade
in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak.
The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and
representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks
joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the
Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and
the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks
determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh,
however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged
and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come
to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent
rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to
govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939.
Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy .
1
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our
people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international,
to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me
personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear.
That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to
mental, internal or international, ties ...... " -
th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) .
�
48
SLOVAKIA
WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
Dr. Arved Grebert
The Slovaks entered into a common state with the
Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia
would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that
it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own
state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the
people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~
mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their
own destiny.
Czech Promises and Fulfillment
I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia.
During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland
and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state
administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy."
The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T.
G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its
own administration, its own legislature and its own courts"
and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language
in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad."
In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6.
1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with
the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration;
I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the
scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere."
fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the
Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be
Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo-
�SLOVAKIA
49
va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand
each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there
be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the
Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we
shaH be masters of ours."
Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the
entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall
not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself."
But even if such agreements and promises were not
made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal
and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of
life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the
sixth century.
Slovakia Flooded By Czechs
But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k
RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was
annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into
Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course,
that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state
administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had
sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech
officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives,
ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters,
mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved
the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland.
In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the
first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921,
twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished,
Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21
hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools
ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ;
many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular
joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930,
twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were
�SLOVAKIA
50
still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their
State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921!
Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout
200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had
to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more
distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918.
After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the
Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of
Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands
ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t
least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see
hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy."
Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the
lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions
that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who
had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of
State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by
57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ;
in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their
nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the
estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the
srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration
iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category
of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the
heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent.
A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have
used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions
in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1
�SLOVAKIA
51
niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as
ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[
NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague,
1935).
Slovakia - A Czech Colony
SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od:
Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in
1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from
Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it
were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit
it."
Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a
Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who
held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918:
"From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple
we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties"
(S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437).
Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also
found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r
(l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he
complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in
Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought
tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are
plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to
serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!"
But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia
really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving
the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will
ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use
those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come
to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of
�f>2
SLOVAKIA
livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite
plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our
colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia."
Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes
threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933:
''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political
fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which,
speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and
Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints
the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia):
"We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but
also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in
Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there
would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees,
for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery
and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased."
The Outflow of Slovak Blood
While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe
Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to
France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and
the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs
in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the
ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared
well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the
forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines
of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after
large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires
were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and
forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil.
�SLOVAKIA
53
So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of
Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period
from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per
cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d
14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6
per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent
emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what
do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring
on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from
Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and
from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but
12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de
la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33).
We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not
Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia,
503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them
in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187).
In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the
United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42
Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the
Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total
Cze~ho.JSlova!kia.
per cent were
per cent, and in
latter year, the
emi·g ration from
This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of
Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with
Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than
that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the
actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The
200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers,
tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia,
which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion.
The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a
single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er
S'lova>kia.
�54
SLOVAKIA
It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself
from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the
outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were
18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930
thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most
part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands.
In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k
gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks
were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key
posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade
in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak.
The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and
representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks
joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the
Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and
the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks
determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh,
however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged
and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come
to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent
rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to
govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939.
Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy .
1
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our
people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international,
to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me
personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear.
That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to
mental, internal or international, ties ...... " -
th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) .
�
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Title
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1953
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Text
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48
SLOVAKIA
WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
Dr. Arved Grebert
The Slovaks entered into a common state with the
Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia
would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that
it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own
state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the
people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~
mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their
own destiny.
Czech Promises and Fulfillment
I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia.
During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland
and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state
administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy."
The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T.
G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its
own administration, its own legislature and its own courts"
and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language
in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad."
In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6.
1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with
the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration;
I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the
scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere."
fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the
Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be
Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo-
SLOVAKIA
49
va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand
each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there
be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the
Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we
shaH be masters of ours."
Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the
entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall
not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself."
But even if such agreements and promises were not
made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal
and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of
life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the
sixth century.
Slovakia Flooded By Czechs
But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k
RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was
annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into
Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course,
that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state
administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had
sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech
officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives,
ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters,
mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved
the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland.
In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the
first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921,
twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished,
Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21
hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools
ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ;
many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular
joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930,
twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were
SLOVAKIA
50
still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their
State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921!
Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout
200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had
to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more
distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918.
After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the
Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of
Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands
ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t
least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see
hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy."
Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the
lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions
that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who
had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of
State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by
57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ;
in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their
nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the
estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the
srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration
iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category
of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the
heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent.
A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have
used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions
in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1
SLOVAKIA
51
niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as
ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[
NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague,
1935).
Slovakia - A Czech Colony
SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od:
Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in
1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from
Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it
were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit
it."
Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a
Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who
held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918:
"From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple
we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties"
(S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437).
Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also
found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r
(l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he
complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in
Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought
tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are
plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to
serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!"
But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia
really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving
the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will
ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use
those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come
to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of
f>2
SLOVAKIA
livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite
plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our
colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia."
Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes
threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933:
''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political
fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which,
speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and
Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints
the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia):
"We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but
also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in
Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there
would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees,
for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery
and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased."
The Outflow of Slovak Blood
While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe
Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to
France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and
the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs
in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the
ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared
well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the
forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines
of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after
large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires
were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and
forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil.
SLOVAKIA
53
So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of
Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period
from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per
cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d
14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6
per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent
emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what
do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring
on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from
Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and
from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but
12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de
la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33).
We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not
Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia,
503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them
in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187).
In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the
United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42
Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the
Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total
Cze~ho.JSlova!kia.
per cent were
per cent, and in
latter year, the
emi·g ration from
This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of
Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with
Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than
that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the
actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The
200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers,
tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia,
which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion.
The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a
single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er
S'lova>kia.
54
SLOVAKIA
It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself
from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the
outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were
18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930
thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most
part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands.
In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k
gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks
were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key
posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade
in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak.
The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and
representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks
joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the
Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and
the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks
determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh,
however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged
and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come
to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent
rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to
govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939.
Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy .
1
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our
people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international,
to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me
personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear.
That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to
mental, internal or international, ties ...... " -
th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) .
Dublin Core
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Title
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Why the Slovaks Were Not Content in Czecho-Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Arved Grébert
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 48-54
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Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001
Date
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December 1953
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Text
SLOVAKIA
55
SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS
Dr. Andrej Dubina
In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials
3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was
mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of
the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf
the representatives of the victorious powers.
HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare
before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light
was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which
the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the
cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with
the gaHows?
In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in
1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy
1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these
questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech
accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are
Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's
Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia.
On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in
1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War
Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan
"Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political
fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich
Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent
of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the
�56
SLOVAKIA
rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical
and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes
himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943,
he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow."
We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of
Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was
beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her
neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is,
had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state.
Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's
office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous
Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10).
Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by
Mendelssohn:
"The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting
the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P
manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had
solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung
but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn
for his ideological principle."
Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with
Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says:
"The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to
him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer
had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit
Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong
imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia
wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused
by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany
and by the importance, of the more serious problems which
then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis
that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was
then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to
co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs.
"Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in
1
�57
SLOVAKIA
order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The
question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own
affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda.
But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should
come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which
did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view
of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal
instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that
reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had
stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself
independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she
hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with
Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy
of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible."
Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few
hours and not in seiveral days.
"He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had
just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements
on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id
sewn make her decision."
1
That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to
Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia
and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is
necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to
Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows:
"Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly
tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region
- I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the
�58
SLOVAKIA
life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have
OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this
affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady
been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the
big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af
friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~
able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. "
Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or
whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium
non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif
every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the
first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence.
Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by
Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under
the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn.
They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of
the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had
transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.
Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg
Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents
the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing
just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely
the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called
"People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents
further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods
used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days.
Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned
and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak
RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and
Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and
exiled and their properties confiscatec.
Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but
�SLOVAKIA
59
protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation,
gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes
and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre
sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic,
anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the
late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold
out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to
tota'1itarian powers.
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BUDATIN
The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina,
just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time
it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led
by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and
the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the
archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have
shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia,
were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the
castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin
tower.
In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the
ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are
adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of
former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a
portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even
today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge
built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work
and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower
are especially interesting, containing as they do many
precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity
�
SLOVAKIA
55
SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS
Dr. Andrej Dubina
In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials
3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was
mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of
the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf
the representatives of the victorious powers.
HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare
before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light
was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which
the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the
cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with
the gaHows?
In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in
1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy
1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these
questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech
accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are
Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's
Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia.
On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in
1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War
Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan
"Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political
fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich
Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent
of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the
�56
SLOVAKIA
rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical
and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes
himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943,
he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow."
We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of
Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was
beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her
neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is,
had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state.
Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's
office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous
Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10).
Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by
Mendelssohn:
"The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting
the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P
manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had
solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung
but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn
for his ideological principle."
Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with
Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says:
"The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to
him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer
had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit
Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong
imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia
wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused
by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany
and by the importance, of the more serious problems which
then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis
that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was
then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to
co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs.
"Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in
1
�57
SLOVAKIA
order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The
question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own
affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda.
But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should
come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which
did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view
of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal
instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that
reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had
stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself
independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she
hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with
Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy
of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible."
Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few
hours and not in seiveral days.
"He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had
just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements
on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id
sewn make her decision."
1
That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to
Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia
and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is
necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to
Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows:
"Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly
tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region
- I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the
�58
SLOVAKIA
life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have
OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this
affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady
been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the
big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af
friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~
able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. "
Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or
whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium
non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif
every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the
first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence.
Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by
Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under
the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn.
They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of
the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had
transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.
Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg
Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents
the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing
just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely
the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called
"People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents
further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods
used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days.
Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned
and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak
RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and
Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and
exiled and their properties confiscatec.
Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but
�SLOVAKIA
59
protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation,
gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes
and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre
sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic,
anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the
late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold
out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to
tota'1itarian powers.
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BUDATIN
The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina,
just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time
it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led
by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and
the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the
archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have
shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia,
were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the
castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin
tower.
In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the
ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are
adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of
former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a
portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even
today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge
built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work
and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower
are especially interesting, containing as they do many
precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
55
SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS
Dr. Andrej Dubina
In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials
3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was
mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of
the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf
the representatives of the victorious powers.
HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare
before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light
was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which
the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the
cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with
the gaHows?
In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in
1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy
1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these
questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech
accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are
Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's
Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia.
On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in
1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War
Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan
"Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political
fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich
Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent
of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the
56
SLOVAKIA
rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical
and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes
himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943,
he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow."
We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of
Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was
beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her
neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is,
had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state.
Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's
office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous
Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10).
Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by
Mendelssohn:
"The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting
the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P
manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had
solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung
but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn
for his ideological principle."
Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with
Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says:
"The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to
him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer
had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit
Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong
imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia
wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused
by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany
and by the importance, of the more serious problems which
then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis
that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was
then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to
co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs.
"Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in
1
57
SLOVAKIA
order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The
question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own
affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda.
But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should
come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which
did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view
of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal
instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that
reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had
stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself
independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she
hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with
Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy
of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible."
Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few
hours and not in seiveral days.
"He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had
just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements
on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id
sewn make her decision."
1
That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to
Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia
and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is
necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to
Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows:
"Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly
tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region
- I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the
58
SLOVAKIA
life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have
OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this
affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady
been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the
big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af
friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~
able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. "
Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or
whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium
non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif
every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the
first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence.
Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by
Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under
the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn.
They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of
the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had
transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.
Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg
Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents
the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing
just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely
the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called
"People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents
further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods
used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days.
Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned
and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak
RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and
Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and
exiled and their properties confiscatec.
Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but
SLOVAKIA
59
protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation,
gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes
and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre
sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic,
anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the
late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold
out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to
tota'1itarian powers.
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BUDATIN
The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina,
just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time
it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led
by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and
the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the
archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have
shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia,
were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the
castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin
tower.
In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the
ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are
adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of
former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a
portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even
today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge
built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work
and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower
are especially interesting, containing as they do many
precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Slovakia in the Light of the Nuremberg Trials
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Andrej Dubina
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 55-59
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Dubina, Andrew
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb56504b2fb7b5b01b1e5cccaadb7e64.pdf
08cd7f1762d80154fe56332576d6d7d8
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
59
protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation,
gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes
and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre
sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic,
anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the
late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold
out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to
tota'1itarian powers.
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BUDATIN
The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina,
just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time
it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led
by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and
the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the
archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have
shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia,
were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the
castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin
tower.
In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the
ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are
adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of
former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a
portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even
today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge
built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work
and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower
are especially interesting, containing as they do many
precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity
�60
S LOVAKIA
from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower
one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon
of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar
Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular
legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice.
From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost
parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle.
Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at
that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document
which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes
of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the
thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following
century, Budatin became the property of the king.
It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak,
"the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty
castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal
adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it
came into royal possession.
During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of
Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well
fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna,
a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia
by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of
the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the
king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433)
also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married
Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar
(Magyar translation "Szunyok").
In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the
throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything.
While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary,
the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance
their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious
John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda-
�SLOVAKIA
61
tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov
and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they
humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king
amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had
to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin
came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the
walled-in bride originated in his time.
At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav
Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers
Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of
volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with
a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything
along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December
11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it.
When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into
Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded
them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the
Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin
Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the
castle disguised as a peasant.
On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were
aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the
volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved
farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin
Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle .
• • •
WHO SAID IT ?
"Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do
not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection
frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May
13, 1944).
�
SLOVAKIA
59
protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation,
gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes
and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre
sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic,
anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the
late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold
out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to
tota'1itarian powers.
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BUDATIN
The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina,
just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time
it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led
by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and
the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the
archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have
shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia,
were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the
castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin
tower.
In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the
ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are
adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of
former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a
portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even
today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge
built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work
and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower
are especially interesting, containing as they do many
precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity
�60
S LOVAKIA
from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower
one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon
of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar
Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular
legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice.
From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost
parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle.
Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at
that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document
which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes
of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the
thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following
century, Budatin became the property of the king.
It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak,
"the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty
castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal
adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it
came into royal possession.
During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of
Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well
fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna,
a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia
by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of
the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the
king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433)
also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married
Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar
(Magyar translation "Szunyok").
In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the
throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything.
While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary,
the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance
their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious
John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda-
�SLOVAKIA
61
tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov
and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they
humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king
amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had
to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin
came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the
walled-in bride originated in his time.
At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav
Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers
Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of
volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with
a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything
along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December
11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it.
When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into
Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded
them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the
Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin
Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the
castle disguised as a peasant.
On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were
aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the
volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved
farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin
Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle .
• • •
WHO SAID IT ?
"Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do
not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection
frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May
13, 1944).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
59
protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation,
gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes
and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre
sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic,
anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the
late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold
out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to
tota'1itarian powers.
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
BUDATIN
The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina,
just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time
it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led
by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and
the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the
archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have
shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia,
were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the
castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin
tower.
In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the
ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are
adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of
former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a
portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even
today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge
built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work
and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower
are especially interesting, containing as they do many
precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity
60
S LOVAKIA
from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower
one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon
of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar
Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular
legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice.
From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost
parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle.
Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at
that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document
which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes
of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the
thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following
century, Budatin became the property of the king.
It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak,
"the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty
castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal
adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it
came into royal possession.
During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of
Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well
fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna,
a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia
by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of
the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the
king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433)
also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married
Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar
(Magyar translation "Szunyok").
In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the
throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything.
While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary,
the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance
their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious
John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda-
SLOVAKIA
61
tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov
and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they
humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king
amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had
to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin
came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the
walled-in bride originated in his time.
At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav
Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers
Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of
volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with
a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything
along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December
11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it.
When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into
Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded
them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the
Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin
Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the
castle disguised as a peasant.
On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were
aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the
volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved
farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin
Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle .
• • •
WHO SAID IT ?
"Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do
not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection
frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May
13, 1944).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Budatín
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 59-61
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1953
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8affe32b1d99e5b7198ea2d629fcb183.pdf
c05f2805e3ec532338bc99ce54df9bc0
PDF Text
Text
62
SLOVAKIA
LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH
Dr. Andrew Dubina
In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union
presented a memorandum concerning the political situation
in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document;
it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr.
Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and
other representatives of the central European nations. The
memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and
their representatives.
The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part
of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians:
Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father,
Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!)
Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum,
it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the
memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against
democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since
1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at
that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and
their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders
of democracy in western Europe and America.
Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia
at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing
over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum):
"All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled
with the victims of class justice.
"Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera-
�SLOVAKIA
63
tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of
the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO
innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits
in the Donbasse region of the USSR."
That is how the memorandum begins and then continues
to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state.
Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime
were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall
them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally
suppressed."
"The universally recognized differentiation between
legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away
with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and
confiscated properties.
"The parliament - that was never the result of free
elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power
of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes.
"The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press
and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses.
"Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent
legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised
to a civic virtue."
Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into
Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni
when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow
and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia.
A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails
for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they
did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty!
But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have
the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the
democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they
dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and
brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base-
�64
SLOVAKIA
ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like
that?!
We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until
it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past
- even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of
Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to
imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even
in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence
would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest
Slovak village.
We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy
and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000
Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the
hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away
with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however,
his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished
miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his
anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies.
And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide
behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they
shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of
innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope
to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the
name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune.
Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way
through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow.
RECOMMENDED BOOKS:
THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak;
312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00.
by Joseph Skultety; 229
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper
cover - $1.00.
�
62
SLOVAKIA
LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH
Dr. Andrew Dubina
In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union
presented a memorandum concerning the political situation
in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document;
it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr.
Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and
other representatives of the central European nations. The
memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and
their representatives.
The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part
of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians:
Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father,
Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!)
Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum,
it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the
memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against
democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since
1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at
that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and
their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders
of democracy in western Europe and America.
Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia
at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing
over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum):
"All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled
with the victims of class justice.
"Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera-
�SLOVAKIA
63
tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of
the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO
innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits
in the Donbasse region of the USSR."
That is how the memorandum begins and then continues
to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state.
Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime
were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall
them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally
suppressed."
"The universally recognized differentiation between
legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away
with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and
confiscated properties.
"The parliament - that was never the result of free
elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power
of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes.
"The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press
and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses.
"Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent
legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised
to a civic virtue."
Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into
Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni
when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow
and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia.
A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails
for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they
did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty!
But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have
the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the
democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they
dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and
brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base-
�64
SLOVAKIA
ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like
that?!
We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until
it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past
- even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of
Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to
imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even
in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence
would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest
Slovak village.
We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy
and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000
Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the
hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away
with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however,
his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished
miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his
anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies.
And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide
behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they
shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of
innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope
to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the
name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune.
Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way
through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow.
RECOMMENDED BOOKS:
THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak;
312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00.
by Joseph Skultety; 229
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper
cover - $1.00.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1953
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
62
SLOVAKIA
LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH
Dr. Andrew Dubina
In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union
presented a memorandum concerning the political situation
in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document;
it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr.
Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and
other representatives of the central European nations. The
memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and
their representatives.
The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part
of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians:
Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father,
Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!)
Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum,
it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the
memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against
democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since
1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at
that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and
their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders
of democracy in western Europe and America.
Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia
at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing
over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum):
"All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled
with the victims of class justice.
"Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera-
SLOVAKIA
63
tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of
the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO
innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits
in the Donbasse region of the USSR."
That is how the memorandum begins and then continues
to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state.
Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime
were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall
them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally
suppressed."
"The universally recognized differentiation between
legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away
with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and
confiscated properties.
"The parliament - that was never the result of free
elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power
of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes.
"The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press
and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses.
"Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent
legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised
to a civic virtue."
Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into
Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni
when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow
and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia.
A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails
for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they
did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty!
But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have
the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the
democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they
dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and
brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base-
64
SLOVAKIA
ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like
that?!
We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until
it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past
- even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of
Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to
imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even
in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence
would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest
Slovak village.
We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy
and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000
Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the
hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away
with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however,
his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished
miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his
anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies.
And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide
behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they
shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of
innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope
to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the
name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune.
Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way
through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow.
RECOMMENDED BOOKS:
THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak;
312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00.
by Joseph Skultety; 229
SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper
cover - $1.00.
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Title
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Lettrich's Regime in the Light of Truth
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Andrew Dubina
Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953
pp. 62-64
Creator
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Dubina, Andrew
Date
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December 1953
name
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9ce6376d7b082d4e046e69dff47642f2
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Text
YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK
as easily as you can any other mode;: n language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them . Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOV AI( LESSONS
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92
lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a
brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES FROl\'i SLOVAK HISTORY
by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0 . D. Koreff;
a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from:
P.A.HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County
�
YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK
as easily as you can any other mode;: n language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them . Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOV AI( LESSONS
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92
lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a
brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES FROl\'i SLOVAK HISTORY
by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0 . D. Koreff;
a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from:
P.A.HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County
�
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1953, Vol. 3
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1953
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SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County
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Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9)
Description
An account of the resource
includes photo of Štiavnička Castle
Date
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December 1953
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�SLOVAK.I A is publishecl periodically by the S lonlk Lcaguc of America,
a cultui-al and ciYic fedeľati on of Americans of S lovak descent.
'ľhc chief pnrpose of S LOVAKl A
is to pľomote a bettcľ nnderstanding
and appreciation of the S lovak n ation
and its long shngglc for freeclom and
ii 1depenclence.
As Ameľic·ans, mcmbers of the
Slovak Leagnc o:f Ameľica fiľmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inheľent and Gocl-given
ľight to freeclorn and independence.
'J 'he,v aľe cleclicated to the cause of the
Ameľi<:an way of life, Slovak freeclom
,mel world peace a:1cl are cletermined to
oppose the plag-nc of Communism and
all othrľ tota litaľi an political systems.
Subsc·ľiptio:1
to SloYaki a $1.00 per
year in thr F. S . A. - $2.00 else\\·her e.
Sencl subscri ptions to :
S LO V AKIA
Box 150
Mi clcllctown, Pa.
--------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
�SLOVAK.I A is publishecl periodically by the S lonlk Lcaguc of America,
a cultui-al and ciYic fedeľati on of Americans of S lovak descent.
'ľhc chief pnrpose of S LOVAKl A
is to pľomote a bettcľ nnderstanding
and appreciation of the S lovak n ation
and its long shngglc for freeclom and
ii 1depenclence.
As Ameľic·ans, mcmbers of the
Slovak Leagnc o:f Ameľica fiľmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inheľent and Gocl-given
ľight to freeclorn and independence.
'J 'he,v aľe cleclicated to the cause of the
Ameľi<:an way of life, Slovak freeclom
,mel world peace a:1cl are cletermined to
oppose the plag-nc of Communism and
all othrľ tota litaľi an political systems.
Subsc·ľiptio:1
to SloYaki a $1.00 per
year in thr F. S . A. - $2.00 else\\·her e.
Sencl subscri ptions to :
S LO V AKIA
Box 150
Mi clcllctown, Pa.
--------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
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Title
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Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3)
Date
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March 1952
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MARCH, 1952.
SLOVAKIA
1
THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Dr. Joseph Cieker
From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has
not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that
their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they
<;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with
many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable.
More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared
from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might
not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path
by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the
extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless,
successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and
the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State.
In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible
task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this
contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair
of the first President of the Slovak Republlc.
The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava
National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second
bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads"
or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther
was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald
the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only
the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of
tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the
national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people.
How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak
nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso
- was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the
work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal
fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will
from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more
concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien
and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak
State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level,
evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized
and cultured nation had ever seen.
�2
SLOVAKIA
The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble
to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak
Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal
forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was
organized and led by the Kremlln.
At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side
of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons,
who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights
of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed·
ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark
on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and
prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet
Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation
who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the
Christian world-outlook.
At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak
State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im·
mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them
in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the
anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression
of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws,
which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist
crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak
assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and
legallzed by the Soviet system.
The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily
was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted,
tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own
executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš
intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of
tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit.
On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the
contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe
and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the
Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as
that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso
among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy-
�SLOVAKIA
a
sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date
no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and
daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political
and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious,
national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence
bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak
man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit.
Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe
clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe
more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso
and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this
background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason,
blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge,
on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to
elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground,
worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally
find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch
their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men,
being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy,
The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that
not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe
wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora!
and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak
statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš
and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of
negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so
much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals
of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst
the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast
between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe
glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests,
led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is,
and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human
profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso,
and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run
measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak
nation.
From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak
11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe
other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences
emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~
the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the
law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon.
�4
SLOVAKIA
To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe
Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic
beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features
were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe
servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life.
Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent
pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as
has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations.
Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe
Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear
deeds of President Tiso himself.
On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or
the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice
of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are
heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by
Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his
death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual
soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e.
"Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because
hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end,
places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation.
The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis
boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe
life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special
blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became
tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism
meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all
bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea.
"Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he
was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat
had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the
life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even
in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making
a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis
full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis
Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but
a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so
dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\
rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi·
cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The
great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis
mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed,
Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he
�SLOVAKIA
6
fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the
right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the
future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by
God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most
intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land."
It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile
of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of
the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the
traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual
and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All
the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service
to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum
that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final
parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words,
but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the
existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that
was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured
and civilized world with bis martyr's death.
We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the
Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of
Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul
the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a
dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human
work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the
value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the
Slovak nation remains on earth.
Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the
coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization
of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as
state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak
gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak
ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso
personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of
the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the
proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler
of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek
the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the
voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the
qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a
duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life..
Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face
of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could
not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after
�6
SLOVAKIA
acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation,
stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why
he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful
people even from the shadow of the gallows.
The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by
tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed
from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph
Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws,
or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate,
prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all
time.
The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic,
serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework
of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its
international relationsbip it could gain recognition.
Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler,
did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London,
or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city
9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under
ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and
he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak
natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play
of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work
of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as
tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the
Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation
existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist.
" This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr.
Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades
of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from
London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague.
·
Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis
llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the
fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such
circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same
polic!es that I did at that Ume."
Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of
tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world,
we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he
could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values.
wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery
�SLOVAKIA
7
which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on
the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal,
but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph
Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were
and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their
place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality
or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and
proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com•
ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro•
file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was
tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc
system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of
course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms,
but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an
alliance witb Communlsm.
That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice
which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe
Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot
pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia
and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor
of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness.
Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to
defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer.
Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin
joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos
of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon,
wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in
s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only
temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve
ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed
as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti,
M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone
qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East
- the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and
the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a
Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the
gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe.
The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the
Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of
a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On
the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the
�8
SLOVAKIA
Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of
the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws;
and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a
patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the
freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly
European State.
Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner
by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so
much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak
s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always
inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation.
J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he
professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he
had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and
himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was
slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his
life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation.
Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to
a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him
a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him
how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist
terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity;
cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense
of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism;
the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo·
rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm
patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation
within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs.
On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines,
they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks
and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages.
The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison,
on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first
President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own
sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe
and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would
�SLOVAK.IA
9
weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals,
but also of nations.
Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot
the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be
said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict
tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in
which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight
for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow,
where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso
will appear on the stage o! European
history.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it
is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late
Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of
one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should
not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with
the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the
development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and
governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak,
elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak
nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent
of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws
of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned."
- Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England,
April 1947.
• • •
"American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno·
minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring
of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be•
neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27,
1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of
75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership
centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We
hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people."
- Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union,
Cleveland, Ohio.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an
opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano,
Yatican City, Haly.
" The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and
served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent
and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary
l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio.
�
MARCH, 1952.
SLOVAKIA
1
THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Dr. Joseph Cieker
From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has
not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that
their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they
<;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with
many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable.
More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared
from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might
not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path
by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the
extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless,
successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and
the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State.
In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible
task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this
contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair
of the first President of the Slovak Republlc.
The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava
National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second
bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads"
or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther
was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald
the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only
the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of
tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the
national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people.
How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak
nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso
- was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the
work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal
fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will
from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more
concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien
and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak
State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level,
evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized
and cultured nation had ever seen.
�2
SLOVAKIA
The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble
to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak
Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal
forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was
organized and led by the Kremlln.
At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side
of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons,
who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights
of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed·
ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark
on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and
prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet
Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation
who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the
Christian world-outlook.
At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak
State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im·
mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them
in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the
anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression
of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws,
which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist
crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak
assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and
legallzed by the Soviet system.
The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily
was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted,
tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own
executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš
intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of
tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit.
On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the
contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe
and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the
Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as
that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso
among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy-
�SLOVAKIA
a
sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date
no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and
daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political
and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious,
national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence
bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak
man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit.
Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe
clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe
more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso
and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this
background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason,
blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge,
on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to
elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground,
worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally
find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch
their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men,
being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy,
The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that
not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe
wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora!
and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak
statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš
and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of
negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so
much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals
of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst
the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast
between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe
glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests,
led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is,
and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human
profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso,
and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run
measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak
nation.
From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak
11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe
other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences
emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~
the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the
law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon.
�4
SLOVAKIA
To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe
Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic
beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features
were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe
servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life.
Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent
pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as
has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations.
Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe
Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear
deeds of President Tiso himself.
On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or
the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice
of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are
heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by
Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his
death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual
soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e.
"Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because
hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end,
places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation.
The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis
boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe
life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special
blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became
tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism
meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all
bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea.
"Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he
was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat
had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the
life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even
in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making
a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis
full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis
Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but
a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so
dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\
rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi·
cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The
great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis
mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed,
Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he
�SLOVAKIA
6
fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the
right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the
future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by
God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most
intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land."
It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile
of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of
the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the
traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual
and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All
the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service
to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum
that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final
parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words,
but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the
existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that
was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured
and civilized world with bis martyr's death.
We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the
Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of
Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul
the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a
dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human
work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the
value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the
Slovak nation remains on earth.
Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the
coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization
of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as
state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak
gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak
ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso
personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of
the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the
proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler
of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek
the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the
voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the
qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a
duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life..
Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face
of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could
not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after
�6
SLOVAKIA
acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation,
stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why
he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful
people even from the shadow of the gallows.
The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by
tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed
from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph
Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws,
or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate,
prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all
time.
The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic,
serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework
of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its
international relationsbip it could gain recognition.
Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler,
did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London,
or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city
9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under
ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and
he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak
natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play
of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work
of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as
tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the
Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation
existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist.
" This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr.
Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades
of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from
London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague.
·
Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis
llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the
fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such
circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same
polic!es that I did at that Ume."
Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of
tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world,
we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he
could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values.
wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery
�SLOVAKIA
7
which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on
the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal,
but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph
Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were
and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their
place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality
or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and
proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com•
ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro•
file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was
tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc
system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of
course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms,
but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an
alliance witb Communlsm.
That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice
which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe
Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot
pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia
and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor
of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness.
Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to
defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer.
Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin
joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos
of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon,
wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in
s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only
temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve
ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed
as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti,
M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone
qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East
- the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and
the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a
Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the
gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe.
The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the
Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of
a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On
the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the
�8
SLOVAKIA
Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of
the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws;
and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a
patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the
freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly
European State.
Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner
by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so
much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak
s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always
inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation.
J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he
professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he
had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and
himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was
slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his
life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation.
Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to
a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him
a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him
how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist
terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity;
cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense
of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism;
the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo·
rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm
patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation
within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs.
On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines,
they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks
and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages.
The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison,
on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first
President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own
sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe
and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would
�SLOVAK.IA
9
weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals,
but also of nations.
Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot
the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be
said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict
tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in
which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight
for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow,
where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso
will appear on the stage o! European
history.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it
is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late
Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of
one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should
not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with
the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the
development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and
governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak,
elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak
nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent
of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws
of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned."
- Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England,
April 1947.
• • •
"American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno·
minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring
of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be•
neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27,
1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of
75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership
centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We
hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people."
- Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union,
Cleveland, Ohio.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an
opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano,
Yatican City, Haly.
" The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and
served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent
and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary
l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio.
�
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1952, Vol. 2
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The Slovak League of America
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1952
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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MARCH, 1952.
SLOVAKIA
1
THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Dr. Joseph Cieker
From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has
not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that
their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they
<;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with
many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable.
More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared
from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might
not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path
by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the
extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless,
successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and
the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State.
In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible
task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this
contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair
of the first President of the Slovak Republlc.
The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava
National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second
bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads"
or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther
was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald
the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only
the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of
tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the
national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people.
How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak
nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso
- was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the
work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal
fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will
from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more
concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien
and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak
State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level,
evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized
and cultured nation had ever seen.
2
SLOVAKIA
The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble
to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak
Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal
forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was
organized and led by the Kremlln.
At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side
of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons,
who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights
of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed·
ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark
on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and
prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet
Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation
who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the
Christian world-outlook.
At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak
State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im·
mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them
in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the
anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression
of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws,
which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist
crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak
assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and
legallzed by the Soviet system.
The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily
was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted,
tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own
executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš
intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of
tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit.
On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the
contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe
and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the
Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as
that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso
among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy-
SLOVAKIA
a
sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date
no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and
daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political
and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious,
national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence
bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak
man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit.
Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe
clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe
more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso
and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this
background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason,
blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge,
on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to
elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground,
worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally
find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch
their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men,
being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy,
The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that
not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe
wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora!
and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak
statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš
and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of
negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so
much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals
of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst
the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast
between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe
glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests,
led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is,
and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human
profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso,
and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run
measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak
nation.
From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak
11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe
other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences
emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~
the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the
law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon.
4
SLOVAKIA
To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe
Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic
beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features
were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe
servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life.
Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent
pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as
has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations.
Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe
Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear
deeds of President Tiso himself.
On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or
the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice
of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are
heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by
Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his
death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual
soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e.
"Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because
hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end,
places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation.
The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis
boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe
life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special
blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became
tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism
meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all
bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea.
"Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he
was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat
had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the
life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even
in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making
a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis
full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis
Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but
a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so
dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\
rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi·
cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The
great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis
mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed,
Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he
SLOVAKIA
6
fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the
right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the
future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by
God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most
intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land."
It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile
of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of
the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the
traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual
and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All
the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service
to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum
that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final
parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words,
but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the
existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that
was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured
and civilized world with bis martyr's death.
We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the
Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of
Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul
the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a
dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human
work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the
value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the
Slovak nation remains on earth.
Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the
coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization
of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as
state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak
gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak
ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso
personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of
the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the
proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler
of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek
the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the
voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the
qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a
duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life..
Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face
of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could
not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after
6
SLOVAKIA
acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation,
stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why
he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful
people even from the shadow of the gallows.
The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by
tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed
from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph
Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws,
or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate,
prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all
time.
The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic,
serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework
of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its
international relationsbip it could gain recognition.
Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler,
did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London,
or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city
9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under
ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and
he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak
natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play
of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work
of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as
tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the
Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation
existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist.
" This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr.
Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades
of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from
London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague.
·
Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis
llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the
fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such
circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same
polic!es that I did at that Ume."
Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of
tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world,
we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he
could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values.
wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery
SLOVAKIA
7
which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on
the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal,
but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph
Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were
and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their
place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality
or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and
proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com•
ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro•
file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was
tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc
system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of
course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms,
but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an
alliance witb Communlsm.
That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice
which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe
Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot
pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia
and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor
of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness.
Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to
defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer.
Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin
joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos
of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon,
wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in
s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only
temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve
ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed
as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti,
M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone
qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East
- the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and
the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a
Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the
gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe.
The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the
Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of
a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On
the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the
8
SLOVAKIA
Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of
the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws;
and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a
patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the
freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly
European State.
Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner
by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so
much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak
s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always
inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation.
J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he
professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he
had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and
himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was
slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his
life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation.
Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to
a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him
a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him
how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist
terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity;
cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense
of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism;
the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo·
rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm
patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation
within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs.
On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines,
they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks
and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages.
The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison,
on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first
President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own
sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe
and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would
SLOVAK.IA
9
weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals,
but also of nations.
Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot
the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be
said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict
tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in
which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight
for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow,
where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso
will appear on the stage o! European
history.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it
is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late
Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of
one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should
not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with
the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the
development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and
governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak,
elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak
nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent
of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws
of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned."
- Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England,
April 1947.
• • •
"American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno·
minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring
of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be•
neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27,
1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of
75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership
centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We
hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people."
- Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union,
Cleveland, Ohio.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an
opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano,
Yatican City, Haly.
" The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and
served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent
and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary
l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio.
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
The First President of the Slovak Republic
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Cieker
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 1-9
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cieker, Jozef, 1907-1969
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
LCNAF+dates
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a26e78cce5aaaba26b6aa159393a855a.pdf
51bfe3ef9f258946af07a9a1b0deebc0
PDF Text
Text
10
SLOVAKIA
THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD
Marian Žiar
In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé
ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the
tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these
two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged.
The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak
ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in
Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti•
Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the
standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in
exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the
Communists.
Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort
of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in
accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the
restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well.
Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had
the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia,
because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The
nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts
bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and
Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among
the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also
western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted
untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars,
Germans and ~ecbs.
In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb
its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule
of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own
money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in
the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve
unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded
Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar
lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of
tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth
century.
At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,.
came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to
thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks
at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under
�SLOVAKIA
11
kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote
beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom
or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu."
In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their
fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that
movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia
from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in
Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution
failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on
and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus,
Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the
solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe
were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central
European nations.
On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled
at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the
Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic
struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher
and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal
News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of
every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the
Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under
their rule.
When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at
ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak
nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a
n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on
January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under
the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e
Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with
complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own
parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e
Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of
l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis
ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak
Republic in 1918.
However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward
Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union
of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the
polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to
fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc.
The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs
and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a
milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only
�12
SLOVAKIA
one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for
the complete political independence of the Slovaks.
By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political
sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re•
public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred
with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development,
however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the
given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took
the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility
for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o!
Slovakia.
From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to
censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it
meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence,
whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation.
Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving
way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole
of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s
for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small,
wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe
can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a
fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon.
And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since
the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla
from the hegemony of Communlsm.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact
that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had
only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr
to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have
suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is
the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for
centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious
rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat
the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also
indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously
professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort
to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo.
"Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation,
killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot.
the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak
nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more
wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak
National Council, London, England, April 1947.
�
10
SLOVAKIA
THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD
Marian Žiar
In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé
ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the
tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these
two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged.
The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak
ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in
Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti•
Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the
standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in
exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the
Communists.
Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort
of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in
accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the
restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well.
Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had
the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia,
because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The
nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts
bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and
Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among
the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also
western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted
untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars,
Germans and ~ecbs.
In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb
its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule
of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own
money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in
the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve
unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded
Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar
lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of
tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth
century.
At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,.
came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to
thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks
at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under
�SLOVAKIA
11
kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote
beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom
or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu."
In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their
fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that
movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia
from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in
Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution
failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on
and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus,
Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the
solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe
were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central
European nations.
On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled
at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the
Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic
struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher
and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal
News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of
every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the
Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under
their rule.
When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at
ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak
nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a
n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on
January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under
the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e
Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with
complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own
parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e
Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of
l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis
ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak
Republic in 1918.
However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward
Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union
of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the
polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to
fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc.
The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs
and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a
milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only
�12
SLOVAKIA
one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for
the complete political independence of the Slovaks.
By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political
sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re•
public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred
with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development,
however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the
given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took
the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility
for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o!
Slovakia.
From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to
censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it
meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence,
whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation.
Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving
way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole
of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s
for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small,
wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe
can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a
fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon.
And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since
the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla
from the hegemony of Communlsm.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact
that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had
only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr
to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have
suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is
the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for
centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious
rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat
the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also
indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously
professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort
to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo.
"Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation,
killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot.
the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak
nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more
wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak
National Council, London, England, April 1947.
�
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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10
SLOVAKIA
THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD
Marian Žiar
In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé
ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the
tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these
two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged.
The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak
ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in
Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti•
Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the
standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in
exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the
Communists.
Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort
of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in
accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the
restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well.
Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had
the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia,
because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The
nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts
bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and
Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among
the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also
western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted
untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars,
Germans and ~ecbs.
In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb
its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule
of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own
money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in
the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve
unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded
Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar
lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of
tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth
century.
At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,.
came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to
thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks
at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under
SLOVAKIA
11
kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote
beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom
or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu."
In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their
fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that
movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia
from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in
Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution
failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on
and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus,
Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the
solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe
were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central
European nations.
On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled
at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the
Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic
struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher
and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal
News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of
every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the
Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under
their rule.
When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at
ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak
nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a
n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on
January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under
the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e
Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with
complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own
parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e
Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of
l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis
ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak
Republic in 1918.
However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward
Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union
of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the
polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to
fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc.
The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs
and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a
milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only
12
SLOVAKIA
one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for
the complete political independence of the Slovaks.
By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political
sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re•
public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred
with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development,
however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the
given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took
the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility
for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o!
Slovakia.
From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to
censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it
meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence,
whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation.
Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving
way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole
of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s
for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small,
wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe
can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a
fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon.
And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since
the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla
from the hegemony of Communlsm.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact
that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had
only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr
to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have
suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is
the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for
centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious
rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat
the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also
indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously
professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort
to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo.
"Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation,
killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot.
the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak
nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more
wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak
National Council, London, England, April 1947.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Tradition of Slovak Statehood
Description
An account of the resource
Marian Žiar
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 10-12
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Žiar, Marian
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/601134ae37c577a6153dcabc2a4076a4.pdf
4f5b1bad0879a3d825ced9b77393b7c2
PDF Text
Text
SLOVA.KIA.
13
IN RETlROSPECT
TISO ON THE GALWWS
(From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947)
The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles,
embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies
are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any
other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the
NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark
that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon
c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to
the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and
her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased
her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia,
Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On
behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s
claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights
are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely
centralized and dependent on Moscow.
Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~
of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers
to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and
Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia
respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and
1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech
and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be
considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome.
On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice
of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action
Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one
can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans
overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe
Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with
the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by
Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France
respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.)
The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very
s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst
Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland.
the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war
progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden.
Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the
U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed
�14
SLOVAKIA
agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the
acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged
by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is
n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com•
mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent
since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich
they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary,
they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak
people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The
proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso
and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed
for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter
of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only
were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives
involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such ....
Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi•
dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the
c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a
democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic."
T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech
ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has
been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis.
Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been
s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt
v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the
fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent
Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop
Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have
thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there
is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I
sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo.
Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In
any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The
Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in
t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could
not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian·
ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever
slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor."
The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation
of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not
a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce.
As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that
Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked
t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes
r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary."
�SLOVAKIA
16
This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the
Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on
Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts.
And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea
aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted
to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the
last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice
trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly
Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of
Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi·
dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused.
Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line.
After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought
refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the
American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the
Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak
League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had
authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff
were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been
taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of
the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at
the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception
of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks.
Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth
chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously
in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was
transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for
his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa
appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly
res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted
and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia
election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the
Slovaks at that time."
Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not
c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho•
Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech
domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my
policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have
done," Tis o declared.
.,.
For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la.
Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the
Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso
at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people,
who were sent to Lalbor Camps.
On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When
asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for
�16
SLOVA.KIA
mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend
his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea,
and he was executed on April 18th.
Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est
is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it
was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea
for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant.
The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend.
The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu
Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere
has become very tense and there is much talk of great political
changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party.
On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official
iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various
occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard
elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against
the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has
been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly
encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to
tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic
reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and
fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe
followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti•
Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to
smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is
called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still
active followers."
Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all,
the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent
trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice.
This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish
Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to
make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the
Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter
your house and destroy you."
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp
wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin·
cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re·
celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London.
December H, 1944).
�
SLOVA.KIA.
13
IN RETlROSPECT
TISO ON THE GALWWS
(From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947)
The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles,
embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies
are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any
other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the
NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark
that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon
c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to
the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and
her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased
her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia,
Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On
behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s
claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights
are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely
centralized and dependent on Moscow.
Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~
of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers
to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and
Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia
respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and
1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech
and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be
considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome.
On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice
of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action
Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one
can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans
overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe
Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with
the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by
Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France
respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.)
The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very
s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst
Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland.
the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war
progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden.
Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the
U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed
�14
SLOVAKIA
agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the
acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged
by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is
n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com•
mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent
since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich
they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary,
they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak
people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The
proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso
and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed
for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter
of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only
were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives
involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such ....
Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi•
dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the
c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a
democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic."
T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech
ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has
been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis.
Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been
s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt
v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the
fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent
Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop
Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have
thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there
is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I
sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo.
Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In
any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The
Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in
t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could
not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian·
ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever
slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor."
The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation
of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not
a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce.
As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that
Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked
t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes
r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary."
�SLOVAKIA
16
This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the
Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on
Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts.
And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea
aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted
to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the
last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice
trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly
Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of
Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi·
dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused.
Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line.
After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought
refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the
American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the
Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak
League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had
authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff
were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been
taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of
the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at
the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception
of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks.
Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth
chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously
in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was
transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for
his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa
appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly
res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted
and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia
election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the
Slovaks at that time."
Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not
c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho•
Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech
domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my
policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have
done," Tis o declared.
.,.
For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la.
Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the
Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso
at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people,
who were sent to Lalbor Camps.
On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When
asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for
�16
SLOVA.KIA
mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend
his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea,
and he was executed on April 18th.
Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est
is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it
was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea
for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant.
The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend.
The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu
Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere
has become very tense and there is much talk of great political
changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party.
On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official
iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various
occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard
elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against
the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has
been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly
encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to
tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic
reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and
fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe
followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti•
Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to
smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is
called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still
active followers."
Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all,
the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent
trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice.
This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish
Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to
make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the
Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter
your house and destroy you."
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp
wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin·
cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re·
celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London.
December H, 1944).
�
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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SLOVA.KIA.
13
IN RETlROSPECT
TISO ON THE GALWWS
(From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947)
The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles,
embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies
are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any
other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the
NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark
that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon
c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to
the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and
her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased
her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia,
Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On
behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s
claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights
are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely
centralized and dependent on Moscow.
Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~
of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers
to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and
Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia
respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and
1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech
and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be
considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome.
On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice
of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action
Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one
can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans
overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe
Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with
the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by
Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France
respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.)
The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very
s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst
Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland.
the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war
progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden.
Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the
U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed
14
SLOVAKIA
agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the
acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged
by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is
n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com•
mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent
since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich
they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary,
they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak
people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The
proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso
and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed
for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter
of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only
were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives
involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such ....
Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi•
dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the
c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a
democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic."
T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech
ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has
been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis.
Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been
s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt
v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the
fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent
Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop
Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have
thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there
is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I
sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo.
Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In
any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The
Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in
t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could
not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian·
ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever
slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor."
The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation
of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not
a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce.
As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that
Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked
t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes
r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary."
SLOVAKIA
16
This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the
Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on
Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts.
And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea
aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted
to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the
last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice
trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly
Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of
Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi·
dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused.
Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line.
After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought
refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the
American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the
Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak
League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had
authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff
were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been
taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of
the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at
the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception
of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks.
Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth
chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously
in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was
transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for
his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa
appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly
res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted
and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia
election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the
Slovaks at that time."
Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not
c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho•
Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech
domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my
policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have
done," Tis o declared.
.,.
For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la.
Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the
Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso
at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people,
who were sent to Lalbor Camps.
On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When
asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for
16
SLOVA.KIA
mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend
his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea,
and he was executed on April 18th.
Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est
is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it
was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea
for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant.
The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend.
The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu
Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere
has become very tense and there is much talk of great political
changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party.
On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official
iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various
occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard
elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against
the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has
been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly
encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to
tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic
reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and
fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe
followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti•
Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to
smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is
called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still
active followers."
Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all,
the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent
trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice.
This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish
Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to
make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the
Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter
your house and destroy you."
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp
wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin·
cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re·
celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London.
December H, 1944).
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Title
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Tiso on the Gallows
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 13-16
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
-
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Text
SLOVAKIA
17
THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE
Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche
{Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c
writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war.
He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the
Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the
French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.)
• • • •
Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new
war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot
tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two,
or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great
mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand
over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen.
In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and
reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy.
In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate
In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald:
" I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\,
that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa
of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a
refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles
behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng
better than that."
Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer:
" I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be
on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.)
lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement
had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about
freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program.
These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe
wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the
West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ?
In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t
of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten
anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté'
oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore,
wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs
to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď
agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe
�18
SLOVAKIA
period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the
second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe•
vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the
first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would
appear once more.
•
•
•
In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon·
slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and
West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal•
ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul·
wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or
Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not
a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does
not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose
power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second
World Wars.
The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945
Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance
of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe
has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists
of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East
has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening
the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help.
Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an
effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which
s he could not achieve by herself?
The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre·
ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of
the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav•
ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will
have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included)
can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre.
It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe
proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we
are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than
to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not
exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza•
tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually,
step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition
ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus
become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of
Centra] Europe.
�SLOVAKIA
19
In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity
of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability.
"The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States.
Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark
against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs·
burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to
the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of
Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the
battle of Austerlltz).
'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied
by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in
that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868).
"If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in
llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less
known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk).
" In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it
would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing
if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more
Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a
State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929).
Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918
wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful
evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed
tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb
less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll
peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas
overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of
Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons
was neitber bumane nor progresslve.
Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization
of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that
such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc.,
are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National
Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of
tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new
Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut
only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small
tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their
political pa.'\t.
While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should
like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that
area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic
t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion
�20
SLOVAKIA
which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one
common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic
background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed
by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with
Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna
and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some
Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally.
As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us
to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which
would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a
federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin
has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the
Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated
existence.
· · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a
member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as
fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons.
H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with
Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get
to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will
be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South•
east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll
be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West,
especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be
averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation.
THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks
might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common
existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the
idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto
the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may
try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had
to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions
Po,l(l&; total 15 millions.
·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent
~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say
that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to
t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical
sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across
the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide.
In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who
lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles
conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected
in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil•
lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil·
�SLPVAKIA
21
ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe
Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted.
C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference
a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her
victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy
founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable
economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the
other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the
former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by
Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference?
To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi
nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will
never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso,
was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite
of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so
doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak
Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks·
and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit,
advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free
will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80
per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be·
no Czechoslovakia.
•.. ,
The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0·
phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova•
kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and
that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_
new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past
have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of
World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for
lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be
seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do
not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e
sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million
Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians.
elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks.
·
lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo.
gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť
is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to
take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda
purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility
of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'!
•
• •
The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat
of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples
within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe
be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl
the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy
alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl
�22
SLOVAKIA
convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics.
From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty
of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to
group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary,
Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e..
natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the
other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich
even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the
case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a
Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs
and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian.
Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon
would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to
invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held
so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining
free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a
great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For
instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna
as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which,
until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria.
Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or
tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the
fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more
just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate
emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make
Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy?
The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into
her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in
the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political
entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary,
it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first
constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization
of Centra! Europe.
Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been
wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo
by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime
of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that
wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than
what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only
bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians.
�
SLOVAKIA
17
THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE
Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche
{Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c
writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war.
He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the
Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the
French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.)
• • • •
Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new
war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot
tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two,
or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great
mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand
over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen.
In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and
reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy.
In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate
In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald:
" I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\,
that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa
of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a
refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles
behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng
better than that."
Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer:
" I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be
on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.)
lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement
had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about
freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program.
These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe
wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the
West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ?
In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t
of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten
anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté'
oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore,
wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs
to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď
agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe
�18
SLOVAKIA
period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the
second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe•
vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the
first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would
appear once more.
•
•
•
In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon·
slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and
West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal•
ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul·
wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or
Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not
a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does
not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose
power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second
World Wars.
The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945
Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance
of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe
has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists
of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East
has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening
the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help.
Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an
effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which
s he could not achieve by herself?
The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre·
ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of
the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav•
ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will
have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included)
can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre.
It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe
proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we
are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than
to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not
exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza•
tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually,
step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition
ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus
become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of
Centra] Europe.
�SLOVAKIA
19
In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity
of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability.
"The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States.
Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark
against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs·
burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to
the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of
Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the
battle of Austerlltz).
'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied
by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in
that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868).
"If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in
llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less
known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk).
" In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it
would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing
if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more
Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a
State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929).
Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918
wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful
evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed
tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb
less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll
peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas
overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of
Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons
was neitber bumane nor progresslve.
Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization
of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that
such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc.,
are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National
Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of
tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new
Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut
only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small
tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their
political pa.'\t.
While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should
like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that
area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic
t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion
�20
SLOVAKIA
which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one
common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic
background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed
by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with
Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna
and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some
Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally.
As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us
to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which
would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a
federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin
has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the
Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated
existence.
· · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a
member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as
fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons.
H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with
Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get
to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will
be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South•
east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll
be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West,
especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be
averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation.
THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks
might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common
existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the
idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto
the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may
try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had
to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions
Po,l(l&; total 15 millions.
·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent
~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say
that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to
t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical
sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across
the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide.
In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who
lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles
conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected
in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil•
lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil·
�SLPVAKIA
21
ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe
Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted.
C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference
a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her
victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy
founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable
economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the
other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the
former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by
Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference?
To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi
nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will
never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso,
was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite
of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so
doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak
Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks·
and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit,
advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free
will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80
per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be·
no Czechoslovakia.
•.. ,
The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0·
phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova•
kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and
that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_
new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past
have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of
World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for
lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be
seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do
not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e
sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million
Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians.
elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks.
·
lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo.
gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť
is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to
take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda
purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility
of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'!
•
• •
The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat
of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples
within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe
be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl
the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy
alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl
�22
SLOVAKIA
convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics.
From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty
of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to
group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary,
Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e..
natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the
other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich
even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the
case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a
Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs
and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian.
Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon
would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to
invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held
so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining
free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a
great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For
instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna
as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which,
until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria.
Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or
tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the
fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more
just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate
emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make
Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy?
The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into
her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in
the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political
entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary,
it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first
constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization
of Centra! Europe.
Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been
wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo
by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime
of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that
wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than
what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only
bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians.
�
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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SLOVAKIA
17
THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE
Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche
{Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c
writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war.
He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the
Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the
French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.)
• • • •
Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new
war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot
tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two,
or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great
mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand
over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen.
In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and
reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy.
In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate
In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald:
" I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\,
that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa
of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a
refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles
behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng
better than that."
Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer:
" I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be
on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.)
lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement
had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about
freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program.
These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe
wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the
West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ?
In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t
of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten
anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté'
oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore,
wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs
to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď
agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe
18
SLOVAKIA
period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the
second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe•
vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the
first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would
appear once more.
•
•
•
In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon·
slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and
West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal•
ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul·
wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or
Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not
a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does
not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose
power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second
World Wars.
The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945
Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance
of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe
has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists
of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East
has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening
the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help.
Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an
effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which
s he could not achieve by herself?
The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre·
ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of
the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav•
ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will
have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included)
can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre.
It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe
proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we
are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than
to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not
exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza•
tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually,
step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition
ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus
become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of
Centra] Europe.
SLOVAKIA
19
In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity
of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability.
"The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States.
Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark
against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs·
burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to
the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of
Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the
battle of Austerlltz).
'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied
by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in
that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868).
"If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in
llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less
known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk).
" In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it
would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing
if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more
Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a
State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929).
Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918
wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful
evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed
tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb
less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll
peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas
overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of
Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons
was neitber bumane nor progresslve.
Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization
of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that
such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc.,
are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National
Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of
tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new
Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut
only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small
tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their
political pa.'\t.
While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should
like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that
area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic
t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion
20
SLOVAKIA
which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one
common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic
background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed
by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with
Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna
and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some
Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally.
As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us
to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which
would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a
federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin
has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the
Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated
existence.
· · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a
member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as
fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons.
H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with
Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get
to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will
be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South•
east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll
be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West,
especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be
averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation.
THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks
might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common
existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the
idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto
the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may
try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had
to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions
Po,l(l&; total 15 millions.
·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent
~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say
that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to
t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical
sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across
the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide.
In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who
lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles
conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected
in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil•
lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil·
SLPVAKIA
21
ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe
Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted.
C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference
a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her
victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy
founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable
economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the
other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the
former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by
Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference?
To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi
nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will
never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso,
was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite
of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so
doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak
Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks·
and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit,
advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free
will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80
per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be·
no Czechoslovakia.
•.. ,
The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0·
phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova•
kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and
that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_
new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past
have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of
World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for
lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be
seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do
not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e
sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million
Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians.
elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks.
·
lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo.
gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť
is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to
take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda
purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility
of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'!
•
• •
The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat
of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples
within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe
be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl
the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy
alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl
22
SLOVAKIA
convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics.
From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty
of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to
group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary,
Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e..
natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the
other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich
even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the
case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a
Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs
and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian.
Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon
would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to
invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held
so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining
free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a
great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For
instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna
as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which,
until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria.
Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or
tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the
fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more
just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate
emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make
Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy?
The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into
her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in
the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political
entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary,
it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first
constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization
of Centra! Europe.
Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been
wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo
by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime
of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that
wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than
what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only
bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Federation of the Danube
Description
An account of the resource
Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 17-22
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, 1905-1992
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/da3f2ca94d04ff9e5d213069e50cef64.pdf
37bf27089082f711bbb586f539324490
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
23
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
ORAVA
The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles
some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or
three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper.
The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as
early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of
Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069,
wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for
tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary.
If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a
gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543"
and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other
of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of
officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo
and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried
witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at
the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate,
and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the
castle proper.
In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a
Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in
l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you
enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and
find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George
Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take
you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the
upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The
chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow
rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved."
The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that
Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč.
In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert
became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica,
succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen
Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380),
and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled
the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that
he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir
dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed
througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd.
·
In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over
Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben
Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew
Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the
Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž,
�24
SLOVAKIA
was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský,
who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas
Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo
sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not
take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000
ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black
Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded
bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis
death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family.
In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen,
defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped
out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas
made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava
and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered)
and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the
castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas
could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but
did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever,
ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra,
Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber
in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next
owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well
in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit
trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout
bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him
four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on
George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich
l<'orgáč.
George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment
against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616
and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later
and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly,
a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble
for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs,
rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar
Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle
was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole
and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son
and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy
won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711.
The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was
partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored
it . to lts present cÓnditlon.
If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel
t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava
valley trom tbe castle heights.
�
SLOVAKIA
23
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
ORAVA
The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles
some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or
three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper.
The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as
early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of
Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069,
wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for
tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary.
If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a
gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543"
and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other
of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of
officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo
and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried
witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at
the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate,
and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the
castle proper.
In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a
Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in
l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you
enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and
find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George
Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take
you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the
upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The
chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow
rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved."
The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that
Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč.
In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert
became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica,
succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen
Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380),
and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled
the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that
he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir
dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed
througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd.
·
In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over
Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben
Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew
Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the
Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž,
�24
SLOVAKIA
was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský,
who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas
Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo
sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not
take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000
ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black
Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded
bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis
death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family.
In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen,
defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped
out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas
made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava
and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered)
and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the
castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas
could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but
did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever,
ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra,
Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber
in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next
owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well
in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit
trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout
bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him
four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on
George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich
l<'orgáč.
George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment
against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616
and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later
and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly,
a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble
for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs,
rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar
Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle
was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole
and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son
and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy
won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711.
The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was
partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored
it . to lts present cÓnditlon.
If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel
t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava
valley trom tbe castle heights.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
23
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
ORAVA
The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles
some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or
three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper.
The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as
early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of
Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069,
wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for
tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary.
If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a
gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543"
and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other
of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of
officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo
and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried
witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at
the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate,
and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the
castle proper.
In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a
Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in
l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you
enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and
find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George
Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take
you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the
upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The
chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow
rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved."
The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that
Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč.
In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert
became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica,
succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen
Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380),
and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled
the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that
he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir
dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed
througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd.
·
In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over
Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben
Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew
Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the
Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž,
24
SLOVAKIA
was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský,
who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas
Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo
sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not
take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000
ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black
Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded
bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis
death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family.
In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen,
defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped
out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas
made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava
and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered)
and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the
castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas
could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but
did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever,
ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra,
Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber
in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next
owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well
in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit
trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout
bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him
four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on
George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich
l<'orgáč.
George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment
against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616
and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later
and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly,
a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble
for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs,
rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar
Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle
was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole
and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son
and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy
won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711.
The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was
partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored
it . to lts present cÓnditlon.
If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel
t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava
valley trom tbe castle heights.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Orava (The Orava Castle)
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 23-24
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
castles
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Text
SLOVAKÍA
Z5
1 WAS IN SWVAKJA
Edward L. Delaney
Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country,
have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and.
As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a,
the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been
impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot
tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will
search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying
the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs.
Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part
of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the
capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors
from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city.
There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess
an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In
the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's
older ci ties.
·
It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor
extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before
visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity
for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and
the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal.
Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State,
a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me
that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that
their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that
l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out
by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light.
An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar.
Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in
Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band·
shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official
greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel,
winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a
cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact
one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied
tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the
most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart
in Centra! Europe.
What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the
usua,I formalities of visitor and host.
"Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In•
teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot
�26
SLOVAKIA
view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or
his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the
pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh
Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns.
Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any
maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in
the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed
on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over
the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the
rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no
longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with
food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early
days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces
and unappetlzing meals.
Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was
the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let,
stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of
Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials
and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before
the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a
swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste.
In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources
in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the
sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that
Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before
thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even
at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of
the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare
good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes,
spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were
reasonabl!l.
Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons
and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets.
Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany
for nearly five years.
In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but
slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur•
chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had.
At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of
goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty.
Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables
of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some
article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be
found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which
materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those
empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was
as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In
Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops
beyond the warrlng zone.
�SLOVAKIA
27
The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable
heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status
as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few
rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that
they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde•
pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in
the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved.
Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people
had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other
of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that
Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods,
such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es,
but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials.
The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts
each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary
prosperity with scant worry about the future.
Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942,
that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope
that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war
and the pf!nalties to follow.
In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country
or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs
were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the
minute as tomorrow's newspaper.
For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from
the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives,
with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other
European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts
on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the
fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or
over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the
traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In
a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the
type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States
seventy-five years ago.
Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the
minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica
was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that
my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow
storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what
seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a
sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the
appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had
probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable
manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those
middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries.
Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves
In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil
tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other
�SLQVAKIA
28
centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made
to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten
German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old.
The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less
than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In
the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural
treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the
creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes.
Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica"
and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent
drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year
old room to find tbat I was frozen to death.
Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that
were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much
of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and
Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined
at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs
of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe
quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia,
those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered
tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing
countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was
steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and
many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops.
Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at
Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have
no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever
treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the
Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot
people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In•
dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of
the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the
needs of Stalin.
Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded
by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce
of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed
persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr
Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have
been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled
for indepen?.encei · ·
S LO V A K IA -
V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA
Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often
to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that
as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into
tbe Red. orbít.
Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen
when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque
referŕed
�i LOVAKIA
efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement
Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague.
Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla.
Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a
Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past
generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough
all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb
or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc
Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb
knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be
great Slav domain of tbe Soviet.
Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman
Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe
Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and
religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng
out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd·
ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis
godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as
tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls
not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds
or tbe OnA Supreme Being.
THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS?
Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no
RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts.
A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de·
veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd
tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty
tomes on tbe origin or man, etc.
' 1•
Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor
In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul)
also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd.
"You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb
is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here
In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black
bair and blue eyes.
If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia!
kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly
supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for
hair and eyes.
lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst
or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe
�30
SLOVAKIA
Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have
been in that general part of the Near East.
The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we
have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer
lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and
pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western
s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in
France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens
in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today.
Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns
- which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake
out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come.
So there they stayed.
Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin'
lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another
evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions.
He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four
stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had
been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There
were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of
clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the
middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had
seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin,
Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had
been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have
found, do have similarity.
The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some
on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on
tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages.
Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots,
instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the
contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica.
S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS
Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow
is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it
is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely
related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and
records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have
done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to
Banska Bystrica.
It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and
strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al·
thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a
�SLOVAKIA
31
Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe.
It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub•
Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European
continent.
In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight
Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls
stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave,
half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from
Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be·
fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile.
A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND
A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about
1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when
it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov·
ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re·
1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights.
As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis
name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words
be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country.
On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes
were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather
holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a
Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg
from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng
five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor•
thy of attentlon
"Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House
today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe
way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and
Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody
reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term)
Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot
the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye
many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt.
What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_>
the Reds aga in?"
It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out
and then . . .
"Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on
the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp
in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only
one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther.
lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he
�32
SLOVAKIA
Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take
over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back•
ward tor ~ century or so."
"You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured
to say.
"NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros•
períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi·
rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on
t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!•
oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man·
archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken
over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make
it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported
by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls
brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But
ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy
of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben
they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about
it tben."
That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia
anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld
far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in
tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate
of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY
agreed with bim.
But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen·
tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln
was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In
'.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art!
exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe
facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition.
MEETING PRESIDENT TISO
At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben
comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the
same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile
my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon.
Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American
an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States
wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were
also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe
greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities
in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn
countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New
York.
He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of
the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs
in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange
an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did.
�SLOVAKIA
33
When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted
for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t,
cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that
it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd
domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a
persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t,
whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on
politlcal issues - domestic and foreign.
Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted
those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please
people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real
thoughts.
He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin
left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He
was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have
prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often
the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r
was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted
bis dark blue eyes.
Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some
dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview
was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a
sovere!gn state.
"Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian
government."
Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not
president.
"There was Richelieu."
He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe
Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history
was correct.
After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had
been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I
would like to do so.
"Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m."
WHAT ABOUT POLICIES?
Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and
most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside
Central Europe during these days.
"It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?"
'"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu•
lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce
we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them.
But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory
as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo
his none too subtle meaning.
�34
SLOVAKIA
"Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by
that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from
the Vatican."
"The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no
connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels,
the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited
representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in
Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our
people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop.
In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other
than I have polnted out."
All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran
Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader
and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were
personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics.
AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ?
Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again
llilite in a government after tbe war?
That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me
that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government,
there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy,
which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested
and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for
protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and
demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de·
s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the
Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and
was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations.
They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent
country. The problems facing them were many and varied.
President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt
in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the
prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through
the enactment of the programs of development then under way.
NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS
Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women
for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors
in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects.
Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want
to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many
businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme."
He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans
were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much
on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for
�SLOVAKIA
36
tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come
into the country to aid In its development.
THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS
There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the
Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941,
but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work·
Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort.
l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs
and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood
brotbers?
Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite
true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table
in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man."
Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla•
vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace
Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But
because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe
propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western
Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually
delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke
to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled
to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst
horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department,
as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe
Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination.
Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country
that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive
in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth·
less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon,
is a grave question.
Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the
assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they
enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben
the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech
majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey
did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe
situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla
accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then
tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi
in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland.
AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted,
smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet
to be wrltten.
�36
SLOVAKlA
TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR
After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about
to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe
Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a
vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe
took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later,
he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat
is another story.
Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me.
"Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re
always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb
In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable
humor In you."
"Perbaps," he smlled.
"Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?"
"Wbat, · for instance·?"
"I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal
purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod
Canadlan whisky."
Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted
there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. ·
The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me
to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the
Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most
treasur-ed possession.
Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now
a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna,
whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot,
Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he
was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was
polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces
or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald
tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country.
COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED
Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months,
was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches
and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the
hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed
bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb
to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials.
"That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal
sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?"
�SLOVAKIA
37
Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know,
but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question
me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was
doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory
for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure
mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge
into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought
out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly
before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo·
vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport
me?
Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me
that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets
on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be
detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured
him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an
extended period.
1 GO TO PIESTAN Y
At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a
health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for
its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German
mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al·
though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force,
judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or
departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there
for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which
weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme.
Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are
beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before
the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and
l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an
island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the
Slovak State.
Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak
Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children
- ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister,
Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio
government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally,
he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to
the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern
Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti
Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by
Germany and cooperating with it.
TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN
But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President
Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the
suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to
the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a
�38
SLOVAK.IA
later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee,"
twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak
Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers."
Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The
question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians"
"Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no.
I was not restralned from associating with them.
In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because,
unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt·
ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian
Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived
some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also.
They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the
country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though
restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps
found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the
Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was
for a trip there and return the same day.
Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to
roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting
what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres,
uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer.
Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak
government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at
regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group.
It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity
were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have
ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen
into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the
Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search
and seizure.
Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer,
a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose
plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New
York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo
where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt
had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and
filmed, as were other of bis plays.
TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE
The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same
permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was
an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer
for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in
Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician
attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of
�SLOVAKIA
39
anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de•
manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but
falsehoods.
Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts.
Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary
forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a
Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the
Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He
felt that it was h!s death knell.
It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward
deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer
Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I
never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s
picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted
away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished
the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many
instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this
is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda
by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members
aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews.
WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A -
GERMANS TAKE OVER
In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German
occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful
nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent
enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force
a quarrel with a giant.
Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the
German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded.
Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah
River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades
and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect
and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city.
Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld
telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far
into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt
was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were
closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed
that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was
at tbelr door.
Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe
office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my
twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He
merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he
asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany."
An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope
for greater consideratlon.
But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice.
however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've
forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and
stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas
been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans
tlncl :,ou."
�40
SLOVAKlA
Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe
German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in
the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.?
Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such
times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement
tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my
bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch
tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed.
Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable.
Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country
were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the
villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were
burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the
way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away.
Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the
eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward
by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time
those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over
t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the
western horizon.
" LIBERATION" BY THE REDS
But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German
evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern
areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by
the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed
to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between
the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle
Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies.
Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand
the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them
to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside
world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the
Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and
also become known to the Allied authorlties.
The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to
alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans
lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght
have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna
and then to Sllesia.
Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down
over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose
who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded
- whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts
to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis
wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that
nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers
were sent to brighten tbelr rooms.
··· ~- '
�SLÔVlinA
41
What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded
Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they
voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon.
More on this will follow.
The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention
that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took
them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President
and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy
and the giant. Might was right.
The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told
later.
THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END
On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe
forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re
turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also
that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber
Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not
Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer"
but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the
attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per•
manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures
of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and
tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that
he sustained other injuries.
The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the
liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there
was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views
and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The
piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and
foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most
meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the
Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people.
Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to
observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet
to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto
Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re.
peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re•
membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in
Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control,
once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon
was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf•
fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also,
was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume
- regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect
now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the
Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so
obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was
but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt.
After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had
been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the
East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil•
�42
SLOVAK.IA
lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards.
When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d
in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In
Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious
thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from
Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But
when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready
left. Now, where to go or what to do?
Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets
westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon
of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the
Hed army captured and butchered them.
OFF TO PRAGUE
An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport
was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or
permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me
that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation."
At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was
scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething
mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to
get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock,
tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss
the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would
ever get out of the stricken city.
The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening
blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight
in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel,
I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express
train which landed me in Prague about mldnight.
All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de•
parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation."
Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees
from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of
weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in
Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then?
Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled
with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and
children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.•
of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as
much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees
in dayl!gbt llours.
�SLOVAKIA
43
REVOLUTION AND REVENGE
Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious
and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg
in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed
to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making.
Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began
defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments.
Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual
language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by
tbe crowd
Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military
cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he
loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view.
A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe
walls and the rattle of machlne guns
Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio
remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it
were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty,
tben ten miles away.
Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken
English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;,
of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would
be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was:
'·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?"
Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That
Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een
sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with
Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who
was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from
the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet,
the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the
Cruclfixion.
THE SAD AWAKENING
On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and
millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were
s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz.
These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first
been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they
turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague.
The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or
these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI
against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when
he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them
sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not.
General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just
as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing
squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove
a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war
for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are
�SLOV~ .I A
110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard.
And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta.
By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the
n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds
or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the
Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did
not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city,
they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place
behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the
p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words.
It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret
conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit.
It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks,
who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and
who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght
to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to
Red dominat!on.
After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those
of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo
assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate
statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that
~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort.
For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew
in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he
then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles
and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth
benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or
those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra!
:E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records.
Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt
snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and
deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past
bistory.
But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has
1emalned.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be
s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as
fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In
it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to
freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are
entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want
ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950).
�
SLOVAKÍA
Z5
1 WAS IN SWVAKJA
Edward L. Delaney
Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country,
have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and.
As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a,
the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been
impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot
tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will
search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying
the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs.
Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part
of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the
capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors
from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city.
There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess
an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In
the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's
older ci ties.
·
It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor
extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before
visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity
for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and
the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal.
Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State,
a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me
that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that
their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that
l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out
by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light.
An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar.
Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in
Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band·
shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official
greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel,
winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a
cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact
one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied
tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the
most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart
in Centra! Europe.
What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the
usua,I formalities of visitor and host.
"Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In•
teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot
�26
SLOVAKIA
view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or
his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the
pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh
Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns.
Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any
maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in
the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed
on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over
the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the
rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no
longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with
food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early
days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces
and unappetlzing meals.
Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was
the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let,
stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of
Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials
and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before
the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a
swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste.
In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources
in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the
sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that
Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before
thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even
at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of
the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare
good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes,
spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were
reasonabl!l.
Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons
and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets.
Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany
for nearly five years.
In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but
slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur•
chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had.
At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of
goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty.
Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables
of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some
article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be
found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which
materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those
empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was
as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In
Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops
beyond the warrlng zone.
�SLOVAKIA
27
The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable
heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status
as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few
rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that
they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde•
pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in
the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved.
Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people
had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other
of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that
Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods,
such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es,
but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials.
The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts
each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary
prosperity with scant worry about the future.
Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942,
that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope
that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war
and the pf!nalties to follow.
In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country
or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs
were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the
minute as tomorrow's newspaper.
For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from
the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives,
with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other
European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts
on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the
fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or
over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the
traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In
a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the
type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States
seventy-five years ago.
Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the
minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica
was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that
my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow
storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what
seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a
sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the
appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had
probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable
manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those
middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries.
Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves
In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil
tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other
�SLQVAKIA
28
centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made
to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten
German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old.
The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less
than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In
the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural
treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the
creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes.
Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica"
and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent
drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year
old room to find tbat I was frozen to death.
Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that
were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much
of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and
Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined
at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs
of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe
quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia,
those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered
tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing
countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was
steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and
many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops.
Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at
Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have
no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever
treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the
Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot
people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In•
dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of
the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the
needs of Stalin.
Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded
by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce
of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed
persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr
Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have
been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled
for indepen?.encei · ·
S LO V A K IA -
V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA
Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often
to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that
as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into
tbe Red. orbít.
Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen
when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque
referŕed
�i LOVAKIA
efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement
Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague.
Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla.
Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a
Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past
generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough
all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb
or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc
Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb
knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be
great Slav domain of tbe Soviet.
Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman
Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe
Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and
religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng
out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd·
ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis
godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as
tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls
not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds
or tbe OnA Supreme Being.
THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS?
Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no
RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts.
A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de·
veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd
tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty
tomes on tbe origin or man, etc.
' 1•
Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor
In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul)
also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd.
"You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb
is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here
In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black
bair and blue eyes.
If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia!
kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly
supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for
hair and eyes.
lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst
or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe
�30
SLOVAKIA
Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have
been in that general part of the Near East.
The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we
have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer
lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and
pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western
s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in
France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens
in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today.
Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns
- which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake
out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come.
So there they stayed.
Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin'
lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another
evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions.
He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four
stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had
been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There
were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of
clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the
middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had
seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin,
Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had
been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have
found, do have similarity.
The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some
on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on
tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages.
Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots,
instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the
contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica.
S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS
Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow
is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it
is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely
related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and
records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have
done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to
Banska Bystrica.
It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and
strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al·
thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a
�SLOVAKIA
31
Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe.
It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub•
Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European
continent.
In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight
Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls
stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave,
half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from
Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be·
fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile.
A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND
A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about
1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when
it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov·
ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re·
1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights.
As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis
name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words
be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country.
On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes
were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather
holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a
Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg
from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng
five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor•
thy of attentlon
"Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House
today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe
way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and
Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody
reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term)
Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot
the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye
many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt.
What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_>
the Reds aga in?"
It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out
and then . . .
"Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on
the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp
in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only
one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther.
lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he
�32
SLOVAKIA
Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take
over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back•
ward tor ~ century or so."
"You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured
to say.
"NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros•
períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi·
rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on
t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!•
oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man·
archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken
over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make
it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported
by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls
brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But
ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy
of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben
they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about
it tben."
That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia
anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld
far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in
tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate
of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY
agreed with bim.
But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen·
tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln
was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In
'.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art!
exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe
facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition.
MEETING PRESIDENT TISO
At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben
comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the
same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile
my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon.
Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American
an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States
wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were
also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe
greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities
in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn
countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New
York.
He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of
the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs
in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange
an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did.
�SLOVAKIA
33
When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted
for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t,
cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that
it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd
domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a
persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t,
whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on
politlcal issues - domestic and foreign.
Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted
those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please
people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real
thoughts.
He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin
left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He
was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have
prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often
the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r
was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted
bis dark blue eyes.
Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some
dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview
was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a
sovere!gn state.
"Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian
government."
Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not
president.
"There was Richelieu."
He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe
Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history
was correct.
After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had
been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I
would like to do so.
"Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m."
WHAT ABOUT POLICIES?
Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and
most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside
Central Europe during these days.
"It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?"
'"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu•
lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce
we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them.
But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory
as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo
his none too subtle meaning.
�34
SLOVAKIA
"Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by
that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from
the Vatican."
"The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no
connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels,
the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited
representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in
Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our
people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop.
In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other
than I have polnted out."
All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran
Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader
and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were
personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics.
AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ?
Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again
llilite in a government after tbe war?
That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me
that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government,
there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy,
which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested
and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for
protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and
demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de·
s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the
Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and
was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations.
They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent
country. The problems facing them were many and varied.
President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt
in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the
prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through
the enactment of the programs of development then under way.
NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS
Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women
for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors
in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects.
Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want
to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many
businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme."
He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans
were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much
on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for
�SLOVAKIA
36
tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come
into the country to aid In its development.
THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS
There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the
Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941,
but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work·
Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort.
l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs
and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood
brotbers?
Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite
true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table
in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man."
Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla•
vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace
Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But
because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe
propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western
Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually
delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke
to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled
to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst
horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department,
as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe
Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination.
Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country
that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive
in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth·
less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon,
is a grave question.
Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the
assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they
enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben
the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech
majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey
did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe
situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla
accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then
tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi
in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland.
AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted,
smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet
to be wrltten.
�36
SLOVAKlA
TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR
After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about
to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe
Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a
vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe
took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later,
he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat
is another story.
Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me.
"Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re
always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb
In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable
humor In you."
"Perbaps," he smlled.
"Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?"
"Wbat, · for instance·?"
"I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal
purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod
Canadlan whisky."
Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted
there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. ·
The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me
to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the
Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most
treasur-ed possession.
Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now
a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna,
whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot,
Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he
was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was
polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces
or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald
tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country.
COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED
Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months,
was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches
and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the
hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed
bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb
to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials.
"That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal
sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?"
�SLOVAKIA
37
Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know,
but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question
me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was
doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory
for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure
mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge
into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought
out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly
before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo·
vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport
me?
Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me
that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets
on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be
detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured
him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an
extended period.
1 GO TO PIESTAN Y
At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a
health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for
its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German
mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al·
though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force,
judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or
departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there
for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which
weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme.
Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are
beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before
the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and
l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an
island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the
Slovak State.
Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak
Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children
- ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister,
Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio
government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally,
he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to
the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern
Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti
Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by
Germany and cooperating with it.
TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN
But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President
Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the
suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to
the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a
�38
SLOVAK.IA
later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee,"
twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak
Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers."
Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The
question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians"
"Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no.
I was not restralned from associating with them.
In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because,
unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt·
ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian
Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived
some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also.
They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the
country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though
restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps
found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the
Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was
for a trip there and return the same day.
Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to
roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting
what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres,
uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer.
Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak
government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at
regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group.
It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity
were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have
ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen
into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the
Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search
and seizure.
Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer,
a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose
plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New
York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo
where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt
had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and
filmed, as were other of bis plays.
TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE
The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same
permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was
an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer
for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in
Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician
attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of
�SLOVAKIA
39
anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de•
manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but
falsehoods.
Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts.
Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary
forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a
Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the
Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He
felt that it was h!s death knell.
It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward
deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer
Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I
never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s
picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted
away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished
the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many
instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this
is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda
by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members
aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews.
WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A -
GERMANS TAKE OVER
In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German
occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful
nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent
enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force
a quarrel with a giant.
Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the
German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded.
Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah
River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades
and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect
and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city.
Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld
telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far
into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt
was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were
closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed
that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was
at tbelr door.
Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe
office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my
twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He
merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he
asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany."
An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope
for greater consideratlon.
But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice.
however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've
forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and
stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas
been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans
tlncl :,ou."
�40
SLOVAKlA
Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe
German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in
the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.?
Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such
times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement
tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my
bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch
tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed.
Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable.
Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country
were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the
villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were
burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the
way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away.
Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the
eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward
by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time
those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over
t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the
western horizon.
" LIBERATION" BY THE REDS
But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German
evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern
areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by
the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed
to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between
the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle
Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies.
Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand
the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them
to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside
world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the
Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and
also become known to the Allied authorlties.
The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to
alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans
lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght
have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna
and then to Sllesia.
Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down
over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose
who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded
- whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts
to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis
wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that
nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers
were sent to brighten tbelr rooms.
··· ~- '
�SLÔVlinA
41
What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded
Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they
voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon.
More on this will follow.
The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention
that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took
them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President
and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy
and the giant. Might was right.
The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told
later.
THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END
On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe
forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re
turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also
that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber
Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not
Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer"
but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the
attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per•
manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures
of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and
tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that
he sustained other injuries.
The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the
liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there
was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views
and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The
piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and
foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most
meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the
Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people.
Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to
observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet
to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto
Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re.
peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re•
membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in
Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control,
once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon
was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf•
fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also,
was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume
- regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect
now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the
Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so
obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was
but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt.
After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had
been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the
East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil•
�42
SLOVAK.IA
lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards.
When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d
in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In
Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious
thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from
Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But
when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready
left. Now, where to go or what to do?
Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets
westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon
of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the
Hed army captured and butchered them.
OFF TO PRAGUE
An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport
was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or
permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me
that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation."
At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was
scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething
mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to
get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock,
tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss
the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would
ever get out of the stricken city.
The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening
blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight
in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel,
I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express
train which landed me in Prague about mldnight.
All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de•
parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation."
Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees
from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of
weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in
Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then?
Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled
with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and
children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.•
of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as
much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees
in dayl!gbt llours.
�SLOVAKIA
43
REVOLUTION AND REVENGE
Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious
and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg
in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed
to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making.
Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began
defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments.
Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual
language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by
tbe crowd
Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military
cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he
loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view.
A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe
walls and the rattle of machlne guns
Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio
remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it
were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty,
tben ten miles away.
Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken
English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;,
of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would
be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was:
'·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?"
Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That
Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een
sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with
Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who
was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from
the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet,
the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the
Cruclfixion.
THE SAD AWAKENING
On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and
millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were
s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz.
These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first
been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they
turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague.
The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or
these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI
against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when
he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them
sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not.
General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just
as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing
squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove
a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war
for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are
�SLOV~ .I A
110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard.
And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta.
By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the
n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds
or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the
Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did
not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city,
they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place
behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the
p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words.
It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret
conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit.
It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks,
who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and
who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght
to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to
Red dominat!on.
After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those
of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo
assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate
statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that
~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort.
For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew
in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he
then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles
and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth
benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or
those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra!
:E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records.
Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt
snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and
deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past
bistory.
But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has
1emalned.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be
s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as
fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In
it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to
freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are
entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want
ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950).
�
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1952, Vol. 2
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The Slovak League of America
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1952
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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SLOVAKÍA
Z5
1 WAS IN SWVAKJA
Edward L. Delaney
Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country,
have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and.
As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a,
the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been
impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot
tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will
search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying
the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs.
Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part
of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the
capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors
from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city.
There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess
an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In
the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's
older ci ties.
·
It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor
extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before
visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity
for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and
the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal.
Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State,
a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me
that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that
their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that
l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out
by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light.
An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar.
Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in
Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band·
shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official
greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel,
winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a
cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact
one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied
tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the
most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart
in Centra! Europe.
What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the
usua,I formalities of visitor and host.
"Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In•
teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot
26
SLOVAKIA
view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or
his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the
pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh
Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns.
Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any
maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in
the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed
on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over
the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the
rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no
longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with
food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early
days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces
and unappetlzing meals.
Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was
the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let,
stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of
Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials
and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before
the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a
swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste.
In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources
in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the
sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that
Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before
thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even
at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of
the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare
good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes,
spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were
reasonabl!l.
Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons
and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets.
Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany
for nearly five years.
In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but
slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur•
chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had.
At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of
goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty.
Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables
of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some
article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be
found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which
materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those
empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was
as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In
Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops
beyond the warrlng zone.
SLOVAKIA
27
The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable
heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status
as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few
rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that
they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde•
pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in
the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved.
Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people
had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other
of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that
Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods,
such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es,
but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials.
The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts
each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary
prosperity with scant worry about the future.
Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942,
that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope
that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war
and the pf!nalties to follow.
In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country
or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs
were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the
minute as tomorrow's newspaper.
For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from
the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives,
with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other
European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts
on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the
fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or
over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the
traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In
a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the
type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States
seventy-five years ago.
Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the
minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica
was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that
my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow
storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what
seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a
sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the
appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had
probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable
manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those
middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries.
Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves
In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil
tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other
SLQVAKIA
28
centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made
to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten
German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old.
The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less
than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In
the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural
treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the
creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes.
Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica"
and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent
drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year
old room to find tbat I was frozen to death.
Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that
were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much
of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and
Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined
at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs
of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe
quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia,
those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered
tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing
countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was
steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and
many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops.
Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at
Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have
no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever
treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the
Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot
people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In•
dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of
the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the
needs of Stalin.
Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded
by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce
of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed
persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr
Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have
been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled
for indepen?.encei · ·
S LO V A K IA -
V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA
Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often
to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that
as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into
tbe Red. orbít.
Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen
when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque
referŕed
i LOVAKIA
efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement
Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague.
Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla.
Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a
Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past
generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough
all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb
or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc
Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb
knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be
great Slav domain of tbe Soviet.
Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman
Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe
Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and
religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng
out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd·
ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis
godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as
tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls
not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds
or tbe OnA Supreme Being.
THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS?
Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no
RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts.
A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de·
veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd
tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty
tomes on tbe origin or man, etc.
' 1•
Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor
In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul)
also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd.
"You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb
is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here
In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black
bair and blue eyes.
If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia!
kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly
supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for
hair and eyes.
lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst
or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe
30
SLOVAKIA
Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have
been in that general part of the Near East.
The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we
have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer
lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and
pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western
s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in
France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens
in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today.
Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns
- which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake
out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come.
So there they stayed.
Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin'
lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another
evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions.
He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four
stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had
been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There
were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of
clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the
middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had
seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin,
Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had
been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have
found, do have similarity.
The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some
on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on
tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages.
Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots,
instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the
contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica.
S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS
Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow
is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it
is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely
related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and
records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have
done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to
Banska Bystrica.
It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and
strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al·
thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a
SLOVAKIA
31
Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe.
It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub•
Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European
continent.
In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight
Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls
stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave,
half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from
Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be·
fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile.
A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND
A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about
1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when
it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov·
ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re·
1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights.
As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis
name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words
be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country.
On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes
were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather
holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a
Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg
from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng
five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor•
thy of attentlon
"Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House
today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe
way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and
Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody
reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term)
Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot
the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye
many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt.
What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_>
the Reds aga in?"
It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out
and then . . .
"Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on
the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp
in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only
one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther.
lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he
32
SLOVAKIA
Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take
over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back•
ward tor ~ century or so."
"You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured
to say.
"NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros•
períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi·
rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on
t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!•
oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man·
archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken
over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make
it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported
by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls
brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But
ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy
of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben
they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about
it tben."
That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia
anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld
far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in
tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate
of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY
agreed with bim.
But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen·
tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln
was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In
'.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art!
exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe
facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition.
MEETING PRESIDENT TISO
At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben
comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the
same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile
my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon.
Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American
an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States
wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were
also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe
greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities
in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn
countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New
York.
He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of
the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs
in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange
an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did.
SLOVAKIA
33
When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted
for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t,
cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that
it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd
domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a
persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t,
whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on
politlcal issues - domestic and foreign.
Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted
those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please
people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real
thoughts.
He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin
left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He
was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have
prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often
the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r
was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted
bis dark blue eyes.
Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some
dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview
was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a
sovere!gn state.
"Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian
government."
Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not
president.
"There was Richelieu."
He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe
Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history
was correct.
After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had
been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I
would like to do so.
"Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m."
WHAT ABOUT POLICIES?
Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and
most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside
Central Europe during these days.
"It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?"
'"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu•
lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce
we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them.
But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory
as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo
his none too subtle meaning.
34
SLOVAKIA
"Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by
that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from
the Vatican."
"The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no
connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels,
the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited
representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in
Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our
people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop.
In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other
than I have polnted out."
All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran
Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader
and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were
personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics.
AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ?
Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again
llilite in a government after tbe war?
That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me
that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government,
there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy,
which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested
and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for
protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and
demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de·
s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the
Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and
was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations.
They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent
country. The problems facing them were many and varied.
President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt
in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the
prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through
the enactment of the programs of development then under way.
NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS
Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women
for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors
in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects.
Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want
to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many
businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme."
He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans
were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much
on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for
SLOVAKIA
36
tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come
into the country to aid In its development.
THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS
There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the
Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941,
but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work·
Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort.
l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs
and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood
brotbers?
Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite
true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table
in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man."
Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla•
vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace
Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But
because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe
propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western
Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually
delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke
to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled
to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst
horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department,
as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe
Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination.
Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country
that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive
in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth·
less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon,
is a grave question.
Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the
assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they
enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben
the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech
majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey
did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe
situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla
accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then
tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi
in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland.
AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted,
smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet
to be wrltten.
36
SLOVAKlA
TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR
After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about
to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe
Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a
vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe
took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later,
he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat
is another story.
Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me.
"Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re
always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb
In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable
humor In you."
"Perbaps," he smlled.
"Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?"
"Wbat, · for instance·?"
"I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal
purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod
Canadlan whisky."
Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted
there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. ·
The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me
to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the
Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most
treasur-ed possession.
Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now
a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna,
whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot,
Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he
was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was
polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces
or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald
tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country.
COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED
Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months,
was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches
and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the
hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed
bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb
to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials.
"That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal
sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?"
SLOVAKIA
37
Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know,
but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question
me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was
doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory
for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure
mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge
into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought
out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly
before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo·
vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport
me?
Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me
that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets
on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be
detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured
him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an
extended period.
1 GO TO PIESTAN Y
At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a
health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for
its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German
mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al·
though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force,
judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or
departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there
for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which
weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme.
Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are
beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before
the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and
l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an
island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the
Slovak State.
Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak
Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children
- ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister,
Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio
government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally,
he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to
the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern
Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti
Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by
Germany and cooperating with it.
TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN
But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President
Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the
suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to
the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a
38
SLOVAK.IA
later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee,"
twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak
Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers."
Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The
question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians"
"Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no.
I was not restralned from associating with them.
In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because,
unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt·
ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian
Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived
some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also.
They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the
country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though
restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps
found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the
Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was
for a trip there and return the same day.
Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to
roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting
what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres,
uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer.
Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak
government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at
regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group.
It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity
were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have
ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen
into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the
Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search
and seizure.
Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer,
a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose
plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New
York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo
where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt
had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and
filmed, as were other of bis plays.
TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE
The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same
permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was
an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer
for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in
Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician
attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of
SLOVAKIA
39
anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de•
manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but
falsehoods.
Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts.
Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary
forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a
Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the
Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He
felt that it was h!s death knell.
It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward
deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer
Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I
never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s
picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted
away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished
the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many
instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this
is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda
by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members
aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews.
WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A -
GERMANS TAKE OVER
In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German
occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful
nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent
enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force
a quarrel with a giant.
Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the
German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded.
Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah
River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades
and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect
and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city.
Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld
telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far
into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt
was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were
closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed
that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was
at tbelr door.
Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe
office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my
twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He
merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he
asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany."
An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope
for greater consideratlon.
But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice.
however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've
forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and
stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas
been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans
tlncl :,ou."
40
SLOVAKlA
Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe
German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in
the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.?
Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such
times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement
tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my
bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch
tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed.
Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable.
Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country
were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the
villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were
burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the
way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away.
Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the
eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward
by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time
those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over
t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the
western horizon.
" LIBERATION" BY THE REDS
But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German
evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern
areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by
the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed
to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between
the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle
Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies.
Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand
the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them
to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside
world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the
Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and
also become known to the Allied authorlties.
The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to
alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans
lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght
have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna
and then to Sllesia.
Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down
over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose
who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded
- whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts
to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis
wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that
nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers
were sent to brighten tbelr rooms.
··· ~- '
SLÔVlinA
41
What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded
Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they
voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon.
More on this will follow.
The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention
that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took
them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President
and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy
and the giant. Might was right.
The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told
later.
THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END
On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe
forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re
turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also
that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber
Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not
Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer"
but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the
attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per•
manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures
of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and
tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that
he sustained other injuries.
The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the
liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there
was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views
and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The
piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and
foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most
meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the
Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people.
Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to
observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet
to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto
Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re.
peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re•
membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in
Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control,
once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon
was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf•
fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also,
was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume
- regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect
now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the
Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so
obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was
but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt.
After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had
been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the
East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil•
42
SLOVAK.IA
lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards.
When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d
in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In
Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious
thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from
Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But
when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready
left. Now, where to go or what to do?
Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets
westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon
of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the
Hed army captured and butchered them.
OFF TO PRAGUE
An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport
was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or
permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me
that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation."
At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was
scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething
mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to
get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock,
tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss
the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would
ever get out of the stricken city.
The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening
blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight
in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel,
I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express
train which landed me in Prague about mldnight.
All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de•
parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation."
Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees
from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of
weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in
Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then?
Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled
with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and
children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.•
of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as
much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees
in dayl!gbt llours.
SLOVAKIA
43
REVOLUTION AND REVENGE
Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious
and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg
in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed
to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making.
Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began
defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments.
Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual
language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by
tbe crowd
Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military
cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he
loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view.
A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe
walls and the rattle of machlne guns
Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio
remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it
were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty,
tben ten miles away.
Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken
English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;,
of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would
be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was:
'·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?"
Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That
Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een
sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with
Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who
was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from
the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet,
the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the
Cruclfixion.
THE SAD AWAKENING
On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and
millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were
s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz.
These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first
been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they
turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague.
The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or
these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI
against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when
he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them
sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not.
General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just
as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing
squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove
a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war
for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are
SLOV~ .I A
110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard.
And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta.
By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the
n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds
or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the
Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did
not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city,
they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place
behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the
p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words.
It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret
conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit.
It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks,
who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and
who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght
to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to
Red dominat!on.
After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those
of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo
assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate
statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that
~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort.
For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew
in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he
then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles
and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth
benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or
those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra!
:E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records.
Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt
snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and
deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past
bistory.
But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has
1emalned.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be
s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as
fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In
it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to
freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are
entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want
ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950).
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I Was in Slovakia
Description
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Edward L. Delaney
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 25-44
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Delaney, Edward L.
Date
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March 1952
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Text
SLOVAKIA
45
DR. JOSF..PH TISO
Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the
Slovak Nation
Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was
born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing
bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in
1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology.
Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce.
In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was
i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or
religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint·
ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father
with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history.
Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He
was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities,
the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly
a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to
elevate them spiritually and m?,terially.
In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce
and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until
he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party,
he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min•
ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme.
Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of
Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa•
ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical
skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim.
Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never
would have been elected
Presldent.
.
.
Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he
came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo·
vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house.
·
When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the
Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous
Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence
of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso
presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939.
Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the
years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng
toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with·
rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to
the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak
,1ľar
�46
SLOVAKIA
government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army
authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and
members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak
authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti·
gated by the U. S. authorities.
From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra•
tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced
by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out
loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was
pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree
wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause
of his people and his Church.
•
•
•
;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl.
PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO
ms PEOPLE
" In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl•
message to the Slovak natlon :
" In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In
every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE
NATION.
I===
_
::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~:
I===_
"That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1
'=-
!=
1
1
~
;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~
:h::~:n::
:o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,!
bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way,
:::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;::
of 1t, Chri,tlan
cha~oto•,
'=-
1
"A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro.
_
Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m.
1
~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1
DR. JOSEPH TISO.
~
(ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~
�
SLOVAKIA
45
DR. JOSF..PH TISO
Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the
Slovak Nation
Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was
born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing
bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in
1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology.
Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce.
In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was
i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or
religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint·
ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father
with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history.
Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He
was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities,
the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly
a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to
elevate them spiritually and m?,terially.
In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce
and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until
he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party,
he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min•
ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme.
Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of
Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa•
ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical
skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim.
Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never
would have been elected
Presldent.
.
.
Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he
came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo·
vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house.
·
When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the
Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous
Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence
of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso
presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939.
Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the
years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng
toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with·
rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to
the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak
,1ľar
�46
SLOVAKIA
government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army
authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and
members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak
authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti·
gated by the U. S. authorities.
From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra•
tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced
by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out
loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was
pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree
wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause
of his people and his Church.
•
•
•
;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl.
PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO
ms PEOPLE
" In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl•
message to the Slovak natlon :
" In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In
every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE
NATION.
I===
_
::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~:
I===_
"That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1
'=-
!=
1
1
~
;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~
:h::~:n::
:o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,!
bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way,
:::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;::
of 1t, Chri,tlan
cha~oto•,
'=-
1
"A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro.
_
Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m.
1
~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1
DR. JOSEPH TISO.
~
(ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
45
DR. JOSF..PH TISO
Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the
Slovak Nation
Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was
born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing
bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in
1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology.
Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce.
In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was
i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or
religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint·
ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father
with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history.
Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He
was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities,
the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly
a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to
elevate them spiritually and m?,terially.
In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce
and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until
he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party,
he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min•
ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme.
Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of
Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa•
ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical
skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim.
Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never
would have been elected
Presldent.
.
.
Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he
came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo·
vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house.
·
When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the
Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous
Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence
of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso
presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939.
Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the
years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng
toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with·
rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to
the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak
,1ľar
46
SLOVAKIA
government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army
authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and
members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak
authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti·
gated by the U. S. authorities.
From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra•
tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced
by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out
loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was
pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree
wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause
of his people and his Church.
•
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dr. Joseph Tiso
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 45-46
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/eb1d6340b2bbe1b294801953ebfa8501.pdf
a085e310acd3ef0b5c8710012d6b1111
PDF Text
Text
46
SLOVAKIA
government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army
authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and
members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak
authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti·
gated by the U. S. authorities.
From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra•
tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced
by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out
loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was
pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree
wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause
of his people and his Church.
•
•
•
;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl.
PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO
ms PEOPLE
" In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl•
message to the Slovak natlon :
" In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In
every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE
NATION.
I===
_
::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~:
I===_
"That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1
'=-
!=
1
1
~
;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~
:h::~:n::
:o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,!
bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way,
:::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;::
of 1t, Chri,tlan
cha~oto•,
'=-
1
"A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro.
_
Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m.
1
~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1
DR. JOSEPH TISO.
~
(ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~
�
46
SLOVAKIA
government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army
authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and
members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak
authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti·
gated by the U. S. authorities.
From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra•
tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced
by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out
loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was
pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree
wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause
of his people and his Church.
•
•
•
;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl.
PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO
ms PEOPLE
" In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl•
message to the Slovak natlon :
" In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In
every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE
NATION.
I===
_
::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~:
I===_
"That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1
'=-
!=
1
1
~
;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~
:h::~:n::
:o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,!
bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way,
:::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;::
of 1t, Chri,tlan
cha~oto•,
'=-
1
"A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro.
_
Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m.
1
~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1
DR. JOSEPH TISO.
~
(ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO HIS PEOPLE
In the spirit of the sacrifice I am about to make, I send this message to the Slovak nation:
In harmony and unison pursue always, everywhere and in every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND FOR THE NATION.
THAT IS NOT ONLY THE UNEQUIVOCAL INTENT OF Slovak history, but also the explicit command of God, Who has made it the law of nature and has inculcated it into the soul of the nation and every one of its members.
That precept I have served all my life and, therefore, I consider myself first of all a martyr of God’s law. Secondly, I feel that I am a martyr of the defense of Christianity against bolshevism, against which our nation must in all possible ways defend itself, not only in the spirit of its Christian character, but also in the interest of its future.
As I beg you to remember me in your prayers, so do I promise to pray to God Almighty for you and supplicate that He bless the Slovak nation in its vital struggle for God and for the nation, so that the Slovak nation will always remain a faithful and devoted son of the Church of Christ.
Bratislava, April 18, 1947, 3 a.m.
DR. JOSEPH TISO.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Tiso's Last Message to His People
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
p. 46
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Tiso, Jozef, 1887-1947
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2cdaac0688357b8c1d5f4f9d35026a92.pdf
ef5e9274705487f6301c7fef1bdeed56
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
47
AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM
By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics
The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk,
then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends,
permit an American who has learned your languages and history to
throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now
termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present
to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations.
The study of the past and observation of today's events boil
down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the
centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of
two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where
two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to
succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must
proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise,
one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech
issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much,
much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo•
sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed
and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance.
The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again
essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart
and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be
better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in
every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical,
economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected.
Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up,
and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the
potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for
one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such
greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership.
The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a
better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get
a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was
made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal
office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po
česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list
of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble,
but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted
lt too.
�SLOVAKIA
Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good
Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel
tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are
certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in
tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla
have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and
tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was
alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for
tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at
tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to
rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would
have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in
good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose
Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes.
The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons
iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro·
gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no
word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for
Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with
Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made?
The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla
was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't
know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla
was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought
and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly
democratlc and progresslve ones.
Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word
"Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls
a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and
an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak
for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and
morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political
scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had
this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in
America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even
beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc
of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons
never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs
of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to
create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con•
sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll•
teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true
concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon
but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt
as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re•
fused to be assimillated by the Czechs.
�SLOVAKlA
49
Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing,
but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist"
and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb
causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come
back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at•
tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc
duty to demand freedom.
Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat
tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber
11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some
freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey
will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir
own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real
situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow
through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had
enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony;
they wísb to "fly alone and fly right."
This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come
so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde•
pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world
affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe
background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat
the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out
thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some
or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable
impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the
western world when the tlme comes for the debut.
In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll
lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit
Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the
United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe
them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are
too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to
study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This
apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al•
ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir
propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only
Cor tbe time being, definltely.
However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and
tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and
botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint
republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will
�60
SLOVA.K.IA
look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing.
lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In
Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they
struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what
ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of
grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class !
And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts,
which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild
propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they
a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han
t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern,
civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they
ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had
no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot
our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington
who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in
the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest
separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be
and just how blind can they be?
What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr
revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who
waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard.
Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for
the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome
them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all
such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for
their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr
liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have
been a benefactor and friend immediateJy.
Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and
see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better
worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista
through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress.
It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng,
progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to
your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are
not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista
proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the
duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista,
your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in
wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when
your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all
things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your
ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your
flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that
ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as
yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s
applles to both Slovaks and Czechs.
�SLOVAKIA
61
The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have
betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now
to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr
own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow
them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that
they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and
exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and
forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll
hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro•
gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move•
ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form
two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies.
And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re•
sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams
and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder
how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people
by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to
thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them
lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you
wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be
discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some•
t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do·
ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally
wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts
are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an
outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction
and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the
core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire
new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles
wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc
was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God•
insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls
natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per
cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that,
inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any
Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and
spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should
not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene•
gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot
one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that
with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc.
How will they contend with the rest?
Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and
oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for
it, must once reap Satan's trash.
The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement
i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours
to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove
you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause.
�52
SLOVAKIA
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the
Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of
civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of
this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho
remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr.
Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and
every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e
Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation
of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second
W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947.
•
•
•
"MURDER IN SLOVAKIA"
( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the
House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) .
Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder
in its most ghastl y and shameful form.•••
But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President
and by our American State Department while this murder was going
o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds
of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them
mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars
to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State
Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against
this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the
l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor."
Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these
American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and
may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent
wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste•
panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will
be protests. But then it wi II be too late.
Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of
Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even
have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record.
By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the
exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a
stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done
i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and
murder has free sway.
�
SLOVAKIA
47
AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM
By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics
The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk,
then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends,
permit an American who has learned your languages and history to
throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now
termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present
to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations.
The study of the past and observation of today's events boil
down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the
centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of
two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where
two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to
succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must
proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise,
one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech
issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much,
much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo•
sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed
and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance.
The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again
essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart
and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be
better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in
every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical,
economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected.
Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up,
and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the
potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for
one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such
greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership.
The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a
better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get
a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was
made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal
office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po
česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list
of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble,
but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted
lt too.
�SLOVAKIA
Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good
Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel
tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are
certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in
tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla
have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and
tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was
alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for
tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at
tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to
rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would
have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in
good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose
Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes.
The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons
iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro·
gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no
word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for
Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with
Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made?
The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla
was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't
know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla
was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought
and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly
democratlc and progresslve ones.
Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word
"Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls
a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and
an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak
for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and
morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political
scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had
this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in
America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even
beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc
of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons
never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs
of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to
create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con•
sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll•
teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true
concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon
but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt
as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re•
fused to be assimillated by the Czechs.
�SLOVAKlA
49
Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing,
but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist"
and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb
causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come
back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at•
tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc
duty to demand freedom.
Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat
tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber
11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some
freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey
will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir
own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real
situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow
through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had
enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony;
they wísb to "fly alone and fly right."
This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come
so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde•
pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world
affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe
background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat
the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out
thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some
or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable
impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the
western world when the tlme comes for the debut.
In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll
lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit
Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the
United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe
them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are
too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to
study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This
apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al•
ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir
propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only
Cor tbe time being, definltely.
However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and
tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and
botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint
republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will
�60
SLOVA.K.IA
look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing.
lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In
Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they
struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what
ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of
grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class !
And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts,
which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild
propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they
a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han
t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern,
civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they
ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had
no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot
our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington
who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in
the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest
separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be
and just how blind can they be?
What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr
revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who
waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard.
Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for
the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome
them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all
such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for
their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr
liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have
been a benefactor and friend immediateJy.
Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and
see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better
worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista
through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress.
It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng,
progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to
your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are
not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista
proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the
duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista,
your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in
wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when
your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all
things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your
ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your
flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that
ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as
yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s
applles to both Slovaks and Czechs.
�SLOVAKIA
61
The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have
betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now
to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr
own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow
them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that
they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and
exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and
forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll
hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro•
gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move•
ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form
two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies.
And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re•
sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams
and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder
how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people
by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to
thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them
lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you
wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be
discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some•
t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do·
ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally
wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts
are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an
outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction
and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the
core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire
new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles
wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc
was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God•
insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls
natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per
cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that,
inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any
Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and
spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should
not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene•
gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot
one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that
with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc.
How will they contend with the rest?
Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and
oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for
it, must once reap Satan's trash.
The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement
i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours
to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove
you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause.
�52
SLOVAKIA
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the
Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of
civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of
this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho
remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr.
Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and
every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e
Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation
of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second
W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947.
•
•
•
"MURDER IN SLOVAKIA"
( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the
House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) .
Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder
in its most ghastl y and shameful form.•••
But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President
and by our American State Department while this murder was going
o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds
of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them
mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars
to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State
Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against
this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the
l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor."
Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these
American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and
may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent
wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste•
panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will
be protests. But then it wi II be too late.
Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of
Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even
have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record.
By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the
exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a
stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done
i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and
murder has free sway.
�
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1952, Vol. 2
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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SLOVAKIA
47
AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM
By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics
The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk,
then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends,
permit an American who has learned your languages and history to
throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now
termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present
to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations.
The study of the past and observation of today's events boil
down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the
centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of
two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where
two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to
succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must
proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise,
one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech
issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much,
much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo•
sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed
and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance.
The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again
essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart
and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be
better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in
every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical,
economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected.
Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up,
and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the
potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for
one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such
greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership.
The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a
better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get
a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was
made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal
office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po
česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list
of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble,
but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted
lt too.
SLOVAKIA
Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good
Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel
tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are
certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in
tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla
have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and
tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was
alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for
tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at
tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to
rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would
have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in
good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose
Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes.
The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons
iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro·
gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no
word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for
Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with
Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made?
The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla
was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't
know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla
was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought
and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly
democratlc and progresslve ones.
Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word
"Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls
a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and
an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak
for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and
morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political
scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had
this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in
America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even
beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc
of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons
never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs
of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to
create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con•
sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll•
teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true
concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon
but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt
as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re•
fused to be assimillated by the Czechs.
SLOVAKlA
49
Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing,
but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist"
and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb
causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come
back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at•
tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc
duty to demand freedom.
Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat
tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber
11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some
freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey
will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir
own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real
situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow
through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had
enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony;
they wísb to "fly alone and fly right."
This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come
so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde•
pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world
affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe
background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat
the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out
thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some
or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable
impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the
western world when the tlme comes for the debut.
In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll
lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit
Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the
United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe
them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are
too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to
study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This
apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al•
ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir
propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only
Cor tbe time being, definltely.
However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and
tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and
botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint
republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will
60
SLOVA.K.IA
look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing.
lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In
Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they
struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what
ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of
grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class !
And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts,
which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild
propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they
a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han
t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern,
civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they
ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had
no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot
our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington
who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in
the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest
separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be
and just how blind can they be?
What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr
revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who
waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard.
Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for
the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome
them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all
such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for
their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr
liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have
been a benefactor and friend immediateJy.
Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and
see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better
worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista
through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress.
It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng,
progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to
your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are
not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista
proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the
duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista,
your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in
wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when
your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all
things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your
ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your
flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that
ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as
yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s
applles to both Slovaks and Czechs.
SLOVAKIA
61
The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have
betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now
to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr
own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow
them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that
they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and
exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and
forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll
hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro•
gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move•
ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form
two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies.
And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re•
sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams
and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder
how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people
by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to
thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them
lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you
wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be
discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some•
t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do·
ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally
wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts
are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an
outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction
and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the
core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire
new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles
wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc
was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God•
insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls
natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per
cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that,
inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any
Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and
spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should
not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene•
gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot
one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that
with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc.
How will they contend with the rest?
Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and
oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for
it, must once reap Satan's trash.
The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement
i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours
to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove
you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause.
52
SLOVAKIA
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the
Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of
civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of
this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho
remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr.
Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and
every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e
Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation
of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second
W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947.
•
•
•
"MURDER IN SLOVAKIA"
( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the
House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) .
Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder
in its most ghastl y and shameful form.•••
But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President
and by our American State Department while this murder was going
o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds
of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them
mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars
to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State
Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against
this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the
l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor."
Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these
American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and
may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent
wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste•
panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will
be protests. But then it wi II be too late.
Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of
Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even
have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record.
By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the
exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a
stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done
i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and
murder has free sway.
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Title
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An Honor in Slovak Separatism
Description
An account of the resource
By E. W., an American Student of Central European Politics
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 47-52
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Anonymous
Date
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March 1952
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SLOVAKIA
63
BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS
At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee
at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory.
It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt
to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost
tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters
whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the
war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í
Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on
innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt.
It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called
Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the
tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will.
A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the
trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened.
The story of this political fraud is as follows:
In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man
and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of
his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo•
vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel
Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn
Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia.
Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\
Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had
agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the
Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that
Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a
separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much.
In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30
mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission
to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that
t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian.
Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis
allies.
Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and
informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r
c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e
opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow.
In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat
Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London
�54
SLOVAKIA
and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten
Germans, Moscow also gave its consent.
But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came
aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius
prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In
d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser•
tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called
Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles
a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal
polltlcal fraud.
Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His
whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia
itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs
never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a
reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the
First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il
partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng
the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone
had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th
of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the
war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy.
After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World
War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this
declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection
of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt
really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do
with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On
page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration
rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the
public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y
within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation."
Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal
methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal
cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless
in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty
Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans.
lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed
on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group.
Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to
shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in•
corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy,
and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils
promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason.
At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity
to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and
without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded
�SLOVAKU
66
a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based
on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn
Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on.
When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a
book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1,
who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao
publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a
receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign
Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington .
Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and
unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people.
In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he
who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to
democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great
Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed
as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees."
The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was
durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and
was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70
pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in
the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck,
and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer.
AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls
great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police.
The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called
Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have
anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e
in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}.
tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are
adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš
.1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst
thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know
the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by
now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded
them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S.
But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany
or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by
denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt.
'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated
however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long
as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe
Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl
In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ).
�
SLOVAKIA
63
BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS
At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee
at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory.
It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt
to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost
tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters
whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the
war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í
Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on
innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt.
It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called
Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the
tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will.
A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the
trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened.
The story of this political fraud is as follows:
In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man
and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of
his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo•
vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel
Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn
Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia.
Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\
Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had
agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the
Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that
Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a
separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much.
In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30
mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission
to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that
t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian.
Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis
allies.
Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and
informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r
c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e
opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow.
In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat
Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London
�54
SLOVAKIA
and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten
Germans, Moscow also gave its consent.
But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came
aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius
prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In
d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser•
tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called
Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles
a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal
polltlcal fraud.
Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His
whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia
itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs
never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a
reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the
First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il
partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng
the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone
had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th
of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the
war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy.
After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World
War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this
declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection
of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt
really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do
with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On
page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration
rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the
public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y
within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation."
Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal
methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal
cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless
in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty
Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans.
lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed
on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group.
Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to
shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in•
corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy,
and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils
promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason.
At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity
to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and
without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded
�SLOVAKU
66
a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based
on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn
Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on.
When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a
book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1,
who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao
publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a
receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign
Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington .
Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and
unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people.
In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he
who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to
democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great
Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed
as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees."
The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was
durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and
was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70
pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in
the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck,
and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer.
AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls
great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police.
The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called
Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have
anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e
in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}.
tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are
adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš
.1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst
thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know
the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by
now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded
them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S.
But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany
or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by
denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt.
'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated
however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long
as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe
Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl
In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ).
�
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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SLOVAKIA
63
BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS
At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee
at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory.
It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt
to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost
tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters
whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the
war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í
Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on
innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt.
It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called
Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the
tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will.
A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the
trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened.
The story of this political fraud is as follows:
In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man
and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of
his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo•
vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel
Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn
Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia.
Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\
Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had
agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the
Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that
Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a
separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much.
In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30
mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission
to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that
t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian.
Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis
allies.
Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and
informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r
c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e
opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow.
In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat
Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London
54
SLOVAKIA
and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten
Germans, Moscow also gave its consent.
But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came
aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius
prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In
d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser•
tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called
Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles
a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal
polltlcal fraud.
Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His
whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia
itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs
never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a
reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the
First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il
partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng
the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone
had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th
of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the
war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy.
After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World
War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this
declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection
of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt
really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do
with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On
page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration
rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the
public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y
within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation."
Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal
methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal
cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless
in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty
Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans.
lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed
on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group.
Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to
shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in•
corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy,
and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils
promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason.
At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity
to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and
without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded
SLOVAKU
66
a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based
on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn
Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on.
When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a
book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1,
who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao
publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a
receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign
Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington .
Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and
unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people.
In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he
who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to
democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great
Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed
as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees."
The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was
durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and
was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70
pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in
the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck,
and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer.
AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls
great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police.
The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called
Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have
anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e
in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}.
tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are
adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš
.1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst
thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know
the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by
now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded
them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S.
But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany
or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by
denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt.
'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated
however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long
as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe
Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl
In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ).
Dublin Core
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Title
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Beneš: King of Political Cheats
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 53-55
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
-
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a434c2df13029e448a36faca66bab2c2
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Text
66
SLOVA.KIA
THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS
JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ
On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the
Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was
accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the
Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt,
side by aide."
On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal
friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow,
Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement
wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can
rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation
stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic."
And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign
Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD
TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of
economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic
"is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy."
The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka,
in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in
Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new
epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men
are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37).
And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same
Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our
liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England
there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet
Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda."
These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we
have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign
policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr
politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they
served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully
expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest
of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and
penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian
Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad
daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the
Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt,
after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they
dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade
agalnst their old communistic love.
To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the
case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are
not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and
extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an
indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world
�SLOVAKIA
67
outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii,
determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system
was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of
politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc•
ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons,
and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure
only in all its conclusions.
The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the
incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory.
They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because
they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon•
taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system
into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth
the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such
miraculous speed to everything Soviet.
When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and
Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence,
but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously.
Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the
name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch,
after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with
lt in all fundamental questlons.
We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward
Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot
principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism
clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks
are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An
abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha
Soviet Union and communism are concerned.
And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political
heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When
they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the
questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak
nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech
nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow
it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right
path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm•
pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng
we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental
questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation.
That is, after au, the law ot democracy.
But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to
the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc
and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm
to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot
and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of
these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng
the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political
system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks.
• They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not
suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much
less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon.
The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them
�68
SLOVAKIA
the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint•
ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for
Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But
a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand,
organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre•
paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use
them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It
wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between
Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the
other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more
valuable personallties.
The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal
victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world
also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully
expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every
other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral
appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the
anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values
wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can
get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a
genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin•
als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even
iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred,
witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal
"as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other
man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the
sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the
Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ;
h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that
'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel
Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he
got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's
judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a
great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was
a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re·
gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of
t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in
the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is
Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne
H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio.
•
"Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr.
Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter.
�
66
SLOVA.KIA
THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS
JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ
On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the
Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was
accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the
Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt,
side by aide."
On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal
friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow,
Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement
wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can
rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation
stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic."
And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign
Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD
TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of
economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic
"is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy."
The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka,
in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in
Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new
epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men
are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37).
And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same
Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our
liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England
there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet
Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda."
These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we
have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign
policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr
politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they
served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully
expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest
of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and
penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian
Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad
daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the
Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt,
after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they
dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade
agalnst their old communistic love.
To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the
case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are
not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and
extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an
indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world
�SLOVAKIA
67
outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii,
determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system
was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of
politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc•
ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons,
and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure
only in all its conclusions.
The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the
incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory.
They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because
they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon•
taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system
into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth
the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such
miraculous speed to everything Soviet.
When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and
Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence,
but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously.
Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the
name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch,
after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with
lt in all fundamental questlons.
We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward
Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot
principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism
clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks
are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An
abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha
Soviet Union and communism are concerned.
And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political
heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When
they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the
questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak
nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech
nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow
it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right
path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm•
pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng
we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental
questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation.
That is, after au, the law ot democracy.
But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to
the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc
and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm
to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot
and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of
these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng
the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political
system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks.
• They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not
suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much
less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon.
The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them
�68
SLOVAKIA
the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint•
ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for
Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But
a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand,
organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre•
paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use
them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It
wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between
Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the
other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more
valuable personallties.
The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal
victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world
also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully
expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every
other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral
appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the
anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values
wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can
get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a
genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin•
als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even
iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred,
witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal
"as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other
man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the
sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the
Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ;
h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that
'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel
Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he
got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's
judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a
great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was
a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re·
gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of
t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in
the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is
Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne
H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio.
•
"Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr.
Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
66
SLOVA.KIA
THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS
JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ
On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the
Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was
accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the
Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt,
side by aide."
On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal
friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow,
Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement
wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can
rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation
stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic."
And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign
Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD
TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of
economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic
"is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy."
The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka,
in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in
Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new
epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men
are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37).
And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same
Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our
liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England
there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet
Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda."
These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we
have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign
policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr
politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they
served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully
expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest
of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and
penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian
Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad
daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the
Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt,
after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they
dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade
agalnst their old communistic love.
To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the
case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are
not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and
extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an
indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world
SLOVAKIA
67
outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii,
determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system
was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of
politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc•
ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons,
and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure
only in all its conclusions.
The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the
incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory.
They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because
they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon•
taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system
into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth
the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such
miraculous speed to everything Soviet.
When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and
Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence,
but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously.
Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the
name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch,
after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with
lt in all fundamental questlons.
We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward
Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot
principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism
clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks
are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An
abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha
Soviet Union and communism are concerned.
And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political
heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When
they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the
questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak
nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech
nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow
it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right
path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm•
pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng
we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental
questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation.
That is, after au, the law ot democracy.
But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to
the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc
and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm
to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot
and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of
these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng
the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political
system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks.
• They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not
suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much
less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon.
The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them
68
SLOVAKIA
the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint•
ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for
Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But
a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand,
organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre•
paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use
them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It
wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between
Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the
other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more
valuable personallties.
The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal
victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world
also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully
expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every
other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral
appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the
anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values
wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can
get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a
genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty.
•
•
•
WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO
"Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin•
als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even
iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred,
witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal
"as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other
man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the
sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the
Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ;
h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that
'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel
Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he
got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's
judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947.
•
•
•
•
•
•
"The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a
great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was
a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re·
gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of
t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in
the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is
Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne
H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio.
•
"Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr.
Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter.
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Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovaks and the Beneš Czechs
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Oravský
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 56-58
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Oravský, Joseph
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6744e6aad7468419ac2624101a85e953.pdf
37c8e65feb163eb93b316fe90cf05207
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
69
THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS
BY: THE INFORMER
The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla
In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon
concerned itself wlth three burning questlons:
1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora!
and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called
"seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl,
do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible,
a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the
leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who
glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued
on October 28th.)
2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the
U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts
is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate
peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense
alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members,
to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans
will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent
homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding
wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth
them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the
Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the
devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt
would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš
Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon
from the Sudetenland of Bobemla.
3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely
criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in
Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch
Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in
Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA.
Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr
dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all
-their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the
"Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be.
He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the
Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are
overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka
�60
SLOVAKIA
will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš
Czechoslovaks !
Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky.
We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents
or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the
Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA
Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends
that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle
one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in
Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona,
the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve
In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope
and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak
nation.
FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT
DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ
The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more
and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our
stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees,
often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it
will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people
at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found
wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural.
Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of
the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it
can be deprived of it only by force and violence.
We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state
from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir
own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe
as an Independent political unit.
It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state.
Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe
Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945.
'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more
power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich)
and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben
tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative
state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the
perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The
president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-
�
SLOVAKIA
69
THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS
BY: THE INFORMER
The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla
In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon
concerned itself wlth three burning questlons:
1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora!
and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called
"seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl,
do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible,
a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the
leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who
glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued
on October 28th.)
2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the
U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts
is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate
peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense
alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members,
to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans
will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent
homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding
wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth
them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the
Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the
devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt
would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš
Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon
from the Sudetenland of Bobemla.
3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely
criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in
Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch
Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in
Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA.
Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr
dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all
-their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the
"Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be.
He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the
Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are
overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka
�60
SLOVAKIA
will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš
Czechoslovaks !
Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky.
We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents
or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the
Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA
Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends
that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle
one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in
Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona,
the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve
In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope
and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak
nation.
FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT
DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ
The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more
and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our
stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees,
often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it
will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people
at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found
wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural.
Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of
the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it
can be deprived of it only by force and violence.
We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state
from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir
own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe
as an Independent political unit.
It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state.
Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe
Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945.
'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more
power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich)
and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben
tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative
state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the
perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The
president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
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Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
69
THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS
BY: THE INFORMER
The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla
In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon
concerned itself wlth three burning questlons:
1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora!
and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called
"seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl,
do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible,
a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the
leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who
glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued
on October 28th.)
2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the
U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts
is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate
peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense
alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members,
to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans
will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent
homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding
wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth
them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the
Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the
devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt
would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš
Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon
from the Sudetenland of Bobemla.
3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely
criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in
Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch
Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in
Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA.
Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr
dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all
-their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the
"Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be.
He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the
Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are
overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka
60
SLOVAKIA
will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš
Czechoslovaks !
Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky.
We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents
or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the
Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA
Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends
that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle
one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in
Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona,
the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve
In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope
and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak
nation.
FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT
DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ
The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more
and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our
stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees,
often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it
will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people
at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found
wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural.
Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of
the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it
can be deprived of it only by force and violence.
We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state
from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir
own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe
as an Independent political unit.
It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state.
Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe
Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945.
'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more
power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich)
and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben
tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative
state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the
perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The
president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Blind Alley of the Czechoslovaks
Description
An account of the resource
By: The Informer
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 59-60
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ca848c11db1831c3dea9d219fc406d38.pdf
05ebb1620f2736aac93f4f27d4224040
PDF Text
Text
60
SLOVAKIA
will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš
Czechoslovaks !
Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky.
We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents
or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the
Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA
Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends
that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle
one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in
Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona,
the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve
In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope
and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak
nation.
FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT
DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ
The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more
and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our
stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees,
often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it
will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people
at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found
wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural.
Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of
the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it
can be deprived of it only by force and violence.
We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state
from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir
own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe
as an Independent political unit.
It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state.
Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe
Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945.
'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more
power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich)
and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben
tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative
state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the
perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The
president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-
�SLOVAKIA
61
tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall
continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak
Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted
in Slovakia by Slovak authorities.
But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take
a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The
Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946
elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would
prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have
the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had
to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who
again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators.
The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944)
is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls
the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats.
In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak
independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other
in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt
o( humanity tbey built gallows.
Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic.
ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons
c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory
they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence,
for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts
of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed
in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a
hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty
l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even
given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and
schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the
whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's•
democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the
gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them.
The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy
sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call
a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or
history.
Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or
independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from
thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those
llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration,
Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let
them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right
to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak
Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study.
Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the
�SLOVAKIA
ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations,
prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present
limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al•
ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon
did not have enough strengtb to effect.
We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb
hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot
be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation
at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation
has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and,
represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to
contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe
Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with
t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com•
manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why
there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be
Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or
vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals.
Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak•
ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona!
inferiority.
Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to
Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group
ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at
because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name
to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are
gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve
the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid
of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of
the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a.
Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at
horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And
yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs
in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to
decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e
Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to
pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first
president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck•
oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot
the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben
negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western
Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany,
as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he
exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme,
of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their
pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr
anclent homelands.
�SLOVAKIA
63
Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are
the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and
as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe.
The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of
centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to
have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the
full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum.
Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some
people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them
in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that
they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in
power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they
themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are
grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled
and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak
independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world
for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more.
If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd
of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP
camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and
responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy.
People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In
our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their
consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the
natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned
only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or
do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and
judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought
the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak
Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly
did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through
slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be
as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran,
Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party.
These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint
of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder
whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and
represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends
entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether
he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak
history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two
possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or
tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on,
�64
SLOVAKIA
or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde•
pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny
it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb
and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty
be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will
whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a
Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the
nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe,
however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own
natlon!
The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not
recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can
only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all
Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the
servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought
up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot
life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any
one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism,
but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls
right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the
A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as
well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large
and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an
independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal
freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace
and weltare.
The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help
of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the
renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation.
But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an
arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our
Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938
we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was
natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the
democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now
depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe
other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr.
Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt.
•
•
•
W H O SAID IT?
WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken
as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the
whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume
the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho•
Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and
f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30).
�
60
SLOVAKIA
will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš
Czechoslovaks !
Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky.
We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents
or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the
Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA
Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends
that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle
one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in
Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona,
the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve
In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope
and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak
nation.
FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT
DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ
The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more
and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our
stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees,
often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it
will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people
at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found
wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural.
Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of
the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it
can be deprived of it only by force and violence.
We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state
from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir
own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe
as an Independent political unit.
It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state.
Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe
Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945.
'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more
power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich)
and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben
tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative
state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the
perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The
president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-
�SLOVAKIA
61
tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall
continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak
Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted
in Slovakia by Slovak authorities.
But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take
a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The
Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946
elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would
prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have
the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had
to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who
again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators.
The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944)
is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls
the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats.
In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak
independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other
in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt
o( humanity tbey built gallows.
Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic.
ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons
c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory
they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence,
for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts
of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed
in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a
hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty
l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even
given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and
schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the
whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's•
democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the
gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them.
The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy
sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call
a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or
history.
Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or
independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from
thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those
llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration,
Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let
them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right
to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak
Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study.
Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the
�SLOVAKIA
ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations,
prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present
limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al•
ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon
did not have enough strengtb to effect.
We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb
hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot
be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation
at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation
has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and,
represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to
contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe
Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with
t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com•
manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why
there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be
Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or
vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals.
Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak•
ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona!
inferiority.
Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to
Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group
ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at
because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name
to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are
gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve
the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid
of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of
the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a.
Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at
horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And
yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs
in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to
decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e
Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to
pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first
president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck•
oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot
the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben
negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western
Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany,
as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he
exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme,
of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their
pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr
anclent homelands.
�SLOVAKIA
63
Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are
the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and
as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe.
The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of
centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to
have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the
full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum.
Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some
people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them
in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that
they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in
power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they
themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are
grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled
and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak
independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world
for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more.
If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd
of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP
camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and
responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy.
People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In
our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their
consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the
natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned
only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or
do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and
judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought
the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak
Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly
did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through
slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be
as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran,
Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party.
These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint
of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder
whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and
represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends
entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether
he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak
history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two
possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or
tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on,
�64
SLOVAKIA
or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde•
pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny
it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb
and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty
be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will
whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a
Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the
nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe,
however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own
natlon!
The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not
recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can
only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all
Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the
servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought
up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot
life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any
one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism,
but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls
right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the
A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as
well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large
and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an
independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal
freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace
and weltare.
The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help
of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the
renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation.
But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an
arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our
Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938
we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was
natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the
democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now
depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe
other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr.
Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt.
•
•
•
W H O SAID IT?
WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken
as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the
whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume
the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho•
Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and
f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30).
�
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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60
SLOVAKIA
will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš
Czechoslovaks !
Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky.
We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents
or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the
Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA
Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends
that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle
one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in
Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona,
the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve
In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope
and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak
nation.
FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT
DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ
The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more
and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our
stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees,
often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it
will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people
at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found
wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural.
Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of
the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it
can be deprived of it only by force and violence.
We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state
from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir
own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe
as an Independent political unit.
It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state.
Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe
Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945.
'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more
power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich)
and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben
tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative
state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the
perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The
president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-
SLOVAKIA
61
tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall
continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak
Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted
in Slovakia by Slovak authorities.
But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take
a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The
Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946
elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would
prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have
the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had
to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who
again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators.
The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944)
is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls
the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats.
In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak
independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other
in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt
o( humanity tbey built gallows.
Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic.
ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons
c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory
they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence,
for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts
of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed
in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a
hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty
l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even
given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and
schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the
whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's•
democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the
gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them.
The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy
sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call
a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or
history.
Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or
independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from
thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those
llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration,
Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let
them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right
to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak
Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study.
Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the
SLOVAKIA
ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations,
prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present
limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al•
ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon
did not have enough strengtb to effect.
We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb
hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot
be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation
at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation
has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and,
represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to
contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe
Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with
t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com•
manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why
there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be
Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or
vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals.
Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak•
ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona!
inferiority.
Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to
Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group
ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at
because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name
to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are
gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve
the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid
of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of
the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a.
Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at
horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And
yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs
in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to
decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e
Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to
pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first
president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck•
oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot
the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben
negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western
Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany,
as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he
exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme,
of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their
pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr
anclent homelands.
SLOVAKIA
63
Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are
the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and
as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe.
The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of
centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to
have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the
full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum.
Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some
people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them
in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that
they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in
power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they
themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are
grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled
and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak
independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world
for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more.
If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd
of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP
camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and
responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy.
People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In
our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their
consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the
natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned
only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or
do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and
judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought
the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak
Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly
did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through
slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be
as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran,
Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party.
These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint
of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder
whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and
represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends
entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether
he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak
history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two
possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or
tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on,
64
SLOVAKIA
or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde•
pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny
it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb
and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty
be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will
whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a
Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the
nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe,
however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own
natlon!
The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not
recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can
only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all
Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the
servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought
up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot
life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any
one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism,
but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls
right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the
A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as
well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large
and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an
independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal
freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace
and weltare.
The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help
of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the
renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation.
But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an
arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our
Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938
we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was
natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the
democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now
depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe
other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr.
Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt.
•
•
•
W H O SAID IT?
WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken
as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the
whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume
the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho•
Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and
f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30).
Dublin Core
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Title
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For Dr. Stephen Osusky's Benefit
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Peter Skalenický
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952
pp. 60-64
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Skalenický, Peter
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e69a2a2f0d54637fbb50516f7b7967f3.pdf
8b2ea9aa98ff238a46467ca06d984ef8
PDF Text
Text
Monsignor Dr. Joseph Tiso (right) with the beloved
Monsignor Andrew Hlinka, charnpion of Slovak freedom,
and Monsignor Dr. Charles Korper (left) in Bratislava,
Slovakia, June 5, 1938, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh P act.
�DR. JOSEPH TISO
National Hero of the Slovak Nation
�
Monsignor Dr. Joseph Tiso (right) with the beloved
Monsignor Andrew Hlinka, charnpion of Slovak freedom,
and Monsignor Dr. Charles Korper (left) in Bratislava,
Slovakia, June 5, 1938, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh P act.
�DR. JOSEPH TISO
National Hero of the Slovak Nation
�
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3)
Description
An account of the resource
includes photo of Joseph Tiso, Andrew Hlinka, and Charles Körper (June 5, 1938) and portrait of Joseph Tiso
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1952
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/51cbb0acbe81cc1074aad64f2bda6191.pdf
3cb71a143f67bad10f423d4eccf3d1ef
PDF Text
Text
�A
I'
SLOVAKl A is publishetl periodi<:ally by the Slornk Lcag-ue of _\merica,
a cultural aml ťiYit ľecleľatio11 of Arneľ
ic:ans of Sloqtk des<:ent.
'ľhť ľhieľ
purpose oľ 8 LOYAK1A
is to pľomotť a bcttcľ unclerstancling
and a ppľľc-intio11 oľ the ~loYak 11atio11
and its long; :-;tľllg-glť f'oľ ťľeedom and
independe11ec.
As Arneľic·am;, 1nembPľs of the
3loY.d-: L eague oľ .\ 111eľ i <.:a fiľlnl _Y belieYe that the f-;lornk natio11, just as nll
11atiorn,, has mi inherť11t a11d Gocl-giYe11
right to freeclom and indepenclence.
The:v a ľť declieated to thť rnnsť oť the
Ameľiean \\'H,Y of' hfe, HloYak fľeedorn
nnd \\'Oľld peac·e and are clctcnn.incd to
oppose tlw plague of C'ommunisrn and
al \ otheľ totnlitaľiai1 politic·nl systems.
_\.C'Hľ
Subs('ľiption to Slon1kia $1.00 peľ
in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewheľť.
Sen cl
subscľi1itio11s
to:
SL O Y AK I ~\
Box 150
Middlcto\\'n, Pa.
--------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
�A
I'
SLOVAKl A is publishetl periodi<:ally by the Slornk Lcag-ue of _\merica,
a cultural aml ťiYit ľecleľatio11 of Arneľ
ic:ans of Sloqtk des<:ent.
'ľhť ľhieľ
purpose oľ 8 LOYAK1A
is to pľomotť a bcttcľ unclerstancling
and a ppľľc-intio11 oľ the ~loYak 11atio11
and its long; :-;tľllg-glť f'oľ ťľeedom and
independe11ec.
As Arneľic·am;, 1nembPľs of the
3loY.d-: L eague oľ .\ 111eľ i <.:a fiľlnl _Y belieYe that the f-;lornk natio11, just as nll
11atiorn,, has mi inherť11t a11d Gocl-giYe11
right to freeclom and indepenclence.
The:v a ľť declieated to thť rnnsť oť the
Ameľiean \\'H,Y of' hfe, HloYak fľeedorn
nnd \\'Oľld peac·e and are clctcnn.incd to
oppose tlw plague of C'ommunisrn and
al \ otheľ totnlitaľiai1 politic·nl systems.
_\.C'Hľ
Subs('ľiption to Slon1kia $1.00 peľ
in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewheľť.
Sen cl
subscľi1itio11s
to:
SL O Y AK I ~\
Box 150
Middlcto\\'n, Pa.
--------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
August 1952
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3a30f0930fb14252cce15b5ae15d325c.pdf
67b79a93269b6588ade3875e6c82c94e
PDF Text
Text
AUGUST, 1952
SLOVAKIA
THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO
B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN
F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone
of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava,
the capltal of Slovakia.
1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had
Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar
and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin.
One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people
were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or
" General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr .
.tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and,
later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic.
Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal
ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but
rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr.
l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to
<"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation
c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment.
Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money
to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc,
and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer
recelved his instructlons directly from bim.
NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO
After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast
.,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause
Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was
th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and
had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature
;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded
!o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er.
.\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that
••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a
umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls
Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican
roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror
Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles.
but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je
lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u,
This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan
not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many
tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law
�2
SLOVAKIA
As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin
ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia,
handed over to the representative of the American Army the note
given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment
the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading
Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except
in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far
as I can recollect.
The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri•
cau Army read as tollows:
GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT
KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA
SLOVAKIAN
To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army
For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army
On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems•
miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, .
do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied
and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding
General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1.
W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise
and ordered by the Allied High Comand.
We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States
in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and
accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people
and by the people.
W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection
for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu•
trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces.
Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945.
(Seal of the Prime Ministry)
Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier.
Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa.
Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture.
Kočiš, Minister of Education.
T. J. Gašpar, Deputy.
W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army.
T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C.
Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO
ON ROAD TO GALLOWS
True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr.
Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also
true
that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender
of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty
or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial
�SLOVAKIA
3
clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected,
the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln
each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the
Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl
to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court.
or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon.
1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd
?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government
of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among
the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender
ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or
p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had
occurred in Tiso's case.
On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak
Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had
it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false.
Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the
tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not
to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to
nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly
wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the
insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State
ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis
group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout
even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng
Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published
ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read:
"Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and
members of his Government are not available to the Department of
State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate
\ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter.
"A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government
weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe
montbs of May and June. 1945. . . .
"The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re.
garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated
with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States
milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the
clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless
they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view
of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed
the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European
�SLOVAKJA
T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been
membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re•
leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed
over in November, 1945. . . .
From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u
Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ
t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho·
Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 ·
tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered
He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe
cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln.
'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred
by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso
and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with
everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he
1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave
r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti·
tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant
certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many
t housands more.
It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I.
because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered
to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce
to Ečer.
No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract
remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr.
Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko·
pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which
showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound
by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ
of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's
IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently.
. Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim
and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards.
bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard.
EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO
Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular
preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed
in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in
force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys
or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute
'.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la.
Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute.
the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual;
hence, lt could malte little headway.
Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t
to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I.
�Sl,OVAKIA
5
And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng
c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried
there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much
of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons,
as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr.
Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence,
could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had
reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the
trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons
that it was imposslble to do so.
After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won
so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd
such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso
would get a fair tria!.
There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When
a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to
bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally
rehabl»tated.
Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament.
l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would
not happen.
'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment.
witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or
Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a
soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal
Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945.
Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal
C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must
be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the
fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso.
If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National
('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot
Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between
1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party
had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably
would bave been allve today.
From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak
Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat:
Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government.
On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the
very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth
tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in
I..ondon.
�6
SLOVAKIA
BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY
Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin,
felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945,
be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on
?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik.
Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr.
Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš
had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa
Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was
the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the
Slovaks.
Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb
he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means
or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out
ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia
was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be
next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945.
whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011
wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that
,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal
Council.
It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague
Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in
Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been.
DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T
L OS E EVERYT HI N G
Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did
what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague
Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst
JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The
Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles,
being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945.
Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume
with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.«
organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the
Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in
~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch
was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty.
The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody
oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from
Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated
him fanatically and undivldedly.
·····
�SLOVAKIA
7
Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section
O, which speaks about clemency and states:
"The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and
the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice,
who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak
NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe
Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against
it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents
it to the President of the Republlc."
When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this
agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and
later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that
before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš
and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would
grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot
amnesty to bim.
It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls
D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in
Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes
the case or Dr. Tiso.
In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš
of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised
that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I
shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth
and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945,
both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well
as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in
offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was
under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat
the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very
sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per·
5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known
•o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they
;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce
they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own
P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when
be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy
which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso.
As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso
c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have
rendered any other verdict but that of death.
Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must
not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because,
in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether
they possess character and a spina! column.
L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES
I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency
to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody
·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the
Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt
�8
SLOVAKIA
seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe
representatives of the Catbolic wing.
Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly
iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called
<..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt
would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party.
Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was
attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš
Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt
was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared.
In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc
l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast
iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro
mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso.
The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions,
ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute
the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed
ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the
Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe
llnlted States.
Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak
,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that
Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn,
!r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc
, na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com•
•nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners.
Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe
lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was
said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts,
tó General Ferjenčik.
Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree.
Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and
Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU
adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for
tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso?
· · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot
Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the
court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for
Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all
costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s·
slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite
the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate.
" I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!"
· Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge,
1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard
XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt
afterward. ·:
.
�SLOVAKIA
9
The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt
waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The
Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal
Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty.
On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil
present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when
I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to
tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go
along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself
wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I
retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing
wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will
hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should
not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge
to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner
oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled:
" Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !"
I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner
well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of
very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not
belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso.
I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of
tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them,
and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the
Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe
)JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a
five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr.
Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to
do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded.
THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS
But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner
opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in
Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon
was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s
defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay.
That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is
jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\.
But the truth 1s altogether differenl
Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very
respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon
as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he
was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm.
They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse
wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons.
What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the
�10
SLOVAKIA
police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was
nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense
counsels.
This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would
be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just
and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume
that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that
it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair.
In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was
sealed.
I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge,
but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made
to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,;
prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or
could successfully take exception to it.
Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge
by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case
one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick.
It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether
it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the
defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might
entertain against any person of lhe jury or court.
Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge
of the court.
Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe
defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do.
In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated
during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on
various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena!
laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance.
Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify
that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to
take over hls judgeshlp again.
Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by
the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis
of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture.
Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that
bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned.
he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was
objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin.
AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED
According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge
against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena!
procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde:
to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict
he had promlsed bis bosses.
When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere,
they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob-
�SLOVAKIA
ll
jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not
valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by
the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter·
natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto
Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned,
or only with the knowledge of one of those powers.
The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in
:-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General
In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon
or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members
of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght
the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments:
l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or
llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has
the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall
live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not
subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts,
which may have been committed during the existence of and on the
territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some
27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela·
tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France
agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should
be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was
arrested by American Military Police.
'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can
eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr.
Tiso.
According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942,
eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the
proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had
undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons.
Tiso was not accused of such a crime.
Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who
as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed
to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion.
·
Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In·
habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak
Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates
had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the
agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and
tried II! Warsaw.
.
Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons
and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the
tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular
and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot
tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that
only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form
,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm.
�12
SLOVAKIA
even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm.
The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according
to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not
recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could
not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by
the Slovak National Councll.
We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about
these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but
Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table
and screaming:
"I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures
here!"
And that is how the tria) against Tiso began.
Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech
reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were
not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed
that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be
staged.
During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner
several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat•
ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he
would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was
recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a
report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch
was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound
off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the
people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be
generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what•
ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I
was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical
trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial
would not have come to l!ght.
Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only
t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked:
"Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained
that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet
aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over•
rule lt!"
THE W I TNESSES
The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in
three categories:
. • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro·
gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided
tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko
and BJshop Michael Bm;alka.
From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult
When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l
�SLOVAKIA
13
not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws
in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are
reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a
witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi
be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in·
s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko,
wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious
beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the
Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in
what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran,
the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the
honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr,
KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed
to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot
Justlce and righteousness.
2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner.
Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling.
From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or•
ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad
s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some
tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go.
Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that
'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant
Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three
days, but was not beaten there and was fed well.
Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions,
s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that
does not have to be explained to us."
Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner
as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT·
Ríny hlmself had attested.
Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another
type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but
with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?"
- He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches
in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed
hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been
evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid.
3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be·
·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed
t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before
the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and
Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common
Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse;
and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta
and einbárrasslng for the defense.
· In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and
generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse,
�14
SLOVAKTA
the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses,
looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities
of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! "
Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would
help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same.
Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious
step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte
s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to
be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli<
eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens.
The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark
blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance
were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages.
Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš
tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble
and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock.
Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but
whether he told me everything, I do not know."
The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have
sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have
answered.
It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak
slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over.
Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both
slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the
Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh
mllltary correspondents questloned him.
I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But
I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm
was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later
ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty
years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and
not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today
that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his
own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some
one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person.
Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or
the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny
t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and
gazed toward tbec eiling.
On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr
force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr.
Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and
he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr.
Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka.
Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the
seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe
lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic
lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was
�SLOVAKIA
15
intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1.
John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in
Budapest.
Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would
only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same
school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the
s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava,
or Prague.
Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who
al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a
defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi•
mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed
to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we
do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over
what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false.
K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol
every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader
of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the
future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator
with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for
that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself
with German testlmony.
Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded
that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in
Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of
Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng
judge of the Natlonal Coun.
The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin,
:VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle.
but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example.
The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu·
tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with
Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis
with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles,
but as interned persons of a forelgn state.
T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" -
A S FORECAST
On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the
verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10
P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party
were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April
15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for
9:0 OA. M.
AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of
course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew
l'verything that Daxner was going to do.
On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be·
gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to
happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become
subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man
expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody.
�16
SLOVAKIA
After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso
ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty.
After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for
Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the
Court for clemency.
Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for
clemency on mora! grounds."
Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea·
sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr.
Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without
delay.
Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against
a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy."
However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take
place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to
Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and
take a definite stand on it.
Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s
wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment,
then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets
a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison.
Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it
was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all
t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso.
But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure,
prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered,
but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so
that he mi~ht put it before the National Court.
F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE -
TO HE ROD
Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that
time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak
National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be
resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr.
Edward Beneš.
Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to
demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began
to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was
feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots.
The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00
A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let·
trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at
once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the
request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary
motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M.
to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso.
.
The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and
Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they
\O'OUld Mt -attend lt.
The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered
by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml·
lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided
�SLOVAKIA
17
that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall
be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by
phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might
get tbere as soon as possible.
If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second
agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right
to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final
validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According
to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice
to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe
recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places
it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read.
Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that
amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as
muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al!
documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš.
'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said:
"The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B,
are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague,
April 17, 1947."
Tbat is all and notbing more.
Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the
SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say
a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt.
'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and
l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could
we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no
Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not
agree upon a word of recommendation?
Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned.
tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC.
But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before
:rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks
and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency.
For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs
from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments:
"On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present
a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln
in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the
SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the
Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng
�18
SLO~A.KIA
mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was
necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon
!rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve
declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open
politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences.
"After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after
discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the
SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for
mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would
complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency
and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter
would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting
mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it
to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment."
LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH
-
.
Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch
there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the
documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately
made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium
went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the
documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the
<.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting.
When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be
i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim?
Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that
he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and
wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming
majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible
be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso.
After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he
agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does
not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of
opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist.
. I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the
Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them,
Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo
is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague
would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r
ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out
the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere
<:alled.
.
.
,
,
, ,
,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from
Bratislava a.lone.
·
·
f
�SLOVAKIA
19
The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in
Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us
private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde.
For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater
publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an
hour was:
-
"For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso
and for us it is unprofitable."
Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for
Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek.
BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT
The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that
even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was
one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11
months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal
church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened
in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the
verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed.
The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by
every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social
Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and
in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra)
stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne
Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic
to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic
Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to
Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the
Government to grant cle mency to Tiso."
In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote:
" The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as
official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as
to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency."
Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a
dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby
he did ,not recommend m ercy."
The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly
C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the
behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American
<'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly.
Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step
in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal
Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent
JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim.
�20
SLOVAKJA
The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government
was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that
time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00
P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o.
The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency,
while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision
or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the
praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of
Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5
strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or
two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So
telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the
NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr.
Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr.
Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy
for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately
he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution."
In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr.
Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution.
Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this
by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however,
i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks
in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso.
And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As
tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with
Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency.
Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once
for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it.
Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even
tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at
the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents,
complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early
as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by
tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's
cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by
phone from Prague much earlier.
BENEŠ WAS THE LAW
It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf'
of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by
returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich
would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice.
Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem?
�SLOVAKIA
21
No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet
were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary
formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them.
But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per·
sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night,
several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through
with everything he had o rdered.
Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight,
and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the
execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula·
tions.
On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso
in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš
rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII
were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the
Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the
;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery.
Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made
its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso
was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything
was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister
came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde
was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in
Tiso's bebalf.
•TISO
LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D
Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very
s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during
the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must
make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would
he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was
also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the
last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler
over excitecl Slovakia.
To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was
before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis
truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted
to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me.
From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the
E-ars of every llstener:
"And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past."
Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating
<·i rcumsta.nce.
For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life
gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness.
determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached
and done.
�JJ
SLOVAKIA
Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis
own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and
unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for
:s;ation" In every regard and at all times.
His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are
most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality.
The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso
was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that
issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist
''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of
a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place.
TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE
Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe
questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the
Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph
'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church?
Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution
there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least
not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or
Tiso.
After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie
body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to
I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors,
became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle·
mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the
cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one."
l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few
or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And
,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon.
·
Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci•
sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already
then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one
wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene!
the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court
had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had
clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be
r,reserved.
Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr.
Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family ,
but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y.
Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's
ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug.
Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial.
Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe
matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere
Dr. Tlso ,vas burled.
:. =•:
�SLOVAKIA
23
For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe
grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem
and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave
with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police
constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and
jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3
pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others
even from hlgh schools.
WHO KILLED TI SO ?
Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands
and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the
Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak
NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was
plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy,
and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,.
c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso.
The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic
voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e
overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s
were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be
known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe
leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r
ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And
'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists
or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members
of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats.
The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as
well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor
diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State.
F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[
tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty
;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men,
violating· the- promlse given the electorate.
Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also.
}!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being
lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the
Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders
and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was
s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to
accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater,
under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as
unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr
backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr
uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in
the Tlso case.
N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT
Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi•
tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying
<'lemenc-y to 'ľiso.
�24
SLOVAKIA
Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake
only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth
the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations.
The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all
connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted,
the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to
the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo.
I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to
Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when
in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand
oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he
was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte
a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who
had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice,
every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does
not let Himself be carried away or frightened.
TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS
Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make.
He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on
every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks
or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had
anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national
hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by
those who previously were agalnst bim.
Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained
tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually
united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed
them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings,
but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation
of Tiso.
Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this
dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the
persons ·involved are free again.
After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated
in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but
it remains unconfirmed.
Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb
of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis
and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities
oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and
they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall
live beneath the Tatras.
�
AUGUST, 1952
SLOVAKIA
THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO
B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN
F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone
of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava,
the capltal of Slovakia.
1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had
Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar
and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin.
One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people
were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or
" General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr .
.tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and,
later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic.
Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal
ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but
rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr.
l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to
<"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation
c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment.
Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money
to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc,
and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer
recelved his instructlons directly from bim.
NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO
After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast
.,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause
Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was
th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and
had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature
;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded
!o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er.
.\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that
••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a
umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls
Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican
roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror
Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles.
but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je
lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u,
This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan
not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many
tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law
�2
SLOVAKIA
As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin
ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia,
handed over to the representative of the American Army the note
given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment
the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading
Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except
in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far
as I can recollect.
The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri•
cau Army read as tollows:
GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT
KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA
SLOVAKIAN
To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army
For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army
On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems•
miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, .
do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied
and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding
General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1.
W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise
and ordered by the Allied High Comand.
We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States
in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and
accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people
and by the people.
W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection
for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu•
trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces.
Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945.
(Seal of the Prime Ministry)
Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier.
Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa.
Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture.
Kočiš, Minister of Education.
T. J. Gašpar, Deputy.
W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army.
T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C.
Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO
ON ROAD TO GALLOWS
True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr.
Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also
true
that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender
of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty
or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial
�SLOVAKIA
3
clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected,
the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln
each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the
Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl
to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court.
or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon.
1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd
?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government
of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among
the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender
ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or
p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had
occurred in Tiso's case.
On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak
Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had
it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false.
Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the
tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not
to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to
nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly
wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the
insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State
ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis
group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout
even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng
Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published
ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read:
"Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and
members of his Government are not available to the Department of
State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate
\ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter.
"A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government
weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe
montbs of May and June. 1945. . . .
"The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re.
garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated
with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States
milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the
clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless
they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view
of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed
the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European
�SLOVAKJA
T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been
membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re•
leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed
over in November, 1945. . . .
From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u
Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ
t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho·
Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 ·
tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered
He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe
cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln.
'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred
by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso
and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with
everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he
1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave
r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti·
tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant
certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many
t housands more.
It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I.
because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered
to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce
to Ečer.
No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract
remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr.
Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko·
pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which
showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound
by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ
of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's
IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently.
. Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim
and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards.
bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard.
EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO
Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular
preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed
in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in
force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys
or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute
'.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la.
Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute.
the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual;
hence, lt could malte little headway.
Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t
to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I.
�Sl,OVAKIA
5
And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng
c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried
there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much
of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons,
as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr.
Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence,
could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had
reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the
trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons
that it was imposslble to do so.
After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won
so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd
such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso
would get a fair tria!.
There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When
a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to
bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally
rehabl»tated.
Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament.
l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would
not happen.
'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment.
witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or
Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a
soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal
Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945.
Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal
C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must
be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the
fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso.
If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National
('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot
Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between
1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party
had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably
would bave been allve today.
From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak
Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat:
Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government.
On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the
very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth
tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in
I..ondon.
�6
SLOVAKIA
BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY
Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin,
felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945,
be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on
?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik.
Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr.
Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš
had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa
Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was
the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the
Slovaks.
Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb
he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means
or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out
ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia
was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be
next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945.
whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011
wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that
,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal
Council.
It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague
Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in
Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been.
DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T
L OS E EVERYT HI N G
Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did
what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague
Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst
JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The
Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles,
being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945.
Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume
with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.«
organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the
Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in
~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch
was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty.
The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody
oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from
Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated
him fanatically and undivldedly.
·····
�SLOVAKIA
7
Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section
O, which speaks about clemency and states:
"The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and
the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice,
who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak
NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe
Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against
it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents
it to the President of the Republlc."
When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this
agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and
later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that
before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš
and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would
grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot
amnesty to bim.
It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls
D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in
Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes
the case or Dr. Tiso.
In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš
of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised
that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I
shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth
and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945,
both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well
as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in
offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was
under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat
the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very
sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per·
5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known
•o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they
;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce
they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own
P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when
be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy
which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso.
As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso
c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have
rendered any other verdict but that of death.
Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must
not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because,
in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether
they possess character and a spina! column.
L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES
I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency
to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody
·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the
Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt
�8
SLOVAKIA
seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe
representatives of the Catbolic wing.
Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly
iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called
<..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt
would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party.
Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was
attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš
Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt
was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared.
In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc
l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast
iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro
mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso.
The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions,
ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute
the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed
ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the
Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe
llnlted States.
Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak
,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that
Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn,
!r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc
, na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com•
•nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners.
Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe
lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was
said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts,
tó General Ferjenčik.
Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree.
Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and
Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU
adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for
tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso?
· · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot
Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the
court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for
Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all
costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s·
slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite
the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate.
" I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!"
· Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge,
1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard
XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt
afterward. ·:
.
�SLOVAKIA
9
The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt
waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The
Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal
Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty.
On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil
present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when
I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to
tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go
along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself
wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I
retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing
wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will
hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should
not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge
to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner
oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled:
" Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !"
I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner
well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of
very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not
belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso.
I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of
tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them,
and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the
Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe
)JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a
five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr.
Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to
do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded.
THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS
But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner
opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in
Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon
was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s
defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay.
That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is
jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\.
But the truth 1s altogether differenl
Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very
respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon
as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he
was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm.
They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse
wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons.
What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the
�10
SLOVAKIA
police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was
nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense
counsels.
This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would
be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just
and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume
that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that
it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair.
In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was
sealed.
I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge,
but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made
to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,;
prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or
could successfully take exception to it.
Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge
by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case
one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick.
It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether
it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the
defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might
entertain against any person of lhe jury or court.
Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge
of the court.
Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe
defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do.
In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated
during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on
various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena!
laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance.
Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify
that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to
take over hls judgeshlp again.
Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by
the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis
of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture.
Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that
bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned.
he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was
objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin.
AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED
According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge
against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena!
procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde:
to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict
he had promlsed bis bosses.
When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere,
they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob-
�SLOVAKIA
ll
jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not
valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by
the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter·
natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto
Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned,
or only with the knowledge of one of those powers.
The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in
:-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General
In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon
or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members
of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght
the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments:
l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or
llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has
the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall
live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not
subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts,
which may have been committed during the existence of and on the
territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some
27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela·
tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France
agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should
be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was
arrested by American Military Police.
'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can
eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr.
Tiso.
According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942,
eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the
proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had
undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons.
Tiso was not accused of such a crime.
Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who
as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed
to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion.
·
Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In·
habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak
Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates
had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the
agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and
tried II! Warsaw.
.
Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons
and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the
tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular
and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot
tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that
only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form
,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm.
�12
SLOVAKIA
even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm.
The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according
to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not
recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could
not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by
the Slovak National Councll.
We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about
these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but
Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table
and screaming:
"I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures
here!"
And that is how the tria) against Tiso began.
Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech
reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were
not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed
that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be
staged.
During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner
several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat•
ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he
would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was
recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a
report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch
was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound
off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the
people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be
generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what•
ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I
was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical
trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial
would not have come to l!ght.
Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only
t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked:
"Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained
that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet
aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over•
rule lt!"
THE W I TNESSES
The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in
three categories:
. • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro·
gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided
tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko
and BJshop Michael Bm;alka.
From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult
When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l
�SLOVAKIA
13
not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws
in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are
reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a
witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi
be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in·
s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko,
wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious
beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the
Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in
what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran,
the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the
honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr,
KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed
to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot
Justlce and righteousness.
2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner.
Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling.
From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or•
ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad
s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some
tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go.
Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that
'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant
Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three
days, but was not beaten there and was fed well.
Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions,
s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that
does not have to be explained to us."
Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner
as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT·
Ríny hlmself had attested.
Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another
type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but
with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?"
- He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches
in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed
hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been
evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid.
3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be·
·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed
t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before
the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and
Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common
Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse;
and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta
and einbárrasslng for the defense.
· In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and
generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse,
�14
SLOVAKTA
the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses,
looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities
of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! "
Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would
help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same.
Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious
step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte
s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to
be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli<
eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens.
The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark
blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance
were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages.
Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš
tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble
and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock.
Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but
whether he told me everything, I do not know."
The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have
sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have
answered.
It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak
slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over.
Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both
slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the
Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh
mllltary correspondents questloned him.
I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But
I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm
was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later
ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty
years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and
not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today
that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his
own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some
one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person.
Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or
the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny
t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and
gazed toward tbec eiling.
On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr
force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr.
Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and
he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr.
Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka.
Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the
seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe
lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic
lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was
�SLOVAKIA
15
intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1.
John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in
Budapest.
Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would
only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same
school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the
s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava,
or Prague.
Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who
al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a
defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi•
mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed
to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we
do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over
what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false.
K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol
every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader
of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the
future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator
with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for
that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself
with German testlmony.
Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded
that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in
Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of
Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng
judge of the Natlonal Coun.
The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin,
:VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle.
but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example.
The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu·
tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with
Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis
with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles,
but as interned persons of a forelgn state.
T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" -
A S FORECAST
On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the
verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10
P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party
were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April
15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for
9:0 OA. M.
AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of
course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew
l'verything that Daxner was going to do.
On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be·
gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to
happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become
subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man
expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody.
�16
SLOVAKIA
After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso
ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty.
After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for
Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the
Court for clemency.
Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for
clemency on mora! grounds."
Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea·
sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr.
Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without
delay.
Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against
a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy."
However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take
place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to
Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and
take a definite stand on it.
Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s
wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment,
then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets
a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison.
Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it
was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all
t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso.
But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure,
prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered,
but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so
that he mi~ht put it before the National Court.
F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE -
TO HE ROD
Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that
time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak
National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be
resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr.
Edward Beneš.
Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to
demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began
to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was
feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots.
The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00
A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let·
trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at
once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the
request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary
motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M.
to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso.
.
The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and
Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they
\O'OUld Mt -attend lt.
The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered
by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml·
lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided
�SLOVAKIA
17
that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall
be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by
phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might
get tbere as soon as possible.
If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second
agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right
to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final
validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According
to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice
to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe
recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places
it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read.
Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that
amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as
muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al!
documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš.
'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said:
"The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B,
are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague,
April 17, 1947."
Tbat is all and notbing more.
Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the
SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say
a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt.
'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and
l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could
we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no
Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not
agree upon a word of recommendation?
Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned.
tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC.
But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before
:rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks
and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency.
For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs
from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments:
"On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present
a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln
in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the
SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the
Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng
�18
SLO~A.KIA
mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was
necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon
!rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve
declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open
politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences.
"After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after
discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the
SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for
mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would
complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency
and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter
would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting
mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it
to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment."
LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH
-
.
Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch
there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the
documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately
made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium
went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the
documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the
<.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting.
When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be
i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim?
Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that
he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and
wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming
majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible
be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso.
After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he
agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does
not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of
opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist.
. I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the
Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them,
Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo
is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague
would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r
ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out
the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere
<:alled.
.
.
,
,
, ,
,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from
Bratislava a.lone.
·
·
f
�SLOVAKIA
19
The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in
Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us
private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde.
For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater
publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an
hour was:
-
"For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso
and for us it is unprofitable."
Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for
Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek.
BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT
The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that
even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was
one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11
months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal
church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened
in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the
verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed.
The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by
every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social
Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and
in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra)
stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne
Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic
to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic
Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to
Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the
Government to grant cle mency to Tiso."
In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote:
" The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as
official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as
to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency."
Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a
dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby
he did ,not recommend m ercy."
The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly
C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the
behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American
<'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly.
Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step
in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal
Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent
JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim.
�20
SLOVAKJA
The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government
was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that
time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00
P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o.
The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency,
while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision
or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the
praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of
Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5
strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or
two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So
telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the
NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr.
Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr.
Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy
for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately
he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution."
In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr.
Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution.
Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this
by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however,
i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks
in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso.
And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As
tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with
Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency.
Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once
for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it.
Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even
tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at
the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents,
complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early
as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by
tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's
cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by
phone from Prague much earlier.
BENEŠ WAS THE LAW
It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf'
of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by
returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich
would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice.
Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem?
�SLOVAKIA
21
No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet
were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary
formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them.
But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per·
sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night,
several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through
with everything he had o rdered.
Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight,
and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the
execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula·
tions.
On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso
in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš
rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII
were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the
Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the
;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery.
Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made
its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso
was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything
was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister
came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde
was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in
Tiso's bebalf.
•TISO
LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D
Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very
s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during
the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must
make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would
he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was
also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the
last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler
over excitecl Slovakia.
To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was
before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis
truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted
to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me.
From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the
E-ars of every llstener:
"And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past."
Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating
<·i rcumsta.nce.
For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life
gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness.
determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached
and done.
�JJ
SLOVAKIA
Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis
own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and
unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for
:s;ation" In every regard and at all times.
His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are
most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality.
The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso
was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that
issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist
''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of
a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place.
TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE
Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe
questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the
Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph
'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church?
Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution
there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least
not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or
Tiso.
After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie
body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to
I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors,
became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle·
mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the
cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one."
l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few
or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And
,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon.
·
Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci•
sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already
then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one
wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene!
the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court
had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had
clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be
r,reserved.
Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr.
Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family ,
but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y.
Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's
ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug.
Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial.
Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe
matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere
Dr. Tlso ,vas burled.
:. =•:
�SLOVAKIA
23
For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe
grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem
and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave
with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police
constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and
jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3
pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others
even from hlgh schools.
WHO KILLED TI SO ?
Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands
and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the
Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak
NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was
plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy,
and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,.
c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso.
The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic
voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e
overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s
were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be
known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe
leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r
ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And
'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists
or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members
of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats.
The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as
well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor
diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State.
F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[
tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty
;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men,
violating· the- promlse given the electorate.
Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also.
}!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being
lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the
Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders
and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was
s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to
accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater,
under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as
unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr
backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr
uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in
the Tlso case.
N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT
Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi•
tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying
<'lemenc-y to 'ľiso.
�24
SLOVAKIA
Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake
only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth
the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations.
The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all
connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted,
the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to
the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo.
I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to
Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when
in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand
oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he
was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte
a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who
had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice,
every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does
not let Himself be carried away or frightened.
TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS
Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make.
He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on
every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks
or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had
anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national
hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by
those who previously were agalnst bim.
Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained
tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually
united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed
them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings,
but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation
of Tiso.
Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this
dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the
persons ·involved are free again.
After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated
in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but
it remains unconfirmed.
Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb
of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis
and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities
oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and
they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall
live beneath the Tatras.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
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AUGUST, 1952
SLOVAKIA
THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO
B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN
F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone
of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava,
the capltal of Slovakia.
1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had
Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar
and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin.
One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people
were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or
" General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr .
.tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and,
later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic.
Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal
ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but
rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr.
l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to
<"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation
c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment.
Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money
to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc,
and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer
recelved his instructlons directly from bim.
NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO
After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast
.,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause
Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was
th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and
had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature
;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded
!o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er.
.\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that
••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a
umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls
Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican
roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror
Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles.
but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je
lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u,
This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan
not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many
tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law
2
SLOVAKIA
As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin
ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia,
handed over to the representative of the American Army the note
given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment
the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading
Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except
in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far
as I can recollect.
The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri•
cau Army read as tollows:
GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT
KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA
SLOVAKIAN
To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army
For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army
On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems•
miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, .
do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied
and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding
General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1.
W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise
and ordered by the Allied High Comand.
We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States
in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and
accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people
and by the people.
W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection
for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu•
trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces.
Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945.
(Seal of the Prime Ministry)
Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier.
Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa.
Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture.
Kočiš, Minister of Education.
T. J. Gašpar, Deputy.
W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army.
T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C.
Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO
ON ROAD TO GALLOWS
True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr.
Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also
true
that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender
of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty
or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial
SLOVAKIA
3
clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected,
the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln
each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the
Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl
to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court.
or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon.
1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd
?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government
of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among
the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender
ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or
p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had
occurred in Tiso's case.
On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak
Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had
it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false.
Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the
tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not
to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to
nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly
wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the
insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State
ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis
group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout
even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng
Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published
ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read:
"Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and
members of his Government are not available to the Department of
State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate
\ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter.
"A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government
weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe
montbs of May and June. 1945. . . .
"The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re.
garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated
with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States
milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the
clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless
they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view
of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed
the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European
SLOVAKJA
T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been
membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re•
leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed
over in November, 1945. . . .
From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u
Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ
t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho·
Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 ·
tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered
He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe
cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln.
'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred
by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso
and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with
everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he
1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave
r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti·
tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant
certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many
t housands more.
It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I.
because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered
to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce
to Ečer.
No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract
remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr.
Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko·
pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which
showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound
by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ
of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's
IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently.
. Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim
and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards.
bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard.
EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO
Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular
preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed
in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in
force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys
or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute
'.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la.
Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute.
the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual;
hence, lt could malte little headway.
Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t
to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I.
Sl,OVAKIA
5
And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng
c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried
there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much
of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons,
as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr.
Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence,
could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had
reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the
trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons
that it was imposslble to do so.
After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won
so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd
such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso
would get a fair tria!.
There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When
a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to
bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally
rehabl»tated.
Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament.
l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would
not happen.
'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment.
witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or
Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a
soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal
Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945.
Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal
C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must
be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the
fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso.
If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National
('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot
Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between
1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party
had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably
would bave been allve today.
From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak
Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat:
Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government.
On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the
very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth
tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in
I..ondon.
6
SLOVAKIA
BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY
Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin,
felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945,
be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on
?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik.
Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr.
Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš
had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa
Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was
the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the
Slovaks.
Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb
he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means
or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out
ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia
was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be
next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945.
whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011
wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that
,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal
Council.
It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague
Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in
Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been.
DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T
L OS E EVERYT HI N G
Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did
what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague
Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst
JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The
Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles,
being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945.
Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume
with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.«
organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the
Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in
~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch
was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty.
The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody
oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from
Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated
him fanatically and undivldedly.
·····
SLOVAKIA
7
Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section
O, which speaks about clemency and states:
"The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and
the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice,
who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak
NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe
Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against
it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents
it to the President of the Republlc."
When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this
agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and
later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that
before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš
and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would
grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot
amnesty to bim.
It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls
D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in
Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes
the case or Dr. Tiso.
In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš
of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised
that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I
shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth
and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945,
both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well
as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in
offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was
under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat
the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very
sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per·
5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known
•o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they
;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce
they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own
P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when
be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy
which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso.
As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso
c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have
rendered any other verdict but that of death.
Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must
not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because,
in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether
they possess character and a spina! column.
L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES
I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency
to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody
·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the
Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt
8
SLOVAKIA
seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe
representatives of the Catbolic wing.
Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly
iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called
<..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt
would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party.
Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was
attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš
Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt
was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared.
In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc
l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast
iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro
mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso.
The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions,
ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute
the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed
ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the
Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe
llnlted States.
Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak
,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that
Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn,
!r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc
, na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com•
•nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners.
Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe
lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was
said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts,
tó General Ferjenčik.
Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree.
Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and
Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU
adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for
tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso?
· · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot
Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the
court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for
Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all
costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s·
slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite
the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate.
" I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!"
· Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge,
1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard
XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt
afterward. ·:
.
SLOVAKIA
9
The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt
waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The
Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal
Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty.
On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil
present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when
I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to
tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go
along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself
wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I
retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing
wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will
hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should
not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge
to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner
oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled:
" Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !"
I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner
well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of
very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not
belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso.
I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of
tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them,
and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the
Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe
)JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a
five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr.
Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to
do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded.
THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS
But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner
opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in
Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon
was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s
defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay.
That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is
jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\.
But the truth 1s altogether differenl
Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very
respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon
as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he
was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm.
They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse
wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons.
What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the
10
SLOVAKIA
police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was
nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense
counsels.
This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would
be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just
and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume
that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that
it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair.
In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was
sealed.
I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge,
but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made
to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,;
prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or
could successfully take exception to it.
Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge
by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case
one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick.
It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether
it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the
defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might
entertain against any person of lhe jury or court.
Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge
of the court.
Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe
defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do.
In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated
during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on
various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena!
laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance.
Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify
that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to
take over hls judgeshlp again.
Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by
the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis
of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture.
Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that
bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned.
he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was
objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin.
AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED
According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge
against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena!
procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde:
to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict
he had promlsed bis bosses.
When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere,
they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob-
SLOVAKIA
ll
jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not
valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by
the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter·
natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto
Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned,
or only with the knowledge of one of those powers.
The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in
:-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General
In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon
or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members
of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght
the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments:
l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or
llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has
the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall
live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not
subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts,
which may have been committed during the existence of and on the
territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some
27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela·
tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France
agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should
be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was
arrested by American Military Police.
'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can
eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr.
Tiso.
According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942,
eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the
proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had
undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons.
Tiso was not accused of such a crime.
Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who
as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed
to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion.
·
Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In·
habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak
Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates
had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the
agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and
tried II! Warsaw.
.
Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons
and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the
tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular
and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot
tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that
only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form
,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm.
12
SLOVAKIA
even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm.
The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according
to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not
recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could
not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by
the Slovak National Councll.
We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about
these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but
Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table
and screaming:
"I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures
here!"
And that is how the tria) against Tiso began.
Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech
reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were
not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed
that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be
staged.
During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner
several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat•
ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he
would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was
recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a
report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch
was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound
off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the
people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be
generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what•
ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I
was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical
trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial
would not have come to l!ght.
Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only
t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked:
"Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained
that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet
aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over•
rule lt!"
THE W I TNESSES
The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in
three categories:
. • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro·
gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided
tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko
and BJshop Michael Bm;alka.
From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult
When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l
SLOVAKIA
13
not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws
in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are
reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a
witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi
be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in·
s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko,
wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious
beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the
Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in
what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran,
the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the
honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr,
KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed
to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot
Justlce and righteousness.
2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner.
Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling.
From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or•
ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad
s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some
tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go.
Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that
'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant
Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three
days, but was not beaten there and was fed well.
Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions,
s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that
does not have to be explained to us."
Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner
as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT·
Ríny hlmself had attested.
Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another
type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but
with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?"
- He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches
in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed
hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been
evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid.
3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be·
·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed
t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before
the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and
Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common
Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse;
and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta
and einbárrasslng for the defense.
· In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and
generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse,
14
SLOVAKTA
the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses,
looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities
of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! "
Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would
help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same.
Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious
step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte
s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to
be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli<
eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens.
The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark
blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance
were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages.
Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš
tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble
and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock.
Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but
whether he told me everything, I do not know."
The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have
sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have
answered.
It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak
slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over.
Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both
slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the
Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh
mllltary correspondents questloned him.
I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But
I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm
was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later
ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty
years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and
not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today
that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his
own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some
one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person.
Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or
the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny
t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and
gazed toward tbec eiling.
On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr
force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr.
Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and
he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr.
Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka.
Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the
seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe
lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic
lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was
SLOVAKIA
15
intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1.
John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in
Budapest.
Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would
only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same
school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the
s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava,
or Prague.
Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who
al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a
defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi•
mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed
to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we
do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over
what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false.
K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol
every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader
of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the
future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator
with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for
that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself
with German testlmony.
Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded
that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in
Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of
Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng
judge of the Natlonal Coun.
The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin,
:VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle.
but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example.
The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu·
tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with
Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis
with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles,
but as interned persons of a forelgn state.
T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" -
A S FORECAST
On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the
verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10
P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party
were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April
15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for
9:0 OA. M.
AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of
course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew
l'verything that Daxner was going to do.
On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be·
gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to
happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become
subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man
expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody.
16
SLOVAKIA
After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso
ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty.
After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for
Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the
Court for clemency.
Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for
clemency on mora! grounds."
Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea·
sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr.
Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without
delay.
Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against
a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy."
However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take
place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to
Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and
take a definite stand on it.
Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s
wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment,
then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets
a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison.
Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it
was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all
t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso.
But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure,
prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered,
but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so
that he mi~ht put it before the National Court.
F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE -
TO HE ROD
Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that
time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak
National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be
resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr.
Edward Beneš.
Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to
demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began
to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was
feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots.
The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00
A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let·
trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at
once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the
request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary
motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M.
to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso.
.
The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and
Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they
\O'OUld Mt -attend lt.
The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered
by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml·
lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided
SLOVAKIA
17
that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall
be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by
phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might
get tbere as soon as possible.
If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second
agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right
to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final
validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According
to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice
to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe
recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places
it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read.
Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that
amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as
muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al!
documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš.
'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said:
"The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B,
are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague,
April 17, 1947."
Tbat is all and notbing more.
Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the
SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say
a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt.
'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and
l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could
we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no
Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not
agree upon a word of recommendation?
Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned.
tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC.
But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before
:rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks
and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency.
For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs
from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments:
"On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present
a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln
in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the
SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the
Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng
18
SLO~A.KIA
mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was
necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon
!rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve
declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open
politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences.
"After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after
discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the
SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for
mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would
complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency
and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter
would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting
mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it
to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment."
LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH
-
.
Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch
there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the
documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately
made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium
went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the
documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the
<.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting.
When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be
i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim?
Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that
he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and
wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming
majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible
be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso.
After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he
agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does
not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of
opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist.
. I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the
Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them,
Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo
is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague
would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r
ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out
the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere
<:alled.
.
.
,
,
, ,
,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from
Bratislava a.lone.
·
·
f
SLOVAKIA
19
The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in
Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us
private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde.
For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater
publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an
hour was:
-
"For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso
and for us it is unprofitable."
Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for
Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek.
BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT
The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that
even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was
one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11
months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal
church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened
in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the
verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed.
The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by
every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social
Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and
in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra)
stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne
Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic
to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic
Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to
Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the
Government to grant cle mency to Tiso."
In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote:
" The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as
official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as
to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency."
Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a
dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby
he did ,not recommend m ercy."
The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly
C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the
behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American
<'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly.
Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step
in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal
Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent
JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim.
20
SLOVAKJA
The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government
was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that
time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00
P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o.
The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency,
while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision
or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the
praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of
Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5
strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or
two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So
telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the
NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr.
Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr.
Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy
for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately
he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution."
In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr.
Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution.
Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this
by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however,
i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks
in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso.
And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As
tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with
Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency.
Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once
for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it.
Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even
tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at
the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents,
complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early
as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by
tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's
cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by
phone from Prague much earlier.
BENEŠ WAS THE LAW
It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf'
of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by
returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich
would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice.
Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem?
SLOVAKIA
21
No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet
were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary
formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them.
But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per·
sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night,
several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through
with everything he had o rdered.
Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight,
and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the
execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula·
tions.
On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso
in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš
rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII
were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the
Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the
;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery.
Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made
its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso
was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything
was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister
came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde
was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in
Tiso's bebalf.
•TISO
LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D
Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very
s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during
the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must
make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would
he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was
also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the
last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler
over excitecl Slovakia.
To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was
before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis
truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted
to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me.
From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the
E-ars of every llstener:
"And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past."
Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating
<·i rcumsta.nce.
For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life
gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness.
determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached
and done.
JJ
SLOVAKIA
Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis
own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and
unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for
:s;ation" In every regard and at all times.
His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are
most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality.
The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso
was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that
issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist
''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of
a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place.
TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE
Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe
questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the
Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph
'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church?
Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution
there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least
not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or
Tiso.
After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie
body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to
I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors,
became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle·
mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the
cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one."
l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few
or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And
,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon.
·
Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci•
sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already
then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one
wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene!
the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court
had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had
clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be
r,reserved.
Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr.
Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family ,
but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y.
Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's
ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug.
Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial.
Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe
matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere
Dr. Tlso ,vas burled.
:. =•:
SLOVAKIA
23
For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe
grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem
and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave
with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police
constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and
jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3
pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others
even from hlgh schools.
WHO KILLED TI SO ?
Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands
and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the
Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak
NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was
plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy,
and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,.
c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso.
The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic
voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e
overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s
were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be
known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe
leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r
ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And
'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists
or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members
of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats.
The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as
well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor
diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State.
F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[
tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty
;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men,
violating· the- promlse given the electorate.
Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also.
}!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being
lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the
Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders
and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was
s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to
accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater,
under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as
unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr
backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr
uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in
the Tlso case.
N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT
Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi•
tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying
<'lemenc-y to 'ľiso.
24
SLOVAKIA
Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake
only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth
the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations.
The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all
connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted,
the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to
the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo.
I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to
Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when
in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand
oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he
was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte
a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who
had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice,
every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does
not let Himself be carried away or frightened.
TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS
Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make.
He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on
every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks
or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had
anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national
hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by
those who previously were agalnst bim.
Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained
tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually
united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed
them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings,
but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation
of Tiso.
Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this
dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the
persons ·involved are free again.
After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated
in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but
it remains unconfirmed.
Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb
of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis
and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities
oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and
they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall
live beneath the Tatras.
Dublin Core
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Title
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The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952
pp. 1-24
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Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968
Date
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August 1952
name
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9300c821ed15a55b939dcfcb0256c321.pdf
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SLOVAKIA
·uow
FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE?
BY KURT GLASSER
1-
THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K
In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra!
Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid
for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens,
will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE.
Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on
an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional
antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian,
Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages
are to follow later.
Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by
the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through
the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic
'·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they
knew what was happening wlth some of their money.
Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond
reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them.
lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich
in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol·
Io wing facts:
1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National
Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as
is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the
contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least
1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line.
2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in
Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret
police.
3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist agents or have criminal records.
4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin
by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED
The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter
Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization,
known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the
station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we
�shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce
World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had
studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would
not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers.
To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as
one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech
natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct
natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can,
wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan
monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the
8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by
Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot
Czecho-Slovakia.
The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe
Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and
discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten
Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts·
burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs
and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants
got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later
under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe
result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to
mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to
"get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord
;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government.
The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a
ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United
States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon
of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western
world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an
island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism.
'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the
road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have
refused to cooperate.
At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak
s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague
agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich,
in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister
'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new
governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler
tbe excuse to march lnto Prague.
lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence
�SLOVAKIA
witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more
t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry.
BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN
· It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for
support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e
felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which
Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today
is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move·
ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940.
was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close
collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion
he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in
);ovember 1945:
" The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that
in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent
collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR,
never against the USSR, always on its side!"
The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the
Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš'
~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic
Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944):
"Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate
officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre.
judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible •
moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth
that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in
that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and
exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere."
The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced
by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese,
L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at
B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks)
Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared
t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda:
" ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the
strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights
than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the
wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national
ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the
minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the·
Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat
as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality."
(B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). ·
�SLOVAKIA
28
Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free
Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of
Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe
Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st
.igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho•
Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo
publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian
Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of
a Communist dally in Slovakia.
In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was
worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and
iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement
with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement.
but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States
s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es
s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role
of .the Communist Party was assured.
II -
THE F A K E D E MOCRACY -
1945-1948
As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes
Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague,
with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the
"Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat
they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm
t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government
in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger•
many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics"
(compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the
Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected
for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional
American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a
democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The
Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian
Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe
war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and
Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20
years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal
parties.
Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party
would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To
make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak
citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap
tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been
r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister.
As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support
Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP,
�iLOVAKIA
Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A .
Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and
After," described thc situation in th e following terms:
1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car.
patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second,
Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The
quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One
has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and
that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the
Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the
Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer.
tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra!
Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and
Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a
pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own.
Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so
long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945!
~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they
entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties
would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology.
In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right
minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister.
Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of
t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called
Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted.
'!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul•
ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the
Gottwald government.
In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had
been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes
party.
These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who
are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these
National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States
today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro.
jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department.
From the point of view of long-range international politics, the
most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans.
Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech
government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to
deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po.
litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas
of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave
tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous
points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an
art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the
�ao
SLOVAKI.A
Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his
frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any
Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however
little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so
tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply
bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast
cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical
authorťties.
·
·
"-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's
(with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the
Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the
Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis."
The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he
Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial
ized as follows:
"Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the
dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the
i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that
a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has
guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples
owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in
Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western
powers."
. The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder
barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II
was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part
ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int,
v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla.
on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she
is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The
way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I
is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state
at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend
on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's
Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe
conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý.
The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between
the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows:
"lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation
of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the
question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t
WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The
fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11,
September 20, 1945, page 3).
Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the
�SLOVAKIA
31
intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even
more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? :
"The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world
Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in
Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people
a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat
at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame
church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8),
Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or
liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only
Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned
a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls
<:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return
to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under
a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In
~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks.
' ·.• ·
The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee,
1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny
rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or
<lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists.
And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe
clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt
refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good
will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to
answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed
bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany
(sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle
l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place:
"Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe
main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants?
" Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes."
Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does
not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has
as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng
in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada,
AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll
Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak
patrlots.
The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they
are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the
most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open
and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to
antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups
which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle
against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech
ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees.
T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better.
•,
�32
SLOVAKIA
I II -
HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND
WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS
On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t
to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant:
walďs
1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who
n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show
ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent
the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations.
2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen
necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make
them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf
Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ?
N ot necessari ly.
tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the
Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse
the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup,
including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia
without the sligh test lnterference from the Government.
The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents
traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had
tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met
witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities,
particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and
become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled
in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for
Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect•
able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy
'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the
American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really
1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed
the natural and human thing to do.
In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have
an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes
party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had
been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left
Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at
all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ
levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl
an ti-Communists.
If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you
have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl
and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes)
Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne-
�SLOVAKIA
33
staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa
Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo•
mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all
except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police,
a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not
poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers
were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother
Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka.
On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their
friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although
these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst
secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs
and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast
under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the
families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this
procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police
with very useful information.
As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground
in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational
headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral
Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service"
in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position
in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under·
ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for
couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection
with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter.
I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without
too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the
following individuals:
1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn
(Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn
Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger•
man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the
Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night
the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers
were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000
and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr.
Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the
JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters
for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he
1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon.
2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels
ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln
Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist
s py.
3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member
of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody.
4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp"
near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon
�SLOVAKIA
34
that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at
Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany.
5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively
for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for
deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is
--strictly secret."
6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent.
Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech
8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing
1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob•
lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent
letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through
cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya
agenta of the secret police.
The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott·
walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or
received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the
trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did
the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking
that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla.
boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda
to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty
years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance
in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was
effectively liquidated.
IV -
AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO
In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech
broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla.
!<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of
who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things
have tieen happlly patched up.
•· ·•
The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party
and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr.
Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch
Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces
of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall
pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy
~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from
his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947:
"N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea
of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical
epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion.
lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of
the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8).
�SLOVAKIA
36
"Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became
clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big.
You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell
me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla.
tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem
to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op.
posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.)
" Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there
lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies.
This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33)
"In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this
respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 )
'.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop.
ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop.
ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be
able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171)
Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an
intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and
ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not
r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he
party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was
formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name
of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti•
German line.
Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef
Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g
the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly
Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne
called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth
th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng,
such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa.
nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of
Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a
Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether
he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during
tbe war.
A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES
Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the
Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech
program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~
involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States.
�36
SLOVAKIA
To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction.
Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those
who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud
since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro·
gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of
patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak
leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak
our thoughts."
So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of
the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes
policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people
won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he
program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a
positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination.
In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program.
'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their
money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists
and near-Communists.
Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the
station requires that it have a good source of news from inside
Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to
use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only
reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also
agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting
only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which
isn't too much.
The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe
tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec
outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida·
tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has
no way of checking whether these stories are true or not.
Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot
Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group
in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even
a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party
of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely
interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I
was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp
alhletic organization.
On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the
anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program
are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been
!leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation
in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal
protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at
I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of-
�S LOVAKIA
37
ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since
Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem
wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There
are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they
teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it
necessary .to do something about it.
N EEDED -
A GOOD CLEANUP
Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms
ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer
to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed.
It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak
program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole
idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri·
cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations
should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are
experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program,
the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle
of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech
and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The
bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department,
American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in
itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to
unravel.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the
sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks
to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm
doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend•
ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate
and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that
Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world
a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own
Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet
the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering,
flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto
the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its
Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many
more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47.
�
SLOVAKIA
·uow
FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE?
BY KURT GLASSER
1-
THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K
In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra!
Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid
for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens,
will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE.
Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on
an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional
antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian,
Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages
are to follow later.
Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by
the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through
the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic
'·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they
knew what was happening wlth some of their money.
Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond
reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them.
lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich
in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol·
Io wing facts:
1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National
Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as
is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the
contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least
1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line.
2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in
Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret
police.
3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist agents or have criminal records.
4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin
by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED
The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter
Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization,
known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the
station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we
�shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce
World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had
studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would
not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers.
To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as
one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech
natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct
natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can,
wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan
monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the
8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by
Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot
Czecho-Slovakia.
The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe
Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and
discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten
Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts·
burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs
and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants
got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later
under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe
result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to
mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to
"get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord
;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government.
The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a
ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United
States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon
of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western
world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an
island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism.
'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the
road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have
refused to cooperate.
At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak
s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague
agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich,
in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister
'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new
governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler
tbe excuse to march lnto Prague.
lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence
�SLOVAKIA
witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more
t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry.
BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN
· It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for
support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e
felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which
Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today
is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move·
ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940.
was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close
collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion
he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in
);ovember 1945:
" The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that
in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent
collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR,
never against the USSR, always on its side!"
The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the
Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš'
~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic
Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944):
"Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate
officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre.
judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible •
moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth
that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in
that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and
exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere."
The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced
by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese,
L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at
B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks)
Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared
t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda:
" ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the
strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights
than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the
wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national
ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the
minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the·
Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat
as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality."
(B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). ·
�SLOVAKIA
28
Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free
Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of
Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe
Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st
.igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho•
Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo
publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian
Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of
a Communist dally in Slovakia.
In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was
worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and
iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement
with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement.
but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States
s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es
s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role
of .the Communist Party was assured.
II -
THE F A K E D E MOCRACY -
1945-1948
As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes
Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague,
with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the
"Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat
they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm
t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government
in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger•
many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics"
(compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the
Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected
for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional
American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a
democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The
Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian
Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe
war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and
Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20
years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal
parties.
Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party
would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To
make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak
citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap
tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been
r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister.
As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support
Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP,
�iLOVAKIA
Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A .
Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and
After," described thc situation in th e following terms:
1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car.
patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second,
Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The
quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One
has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and
that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the
Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the
Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer.
tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra!
Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and
Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a
pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own.
Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so
long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945!
~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they
entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties
would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology.
In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right
minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister.
Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of
t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called
Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted.
'!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul•
ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the
Gottwald government.
In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had
been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes
party.
These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who
are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these
National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States
today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro.
jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department.
From the point of view of long-range international politics, the
most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans.
Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech
government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to
deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po.
litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas
of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave
tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous
points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an
art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the
�ao
SLOVAKI.A
Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his
frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any
Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however
little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so
tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply
bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast
cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical
authorťties.
·
·
"-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's
(with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the
Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the
Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis."
The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he
Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial
ized as follows:
"Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the
dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the
i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that
a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has
guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples
owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in
Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western
powers."
. The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder
barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II
was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part
ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int,
v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla.
on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she
is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The
way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I
is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state
at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend
on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's
Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe
conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý.
The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between
the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows:
"lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation
of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the
question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t
WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The
fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11,
September 20, 1945, page 3).
Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the
�SLOVAKIA
31
intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even
more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? :
"The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world
Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in
Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people
a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat
at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame
church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8),
Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or
liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only
Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned
a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls
<:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return
to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under
a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In
~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks.
' ·.• ·
The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee,
1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny
rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or
<lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists.
And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe
clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt
refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good
will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to
answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed
bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany
(sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle
l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place:
"Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe
main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants?
" Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes."
Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does
not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has
as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng
in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada,
AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll
Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak
patrlots.
The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they
are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the
most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open
and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to
antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups
which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle
against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech
ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees.
T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better.
•,
�32
SLOVAKIA
I II -
HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND
WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS
On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t
to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant:
walďs
1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who
n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show
ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent
the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations.
2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen
necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make
them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf
Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ?
N ot necessari ly.
tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the
Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse
the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup,
including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia
without the sligh test lnterference from the Government.
The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents
traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had
tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met
witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities,
particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and
become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled
in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for
Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect•
able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy
'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the
American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really
1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed
the natural and human thing to do.
In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have
an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes
party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had
been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left
Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at
all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ
levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl
an ti-Communists.
If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you
have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl
and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes)
Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne-
�SLOVAKIA
33
staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa
Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo•
mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all
except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police,
a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not
poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers
were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother
Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka.
On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their
friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although
these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst
secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs
and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast
under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the
families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this
procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police
with very useful information.
As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground
in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational
headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral
Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service"
in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position
in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under·
ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for
couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection
with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter.
I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without
too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the
following individuals:
1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn
(Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn
Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger•
man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the
Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night
the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers
were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000
and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr.
Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the
JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters
for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he
1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon.
2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels
ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln
Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist
s py.
3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member
of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody.
4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp"
near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon
�SLOVAKIA
34
that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at
Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany.
5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively
for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for
deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is
--strictly secret."
6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent.
Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech
8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing
1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob•
lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent
letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through
cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya
agenta of the secret police.
The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott·
walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or
received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the
trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did
the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking
that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla.
boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda
to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty
years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance
in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was
effectively liquidated.
IV -
AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO
In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech
broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla.
!<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of
who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things
have tieen happlly patched up.
•· ·•
The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party
and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr.
Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch
Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces
of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall
pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy
~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from
his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947:
"N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea
of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical
epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion.
lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of
the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8).
�SLOVAKIA
36
"Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became
clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big.
You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell
me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla.
tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem
to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op.
posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.)
" Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there
lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies.
This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33)
"In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this
respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 )
'.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop.
ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop.
ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be
able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171)
Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an
intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and
ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not
r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he
party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was
formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name
of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti•
German line.
Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef
Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g
the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly
Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne
called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth
th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng,
such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa.
nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of
Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a
Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether
he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during
tbe war.
A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES
Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the
Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech
program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~
involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States.
�36
SLOVAKIA
To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction.
Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those
who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud
since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro·
gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of
patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak
leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak
our thoughts."
So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of
the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes
policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people
won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he
program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a
positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination.
In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program.
'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their
money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists
and near-Communists.
Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the
station requires that it have a good source of news from inside
Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to
use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only
reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also
agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting
only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which
isn't too much.
The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe
tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec
outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida·
tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has
no way of checking whether these stories are true or not.
Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot
Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group
in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even
a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party
of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely
interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I
was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp
alhletic organization.
On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the
anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program
are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been
!leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation
in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal
protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at
I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of-
�S LOVAKIA
37
ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since
Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem
wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There
are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they
teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it
necessary .to do something about it.
N EEDED -
A GOOD CLEANUP
Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms
ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer
to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed.
It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak
program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole
idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri·
cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations
should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are
experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program,
the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle
of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech
and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The
bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department,
American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in
itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to
unravel.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the
sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks
to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm
doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend•
ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate
and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that
Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world
a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own
Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet
the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering,
flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto
the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its
Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many
more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47.
�
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1952, Vol. 2
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The Slovak League of America
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1952
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
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SLOVAKIA
·uow
FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE?
BY KURT GLASSER
1-
THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K
In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra!
Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid
for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens,
will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE.
Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on
an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional
antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian,
Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages
are to follow later.
Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by
the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through
the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic
'·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they
knew what was happening wlth some of their money.
Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond
reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them.
lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich
in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol·
Io wing facts:
1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National
Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as
is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the
contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least
1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line.
2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in
Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret
police.
3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist agents or have criminal records.
4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin
by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED
The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter
Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization,
known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the
station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we
shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce
World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had
studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would
not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers.
To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as
one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech
natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct
natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can,
wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan
monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the
8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by
Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot
Czecho-Slovakia.
The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe
Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and
discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten
Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts·
burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs
and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants
got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later
under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe
result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to
mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to
"get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord
;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government.
The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a
ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United
States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon
of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western
world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an
island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism.
'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the
road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have
refused to cooperate.
At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak
s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague
agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich,
in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister
'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new
governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler
tbe excuse to march lnto Prague.
lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence
SLOVAKIA
witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more
t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry.
BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN
· It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for
support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e
felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which
Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today
is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move·
ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940.
was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close
collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion
he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in
);ovember 1945:
" The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that
in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent
collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR,
never against the USSR, always on its side!"
The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the
Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš'
~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic
Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944):
"Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate
officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre.
judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible •
moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth
that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in
that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and
exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere."
The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced
by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese,
L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at
B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks)
Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared
t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda:
" ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the
strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights
than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the
wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national
ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the
minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the·
Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat
as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality."
(B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). ·
SLOVAKIA
28
Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free
Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of
Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe
Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st
.igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho•
Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo
publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian
Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of
a Communist dally in Slovakia.
In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was
worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and
iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement
with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement.
but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States
s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es
s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role
of .the Communist Party was assured.
II -
THE F A K E D E MOCRACY -
1945-1948
As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes
Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague,
with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the
"Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat
they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm
t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government
in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger•
many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics"
(compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the
Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected
for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional
American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a
democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The
Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian
Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe
war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and
Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20
years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal
parties.
Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party
would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To
make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak
citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap
tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been
r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister.
As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support
Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP,
iLOVAKIA
Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A .
Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and
After," described thc situation in th e following terms:
1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car.
patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second,
Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The
quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One
has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and
that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the
Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the
Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer.
tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra!
Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and
Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a
pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own.
Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so
long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945!
~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they
entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties
would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology.
In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right
minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister.
Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of
t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called
Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted.
'!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul•
ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the
Gottwald government.
In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had
been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes
party.
These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who
are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these
National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States
today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro.
jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department.
From the point of view of long-range international politics, the
most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans.
Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech
government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to
deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po.
litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas
of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave
tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous
points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an
art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the
ao
SLOVAKI.A
Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his
frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any
Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however
little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so
tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply
bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast
cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical
authorťties.
·
·
"-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's
(with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the
Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the
Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis."
The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he
Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial
ized as follows:
"Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the
dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the
i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that
a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has
guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples
owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in
Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western
powers."
. The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder
barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II
was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part
ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int,
v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla.
on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she
is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The
way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I
is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state
at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend
on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's
Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe
conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý.
The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between
the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows:
"lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation
of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the
question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t
WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The
fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11,
September 20, 1945, page 3).
Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the
SLOVAKIA
31
intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even
more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? :
"The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world
Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in
Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people
a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat
at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame
church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8),
Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or
liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only
Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned
a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls
<:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return
to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under
a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In
~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks.
' ·.• ·
The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee,
1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny
rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or
<lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists.
And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe
clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt
refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good
will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to
answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed
bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany
(sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle
l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place:
"Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe
main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants?
" Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes."
Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does
not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has
as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng
in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada,
AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll
Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak
patrlots.
The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they
are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the
most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open
and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to
antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups
which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle
against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech
ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees.
T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better.
•,
32
SLOVAKIA
I II -
HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND
WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS
On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t
to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant:
walďs
1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who
n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show
ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent
the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations.
2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen
necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make
them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf
Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ?
N ot necessari ly.
tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the
Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse
the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup,
including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia
without the sligh test lnterference from the Government.
The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents
traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had
tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met
witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities,
particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and
become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled
in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for
Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect•
able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy
'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the
American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really
1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed
the natural and human thing to do.
In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have
an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes
party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had
been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left
Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at
all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ
levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl
an ti-Communists.
If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you
have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl
and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes)
Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne-
SLOVAKIA
33
staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa
Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo•
mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all
except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police,
a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not
poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers
were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother
Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka.
On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their
friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although
these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst
secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs
and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast
under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the
families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this
procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police
with very useful information.
As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground
in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational
headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral
Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service"
in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position
in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under·
ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for
couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection
with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter.
I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without
too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the
following individuals:
1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn
(Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn
Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger•
man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the
Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night
the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers
were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000
and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr.
Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the
JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters
for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he
1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon.
2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels
ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln
Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist
s py.
3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member
of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody.
4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp"
near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon
SLOVAKIA
34
that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at
Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany.
5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively
for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for
deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is
--strictly secret."
6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent.
Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech
8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing
1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob•
lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent
letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through
cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya
agenta of the secret police.
The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott·
walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or
received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the
trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did
the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking
that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla.
boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda
to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty
years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance
in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was
effectively liquidated.
IV -
AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO
In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech
broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla.
!<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of
who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things
have tieen happlly patched up.
•· ·•
The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party
and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr.
Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch
Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces
of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall
pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy
~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from
his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947:
"N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea
of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical
epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion.
lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of
the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8).
SLOVAKIA
36
"Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became
clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big.
You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell
me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla.
tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem
to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op.
posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.)
" Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there
lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies.
This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33)
"In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this
respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 )
'.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop.
ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop.
ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be
able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171)
Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an
intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and
ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not
r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he
party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was
formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name
of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti•
German line.
Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef
Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g
the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly
Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne
called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth
th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng,
such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa.
nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of
Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a
Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether
he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during
tbe war.
A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES
Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the
Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech
program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~
involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States.
36
SLOVAKIA
To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction.
Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those
who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud
since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro·
gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of
patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak
leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak
our thoughts."
So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of
the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes
policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people
won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he
program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a
positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination.
In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program.
'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their
money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists
and near-Communists.
Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the
station requires that it have a good source of news from inside
Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to
use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only
reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also
agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting
only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which
isn't too much.
The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe
tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec
outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida·
tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has
no way of checking whether these stories are true or not.
Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot
Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group
in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even
a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party
of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely
interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I
was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp
alhletic organization.
On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the
anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program
are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been
!leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation
in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal
protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at
I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of-
S LOVAKIA
37
ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since
Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem
wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There
are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they
teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it
necessary .to do something about it.
N EEDED -
A GOOD CLEANUP
Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms
ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer
to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed.
It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak
program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole
idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri·
cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations
should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are
experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program,
the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle
of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech
and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The
bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department,
American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in
itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to
unravel.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the
sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks
to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm
doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend•
ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate
and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that
Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world
a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own
Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet
the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering,
flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto
the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its
Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many
more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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How Free is Radio Free Europe?
Description
An account of the resource
Kurt Glasser
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952
pp. 25-37
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
August 1952
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f841e2bddb560de426f2a8cd936a6f02.pdf
e149e9d1fae319afac2fbbe288f8448e
PDF Text
Text
38
SLOVA.KIA
THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ
Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te
originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under
whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in
19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the
fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak
Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at
every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled
in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany
when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu
and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated
in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection).
The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak
Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted
not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the
most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on
the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies
in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were
c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc
corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State.
ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize
tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with
it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic
and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not
only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but
also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled
Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and
J<,cuador.
Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events
would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s'
\\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty
Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget
ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in
Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan
and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb.
There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London,
and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in
foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the
territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example,
was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb
America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in
North America.
�BLOVAKlA
39
k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop
to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would
bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy
probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the
Baltic States did in London and Washington.
Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also.
Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe
did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge
paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even
tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States
wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and
by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak
exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied
the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of
the Centra! European Slates.
But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it
that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent.
They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak
lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples.
and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s
about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em•
bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm.
Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the
e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the
Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I
in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages
about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the
Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious
books of Czech and Magyar authors.
From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that
many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many
more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense.
Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and
J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l.
Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler.
For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the
Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French
soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And
~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in
keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In
Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu.
lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e
�tO
SLOVA.KLA
Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a
manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted
toward German representatives in much the same manner as they
did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign
servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver·
trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome
had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of
1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with
Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we
requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the
„equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of
sneh an impoiitant war material.
"Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for
Germany?" we were asked.
,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce
proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations
with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at
al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial
po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra!
State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth
the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got
into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen,
through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands
of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge.
Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called
to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler
for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps.
"Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I
do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to
Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how
Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the
end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's
minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were
occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies
in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after
that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself.
Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives
and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was
fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along
with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest
was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war.
Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded
as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka
failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a
�SLOVAKIA
few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action
and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign
Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only
for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State.
Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany
and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State
by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak
foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps
was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency.
To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza
Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an
episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš
to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who
came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade
delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant
material, which he later sent to London.
This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery
wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer
during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava.
In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps
remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even
when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is
comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign
service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor,
Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph
Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr.
števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc.
All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully
aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means
to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse
of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for
Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran,
Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the
principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely
roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists
on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors
until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the
map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe.
•
•
•
"In the West some indivlduals assert that we
are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs
differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall
remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng
and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague
Broadcast, October 9, 1945).
WHO SAID IT? -
�
38
SLOVA.KIA
THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ
Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te
originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under
whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in
19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the
fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak
Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at
every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled
in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany
when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu
and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated
in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection).
The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak
Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted
not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the
most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on
the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies
in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were
c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc
corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State.
ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize
tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with
it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic
and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not
only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but
also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled
Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and
J<,cuador.
Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events
would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s'
\\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty
Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget
ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in
Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan
and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb.
There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London,
and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in
foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the
territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example,
was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb
America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in
North America.
�BLOVAKlA
39
k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop
to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would
bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy
probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the
Baltic States did in London and Washington.
Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also.
Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe
did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge
paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even
tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States
wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and
by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak
exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied
the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of
the Centra! European Slates.
But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it
that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent.
They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak
lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples.
and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s
about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em•
bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm.
Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the
e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the
Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I
in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages
about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the
Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious
books of Czech and Magyar authors.
From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that
many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many
more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense.
Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and
J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l.
Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler.
For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the
Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French
soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And
~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in
keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In
Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu.
lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e
�tO
SLOVA.KLA
Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a
manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted
toward German representatives in much the same manner as they
did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign
servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver·
trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome
had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of
1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with
Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we
requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the
„equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of
sneh an impoiitant war material.
"Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for
Germany?" we were asked.
,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce
proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations
with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at
al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial
po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra!
State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth
the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got
into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen,
through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands
of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge.
Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called
to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler
for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps.
"Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I
do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to
Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how
Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the
end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's
minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were
occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies
in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after
that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself.
Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives
and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was
fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along
with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest
was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war.
Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded
as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka
failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a
�SLOVAKIA
few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action
and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign
Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only
for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State.
Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany
and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State
by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak
foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps
was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency.
To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza
Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an
episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš
to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who
came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade
delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant
material, which he later sent to London.
This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery
wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer
during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava.
In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps
remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even
when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is
comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign
service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor,
Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph
Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr.
števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc.
All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully
aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means
to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse
of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for
Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran,
Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the
principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely
roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists
on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors
until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the
map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe.
•
•
•
"In the West some indivlduals assert that we
are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs
differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall
remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng
and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague
Broadcast, October 9, 1945).
WHO SAID IT? -
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
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Text
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38
SLOVA.KIA
THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ
Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te
originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under
whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in
19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the
fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak
Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at
every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled
in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany
when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu
and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated
in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection).
The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak
Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted
not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the
most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on
the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies
in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were
c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc
corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State.
ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize
tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with
it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic
and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not
only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but
also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled
Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and
J<,cuador.
Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events
would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s'
\\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty
Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget
ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in
Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan
and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb.
There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London,
and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in
foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the
territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example,
was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb
America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in
North America.
BLOVAKlA
39
k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop
to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would
bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy
probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the
Baltic States did in London and Washington.
Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also.
Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe
did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge
paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even
tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States
wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and
by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak
exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied
the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of
the Centra! European Slates.
But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it
that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent.
They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak
lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples.
and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s
about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em•
bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm.
Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the
e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the
Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I
in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages
about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the
Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious
books of Czech and Magyar authors.
From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that
many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many
more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense.
Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and
J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l.
Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler.
For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the
Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French
soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And
~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in
keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In
Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu.
lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e
tO
SLOVA.KLA
Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a
manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted
toward German representatives in much the same manner as they
did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign
servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver·
trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome
had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of
1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with
Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we
requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the
„equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of
sneh an impoiitant war material.
"Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for
Germany?" we were asked.
,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce
proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations
with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at
al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial
po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra!
State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth
the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got
into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen,
through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands
of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge.
Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called
to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler
for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps.
"Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I
do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to
Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how
Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the
end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's
minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were
occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies
in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after
that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself.
Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives
and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was
fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along
with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest
was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war.
Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded
as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka
failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a
SLOVAKIA
few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action
and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign
Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only
for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State.
Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany
and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State
by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak
foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps
was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency.
To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza
Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an
episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš
to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who
came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade
delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant
material, which he later sent to London.
This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery
wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer
during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava.
In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps
remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even
when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is
comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign
service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor,
Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph
Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr.
števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc.
All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully
aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means
to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse
of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for
Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran,
Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the
principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely
roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists
on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors
until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the
map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe.
•
•
•
"In the West some indivlduals assert that we
are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs
differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall
remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng
and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague
Broadcast, October 9, 1945).
WHO SAID IT? -
Dublin Core
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Title
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The Diplomatic Service of the Slovak Republic
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Mikuš
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952
pp. 38-41
Creator
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Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005
Date
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August 1952
LCNAF+dates