12 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9d6bfbe96479556cd018597efcd96afa.pdf 31bb9a054f4b02976b6e9d17f0409a01 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well (The following is the address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa.) By John T. Van Sant Somehow it is most appropriate that we should meet together on this day in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For here we have h!istoTic traditions of being "the Ho1y Experiment, a co1ony established on the guiding principle of freedom for all mankind." As OTdained in the "Declaration of Rights," every man has the right to worship according to the dictates o,f his own conscience. It is this spiritual basis and our belief in God which has guided us through the stormy sea of rebellion to nationhood. It is this freedom which has beckoned to the oppressed people of the world who have made their home h€re. As we meet today it is especially fitting thait we join in special tribute on this national holiday to our first president, George Washington. Washington has been described as "more than a general ... as the embodiment of everything fine in the American chairacter .. . with no illusions of grandeur ... he answered ev•ery responsibility thrust upon him and fulfilled it . . . he brought something more to the cause than military ability and statesmanship -to us he brought the priceless gift of character. " It was his leadership that guided and maintained the little band of thirteen colonies into the course of nationhood; welding them together into the union of states we have today. In 1831 the French aristocrat, Alexis De Tocqueville, came to America to study our experiment in Democracy. Fascinated by the fusion of people reaching our country, he remarked that the immigrants came with two elements �SLOVAKIA 29 essential to the development of a democracy-"no notion of superi()lfity, one over another, and poverty and misfortune." What Alexis De TocqueviHe saw here was a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, a nation of people with fresh memories of old traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves in a society that did not restrict their freedom of choice. In just over 350 years our nation of nearly 200 million people has grown up, popul ated almost entirely by persons who came from other lands or whose forefathers came from other lands. 1 The interaction of these disparate cultures, the belief in the ideals that led the immigrants here, the opportunity for a new life, all gave America a flavor and character that distinguishes our land today. Immigrants have enriched the fabric of American lifethe American poet, Walt Whitman said: "These states are the amplest poem-here is not merely a nation but a teeming nartion of nations." Victims of oppression have always looked upon migration to a new land with a promise of freedom and equal opportunity. The Slovak of the 19bh century was no exception. Subject to the insidious pressures of Magyarization, longing to be free of social injustice, economic serfdom and the threat of national liquidation, literally thousands of Slovak famiHes sought refuge in the New World. They were among the countless thousands of oppressed peoples from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe who came to dwell here in the last qua!fter of the 19th century. The uprooting of these countless families was not without its pain and hea,r tbreak-although sure that he was headed for a "better lifo" for himse-1£ and his family, the Slovak immig,rant left his ancestral home and aH its romantic traditions f()lf a strange new lif·e in the stone and asphalt deserts of industrial and mining America . For the poor Slovak peasant, for centuries the tiller of someone's soil, the change was never an easy one. Always close �30 SLOVAKIA to the land the Slovak immigrant now found himself working in the mil:ls of America or mining in the darkness of its coal mines. Life was not easy-only the menial tasks were open to him. City living was strang,e and often frightening. The language made huddling tog-ether a necessityBut there was freedom , freedom to think, write and worshlp as one wishes-There was opportunity to grow and to prosper. The late Car-dinal Francis J . Spellman said "I think the story, the traditions and the lives of the Slovak people are one of the most glorious stories in history. It is hard to find any greater story of any people, for more than one thousand years, were deprived of liberty, nationality and subjected to national and religious persecution. The Slovaks have given aN the world a lesson in what it means to be devoted to ideals. During the crucial period of their history, these brothers, sisters and children of that noble race came to the United States, which has been a sanctuary and a home of persecuted people." Slovaks have repaid their adopted country well. Major John L. Polerecky served with George Washlngton . Colonel Gejza Mihal6tzy recrnited a company of riflemen in Chicago and then wrote for and received permission from President Lincoln to call the group "The Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak origin". Sergeant Matej Kocak, w1nnier of two Congressiol'l!al Medails of Honor, died on a French baittlefi:eld druving World Warr I, and one of the men who raised 'the £fag art Iwo J,ima was named Stralllk and hailed rrom Franklin Boro, Pa. These are to name only a few of the soldiers who have fought bravely for the United States. In World War II alone moTe than 50,000 Americans of Slovak descent served and of these more than 3,000 gave their lives. But the Slovak people have served this state, and this nation, in peace as weH as war; and they have been doing it for a long time. Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the "Apostle orf the Alleghenies, " came to Pennsylvania before 1800 as Father Gallitzin. And in his footsteps have followed clergymen like the Reverend Father Stephen Furdek; the Reverend Father John Marrtvon; Father Joseph Murgas; Father Gregory Vaniscak: And the Right Reverend Stanislaus Gmuca. �SLOVAKIA 31 And, as good Americans as they are, they have managed to maintain the color and warmth of the Slovak tradition. But as the immigrants settled in the eastern cities of this country, in Wilkes-Ba:rre, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Hazleton and Philadelph ia-there was scarcely a mill, factory or mine where they could not be f.ound . It was these haTdworking, hardy, heroic folks who stoked the furnaces of our steel mills, dug the coal from the seams of the earth and embedded railroad ties. Everywhere they went they were motivated by the drive to Americanize and to win social acceptance and yet still longing for a homeland across the ocean. The founding of the First Catholic Slovak Union for Slovaks and their families by Father Stephen Furdek was one means, and a very successful one, which assisted new immigrants by providing financial security against incapacitation by serious illness and death. From this early beginning the members of your organization are to be commended for their phenomena l success. The la,test information I have received indicates an excess of 117,500 insurance certificates were issued at a value of $121.5 million in 1968. But even more significant is the outgrowth of a truly farseeing benevolent and protective program for your members of whom some 59,000 make their home here in Pennsylvania. The naitional home for orphaned children in Middletown, Outside of Harrisburg, (1909), and the first Slovak high school for girls at St. Cyril's Academy in Danville, now named for both great missionaTies among the Slovak people, (1919) are only a few of the notewodhy achievements of your organization here in Pennsylvania. And your college scholw-ship program should not be overlooked, for in an age when the costs of education are so great, these scho,l arships provide incentive as well as financial aid to worthy boys and girls to continue their education. But I marvel even more at the leader and founderr of this great movement. Surely Father Stephen Furdek had a special vision in mind 1 �32 SLOVAKIA for the Slovak people when he founded your organization, a vision which if he were heire today would please him. Arriving here early in the spring of 1882 he completed his studies in the diocesan seminary and was o,rdained. As he wo,rked and preached among the Slovak people he recognized •the great need which had to be met. The founding of your organization (1890) as well as the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Unio,n (1892), the Slovenska Matica (Slovak Institute) (1893), ,the National Fund, later the Fund ,t o P,veserv,e our Na,tional Hwtage ·and Slovak League of America (1907) present 1the keys to the £utwe ,educational and cultural accomp'Hshments for the Slovak people. "Za Boha a za narod" . "For God and for the Nation" was his lifo's slogan. What mo•r e worthy goal is there than this one! And though Father Furdek is not the only Slovak to leave his mark on our histo,r y-he does represent, in every sense, the qualities of leadership which distinguish him above all others. As George Wa,shington is revered and hono·red as the Father of Our Country-so Father Furdek is to be remembered and honored as the Father of the First Catholic Slovak Union. There is one other impression I have of Father Furdek on which I would like to comment. As he toiled among the early immigrants he recognized that there were common bonds necessary to hold his people together. They were the urgent need for education, the continuation of cultural ties and customs and above all-faith. ReaHzing that most of the immigrants had sought opportunity in America because they had been held in bondage in their native land, one of the most important ingredients to succeed in the new land was to be educated, for without an education they could not be accepted in the new society. MeanwhHe, to provide for his family , the Slovak immigrant took any job he could find. Everyone in the family worked at something, as they struggled to survive, and they did. Schools where Slovak was taught and churches where Slova·k wa,s spoken and which kept the faith rooted in the young received the time and wha,tever financial resources the family �SLOVAKIA 33 had left aiter sending weekly stipends to the family back in the old country. But it was mainta-ining his Catholic faith that the Slovak devo,ted the major po·rtion of his efforts. The first Catholic parish was founded in HazJeton in 1882 and the rkst Evangelical {LutJheran) in Streart:oir, Illino,is, iii 1884. ·• Slovak priests were enlisted from the old country to serve heire 1n the churches where the native tongue was spoken. lh 1909 the Congregation of bhe Sisters of SS. Cyriil ,a nd Methodius was founded by Father Matthew Jankofa, and in 1922 th e Slova,k Benedictine Fathers were established. These two ord&s have as one of thei!l' principal aims the preservation and promulgation of the Slovak national culture. But Father Furdek went futher, knowing that in order to preserve a language one must read and speak it, through his effoirts, the official newspaper JEDNOTA was founded, edited and published by him until his death . While the framework of culture, 1anguag,e and church organizations were helpful to the Slovak people in retaining theiir national identity, the real spirit of the homeland was kept aili\11e in the family. Slo·vak was spoken at home, in school and in church. Eveiryday customs of prayers, food and dress were continued with modification. Even dance and chornl groups helped keep al!ive the coilorful historic traditions. The "melting pot" symbol of America is not yet dead. The process of blending many strains into a single nationality need not mean the end of particular ethnic identities or traditions. Groups such as yours is a prime example of how one nationality can retain its culture and cus ~oms and still become a corutiributor to the national identity. Rededication to the American philosophy or equality means much more than the restatement of the Decfairation of Independence . 1 It means a reunifica,tion of spirit and energy to build · a strong economy, it means conquering the massive frontier and a virgin continent, shaping and reshaping the structure of government and influencing the American a,ttitude towaird the outside world. �34 SLOVAKIA The second generation, and the thi.Td, and the fourth, are inheriting the fruits of the geneTation. Let us hope that we, the members of generations which inheriited American citizenship instead of winning it, prize our freedom as highly as those who founded our families in this -great land. For if we do, the United States will grow stronger and better as its years increase. Let us a:lso welcome the men and women of other lands who still seek, and who wm continue to seek, sanctuary from oppression, and hope for a better life, in America. Whether they come from Calaiis or Bratislava, from Bremen or Naples, t his nation has always welcomed them. For in the fresh air of freedom they f1omish: to their own, and our own, inestimable benefits. In New York Harbor the Statue of Liberty awaits them, symbolizing the welcome we always have ex;tended in the land of 1mmigrants and immigraruts' sons and daughters. And on the base of that statue, these words are written for all to see and all to live by: "Give me your tired, your poor, "You!l' hudd1ed masses yearning to breathe free , "The wretched ref use of your teemmg shore, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: "I 1ift my lamp beside the golden door." The coming of new immigrants to the country serves as a continual reminder to all Americans, old and new-that change is the essence of Hfe, and thait the American society is a process, not a conclusion. The abundant resources of this nation provided the founda·tion for our nation, but only people could marke the opportunity a reality. Immigrants pvovide the human resource and more than -thart--infused the nation with a commitment to new frontiers. They have kept the spirit of equality and hope always alive and strong. Herman Melville the American author, wrote "We are the heirs of al!l time and with all nations we divide our inherita,nce. '' To my fellow countrymen and especia lliy to you of Slovak descent I say, thank you for sharing with us your customs and your culture. 1 � 28 SLOVAKIA Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well (The following is the address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa.) By John T. Van Sant Somehow it is most appropriate that we should meet together on this day in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For here we have h!istoTic traditions of being "the Ho1y Experiment, a co1ony established on the guiding principle of freedom for all mankind." As OTdained in the "Declaration of Rights," every man has the right to worship according to the dictates o,f his own conscience. It is this spiritual basis and our belief in God which has guided us through the stormy sea of rebellion to nationhood. It is this freedom which has beckoned to the oppressed people of the world who have made their home h€re. As we meet today it is especially fitting thait we join in special tribute on this national holiday to our first president, George Washington. Washington has been described as "more than a general ... as the embodiment of everything fine in the American chairacter .. . with no illusions of grandeur ... he answered ev•ery responsibility thrust upon him and fulfilled it . . . he brought something more to the cause than military ability and statesmanship -to us he brought the priceless gift of character. " It was his leadership that guided and maintained the little band of thirteen colonies into the course of nationhood; welding them together into the union of states we have today. In 1831 the French aristocrat, Alexis De Tocqueville, came to America to study our experiment in Democracy. Fascinated by the fusion of people reaching our country, he remarked that the immigrants came with two elements �SLOVAKIA 29 essential to the development of a democracy-"no notion of superi()lfity, one over another, and poverty and misfortune." What Alexis De TocqueviHe saw here was a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, a nation of people with fresh memories of old traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves in a society that did not restrict their freedom of choice. In just over 350 years our nation of nearly 200 million people has grown up, popul ated almost entirely by persons who came from other lands or whose forefathers came from other lands. 1 The interaction of these disparate cultures, the belief in the ideals that led the immigrants here, the opportunity for a new life, all gave America a flavor and character that distinguishes our land today. Immigrants have enriched the fabric of American lifethe American poet, Walt Whitman said: "These states are the amplest poem-here is not merely a nation but a teeming nartion of nations." Victims of oppression have always looked upon migration to a new land with a promise of freedom and equal opportunity. The Slovak of the 19bh century was no exception. Subject to the insidious pressures of Magyarization, longing to be free of social injustice, economic serfdom and the threat of national liquidation, literally thousands of Slovak famiHes sought refuge in the New World. They were among the countless thousands of oppressed peoples from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe who came to dwell here in the last qua!fter of the 19th century. The uprooting of these countless families was not without its pain and hea,r tbreak-although sure that he was headed for a "better lifo" for himse-1£ and his family, the Slovak immig,rant left his ancestral home and aH its romantic traditions f()lf a strange new lif·e in the stone and asphalt deserts of industrial and mining America . For the poor Slovak peasant, for centuries the tiller of someone's soil, the change was never an easy one. Always close �30 SLOVAKIA to the land the Slovak immigrant now found himself working in the mil:ls of America or mining in the darkness of its coal mines. Life was not easy-only the menial tasks were open to him. City living was strang,e and often frightening. The language made huddling tog-ether a necessityBut there was freedom , freedom to think, write and worshlp as one wishes-There was opportunity to grow and to prosper. The late Car-dinal Francis J . Spellman said "I think the story, the traditions and the lives of the Slovak people are one of the most glorious stories in history. It is hard to find any greater story of any people, for more than one thousand years, were deprived of liberty, nationality and subjected to national and religious persecution. The Slovaks have given aN the world a lesson in what it means to be devoted to ideals. During the crucial period of their history, these brothers, sisters and children of that noble race came to the United States, which has been a sanctuary and a home of persecuted people." Slovaks have repaid their adopted country well. Major John L. Polerecky served with George Washlngton . Colonel Gejza Mihal6tzy recrnited a company of riflemen in Chicago and then wrote for and received permission from President Lincoln to call the group "The Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak origin". Sergeant Matej Kocak, w1nnier of two Congressiol'l!al Medails of Honor, died on a French baittlefi:eld druving World Warr I, and one of the men who raised 'the £fag art Iwo J,ima was named Stralllk and hailed rrom Franklin Boro, Pa. These are to name only a few of the soldiers who have fought bravely for the United States. In World War II alone moTe than 50,000 Americans of Slovak descent served and of these more than 3,000 gave their lives. But the Slovak people have served this state, and this nation, in peace as weH as war; and they have been doing it for a long time. Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the "Apostle orf the Alleghenies, " came to Pennsylvania before 1800 as Father Gallitzin. And in his footsteps have followed clergymen like the Reverend Father Stephen Furdek; the Reverend Father John Marrtvon; Father Joseph Murgas; Father Gregory Vaniscak: And the Right Reverend Stanislaus Gmuca. �SLOVAKIA 31 And, as good Americans as they are, they have managed to maintain the color and warmth of the Slovak tradition. But as the immigrants settled in the eastern cities of this country, in Wilkes-Ba:rre, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Hazleton and Philadelph ia-there was scarcely a mill, factory or mine where they could not be f.ound . It was these haTdworking, hardy, heroic folks who stoked the furnaces of our steel mills, dug the coal from the seams of the earth and embedded railroad ties. Everywhere they went they were motivated by the drive to Americanize and to win social acceptance and yet still longing for a homeland across the ocean. The founding of the First Catholic Slovak Union for Slovaks and their families by Father Stephen Furdek was one means, and a very successful one, which assisted new immigrants by providing financial security against incapacitation by serious illness and death. From this early beginning the members of your organization are to be commended for their phenomena l success. The la,test information I have received indicates an excess of 117,500 insurance certificates were issued at a value of $121.5 million in 1968. But even more significant is the outgrowth of a truly farseeing benevolent and protective program for your members of whom some 59,000 make their home here in Pennsylvania. The naitional home for orphaned children in Middletown, Outside of Harrisburg, (1909), and the first Slovak high school for girls at St. Cyril's Academy in Danville, now named for both great missionaTies among the Slovak people, (1919) are only a few of the notewodhy achievements of your organization here in Pennsylvania. And your college scholw-ship program should not be overlooked, for in an age when the costs of education are so great, these scho,l arships provide incentive as well as financial aid to worthy boys and girls to continue their education. But I marvel even more at the leader and founderr of this great movement. Surely Father Stephen Furdek had a special vision in mind 1 �32 SLOVAKIA for the Slovak people when he founded your organization, a vision which if he were heire today would please him. Arriving here early in the spring of 1882 he completed his studies in the diocesan seminary and was o,rdained. As he wo,rked and preached among the Slovak people he recognized •the great need which had to be met. The founding of your organization (1890) as well as the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Unio,n (1892), the Slovenska Matica (Slovak Institute) (1893), ,the National Fund, later the Fund ,t o P,veserv,e our Na,tional Hwtage ·and Slovak League of America (1907) present 1the keys to the £utwe ,educational and cultural accomp'Hshments for the Slovak people. "Za Boha a za narod" . "For God and for the Nation" was his lifo's slogan. What mo•r e worthy goal is there than this one! And though Father Furdek is not the only Slovak to leave his mark on our histo,r y-he does represent, in every sense, the qualities of leadership which distinguish him above all others. As George Wa,shington is revered and hono·red as the Father of Our Country-so Father Furdek is to be remembered and honored as the Father of the First Catholic Slovak Union. There is one other impression I have of Father Furdek on which I would like to comment. As he toiled among the early immigrants he recognized that there were common bonds necessary to hold his people together. They were the urgent need for education, the continuation of cultural ties and customs and above all-faith. ReaHzing that most of the immigrants had sought opportunity in America because they had been held in bondage in their native land, one of the most important ingredients to succeed in the new land was to be educated, for without an education they could not be accepted in the new society. MeanwhHe, to provide for his family , the Slovak immigrant took any job he could find. Everyone in the family worked at something, as they struggled to survive, and they did. Schools where Slovak was taught and churches where Slova·k wa,s spoken and which kept the faith rooted in the young received the time and wha,tever financial resources the family �SLOVAKIA 33 had left aiter sending weekly stipends to the family back in the old country. But it was mainta-ining his Catholic faith that the Slovak devo,ted the major po·rtion of his efforts. The first Catholic parish was founded in HazJeton in 1882 and the rkst Evangelical {LutJheran) in Streart:oir, Illino,is, iii 1884. ·• Slovak priests were enlisted from the old country to serve heire 1n the churches where the native tongue was spoken. lh 1909 the Congregation of bhe Sisters of SS. Cyriil ,a nd Methodius was founded by Father Matthew Jankofa, and in 1922 th e Slova,k Benedictine Fathers were established. These two ord&s have as one of thei!l' principal aims the preservation and promulgation of the Slovak national culture. But Father Furdek went futher, knowing that in order to preserve a language one must read and speak it, through his effoirts, the official newspaper JEDNOTA was founded, edited and published by him until his death . While the framework of culture, 1anguag,e and church organizations were helpful to the Slovak people in retaining theiir national identity, the real spirit of the homeland was kept aili\11e in the family. Slo·vak was spoken at home, in school and in church. Eveiryday customs of prayers, food and dress were continued with modification. Even dance and chornl groups helped keep al!ive the coilorful historic traditions. The "melting pot" symbol of America is not yet dead. The process of blending many strains into a single nationality need not mean the end of particular ethnic identities or traditions. Groups such as yours is a prime example of how one nationality can retain its culture and cus ~oms and still become a corutiributor to the national identity. Rededication to the American philosophy or equality means much more than the restatement of the Decfairation of Independence . 1 It means a reunifica,tion of spirit and energy to build · a strong economy, it means conquering the massive frontier and a virgin continent, shaping and reshaping the structure of government and influencing the American a,ttitude towaird the outside world. �34 SLOVAKIA The second generation, and the thi.Td, and the fourth, are inheriting the fruits of the geneTation. Let us hope that we, the members of generations which inheriited American citizenship instead of winning it, prize our freedom as highly as those who founded our families in this -great land. For if we do, the United States will grow stronger and better as its years increase. Let us a:lso welcome the men and women of other lands who still seek, and who wm continue to seek, sanctuary from oppression, and hope for a better life, in America. Whether they come from Calaiis or Bratislava, from Bremen or Naples, t his nation has always welcomed them. For in the fresh air of freedom they f1omish: to their own, and our own, inestimable benefits. In New York Harbor the Statue of Liberty awaits them, symbolizing the welcome we always have ex;tended in the land of 1mmigrants and immigraruts' sons and daughters. And on the base of that statue, these words are written for all to see and all to live by: "Give me your tired, your poor, "You!l' hudd1ed masses yearning to breathe free , "The wretched ref use of your teemmg shore, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: "I 1ift my lamp beside the golden door." The coming of new immigrants to the country serves as a continual reminder to all Americans, old and new-that change is the essence of Hfe, and thait the American society is a process, not a conclusion. The abundant resources of this nation provided the founda·tion for our nation, but only people could marke the opportunity a reality. Immigrants pvovide the human resource and more than -thart--infused the nation with a commitment to new frontiers. They have kept the spirit of equality and hope always alive and strong. Herman Melville the American author, wrote "We are the heirs of al!l time and with all nations we divide our inherita,nce. '' To my fellow countrymen and especia lliy to you of Slovak descent I say, thank you for sharing with us your customs and your culture. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1970, Vol. 20 Description An account of the resource Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well (The following is the address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa.) By John T. Van Sant Somehow it is most appropriate that we should meet together on this day in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For here we have h!istoTic traditions of being "the Ho1y Experiment, a co1ony established on the guiding principle of freedom for all mankind." As OTdained in the "Declaration of Rights," every man has the right to worship according to the dictates o,f his own conscience. It is this spiritual basis and our belief in God which has guided us through the stormy sea of rebellion to nationhood. It is this freedom which has beckoned to the oppressed people of the world who have made their home h€re. As we meet today it is especially fitting thait we join in special tribute on this national holiday to our first president, George Washington. Washington has been described as "more than a general ... as the embodiment of everything fine in the American chairacter .. . with no illusions of grandeur ... he answered ev•ery responsibility thrust upon him and fulfilled it . . . he brought something more to the cause than military ability and statesmanship -to us he brought the priceless gift of character. " It was his leadership that guided and maintained the little band of thirteen colonies into the course of nationhood; welding them together into the union of states we have today. In 1831 the French aristocrat, Alexis De Tocqueville, came to America to study our experiment in Democracy. Fascinated by the fusion of people reaching our country, he remarked that the immigrants came with two elements SLOVAKIA 29 essential to the development of a democracy-"no notion of superi()lfity, one over another, and poverty and misfortune." What Alexis De TocqueviHe saw here was a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, a nation of people with fresh memories of old traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves in a society that did not restrict their freedom of choice. In just over 350 years our nation of nearly 200 million people has grown up, popul ated almost entirely by persons who came from other lands or whose forefathers came from other lands. 1 The interaction of these disparate cultures, the belief in the ideals that led the immigrants here, the opportunity for a new life, all gave America a flavor and character that distinguishes our land today. Immigrants have enriched the fabric of American lifethe American poet, Walt Whitman said: "These states are the amplest poem-here is not merely a nation but a teeming nartion of nations." Victims of oppression have always looked upon migration to a new land with a promise of freedom and equal opportunity. The Slovak of the 19bh century was no exception. Subject to the insidious pressures of Magyarization, longing to be free of social injustice, economic serfdom and the threat of national liquidation, literally thousands of Slovak famiHes sought refuge in the New World. They were among the countless thousands of oppressed peoples from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe who came to dwell here in the last qua!fter of the 19th century. The uprooting of these countless families was not without its pain and hea,r tbreak-although sure that he was headed for a "better lifo" for himse-1£ and his family, the Slovak immig,rant left his ancestral home and aH its romantic traditions f()lf a strange new lif·e in the stone and asphalt deserts of industrial and mining America . For the poor Slovak peasant, for centuries the tiller of someone's soil, the change was never an easy one. Always close 30 SLOVAKIA to the land the Slovak immigrant now found himself working in the mil:ls of America or mining in the darkness of its coal mines. Life was not easy-only the menial tasks were open to him. City living was strang,e and often frightening. The language made huddling tog-ether a necessityBut there was freedom , freedom to think, write and worshlp as one wishes-There was opportunity to grow and to prosper. The late Car-dinal Francis J . Spellman said "I think the story, the traditions and the lives of the Slovak people are one of the most glorious stories in history. It is hard to find any greater story of any people, for more than one thousand years, were deprived of liberty, nationality and subjected to national and religious persecution. The Slovaks have given aN the world a lesson in what it means to be devoted to ideals. During the crucial period of their history, these brothers, sisters and children of that noble race came to the United States, which has been a sanctuary and a home of persecuted people." Slovaks have repaid their adopted country well. Major John L. Polerecky served with George Washlngton . Colonel Gejza Mihal6tzy recrnited a company of riflemen in Chicago and then wrote for and received permission from President Lincoln to call the group "The Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak origin". Sergeant Matej Kocak, w1nnier of two Congressiol'l!al Medails of Honor, died on a French baittlefi:eld druving World Warr I, and one of the men who raised 'the £fag art Iwo J,ima was named Stralllk and hailed rrom Franklin Boro, Pa. These are to name only a few of the soldiers who have fought bravely for the United States. In World War II alone moTe than 50,000 Americans of Slovak descent served and of these more than 3,000 gave their lives. But the Slovak people have served this state, and this nation, in peace as weH as war; and they have been doing it for a long time. Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the "Apostle orf the Alleghenies, " came to Pennsylvania before 1800 as Father Gallitzin. And in his footsteps have followed clergymen like the Reverend Father Stephen Furdek; the Reverend Father John Marrtvon; Father Joseph Murgas; Father Gregory Vaniscak: And the Right Reverend Stanislaus Gmuca. SLOVAKIA 31 And, as good Americans as they are, they have managed to maintain the color and warmth of the Slovak tradition. But as the immigrants settled in the eastern cities of this country, in Wilkes-Ba:rre, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Hazleton and Philadelph ia-there was scarcely a mill, factory or mine where they could not be f.ound . It was these haTdworking, hardy, heroic folks who stoked the furnaces of our steel mills, dug the coal from the seams of the earth and embedded railroad ties. Everywhere they went they were motivated by the drive to Americanize and to win social acceptance and yet still longing for a homeland across the ocean. The founding of the First Catholic Slovak Union for Slovaks and their families by Father Stephen Furdek was one means, and a very successful one, which assisted new immigrants by providing financial security against incapacitation by serious illness and death. From this early beginning the members of your organization are to be commended for their phenomena l success. The la,test information I have received indicates an excess of 117,500 insurance certificates were issued at a value of $121.5 million in 1968. But even more significant is the outgrowth of a truly farseeing benevolent and protective program for your members of whom some 59,000 make their home here in Pennsylvania. The naitional home for orphaned children in Middletown, Outside of Harrisburg, (1909), and the first Slovak high school for girls at St. Cyril's Academy in Danville, now named for both great missionaTies among the Slovak people, (1919) are only a few of the notewodhy achievements of your organization here in Pennsylvania. And your college scholw-ship program should not be overlooked, for in an age when the costs of education are so great, these scho,l arships provide incentive as well as financial aid to worthy boys and girls to continue their education. But I marvel even more at the leader and founderr of this great movement. Surely Father Stephen Furdek had a special vision in mind 1 32 SLOVAKIA for the Slovak people when he founded your organization, a vision which if he were heire today would please him. Arriving here early in the spring of 1882 he completed his studies in the diocesan seminary and was o,rdained. As he wo,rked and preached among the Slovak people he recognized •the great need which had to be met. The founding of your organization (1890) as well as the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Unio,n (1892), the Slovenska Matica (Slovak Institute) (1893), ,the National Fund, later the Fund ,t o P,veserv,e our Na,tional Hwtage ·and Slovak League of America (1907) present 1the keys to the £utwe ,educational and cultural accomp'Hshments for the Slovak people. "Za Boha a za narod" . "For God and for the Nation" was his lifo's slogan. What mo•r e worthy goal is there than this one! And though Father Furdek is not the only Slovak to leave his mark on our histo,r y-he does represent, in every sense, the qualities of leadership which distinguish him above all others. As George Wa,shington is revered and hono·red as the Father of Our Country-so Father Furdek is to be remembered and honored as the Father of the First Catholic Slovak Union. There is one other impression I have of Father Furdek on which I would like to comment. As he toiled among the early immigrants he recognized that there were common bonds necessary to hold his people together. They were the urgent need for education, the continuation of cultural ties and customs and above all-faith. ReaHzing that most of the immigrants had sought opportunity in America because they had been held in bondage in their native land, one of the most important ingredients to succeed in the new land was to be educated, for without an education they could not be accepted in the new society. MeanwhHe, to provide for his family , the Slovak immigrant took any job he could find. Everyone in the family worked at something, as they struggled to survive, and they did. Schools where Slovak was taught and churches where Slova·k wa,s spoken and which kept the faith rooted in the young received the time and wha,tever financial resources the family SLOVAKIA 33 had left aiter sending weekly stipends to the family back in the old country. But it was mainta-ining his Catholic faith that the Slovak devo,ted the major po·rtion of his efforts. The first Catholic parish was founded in HazJeton in 1882 and the rkst Evangelical {LutJheran) in Streart:oir, Illino,is, iii 1884. ·• Slovak priests were enlisted from the old country to serve heire 1n the churches where the native tongue was spoken. lh 1909 the Congregation of bhe Sisters of SS. Cyriil ,a nd Methodius was founded by Father Matthew Jankofa, and in 1922 th e Slova,k Benedictine Fathers were established. These two ord&s have as one of thei!l' principal aims the preservation and promulgation of the Slovak national culture. But Father Furdek went futher, knowing that in order to preserve a language one must read and speak it, through his effoirts, the official newspaper JEDNOTA was founded, edited and published by him until his death . While the framework of culture, 1anguag,e and church organizations were helpful to the Slovak people in retaining theiir national identity, the real spirit of the homeland was kept aili\11e in the family. Slo·vak was spoken at home, in school and in church. Eveiryday customs of prayers, food and dress were continued with modification. Even dance and chornl groups helped keep al!ive the coilorful historic traditions. The "melting pot" symbol of America is not yet dead. The process of blending many strains into a single nationality need not mean the end of particular ethnic identities or traditions. Groups such as yours is a prime example of how one nationality can retain its culture and cus ~oms and still become a corutiributor to the national identity. Rededication to the American philosophy or equality means much more than the restatement of the Decfairation of Independence . 1 It means a reunifica,tion of spirit and energy to build · a strong economy, it means conquering the massive frontier and a virgin continent, shaping and reshaping the structure of government and influencing the American a,ttitude towaird the outside world. 34 SLOVAKIA The second generation, and the thi.Td, and the fourth, are inheriting the fruits of the geneTation. Let us hope that we, the members of generations which inheriited American citizenship instead of winning it, prize our freedom as highly as those who founded our families in this -great land. For if we do, the United States will grow stronger and better as its years increase. Let us a:lso welcome the men and women of other lands who still seek, and who wm continue to seek, sanctuary from oppression, and hope for a better life, in America. Whether they come from Calaiis or Bratislava, from Bremen or Naples, t his nation has always welcomed them. For in the fresh air of freedom they f1omish: to their own, and our own, inestimable benefits. In New York Harbor the Statue of Liberty awaits them, symbolizing the welcome we always have ex;tended in the land of 1mmigrants and immigraruts' sons and daughters. And on the base of that statue, these words are written for all to see and all to live by: "Give me your tired, your poor, "You!l' hudd1ed masses yearning to breathe free , "The wretched ref use of your teemmg shore, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: "I 1ift my lamp beside the golden door." The coming of new immigrants to the country serves as a continual reminder to all Americans, old and new-that change is the essence of Hfe, and thait the American society is a process, not a conclusion. The abundant resources of this nation provided the founda·tion for our nation, but only people could marke the opportunity a reality. Immigrants pvovide the human resource and more than -thart--infused the nation with a commitment to new frontiers. They have kept the spirit of equality and hope always alive and strong. Herman Melville the American author, wrote "We are the heirs of al!l time and with all nations we divide our inherita,nce. '' To my fellow countrymen and especia lliy to you of Slovak descent I say, thank you for sharing with us your customs and your culture. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well Description An account of the resource Address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa. Slovakia, Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970 pp. 28-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Van Sant, John T. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/143749d0b4a4e1092a7042332c0bed89.pdf 75ec6b697d890207561ba49f26581f1a PDF Text Text 80 SLOVAKIA Andrew Pi er, O.S.B.: Slovaks Ln Blandburg AN AMERICAN HOLIDAY About a month after school vacations began, we looked forward to the Fourth of July with impatient anticipation of a great and exciting holiday. We were never disappointed, for American Independence Day was traditionally celebrated with great fanfare, noise and fun from early morning to late at night. At first it all seemed strange to us, but it did not take us long to get into the spirit of the day long before we learned the historical significance of the great day in mid-summer. The fervor of patriotism ran high from dawn to mid-night. Explosives of black-powder, gun-fire and dynamite routed everyone out of bed at the first light of day, the sound of fire-crackers continued all day long and a bright display of sparklers and rockets after dark finally climaxed a day of unexcelled excitement. The day's festivities were highlighted by a parade iR which participants of all ages escorted or rode prancing horses and sedate mules that were drafted from the mines or farms to add color and life to the happy event. An added feature was a troop of ex-soldiers and dragoons from the Austro•Hungarian armed forces (mostly Slovaks who had served in the imperial army) who rode on mules borrowed from the mine-owners of the district for the occasion. Gaily attired in their colorful uniforms ( which they had brought with them to this country as souvenirs) they gave a kind of 'foreign legion' picture and atmosphere to the American Fourth of July parade, the like of which will never be seen again. Baseball attracted large crowds before and after lunch as our town's heroes played for glory and victory in a pair of traditional contests against a visiting team. At intermission an abbreviated game between rival teams picked from the mines' department and the brick-yard division of Harbi- �SLOVAKIA 81 -------------------------- son Walker Refractorie s provided no end of entertainm ent as these 'amateurs' never failed to provide hilarious plays in what turned out to be a comedy of errors. The winners were rewarded with great applause and free beer. The children were not neglected, nor were the youthful athletes in their early teens. There were many prizes for them in a series of contests that included running, jumping, throwing the ball, potato-sack races, the three-legged race, the spoon-egg race, etc. Twilight was greeted by an awesome array of rockets and sparklers that lighted up the sky. But this was merely the prelude to a final breath-taki ng outburst of rockets that exploded into beautiful pictorial designs that were greeted exciting 'oh's and ah's' from one end of town to the other. Finally, as if by common agreement when the last sparkler and rocket were reduced to ashes, a sudden silence filled the town. Not even a dog barked as the townspeop le returned to their homes to put their children to sleep before retiring at the end of a perfect day .. . at least for the children who went off to sleep and dream of the happy· days ahead before the school bell would again summon them to resume the perennial struggle in the endless pursuit of learning and knowledge . But for them, at least, that day was far distant as they dozed off into sweet dream after a truly happy and unforgetta ble holiday. A PARADE FOR THE SLOVAK NATION Approxima tely a half century has passed by since the Slovak nation awaited its liberation from political bondage and the American Slovaks gave a helping hand generously in the movement to free their native homeland from foreign rule. I was only a boy but I remember the spirit of the times. July 4, 1917, stands out in my memory as a memorabl e day because it is an American national holiday and because it is so near to the feastday of SS. Cyril and Methodius (it was celebrated on July 5 or July 7 in those days). At any rate a patriotic-m inded group of Slovaks planned to observe a double holiday on July 4 that year. They decided to hold �82 SLOVAKIA a parade throught the main street of our small town of about 2,000 in population. This was, in fact, the only real street we had, and it was a dirt road at that. When it rained it was a muddy thorofare ... and when it was dry it was rather dusty. But we preferred dust to mud and therefore we prayed fervently for a sunny day. Our prayers were answered. July the Fourth was ushered in by a beautiful sunrise and sunny skies prevailed throughout the historic day. Our priest was of Irish descent and he sympathized with the Slovaks, for he knew at firsthand that English oppression was no better than Magyar rule. He agreed to offer up a Mass commemorating the feast of SS. Cyril and Methodius, the ninth century missionary-Apostles who converted the Slovaks to Christianity, approved the singing of Slovak hyms, and promised to read both the Epistle and Gospel in the Slovak language personally ... after all it was like reading Latin. Long before the parade got underway the Slovaks gathered in front of our home on a side-street (if we must give the roadway a dignified name) and the small band of musicians (three amateur accordionists) and a trumpetplayer soon attracted an increasing number of admirers ... even without benefit of modern stereo the music was loud and clear . . . the band performed with great spirit because its members knew they were playing for a cause and the ever-growing appreciative audience encouraged their efforts. Finally, the parade started for the church which was about a mile at the each end of our town. The American Flag and the Slovak Flag (the same colors: White-Blue-Red) were proudly carried at the head of the parade and the marchers waved smaller flags as they followed the major Flag-bearers and the musicians. We all sang both the Star Spangled Banner and My Country Tis of Thee (the youngsters with gusto and their elders, recent arrivals from across the seas, with a muted foreign accent but with more reverence) and the 'Hej, Slovaci' when the elders came into their own ... they sang their heart out. Too bad this scene was not recorded on film and an a sound track. Perhaps �SLOVAKIA 83 it may be re-created as a colorful chapter in American Slovak folklorama that has great historic significance. Half-way to the Church the parade was swelled by groups of youngsters who joined in the march. There were the 'native' Americans, as well as representatives of the Polish, Moravian, Russian, Croatian, Irish, Scotch and English communities ... a veritable United Nations parade on the march for Slovak national freedom. Needless to observe that the Church ceremonies were impressive and the good pastor read the Slovak portions of the Liturgy with unique Latin-Irish pronunciation that was quite understandable and inspiring. And the special Slovak choir that led the Congregational Singing was at its best. Even the regular choir members who were veterans of the Sunday Latin Mass were impressed both by the beautiful Slovak melodies and the singers, too. It was truly a great day for the Slovaks. From that day on the townspeople looked upon the Slovaks with new interest and respect, for they recognized in them a hitherto quality that had been hidden beneath a shy exterior, namely, a vigorous spirit of proud identity as free men who marched and sang in public manifestation of their profound devotion to the ideals of faith and freedom under God in a free country ... and at the same time of fierce pride in their Slovak ancestry and love of their ancient Christian heritage. (A translation from the Slovak book, Nad nami hory - pod nami bane . . . (Woodlands above us-Mines below), by Andrew Pier, 0 .S.B. , 1972.) DR. MARIA KOSOV .A of the Slovak Academy of Science and Art in Bratislava, Slovakia, was the guest speaker last September at the Cleveland Public Library. More than three hundred attended the illustrated slide-lecture on the subject of Slovak folklore and art. � 80 SLOVAKIA Andrew Pi er, O.S.B.: Slovaks Ln Blandburg AN AMERICAN HOLIDAY About a month after school vacations began, we looked forward to the Fourth of July with impatient anticipation of a great and exciting holiday. We were never disappointed, for American Independence Day was traditionally celebrated with great fanfare, noise and fun from early morning to late at night. At first it all seemed strange to us, but it did not take us long to get into the spirit of the day long before we learned the historical significance of the great day in mid-summer. The fervor of patriotism ran high from dawn to mid-night. Explosives of black-powder, gun-fire and dynamite routed everyone out of bed at the first light of day, the sound of fire-crackers continued all day long and a bright display of sparklers and rockets after dark finally climaxed a day of unexcelled excitement. The day's festivities were highlighted by a parade iR which participants of all ages escorted or rode prancing horses and sedate mules that were drafted from the mines or farms to add color and life to the happy event. An added feature was a troop of ex-soldiers and dragoons from the Austro•Hungarian armed forces (mostly Slovaks who had served in the imperial army) who rode on mules borrowed from the mine-owners of the district for the occasion. Gaily attired in their colorful uniforms ( which they had brought with them to this country as souvenirs) they gave a kind of 'foreign legion' picture and atmosphere to the American Fourth of July parade, the like of which will never be seen again. Baseball attracted large crowds before and after lunch as our town's heroes played for glory and victory in a pair of traditional contests against a visiting team. At intermission an abbreviated game between rival teams picked from the mines' department and the brick-yard division of Harbi- �SLOVAKIA 81 -------------------------- son Walker Refractorie s provided no end of entertainm ent as these 'amateurs' never failed to provide hilarious plays in what turned out to be a comedy of errors. The winners were rewarded with great applause and free beer. The children were not neglected, nor were the youthful athletes in their early teens. There were many prizes for them in a series of contests that included running, jumping, throwing the ball, potato-sack races, the three-legged race, the spoon-egg race, etc. Twilight was greeted by an awesome array of rockets and sparklers that lighted up the sky. But this was merely the prelude to a final breath-taki ng outburst of rockets that exploded into beautiful pictorial designs that were greeted exciting 'oh's and ah's' from one end of town to the other. Finally, as if by common agreement when the last sparkler and rocket were reduced to ashes, a sudden silence filled the town. Not even a dog barked as the townspeop le returned to their homes to put their children to sleep before retiring at the end of a perfect day .. . at least for the children who went off to sleep and dream of the happy· days ahead before the school bell would again summon them to resume the perennial struggle in the endless pursuit of learning and knowledge . But for them, at least, that day was far distant as they dozed off into sweet dream after a truly happy and unforgetta ble holiday. A PARADE FOR THE SLOVAK NATION Approxima tely a half century has passed by since the Slovak nation awaited its liberation from political bondage and the American Slovaks gave a helping hand generously in the movement to free their native homeland from foreign rule. I was only a boy but I remember the spirit of the times. July 4, 1917, stands out in my memory as a memorabl e day because it is an American national holiday and because it is so near to the feastday of SS. Cyril and Methodius (it was celebrated on July 5 or July 7 in those days). At any rate a patriotic-m inded group of Slovaks planned to observe a double holiday on July 4 that year. They decided to hold �82 SLOVAKIA a parade throught the main street of our small town of about 2,000 in population. This was, in fact, the only real street we had, and it was a dirt road at that. When it rained it was a muddy thorofare ... and when it was dry it was rather dusty. But we preferred dust to mud and therefore we prayed fervently for a sunny day. Our prayers were answered. July the Fourth was ushered in by a beautiful sunrise and sunny skies prevailed throughout the historic day. Our priest was of Irish descent and he sympathized with the Slovaks, for he knew at firsthand that English oppression was no better than Magyar rule. He agreed to offer up a Mass commemorating the feast of SS. Cyril and Methodius, the ninth century missionary-Apostles who converted the Slovaks to Christianity, approved the singing of Slovak hyms, and promised to read both the Epistle and Gospel in the Slovak language personally ... after all it was like reading Latin. Long before the parade got underway the Slovaks gathered in front of our home on a side-street (if we must give the roadway a dignified name) and the small band of musicians (three amateur accordionists) and a trumpetplayer soon attracted an increasing number of admirers ... even without benefit of modern stereo the music was loud and clear . . . the band performed with great spirit because its members knew they were playing for a cause and the ever-growing appreciative audience encouraged their efforts. Finally, the parade started for the church which was about a mile at the each end of our town. The American Flag and the Slovak Flag (the same colors: White-Blue-Red) were proudly carried at the head of the parade and the marchers waved smaller flags as they followed the major Flag-bearers and the musicians. We all sang both the Star Spangled Banner and My Country Tis of Thee (the youngsters with gusto and their elders, recent arrivals from across the seas, with a muted foreign accent but with more reverence) and the 'Hej, Slovaci' when the elders came into their own ... they sang their heart out. Too bad this scene was not recorded on film and an a sound track. Perhaps �SLOVAKIA 83 it may be re-created as a colorful chapter in American Slovak folklorama that has great historic significance. Half-way to the Church the parade was swelled by groups of youngsters who joined in the march. There were the 'native' Americans, as well as representatives of the Polish, Moravian, Russian, Croatian, Irish, Scotch and English communities ... a veritable United Nations parade on the march for Slovak national freedom. Needless to observe that the Church ceremonies were impressive and the good pastor read the Slovak portions of the Liturgy with unique Latin-Irish pronunciation that was quite understandable and inspiring. And the special Slovak choir that led the Congregational Singing was at its best. Even the regular choir members who were veterans of the Sunday Latin Mass were impressed both by the beautiful Slovak melodies and the singers, too. It was truly a great day for the Slovaks. From that day on the townspeople looked upon the Slovaks with new interest and respect, for they recognized in them a hitherto quality that had been hidden beneath a shy exterior, namely, a vigorous spirit of proud identity as free men who marched and sang in public manifestation of their profound devotion to the ideals of faith and freedom under God in a free country ... and at the same time of fierce pride in their Slovak ancestry and love of their ancient Christian heritage. (A translation from the Slovak book, Nad nami hory - pod nami bane . . . (Woodlands above us-Mines below), by Andrew Pier, 0 .S.B. , 1972.) DR. MARIA KOSOV .A of the Slovak Academy of Science and Art in Bratislava, Slovakia, was the guest speaker last September at the Cleveland Public Library. More than three hundred attended the illustrated slide-lecture on the subject of Slovak folklore and art. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 80 SLOVAKIA Andrew Pi er, O.S.B.: Slovaks Ln Blandburg AN AMERICAN HOLIDAY About a month after school vacations began, we looked forward to the Fourth of July with impatient anticipation of a great and exciting holiday. We were never disappointed, for American Independence Day was traditionally celebrated with great fanfare, noise and fun from early morning to late at night. At first it all seemed strange to us, but it did not take us long to get into the spirit of the day long before we learned the historical significance of the great day in mid-summer. The fervor of patriotism ran high from dawn to mid-night. Explosives of black-powder, gun-fire and dynamite routed everyone out of bed at the first light of day, the sound of fire-crackers continued all day long and a bright display of sparklers and rockets after dark finally climaxed a day of unexcelled excitement. The day's festivities were highlighted by a parade iR which participants of all ages escorted or rode prancing horses and sedate mules that were drafted from the mines or farms to add color and life to the happy event. An added feature was a troop of ex-soldiers and dragoons from the Austro•Hungarian armed forces (mostly Slovaks who had served in the imperial army) who rode on mules borrowed from the mine-owners of the district for the occasion. Gaily attired in their colorful uniforms ( which they had brought with them to this country as souvenirs) they gave a kind of 'foreign legion' picture and atmosphere to the American Fourth of July parade, the like of which will never be seen again. Baseball attracted large crowds before and after lunch as our town's heroes played for glory and victory in a pair of traditional contests against a visiting team. At intermission an abbreviated game between rival teams picked from the mines' department and the brick-yard division of Harbi- SLOVAKIA 81 -------------------------- son Walker Refractorie s provided no end of entertainm ent as these 'amateurs' never failed to provide hilarious plays in what turned out to be a comedy of errors. The winners were rewarded with great applause and free beer. The children were not neglected, nor were the youthful athletes in their early teens. There were many prizes for them in a series of contests that included running, jumping, throwing the ball, potato-sack races, the three-legged race, the spoon-egg race, etc. Twilight was greeted by an awesome array of rockets and sparklers that lighted up the sky. But this was merely the prelude to a final breath-taki ng outburst of rockets that exploded into beautiful pictorial designs that were greeted exciting 'oh's and ah's' from one end of town to the other. Finally, as if by common agreement when the last sparkler and rocket were reduced to ashes, a sudden silence filled the town. Not even a dog barked as the townspeop le returned to their homes to put their children to sleep before retiring at the end of a perfect day .. . at least for the children who went off to sleep and dream of the happy· days ahead before the school bell would again summon them to resume the perennial struggle in the endless pursuit of learning and knowledge . But for them, at least, that day was far distant as they dozed off into sweet dream after a truly happy and unforgetta ble holiday. A PARADE FOR THE SLOVAK NATION Approxima tely a half century has passed by since the Slovak nation awaited its liberation from political bondage and the American Slovaks gave a helping hand generously in the movement to free their native homeland from foreign rule. I was only a boy but I remember the spirit of the times. July 4, 1917, stands out in my memory as a memorabl e day because it is an American national holiday and because it is so near to the feastday of SS. Cyril and Methodius (it was celebrated on July 5 or July 7 in those days). At any rate a patriotic-m inded group of Slovaks planned to observe a double holiday on July 4 that year. They decided to hold 82 SLOVAKIA a parade throught the main street of our small town of about 2,000 in population. This was, in fact, the only real street we had, and it was a dirt road at that. When it rained it was a muddy thorofare ... and when it was dry it was rather dusty. But we preferred dust to mud and therefore we prayed fervently for a sunny day. Our prayers were answered. July the Fourth was ushered in by a beautiful sunrise and sunny skies prevailed throughout the historic day. Our priest was of Irish descent and he sympathized with the Slovaks, for he knew at firsthand that English oppression was no better than Magyar rule. He agreed to offer up a Mass commemorating the feast of SS. Cyril and Methodius, the ninth century missionary-Apostles who converted the Slovaks to Christianity, approved the singing of Slovak hyms, and promised to read both the Epistle and Gospel in the Slovak language personally ... after all it was like reading Latin. Long before the parade got underway the Slovaks gathered in front of our home on a side-street (if we must give the roadway a dignified name) and the small band of musicians (three amateur accordionists) and a trumpetplayer soon attracted an increasing number of admirers ... even without benefit of modern stereo the music was loud and clear . . . the band performed with great spirit because its members knew they were playing for a cause and the ever-growing appreciative audience encouraged their efforts. Finally, the parade started for the church which was about a mile at the each end of our town. The American Flag and the Slovak Flag (the same colors: White-Blue-Red) were proudly carried at the head of the parade and the marchers waved smaller flags as they followed the major Flag-bearers and the musicians. We all sang both the Star Spangled Banner and My Country Tis of Thee (the youngsters with gusto and their elders, recent arrivals from across the seas, with a muted foreign accent but with more reverence) and the 'Hej, Slovaci' when the elders came into their own ... they sang their heart out. Too bad this scene was not recorded on film and an a sound track. Perhaps SLOVAKIA 83 it may be re-created as a colorful chapter in American Slovak folklorama that has great historic significance. Half-way to the Church the parade was swelled by groups of youngsters who joined in the march. There were the 'native' Americans, as well as representatives of the Polish, Moravian, Russian, Croatian, Irish, Scotch and English communities ... a veritable United Nations parade on the march for Slovak national freedom. Needless to observe that the Church ceremonies were impressive and the good pastor read the Slovak portions of the Liturgy with unique Latin-Irish pronunciation that was quite understandable and inspiring. And the special Slovak choir that led the Congregational Singing was at its best. Even the regular choir members who were veterans of the Sunday Latin Mass were impressed both by the beautiful Slovak melodies and the singers, too. It was truly a great day for the Slovaks. From that day on the townspeople looked upon the Slovaks with new interest and respect, for they recognized in them a hitherto quality that had been hidden beneath a shy exterior, namely, a vigorous spirit of proud identity as free men who marched and sang in public manifestation of their profound devotion to the ideals of faith and freedom under God in a free country ... and at the same time of fierce pride in their Slovak ancestry and love of their ancient Christian heritage. (A translation from the Slovak book, Nad nami hory - pod nami bane . . . (Woodlands above us-Mines below), by Andrew Pier, 0 .S.B. , 1972.) DR. MARIA KOSOV .A of the Slovak Academy of Science and Art in Bratislava, Slovakia, was the guest speaker last September at the Cleveland Public Library. More than three hundred attended the illustrated slide-lecture on the subject of Slovak folklore and art.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovaks in Blandburg: An American Holiday Description An account of the resource Andrew Pier, O.S.B. Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 80-83 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pier, Andrew W., 1910-2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8ece0905832f6c07ea3b4ef134836c1b.pdf 8b7a48ca63cf6a9520576e837e68fe19 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 41 New Interests 1900-1914 SLOVAKS IN THE U.S.A. By James J. Zatk o, Ph. D ., University of Notre D ame By 1900 growing Slovak nationalism had begun to grip the Slovak immigrants, and during the next decade and a half the Slovaks agitated for distinotly Slovak institutions, for Slovak education, and for Slovak liberation overseas from Hungarian control. What seemed the most important need of the Slovak immigrants to many thinking minds was Slovak education. Some Catholics found the cause of religious decline in the non-confessional Slovak schools that others advocated and established. Public schools seemed equally pernicious to their mind as being Protestant schools. Too much Americanization injured faith and morals. To them the great answer was Slovak Catholic schools; but these were practically non-existent. Some pastors just were not interested in schools, Slovak or Catholic. The debts resulting from building churches weighted down the parishes and blocked any ambitious program of school construction. Often Slovaks were too scattered throughout a region to support their own church and school.1 However, the crucial obstacle was a lack of Slovak teachers. Even if schools were built, they might be Catholic schools, but they would not be Slovak schools, for there were not enough Slovak teachers. As early as 1900 Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, suggested a solution, Slovak nuns to teach in Slovak schools, but this suggestion took almost ten years to mature. 2 Nevertheless, schools were not entirely neglected during these first years of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Rev. Bartholomew Kvitek, a Catholic priest, organized the Slovak school of St. Michael's parish in Chicago; and in 1902 the first Vincentian Sisters of Charity arrived from Slovakia to serve in St. Michael's parish in Braddock, Pa., where they took charge of the parochial school's 65 students. 3 Plans for non-confessional schools never came to very much, because the Slovaks were opposed to education without religion. 4 In 1900 the Slovaks won a local victory over the Hungarians when their protests blocked the erection of Louis Kossuth's statue in the public square of Cleveland. When Count �42 SLOVAKIA Albert Apponyi and forty delegates arrived in America during the World's Fair at St. Louis in 1904, the Slovaks presented a Memorandum recounting their objections against the electoral system in Hungary and Magyarization. Although the Count refused even to discuss Slovak grievances, ,the Memorandum at least informed public opinion about undemocratic election procedures and anti-Slovak schools. 5 However, all anti-Magyar agitation was focussed by the creation in 1907 of the Slovak League of America on May 26, in Cleveland, Ohio, by seven thousand delegates. The League became an alliance of Slovak educational, fraternal, and religious groups in this country. The purposes of the League were to educate Slovaks everywhere, to uplift them here in America and elsewhere morally, economically, socially and politically. 6 It became the leader in the drive to alleviate political conditions in Slovakia, but its efforts might have been still-born had not the Massacre of Cernova on the 27th of October, 1907 aroused not only Slovaks but world opinion. To understand this ev,e nt some facts need to be reviewed. The Rev. Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest both pious and devoted to the political and social welfare of the Slovaks, in 1897 became editor of The People's News and fought the Magyarization program of the gov,e rnment; his speeches and writings helped elect seven Slovaks to the Hungarian Parliament in 1906. He and fifteen other Slovaks were arrested and tried for "agitation against Hungarian nationality". Hlinka was fined 1500 crowns and costs of 680 crowns and sentenced to two years in prison. In a farewell message to his parishioners he declared thart he would gladly suffer imprisonment to secure recognition of the Slovak nation. For this he received another eighteen months and a fine of 400 crowns. 7 Prior to this the Rev. A. Hlinka had been appointed pastor in his native city, Ruzomberok; in the quarter known as Cernova he had begun building a new church for which he collected funds from all over Slovakia. He had in the meantime been suspended by Bishop Parvy, an ardent pro-Magyar. When the church in Cernova was to be dedicated, the parishioners refused to permit the blessing, unless their pastor returned to them. On October 27, 1907 gendarmes marched into Cernova to help keep order, and they lined the streets leading to the church. That morning coaches arrived bringing the Rev. Pazurik from Llkavka and other visitors to conduct the dedi- �SLOVAKIA 43 cation. When the people blockaded the road, the coachman began to lay about his whip in order to drive his horses through the crowd ; some men seized the horses' bridles to turn them around. An order was given to the gendarmes to open fire. Instantly nine people fell dead, men, women, and children, and six more died of their wounds later. 8 The National Slovak Society immediately took in hand the problem of aid for the widows and orphans that resulted from the Cernova Massacre and voted $2,000 for r•elief.9 While political nationalism received immense stimulus from the Massacre, nationalism began to play a greater role in the sphere of religion after 1900. Under the influence of their nationalism, the Slovaks began to feel their unity as a group and their need of exclusivness as a nation. This led to organization on a unique national basis in religion and to demands for r•ecognizing the "rights of Slovaks" in religious matters, like organization of synods for the Lutherans, Catholic action groups for the Slovak Catholics, and teaching of Slovak in the schools. The Slovak Lutherans formed the Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the United States of America with headquarters in Whiting, Indiana. This Synod was founded in the church of St. Peter, September 2, 1902, at Connellsville, Pa. A beginning had been made in Mahanoy City, Pa., but more definite steps were taken at conferences in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and Braddock, Pa.; in the actual founding all the Slovak ministers and congregations cooperated. The Synod used the Slovak language in services and sermons, except where unusual circumstances required the use of English. Even the children wer,e taught their religion in Slovak. The Synod obtained its funds from prescribed contributions of the various parishes belonging to it. In Cleveland it owned a considerable prope1;ty intended for a Lutheran orphanage. The of.ficial organ was the Svedo k, which began in 1906 and was published twice a month.10 The troubled relations of Catholicism with Slovak nationalism continued to split various groups. A National Slovak Sokol had been established to include all Sokol activities in the United States; but discrimination against Catholics led to the creation of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in 1905; the headquarters of this group were in Passaic, N. J. The Slovak Catholic Sokol began publishing its own paper, the Katolicky �44 SLOVAKIA Sokol, and launched an extensive program to attract Slovak youth in gymnastics, athletics, and social activities. 11 The most violent conflict among Slovaks of the first decade of the twentieth century involved Slovak nationalism, but it was a conflict within the Catholic group between Catholic Nationalists and the Madarones. The founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the Rev. Stephen Furdek, called for an annual Slovak day that was to renew the Catholic spirit and attachment to Slovak nationality. The first Slovak day was to be called the Catholic Congress. This evoked bitter opposition in letters and even a telegram to Bishop Michael J . Hoban of Scranton from the Rev. Kossalko who denounced the whole project as "pan-slavistic" and as an attempt to set up a national church. When Bishop Hoban sanctioned the Slovak Day or Catholic Congress in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., by addressing it on September 3, 1906, Kossalko's rage knew no bounds. He addressed a Memorandum, signed by a large number of Madarone Slovak clergy, to the Apostolic Delegate and the archbishops of the United States. He demanded a condemnation of the affair. The Memorandum expressed fear for the unity of the church and the salvation of 500,000 souls, and accused the Slovak Catholics of working for "panslavism", which was inimical to Hungary, Germany, and the United States. However, Bishop Hoban's influence shielded the Catholic Slovak clergy and no action was taken.12 This event discredited the Madarones. Within the framework of the Catholic Church in the United States Slovak Catholics became involved in a struggle to preserve what they considered their national rights. There were arguments with non-Slovak pastors over hiring organists who would be able to teach Slovak to the children. 13 At other times Slovak Catholic efforts to obtain Slovak priests who could minister to them in their own language conflicted with bishops who did not always agree on Slovak "rights" .14 One bitter quarrel led to a schism in the Slovak settlement of Masontown, Pa. In Leckrone, Pa., a settlement of Irish and Slovaks, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual help was blessed by Bishop Richard Phelan of Pittsburgh on October 9, 1904. In 1907 the church burned down, but a hall was built in which religious services were held. The Slovaks by this time had a Slovak pastor, but they still wanted a parish all their own. Bishop �SLOVAKIA 45 Francis R. Canevin of Pittsburgh requested the Rev. Charles Janda to look for a suitable location ; Rev. C. Janda sugg,ested Masontown. Since the Irish Catholics also wanted to have a parish in Masontown, the Slovaks were told to take the church in Leckrone for their use; but the Slovaks in Masontown were not satisfied. They went ahead and built their own church, and when the bishop would not cooperate with them, they cast about for a priest who might be willing to serve their church. Eventually they found an "independent" priest and so fell into schism.15 In sptte of such trouble, the Slovak Catholic body remained generally healthy. On February 22, 1911 a Slovak Catholic Priest and inventor, the Rev. Joseph Murgas, led in forming The Slovak Catholic Federation in America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Und,e r the control of Slovak Catholic priests this group was to spread and coordinate Catholic action among Slovaks in America; until this year Slovak Catholic activities had been unorganized and subordinated to political and social ends.16 Exact religious statistics for ·t he Slovak immigrant group for that time are not available, but the best estimate suggests that of the 560,000 Slovak immigrants in America in 1911, 450,000 were Roman Catholics. The Slovak Catholics had 134 parishes in the United States. Protestants among the Slovaks numbered 95,000 .17 Of this Protestant group, Calvinists are estimated to run about 15,000. 18 After 1905 the development of Slovak Catholic elementary schools gained momentum. A system both Slovak and Catholic had been impossible without Slovak Catholic teachers. The Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, organized the Priests' Society of St. Anthony's Burse in the United States of America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , in 1903 and it was chartered in 1905. In the Kalendar Jednota of 1908 Rev. M. Jankola proposed the Burse of St. Anthony for Catholics generally to support students preparing to be teachers and Slovak girls preparing to be teaching nuns. 19 Although the Slovak Catholics supported this program generously with frequent collections and donations 20 , the fund proved insufficient for the purpose. Three Slovak girls who had been sent to the novitiate of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1906 were the nucleus of a Slovak sisterhood. In 1909 interested Slovak priests petitioned for the foundation of a distinctly �46 SLOVAKIA Slovak sisterhood, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. On June 26, 1909 the Congregation for Religious approved this project, and the motherhouse of the new Slovak congregation was established in Danville, Pa.21 In the year 1911 the Most Reverend Joseph Koudelka, the bishop of Superior sent a request to the general motherhouse of the Congregation of School Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis in Prague. He asked the sisters to come to his diocese to work. Mother General M. Xavier sent Sister M. Georgia and Sister M. Hyacinth to look over the possibilities. These sisters stopped in Pittsburgh, where the Rev. J. Vrana persuaded them that the Pittsburgh diocese offered them greater opportunities and had greater need. When Sister M. Hyacinth took sick and died on March 10, 1912, the Mother General herself came to Pittsburgh. Rev. Ferdinand Prikazky, who at the moment was struggling to get nuns to teach in his St. Gabriel's parochial school, convinc,e d the sisters to settle in Pittsburgh. This was the beginning. By 1914 twenty three sisters of this congregation were teaching 579 children in three Slovak Catholic parishes.22 Progress had been made in solving the problem of elementary school education; schools were built in the parishes almost as quickly as teachers could be provided. The question of secondary school education also began to agitate Slovak circles. Very early, the Rev. Stephen Furdek suggested the idea of a Slovak high school for boys; he was seconded in this by the Rev. M. Jankola. However, nothing came of the idea until 1921 when it revived and resulted in the Benedictine High School in Cleveland in 1927.23 The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius opened a high school for girls at Danville in 1922, and the Sisters of St. Francis opened one at Bellevue, Pa., in 1927. 24 There was continuous agitation for a college. A Slovak business college was suggested to improve the Slovak economic position.25 P. J . Kunovsky worked out a whole scheme for a Slovak school on a higher level. He argued that $100,000 would put up a building, and then he suggested that each fraternal organization ought to support a professor. This school was to include business and technical courses. As to religious affiliation, the school would be non-confessional, but the Oatholics could have a lecturer on the Catholic Faith and the Lutherans could support one to lecture on the Lutheran faith. This in- �SLOVAKIA 47 stitution was to be coeducational. Nothing came of this project.2s Very few Slovak children of the first immigrants had a chance to go to college, but those who did go generally took advantag,e of existing colleges. In 1901 the Czech Benedictines had established St. Procopius College at Lisle, Ill., and by 1907 there were ten Slovak youths studying there. They organized the "Literary Society of Stephen Moyses" and issued a monthly multigraphed little paper, Horlivost'. The club and the paper lasted for four years. The Slovaks also owed a special debt to the College and Seminary of St. Vincent's Archabbey in Latrobe, Pa., for in this college and seminary almost all the Catholic Slovak priests and many Slovak young men were trained. 27 During the years between 1902 and 1936 545 Slovak students attended St. Vincent's. 28 Informal education made most progress among the Slovaks. Clubs, multiplied, political, social, cultural, and literary. The political club seems to have been the most popular. It had a variety of purposes: to fighrt political apathy among the Slovaks, to help the Slovaks gain their political rights, and to help Slovaks become American citizens. In one year a club in Rankin, Pa., succeeded in getting thirteen Slovaks to obtain their citizenship papers. 29 Literary clubs also became popular among the Slovaks as a mean of self- improvement. 30 Both the newspapers and the almanacs were also instrumental in educating the Slovak immigrants. The Jednota discussed Darwinism, the "higher criticism" and socialism. 31 The almanacs explained the procedure of becoming citizens, American electoral system, stocks and bonds, and even discussed the origin of the world. 32 One of the complaints about the Slovaks made by their own leaders is their lack of interest in books and good reading. To make the Slovaks book-lovers, Slovak political and literary clubs founded Slovak libraries. 33 The national fraternal organizations sometimes contributed money to help in the acquisition of a building, or, if the Slovaks already possessed a lodge hall, to aid in the purchase of books. 34 That a demand actually developed for Slovak books is suggested by the special sections for Slovak readers in public libraries, as for instance, the Oarnegie Library in Homestead, Pa., 35 and the public library in Cleveland. 36 The most ambitious project launched to interest the Slo- �48 SLOVAKIA vaks in reading was a book club. P. J. Kunovsky suggested in 1912 the formation of a book club to consist of 5,000 Slovaks. This number would enable the club to sell four books for a dollar. 37 By July 11, 1912 a literary committee to choose books had been elected. 38 Even this cultural project could not move along without factions; for there were some objections to the composition of the literary committee. Only "one side" was represented. 39 There were complaints by Kunovsky that progress was slow; in fact, after six months of vigorous propaganda, there were not even 1,000 members, and the club needed 5,000 members in one year. 40 By November, 1914, the "Four Books for a Dollar" was still going and growing somewhat, 41 but the Slovaks were apparently still not too interested in books. One book promotion was quite successful. The Rev. J. Murgas led a drive to get 3,000 subscribers for a Cathechetical Encyclopedia, written by Rev. Vaclav Melchior, C. Ss. R. 42 Enough subscribers undertook to buy the book. It was a project more adapted to Slovak ideas; it seemed worthwhile to invest in a book on religion. The taste of Slovaks in reading was quite varied. We cannot judge from actual reports of reading, but the types of books published for them may serve as an indication of their reading tast,e. There were romances dealing with the Janosik cycle, a Slovak Robin Hood; others dealt with the adventures of a likeable thief, Rinaldo Rinaldini; sensational stories included Dracula, Harry Tracy, Most Desperate Criminal of Our Time , and World Detective Romances and Novel series.43 Other books published dealt with Slovak history and Magyar oppression. 44 One anti-clerical work was Z dejin Cirkvi by A. M. Spera, an anti-Catholic church history: 45 there was even a socialist work, Socialisti idu. 46 Publications included readers and catechisms, 47 dictionaries and grammars, 48 and devotional works. 49 The translations printed in the Narodne Noviny from American literature included Edgar A. Poe's The Black Cat 50 and Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.51 Whatever reading may have been done by the Slovaks besides the almanacs and newspapers, these books are a suggestion of its type. Another form of informal education proposed was a Slovak Chautauqua. The Rev. W. Regnemer, a Calvinist minister, suggested that a fraternal organization hire a pleasure �SLOVAKIA 49 park during the summer for one day, prepare a cultural and entertaining program and charge an admission of twenty fiv,e or fifty cents. 52 This idea was still-born. Theatrical productions were very common among the Slovaks, 53 but the drama was not on a very high level. Most popular were plays in Slovak portraying Slovakia and Slovak life. There was no attempt to translate the English classics of the stage into Slovak. 54 Both the Narodne Noviny and the Jednota encouraged the staging of plays by publishing a large number of them in their columns, 55 for plays portraying Slovak life served to arouse national consciousness, besides being good entertainment. 56 One complaint about the theatrical entertainment was the bad conduct of the audience, which frequently shouted to their friends on the stage, whistled, stamped their feet. Mothers brought very young children or babies who disturbed the performance with their crying. 57 The Slovaks organized bands and choirs ;58 popular music was also encouraged by the publication of songs in the almanacs. Some of the choirs advanced so rapidly that they were able to stage small operettas. 59 One obstacle to further Slovak progress was intemperance. The drink problem, its source in poverty, was an old one for the Slovaks. All sources agree that drink, especially whisk,ey, was the curse of Slovakia and helped impoverish the country. 60 During the 1840',s Rev. Stephan Zavodnik, a Catholic priest, influenced by Father Matthew, inaugurated the struggle against intemperance in Slovakia. Father Matthew's influence had trav,elled through Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and finally reached Slovakia. 61 Temperance societies were first organized in Orava in 1845 and in half a year had 20,000 members. The city councils assisted the societies; the ecclesiastical authorities put their prestige behind the movement. In 1847 the bishop of Banska Bystrica asked his clergy to publicize these societies during Lent ; the bishop of Roznava issued a pastoral letter on the subject in 1846. The Lutherans too supported the movement. 62 The nationalistic agitation and revolution in 1848 disrupted the growth of these societies, but by 1870 the fight against drink revived. 63 When the Slovaks came to America, they brought their weakness for drink with them. Still there were Slovaks who understood the pernicious effect of over-indulgence in strong �50 SLOVAKIA drink. Saloon keepers were attacked for disrupting family life. Slovak saloon keepers were urged to remove the national disgrace by going into another line of business. 64 The agitation against the use and abuse of alcohol filled many a column in the N arodne N oviny and J ednota. Alcohol was the cause of disease, for example, tuberculosis, of many economic and social losses ; whiskey was the root of all social evils.65 The most eff.ective agitation against intemperance was the total abstinence society. The best reason for creating such societies was their need. There were such sodeties already in existence in 1911 for example, in Hazleton, Pa., McAdoo, Pa. , St. Clair, Pa., and Mahanoy City, Pa.66 When the temperance club was organized in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., forty five prospective members attended the meeting; but only eight were willing to take the pledge and join the society. Eventually twenty women and girls joined; since then five or six members were added at each meeting, and the number finally grew to forty five! 67 Hand in hand with the progress in religious organization, in education, and political action, went the bettering of the Slovak economic conditions. As with the other activities, economic life among the Slovaks began to be colored by nationalism. The Slovaks set up Slovak grocery stores and Slovak banks. Surprisingly enough, a farm movement among the Slovaks developed from many causes. The success of the Slovaktown venture was continually reported in the newspapers: news of hay selling for $7 a ton, in November, 1912, seven weddings, good markets, freedom from the bleak life of a miners' town and from strikes. 68 To some life on the farm meant a life less dangerous to the faith and a healthier family life;69 to others it meant protection against too quick an assimilation to American ways, especially American morals.70 In 1910 the National Slovak Society embarked on a considerable farm colonization venture. The Society's national convention had voted in 1909 that not less than 1,000 acres of farm land should be bought for an orphanage. A committee investigated real estate in Prince George, Calvert, and St. Mary's counties in Maryland; enough land was to be bought to build an orphanage and to form a Slovak settlement to help in the upkeep of the orphanage. After considerable debate on whether the primary purpose was a settlement �SLOVAKIA 51 or an orphanage, 2,813 acres of land were purchased for F 0,000 in St. Mary's county, near St. Mary's, Maryland. One thousand one hundred acres were arable and the rest was woodland ; there was a three mile frontage on St. Mary's River. 71 Eight hundred acres were to be set aside for the orphanage and old folks ' home, and two thousand acres were to be put up for sale.72 The land was divided into thirty nine farms, ranging in size from 33 acres to 132, and classified in value thus: class A farms at $40-$50 an acre, class B farms at $25-$40 an acre, and Class C at $10-$25 an acre. The price of the farms varied from $600 to $3,100.73 The land sales went so well that the National Slovak Society decided to reserve only 500 acres for the orphanage and to sell 2,300 acres for farms.74 Such was the venture's success that by June, 1912, the Slovak Farmers Association was chartered in Maryland with a capitalization of $25,000. First class stock was to get 5% dividend; and as soon as the second class stock reached 5%, the rate of the first class was to jump to 7%. The organization's purpose was to settle Slovaks on good farms, especially in Maryland. The association also had a hotel where Slovaks might disport themselves in the summer for longer or shorter periods of time. 75 Behind the scenes, however, some financial skulduggery was afoot and the exposure of "commission-masters" definitely dampened enthusiasm for the project. A. S. Ambrose, the president of the National Slovak Society, had taken a ten percent commission on $48,735 worth of land sales and netted himself a tidy $4,875.30. Of the sales themselves $16,156.70 in cash had been placed into the Society's treasury, while $28,580 had been mortgaged to the Society. 76 On this transaction the Society was estimated to have lost nearly $20,000 through various "commissions." 77 At least on paper in 1911 the Slovak American Colonization Company was organized with an intended Capitalization of $50,000 at $50 a share. It planned the erection of houses, business structures, saw-mills, and other needed buildings. It remained a paper organization. 78 In spite of the publicity giv,en these projects, the influx of Slovaks onto the land came from individual initiative for most part. Small colonies of Slovak farmers grew up around Denmark, Maine, 79 Phillips, Wisconsin, 80 Tabor, Minnesota,81 Louisiana and Mississippi,82 Callahan and Pine Land, Flo- �52 SLOVAKIA rida,83 Michigan,84 and North Emporia and Antioch, Virginia.a5 If the Slovak farmer struck upon land already cleared, he did not have too difficult a time making a success of farming; but if he bought land that had yet to be cleared, like the second growth timberlands in Wisconsin, the first few years on the "blessed" land were murderous in their demands of labor and capital. For instance, two brothers and their families, having read accounts of successful farming in Wisconsin, used their savings to buy a farm in northern Wisconsin. The land had to be cleared, and ,even the women were put to work carrying away the heavy wood. Besides, the brothers had to build a log house big enough to shelter the two families. During the winter months, the men worked as lumberjacks, and in order to have enough capital to begin farming in spring had to borrow at six percent. After plowing and buying seed, the two new farmers were without money. One of them went to work in a glass mill in Illinois, while the other continued the back-breaking work clearing the land and farming. To add to their troubles, the nearby creek dried up in the summer, and the water could be brought in only from a distant spring. A horse had to be bought ! The beginning of farming was bitter for the Slovaks in northern Wisconsin.86 Although the Slovak farmers did organize locally, they did not form any national Slovak farmer societies. In Moquah, Wis. , for instance, a special farmers' society was established in 1911. The two national fraternal organizations served their social purposes sufficiently. One farmer from Tabor, Minn., did suggest that the Slovak farmers in the west needed a "clearing house" in a city like Pittsburgh, where they could sell their products, especially, grain, directly to the consumer. This would save the farmer some of his profits and the workingman some of his hard earned money. This remained only a suggestion. 87 Generally the new farmers were quite successful. The land was good, profits were high, and there were no strikes. 88 In Slovaktown hay was sold for $7 a ton in 1913; a Slovak farmer in Virginia made $1 ,100 on peanuts and $220 on cotton on a 220 acre farm . Still there were failures . A considerable number of advertisements announcing the farm sales appeared in the Jednota and the Narodne Noviny. 89 Some- �SLOVAKIA 53 times the reason was the mortgag,e ;90 at other times the family found the life too difficult and drab.9 1 While some Slovaks managed to escape to the farm from the hard life of mine and mill, most Slovaks remained city-dwellers. One of the problems of the city-dweller was the high cost of living as compared with wages. 92 The high prices led to a large number of cooperative ventures on a nationality basis. Most frequently this was a meat and grocery store. The enterprise resembled a corporation more than a cooperative. A share might cost $10 and a board of directors headed and managed the enterprise. Sometimes a limit was placed on the number of shares an individual might hold, lest any one person should capture control of the corporation.93 In Yukon, Pa., for instance, 200 families established a share-holding grocery store which was successful despite the opposition of some Slovaks. The corporation charter provided that any man could belong, but no one was allowed to invest more than $1 ,000! In 9 months a dividend of $4.85 was paid for each share. The cooperative enterprise could save a working man about fifteen cents a day on his food bill. In spite of considerable propaganda in the papers heralding these ventures, the Slovaks did not support these "Slovak stores" universally. The proprietors complained that Slovaks continued to patronize non-Slovak businesses. 9 4 There were many suggestions for Slovak enterprise: the organization of all Slovak businessmen in America, a law firm to take care of Slovak interests, a hospital for Slovak immigrants, a shoe factory to be built by the National Slovak Society or the Slovak League. 95 Of all the ephemeral proposals made, one did become actual. A Slovak bank to handle Slovak business was considered a necessity; but the idea was only gingerly approached after the failure of Peter V. Rovnianek's Bank in Pittsburgh, in 1907. Michael Bosak founded the State Slovak Bank in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; the bank opened for business on December 2, 1912, and in its first five months showed a profit of $7,250. 96 Progress was also the keynote of the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1910 the Union established its own printery in Middletown, Pa. This was a two story red brick building, one hundred twenty feet long and forty feet wide. The equipment included Duplex printing press and a linotype machine. The blessing of the printery took place on October 27, 1910.97 �54 SLOVAKIA In 1914 the Union also opened an orphanage, which the Sisters of Ss. Cyril and Methodius took under their supervision. The building itself cost $97,000, and the total cost was about $110,000. The chapel had an altar of Vermont marble worth $1,200 and a seating capacity of 150. 98 This orphanage was located in Middletown, Pa. The Slovak Catholics wer,e justly very proud of this achievement, especially when they remembered how poor they had been when they landed in the United States. The National Slovak Society showed its energy by creating an official newspaper for its own use, the Narodne Noviny, in 1910; this paper replaced the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny which had spoken for the National Slovak Society but had never been adopted as the official organ of the Society. This new newspaper became definitely anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic. In 1910 an editorial defended the modernists and attacked the Catholic Church as being an Italian and Roman Church, and not truly Catholic. 99 Any clerical scandal was written up with glee, and cartoons were not only anti-clerical but in very bad taste. These attacks and insults became so violent that the Bishop of Altoona, Eugene A. Garvey, banned the newspaper from his diocese on the grounds that it was written and published by "Jews, unbelievers, and heretics," spreading anarchism, unbelief, and socialism.100 The National Slovak Society did more constructive work when it organized the Youth Circles of the National Slovak Society in 1913. The chief purpose of these circles was educational. The elder and chief gymnast had to be total abstainers and men of sound general educa:tion. 101 The official language was Slovak. Dues were to be twenty cents a month for each child; of this amount fifteen cents were to be forwarded to the treasurer of the National Slovak Society. All meetings were to begin with Slovak and American patriotic songs; the American songs were to be translated into Slovak.102 Besides one official meeting a month to transact business, there were frequent meetings for lectures, study, and general education. 103 These circles presented programs which featured recitation of poems in Slovak, Slovak songs sung as solos and in chorus, instrumental solos, lectures by visitors. 104 The circles were beneficial to young Slovaks, and their growth �SLOVAKIA 55 was very rapid. By September, 1914, sixty nine circles had been established. 105 In spite of all the discussion of an orphanage, the National Slovak Society finally abandoned the plan. The matter was dropped because of the religious problem. The Society consisted of members belonging to various religious sects and claimed that it could not without showing favoritism provide for religious instruction. An orphanage without religious instruction and education was unacceptable to the Slovaks. 106 The fraternal organizations during this time suffered somewhat from embezzlement and swindling. Joseph Joscak, an editor of the Narodne Noviny , had taken a $19,000 "commission" from the National Slovak Society but was caught up with in 1913. 107 During the same years a William Vokolek swindled the Slovak fraternal organizations to the extent of $300,000. 108 Of course, A. S. Amrose's "commission" on the St. Mary's settlement must also be recalled here. Another common feature of fraternal life in this period was the construction of lodge halls, which were built almost in every settlement. These lodge halls became the centers of social life; they provided places for lodge meetings, theatrical productions, dances, gymnastic exercises, and quarters for the political and literary clubs. 109 One of the storms that troubled the fraternal organizations was the debate on the "old system" as against the "new system." Almost any issue of the Jednota after 1906 and the Narodne Noviny after 1910 contained letters with arguments on both sides of the question. 110 While operating under the older method of assessment, the organizations failed to build up a reserve for times of special demand; they were merely collecting agencies. For instance, if the organization needed $3,000 and had 12,000 members, each member was obliged to pay twenty five cents, which were collected to meet the cost. The new system involved paying dues r,e gularly, determined according to age. As early as 1906 the Rev. S. Furdek, the Rev. M. Jankola, and A. S. Ambrose pointed out the advantages of the new system, but there was much opposition. By 1914 both the First Catholic Slovak Union and the National Slovak Society had adopted the modern method. m Although progress was considerable among the Slovak immigrants in education, business enterprise, and farming , in many ways the lot of the workingman remained a hard �56 SLOVAKIA one. For instance, mine disasters continued to take lives. At Fernie, Pa. , in June, 1902, 200 miners perished, 50 of them Slovaks. Forty two Slovak miners were killed at Cambria, Pa. , during July, 1902. 112 Strikes still plagued the coal fields in which Slovaks were working. In Westmoreland county a strike began at Greensburg, Pa., on March 10, 1910 over union recognition and as a protest against the company store system. It spread to the neighboring mining centers of K,eystone, Irwin, Latrobe, and Westmoreland. Then in the confusion a mine guard shot an eighteen year old youth, and 15,000 miners went on strike. Eleven thousand wer•e said to be Slovaks. They joined the union to show their defiance and to emphasize their demands. As a counter-measure, the company called in the Pinkerton detectives, and the striking miners were blacklisted.113 During the strike the miners had very little to subsist upon, and that little came from the United Mine Workers of America. The union provided $2.50 a week for each man, $1.00 a week for each woman dependent, and $0 .50 a week for each child. 114 The president of the National Slovak Society, Mr. A. S. Ambrose, visited the strike-bound coal-fields. In his newspaper articles he estimated that about 20,000 men were on strike ; about 95 % were Slavs, and of this latter group about 60 % were Slovaks. The striking miners lived in shacks that could not protect them against the bitter cold, the children went about bare-foot and hungry. 115 Since 500 strikers were members of the National Slovak Society, the Society published appeals for help and even began a collection for relief of the strikers in Westmoreland county.116 Gradually the strike was broken and nothing substantial was won. Another strike in which many Slovaks were involved began in 1913, led by the Industrial Workers of the World. It started in the broad-loom silk mills of Patterson, N. J. , on February 25, 1913. Over twenty five thousand workers were affected. There were two factors that prolonged the bitter strife. One was the introduction of the three and four loom system; this involved the question of whether Patterson should invade the cheap silk field in opposition to the Pennsylvania mills. Fear of lower wages and loss of work followed as a consequence. The second factor was resentment of I.W.W. tactics. The Jednota condemned the I. W. W.'s socialist tendencies and opposition to the American Federation of Labor. 117 �SLOVAKIA 57 Still these defects of the union did not blind the First Catholic Slovak Union to the needs of the strikers, many of whom were Slovaks. 118 For five months the leadership of the I. W. W. kept the strikers' ranks intact, but lack of funds and loss of morale at last broke the strike. After twenty one weeks of bitter struggle the strike was settled without any gains for the workers. The J ednota laid the blame on the socialists. 119 Both newspapers were strong supporters of unions. They considered it the duty of every Slovak to belong to the unions, especially the American Federation of Labor. After all, it was the unions that improved the worker's lot and gave labor a position of influence in the world. 120 The strike-breaker and the "scab" were excluded from Slovak organizations. 121 In their attitude toward socialism the two newspapers differed. The Narodne Noviny showed itself definitely hospitable to socialist ideas. Articles were featured insisting that there could be no friendly contacts between capitalists and workers; workers were urged to abandon the Democratic and Republican parties and to join the party of the working class! 122 The Jednota unreservedly repudiated socialism. It condemned socialist anti-religious tactics and ridicule of Catholics. 123 Socialism was anti-Christian in its very essence, and had been consistently opposed to religion. The only agency that did in fact transform slave labor into free human labor was the Catholic Church. 124 As the first decade of the twentieth century ended and another began, the dawn of new interests appeared on the horizon. In 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, who has been mentioned before, returned to the United States on behalf of Hungary which he described as "an island of freedom" in central Europe. Slovak publicity about Hungarian mistreatment of Slovaks caused the mission of Count Apponyi to fail.1 25 Hard upon the heels of this came the Balkan wars. Slovak efforts at war relief were conditioned by nationalism. Within the months from November 21, 1912 to June 19, 1913, the Narodne Noviny collected $1,547.95 for the Slavonic Red Cross; and it was made clear that this collection was only for the Slavs. 126 By January 22, 1913 the Jednota had collected $2,350.00 for the same cause. 127 With regard to the "Slovak question," which was on the verge of becoming the paramouth one for the Slovaks, opinion among the American Slovaks had undergone quite a change. �58 SLOVAKIA Almost up to 1914 Slovaks sought concessions from Hungary for Slovakia; but these concessions of political and cultural rights wer-e understood within the existing framework of government. However, in April, 1914, when Count Michael Karolyi came to the United States to win Slovak favor for a Slovak and Hungarian union in a completely independent Hungary, the Slovaks questioned the sincerity of the Count and the government. In New York, on May 24, 1914, a debate took place on the question: "Can the Slovaks trust the Hungarian government in its movement for general suffrage in Hungary and with complete Hungarian independence?" The debate solved no real problem, but stated clearly the issues: what was to be the Slovaks' future relation to Hungary? The Slovak League arranged several protest meetings, and on April 28, 1914 issued a Memorandum, which was practically a declaration of independence and demanded autonomy for Slovakia. The League did not explain the kind of autonomy Slovakia should have, whether within Austro-Hungary or with Hungary as an independent state or complete independence for Slovakia for the Slovaks in America themselves disagreed on what they wanted. In order to clarify their position, a Congress of the Slovak League was held in Pittsburgh, September 10, 1914. After everybody had aired their views, it appeared that in 1914, as late as September of that year, the American Slovaks had not generally accepted political plans for Slovakia. 128 They were divided into three camps: one demanded complete independence for Slovakia, another wanted autonomy within Hungary, and a third desired the creation of a new state in which Czechs and Slovaks would be united. 129 With the coming of the World War, Slovak attention was diverted from the creation of Slovak institutions here in America to the creation of Slovakia. The World War found the Slovaks anti-German and anti-Habsburg. 130 The Jednota printed German atrocity stories and even went so far as to charge that German Protestantism was serving German mili'tarism.131 The Slovak League managed to chanel the desire for a better Slovakia and the anti-Habsburg feeling into an extensive Slovak nationalist movement. Through the Slovak League over a million dollars was poured into the cause of Slovak freedom. 132 By 1914 the Slovak immigrants had made themselves �SLOVAKIA 59 economically secure as far as a group of working people could in the American economy. Socially they had made progress in organizing national fraternal organizations, establishing Slovak schools, creating Slovak parishes. Their nationalism, manifested in efforts to form distinct Slovak institutions and their interest in European Slovakia, prevented their complete integration with American life; but the Slovak institutions seemed foredoomed to failure. The explanation for much of this lies outside the special character of the Slovaks. After 1890, the close of the frontier, the new industrial city became the characteristic of American life ; it became the center of production, the leader in social and cultural lif.e, and great center of communication. By the very fact that Slovaks were immersed in industrial and eventually city rather than farm life, they were exposed to the influence of this most Americanizing force. The problems of new city life, the economic opportunities offered them in industry, and economic competition made the attempt to establish particularly Slovak institutions a struggle against the current. The attempted settlement on ,t he farms was also against the trends of the times which led toward the city. The crucial factor in American Slovak social history seems to be their engaging in industry and their settlement in industrial centers. Slovak nationalism attempted to modify the influence of this industrial city, and in so far as it did, it hindered progress among the Slovak immigrants in America. FOOTNOTES 1. Francis Sasinek, "Myslienky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakmi," Kalendar Jednota (1897 ) , II, 139. 2. M. Jankola, " Nase Skoly," Kalendar Jedno ta ( 1900), V, 135-136. 3. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 69-70. 4. Culen, Slovaci v Ameri ke, p. 394; Jednota, June 18, 1913, September 3, 1913. 5. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187; Hrusovsky, This i s Slovakia, p. 50. 6. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 82-83 ; Yurchak, .The ,Slovaks, p . 190. 7. Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 229-230. 8. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1938 (Bratislava, 1934), pp. 186191 ; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 313-315; Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 230-232. 9. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 81. 10. John S. Bradac, "Slovenski Evanjelici-Lutherani v Spojenych Statoch Arnerickych," World's Fair Memorial, pp. 81-82. 11. "The Slovak Sokol," Sborni k Slovenskeho Katoli ckeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXVIII, 242-243 . 12. Culen, Dejiny, II, 80-81, 93-94. �60 SLOVAKIA 13. J ednota, February 5, 1913. The pastor told the organist " the Slovak language was nothing." The organist quit. 14. Jednota, July 8, 1914. After the Slovaks had brought a priest from Slovakia and paid his way, the bishop refused to let him be their pastor. 15. Narodne Noviny, September 15, 1910; Kushner, Slovaci, p . 32. 16. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 94-95. 17. Andrew J. Shipman, " Slavs in America," Th e Catholic Encyclop edia ( 1912), XIV, p. 55. 18. Culen, Dejiny, I. 114-115. 19. M. Jankola, " Pokladnica sv. Antona v Amerike," Kalendar Jedn ota (1908), XIII, 177-178. 20. Jednota, February 12, 1913. 21. Culen Slovaci v A merike, p . 418; " Slovenska zenska rehol'a ssv. Cyrilla i Me thoda v Amerike ," Ka lendar J ednot a ( 1911 ), XVI, 97-98 ; M. Jankola , " Prvotiny pr vej slovenskej zenskej rehole" , Ka lendar Jednot a (1909), XIV, 17-176; "Dcery ssv. Cyrilla i Methoda", Kalendar J ednota (1914 ), XIX, 194-195. 22. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 150-152. 23. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, pp. 408-409. 24. Ibi d., 418,424. 25. Narodne Noviny, August 15, 1913, August 29,1913. 26. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 27. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 156-157. 28. Culen, Slovaci v A merike, p. 401. 29. Narodne Noviny, June 9, 1910, April 27, 1911 ; September 5, 1912; August 29, 1912; Jednota, July 2, 1913. 30. Narodne Noviny, June 23, 1910, February 15, 1913 ; Jednota, April 1, 1914. 31. J ednota, March 4, 1913, March 12, 1913. 32. Stephan Furdek, "Dlfobny upis a ucastina," Kalendar Jednota (1909 ), XIV, pp. 192-195; "Ako povstal svet," Kalendar Jednota (1910), XV, pp. 141-145; J. Porubsky, "Ako volia v Amerike prezidenta," Kalendar J ednota (1913) , XVII, pp. 97-103; I. G., "Ako stat' sa obcanom Spoj. Statov," Kalendar Narodneho Slov enskeho Spolku (1913 ), XX, pp. 83-96. 33. Nar odne Noviny, June 12, 1913 ; Jednota, November 19, 1913. 34. N arodne Noviny, April 25, 1912; Jednota, June 11, 1913. 35. Narodne Noviny , August 10, 1911. 36. J . A. F ., " Pokrok," Sborni k (1915) , I, 43. 37. N arodne Noviny, April 4, 1912. 38. Narodne Noviny, July 11, 1912. 39. Narodne Noviny, July 25, 1912. 40. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912, September 19, 1912. 41. Narodne Noviny, November 12, 1914. 42. Jednota, January 1, 1913, February 12, 1913, May 7, 1913. 43. Culen, Slovaci v A m erike, pp. 175-190. 44. Ibi d., pp. 236-237. 45. Ibid. , p. 266. 46. Ibi d., p. 267. 47. Ibid., pp. 294-296. 48. Ibi d., pp. 297-305. 49. Ibid., pp. 306-337. 50. N arodne Noviny, February 3, 1910. �SLOVAKIA 61 51. Narodne Noviny, March 27, 1913. 52. Narodne Noviny, February 10, 1910, October 24, 1912. 53. Jednota, January 8, 1913, February 19, 1913, June 18, 1913, July 16, 1913. 54. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 191. 55. Narodne Noviny, July 7, 1910, June 27, 1912, April 17, 1913 ; Jednota, November 4, 1914, December 23, 1914. 56. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 57. Narodne Noviny, October 6, 1910. 58. Narodne Noviny, January 27, 1910; Jednota, May 14, 1913, December 31, 1913 ; Kalendar Jednota (1915), XX, 75. 59. Narodne Noviny, March 7, 1912. 60. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, August 19, 1897. 61. Joseph Pauco, ~udovychorn u Sturovcov (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943) , pp. 107-108. 62. Ibid. , pp. 137-140. 63. Jednota, February 5, 1913. 64. Narodne Noviny, April 28, 1910, April 4, 1912, March 21, 1912. 65. Narodne Noviny, April 4, 1912; Paul Jamarik, " Opojny a krcma, " Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku ( 1914), XXII, 198-206 ; Jednota, February 19, 1913, June 25, 1913. 66. !1udomil, "Zakladajme spolky uplnej striezlivosti," Kalendar Jednota, (1911), XVI, 41-42. 67. Jednota, March 5, 1913. 68. Narodne Noviny, February 24, 1910, August 4, 1910; Jednota, January 29, 1913. 69. Jednota, July 30, 1913. 70. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 71. Narodne Noviny, January 13, 1910, May 12, 1912, August 25, 1910. 72. Narodne Noviny, November 2, 1911. 73. Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1911. 74. Narodne Noviny, January 25, 1912. 75. Narodne Noviny, June 6, 1912. 76. Narodne Noviny, September 18, 1913. 77. Narodne Noviny, October 1, 1914. 78. Narodne Noviny, November 16, 1911. 79. Jednota, September 17, 1913 ; Narodne Noviny, May 25, 1911. 80. Jednota, February 4, 1914; Narodne Noviny , March 19, 1914, June 11, 1914. 81. Jednota, February 19, 1913. 82. Narodne Noviny, October 7, 1910. 83. Jednota, July 9, 1913 Narodne Noviny, May 11, 1912. 84. Jednota, January 1, 1913 ; January 21, 1914. 85. Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914, April 25, 1912. 86. Jednota, January 21, 1914, January 28, 1914. 87. Jednota, February 12, 1913, August 13, 1913. 88. Jednota, August 13, 1913; Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914; Jednota, September 17, 1913, January 21 , 1914. 89. Jednota, December 9, 1914, October 14, 1914, December 30, 1914. 90. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 91. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912. 92. Narodne Noviny, February 17, 1910, April 27, 1911. 93 . Narodne Noviny, February 29, 1914; Jednota, July 1, 1914; Narodne Noviny, May 14, 1914. 94. Jednota, July 1, 1914. �62 SLOVAKIA 95. N<irodne Noviny, December 28, 1911, September 12, 1912, October 12, 1911, June 11, 1914. 96. N<irodne Noviny, March 7, 1912; Jednota, May 21, 1913. 97. A. V. Kozak, "Ustav I . Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota (1912) , XVII, 22. 98. " Ustav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota ( 1915), xx, 163-164. 99. N<irodne Noviny, July 14, 1910. 100. N<irodne Noviny, July 13, 1911. 101. N<irodne Noviny, October 13, 1913. 102. N<irodne Noviny, January 8, 1914. 103. N<irodne Noviny, January 29, 1914. 104. N<irodne Noviny, April 16, 1914. 105. N<irodne Noviny, September 17, 1914. 106. Pamiitnica k zlatemu Jubileu N<irodneho Slov enskeho Spolku v U .S.A . (Pittsburgh, 1940) , p. 47. 107. N<irodne Noviny, March 13, 1913. 108. N<irodne Noviny, January 16, 1913. 109. N <irodn e Noviny, March 24, 1910, April 28, 1910, June 30, 1910. 110. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 111. "Prorocke slova dp. Matufa Jankolu o novom systeme," Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 82; Jednota, January 1, 1913. 112. Culen, Dejiny, I, 125. 113. Ibid., I, 122-123. 114. N<irodne Noviny, March 23 , 1911. 115. N<irodn e Noviny, March 16, 1911. 116. N<irodne Noviny, September 22, 1910. 117. Jednota, May 14, 1913, May 21, 1913, July 2, 1913, September 10. 1913. 118. Jednota, June 18, 1913. 119. Jednot a, July 30, 1913. 120. N<irodn e Noviny, August 22, 1912, October 23, 1913 ; S. F., "Robotnicka otazka," Ka lend<ir J ednota (1906 ), XIII, 56. 121. Culen, Deji ny, I, 123-124; N<irodne Noviny, February 24, 1913. 122. N<irodne Noviny, January 15, 1914, February 12, 1914, February 26, 1914, June 11, 1914. 123. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 124. Jednota, May 7, 1913, July 2, 1913, May 14, 1913. 125. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187. 126. N<irodne Noviny, November 21, 1912, June 19, 1913. 127. J ednota, January 22, 1913. 128. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 99-102. 129. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 190. 130. Jednota, September 30, 1914, October 14, 1914. 131. Jednot a, October 21, 1914, November 4, 1914. 132. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p . 191. � SLOVAKIA 41 New Interests 1900-1914 SLOVAKS IN THE U.S.A. By James J. Zatk o, Ph. D ., University of Notre D ame By 1900 growing Slovak nationalism had begun to grip the Slovak immigrants, and during the next decade and a half the Slovaks agitated for distinotly Slovak institutions, for Slovak education, and for Slovak liberation overseas from Hungarian control. What seemed the most important need of the Slovak immigrants to many thinking minds was Slovak education. Some Catholics found the cause of religious decline in the non-confessional Slovak schools that others advocated and established. Public schools seemed equally pernicious to their mind as being Protestant schools. Too much Americanization injured faith and morals. To them the great answer was Slovak Catholic schools; but these were practically non-existent. Some pastors just were not interested in schools, Slovak or Catholic. The debts resulting from building churches weighted down the parishes and blocked any ambitious program of school construction. Often Slovaks were too scattered throughout a region to support their own church and school.1 However, the crucial obstacle was a lack of Slovak teachers. Even if schools were built, they might be Catholic schools, but they would not be Slovak schools, for there were not enough Slovak teachers. As early as 1900 Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, suggested a solution, Slovak nuns to teach in Slovak schools, but this suggestion took almost ten years to mature. 2 Nevertheless, schools were not entirely neglected during these first years of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Rev. Bartholomew Kvitek, a Catholic priest, organized the Slovak school of St. Michael's parish in Chicago; and in 1902 the first Vincentian Sisters of Charity arrived from Slovakia to serve in St. Michael's parish in Braddock, Pa., where they took charge of the parochial school's 65 students. 3 Plans for non-confessional schools never came to very much, because the Slovaks were opposed to education without religion. 4 In 1900 the Slovaks won a local victory over the Hungarians when their protests blocked the erection of Louis Kossuth's statue in the public square of Cleveland. When Count �42 SLOVAKIA Albert Apponyi and forty delegates arrived in America during the World's Fair at St. Louis in 1904, the Slovaks presented a Memorandum recounting their objections against the electoral system in Hungary and Magyarization. Although the Count refused even to discuss Slovak grievances, ,the Memorandum at least informed public opinion about undemocratic election procedures and anti-Slovak schools. 5 However, all anti-Magyar agitation was focussed by the creation in 1907 of the Slovak League of America on May 26, in Cleveland, Ohio, by seven thousand delegates. The League became an alliance of Slovak educational, fraternal, and religious groups in this country. The purposes of the League were to educate Slovaks everywhere, to uplift them here in America and elsewhere morally, economically, socially and politically. 6 It became the leader in the drive to alleviate political conditions in Slovakia, but its efforts might have been still-born had not the Massacre of Cernova on the 27th of October, 1907 aroused not only Slovaks but world opinion. To understand this ev,e nt some facts need to be reviewed. The Rev. Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest both pious and devoted to the political and social welfare of the Slovaks, in 1897 became editor of The People's News and fought the Magyarization program of the gov,e rnment; his speeches and writings helped elect seven Slovaks to the Hungarian Parliament in 1906. He and fifteen other Slovaks were arrested and tried for "agitation against Hungarian nationality". Hlinka was fined 1500 crowns and costs of 680 crowns and sentenced to two years in prison. In a farewell message to his parishioners he declared thart he would gladly suffer imprisonment to secure recognition of the Slovak nation. For this he received another eighteen months and a fine of 400 crowns. 7 Prior to this the Rev. A. Hlinka had been appointed pastor in his native city, Ruzomberok; in the quarter known as Cernova he had begun building a new church for which he collected funds from all over Slovakia. He had in the meantime been suspended by Bishop Parvy, an ardent pro-Magyar. When the church in Cernova was to be dedicated, the parishioners refused to permit the blessing, unless their pastor returned to them. On October 27, 1907 gendarmes marched into Cernova to help keep order, and they lined the streets leading to the church. That morning coaches arrived bringing the Rev. Pazurik from Llkavka and other visitors to conduct the dedi- �SLOVAKIA 43 cation. When the people blockaded the road, the coachman began to lay about his whip in order to drive his horses through the crowd ; some men seized the horses' bridles to turn them around. An order was given to the gendarmes to open fire. Instantly nine people fell dead, men, women, and children, and six more died of their wounds later. 8 The National Slovak Society immediately took in hand the problem of aid for the widows and orphans that resulted from the Cernova Massacre and voted $2,000 for r•elief.9 While political nationalism received immense stimulus from the Massacre, nationalism began to play a greater role in the sphere of religion after 1900. Under the influence of their nationalism, the Slovaks began to feel their unity as a group and their need of exclusivness as a nation. This led to organization on a unique national basis in religion and to demands for r•ecognizing the "rights of Slovaks" in religious matters, like organization of synods for the Lutherans, Catholic action groups for the Slovak Catholics, and teaching of Slovak in the schools. The Slovak Lutherans formed the Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the United States of America with headquarters in Whiting, Indiana. This Synod was founded in the church of St. Peter, September 2, 1902, at Connellsville, Pa. A beginning had been made in Mahanoy City, Pa., but more definite steps were taken at conferences in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and Braddock, Pa.; in the actual founding all the Slovak ministers and congregations cooperated. The Synod used the Slovak language in services and sermons, except where unusual circumstances required the use of English. Even the children wer,e taught their religion in Slovak. The Synod obtained its funds from prescribed contributions of the various parishes belonging to it. In Cleveland it owned a considerable prope1;ty intended for a Lutheran orphanage. The of.ficial organ was the Svedo k, which began in 1906 and was published twice a month.10 The troubled relations of Catholicism with Slovak nationalism continued to split various groups. A National Slovak Sokol had been established to include all Sokol activities in the United States; but discrimination against Catholics led to the creation of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in 1905; the headquarters of this group were in Passaic, N. J. The Slovak Catholic Sokol began publishing its own paper, the Katolicky �44 SLOVAKIA Sokol, and launched an extensive program to attract Slovak youth in gymnastics, athletics, and social activities. 11 The most violent conflict among Slovaks of the first decade of the twentieth century involved Slovak nationalism, but it was a conflict within the Catholic group between Catholic Nationalists and the Madarones. The founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the Rev. Stephen Furdek, called for an annual Slovak day that was to renew the Catholic spirit and attachment to Slovak nationality. The first Slovak day was to be called the Catholic Congress. This evoked bitter opposition in letters and even a telegram to Bishop Michael J . Hoban of Scranton from the Rev. Kossalko who denounced the whole project as "pan-slavistic" and as an attempt to set up a national church. When Bishop Hoban sanctioned the Slovak Day or Catholic Congress in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., by addressing it on September 3, 1906, Kossalko's rage knew no bounds. He addressed a Memorandum, signed by a large number of Madarone Slovak clergy, to the Apostolic Delegate and the archbishops of the United States. He demanded a condemnation of the affair. The Memorandum expressed fear for the unity of the church and the salvation of 500,000 souls, and accused the Slovak Catholics of working for "panslavism", which was inimical to Hungary, Germany, and the United States. However, Bishop Hoban's influence shielded the Catholic Slovak clergy and no action was taken.12 This event discredited the Madarones. Within the framework of the Catholic Church in the United States Slovak Catholics became involved in a struggle to preserve what they considered their national rights. There were arguments with non-Slovak pastors over hiring organists who would be able to teach Slovak to the children. 13 At other times Slovak Catholic efforts to obtain Slovak priests who could minister to them in their own language conflicted with bishops who did not always agree on Slovak "rights" .14 One bitter quarrel led to a schism in the Slovak settlement of Masontown, Pa. In Leckrone, Pa., a settlement of Irish and Slovaks, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual help was blessed by Bishop Richard Phelan of Pittsburgh on October 9, 1904. In 1907 the church burned down, but a hall was built in which religious services were held. The Slovaks by this time had a Slovak pastor, but they still wanted a parish all their own. Bishop �SLOVAKIA 45 Francis R. Canevin of Pittsburgh requested the Rev. Charles Janda to look for a suitable location ; Rev. C. Janda sugg,ested Masontown. Since the Irish Catholics also wanted to have a parish in Masontown, the Slovaks were told to take the church in Leckrone for their use; but the Slovaks in Masontown were not satisfied. They went ahead and built their own church, and when the bishop would not cooperate with them, they cast about for a priest who might be willing to serve their church. Eventually they found an "independent" priest and so fell into schism.15 In sptte of such trouble, the Slovak Catholic body remained generally healthy. On February 22, 1911 a Slovak Catholic Priest and inventor, the Rev. Joseph Murgas, led in forming The Slovak Catholic Federation in America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Und,e r the control of Slovak Catholic priests this group was to spread and coordinate Catholic action among Slovaks in America; until this year Slovak Catholic activities had been unorganized and subordinated to political and social ends.16 Exact religious statistics for ·t he Slovak immigrant group for that time are not available, but the best estimate suggests that of the 560,000 Slovak immigrants in America in 1911, 450,000 were Roman Catholics. The Slovak Catholics had 134 parishes in the United States. Protestants among the Slovaks numbered 95,000 .17 Of this Protestant group, Calvinists are estimated to run about 15,000. 18 After 1905 the development of Slovak Catholic elementary schools gained momentum. A system both Slovak and Catholic had been impossible without Slovak Catholic teachers. The Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, organized the Priests' Society of St. Anthony's Burse in the United States of America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , in 1903 and it was chartered in 1905. In the Kalendar Jednota of 1908 Rev. M. Jankola proposed the Burse of St. Anthony for Catholics generally to support students preparing to be teachers and Slovak girls preparing to be teaching nuns. 19 Although the Slovak Catholics supported this program generously with frequent collections and donations 20 , the fund proved insufficient for the purpose. Three Slovak girls who had been sent to the novitiate of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1906 were the nucleus of a Slovak sisterhood. In 1909 interested Slovak priests petitioned for the foundation of a distinctly �46 SLOVAKIA Slovak sisterhood, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. On June 26, 1909 the Congregation for Religious approved this project, and the motherhouse of the new Slovak congregation was established in Danville, Pa.21 In the year 1911 the Most Reverend Joseph Koudelka, the bishop of Superior sent a request to the general motherhouse of the Congregation of School Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis in Prague. He asked the sisters to come to his diocese to work. Mother General M. Xavier sent Sister M. Georgia and Sister M. Hyacinth to look over the possibilities. These sisters stopped in Pittsburgh, where the Rev. J. Vrana persuaded them that the Pittsburgh diocese offered them greater opportunities and had greater need. When Sister M. Hyacinth took sick and died on March 10, 1912, the Mother General herself came to Pittsburgh. Rev. Ferdinand Prikazky, who at the moment was struggling to get nuns to teach in his St. Gabriel's parochial school, convinc,e d the sisters to settle in Pittsburgh. This was the beginning. By 1914 twenty three sisters of this congregation were teaching 579 children in three Slovak Catholic parishes.22 Progress had been made in solving the problem of elementary school education; schools were built in the parishes almost as quickly as teachers could be provided. The question of secondary school education also began to agitate Slovak circles. Very early, the Rev. Stephen Furdek suggested the idea of a Slovak high school for boys; he was seconded in this by the Rev. M. Jankola. However, nothing came of the idea until 1921 when it revived and resulted in the Benedictine High School in Cleveland in 1927.23 The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius opened a high school for girls at Danville in 1922, and the Sisters of St. Francis opened one at Bellevue, Pa., in 1927. 24 There was continuous agitation for a college. A Slovak business college was suggested to improve the Slovak economic position.25 P. J . Kunovsky worked out a whole scheme for a Slovak school on a higher level. He argued that $100,000 would put up a building, and then he suggested that each fraternal organization ought to support a professor. This school was to include business and technical courses. As to religious affiliation, the school would be non-confessional, but the Oatholics could have a lecturer on the Catholic Faith and the Lutherans could support one to lecture on the Lutheran faith. This in- �SLOVAKIA 47 stitution was to be coeducational. Nothing came of this project.2s Very few Slovak children of the first immigrants had a chance to go to college, but those who did go generally took advantag,e of existing colleges. In 1901 the Czech Benedictines had established St. Procopius College at Lisle, Ill., and by 1907 there were ten Slovak youths studying there. They organized the "Literary Society of Stephen Moyses" and issued a monthly multigraphed little paper, Horlivost'. The club and the paper lasted for four years. The Slovaks also owed a special debt to the College and Seminary of St. Vincent's Archabbey in Latrobe, Pa., for in this college and seminary almost all the Catholic Slovak priests and many Slovak young men were trained. 27 During the years between 1902 and 1936 545 Slovak students attended St. Vincent's. 28 Informal education made most progress among the Slovaks. Clubs, multiplied, political, social, cultural, and literary. The political club seems to have been the most popular. It had a variety of purposes: to fighrt political apathy among the Slovaks, to help the Slovaks gain their political rights, and to help Slovaks become American citizens. In one year a club in Rankin, Pa., succeeded in getting thirteen Slovaks to obtain their citizenship papers. 29 Literary clubs also became popular among the Slovaks as a mean of self- improvement. 30 Both the newspapers and the almanacs were also instrumental in educating the Slovak immigrants. The Jednota discussed Darwinism, the "higher criticism" and socialism. 31 The almanacs explained the procedure of becoming citizens, American electoral system, stocks and bonds, and even discussed the origin of the world. 32 One of the complaints about the Slovaks made by their own leaders is their lack of interest in books and good reading. To make the Slovaks book-lovers, Slovak political and literary clubs founded Slovak libraries. 33 The national fraternal organizations sometimes contributed money to help in the acquisition of a building, or, if the Slovaks already possessed a lodge hall, to aid in the purchase of books. 34 That a demand actually developed for Slovak books is suggested by the special sections for Slovak readers in public libraries, as for instance, the Oarnegie Library in Homestead, Pa., 35 and the public library in Cleveland. 36 The most ambitious project launched to interest the Slo- �48 SLOVAKIA vaks in reading was a book club. P. J. Kunovsky suggested in 1912 the formation of a book club to consist of 5,000 Slovaks. This number would enable the club to sell four books for a dollar. 37 By July 11, 1912 a literary committee to choose books had been elected. 38 Even this cultural project could not move along without factions; for there were some objections to the composition of the literary committee. Only "one side" was represented. 39 There were complaints by Kunovsky that progress was slow; in fact, after six months of vigorous propaganda, there were not even 1,000 members, and the club needed 5,000 members in one year. 40 By November, 1914, the "Four Books for a Dollar" was still going and growing somewhat, 41 but the Slovaks were apparently still not too interested in books. One book promotion was quite successful. The Rev. J. Murgas led a drive to get 3,000 subscribers for a Cathechetical Encyclopedia, written by Rev. Vaclav Melchior, C. Ss. R. 42 Enough subscribers undertook to buy the book. It was a project more adapted to Slovak ideas; it seemed worthwhile to invest in a book on religion. The taste of Slovaks in reading was quite varied. We cannot judge from actual reports of reading, but the types of books published for them may serve as an indication of their reading tast,e. There were romances dealing with the Janosik cycle, a Slovak Robin Hood; others dealt with the adventures of a likeable thief, Rinaldo Rinaldini; sensational stories included Dracula, Harry Tracy, Most Desperate Criminal of Our Time , and World Detective Romances and Novel series.43 Other books published dealt with Slovak history and Magyar oppression. 44 One anti-clerical work was Z dejin Cirkvi by A. M. Spera, an anti-Catholic church history: 45 there was even a socialist work, Socialisti idu. 46 Publications included readers and catechisms, 47 dictionaries and grammars, 48 and devotional works. 49 The translations printed in the Narodne Noviny from American literature included Edgar A. Poe's The Black Cat 50 and Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.51 Whatever reading may have been done by the Slovaks besides the almanacs and newspapers, these books are a suggestion of its type. Another form of informal education proposed was a Slovak Chautauqua. The Rev. W. Regnemer, a Calvinist minister, suggested that a fraternal organization hire a pleasure �SLOVAKIA 49 park during the summer for one day, prepare a cultural and entertaining program and charge an admission of twenty fiv,e or fifty cents. 52 This idea was still-born. Theatrical productions were very common among the Slovaks, 53 but the drama was not on a very high level. Most popular were plays in Slovak portraying Slovakia and Slovak life. There was no attempt to translate the English classics of the stage into Slovak. 54 Both the Narodne Noviny and the Jednota encouraged the staging of plays by publishing a large number of them in their columns, 55 for plays portraying Slovak life served to arouse national consciousness, besides being good entertainment. 56 One complaint about the theatrical entertainment was the bad conduct of the audience, which frequently shouted to their friends on the stage, whistled, stamped their feet. Mothers brought very young children or babies who disturbed the performance with their crying. 57 The Slovaks organized bands and choirs ;58 popular music was also encouraged by the publication of songs in the almanacs. Some of the choirs advanced so rapidly that they were able to stage small operettas. 59 One obstacle to further Slovak progress was intemperance. The drink problem, its source in poverty, was an old one for the Slovaks. All sources agree that drink, especially whisk,ey, was the curse of Slovakia and helped impoverish the country. 60 During the 1840',s Rev. Stephan Zavodnik, a Catholic priest, influenced by Father Matthew, inaugurated the struggle against intemperance in Slovakia. Father Matthew's influence had trav,elled through Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and finally reached Slovakia. 61 Temperance societies were first organized in Orava in 1845 and in half a year had 20,000 members. The city councils assisted the societies; the ecclesiastical authorities put their prestige behind the movement. In 1847 the bishop of Banska Bystrica asked his clergy to publicize these societies during Lent ; the bishop of Roznava issued a pastoral letter on the subject in 1846. The Lutherans too supported the movement. 62 The nationalistic agitation and revolution in 1848 disrupted the growth of these societies, but by 1870 the fight against drink revived. 63 When the Slovaks came to America, they brought their weakness for drink with them. Still there were Slovaks who understood the pernicious effect of over-indulgence in strong �50 SLOVAKIA drink. Saloon keepers were attacked for disrupting family life. Slovak saloon keepers were urged to remove the national disgrace by going into another line of business. 64 The agitation against the use and abuse of alcohol filled many a column in the N arodne N oviny and J ednota. Alcohol was the cause of disease, for example, tuberculosis, of many economic and social losses ; whiskey was the root of all social evils.65 The most eff.ective agitation against intemperance was the total abstinence society. The best reason for creating such societies was their need. There were such sodeties already in existence in 1911 for example, in Hazleton, Pa., McAdoo, Pa. , St. Clair, Pa., and Mahanoy City, Pa.66 When the temperance club was organized in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., forty five prospective members attended the meeting; but only eight were willing to take the pledge and join the society. Eventually twenty women and girls joined; since then five or six members were added at each meeting, and the number finally grew to forty five! 67 Hand in hand with the progress in religious organization, in education, and political action, went the bettering of the Slovak economic conditions. As with the other activities, economic life among the Slovaks began to be colored by nationalism. The Slovaks set up Slovak grocery stores and Slovak banks. Surprisingly enough, a farm movement among the Slovaks developed from many causes. The success of the Slovaktown venture was continually reported in the newspapers: news of hay selling for $7 a ton, in November, 1912, seven weddings, good markets, freedom from the bleak life of a miners' town and from strikes. 68 To some life on the farm meant a life less dangerous to the faith and a healthier family life;69 to others it meant protection against too quick an assimilation to American ways, especially American morals.70 In 1910 the National Slovak Society embarked on a considerable farm colonization venture. The Society's national convention had voted in 1909 that not less than 1,000 acres of farm land should be bought for an orphanage. A committee investigated real estate in Prince George, Calvert, and St. Mary's counties in Maryland; enough land was to be bought to build an orphanage and to form a Slovak settlement to help in the upkeep of the orphanage. After considerable debate on whether the primary purpose was a settlement �SLOVAKIA 51 or an orphanage, 2,813 acres of land were purchased for F 0,000 in St. Mary's county, near St. Mary's, Maryland. One thousand one hundred acres were arable and the rest was woodland ; there was a three mile frontage on St. Mary's River. 71 Eight hundred acres were to be set aside for the orphanage and old folks ' home, and two thousand acres were to be put up for sale.72 The land was divided into thirty nine farms, ranging in size from 33 acres to 132, and classified in value thus: class A farms at $40-$50 an acre, class B farms at $25-$40 an acre, and Class C at $10-$25 an acre. The price of the farms varied from $600 to $3,100.73 The land sales went so well that the National Slovak Society decided to reserve only 500 acres for the orphanage and to sell 2,300 acres for farms.74 Such was the venture's success that by June, 1912, the Slovak Farmers Association was chartered in Maryland with a capitalization of $25,000. First class stock was to get 5% dividend; and as soon as the second class stock reached 5%, the rate of the first class was to jump to 7%. The organization's purpose was to settle Slovaks on good farms, especially in Maryland. The association also had a hotel where Slovaks might disport themselves in the summer for longer or shorter periods of time. 75 Behind the scenes, however, some financial skulduggery was afoot and the exposure of "commission-masters" definitely dampened enthusiasm for the project. A. S. Ambrose, the president of the National Slovak Society, had taken a ten percent commission on $48,735 worth of land sales and netted himself a tidy $4,875.30. Of the sales themselves $16,156.70 in cash had been placed into the Society's treasury, while $28,580 had been mortgaged to the Society. 76 On this transaction the Society was estimated to have lost nearly $20,000 through various "commissions." 77 At least on paper in 1911 the Slovak American Colonization Company was organized with an intended Capitalization of $50,000 at $50 a share. It planned the erection of houses, business structures, saw-mills, and other needed buildings. It remained a paper organization. 78 In spite of the publicity giv,en these projects, the influx of Slovaks onto the land came from individual initiative for most part. Small colonies of Slovak farmers grew up around Denmark, Maine, 79 Phillips, Wisconsin, 80 Tabor, Minnesota,81 Louisiana and Mississippi,82 Callahan and Pine Land, Flo- �52 SLOVAKIA rida,83 Michigan,84 and North Emporia and Antioch, Virginia.a5 If the Slovak farmer struck upon land already cleared, he did not have too difficult a time making a success of farming; but if he bought land that had yet to be cleared, like the second growth timberlands in Wisconsin, the first few years on the "blessed" land were murderous in their demands of labor and capital. For instance, two brothers and their families, having read accounts of successful farming in Wisconsin, used their savings to buy a farm in northern Wisconsin. The land had to be cleared, and ,even the women were put to work carrying away the heavy wood. Besides, the brothers had to build a log house big enough to shelter the two families. During the winter months, the men worked as lumberjacks, and in order to have enough capital to begin farming in spring had to borrow at six percent. After plowing and buying seed, the two new farmers were without money. One of them went to work in a glass mill in Illinois, while the other continued the back-breaking work clearing the land and farming. To add to their troubles, the nearby creek dried up in the summer, and the water could be brought in only from a distant spring. A horse had to be bought ! The beginning of farming was bitter for the Slovaks in northern Wisconsin.86 Although the Slovak farmers did organize locally, they did not form any national Slovak farmer societies. In Moquah, Wis. , for instance, a special farmers' society was established in 1911. The two national fraternal organizations served their social purposes sufficiently. One farmer from Tabor, Minn., did suggest that the Slovak farmers in the west needed a "clearing house" in a city like Pittsburgh, where they could sell their products, especially, grain, directly to the consumer. This would save the farmer some of his profits and the workingman some of his hard earned money. This remained only a suggestion. 87 Generally the new farmers were quite successful. The land was good, profits were high, and there were no strikes. 88 In Slovaktown hay was sold for $7 a ton in 1913; a Slovak farmer in Virginia made $1 ,100 on peanuts and $220 on cotton on a 220 acre farm . Still there were failures . A considerable number of advertisements announcing the farm sales appeared in the Jednota and the Narodne Noviny. 89 Some- �SLOVAKIA 53 times the reason was the mortgag,e ;90 at other times the family found the life too difficult and drab.9 1 While some Slovaks managed to escape to the farm from the hard life of mine and mill, most Slovaks remained city-dwellers. One of the problems of the city-dweller was the high cost of living as compared with wages. 92 The high prices led to a large number of cooperative ventures on a nationality basis. Most frequently this was a meat and grocery store. The enterprise resembled a corporation more than a cooperative. A share might cost $10 and a board of directors headed and managed the enterprise. Sometimes a limit was placed on the number of shares an individual might hold, lest any one person should capture control of the corporation.93 In Yukon, Pa., for instance, 200 families established a share-holding grocery store which was successful despite the opposition of some Slovaks. The corporation charter provided that any man could belong, but no one was allowed to invest more than $1 ,000! In 9 months a dividend of $4.85 was paid for each share. The cooperative enterprise could save a working man about fifteen cents a day on his food bill. In spite of considerable propaganda in the papers heralding these ventures, the Slovaks did not support these "Slovak stores" universally. The proprietors complained that Slovaks continued to patronize non-Slovak businesses. 9 4 There were many suggestions for Slovak enterprise: the organization of all Slovak businessmen in America, a law firm to take care of Slovak interests, a hospital for Slovak immigrants, a shoe factory to be built by the National Slovak Society or the Slovak League. 95 Of all the ephemeral proposals made, one did become actual. A Slovak bank to handle Slovak business was considered a necessity; but the idea was only gingerly approached after the failure of Peter V. Rovnianek's Bank in Pittsburgh, in 1907. Michael Bosak founded the State Slovak Bank in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; the bank opened for business on December 2, 1912, and in its first five months showed a profit of $7,250. 96 Progress was also the keynote of the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1910 the Union established its own printery in Middletown, Pa. This was a two story red brick building, one hundred twenty feet long and forty feet wide. The equipment included Duplex printing press and a linotype machine. The blessing of the printery took place on October 27, 1910.97 �54 SLOVAKIA In 1914 the Union also opened an orphanage, which the Sisters of Ss. Cyril and Methodius took under their supervision. The building itself cost $97,000, and the total cost was about $110,000. The chapel had an altar of Vermont marble worth $1,200 and a seating capacity of 150. 98 This orphanage was located in Middletown, Pa. The Slovak Catholics wer,e justly very proud of this achievement, especially when they remembered how poor they had been when they landed in the United States. The National Slovak Society showed its energy by creating an official newspaper for its own use, the Narodne Noviny, in 1910; this paper replaced the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny which had spoken for the National Slovak Society but had never been adopted as the official organ of the Society. This new newspaper became definitely anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic. In 1910 an editorial defended the modernists and attacked the Catholic Church as being an Italian and Roman Church, and not truly Catholic. 99 Any clerical scandal was written up with glee, and cartoons were not only anti-clerical but in very bad taste. These attacks and insults became so violent that the Bishop of Altoona, Eugene A. Garvey, banned the newspaper from his diocese on the grounds that it was written and published by "Jews, unbelievers, and heretics," spreading anarchism, unbelief, and socialism.100 The National Slovak Society did more constructive work when it organized the Youth Circles of the National Slovak Society in 1913. The chief purpose of these circles was educational. The elder and chief gymnast had to be total abstainers and men of sound general educa:tion. 101 The official language was Slovak. Dues were to be twenty cents a month for each child; of this amount fifteen cents were to be forwarded to the treasurer of the National Slovak Society. All meetings were to begin with Slovak and American patriotic songs; the American songs were to be translated into Slovak.102 Besides one official meeting a month to transact business, there were frequent meetings for lectures, study, and general education. 103 These circles presented programs which featured recitation of poems in Slovak, Slovak songs sung as solos and in chorus, instrumental solos, lectures by visitors. 104 The circles were beneficial to young Slovaks, and their growth �SLOVAKIA 55 was very rapid. By September, 1914, sixty nine circles had been established. 105 In spite of all the discussion of an orphanage, the National Slovak Society finally abandoned the plan. The matter was dropped because of the religious problem. The Society consisted of members belonging to various religious sects and claimed that it could not without showing favoritism provide for religious instruction. An orphanage without religious instruction and education was unacceptable to the Slovaks. 106 The fraternal organizations during this time suffered somewhat from embezzlement and swindling. Joseph Joscak, an editor of the Narodne Noviny , had taken a $19,000 "commission" from the National Slovak Society but was caught up with in 1913. 107 During the same years a William Vokolek swindled the Slovak fraternal organizations to the extent of $300,000. 108 Of course, A. S. Amrose's "commission" on the St. Mary's settlement must also be recalled here. Another common feature of fraternal life in this period was the construction of lodge halls, which were built almost in every settlement. These lodge halls became the centers of social life; they provided places for lodge meetings, theatrical productions, dances, gymnastic exercises, and quarters for the political and literary clubs. 109 One of the storms that troubled the fraternal organizations was the debate on the "old system" as against the "new system." Almost any issue of the Jednota after 1906 and the Narodne Noviny after 1910 contained letters with arguments on both sides of the question. 110 While operating under the older method of assessment, the organizations failed to build up a reserve for times of special demand; they were merely collecting agencies. For instance, if the organization needed $3,000 and had 12,000 members, each member was obliged to pay twenty five cents, which were collected to meet the cost. The new system involved paying dues r,e gularly, determined according to age. As early as 1906 the Rev. S. Furdek, the Rev. M. Jankola, and A. S. Ambrose pointed out the advantages of the new system, but there was much opposition. By 1914 both the First Catholic Slovak Union and the National Slovak Society had adopted the modern method. m Although progress was considerable among the Slovak immigrants in education, business enterprise, and farming , in many ways the lot of the workingman remained a hard �56 SLOVAKIA one. For instance, mine disasters continued to take lives. At Fernie, Pa. , in June, 1902, 200 miners perished, 50 of them Slovaks. Forty two Slovak miners were killed at Cambria, Pa. , during July, 1902. 112 Strikes still plagued the coal fields in which Slovaks were working. In Westmoreland county a strike began at Greensburg, Pa., on March 10, 1910 over union recognition and as a protest against the company store system. It spread to the neighboring mining centers of K,eystone, Irwin, Latrobe, and Westmoreland. Then in the confusion a mine guard shot an eighteen year old youth, and 15,000 miners went on strike. Eleven thousand wer•e said to be Slovaks. They joined the union to show their defiance and to emphasize their demands. As a counter-measure, the company called in the Pinkerton detectives, and the striking miners were blacklisted.113 During the strike the miners had very little to subsist upon, and that little came from the United Mine Workers of America. The union provided $2.50 a week for each man, $1.00 a week for each woman dependent, and $0 .50 a week for each child. 114 The president of the National Slovak Society, Mr. A. S. Ambrose, visited the strike-bound coal-fields. In his newspaper articles he estimated that about 20,000 men were on strike ; about 95 % were Slavs, and of this latter group about 60 % were Slovaks. The striking miners lived in shacks that could not protect them against the bitter cold, the children went about bare-foot and hungry. 115 Since 500 strikers were members of the National Slovak Society, the Society published appeals for help and even began a collection for relief of the strikers in Westmoreland county.116 Gradually the strike was broken and nothing substantial was won. Another strike in which many Slovaks were involved began in 1913, led by the Industrial Workers of the World. It started in the broad-loom silk mills of Patterson, N. J. , on February 25, 1913. Over twenty five thousand workers were affected. There were two factors that prolonged the bitter strife. One was the introduction of the three and four loom system; this involved the question of whether Patterson should invade the cheap silk field in opposition to the Pennsylvania mills. Fear of lower wages and loss of work followed as a consequence. The second factor was resentment of I.W.W. tactics. The Jednota condemned the I. W. W.'s socialist tendencies and opposition to the American Federation of Labor. 117 �SLOVAKIA 57 Still these defects of the union did not blind the First Catholic Slovak Union to the needs of the strikers, many of whom were Slovaks. 118 For five months the leadership of the I. W. W. kept the strikers' ranks intact, but lack of funds and loss of morale at last broke the strike. After twenty one weeks of bitter struggle the strike was settled without any gains for the workers. The J ednota laid the blame on the socialists. 119 Both newspapers were strong supporters of unions. They considered it the duty of every Slovak to belong to the unions, especially the American Federation of Labor. After all, it was the unions that improved the worker's lot and gave labor a position of influence in the world. 120 The strike-breaker and the "scab" were excluded from Slovak organizations. 121 In their attitude toward socialism the two newspapers differed. The Narodne Noviny showed itself definitely hospitable to socialist ideas. Articles were featured insisting that there could be no friendly contacts between capitalists and workers; workers were urged to abandon the Democratic and Republican parties and to join the party of the working class! 122 The Jednota unreservedly repudiated socialism. It condemned socialist anti-religious tactics and ridicule of Catholics. 123 Socialism was anti-Christian in its very essence, and had been consistently opposed to religion. The only agency that did in fact transform slave labor into free human labor was the Catholic Church. 124 As the first decade of the twentieth century ended and another began, the dawn of new interests appeared on the horizon. In 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, who has been mentioned before, returned to the United States on behalf of Hungary which he described as "an island of freedom" in central Europe. Slovak publicity about Hungarian mistreatment of Slovaks caused the mission of Count Apponyi to fail.1 25 Hard upon the heels of this came the Balkan wars. Slovak efforts at war relief were conditioned by nationalism. Within the months from November 21, 1912 to June 19, 1913, the Narodne Noviny collected $1,547.95 for the Slavonic Red Cross; and it was made clear that this collection was only for the Slavs. 126 By January 22, 1913 the Jednota had collected $2,350.00 for the same cause. 127 With regard to the "Slovak question," which was on the verge of becoming the paramouth one for the Slovaks, opinion among the American Slovaks had undergone quite a change. �58 SLOVAKIA Almost up to 1914 Slovaks sought concessions from Hungary for Slovakia; but these concessions of political and cultural rights wer-e understood within the existing framework of government. However, in April, 1914, when Count Michael Karolyi came to the United States to win Slovak favor for a Slovak and Hungarian union in a completely independent Hungary, the Slovaks questioned the sincerity of the Count and the government. In New York, on May 24, 1914, a debate took place on the question: "Can the Slovaks trust the Hungarian government in its movement for general suffrage in Hungary and with complete Hungarian independence?" The debate solved no real problem, but stated clearly the issues: what was to be the Slovaks' future relation to Hungary? The Slovak League arranged several protest meetings, and on April 28, 1914 issued a Memorandum, which was practically a declaration of independence and demanded autonomy for Slovakia. The League did not explain the kind of autonomy Slovakia should have, whether within Austro-Hungary or with Hungary as an independent state or complete independence for Slovakia for the Slovaks in America themselves disagreed on what they wanted. In order to clarify their position, a Congress of the Slovak League was held in Pittsburgh, September 10, 1914. After everybody had aired their views, it appeared that in 1914, as late as September of that year, the American Slovaks had not generally accepted political plans for Slovakia. 128 They were divided into three camps: one demanded complete independence for Slovakia, another wanted autonomy within Hungary, and a third desired the creation of a new state in which Czechs and Slovaks would be united. 129 With the coming of the World War, Slovak attention was diverted from the creation of Slovak institutions here in America to the creation of Slovakia. The World War found the Slovaks anti-German and anti-Habsburg. 130 The Jednota printed German atrocity stories and even went so far as to charge that German Protestantism was serving German mili'tarism.131 The Slovak League managed to chanel the desire for a better Slovakia and the anti-Habsburg feeling into an extensive Slovak nationalist movement. Through the Slovak League over a million dollars was poured into the cause of Slovak freedom. 132 By 1914 the Slovak immigrants had made themselves �SLOVAKIA 59 economically secure as far as a group of working people could in the American economy. Socially they had made progress in organizing national fraternal organizations, establishing Slovak schools, creating Slovak parishes. Their nationalism, manifested in efforts to form distinct Slovak institutions and their interest in European Slovakia, prevented their complete integration with American life; but the Slovak institutions seemed foredoomed to failure. The explanation for much of this lies outside the special character of the Slovaks. After 1890, the close of the frontier, the new industrial city became the characteristic of American life ; it became the center of production, the leader in social and cultural lif.e, and great center of communication. By the very fact that Slovaks were immersed in industrial and eventually city rather than farm life, they were exposed to the influence of this most Americanizing force. The problems of new city life, the economic opportunities offered them in industry, and economic competition made the attempt to establish particularly Slovak institutions a struggle against the current. The attempted settlement on ,t he farms was also against the trends of the times which led toward the city. The crucial factor in American Slovak social history seems to be their engaging in industry and their settlement in industrial centers. Slovak nationalism attempted to modify the influence of this industrial city, and in so far as it did, it hindered progress among the Slovak immigrants in America. FOOTNOTES 1. Francis Sasinek, "Myslienky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakmi," Kalendar Jednota (1897 ) , II, 139. 2. M. Jankola, " Nase Skoly," Kalendar Jedno ta ( 1900), V, 135-136. 3. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 69-70. 4. Culen, Slovaci v Ameri ke, p. 394; Jednota, June 18, 1913, September 3, 1913. 5. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187; Hrusovsky, This i s Slovakia, p. 50. 6. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 82-83 ; Yurchak, .The ,Slovaks, p . 190. 7. Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 229-230. 8. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1938 (Bratislava, 1934), pp. 186191 ; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 313-315; Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 230-232. 9. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 81. 10. John S. Bradac, "Slovenski Evanjelici-Lutherani v Spojenych Statoch Arnerickych," World's Fair Memorial, pp. 81-82. 11. "The Slovak Sokol," Sborni k Slovenskeho Katoli ckeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXVIII, 242-243 . 12. Culen, Dejiny, II, 80-81, 93-94. �60 SLOVAKIA 13. J ednota, February 5, 1913. The pastor told the organist " the Slovak language was nothing." The organist quit. 14. Jednota, July 8, 1914. After the Slovaks had brought a priest from Slovakia and paid his way, the bishop refused to let him be their pastor. 15. Narodne Noviny, September 15, 1910; Kushner, Slovaci, p . 32. 16. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 94-95. 17. Andrew J. Shipman, " Slavs in America," Th e Catholic Encyclop edia ( 1912), XIV, p. 55. 18. Culen, Dejiny, I. 114-115. 19. M. Jankola, " Pokladnica sv. Antona v Amerike," Kalendar Jedn ota (1908), XIII, 177-178. 20. Jednota, February 12, 1913. 21. Culen Slovaci v A merike, p . 418; " Slovenska zenska rehol'a ssv. Cyrilla i Me thoda v Amerike ," Ka lendar J ednot a ( 1911 ), XVI, 97-98 ; M. Jankola , " Prvotiny pr vej slovenskej zenskej rehole" , Ka lendar Jednot a (1909), XIV, 17-176; "Dcery ssv. Cyrilla i Methoda", Kalendar J ednota (1914 ), XIX, 194-195. 22. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 150-152. 23. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, pp. 408-409. 24. Ibi d., 418,424. 25. Narodne Noviny, August 15, 1913, August 29,1913. 26. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 27. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 156-157. 28. Culen, Slovaci v A merike, p. 401. 29. Narodne Noviny, June 9, 1910, April 27, 1911 ; September 5, 1912; August 29, 1912; Jednota, July 2, 1913. 30. Narodne Noviny, June 23, 1910, February 15, 1913 ; Jednota, April 1, 1914. 31. J ednota, March 4, 1913, March 12, 1913. 32. Stephan Furdek, "Dlfobny upis a ucastina," Kalendar Jednota (1909 ), XIV, pp. 192-195; "Ako povstal svet," Kalendar Jednota (1910), XV, pp. 141-145; J. Porubsky, "Ako volia v Amerike prezidenta," Kalendar J ednota (1913) , XVII, pp. 97-103; I. G., "Ako stat' sa obcanom Spoj. Statov," Kalendar Narodneho Slov enskeho Spolku (1913 ), XX, pp. 83-96. 33. Nar odne Noviny, June 12, 1913 ; Jednota, November 19, 1913. 34. N arodne Noviny, April 25, 1912; Jednota, June 11, 1913. 35. Narodne Noviny , August 10, 1911. 36. J . A. F ., " Pokrok," Sborni k (1915) , I, 43. 37. N arodne Noviny, April 4, 1912. 38. Narodne Noviny, July 11, 1912. 39. Narodne Noviny, July 25, 1912. 40. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912, September 19, 1912. 41. Narodne Noviny, November 12, 1914. 42. Jednota, January 1, 1913, February 12, 1913, May 7, 1913. 43. Culen, Slovaci v A m erike, pp. 175-190. 44. Ibi d., pp. 236-237. 45. Ibid. , p. 266. 46. Ibi d., p. 267. 47. Ibid., pp. 294-296. 48. Ibi d., pp. 297-305. 49. Ibid., pp. 306-337. 50. N arodne Noviny, February 3, 1910. �SLOVAKIA 61 51. Narodne Noviny, March 27, 1913. 52. Narodne Noviny, February 10, 1910, October 24, 1912. 53. Jednota, January 8, 1913, February 19, 1913, June 18, 1913, July 16, 1913. 54. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 191. 55. Narodne Noviny, July 7, 1910, June 27, 1912, April 17, 1913 ; Jednota, November 4, 1914, December 23, 1914. 56. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 57. Narodne Noviny, October 6, 1910. 58. Narodne Noviny, January 27, 1910; Jednota, May 14, 1913, December 31, 1913 ; Kalendar Jednota (1915), XX, 75. 59. Narodne Noviny, March 7, 1912. 60. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, August 19, 1897. 61. Joseph Pauco, ~udovychorn u Sturovcov (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943) , pp. 107-108. 62. Ibid. , pp. 137-140. 63. Jednota, February 5, 1913. 64. Narodne Noviny, April 28, 1910, April 4, 1912, March 21, 1912. 65. Narodne Noviny, April 4, 1912; Paul Jamarik, " Opojny a krcma, " Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku ( 1914), XXII, 198-206 ; Jednota, February 19, 1913, June 25, 1913. 66. !1udomil, "Zakladajme spolky uplnej striezlivosti," Kalendar Jednota, (1911), XVI, 41-42. 67. Jednota, March 5, 1913. 68. Narodne Noviny, February 24, 1910, August 4, 1910; Jednota, January 29, 1913. 69. Jednota, July 30, 1913. 70. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 71. Narodne Noviny, January 13, 1910, May 12, 1912, August 25, 1910. 72. Narodne Noviny, November 2, 1911. 73. Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1911. 74. Narodne Noviny, January 25, 1912. 75. Narodne Noviny, June 6, 1912. 76. Narodne Noviny, September 18, 1913. 77. Narodne Noviny, October 1, 1914. 78. Narodne Noviny, November 16, 1911. 79. Jednota, September 17, 1913 ; Narodne Noviny, May 25, 1911. 80. Jednota, February 4, 1914; Narodne Noviny , March 19, 1914, June 11, 1914. 81. Jednota, February 19, 1913. 82. Narodne Noviny, October 7, 1910. 83. Jednota, July 9, 1913 Narodne Noviny, May 11, 1912. 84. Jednota, January 1, 1913 ; January 21, 1914. 85. Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914, April 25, 1912. 86. Jednota, January 21, 1914, January 28, 1914. 87. Jednota, February 12, 1913, August 13, 1913. 88. Jednota, August 13, 1913; Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914; Jednota, September 17, 1913, January 21 , 1914. 89. Jednota, December 9, 1914, October 14, 1914, December 30, 1914. 90. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 91. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912. 92. Narodne Noviny, February 17, 1910, April 27, 1911. 93 . Narodne Noviny, February 29, 1914; Jednota, July 1, 1914; Narodne Noviny, May 14, 1914. 94. Jednota, July 1, 1914. �62 SLOVAKIA 95. N<irodne Noviny, December 28, 1911, September 12, 1912, October 12, 1911, June 11, 1914. 96. N<irodne Noviny, March 7, 1912; Jednota, May 21, 1913. 97. A. V. Kozak, "Ustav I . Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota (1912) , XVII, 22. 98. " Ustav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota ( 1915), xx, 163-164. 99. N<irodne Noviny, July 14, 1910. 100. N<irodne Noviny, July 13, 1911. 101. N<irodne Noviny, October 13, 1913. 102. N<irodne Noviny, January 8, 1914. 103. N<irodne Noviny, January 29, 1914. 104. N<irodne Noviny, April 16, 1914. 105. N<irodne Noviny, September 17, 1914. 106. Pamiitnica k zlatemu Jubileu N<irodneho Slov enskeho Spolku v U .S.A . (Pittsburgh, 1940) , p. 47. 107. N<irodne Noviny, March 13, 1913. 108. N<irodne Noviny, January 16, 1913. 109. N <irodn e Noviny, March 24, 1910, April 28, 1910, June 30, 1910. 110. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 111. "Prorocke slova dp. Matufa Jankolu o novom systeme," Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 82; Jednota, January 1, 1913. 112. Culen, Dejiny, I, 125. 113. Ibid., I, 122-123. 114. N<irodne Noviny, March 23 , 1911. 115. N<irodn e Noviny, March 16, 1911. 116. N<irodne Noviny, September 22, 1910. 117. Jednota, May 14, 1913, May 21, 1913, July 2, 1913, September 10. 1913. 118. Jednota, June 18, 1913. 119. Jednot a, July 30, 1913. 120. N<irodn e Noviny, August 22, 1912, October 23, 1913 ; S. F., "Robotnicka otazka," Ka lend<ir J ednota (1906 ), XIII, 56. 121. Culen, Deji ny, I, 123-124; N<irodne Noviny, February 24, 1913. 122. N<irodne Noviny, January 15, 1914, February 12, 1914, February 26, 1914, June 11, 1914. 123. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 124. Jednota, May 7, 1913, July 2, 1913, May 14, 1913. 125. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187. 126. N<irodne Noviny, November 21, 1912, June 19, 1913. 127. J ednota, January 22, 1913. 128. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 99-102. 129. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 190. 130. Jednota, September 30, 1914, October 14, 1914. 131. Jednot a, October 21, 1914, November 4, 1914. 132. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p . 191. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1966, Vol. 16 Description An account of the resource Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 41 New Interests 1900-1914 SLOVAKS IN THE U.S.A. By James J. Zatk o, Ph. D ., University of Notre D ame By 1900 growing Slovak nationalism had begun to grip the Slovak immigrants, and during the next decade and a half the Slovaks agitated for distinotly Slovak institutions, for Slovak education, and for Slovak liberation overseas from Hungarian control. What seemed the most important need of the Slovak immigrants to many thinking minds was Slovak education. Some Catholics found the cause of religious decline in the non-confessional Slovak schools that others advocated and established. Public schools seemed equally pernicious to their mind as being Protestant schools. Too much Americanization injured faith and morals. To them the great answer was Slovak Catholic schools; but these were practically non-existent. Some pastors just were not interested in schools, Slovak or Catholic. The debts resulting from building churches weighted down the parishes and blocked any ambitious program of school construction. Often Slovaks were too scattered throughout a region to support their own church and school.1 However, the crucial obstacle was a lack of Slovak teachers. Even if schools were built, they might be Catholic schools, but they would not be Slovak schools, for there were not enough Slovak teachers. As early as 1900 Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, suggested a solution, Slovak nuns to teach in Slovak schools, but this suggestion took almost ten years to mature. 2 Nevertheless, schools were not entirely neglected during these first years of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Rev. Bartholomew Kvitek, a Catholic priest, organized the Slovak school of St. Michael's parish in Chicago; and in 1902 the first Vincentian Sisters of Charity arrived from Slovakia to serve in St. Michael's parish in Braddock, Pa., where they took charge of the parochial school's 65 students. 3 Plans for non-confessional schools never came to very much, because the Slovaks were opposed to education without religion. 4 In 1900 the Slovaks won a local victory over the Hungarians when their protests blocked the erection of Louis Kossuth's statue in the public square of Cleveland. When Count 42 SLOVAKIA Albert Apponyi and forty delegates arrived in America during the World's Fair at St. Louis in 1904, the Slovaks presented a Memorandum recounting their objections against the electoral system in Hungary and Magyarization. Although the Count refused even to discuss Slovak grievances, ,the Memorandum at least informed public opinion about undemocratic election procedures and anti-Slovak schools. 5 However, all anti-Magyar agitation was focussed by the creation in 1907 of the Slovak League of America on May 26, in Cleveland, Ohio, by seven thousand delegates. The League became an alliance of Slovak educational, fraternal, and religious groups in this country. The purposes of the League were to educate Slovaks everywhere, to uplift them here in America and elsewhere morally, economically, socially and politically. 6 It became the leader in the drive to alleviate political conditions in Slovakia, but its efforts might have been still-born had not the Massacre of Cernova on the 27th of October, 1907 aroused not only Slovaks but world opinion. To understand this ev,e nt some facts need to be reviewed. The Rev. Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest both pious and devoted to the political and social welfare of the Slovaks, in 1897 became editor of The People's News and fought the Magyarization program of the gov,e rnment; his speeches and writings helped elect seven Slovaks to the Hungarian Parliament in 1906. He and fifteen other Slovaks were arrested and tried for "agitation against Hungarian nationality". Hlinka was fined 1500 crowns and costs of 680 crowns and sentenced to two years in prison. In a farewell message to his parishioners he declared thart he would gladly suffer imprisonment to secure recognition of the Slovak nation. For this he received another eighteen months and a fine of 400 crowns. 7 Prior to this the Rev. A. Hlinka had been appointed pastor in his native city, Ruzomberok; in the quarter known as Cernova he had begun building a new church for which he collected funds from all over Slovakia. He had in the meantime been suspended by Bishop Parvy, an ardent pro-Magyar. When the church in Cernova was to be dedicated, the parishioners refused to permit the blessing, unless their pastor returned to them. On October 27, 1907 gendarmes marched into Cernova to help keep order, and they lined the streets leading to the church. That morning coaches arrived bringing the Rev. Pazurik from Llkavka and other visitors to conduct the dedi- SLOVAKIA 43 cation. When the people blockaded the road, the coachman began to lay about his whip in order to drive his horses through the crowd ; some men seized the horses' bridles to turn them around. An order was given to the gendarmes to open fire. Instantly nine people fell dead, men, women, and children, and six more died of their wounds later. 8 The National Slovak Society immediately took in hand the problem of aid for the widows and orphans that resulted from the Cernova Massacre and voted $2,000 for r•elief.9 While political nationalism received immense stimulus from the Massacre, nationalism began to play a greater role in the sphere of religion after 1900. Under the influence of their nationalism, the Slovaks began to feel their unity as a group and their need of exclusivness as a nation. This led to organization on a unique national basis in religion and to demands for r•ecognizing the "rights of Slovaks" in religious matters, like organization of synods for the Lutherans, Catholic action groups for the Slovak Catholics, and teaching of Slovak in the schools. The Slovak Lutherans formed the Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the United States of America with headquarters in Whiting, Indiana. This Synod was founded in the church of St. Peter, September 2, 1902, at Connellsville, Pa. A beginning had been made in Mahanoy City, Pa., but more definite steps were taken at conferences in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and Braddock, Pa.; in the actual founding all the Slovak ministers and congregations cooperated. The Synod used the Slovak language in services and sermons, except where unusual circumstances required the use of English. Even the children wer,e taught their religion in Slovak. The Synod obtained its funds from prescribed contributions of the various parishes belonging to it. In Cleveland it owned a considerable prope1;ty intended for a Lutheran orphanage. The of.ficial organ was the Svedo k, which began in 1906 and was published twice a month.10 The troubled relations of Catholicism with Slovak nationalism continued to split various groups. A National Slovak Sokol had been established to include all Sokol activities in the United States; but discrimination against Catholics led to the creation of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in 1905; the headquarters of this group were in Passaic, N. J. The Slovak Catholic Sokol began publishing its own paper, the Katolicky 44 SLOVAKIA Sokol, and launched an extensive program to attract Slovak youth in gymnastics, athletics, and social activities. 11 The most violent conflict among Slovaks of the first decade of the twentieth century involved Slovak nationalism, but it was a conflict within the Catholic group between Catholic Nationalists and the Madarones. The founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the Rev. Stephen Furdek, called for an annual Slovak day that was to renew the Catholic spirit and attachment to Slovak nationality. The first Slovak day was to be called the Catholic Congress. This evoked bitter opposition in letters and even a telegram to Bishop Michael J . Hoban of Scranton from the Rev. Kossalko who denounced the whole project as "pan-slavistic" and as an attempt to set up a national church. When Bishop Hoban sanctioned the Slovak Day or Catholic Congress in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., by addressing it on September 3, 1906, Kossalko's rage knew no bounds. He addressed a Memorandum, signed by a large number of Madarone Slovak clergy, to the Apostolic Delegate and the archbishops of the United States. He demanded a condemnation of the affair. The Memorandum expressed fear for the unity of the church and the salvation of 500,000 souls, and accused the Slovak Catholics of working for "panslavism", which was inimical to Hungary, Germany, and the United States. However, Bishop Hoban's influence shielded the Catholic Slovak clergy and no action was taken.12 This event discredited the Madarones. Within the framework of the Catholic Church in the United States Slovak Catholics became involved in a struggle to preserve what they considered their national rights. There were arguments with non-Slovak pastors over hiring organists who would be able to teach Slovak to the children. 13 At other times Slovak Catholic efforts to obtain Slovak priests who could minister to them in their own language conflicted with bishops who did not always agree on Slovak "rights" .14 One bitter quarrel led to a schism in the Slovak settlement of Masontown, Pa. In Leckrone, Pa., a settlement of Irish and Slovaks, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual help was blessed by Bishop Richard Phelan of Pittsburgh on October 9, 1904. In 1907 the church burned down, but a hall was built in which religious services were held. The Slovaks by this time had a Slovak pastor, but they still wanted a parish all their own. Bishop SLOVAKIA 45 Francis R. Canevin of Pittsburgh requested the Rev. Charles Janda to look for a suitable location ; Rev. C. Janda sugg,ested Masontown. Since the Irish Catholics also wanted to have a parish in Masontown, the Slovaks were told to take the church in Leckrone for their use; but the Slovaks in Masontown were not satisfied. They went ahead and built their own church, and when the bishop would not cooperate with them, they cast about for a priest who might be willing to serve their church. Eventually they found an "independent" priest and so fell into schism.15 In sptte of such trouble, the Slovak Catholic body remained generally healthy. On February 22, 1911 a Slovak Catholic Priest and inventor, the Rev. Joseph Murgas, led in forming The Slovak Catholic Federation in America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Und,e r the control of Slovak Catholic priests this group was to spread and coordinate Catholic action among Slovaks in America; until this year Slovak Catholic activities had been unorganized and subordinated to political and social ends.16 Exact religious statistics for ·t he Slovak immigrant group for that time are not available, but the best estimate suggests that of the 560,000 Slovak immigrants in America in 1911, 450,000 were Roman Catholics. The Slovak Catholics had 134 parishes in the United States. Protestants among the Slovaks numbered 95,000 .17 Of this Protestant group, Calvinists are estimated to run about 15,000. 18 After 1905 the development of Slovak Catholic elementary schools gained momentum. A system both Slovak and Catholic had been impossible without Slovak Catholic teachers. The Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, organized the Priests' Society of St. Anthony's Burse in the United States of America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , in 1903 and it was chartered in 1905. In the Kalendar Jednota of 1908 Rev. M. Jankola proposed the Burse of St. Anthony for Catholics generally to support students preparing to be teachers and Slovak girls preparing to be teaching nuns. 19 Although the Slovak Catholics supported this program generously with frequent collections and donations 20 , the fund proved insufficient for the purpose. Three Slovak girls who had been sent to the novitiate of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1906 were the nucleus of a Slovak sisterhood. In 1909 interested Slovak priests petitioned for the foundation of a distinctly 46 SLOVAKIA Slovak sisterhood, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. On June 26, 1909 the Congregation for Religious approved this project, and the motherhouse of the new Slovak congregation was established in Danville, Pa.21 In the year 1911 the Most Reverend Joseph Koudelka, the bishop of Superior sent a request to the general motherhouse of the Congregation of School Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis in Prague. He asked the sisters to come to his diocese to work. Mother General M. Xavier sent Sister M. Georgia and Sister M. Hyacinth to look over the possibilities. These sisters stopped in Pittsburgh, where the Rev. J. Vrana persuaded them that the Pittsburgh diocese offered them greater opportunities and had greater need. When Sister M. Hyacinth took sick and died on March 10, 1912, the Mother General herself came to Pittsburgh. Rev. Ferdinand Prikazky, who at the moment was struggling to get nuns to teach in his St. Gabriel's parochial school, convinc,e d the sisters to settle in Pittsburgh. This was the beginning. By 1914 twenty three sisters of this congregation were teaching 579 children in three Slovak Catholic parishes.22 Progress had been made in solving the problem of elementary school education; schools were built in the parishes almost as quickly as teachers could be provided. The question of secondary school education also began to agitate Slovak circles. Very early, the Rev. Stephen Furdek suggested the idea of a Slovak high school for boys; he was seconded in this by the Rev. M. Jankola. However, nothing came of the idea until 1921 when it revived and resulted in the Benedictine High School in Cleveland in 1927.23 The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius opened a high school for girls at Danville in 1922, and the Sisters of St. Francis opened one at Bellevue, Pa., in 1927. 24 There was continuous agitation for a college. A Slovak business college was suggested to improve the Slovak economic position.25 P. J . Kunovsky worked out a whole scheme for a Slovak school on a higher level. He argued that $100,000 would put up a building, and then he suggested that each fraternal organization ought to support a professor. This school was to include business and technical courses. As to religious affiliation, the school would be non-confessional, but the Oatholics could have a lecturer on the Catholic Faith and the Lutherans could support one to lecture on the Lutheran faith. This in- SLOVAKIA 47 stitution was to be coeducational. Nothing came of this project.2s Very few Slovak children of the first immigrants had a chance to go to college, but those who did go generally took advantag,e of existing colleges. In 1901 the Czech Benedictines had established St. Procopius College at Lisle, Ill., and by 1907 there were ten Slovak youths studying there. They organized the "Literary Society of Stephen Moyses" and issued a monthly multigraphed little paper, Horlivost'. The club and the paper lasted for four years. The Slovaks also owed a special debt to the College and Seminary of St. Vincent's Archabbey in Latrobe, Pa., for in this college and seminary almost all the Catholic Slovak priests and many Slovak young men were trained. 27 During the years between 1902 and 1936 545 Slovak students attended St. Vincent's. 28 Informal education made most progress among the Slovaks. Clubs, multiplied, political, social, cultural, and literary. The political club seems to have been the most popular. It had a variety of purposes: to fighrt political apathy among the Slovaks, to help the Slovaks gain their political rights, and to help Slovaks become American citizens. In one year a club in Rankin, Pa., succeeded in getting thirteen Slovaks to obtain their citizenship papers. 29 Literary clubs also became popular among the Slovaks as a mean of self- improvement. 30 Both the newspapers and the almanacs were also instrumental in educating the Slovak immigrants. The Jednota discussed Darwinism, the "higher criticism" and socialism. 31 The almanacs explained the procedure of becoming citizens, American electoral system, stocks and bonds, and even discussed the origin of the world. 32 One of the complaints about the Slovaks made by their own leaders is their lack of interest in books and good reading. To make the Slovaks book-lovers, Slovak political and literary clubs founded Slovak libraries. 33 The national fraternal organizations sometimes contributed money to help in the acquisition of a building, or, if the Slovaks already possessed a lodge hall, to aid in the purchase of books. 34 That a demand actually developed for Slovak books is suggested by the special sections for Slovak readers in public libraries, as for instance, the Oarnegie Library in Homestead, Pa., 35 and the public library in Cleveland. 36 The most ambitious project launched to interest the Slo- 48 SLOVAKIA vaks in reading was a book club. P. J. Kunovsky suggested in 1912 the formation of a book club to consist of 5,000 Slovaks. This number would enable the club to sell four books for a dollar. 37 By July 11, 1912 a literary committee to choose books had been elected. 38 Even this cultural project could not move along without factions; for there were some objections to the composition of the literary committee. Only "one side" was represented. 39 There were complaints by Kunovsky that progress was slow; in fact, after six months of vigorous propaganda, there were not even 1,000 members, and the club needed 5,000 members in one year. 40 By November, 1914, the "Four Books for a Dollar" was still going and growing somewhat, 41 but the Slovaks were apparently still not too interested in books. One book promotion was quite successful. The Rev. J. Murgas led a drive to get 3,000 subscribers for a Cathechetical Encyclopedia, written by Rev. Vaclav Melchior, C. Ss. R. 42 Enough subscribers undertook to buy the book. It was a project more adapted to Slovak ideas; it seemed worthwhile to invest in a book on religion. The taste of Slovaks in reading was quite varied. We cannot judge from actual reports of reading, but the types of books published for them may serve as an indication of their reading tast,e. There were romances dealing with the Janosik cycle, a Slovak Robin Hood; others dealt with the adventures of a likeable thief, Rinaldo Rinaldini; sensational stories included Dracula, Harry Tracy, Most Desperate Criminal of Our Time , and World Detective Romances and Novel series.43 Other books published dealt with Slovak history and Magyar oppression. 44 One anti-clerical work was Z dejin Cirkvi by A. M. Spera, an anti-Catholic church history: 45 there was even a socialist work, Socialisti idu. 46 Publications included readers and catechisms, 47 dictionaries and grammars, 48 and devotional works. 49 The translations printed in the Narodne Noviny from American literature included Edgar A. Poe's The Black Cat 50 and Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.51 Whatever reading may have been done by the Slovaks besides the almanacs and newspapers, these books are a suggestion of its type. Another form of informal education proposed was a Slovak Chautauqua. The Rev. W. Regnemer, a Calvinist minister, suggested that a fraternal organization hire a pleasure SLOVAKIA 49 park during the summer for one day, prepare a cultural and entertaining program and charge an admission of twenty fiv,e or fifty cents. 52 This idea was still-born. Theatrical productions were very common among the Slovaks, 53 but the drama was not on a very high level. Most popular were plays in Slovak portraying Slovakia and Slovak life. There was no attempt to translate the English classics of the stage into Slovak. 54 Both the Narodne Noviny and the Jednota encouraged the staging of plays by publishing a large number of them in their columns, 55 for plays portraying Slovak life served to arouse national consciousness, besides being good entertainment. 56 One complaint about the theatrical entertainment was the bad conduct of the audience, which frequently shouted to their friends on the stage, whistled, stamped their feet. Mothers brought very young children or babies who disturbed the performance with their crying. 57 The Slovaks organized bands and choirs ;58 popular music was also encouraged by the publication of songs in the almanacs. Some of the choirs advanced so rapidly that they were able to stage small operettas. 59 One obstacle to further Slovak progress was intemperance. The drink problem, its source in poverty, was an old one for the Slovaks. All sources agree that drink, especially whisk,ey, was the curse of Slovakia and helped impoverish the country. 60 During the 1840',s Rev. Stephan Zavodnik, a Catholic priest, influenced by Father Matthew, inaugurated the struggle against intemperance in Slovakia. Father Matthew's influence had trav,elled through Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and finally reached Slovakia. 61 Temperance societies were first organized in Orava in 1845 and in half a year had 20,000 members. The city councils assisted the societies; the ecclesiastical authorities put their prestige behind the movement. In 1847 the bishop of Banska Bystrica asked his clergy to publicize these societies during Lent ; the bishop of Roznava issued a pastoral letter on the subject in 1846. The Lutherans too supported the movement. 62 The nationalistic agitation and revolution in 1848 disrupted the growth of these societies, but by 1870 the fight against drink revived. 63 When the Slovaks came to America, they brought their weakness for drink with them. Still there were Slovaks who understood the pernicious effect of over-indulgence in strong 50 SLOVAKIA drink. Saloon keepers were attacked for disrupting family life. Slovak saloon keepers were urged to remove the national disgrace by going into another line of business. 64 The agitation against the use and abuse of alcohol filled many a column in the N arodne N oviny and J ednota. Alcohol was the cause of disease, for example, tuberculosis, of many economic and social losses ; whiskey was the root of all social evils.65 The most eff.ective agitation against intemperance was the total abstinence society. The best reason for creating such societies was their need. There were such sodeties already in existence in 1911 for example, in Hazleton, Pa., McAdoo, Pa. , St. Clair, Pa., and Mahanoy City, Pa.66 When the temperance club was organized in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., forty five prospective members attended the meeting; but only eight were willing to take the pledge and join the society. Eventually twenty women and girls joined; since then five or six members were added at each meeting, and the number finally grew to forty five! 67 Hand in hand with the progress in religious organization, in education, and political action, went the bettering of the Slovak economic conditions. As with the other activities, economic life among the Slovaks began to be colored by nationalism. The Slovaks set up Slovak grocery stores and Slovak banks. Surprisingly enough, a farm movement among the Slovaks developed from many causes. The success of the Slovaktown venture was continually reported in the newspapers: news of hay selling for $7 a ton, in November, 1912, seven weddings, good markets, freedom from the bleak life of a miners' town and from strikes. 68 To some life on the farm meant a life less dangerous to the faith and a healthier family life;69 to others it meant protection against too quick an assimilation to American ways, especially American morals.70 In 1910 the National Slovak Society embarked on a considerable farm colonization venture. The Society's national convention had voted in 1909 that not less than 1,000 acres of farm land should be bought for an orphanage. A committee investigated real estate in Prince George, Calvert, and St. Mary's counties in Maryland; enough land was to be bought to build an orphanage and to form a Slovak settlement to help in the upkeep of the orphanage. After considerable debate on whether the primary purpose was a settlement SLOVAKIA 51 or an orphanage, 2,813 acres of land were purchased for F 0,000 in St. Mary's county, near St. Mary's, Maryland. One thousand one hundred acres were arable and the rest was woodland ; there was a three mile frontage on St. Mary's River. 71 Eight hundred acres were to be set aside for the orphanage and old folks ' home, and two thousand acres were to be put up for sale.72 The land was divided into thirty nine farms, ranging in size from 33 acres to 132, and classified in value thus: class A farms at $40-$50 an acre, class B farms at $25-$40 an acre, and Class C at $10-$25 an acre. The price of the farms varied from $600 to $3,100.73 The land sales went so well that the National Slovak Society decided to reserve only 500 acres for the orphanage and to sell 2,300 acres for farms.74 Such was the venture's success that by June, 1912, the Slovak Farmers Association was chartered in Maryland with a capitalization of $25,000. First class stock was to get 5% dividend; and as soon as the second class stock reached 5%, the rate of the first class was to jump to 7%. The organization's purpose was to settle Slovaks on good farms, especially in Maryland. The association also had a hotel where Slovaks might disport themselves in the summer for longer or shorter periods of time. 75 Behind the scenes, however, some financial skulduggery was afoot and the exposure of "commission-masters" definitely dampened enthusiasm for the project. A. S. Ambrose, the president of the National Slovak Society, had taken a ten percent commission on $48,735 worth of land sales and netted himself a tidy $4,875.30. Of the sales themselves $16,156.70 in cash had been placed into the Society's treasury, while $28,580 had been mortgaged to the Society. 76 On this transaction the Society was estimated to have lost nearly $20,000 through various "commissions." 77 At least on paper in 1911 the Slovak American Colonization Company was organized with an intended Capitalization of $50,000 at $50 a share. It planned the erection of houses, business structures, saw-mills, and other needed buildings. It remained a paper organization. 78 In spite of the publicity giv,en these projects, the influx of Slovaks onto the land came from individual initiative for most part. Small colonies of Slovak farmers grew up around Denmark, Maine, 79 Phillips, Wisconsin, 80 Tabor, Minnesota,81 Louisiana and Mississippi,82 Callahan and Pine Land, Flo- 52 SLOVAKIA rida,83 Michigan,84 and North Emporia and Antioch, Virginia.a5 If the Slovak farmer struck upon land already cleared, he did not have too difficult a time making a success of farming; but if he bought land that had yet to be cleared, like the second growth timberlands in Wisconsin, the first few years on the "blessed" land were murderous in their demands of labor and capital. For instance, two brothers and their families, having read accounts of successful farming in Wisconsin, used their savings to buy a farm in northern Wisconsin. The land had to be cleared, and ,even the women were put to work carrying away the heavy wood. Besides, the brothers had to build a log house big enough to shelter the two families. During the winter months, the men worked as lumberjacks, and in order to have enough capital to begin farming in spring had to borrow at six percent. After plowing and buying seed, the two new farmers were without money. One of them went to work in a glass mill in Illinois, while the other continued the back-breaking work clearing the land and farming. To add to their troubles, the nearby creek dried up in the summer, and the water could be brought in only from a distant spring. A horse had to be bought ! The beginning of farming was bitter for the Slovaks in northern Wisconsin.86 Although the Slovak farmers did organize locally, they did not form any national Slovak farmer societies. In Moquah, Wis. , for instance, a special farmers' society was established in 1911. The two national fraternal organizations served their social purposes sufficiently. One farmer from Tabor, Minn., did suggest that the Slovak farmers in the west needed a "clearing house" in a city like Pittsburgh, where they could sell their products, especially, grain, directly to the consumer. This would save the farmer some of his profits and the workingman some of his hard earned money. This remained only a suggestion. 87 Generally the new farmers were quite successful. The land was good, profits were high, and there were no strikes. 88 In Slovaktown hay was sold for $7 a ton in 1913; a Slovak farmer in Virginia made $1 ,100 on peanuts and $220 on cotton on a 220 acre farm . Still there were failures . A considerable number of advertisements announcing the farm sales appeared in the Jednota and the Narodne Noviny. 89 Some- SLOVAKIA 53 times the reason was the mortgag,e ;90 at other times the family found the life too difficult and drab.9 1 While some Slovaks managed to escape to the farm from the hard life of mine and mill, most Slovaks remained city-dwellers. One of the problems of the city-dweller was the high cost of living as compared with wages. 92 The high prices led to a large number of cooperative ventures on a nationality basis. Most frequently this was a meat and grocery store. The enterprise resembled a corporation more than a cooperative. A share might cost $10 and a board of directors headed and managed the enterprise. Sometimes a limit was placed on the number of shares an individual might hold, lest any one person should capture control of the corporation.93 In Yukon, Pa., for instance, 200 families established a share-holding grocery store which was successful despite the opposition of some Slovaks. The corporation charter provided that any man could belong, but no one was allowed to invest more than $1 ,000! In 9 months a dividend of $4.85 was paid for each share. The cooperative enterprise could save a working man about fifteen cents a day on his food bill. In spite of considerable propaganda in the papers heralding these ventures, the Slovaks did not support these "Slovak stores" universally. The proprietors complained that Slovaks continued to patronize non-Slovak businesses. 9 4 There were many suggestions for Slovak enterprise: the organization of all Slovak businessmen in America, a law firm to take care of Slovak interests, a hospital for Slovak immigrants, a shoe factory to be built by the National Slovak Society or the Slovak League. 95 Of all the ephemeral proposals made, one did become actual. A Slovak bank to handle Slovak business was considered a necessity; but the idea was only gingerly approached after the failure of Peter V. Rovnianek's Bank in Pittsburgh, in 1907. Michael Bosak founded the State Slovak Bank in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; the bank opened for business on December 2, 1912, and in its first five months showed a profit of $7,250. 96 Progress was also the keynote of the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1910 the Union established its own printery in Middletown, Pa. This was a two story red brick building, one hundred twenty feet long and forty feet wide. The equipment included Duplex printing press and a linotype machine. The blessing of the printery took place on October 27, 1910.97 54 SLOVAKIA In 1914 the Union also opened an orphanage, which the Sisters of Ss. Cyril and Methodius took under their supervision. The building itself cost $97,000, and the total cost was about $110,000. The chapel had an altar of Vermont marble worth $1,200 and a seating capacity of 150. 98 This orphanage was located in Middletown, Pa. The Slovak Catholics wer,e justly very proud of this achievement, especially when they remembered how poor they had been when they landed in the United States. The National Slovak Society showed its energy by creating an official newspaper for its own use, the Narodne Noviny, in 1910; this paper replaced the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny which had spoken for the National Slovak Society but had never been adopted as the official organ of the Society. This new newspaper became definitely anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic. In 1910 an editorial defended the modernists and attacked the Catholic Church as being an Italian and Roman Church, and not truly Catholic. 99 Any clerical scandal was written up with glee, and cartoons were not only anti-clerical but in very bad taste. These attacks and insults became so violent that the Bishop of Altoona, Eugene A. Garvey, banned the newspaper from his diocese on the grounds that it was written and published by "Jews, unbelievers, and heretics," spreading anarchism, unbelief, and socialism.100 The National Slovak Society did more constructive work when it organized the Youth Circles of the National Slovak Society in 1913. The chief purpose of these circles was educational. The elder and chief gymnast had to be total abstainers and men of sound general educa:tion. 101 The official language was Slovak. Dues were to be twenty cents a month for each child; of this amount fifteen cents were to be forwarded to the treasurer of the National Slovak Society. All meetings were to begin with Slovak and American patriotic songs; the American songs were to be translated into Slovak.102 Besides one official meeting a month to transact business, there were frequent meetings for lectures, study, and general education. 103 These circles presented programs which featured recitation of poems in Slovak, Slovak songs sung as solos and in chorus, instrumental solos, lectures by visitors. 104 The circles were beneficial to young Slovaks, and their growth SLOVAKIA 55 was very rapid. By September, 1914, sixty nine circles had been established. 105 In spite of all the discussion of an orphanage, the National Slovak Society finally abandoned the plan. The matter was dropped because of the religious problem. The Society consisted of members belonging to various religious sects and claimed that it could not without showing favoritism provide for religious instruction. An orphanage without religious instruction and education was unacceptable to the Slovaks. 106 The fraternal organizations during this time suffered somewhat from embezzlement and swindling. Joseph Joscak, an editor of the Narodne Noviny , had taken a $19,000 "commission" from the National Slovak Society but was caught up with in 1913. 107 During the same years a William Vokolek swindled the Slovak fraternal organizations to the extent of $300,000. 108 Of course, A. S. Amrose's "commission" on the St. Mary's settlement must also be recalled here. Another common feature of fraternal life in this period was the construction of lodge halls, which were built almost in every settlement. These lodge halls became the centers of social life; they provided places for lodge meetings, theatrical productions, dances, gymnastic exercises, and quarters for the political and literary clubs. 109 One of the storms that troubled the fraternal organizations was the debate on the "old system" as against the "new system." Almost any issue of the Jednota after 1906 and the Narodne Noviny after 1910 contained letters with arguments on both sides of the question. 110 While operating under the older method of assessment, the organizations failed to build up a reserve for times of special demand; they were merely collecting agencies. For instance, if the organization needed $3,000 and had 12,000 members, each member was obliged to pay twenty five cents, which were collected to meet the cost. The new system involved paying dues r,e gularly, determined according to age. As early as 1906 the Rev. S. Furdek, the Rev. M. Jankola, and A. S. Ambrose pointed out the advantages of the new system, but there was much opposition. By 1914 both the First Catholic Slovak Union and the National Slovak Society had adopted the modern method. m Although progress was considerable among the Slovak immigrants in education, business enterprise, and farming , in many ways the lot of the workingman remained a hard 56 SLOVAKIA one. For instance, mine disasters continued to take lives. At Fernie, Pa. , in June, 1902, 200 miners perished, 50 of them Slovaks. Forty two Slovak miners were killed at Cambria, Pa. , during July, 1902. 112 Strikes still plagued the coal fields in which Slovaks were working. In Westmoreland county a strike began at Greensburg, Pa., on March 10, 1910 over union recognition and as a protest against the company store system. It spread to the neighboring mining centers of K,eystone, Irwin, Latrobe, and Westmoreland. Then in the confusion a mine guard shot an eighteen year old youth, and 15,000 miners went on strike. Eleven thousand wer•e said to be Slovaks. They joined the union to show their defiance and to emphasize their demands. As a counter-measure, the company called in the Pinkerton detectives, and the striking miners were blacklisted.113 During the strike the miners had very little to subsist upon, and that little came from the United Mine Workers of America. The union provided $2.50 a week for each man, $1.00 a week for each woman dependent, and $0 .50 a week for each child. 114 The president of the National Slovak Society, Mr. A. S. Ambrose, visited the strike-bound coal-fields. In his newspaper articles he estimated that about 20,000 men were on strike ; about 95 % were Slavs, and of this latter group about 60 % were Slovaks. The striking miners lived in shacks that could not protect them against the bitter cold, the children went about bare-foot and hungry. 115 Since 500 strikers were members of the National Slovak Society, the Society published appeals for help and even began a collection for relief of the strikers in Westmoreland county.116 Gradually the strike was broken and nothing substantial was won. Another strike in which many Slovaks were involved began in 1913, led by the Industrial Workers of the World. It started in the broad-loom silk mills of Patterson, N. J. , on February 25, 1913. Over twenty five thousand workers were affected. There were two factors that prolonged the bitter strife. One was the introduction of the three and four loom system; this involved the question of whether Patterson should invade the cheap silk field in opposition to the Pennsylvania mills. Fear of lower wages and loss of work followed as a consequence. The second factor was resentment of I.W.W. tactics. The Jednota condemned the I. W. W.'s socialist tendencies and opposition to the American Federation of Labor. 117 SLOVAKIA 57 Still these defects of the union did not blind the First Catholic Slovak Union to the needs of the strikers, many of whom were Slovaks. 118 For five months the leadership of the I. W. W. kept the strikers' ranks intact, but lack of funds and loss of morale at last broke the strike. After twenty one weeks of bitter struggle the strike was settled without any gains for the workers. The J ednota laid the blame on the socialists. 119 Both newspapers were strong supporters of unions. They considered it the duty of every Slovak to belong to the unions, especially the American Federation of Labor. After all, it was the unions that improved the worker's lot and gave labor a position of influence in the world. 120 The strike-breaker and the "scab" were excluded from Slovak organizations. 121 In their attitude toward socialism the two newspapers differed. The Narodne Noviny showed itself definitely hospitable to socialist ideas. Articles were featured insisting that there could be no friendly contacts between capitalists and workers; workers were urged to abandon the Democratic and Republican parties and to join the party of the working class! 122 The Jednota unreservedly repudiated socialism. It condemned socialist anti-religious tactics and ridicule of Catholics. 123 Socialism was anti-Christian in its very essence, and had been consistently opposed to religion. The only agency that did in fact transform slave labor into free human labor was the Catholic Church. 124 As the first decade of the twentieth century ended and another began, the dawn of new interests appeared on the horizon. In 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, who has been mentioned before, returned to the United States on behalf of Hungary which he described as "an island of freedom" in central Europe. Slovak publicity about Hungarian mistreatment of Slovaks caused the mission of Count Apponyi to fail.1 25 Hard upon the heels of this came the Balkan wars. Slovak efforts at war relief were conditioned by nationalism. Within the months from November 21, 1912 to June 19, 1913, the Narodne Noviny collected $1,547.95 for the Slavonic Red Cross; and it was made clear that this collection was only for the Slavs. 126 By January 22, 1913 the Jednota had collected $2,350.00 for the same cause. 127 With regard to the "Slovak question," which was on the verge of becoming the paramouth one for the Slovaks, opinion among the American Slovaks had undergone quite a change. 58 SLOVAKIA Almost up to 1914 Slovaks sought concessions from Hungary for Slovakia; but these concessions of political and cultural rights wer-e understood within the existing framework of government. However, in April, 1914, when Count Michael Karolyi came to the United States to win Slovak favor for a Slovak and Hungarian union in a completely independent Hungary, the Slovaks questioned the sincerity of the Count and the government. In New York, on May 24, 1914, a debate took place on the question: "Can the Slovaks trust the Hungarian government in its movement for general suffrage in Hungary and with complete Hungarian independence?" The debate solved no real problem, but stated clearly the issues: what was to be the Slovaks' future relation to Hungary? The Slovak League arranged several protest meetings, and on April 28, 1914 issued a Memorandum, which was practically a declaration of independence and demanded autonomy for Slovakia. The League did not explain the kind of autonomy Slovakia should have, whether within Austro-Hungary or with Hungary as an independent state or complete independence for Slovakia for the Slovaks in America themselves disagreed on what they wanted. In order to clarify their position, a Congress of the Slovak League was held in Pittsburgh, September 10, 1914. After everybody had aired their views, it appeared that in 1914, as late as September of that year, the American Slovaks had not generally accepted political plans for Slovakia. 128 They were divided into three camps: one demanded complete independence for Slovakia, another wanted autonomy within Hungary, and a third desired the creation of a new state in which Czechs and Slovaks would be united. 129 With the coming of the World War, Slovak attention was diverted from the creation of Slovak institutions here in America to the creation of Slovakia. The World War found the Slovaks anti-German and anti-Habsburg. 130 The Jednota printed German atrocity stories and even went so far as to charge that German Protestantism was serving German mili'tarism.131 The Slovak League managed to chanel the desire for a better Slovakia and the anti-Habsburg feeling into an extensive Slovak nationalist movement. Through the Slovak League over a million dollars was poured into the cause of Slovak freedom. 132 By 1914 the Slovak immigrants had made themselves SLOVAKIA 59 economically secure as far as a group of working people could in the American economy. Socially they had made progress in organizing national fraternal organizations, establishing Slovak schools, creating Slovak parishes. Their nationalism, manifested in efforts to form distinct Slovak institutions and their interest in European Slovakia, prevented their complete integration with American life; but the Slovak institutions seemed foredoomed to failure. The explanation for much of this lies outside the special character of the Slovaks. After 1890, the close of the frontier, the new industrial city became the characteristic of American life ; it became the center of production, the leader in social and cultural lif.e, and great center of communication. By the very fact that Slovaks were immersed in industrial and eventually city rather than farm life, they were exposed to the influence of this most Americanizing force. The problems of new city life, the economic opportunities offered them in industry, and economic competition made the attempt to establish particularly Slovak institutions a struggle against the current. The attempted settlement on ,t he farms was also against the trends of the times which led toward the city. The crucial factor in American Slovak social history seems to be their engaging in industry and their settlement in industrial centers. Slovak nationalism attempted to modify the influence of this industrial city, and in so far as it did, it hindered progress among the Slovak immigrants in America. FOOTNOTES 1. Francis Sasinek, "Myslienky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakmi," Kalendar Jednota (1897 ) , II, 139. 2. M. Jankola, " Nase Skoly," Kalendar Jedno ta ( 1900), V, 135-136. 3. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 69-70. 4. Culen, Slovaci v Ameri ke, p. 394; Jednota, June 18, 1913, September 3, 1913. 5. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187; Hrusovsky, This i s Slovakia, p. 50. 6. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 82-83 ; Yurchak, .The ,Slovaks, p . 190. 7. Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 229-230. 8. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1938 (Bratislava, 1934), pp. 186191 ; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 313-315; Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 230-232. 9. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 81. 10. John S. Bradac, "Slovenski Evanjelici-Lutherani v Spojenych Statoch Arnerickych," World's Fair Memorial, pp. 81-82. 11. "The Slovak Sokol," Sborni k Slovenskeho Katoli ckeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXVIII, 242-243 . 12. Culen, Dejiny, II, 80-81, 93-94. 60 SLOVAKIA 13. J ednota, February 5, 1913. The pastor told the organist " the Slovak language was nothing." The organist quit. 14. Jednota, July 8, 1914. After the Slovaks had brought a priest from Slovakia and paid his way, the bishop refused to let him be their pastor. 15. Narodne Noviny, September 15, 1910; Kushner, Slovaci, p . 32. 16. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 94-95. 17. Andrew J. Shipman, " Slavs in America," Th e Catholic Encyclop edia ( 1912), XIV, p. 55. 18. Culen, Dejiny, I. 114-115. 19. M. Jankola, " Pokladnica sv. Antona v Amerike," Kalendar Jedn ota (1908), XIII, 177-178. 20. Jednota, February 12, 1913. 21. Culen Slovaci v A merike, p . 418; " Slovenska zenska rehol'a ssv. Cyrilla i Me thoda v Amerike ," Ka lendar J ednot a ( 1911 ), XVI, 97-98 ; M. Jankola , " Prvotiny pr vej slovenskej zenskej rehole" , Ka lendar Jednot a (1909), XIV, 17-176; "Dcery ssv. Cyrilla i Methoda", Kalendar J ednota (1914 ), XIX, 194-195. 22. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 150-152. 23. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, pp. 408-409. 24. Ibi d., 418,424. 25. Narodne Noviny, August 15, 1913, August 29,1913. 26. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 27. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 156-157. 28. Culen, Slovaci v A merike, p. 401. 29. Narodne Noviny, June 9, 1910, April 27, 1911 ; September 5, 1912; August 29, 1912; Jednota, July 2, 1913. 30. Narodne Noviny, June 23, 1910, February 15, 1913 ; Jednota, April 1, 1914. 31. J ednota, March 4, 1913, March 12, 1913. 32. Stephan Furdek, "Dlfobny upis a ucastina," Kalendar Jednota (1909 ), XIV, pp. 192-195; "Ako povstal svet," Kalendar Jednota (1910), XV, pp. 141-145; J. Porubsky, "Ako volia v Amerike prezidenta," Kalendar J ednota (1913) , XVII, pp. 97-103; I. G., "Ako stat' sa obcanom Spoj. Statov," Kalendar Narodneho Slov enskeho Spolku (1913 ), XX, pp. 83-96. 33. Nar odne Noviny, June 12, 1913 ; Jednota, November 19, 1913. 34. N arodne Noviny, April 25, 1912; Jednota, June 11, 1913. 35. Narodne Noviny , August 10, 1911. 36. J . A. F ., " Pokrok," Sborni k (1915) , I, 43. 37. N arodne Noviny, April 4, 1912. 38. Narodne Noviny, July 11, 1912. 39. Narodne Noviny, July 25, 1912. 40. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912, September 19, 1912. 41. Narodne Noviny, November 12, 1914. 42. Jednota, January 1, 1913, February 12, 1913, May 7, 1913. 43. Culen, Slovaci v A m erike, pp. 175-190. 44. Ibi d., pp. 236-237. 45. Ibid. , p. 266. 46. Ibi d., p. 267. 47. Ibid., pp. 294-296. 48. Ibi d., pp. 297-305. 49. Ibid., pp. 306-337. 50. N arodne Noviny, February 3, 1910. SLOVAKIA 61 51. Narodne Noviny, March 27, 1913. 52. Narodne Noviny, February 10, 1910, October 24, 1912. 53. Jednota, January 8, 1913, February 19, 1913, June 18, 1913, July 16, 1913. 54. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 191. 55. Narodne Noviny, July 7, 1910, June 27, 1912, April 17, 1913 ; Jednota, November 4, 1914, December 23, 1914. 56. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 57. Narodne Noviny, October 6, 1910. 58. Narodne Noviny, January 27, 1910; Jednota, May 14, 1913, December 31, 1913 ; Kalendar Jednota (1915), XX, 75. 59. Narodne Noviny, March 7, 1912. 60. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, August 19, 1897. 61. Joseph Pauco, ~udovychorn u Sturovcov (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943) , pp. 107-108. 62. Ibid. , pp. 137-140. 63. Jednota, February 5, 1913. 64. Narodne Noviny, April 28, 1910, April 4, 1912, March 21, 1912. 65. Narodne Noviny, April 4, 1912; Paul Jamarik, " Opojny a krcma, " Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku ( 1914), XXII, 198-206 ; Jednota, February 19, 1913, June 25, 1913. 66. !1udomil, "Zakladajme spolky uplnej striezlivosti," Kalendar Jednota, (1911), XVI, 41-42. 67. Jednota, March 5, 1913. 68. Narodne Noviny, February 24, 1910, August 4, 1910; Jednota, January 29, 1913. 69. Jednota, July 30, 1913. 70. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 71. Narodne Noviny, January 13, 1910, May 12, 1912, August 25, 1910. 72. Narodne Noviny, November 2, 1911. 73. Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1911. 74. Narodne Noviny, January 25, 1912. 75. Narodne Noviny, June 6, 1912. 76. Narodne Noviny, September 18, 1913. 77. Narodne Noviny, October 1, 1914. 78. Narodne Noviny, November 16, 1911. 79. Jednota, September 17, 1913 ; Narodne Noviny, May 25, 1911. 80. Jednota, February 4, 1914; Narodne Noviny , March 19, 1914, June 11, 1914. 81. Jednota, February 19, 1913. 82. Narodne Noviny, October 7, 1910. 83. Jednota, July 9, 1913 Narodne Noviny, May 11, 1912. 84. Jednota, January 1, 1913 ; January 21, 1914. 85. Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914, April 25, 1912. 86. Jednota, January 21, 1914, January 28, 1914. 87. Jednota, February 12, 1913, August 13, 1913. 88. Jednota, August 13, 1913; Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914; Jednota, September 17, 1913, January 21 , 1914. 89. Jednota, December 9, 1914, October 14, 1914, December 30, 1914. 90. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 91. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912. 92. Narodne Noviny, February 17, 1910, April 27, 1911. 93 . Narodne Noviny, February 29, 1914; Jednota, July 1, 1914; Narodne Noviny, May 14, 1914. 94. Jednota, July 1, 1914. 62 SLOVAKIA 95. N<irodne Noviny, December 28, 1911, September 12, 1912, October 12, 1911, June 11, 1914. 96. N<irodne Noviny, March 7, 1912; Jednota, May 21, 1913. 97. A. V. Kozak, "Ustav I . Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota (1912) , XVII, 22. 98. " Ustav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota ( 1915), xx, 163-164. 99. N<irodne Noviny, July 14, 1910. 100. N<irodne Noviny, July 13, 1911. 101. N<irodne Noviny, October 13, 1913. 102. N<irodne Noviny, January 8, 1914. 103. N<irodne Noviny, January 29, 1914. 104. N<irodne Noviny, April 16, 1914. 105. N<irodne Noviny, September 17, 1914. 106. Pamiitnica k zlatemu Jubileu N<irodneho Slov enskeho Spolku v U .S.A . (Pittsburgh, 1940) , p. 47. 107. N<irodne Noviny, March 13, 1913. 108. N<irodne Noviny, January 16, 1913. 109. N <irodn e Noviny, March 24, 1910, April 28, 1910, June 30, 1910. 110. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 111. "Prorocke slova dp. Matufa Jankolu o novom systeme," Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 82; Jednota, January 1, 1913. 112. Culen, Dejiny, I, 125. 113. Ibid., I, 122-123. 114. N<irodne Noviny, March 23 , 1911. 115. N<irodn e Noviny, March 16, 1911. 116. N<irodne Noviny, September 22, 1910. 117. Jednota, May 14, 1913, May 21, 1913, July 2, 1913, September 10. 1913. 118. Jednota, June 18, 1913. 119. Jednot a, July 30, 1913. 120. N<irodn e Noviny, August 22, 1912, October 23, 1913 ; S. F., "Robotnicka otazka," Ka lend<ir J ednota (1906 ), XIII, 56. 121. Culen, Deji ny, I, 123-124; N<irodne Noviny, February 24, 1913. 122. N<irodne Noviny, January 15, 1914, February 12, 1914, February 26, 1914, June 11, 1914. 123. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 124. Jednota, May 7, 1913, July 2, 1913, May 14, 1913. 125. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187. 126. N<irodne Noviny, November 21, 1912, June 19, 1913. 127. J ednota, January 22, 1913. 128. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 99-102. 129. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 190. 130. Jednota, September 30, 1914, October 14, 1914. 131. Jednot a, October 21, 1914, November 4, 1914. 132. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p . 191.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovaks in the U.S.A. Description An account of the resource James J. Zatko, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966 pp. 41-62 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zatko, James J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b6b8000204ecbaea6c54d44eefc26dac.pdf 4fce58f3064c766f04e09a6fe0dcd850 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 145 Slovaks A PART OF THE GREAT EMIGRATION TO AMERICA Joseph John K r a j s a The Slovak nation and the Slovak people, who have had their own territory of Slovakia since the sixth century in Central Europe, and who were a part of the great emigration to America, have left their indelible imprint on the character of America. Slovakia's history is a very tragic one. This country has suffered for over 1,100 years from every type of oppression ever conceived by man. It is one of the oldest Christian nations in Central Eure>pe, and has suffered under foreign domination more than any other nation. At times the Slovaks have been misunderstood and misrepresented, but they clung to their language, religion, customs, and traditions. The Slovaks lived through the predominance of feudalistic Hungary, the glory of the Magyars and the Czechs, and presently the Slovaks are ever determined to outlive the terror of Communism that has been thrust on them since 1945. Until recent years, very little has been written in this country on the history and culture of the Slovak people, in spite of the fact that almost one-third of all the Slovaks in the world live in the United States and Canada. 1 In area Slovakia is larger than Switzerland or Denmark. It lies along the northern shores of the Central Danube River, where its slopes on the east touch the Alps and the western slopes the Carpathian mountains. Since the beginning of European history, a route run through the gate of the Danube basin connecting the West and the East. Because of this fact, Slovakia is a nation that blends the culture of the West with the Eastern Slovanic culture even though the Romans withdraw from the Danube at the end of the 4th century. Oppressive measures continued for centuries in one form or another, but when it became possible to rid themselves of this oppression, the Slovaks migrated to �146 SLOVAKIA America to help mould the American culture-one rooted in the best traditions which they brought with them. True, the Slovaks began coming to America after 1875 numbers and before the great exodus itself, there great in hardly was a family in Slovakia which did not have at least one relative in America. The Slovaks were not always welcomed in the locale where they settled. When my grandfather arrived in A· merica in 1906, he was stoned by the "Americans" from the railroad station until he arrived in the section of the town called a Ward where all the "foreigners" were living. When he became settled, he was hard at work like the rest of the immigrants. He worked as a wiremaker ( drotar) and became what the handbook, "Gateway to Citizenship", prepared by the Department of Justice, said in tribute: The Slovak The endlessly unbowed, That gave the west continent The proudest and best of my Broad backs and eager youth ... Ask the coal you burn, who mined it, The ore, what worker wrung it from the earth, The bridge, what man bound its steel togetherAn every third answer will be a 'Slovak' ... And shall you forget me?2 President Taft did not forgot when he said of the Slovaks: The truth is, we need a little ,p oetry among our native Americans; we need an appreciation of poetic ideals; we need to have mixed with our every-day humdrum life a little bit of the romance that you bring from the old country and we welcome you on that account. 2 a President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not forgot the Slovak1s when he said: This country is m~dful of the vast contribution the Slovaks have made to ,the cause of furthering its development and growth-moral, cultural and material. The stout-hearted, clear-minded, freedomloving and determined people of Slovakia, who, sensitive of the wrongs and deprivations experienced in th~ir own country at the hands of invading forces, turned to America seeking a new home, now comprise with their children and grandchildren an asset in life, industry and culture of this great land that defies human power of appraisal.3 �SLOVAKIA 147 EARLY SWVAK EMIGRATION Even before the great "new emigration" which began around 1873, many Slovaks came to America as part of the "old emigration". Long before the exodus of the Slovak peasants and journeymen for America, hundreds of Slovaks left their homeland for life elsewhere. The Slovak emigration was not only for economic reasons, but also involved was the impelling desire to be part of the dream of a free world. This was also the dream of other ethnic groups from Central Europe. It should be mentioned, however, that before the mass emigration to the United States after the 1870's, there were Slovaks who made their mark in this land of the free. One Slovak who helped America gain her independence from Great Britain was a soldier, Major John J. Polereck~•, son of Count Andrew Polerecky of Polerieka, Turiec County, Slovakia. In 1781, when the army of Cornwallis was defeated, its arms were surrendered to Polerecky at Yorktown, Va. The story of John Polerecky's participation in the American Revolution was unfolded by Dr. Joseph Cincik, a professor in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a distant relative of Major Polerecky. John Polerecky, promoted to a Major in the " French Hussars" by Louis XV, came to America with the French expeditionary army of Rochambeau to help the colonists overthrow British rule. It was during the siege of Yorktown, ait: the beginning of 1781, that Major Polerecky became acquainted with Col. Henry Dearborn (1751-1829) and Col. Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810), who later became General in the American Army and then Secretary of War. On October 20, 1781, when Rochambeau sent Duke de Lauzun to Paris to report the victory to the French King, Polerecky accompanied him. Polerecky became a naturalized citizen by an act of ;the Massachusetts legislature and his papers were signed by Governor John Hancock, one of the signers of ,the American Dec1aration of Independence. Major Polerecky held various public offices from 1789 to 1828.4 Another Slovak who came to America in the earlier years was a doctor, Dr. Samuel Figuly, who fought in the Civil War in the side of the North and is especially noted for his many contributions to the scientific cultivation of tabacco in Virginia. As a plantation owner, he settled down to the cultivation of tabacco in the South, counseled from abroad by the Slovak botanist, Holuby. During the latter part of his life, Dr. Figuly took part in the unsuccessful expedition to the North Pole.5 �148 SLOVAKIA There is a long list of Slovak names that appear on the list of volunteers during the Civil War, especially with the militia in Chicago known as the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin". Such names as Filip, Krupinsky, Fiala, and Kozlej are listed as some of the volunteers.6 The famed Civil War soldier who commanded the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin" was a Slovak, Col Gejza Mihalotzy, who was killed later at Chattanooga. The fort there was then referred to as "Fort Mihalotzy". Col. Mihalotzy recruited the company of riflemen in Illinois and received permission from the President to call his group the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin" .7 A Slovak, Andrew Jelik, was a tailor on a Dutch Ship which sailed to America in 1754-1755.8 Another Slovak who arrived in America during the 18th century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed in Baltimore, Maryland in 1757 . .Ais an adventurer his career took him to Madagascar where he became King. In the year 1800, a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit by making his confession in Slovak. 9 The first Slovak setUement was made in Philadelphia, Pa. by wire-workers (drotari), in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street.10A Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became an American citizen in 1879. He made the round-trip across the ocean twenty-six times.11 THE GREAT SURGE OF SLOVAK EMIGRATION In the wake of the great emigration to America, the movement seems to have begun in the eastern part of Slovakia, especially the counties of Zemplin, saris, and Spis.12 Between the years 1869-1890, the county of Spis lost 14 % of her youth between the ages of 20 to 25 years and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; saris lost 34 % of those between 20 and 25 and 44 % of the men ·b etween 26 and 30 years of age. The movement spread in Slovakia as their brethren became settled in America and the central and western counties took to emigration in the next decade. 13 Between 1875-1914, great masses of Slovak intellectuals, peasants, tradesmen, and artists made up the hundreds �SLOVAKIA 149 of thousands who crowded the cities of New York, Scranton, Hazleton, Cleveland, Wilkes-Barre, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Philadelphia, Detroit, Bridgeport, Newark and the eastern industrial portions of the United States. These big cities and the little towns around them became centers of the new Slovak life in this country. There scarcely was an industry or trade, factory, mill, mine, or iron works where Slovak immigrants and their sons could not be found. Because of their brawn, they took on the most difficult jobs.14 New York ranked first as the port of entry to America; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston, and Portland. From Slovakia, the immigrants generally moved by rail to German, Dutch, or Italian ports. Through the port of Hamburg, Germany passed the greatest number of emigrants. Their voyage took from 13 to 19 days. For my grandmother and grandfather, who came across the ocean in different ships and in different years, the voyage lasted thirteen days. All they brought with them was a suitcase made of straw. It is difficult to give the exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 because the authorities counted the immigrants according to the country of last residence, and many of the Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. The total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673 in the period of 1899-1910, and of this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. The peak year was 1905 for the Slovaks when 52,368 of them were admitted to this new country of America. 15 In the twelve years ending with June 30, 1910, Slovakia ranked eight among the nations who emigrated to the United States. The Slovaks percentage rate of emigration was the highest of any other group. In fact, the rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3). 16 SWV AK PIONEERS The truth remains that Slovakia, a nation with an area of 31,600 square miles-situated in the very heart of Central Europe; a small number of people of five million �150 SLOVAKIA in population and the oldest nation on the central Danube River, contributed much to the development of America. 17 In 1963, United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, reflected pointedly about the Slovaks when he spoke in Youngstown, Ohio: The United States wou~d be a poorer nation today, economically, intellectually, culturally, and in every other way, if it were not for the over two million of our citizens who are of Slovak birth or ancestry.17a The passing of some eighty years and the contributions of Slovaks to this country prompted Attorney General Kennedy to make the above conclusion. The immigrant, no matter where he was situated in the United States, had two seemingly opposing drives that moved him. One was toward becoming an American with which came the social acceptance all immigrants wanted from those who came to this country before them. The other was to preserve the culture, language, and faith of their Slovak past. Strange as it may seem, the two aims did not clash, instead, the two meshed and contributed largerly to the dedication and labors of the Slovak pioneers in the new land. Living in a vastly different environment, they were able to fashion a completely new life. 18 Thou, 0 Columbia, hast rent their chains, And lifted them to manhood, heaven, God!l9 On United States soil, the Slovaks developed a very living and dynamic organized activity; chiefly in journalism, fratemalism, education, music, drama, and religion. 20 Among the first was Julius Wolf (1859-1930) and John Slovensky ( 1856-1900) who, shortly after arriving in America in 1879, founded in Pittsburgh, Pa., the first Slovak periodical, the BULLETIN" (1885), which was hectograph~d. lit was replaced a year later, on October 21, 1886, by the first Slovak newspaper published in America, the AMERIKANSKO-SLOVENSK:t NOVINY (The American-Slovak News), through which Wolf and Slovensky set about encouraging the twofold development of .Slovaks in America. Intergration and yet preservation were ,the ideas of Slovensky and Wolf, both former teachers in Spis County, held out as maxims to the new immigrant.21 The second Slovak newspaper in the United States, called NOVA VLAS1' (The New Homeland), was founded in 1888 in Streator, Illinois. However, the town of Plymouth, �SLOVAKIA 151 Pennsylvania is the cradle of SWV .AK V AMERIKE (Slovak In America), which is actually the oldest continuously published Slovak newspaper in the world. The founder of this newspaper was Albert S. Ambrose in 1889.22 The largest and most influential American-Slovak newspaper in the world-even today-is the JEDNOTA (The Union) -circulation 40,000-the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, which was founded by the Rev. Stephen Furdek in Cleveland, Ohio, May 12, 1891.23 From the very beginning, the Slovaks set out to preserve their Christian heritage, and, because of economic and social need, they formed societies or lodges. Both established organizational life for the Slovaks and the task of implementing it fell on the shoulders of clergymen. It was the Slovak clergymen who came from the old country and responded to the call of the people and founded and helped to organize parishes, fraternal benefit societies, other organizations, and edited newspapers and periodicals.24 It was natural that the Slovaks first wanted to have their own churches for that was their prized heritage. In 862, there already stood in our Nitra, Slovakia, a Christian church for more than thirty years, the first among all western Slavs and the first church in Central Europe.25 The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa. had a chapel there in 1888 and were first organized as a religious group in 1887 in Scranton, Pa. 26 The Slovak Lutherans were the first to organize on a religious basis in the United States. They established the Parish of the Holy Trinity in Streator, Illinois, October 5, 1884, and their first minister was Karol Horak. Other Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa. and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1888.27 The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 1893 and in 1894, the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor. 28 Today, the Protestant group represents about 12 % of the Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Church has 52 churches and the Slovak Presbyterians have 15 churches. A very small number of Slovaks also belong to other denominations. 29 The first Catholic parish was founded in Hazleton, �152 SLOVAKIA Pa., in 1882, by the Slovak priest, Ignatius Jaskovic. His St. Joseph's Parish was actually formed in November 18, 1884. Prior to that he 1said Mass for his people in the "Irish Church", St. Gabriel's of Hazleton.30 The Slovak Catholics had two problems: priests were needed who could speak the language and funds were needed for parish churches and schools. One of the first Slovak priests who came to the new world, and luckily for the future, was the Rev. Stephen Furdek, a native of the village of Trstemi, Orava County, Slovakia. He arrived in Cleveland, Ohio in the early spring of 1882, and with Bishop Richard Gilmour's understanding and cooperation, he set the pattern in motion to solve the Slovak's problems. At the Bishop's request, Father Furdek went to Europe to seek out priests who would serve the spiritual needs of the Catholic Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croatians.31 Besides Father Furdek, other Catholic clergymen-Rev. Paul Lisicky, Dr. Alexander Dianiska, Rev. Anton Gracik, Rev. Joseph Murgas, Msgr. Stephen Krasul'a, and others became dynamic leaders of the Slovaks in America.32 Slovak Catholics number about 85 % of the American Slovaks in this country.33 A look at our Church dignitaries shows Bishop Joseph A. Durick, Bishop Andrew G. Grutka, Bishop Paul Hnilica, Bishop Michael Rusnak (the first Bishop i-n over 1,100 years for the Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite); Abbots Theodore Kojis, Stanislav F. Gmuca, Jerome Koval; five with the rank of Protonotary Apostolic; over fifty prelates; and over 1,000 American,Slov,ak priests. There are seven friaries, one abbey, nine motherhouses for Sisters; nine institutions of higher learning; an orphanage; four old age homes; hundreds of elementary schools; and about 300 Slovak Catholic Parishes. 34 It was toward the maintaining of his Catholic faith that the Slovak Catholic immigrant devoted the greatest portion of his efforts. He did this by organizing parishes, schools, social clubs, and fraternal societies to keep the faith rooted in the young. He did it with whatever time and financial resources he had left after sending stipends back to relatives in the old country for payment of his passage to America or to help his next of kin to emigrate to this land of opportunity.35 Mine disasters and other tragedies often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family destitute and �SLOVAKIA 153 without money for the funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits, a large number of societies grew up in the industrial and mining towns. Father Furdek organized these individual societies into a Union (Jednota) -the First Catholic Slovak Union (1890). He also organized the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892), the Slovak Institute (Matica Slovenska) (1893), The National Fund, and the Fund to Preserve National Heritage. 36 The First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest Slovak fraternal benefit society in the world (105,000 members), founded in Cleveland, on September 4, 1890, is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. He founded the organization's official organ, JEDNOT A (The Union), on May 12, 1891, and edited and published it and the KALENDAR JEDNOTA (Annual Jednota) for over a decade. 37 To write about the contributions of the Jednota to American-Slovak life would require a manuscript that could fill a good size book. In fact, on the society's 75th Anniversary in 1965, its history was published in a 560-page book: 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union), by Dr. Joseph Pauco. This book portrays the early struggles of the Slovak immigrant.:;, their traits of character, their involvement in events, both here and rn their fatherland, their progress from life in simple settlements to flourishing parishes and to the founding of religious, dducational, cultural and eharitable institutions. It presents thumbnail sketches of institutions like the Catholic Slovak Federation of men and women, the newly established Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome for the training of priests for Slovakia. It includes biographical sketches of notable persons in Slovak life, contemporary ,as well as past, persons whose names were household words in their day-Furdek, Jankola, Hrobak, Dianiska, Pavfo, Murga§, Husek, Kozak, Lach, Rovnianek-all active in American Slovak life.as The Immigrant Archives of the University of Minnesota is establishing a Slovak Room with materials and references from Jednota Press in Middletown, Pa. Other Slovak societies and institutions are making their resources available to the study.39 Another Slovak pioneer, Peter P. Rovnianek, an outstanding organizer, brilliant writer and speaker, organized �154 SLOVAKIA the National Slovak Society "for all the Slovaks" without regard to creed (1890). He was born in Dolny Hricov, Trencin County, Slovakia. 40 In al:idition to the National Slovak Society, the First Catholic Slovak Union, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, other Slovak fraternal benefit societies were organized: the Zivena Beneficial Society (1891), the Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union (1893), the Slovak Evangelical Union (1893), the Slovak Gymnastic Union (1896), the Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Ladies Union (1898), the Slovak Caitholic Sokol (1905), the Oanadian Slovak League (1932). The total membership of the Slovak fraternal benefit societies in the United States and Canada today is at the 500,000 mark.41 The newspapers were the sounding boards of popular oprmon as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Almanacs, such as the FIRST SLOVAK NATIONAL ALMANAC of the National Slovak Society (1893), and KALEND.AR JEDNOTA (Annual Jednota) (1896) of the First Catholic Slovak Union, provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays, reviews of important events, religious essays, articles on marriage, and articles pertaining to almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. Almanacs by the Slovak writers reached the American-Slovak public and became so popular that twenty-nine were published at one time.t2 Slovakia was a land of song and dancing and any celebration of even slight importance in America had to be combined with singing, dancing, and shouting of the most vigorous sort.43 The Slovaks have thousands of folk songs and the 'cardas' dance is the universal favorite. 41 Slovak dramatic clubs were organized at the Slovak parishes and the plays served as the handmaid of religion and stirred the audiences. The best remembered plays are "St. Elizabeth", "St. Genevieva", and "Fabiola", by Fr. Matthew Jankola, a man who foresaw the needs of the Slovak immigrants and did much for them, especially in the field of education. Often enacted were ... entertaining skits portraying the Foibles of human nature, each with a wholesome lesson.4s The Slovaks also organized political clubs, cultural societies, and literary circles, but these had to wait because the Slovaks were occupied with labor conflicts. The early �SLOVAKIA 155 history of unions show the great part the Slovaks played in the labor movement. 46 The Slovaks made their contribution to agriculture in this country. Slovaktown, Arkansas, was a farm community near the town of Stuttgart, which was established by Slovak settlers from the "old country" who came there from the coal fields of Pennsylvania to produce dairy products and vegetables. Slovaktown was chartered in 1895, through the efforts of Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. Stephen Dzubaj, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Rev. Vaclav Panuska. 47 The first Slovak Catholic parochial school in America was established in 1889 in Streator, Illinois, by the Rev. Ervin E. Gelhoff. 48 Today there are over 200 parochial schools, several high schools, also : St. Andrew's Abbey of the Slovak Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio; the Slovak Franciscan Fathers of Uniontown, Pa., Pittsburgh, Pa., Valparaiso, Ind., Columbiana, Ohio, and Easton, Pa.; the Order of Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, Danville, Pa.; the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford, Mich.; the Slovak Vincentian Sisters, Perrysville, Pa., Bedford, Ohio; the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue, Pa., Lacon, Ill., and Bethlehem, Pa; and the Slovak Benedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill .49 Their contribution to the education and the life of the Slovak immigrants should be regarded with deep appreciation for the achievements and accomplishments for the Slovaks in America. They have fulfilled their mission and lived up to their motto "For God and Country" (Za Boha a narod ).50 There remains a whole list of Slovak pioneers, and, with those already mentioned in some detail, a whole volume can be written on each with ease. Perhaps the most fertile, imaginative mind among the Slovaks who came to this country belonged to Father Joseph Murgas. A man of many talents, a painter, and yet having literary skill, Father Murgas made outstanding contributions in the field of electronics. Working even before Marconi had perfected his wireless, Murgas pioneered in telegraphic communication. He perfected a method to transit messages to moving railroad trains and secured a series of patents for his invention which he called the "Tone System". With his financial resources exhausted, Fr. Murgas invited �156 SLOVAKIA Marconi and the famous Professor Fessendom of the University of Pittsburgh to assess his work. What followed is not too clear, but shortly the "Sonorous System" appeared on the commercial market that infringed upon Murgas' patents. The "System" was sold in Europe beyond the reach of U.S. patent courts. Father Murgas held twelve patents, all instrumental in making wireless communications between railroad trains possible. In Slovakia, a new radio station was named after him and the Slovak Republic issued a postage stamp in his memory. In United States during World War II, a Liberty Ship was named in his honor. Father Murgas is also the founder of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, a Slovak Catholic Action organization which came into existence on February 22, 1911, in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.st Just as the Slovak Catholic Federation of America was founded to promote Catholic Action, so on May 26, 1907, Father Furdek presided over 7,000 Slovaks in Cleveland, Ohio, representing all the Slovak societies and newspapers and clergy and laity of various religious and political convictions, to found the Slovak League of America. The purpose of the League was to unite all Americans of Slovak descent in the fight of the Slovak nation abroad. 52 The activities of the League and the Federation are a significant chapter in the life of the Slovak immigrants and they still function today with effectiveness. The League promotes Slovak culture and maintains the identity of the Slovak, and the Federation continues to promote Catholic Action. Another Slovak immigrant who "labored indefatigably" to preserve the Catholic faith among the people of his nationality was the Rev. Matthew Jankola. He not only took care of and built parishes in Hazleton, Pa., Pittston, Pa., and Bridgeport, Conn., but served as president of the First Catholic Slovak Union; was editor of JEDNOJ;'A (The Union); contributed to Slovak periodicals; and was responsible, after tremendous effort, of establishing a teaching community of Slovak Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius for the perpetuation of Catholic education among the Slovak people of America.53 It has been said that what Fr. �SLOVAKIA 157 Furdek was to the national life of the Slovak immigrants, Father Jankola was to their religious life.54 CONCLUSION The Slovak pioneer has built the foundation and started the process of development in the religious field, in education, in fraternalism, in journalism, in literature, and in culture. He did this in a strange environment, living in big cities and small towns, with a frightening language barrier, but he enjoyed and breathed freedom. He was free to think, work, write, and worship as he wished. He grasped every opportunity to grow and prosper in this free land, and he did all this to good advantage, thereby reaping all the precious things necessary and peculiar to him in the new world. And, the Slovak pioneer did this within one generation! 55 The Slovak with his sons and their sons, the new generations, advanced rapidly and their activity in the business world, political life, sports, and social life became more pronounced. But it was the hundreds of thousands of Slovak workers-the peasants representing practically every village in Slovakia- who gave concrete meaning to the dream which brought them here.56 The immigrants and those of Slovak descent took on another task when they resolved in the spirit of America that their homeland, Slovakia, would some day be free and independent of alien rule. They worked for and were determined to see in their time, . . . that Slovakia some day would be master of its own household, free to work out its own destiny ·as on equal among the civilized nations of the eavth.57 Along with Father Furdek, countless others played a large role in this work. Among them were Michael Bosak, Sr., whose warm story follows the traditionally American "rags to riches" theme. He was the wealthiest American of Slovak descent in the entire country. 58 Then there was Joseph Rusek, who spent thirty-seven years as the editor of the JEDNOTA (The Union), the most widely read American-Slovak newspaper in the United States. Both these men were instrumental in getting Slovakia's problems before their fellow Americans.59 �158 SLOVAKIA There were also many significant contributions by the American Slovaks in all the wars. Not only did the youth serve with distinction in the armed forces, but the Slovak leaders at home conducted huge War Bond drives. In World War II, headed by the Rev. John J. Lach of Whiting, Indiana, the Committee sold over $53 million in bonds. In recognition of this achievement, the Treasury Department credited the Slovak League with five bombers and named four "Liberty Ships" after famous Slovaks: "The Stephen Furdek", "The Mathias Kocak", "The General Milan R. t'itefanik", and "The Joseph Murgas". 60 In 1964, the Slovaks of America donated over one-half million dollars to build the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome, where young men are being trained to be priests so that one day they can serve Slovakia when it is free of communism. Another great contribution was the Chapel of Our Mother of Sorrows, a gift of the First Catholic Slovak Union which was dedicated on September 5, 1965 in the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, Washington, D. C. This occasion was also the Diamond Jubilee of the Jednota and over 15,000 American• Slovaks gathered in the nation's capital to hear Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio laud the achievements of the American Slovaks. 61 The Slovaks contributed a large quota of stars and stalwarts in the field of sports and athletics in American colleges and on the professional teams. 62 The names on the teams' rosters today are witness to this fact, but names like: Pafko, Lapchik, Musial, Bucha, Bednarik, Valo, Kralik and Mucha are familiar to most sports-minded Americans. Yes, indeed, the Slovakis were a part of the "great emigration and: ... they have definitely and permanently united their /destiny with the destiny of America. It was men like Furdek, Murgas, Jankola, Rovnianek, and others who came after them that aided and guided their fellow Slovaks. They interpret~d America to the Slovaks and likewise interpreted the psychology and ideals of the Slovaks to their American neighbors. Through their leadership and guidance the Slovaks of America were enabled to make their contribution to the material, cultural, and spiritual progress of their adopted land.6 3 The Slovak was similar in many ways to other im- �SLOVAKIA 159 migrants in the assimilation process, but unlike the other ethnic groups, he was destined to play a role in the future of his homeland.64 In the last 25 years, over 15,000 Slovaks fled from their homeland to escape the vengeance of the communists and over 3,000 of these were Slovak intellectuals. Among the refugees from this tyranny are some of the best known Slovak novelists, journalists, poets, and writers. These writers preserved their literary creativeness and formed the Association of Slovak Writers and Artists and opened avenue to the greatest surge of literary efforts aboUlt Slovaks on several continents. More books have been published and distributed about the Slovak!s on this continent in the last ten years than in all the prevfous years put together.65 There is no question that these writers and historians will echo the deeds of their countrymen for posterity. What is still needed, however, are writers about the Slovaks in the English language. The Most Reverend Joseph A. Durick, D. D., Bishop, Diocese of Nashville, Tenn., speaking in 1965 in Washington, D. C.,summed it all up when in tribute to the Slovaks he said: The triumph of the Slov,aks has come about because of constant effort, faithful service, zeal for God's house and the willingness always to sacrifice. The Slovaks great triumph over innumerable odds has made ,t heir contribution to Church and Country a considerable one. By their loyalty to the Faith and subscription to the great fundamental fre~doms which they •have exemplified in the market place and in th~ home, they have helped to build the great city of God and the city of man in our beloved Country.66 FOOTNOTES 1) Victor R. Greene, " Sons of Hunkies: Men With A Past," SLOVAKI,\ , Vol. XVI (No. 39, 1966) , 80. 2) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946) , p. 176. 2a ) Ibid., p. 177. 3) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 178. 4 ) Gilbert L. Oddo, SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y. , 1960) , pp. 331-332. 5) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946),p. 168. 6) John Porubsky, "Lincoln And The Slovaks", KALEND'AR JEDNOTA, XLVII (1944), 129. �160 SLOVAKI A 7) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p. 332. 8 ) Konstantin Culen, DEJINY SLOVAKOV V AMERJKE (History of the Slovaks In America) (Slovakia, 1942), I, 24-25. 9 ) Ibid., p. 26-27. 10 ) Ibid. , p. 28. 11) Ibid., p . 29. 12) Emily Greene Balch, Ph.D., OUR SLAVIC FELLOW CITIZENS (New York, N. Y., 1910), p. 99. 13 ) James J. Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV ( 1965), 15. 14) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p. 333. 15) Emily Greene Balch, Ph.D., OUR SLAVIC CITIZENS (New York, N. Y., 1910) , p. 103. 16) James J . Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), 16. 17 ) Joseph M. Kirschbaum , LL.D., Ph.D., SLOVAKIA : NATION AT THE CROSSROA DS OF CENTRAL EUROPE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p . 15. 17a ) Joseph N. Misany, Esq., "Father Andrew Hlinka", SLOVAKIA , xv (1965), p. 76. 18) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y. , 1960), p. 333. 19) Peter P . Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p . 157. 20) Bonaventu re S. Bue, Ph.D., SLOVAK NATIONAL ISM: ITS ORIGINS, CONFLICT S AND OBJECTIV ES (M.ddletow n, Pa., 1957), p. 60. 21) Oddo, op. cit., p. 334. 22) William Kona, M.A., "The Oldest Slovak Newpaper in the U.S.A.", S LOVAKIA, XV (1965), pp. 38-39. 23 ) Joseph Pauoo, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCK EJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Middletow n, Pa., 1965) , pp. 13-14. 24 ) Gilbert Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960 ), p. 169. 25 ) Joseph Skultety, SKETCHE S FROM SLOVAK HISTORY (Middletown, Pa., 1930), p. 10. 26) Konstantin Culen, DEJINY SLOVAKO V V AMERIKE (History of the Slovaks in America) (Slovakia, 1942), I, 114-115. 28) James J . Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), 28. 29) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960 ), p. 338. �SLOVAKIA 161 30) "St. Joseph's Hazleton: Slovak Church Rebuilt", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV (1966) , p. 12. 31) Gilbert L. o'ddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 334. 32) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 169. 33) Oddo, op. cit., p. 337. 34) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrived", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965) , p. 65. 35) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 336. 36) Ibid., p. 335. 37) Ibid., p . 334. 38) Mother M. Emerentia, SS.C.M., "Book Reviews", SLOVAKIA, XV, (1965), pp. 152-155. 39) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Jednota Talk", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV, (1966), p. 5. 40) Dr. Peter Hletko, "The Founder of Our Society", ALMANAC FOR THE YEAR 1966, LXXIV (1966), 3. 41) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York. N. Y., 1960), p . 339. 42) James J. Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of the Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), p . 25. 43) Sr. Mary Eileen, SS.C.M., SLOVAK WEEK LECTURES: FEATURING ART AND MUSIC (Danville, Pa., 1957), p. 1. 44) James J . .Zatko, Ph.D., Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), p . 19. 45) Sr. M. Consuela Gregorovic, M .A., CONTRIBUTIONS OF MATTHEW JANKOLA TO SLOVAK EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Danville, Pa., 1959), pp. 11, 47. 46) .Zatko, op. cit. , p. 29. 47) James J . .Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), p. 30. 48) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Looking Back", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV ( 1966), p. 5. 49) Philip A. Hrobak, SLOVAK CATHOLIC PARISHES AND INSTITUTIONS (Middletown, Pa., 1955) , p. 23. 50) Ibid., p. 27. 51) Canon Joseph Altany, LL.D., "Joseph Murgas: Father of Wireless", DOBRY PASTIER (Good Shepherd), XXXVII (1964), p. 3. 52) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , pp. 343, 344. 53) Sr. M. Consuela Gregorovic, M.A., CONTRIBUTIONS OF MAT- �162 SLOVAKIA THEW JANKOLA TO SLOVAK EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Danville, Pa., 1959), p. 6. 54) Joseph Pauco, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Mid/dletown, Pa., 1965), .p . 306. 55) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 331. 56) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 157. 57) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 344. 58) Joseph Pauco, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of ,the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Middletown, Pa., 1965), p. 179. 59) Ibid., p. 344. 60) Oddo, op. cit., p. 338. 61) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrivejd", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), pp. 66, 67. 62) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton,Pa., 1946),p.176. 63) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 177. 64) Gilbert L. O~do, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y.), p. 346. 65) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrived", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965) , p. 65. 66) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Jednota's Glories and Future", JEDNOTA ANNUAL FURDEK, 1966, V (1966), pp. 4, 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY Altany, Joseph. " Rev. Joseph Murgas, Founder of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Recogniz~ as the 'Father of Wireless'", Dobry Pastier (Good Shepherd), XXXVII (1964). Balch, Emily G. Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, New York: Charities Publication, 1910. Consuela, Sr. M. Contributions of Reverend Matthew Jankola to Slovak Catholic Education in the United States. Danville, Pa., 1958. <'.'.:ulen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (History of the Slovaks in America), Bratislava, Slovakia, 1942. Eileen, Sr. M. Slovak Week Lectures: Featuring Art and Music. Danville, Pa., 1957. Emerentia, Mother M. "Book reviews", Slovakia, XV (1965). Greene, Victor R. "Sons of Hunkies: Men With a Past?", Slovakia, XVI, Middletown, Pa., (1966). Hletko, Peter. "The Founder of Our Society", Almanac for the Year 1966. LXXIV, Pittsburgh, Pa., (1966). �SLOVAKIA 163 Hrobak, Philip. Slovak Catholic Parishes and Instituti ons. Midjdletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1955. Kirschbaum, Joseph. Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Kona, William. "The Oldest Slovak Newspaper in the U.S.A.", Slovakia , XV, Middletown, Pa., (1965). Krajsa, Joseph C. "St. Joseph, Hazleton: Slovak Church Rebuilt", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 3998 (1966). "Jednota Talk", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 3999 (1966). "Looking Back", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 4000 (1966). "Je\foOlta Glories and Future", Jednota Annual Furdek. V, Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, (1960). "Slovaks Have Arrived", Slovakia. XV, Jednota Press, Middletown , Pa., (1965)°. Misany, Joseph N. "Father Andrew ffiinka", Slovakia, XV, Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa. ( 1965). Mother Tongue of the Foreign Born. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, United States Census of Population, 1960. Washington, D. C. (1966). Qido, Gilbert L. Slovakia and Its People. New York : Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Orth, Samuel P. Immigration and Labor. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1920. Pauco, Joseph. 75 Rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union). Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1965. Porubsky, John Rev. "Lincoln and the Slovaks", Kalendar Jednota (Annual Jednota) XLVII, Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, (1944) . Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1930. Steiner, Edward A. The Immigrant Tide: Its Ebb and Flow. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1909. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, 1946. 2atko, James J. "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", Slovakia, XV, Middletown, Pa., Jednota Press, (1965). THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is dedicated to works of charity, materially and morally aids Slovaks, here and abroad, who may be in need of such aid; it supports the American Red Cross, United Fund Campaigns and other American charitable projects. � SLOVAKIA 145 Slovaks A PART OF THE GREAT EMIGRATION TO AMERICA Joseph John K r a j s a The Slovak nation and the Slovak people, who have had their own territory of Slovakia since the sixth century in Central Europe, and who were a part of the great emigration to America, have left their indelible imprint on the character of America. Slovakia's history is a very tragic one. This country has suffered for over 1,100 years from every type of oppression ever conceived by man. It is one of the oldest Christian nations in Central Eure>pe, and has suffered under foreign domination more than any other nation. At times the Slovaks have been misunderstood and misrepresented, but they clung to their language, religion, customs, and traditions. The Slovaks lived through the predominance of feudalistic Hungary, the glory of the Magyars and the Czechs, and presently the Slovaks are ever determined to outlive the terror of Communism that has been thrust on them since 1945. Until recent years, very little has been written in this country on the history and culture of the Slovak people, in spite of the fact that almost one-third of all the Slovaks in the world live in the United States and Canada. 1 In area Slovakia is larger than Switzerland or Denmark. It lies along the northern shores of the Central Danube River, where its slopes on the east touch the Alps and the western slopes the Carpathian mountains. Since the beginning of European history, a route run through the gate of the Danube basin connecting the West and the East. Because of this fact, Slovakia is a nation that blends the culture of the West with the Eastern Slovanic culture even though the Romans withdraw from the Danube at the end of the 4th century. Oppressive measures continued for centuries in one form or another, but when it became possible to rid themselves of this oppression, the Slovaks migrated to �146 SLOVAKIA America to help mould the American culture-one rooted in the best traditions which they brought with them. True, the Slovaks began coming to America after 1875 numbers and before the great exodus itself, there great in hardly was a family in Slovakia which did not have at least one relative in America. The Slovaks were not always welcomed in the locale where they settled. When my grandfather arrived in A· merica in 1906, he was stoned by the "Americans" from the railroad station until he arrived in the section of the town called a Ward where all the "foreigners" were living. When he became settled, he was hard at work like the rest of the immigrants. He worked as a wiremaker ( drotar) and became what the handbook, "Gateway to Citizenship", prepared by the Department of Justice, said in tribute: The Slovak The endlessly unbowed, That gave the west continent The proudest and best of my Broad backs and eager youth ... Ask the coal you burn, who mined it, The ore, what worker wrung it from the earth, The bridge, what man bound its steel togetherAn every third answer will be a 'Slovak' ... And shall you forget me?2 President Taft did not forgot when he said of the Slovaks: The truth is, we need a little ,p oetry among our native Americans; we need an appreciation of poetic ideals; we need to have mixed with our every-day humdrum life a little bit of the romance that you bring from the old country and we welcome you on that account. 2 a President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not forgot the Slovak1s when he said: This country is m~dful of the vast contribution the Slovaks have made to ,the cause of furthering its development and growth-moral, cultural and material. The stout-hearted, clear-minded, freedomloving and determined people of Slovakia, who, sensitive of the wrongs and deprivations experienced in th~ir own country at the hands of invading forces, turned to America seeking a new home, now comprise with their children and grandchildren an asset in life, industry and culture of this great land that defies human power of appraisal.3 �SLOVAKIA 147 EARLY SWVAK EMIGRATION Even before the great "new emigration" which began around 1873, many Slovaks came to America as part of the "old emigration". Long before the exodus of the Slovak peasants and journeymen for America, hundreds of Slovaks left their homeland for life elsewhere. The Slovak emigration was not only for economic reasons, but also involved was the impelling desire to be part of the dream of a free world. This was also the dream of other ethnic groups from Central Europe. It should be mentioned, however, that before the mass emigration to the United States after the 1870's, there were Slovaks who made their mark in this land of the free. One Slovak who helped America gain her independence from Great Britain was a soldier, Major John J. Polereck~•, son of Count Andrew Polerecky of Polerieka, Turiec County, Slovakia. In 1781, when the army of Cornwallis was defeated, its arms were surrendered to Polerecky at Yorktown, Va. The story of John Polerecky's participation in the American Revolution was unfolded by Dr. Joseph Cincik, a professor in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a distant relative of Major Polerecky. John Polerecky, promoted to a Major in the " French Hussars" by Louis XV, came to America with the French expeditionary army of Rochambeau to help the colonists overthrow British rule. It was during the siege of Yorktown, ait: the beginning of 1781, that Major Polerecky became acquainted with Col. Henry Dearborn (1751-1829) and Col. Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810), who later became General in the American Army and then Secretary of War. On October 20, 1781, when Rochambeau sent Duke de Lauzun to Paris to report the victory to the French King, Polerecky accompanied him. Polerecky became a naturalized citizen by an act of ;the Massachusetts legislature and his papers were signed by Governor John Hancock, one of the signers of ,the American Dec1aration of Independence. Major Polerecky held various public offices from 1789 to 1828.4 Another Slovak who came to America in the earlier years was a doctor, Dr. Samuel Figuly, who fought in the Civil War in the side of the North and is especially noted for his many contributions to the scientific cultivation of tabacco in Virginia. As a plantation owner, he settled down to the cultivation of tabacco in the South, counseled from abroad by the Slovak botanist, Holuby. During the latter part of his life, Dr. Figuly took part in the unsuccessful expedition to the North Pole.5 �148 SLOVAKIA There is a long list of Slovak names that appear on the list of volunteers during the Civil War, especially with the militia in Chicago known as the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin". Such names as Filip, Krupinsky, Fiala, and Kozlej are listed as some of the volunteers.6 The famed Civil War soldier who commanded the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin" was a Slovak, Col Gejza Mihalotzy, who was killed later at Chattanooga. The fort there was then referred to as "Fort Mihalotzy". Col. Mihalotzy recruited the company of riflemen in Illinois and received permission from the President to call his group the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin" .7 A Slovak, Andrew Jelik, was a tailor on a Dutch Ship which sailed to America in 1754-1755.8 Another Slovak who arrived in America during the 18th century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed in Baltimore, Maryland in 1757 . .Ais an adventurer his career took him to Madagascar where he became King. In the year 1800, a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit by making his confession in Slovak. 9 The first Slovak setUement was made in Philadelphia, Pa. by wire-workers (drotari), in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street.10A Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became an American citizen in 1879. He made the round-trip across the ocean twenty-six times.11 THE GREAT SURGE OF SLOVAK EMIGRATION In the wake of the great emigration to America, the movement seems to have begun in the eastern part of Slovakia, especially the counties of Zemplin, saris, and Spis.12 Between the years 1869-1890, the county of Spis lost 14 % of her youth between the ages of 20 to 25 years and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; saris lost 34 % of those between 20 and 25 and 44 % of the men ·b etween 26 and 30 years of age. The movement spread in Slovakia as their brethren became settled in America and the central and western counties took to emigration in the next decade. 13 Between 1875-1914, great masses of Slovak intellectuals, peasants, tradesmen, and artists made up the hundreds �SLOVAKIA 149 of thousands who crowded the cities of New York, Scranton, Hazleton, Cleveland, Wilkes-Barre, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Philadelphia, Detroit, Bridgeport, Newark and the eastern industrial portions of the United States. These big cities and the little towns around them became centers of the new Slovak life in this country. There scarcely was an industry or trade, factory, mill, mine, or iron works where Slovak immigrants and their sons could not be found. Because of their brawn, they took on the most difficult jobs.14 New York ranked first as the port of entry to America; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston, and Portland. From Slovakia, the immigrants generally moved by rail to German, Dutch, or Italian ports. Through the port of Hamburg, Germany passed the greatest number of emigrants. Their voyage took from 13 to 19 days. For my grandmother and grandfather, who came across the ocean in different ships and in different years, the voyage lasted thirteen days. All they brought with them was a suitcase made of straw. It is difficult to give the exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 because the authorities counted the immigrants according to the country of last residence, and many of the Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. The total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673 in the period of 1899-1910, and of this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. The peak year was 1905 for the Slovaks when 52,368 of them were admitted to this new country of America. 15 In the twelve years ending with June 30, 1910, Slovakia ranked eight among the nations who emigrated to the United States. The Slovaks percentage rate of emigration was the highest of any other group. In fact, the rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3). 16 SWV AK PIONEERS The truth remains that Slovakia, a nation with an area of 31,600 square miles-situated in the very heart of Central Europe; a small number of people of five million �150 SLOVAKIA in population and the oldest nation on the central Danube River, contributed much to the development of America. 17 In 1963, United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, reflected pointedly about the Slovaks when he spoke in Youngstown, Ohio: The United States wou~d be a poorer nation today, economically, intellectually, culturally, and in every other way, if it were not for the over two million of our citizens who are of Slovak birth or ancestry.17a The passing of some eighty years and the contributions of Slovaks to this country prompted Attorney General Kennedy to make the above conclusion. The immigrant, no matter where he was situated in the United States, had two seemingly opposing drives that moved him. One was toward becoming an American with which came the social acceptance all immigrants wanted from those who came to this country before them. The other was to preserve the culture, language, and faith of their Slovak past. Strange as it may seem, the two aims did not clash, instead, the two meshed and contributed largerly to the dedication and labors of the Slovak pioneers in the new land. Living in a vastly different environment, they were able to fashion a completely new life. 18 Thou, 0 Columbia, hast rent their chains, And lifted them to manhood, heaven, God!l9 On United States soil, the Slovaks developed a very living and dynamic organized activity; chiefly in journalism, fratemalism, education, music, drama, and religion. 20 Among the first was Julius Wolf (1859-1930) and John Slovensky ( 1856-1900) who, shortly after arriving in America in 1879, founded in Pittsburgh, Pa., the first Slovak periodical, the BULLETIN" (1885), which was hectograph~d. lit was replaced a year later, on October 21, 1886, by the first Slovak newspaper published in America, the AMERIKANSKO-SLOVENSK:t NOVINY (The American-Slovak News), through which Wolf and Slovensky set about encouraging the twofold development of .Slovaks in America. Intergration and yet preservation were ,the ideas of Slovensky and Wolf, both former teachers in Spis County, held out as maxims to the new immigrant.21 The second Slovak newspaper in the United States, called NOVA VLAS1' (The New Homeland), was founded in 1888 in Streator, Illinois. However, the town of Plymouth, �SLOVAKIA 151 Pennsylvania is the cradle of SWV .AK V AMERIKE (Slovak In America), which is actually the oldest continuously published Slovak newspaper in the world. The founder of this newspaper was Albert S. Ambrose in 1889.22 The largest and most influential American-Slovak newspaper in the world-even today-is the JEDNOTA (The Union) -circulation 40,000-the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, which was founded by the Rev. Stephen Furdek in Cleveland, Ohio, May 12, 1891.23 From the very beginning, the Slovaks set out to preserve their Christian heritage, and, because of economic and social need, they formed societies or lodges. Both established organizational life for the Slovaks and the task of implementing it fell on the shoulders of clergymen. It was the Slovak clergymen who came from the old country and responded to the call of the people and founded and helped to organize parishes, fraternal benefit societies, other organizations, and edited newspapers and periodicals.24 It was natural that the Slovaks first wanted to have their own churches for that was their prized heritage. In 862, there already stood in our Nitra, Slovakia, a Christian church for more than thirty years, the first among all western Slavs and the first church in Central Europe.25 The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa. had a chapel there in 1888 and were first organized as a religious group in 1887 in Scranton, Pa. 26 The Slovak Lutherans were the first to organize on a religious basis in the United States. They established the Parish of the Holy Trinity in Streator, Illinois, October 5, 1884, and their first minister was Karol Horak. Other Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa. and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1888.27 The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 1893 and in 1894, the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor. 28 Today, the Protestant group represents about 12 % of the Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Church has 52 churches and the Slovak Presbyterians have 15 churches. A very small number of Slovaks also belong to other denominations. 29 The first Catholic parish was founded in Hazleton, �152 SLOVAKIA Pa., in 1882, by the Slovak priest, Ignatius Jaskovic. His St. Joseph's Parish was actually formed in November 18, 1884. Prior to that he 1said Mass for his people in the "Irish Church", St. Gabriel's of Hazleton.30 The Slovak Catholics had two problems: priests were needed who could speak the language and funds were needed for parish churches and schools. One of the first Slovak priests who came to the new world, and luckily for the future, was the Rev. Stephen Furdek, a native of the village of Trstemi, Orava County, Slovakia. He arrived in Cleveland, Ohio in the early spring of 1882, and with Bishop Richard Gilmour's understanding and cooperation, he set the pattern in motion to solve the Slovak's problems. At the Bishop's request, Father Furdek went to Europe to seek out priests who would serve the spiritual needs of the Catholic Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croatians.31 Besides Father Furdek, other Catholic clergymen-Rev. Paul Lisicky, Dr. Alexander Dianiska, Rev. Anton Gracik, Rev. Joseph Murgas, Msgr. Stephen Krasul'a, and others became dynamic leaders of the Slovaks in America.32 Slovak Catholics number about 85 % of the American Slovaks in this country.33 A look at our Church dignitaries shows Bishop Joseph A. Durick, Bishop Andrew G. Grutka, Bishop Paul Hnilica, Bishop Michael Rusnak (the first Bishop i-n over 1,100 years for the Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite); Abbots Theodore Kojis, Stanislav F. Gmuca, Jerome Koval; five with the rank of Protonotary Apostolic; over fifty prelates; and over 1,000 American,Slov,ak priests. There are seven friaries, one abbey, nine motherhouses for Sisters; nine institutions of higher learning; an orphanage; four old age homes; hundreds of elementary schools; and about 300 Slovak Catholic Parishes. 34 It was toward the maintaining of his Catholic faith that the Slovak Catholic immigrant devoted the greatest portion of his efforts. He did this by organizing parishes, schools, social clubs, and fraternal societies to keep the faith rooted in the young. He did it with whatever time and financial resources he had left after sending stipends back to relatives in the old country for payment of his passage to America or to help his next of kin to emigrate to this land of opportunity.35 Mine disasters and other tragedies often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family destitute and �SLOVAKIA 153 without money for the funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits, a large number of societies grew up in the industrial and mining towns. Father Furdek organized these individual societies into a Union (Jednota) -the First Catholic Slovak Union (1890). He also organized the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892), the Slovak Institute (Matica Slovenska) (1893), The National Fund, and the Fund to Preserve National Heritage. 36 The First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest Slovak fraternal benefit society in the world (105,000 members), founded in Cleveland, on September 4, 1890, is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. He founded the organization's official organ, JEDNOT A (The Union), on May 12, 1891, and edited and published it and the KALENDAR JEDNOTA (Annual Jednota) for over a decade. 37 To write about the contributions of the Jednota to American-Slovak life would require a manuscript that could fill a good size book. In fact, on the society's 75th Anniversary in 1965, its history was published in a 560-page book: 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union), by Dr. Joseph Pauco. This book portrays the early struggles of the Slovak immigrant.:;, their traits of character, their involvement in events, both here and rn their fatherland, their progress from life in simple settlements to flourishing parishes and to the founding of religious, dducational, cultural and eharitable institutions. It presents thumbnail sketches of institutions like the Catholic Slovak Federation of men and women, the newly established Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome for the training of priests for Slovakia. It includes biographical sketches of notable persons in Slovak life, contemporary ,as well as past, persons whose names were household words in their day-Furdek, Jankola, Hrobak, Dianiska, Pavfo, Murga§, Husek, Kozak, Lach, Rovnianek-all active in American Slovak life.as The Immigrant Archives of the University of Minnesota is establishing a Slovak Room with materials and references from Jednota Press in Middletown, Pa. Other Slovak societies and institutions are making their resources available to the study.39 Another Slovak pioneer, Peter P. Rovnianek, an outstanding organizer, brilliant writer and speaker, organized �154 SLOVAKIA the National Slovak Society "for all the Slovaks" without regard to creed (1890). He was born in Dolny Hricov, Trencin County, Slovakia. 40 In al:idition to the National Slovak Society, the First Catholic Slovak Union, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, other Slovak fraternal benefit societies were organized: the Zivena Beneficial Society (1891), the Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union (1893), the Slovak Evangelical Union (1893), the Slovak Gymnastic Union (1896), the Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Ladies Union (1898), the Slovak Caitholic Sokol (1905), the Oanadian Slovak League (1932). The total membership of the Slovak fraternal benefit societies in the United States and Canada today is at the 500,000 mark.41 The newspapers were the sounding boards of popular oprmon as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Almanacs, such as the FIRST SLOVAK NATIONAL ALMANAC of the National Slovak Society (1893), and KALEND.AR JEDNOTA (Annual Jednota) (1896) of the First Catholic Slovak Union, provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays, reviews of important events, religious essays, articles on marriage, and articles pertaining to almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. Almanacs by the Slovak writers reached the American-Slovak public and became so popular that twenty-nine were published at one time.t2 Slovakia was a land of song and dancing and any celebration of even slight importance in America had to be combined with singing, dancing, and shouting of the most vigorous sort.43 The Slovaks have thousands of folk songs and the 'cardas' dance is the universal favorite. 41 Slovak dramatic clubs were organized at the Slovak parishes and the plays served as the handmaid of religion and stirred the audiences. The best remembered plays are "St. Elizabeth", "St. Genevieva", and "Fabiola", by Fr. Matthew Jankola, a man who foresaw the needs of the Slovak immigrants and did much for them, especially in the field of education. Often enacted were ... entertaining skits portraying the Foibles of human nature, each with a wholesome lesson.4s The Slovaks also organized political clubs, cultural societies, and literary circles, but these had to wait because the Slovaks were occupied with labor conflicts. The early �SLOVAKIA 155 history of unions show the great part the Slovaks played in the labor movement. 46 The Slovaks made their contribution to agriculture in this country. Slovaktown, Arkansas, was a farm community near the town of Stuttgart, which was established by Slovak settlers from the "old country" who came there from the coal fields of Pennsylvania to produce dairy products and vegetables. Slovaktown was chartered in 1895, through the efforts of Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. Stephen Dzubaj, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Rev. Vaclav Panuska. 47 The first Slovak Catholic parochial school in America was established in 1889 in Streator, Illinois, by the Rev. Ervin E. Gelhoff. 48 Today there are over 200 parochial schools, several high schools, also : St. Andrew's Abbey of the Slovak Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio; the Slovak Franciscan Fathers of Uniontown, Pa., Pittsburgh, Pa., Valparaiso, Ind., Columbiana, Ohio, and Easton, Pa.; the Order of Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, Danville, Pa.; the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford, Mich.; the Slovak Vincentian Sisters, Perrysville, Pa., Bedford, Ohio; the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue, Pa., Lacon, Ill., and Bethlehem, Pa; and the Slovak Benedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill .49 Their contribution to the education and the life of the Slovak immigrants should be regarded with deep appreciation for the achievements and accomplishments for the Slovaks in America. They have fulfilled their mission and lived up to their motto "For God and Country" (Za Boha a narod ).50 There remains a whole list of Slovak pioneers, and, with those already mentioned in some detail, a whole volume can be written on each with ease. Perhaps the most fertile, imaginative mind among the Slovaks who came to this country belonged to Father Joseph Murgas. A man of many talents, a painter, and yet having literary skill, Father Murgas made outstanding contributions in the field of electronics. Working even before Marconi had perfected his wireless, Murgas pioneered in telegraphic communication. He perfected a method to transit messages to moving railroad trains and secured a series of patents for his invention which he called the "Tone System". With his financial resources exhausted, Fr. Murgas invited �156 SLOVAKIA Marconi and the famous Professor Fessendom of the University of Pittsburgh to assess his work. What followed is not too clear, but shortly the "Sonorous System" appeared on the commercial market that infringed upon Murgas' patents. The "System" was sold in Europe beyond the reach of U.S. patent courts. Father Murgas held twelve patents, all instrumental in making wireless communications between railroad trains possible. In Slovakia, a new radio station was named after him and the Slovak Republic issued a postage stamp in his memory. In United States during World War II, a Liberty Ship was named in his honor. Father Murgas is also the founder of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, a Slovak Catholic Action organization which came into existence on February 22, 1911, in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.st Just as the Slovak Catholic Federation of America was founded to promote Catholic Action, so on May 26, 1907, Father Furdek presided over 7,000 Slovaks in Cleveland, Ohio, representing all the Slovak societies and newspapers and clergy and laity of various religious and political convictions, to found the Slovak League of America. The purpose of the League was to unite all Americans of Slovak descent in the fight of the Slovak nation abroad. 52 The activities of the League and the Federation are a significant chapter in the life of the Slovak immigrants and they still function today with effectiveness. The League promotes Slovak culture and maintains the identity of the Slovak, and the Federation continues to promote Catholic Action. Another Slovak immigrant who "labored indefatigably" to preserve the Catholic faith among the people of his nationality was the Rev. Matthew Jankola. He not only took care of and built parishes in Hazleton, Pa., Pittston, Pa., and Bridgeport, Conn., but served as president of the First Catholic Slovak Union; was editor of JEDNOJ;'A (The Union); contributed to Slovak periodicals; and was responsible, after tremendous effort, of establishing a teaching community of Slovak Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius for the perpetuation of Catholic education among the Slovak people of America.53 It has been said that what Fr. �SLOVAKIA 157 Furdek was to the national life of the Slovak immigrants, Father Jankola was to their religious life.54 CONCLUSION The Slovak pioneer has built the foundation and started the process of development in the religious field, in education, in fraternalism, in journalism, in literature, and in culture. He did this in a strange environment, living in big cities and small towns, with a frightening language barrier, but he enjoyed and breathed freedom. He was free to think, work, write, and worship as he wished. He grasped every opportunity to grow and prosper in this free land, and he did all this to good advantage, thereby reaping all the precious things necessary and peculiar to him in the new world. And, the Slovak pioneer did this within one generation! 55 The Slovak with his sons and their sons, the new generations, advanced rapidly and their activity in the business world, political life, sports, and social life became more pronounced. But it was the hundreds of thousands of Slovak workers-the peasants representing practically every village in Slovakia- who gave concrete meaning to the dream which brought them here.56 The immigrants and those of Slovak descent took on another task when they resolved in the spirit of America that their homeland, Slovakia, would some day be free and independent of alien rule. They worked for and were determined to see in their time, . . . that Slovakia some day would be master of its own household, free to work out its own destiny ·as on equal among the civilized nations of the eavth.57 Along with Father Furdek, countless others played a large role in this work. Among them were Michael Bosak, Sr., whose warm story follows the traditionally American "rags to riches" theme. He was the wealthiest American of Slovak descent in the entire country. 58 Then there was Joseph Rusek, who spent thirty-seven years as the editor of the JEDNOTA (The Union), the most widely read American-Slovak newspaper in the United States. Both these men were instrumental in getting Slovakia's problems before their fellow Americans.59 �158 SLOVAKIA There were also many significant contributions by the American Slovaks in all the wars. Not only did the youth serve with distinction in the armed forces, but the Slovak leaders at home conducted huge War Bond drives. In World War II, headed by the Rev. John J. Lach of Whiting, Indiana, the Committee sold over $53 million in bonds. In recognition of this achievement, the Treasury Department credited the Slovak League with five bombers and named four "Liberty Ships" after famous Slovaks: "The Stephen Furdek", "The Mathias Kocak", "The General Milan R. t'itefanik", and "The Joseph Murgas". 60 In 1964, the Slovaks of America donated over one-half million dollars to build the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome, where young men are being trained to be priests so that one day they can serve Slovakia when it is free of communism. Another great contribution was the Chapel of Our Mother of Sorrows, a gift of the First Catholic Slovak Union which was dedicated on September 5, 1965 in the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, Washington, D. C. This occasion was also the Diamond Jubilee of the Jednota and over 15,000 American• Slovaks gathered in the nation's capital to hear Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio laud the achievements of the American Slovaks. 61 The Slovaks contributed a large quota of stars and stalwarts in the field of sports and athletics in American colleges and on the professional teams. 62 The names on the teams' rosters today are witness to this fact, but names like: Pafko, Lapchik, Musial, Bucha, Bednarik, Valo, Kralik and Mucha are familiar to most sports-minded Americans. Yes, indeed, the Slovakis were a part of the "great emigration and: ... they have definitely and permanently united their /destiny with the destiny of America. It was men like Furdek, Murgas, Jankola, Rovnianek, and others who came after them that aided and guided their fellow Slovaks. They interpret~d America to the Slovaks and likewise interpreted the psychology and ideals of the Slovaks to their American neighbors. Through their leadership and guidance the Slovaks of America were enabled to make their contribution to the material, cultural, and spiritual progress of their adopted land.6 3 The Slovak was similar in many ways to other im- �SLOVAKIA 159 migrants in the assimilation process, but unlike the other ethnic groups, he was destined to play a role in the future of his homeland.64 In the last 25 years, over 15,000 Slovaks fled from their homeland to escape the vengeance of the communists and over 3,000 of these were Slovak intellectuals. Among the refugees from this tyranny are some of the best known Slovak novelists, journalists, poets, and writers. These writers preserved their literary creativeness and formed the Association of Slovak Writers and Artists and opened avenue to the greatest surge of literary efforts aboUlt Slovaks on several continents. More books have been published and distributed about the Slovak!s on this continent in the last ten years than in all the prevfous years put together.65 There is no question that these writers and historians will echo the deeds of their countrymen for posterity. What is still needed, however, are writers about the Slovaks in the English language. The Most Reverend Joseph A. Durick, D. D., Bishop, Diocese of Nashville, Tenn., speaking in 1965 in Washington, D. C.,summed it all up when in tribute to the Slovaks he said: The triumph of the Slov,aks has come about because of constant effort, faithful service, zeal for God's house and the willingness always to sacrifice. The Slovaks great triumph over innumerable odds has made ,t heir contribution to Church and Country a considerable one. By their loyalty to the Faith and subscription to the great fundamental fre~doms which they •have exemplified in the market place and in th~ home, they have helped to build the great city of God and the city of man in our beloved Country.66 FOOTNOTES 1) Victor R. Greene, " Sons of Hunkies: Men With A Past," SLOVAKI,\ , Vol. XVI (No. 39, 1966) , 80. 2) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946) , p. 176. 2a ) Ibid., p. 177. 3) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 178. 4 ) Gilbert L. Oddo, SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y. , 1960) , pp. 331-332. 5) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946),p. 168. 6) John Porubsky, "Lincoln And The Slovaks", KALEND'AR JEDNOTA, XLVII (1944), 129. �160 SLOVAKI A 7) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p. 332. 8 ) Konstantin Culen, DEJINY SLOVAKOV V AMERJKE (History of the Slovaks In America) (Slovakia, 1942), I, 24-25. 9 ) Ibid., p. 26-27. 10 ) Ibid. , p. 28. 11) Ibid., p . 29. 12) Emily Greene Balch, Ph.D., OUR SLAVIC FELLOW CITIZENS (New York, N. Y., 1910), p. 99. 13 ) James J. Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV ( 1965), 15. 14) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p. 333. 15) Emily Greene Balch, Ph.D., OUR SLAVIC CITIZENS (New York, N. Y., 1910) , p. 103. 16) James J . Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), 16. 17 ) Joseph M. Kirschbaum , LL.D., Ph.D., SLOVAKIA : NATION AT THE CROSSROA DS OF CENTRAL EUROPE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p . 15. 17a ) Joseph N. Misany, Esq., "Father Andrew Hlinka", SLOVAKIA , xv (1965), p. 76. 18) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y. , 1960), p. 333. 19) Peter P . Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p . 157. 20) Bonaventu re S. Bue, Ph.D., SLOVAK NATIONAL ISM: ITS ORIGINS, CONFLICT S AND OBJECTIV ES (M.ddletow n, Pa., 1957), p. 60. 21) Oddo, op. cit., p. 334. 22) William Kona, M.A., "The Oldest Slovak Newpaper in the U.S.A.", S LOVAKIA, XV (1965), pp. 38-39. 23 ) Joseph Pauoo, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCK EJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Middletow n, Pa., 1965) , pp. 13-14. 24 ) Gilbert Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960 ), p. 169. 25 ) Joseph Skultety, SKETCHE S FROM SLOVAK HISTORY (Middletown, Pa., 1930), p. 10. 26) Konstantin Culen, DEJINY SLOVAKO V V AMERIKE (History of the Slovaks in America) (Slovakia, 1942), I, 114-115. 28) James J . Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), 28. 29) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960 ), p. 338. �SLOVAKIA 161 30) "St. Joseph's Hazleton: Slovak Church Rebuilt", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV (1966) , p. 12. 31) Gilbert L. o'ddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 334. 32) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 169. 33) Oddo, op. cit., p. 337. 34) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrived", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965) , p. 65. 35) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 336. 36) Ibid., p. 335. 37) Ibid., p . 334. 38) Mother M. Emerentia, SS.C.M., "Book Reviews", SLOVAKIA, XV, (1965), pp. 152-155. 39) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Jednota Talk", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV, (1966), p. 5. 40) Dr. Peter Hletko, "The Founder of Our Society", ALMANAC FOR THE YEAR 1966, LXXIV (1966), 3. 41) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York. N. Y., 1960), p . 339. 42) James J. Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of the Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), p . 25. 43) Sr. Mary Eileen, SS.C.M., SLOVAK WEEK LECTURES: FEATURING ART AND MUSIC (Danville, Pa., 1957), p. 1. 44) James J . .Zatko, Ph.D., Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), p . 19. 45) Sr. M. Consuela Gregorovic, M .A., CONTRIBUTIONS OF MATTHEW JANKOLA TO SLOVAK EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Danville, Pa., 1959), pp. 11, 47. 46) .Zatko, op. cit. , p. 29. 47) James J . .Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), p. 30. 48) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Looking Back", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV ( 1966), p. 5. 49) Philip A. Hrobak, SLOVAK CATHOLIC PARISHES AND INSTITUTIONS (Middletown, Pa., 1955) , p. 23. 50) Ibid., p. 27. 51) Canon Joseph Altany, LL.D., "Joseph Murgas: Father of Wireless", DOBRY PASTIER (Good Shepherd), XXXVII (1964), p. 3. 52) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , pp. 343, 344. 53) Sr. M. Consuela Gregorovic, M.A., CONTRIBUTIONS OF MAT- �162 SLOVAKIA THEW JANKOLA TO SLOVAK EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Danville, Pa., 1959), p. 6. 54) Joseph Pauco, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Mid/dletown, Pa., 1965), .p . 306. 55) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 331. 56) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 157. 57) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 344. 58) Joseph Pauco, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of ,the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Middletown, Pa., 1965), p. 179. 59) Ibid., p. 344. 60) Oddo, op. cit., p. 338. 61) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrivejd", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), pp. 66, 67. 62) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton,Pa., 1946),p.176. 63) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 177. 64) Gilbert L. O~do, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y.), p. 346. 65) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrived", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965) , p. 65. 66) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Jednota's Glories and Future", JEDNOTA ANNUAL FURDEK, 1966, V (1966), pp. 4, 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY Altany, Joseph. " Rev. Joseph Murgas, Founder of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Recogniz~ as the 'Father of Wireless'", Dobry Pastier (Good Shepherd), XXXVII (1964). Balch, Emily G. Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, New York: Charities Publication, 1910. Consuela, Sr. M. Contributions of Reverend Matthew Jankola to Slovak Catholic Education in the United States. Danville, Pa., 1958. <'.'.:ulen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (History of the Slovaks in America), Bratislava, Slovakia, 1942. Eileen, Sr. M. Slovak Week Lectures: Featuring Art and Music. Danville, Pa., 1957. Emerentia, Mother M. "Book reviews", Slovakia, XV (1965). Greene, Victor R. "Sons of Hunkies: Men With a Past?", Slovakia, XVI, Middletown, Pa., (1966). Hletko, Peter. "The Founder of Our Society", Almanac for the Year 1966. LXXIV, Pittsburgh, Pa., (1966). �SLOVAKIA 163 Hrobak, Philip. Slovak Catholic Parishes and Instituti ons. Midjdletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1955. Kirschbaum, Joseph. Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Kona, William. "The Oldest Slovak Newspaper in the U.S.A.", Slovakia , XV, Middletown, Pa., (1965). Krajsa, Joseph C. "St. Joseph, Hazleton: Slovak Church Rebuilt", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 3998 (1966). "Jednota Talk", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 3999 (1966). "Looking Back", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 4000 (1966). "Je\foOlta Glories and Future", Jednota Annual Furdek. V, Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, (1960). "Slovaks Have Arrived", Slovakia. XV, Jednota Press, Middletown , Pa., (1965)°. Misany, Joseph N. "Father Andrew ffiinka", Slovakia, XV, Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa. ( 1965). Mother Tongue of the Foreign Born. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, United States Census of Population, 1960. Washington, D. C. (1966). Qido, Gilbert L. Slovakia and Its People. New York : Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Orth, Samuel P. Immigration and Labor. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1920. Pauco, Joseph. 75 Rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union). Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1965. Porubsky, John Rev. "Lincoln and the Slovaks", Kalendar Jednota (Annual Jednota) XLVII, Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, (1944) . Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1930. Steiner, Edward A. The Immigrant Tide: Its Ebb and Flow. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1909. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, 1946. 2atko, James J. "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", Slovakia, XV, Middletown, Pa., Jednota Press, (1965). THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is dedicated to works of charity, materially and morally aids Slovaks, here and abroad, who may be in need of such aid; it supports the American Red Cross, United Fund Campaigns and other American charitable projects. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1971, Vol. 21 Description An account of the resource Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 145 Slovaks A PART OF THE GREAT EMIGRATION TO AMERICA Joseph John K r a j s a The Slovak nation and the Slovak people, who have had their own territory of Slovakia since the sixth century in Central Europe, and who were a part of the great emigration to America, have left their indelible imprint on the character of America. Slovakia's history is a very tragic one. This country has suffered for over 1,100 years from every type of oppression ever conceived by man. It is one of the oldest Christian nations in Central Eure>pe, and has suffered under foreign domination more than any other nation. At times the Slovaks have been misunderstood and misrepresented, but they clung to their language, religion, customs, and traditions. The Slovaks lived through the predominance of feudalistic Hungary, the glory of the Magyars and the Czechs, and presently the Slovaks are ever determined to outlive the terror of Communism that has been thrust on them since 1945. Until recent years, very little has been written in this country on the history and culture of the Slovak people, in spite of the fact that almost one-third of all the Slovaks in the world live in the United States and Canada. 1 In area Slovakia is larger than Switzerland or Denmark. It lies along the northern shores of the Central Danube River, where its slopes on the east touch the Alps and the western slopes the Carpathian mountains. Since the beginning of European history, a route run through the gate of the Danube basin connecting the West and the East. Because of this fact, Slovakia is a nation that blends the culture of the West with the Eastern Slovanic culture even though the Romans withdraw from the Danube at the end of the 4th century. Oppressive measures continued for centuries in one form or another, but when it became possible to rid themselves of this oppression, the Slovaks migrated to 146 SLOVAKIA America to help mould the American culture-one rooted in the best traditions which they brought with them. True, the Slovaks began coming to America after 1875 numbers and before the great exodus itself, there great in hardly was a family in Slovakia which did not have at least one relative in America. The Slovaks were not always welcomed in the locale where they settled. When my grandfather arrived in A· merica in 1906, he was stoned by the "Americans" from the railroad station until he arrived in the section of the town called a Ward where all the "foreigners" were living. When he became settled, he was hard at work like the rest of the immigrants. He worked as a wiremaker ( drotar) and became what the handbook, "Gateway to Citizenship", prepared by the Department of Justice, said in tribute: The Slovak The endlessly unbowed, That gave the west continent The proudest and best of my Broad backs and eager youth ... Ask the coal you burn, who mined it, The ore, what worker wrung it from the earth, The bridge, what man bound its steel togetherAn every third answer will be a 'Slovak' ... And shall you forget me?2 President Taft did not forgot when he said of the Slovaks: The truth is, we need a little ,p oetry among our native Americans; we need an appreciation of poetic ideals; we need to have mixed with our every-day humdrum life a little bit of the romance that you bring from the old country and we welcome you on that account. 2 a President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not forgot the Slovak1s when he said: This country is m~dful of the vast contribution the Slovaks have made to ,the cause of furthering its development and growth-moral, cultural and material. The stout-hearted, clear-minded, freedomloving and determined people of Slovakia, who, sensitive of the wrongs and deprivations experienced in th~ir own country at the hands of invading forces, turned to America seeking a new home, now comprise with their children and grandchildren an asset in life, industry and culture of this great land that defies human power of appraisal.3 SLOVAKIA 147 EARLY SWVAK EMIGRATION Even before the great "new emigration" which began around 1873, many Slovaks came to America as part of the "old emigration". Long before the exodus of the Slovak peasants and journeymen for America, hundreds of Slovaks left their homeland for life elsewhere. The Slovak emigration was not only for economic reasons, but also involved was the impelling desire to be part of the dream of a free world. This was also the dream of other ethnic groups from Central Europe. It should be mentioned, however, that before the mass emigration to the United States after the 1870's, there were Slovaks who made their mark in this land of the free. One Slovak who helped America gain her independence from Great Britain was a soldier, Major John J. Polereck~•, son of Count Andrew Polerecky of Polerieka, Turiec County, Slovakia. In 1781, when the army of Cornwallis was defeated, its arms were surrendered to Polerecky at Yorktown, Va. The story of John Polerecky's participation in the American Revolution was unfolded by Dr. Joseph Cincik, a professor in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a distant relative of Major Polerecky. John Polerecky, promoted to a Major in the " French Hussars" by Louis XV, came to America with the French expeditionary army of Rochambeau to help the colonists overthrow British rule. It was during the siege of Yorktown, ait: the beginning of 1781, that Major Polerecky became acquainted with Col. Henry Dearborn (1751-1829) and Col. Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810), who later became General in the American Army and then Secretary of War. On October 20, 1781, when Rochambeau sent Duke de Lauzun to Paris to report the victory to the French King, Polerecky accompanied him. Polerecky became a naturalized citizen by an act of ;the Massachusetts legislature and his papers were signed by Governor John Hancock, one of the signers of ,the American Dec1aration of Independence. Major Polerecky held various public offices from 1789 to 1828.4 Another Slovak who came to America in the earlier years was a doctor, Dr. Samuel Figuly, who fought in the Civil War in the side of the North and is especially noted for his many contributions to the scientific cultivation of tabacco in Virginia. As a plantation owner, he settled down to the cultivation of tabacco in the South, counseled from abroad by the Slovak botanist, Holuby. During the latter part of his life, Dr. Figuly took part in the unsuccessful expedition to the North Pole.5 148 SLOVAKIA There is a long list of Slovak names that appear on the list of volunteers during the Civil War, especially with the militia in Chicago known as the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin". Such names as Filip, Krupinsky, Fiala, and Kozlej are listed as some of the volunteers.6 The famed Civil War soldier who commanded the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin" was a Slovak, Col Gejza Mihalotzy, who was killed later at Chattanooga. The fort there was then referred to as "Fort Mihalotzy". Col. Mihalotzy recruited the company of riflemen in Illinois and received permission from the President to call his group the "Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak Origin" .7 A Slovak, Andrew Jelik, was a tailor on a Dutch Ship which sailed to America in 1754-1755.8 Another Slovak who arrived in America during the 18th century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed in Baltimore, Maryland in 1757 . .Ais an adventurer his career took him to Madagascar where he became King. In the year 1800, a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit by making his confession in Slovak. 9 The first Slovak setUement was made in Philadelphia, Pa. by wire-workers (drotari), in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street.10A Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became an American citizen in 1879. He made the round-trip across the ocean twenty-six times.11 THE GREAT SURGE OF SLOVAK EMIGRATION In the wake of the great emigration to America, the movement seems to have begun in the eastern part of Slovakia, especially the counties of Zemplin, saris, and Spis.12 Between the years 1869-1890, the county of Spis lost 14 % of her youth between the ages of 20 to 25 years and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; saris lost 34 % of those between 20 and 25 and 44 % of the men ·b etween 26 and 30 years of age. The movement spread in Slovakia as their brethren became settled in America and the central and western counties took to emigration in the next decade. 13 Between 1875-1914, great masses of Slovak intellectuals, peasants, tradesmen, and artists made up the hundreds SLOVAKIA 149 of thousands who crowded the cities of New York, Scranton, Hazleton, Cleveland, Wilkes-Barre, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Philadelphia, Detroit, Bridgeport, Newark and the eastern industrial portions of the United States. These big cities and the little towns around them became centers of the new Slovak life in this country. There scarcely was an industry or trade, factory, mill, mine, or iron works where Slovak immigrants and their sons could not be found. Because of their brawn, they took on the most difficult jobs.14 New York ranked first as the port of entry to America; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston, and Portland. From Slovakia, the immigrants generally moved by rail to German, Dutch, or Italian ports. Through the port of Hamburg, Germany passed the greatest number of emigrants. Their voyage took from 13 to 19 days. For my grandmother and grandfather, who came across the ocean in different ships and in different years, the voyage lasted thirteen days. All they brought with them was a suitcase made of straw. It is difficult to give the exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 because the authorities counted the immigrants according to the country of last residence, and many of the Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. The total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673 in the period of 1899-1910, and of this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. The peak year was 1905 for the Slovaks when 52,368 of them were admitted to this new country of America. 15 In the twelve years ending with June 30, 1910, Slovakia ranked eight among the nations who emigrated to the United States. The Slovaks percentage rate of emigration was the highest of any other group. In fact, the rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3). 16 SWV AK PIONEERS The truth remains that Slovakia, a nation with an area of 31,600 square miles-situated in the very heart of Central Europe; a small number of people of five million 150 SLOVAKIA in population and the oldest nation on the central Danube River, contributed much to the development of America. 17 In 1963, United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, reflected pointedly about the Slovaks when he spoke in Youngstown, Ohio: The United States wou~d be a poorer nation today, economically, intellectually, culturally, and in every other way, if it were not for the over two million of our citizens who are of Slovak birth or ancestry.17a The passing of some eighty years and the contributions of Slovaks to this country prompted Attorney General Kennedy to make the above conclusion. The immigrant, no matter where he was situated in the United States, had two seemingly opposing drives that moved him. One was toward becoming an American with which came the social acceptance all immigrants wanted from those who came to this country before them. The other was to preserve the culture, language, and faith of their Slovak past. Strange as it may seem, the two aims did not clash, instead, the two meshed and contributed largerly to the dedication and labors of the Slovak pioneers in the new land. Living in a vastly different environment, they were able to fashion a completely new life. 18 Thou, 0 Columbia, hast rent their chains, And lifted them to manhood, heaven, God!l9 On United States soil, the Slovaks developed a very living and dynamic organized activity; chiefly in journalism, fratemalism, education, music, drama, and religion. 20 Among the first was Julius Wolf (1859-1930) and John Slovensky ( 1856-1900) who, shortly after arriving in America in 1879, founded in Pittsburgh, Pa., the first Slovak periodical, the BULLETIN" (1885), which was hectograph~d. lit was replaced a year later, on October 21, 1886, by the first Slovak newspaper published in America, the AMERIKANSKO-SLOVENSK:t NOVINY (The American-Slovak News), through which Wolf and Slovensky set about encouraging the twofold development of .Slovaks in America. Intergration and yet preservation were ,the ideas of Slovensky and Wolf, both former teachers in Spis County, held out as maxims to the new immigrant.21 The second Slovak newspaper in the United States, called NOVA VLAS1' (The New Homeland), was founded in 1888 in Streator, Illinois. However, the town of Plymouth, SLOVAKIA 151 Pennsylvania is the cradle of SWV .AK V AMERIKE (Slovak In America), which is actually the oldest continuously published Slovak newspaper in the world. The founder of this newspaper was Albert S. Ambrose in 1889.22 The largest and most influential American-Slovak newspaper in the world-even today-is the JEDNOTA (The Union) -circulation 40,000-the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, which was founded by the Rev. Stephen Furdek in Cleveland, Ohio, May 12, 1891.23 From the very beginning, the Slovaks set out to preserve their Christian heritage, and, because of economic and social need, they formed societies or lodges. Both established organizational life for the Slovaks and the task of implementing it fell on the shoulders of clergymen. It was the Slovak clergymen who came from the old country and responded to the call of the people and founded and helped to organize parishes, fraternal benefit societies, other organizations, and edited newspapers and periodicals.24 It was natural that the Slovaks first wanted to have their own churches for that was their prized heritage. In 862, there already stood in our Nitra, Slovakia, a Christian church for more than thirty years, the first among all western Slavs and the first church in Central Europe.25 The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa. had a chapel there in 1888 and were first organized as a religious group in 1887 in Scranton, Pa. 26 The Slovak Lutherans were the first to organize on a religious basis in the United States. They established the Parish of the Holy Trinity in Streator, Illinois, October 5, 1884, and their first minister was Karol Horak. Other Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa. and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1888.27 The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 1893 and in 1894, the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor. 28 Today, the Protestant group represents about 12 % of the Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Church has 52 churches and the Slovak Presbyterians have 15 churches. A very small number of Slovaks also belong to other denominations. 29 The first Catholic parish was founded in Hazleton, 152 SLOVAKIA Pa., in 1882, by the Slovak priest, Ignatius Jaskovic. His St. Joseph's Parish was actually formed in November 18, 1884. Prior to that he 1said Mass for his people in the "Irish Church", St. Gabriel's of Hazleton.30 The Slovak Catholics had two problems: priests were needed who could speak the language and funds were needed for parish churches and schools. One of the first Slovak priests who came to the new world, and luckily for the future, was the Rev. Stephen Furdek, a native of the village of Trstemi, Orava County, Slovakia. He arrived in Cleveland, Ohio in the early spring of 1882, and with Bishop Richard Gilmour's understanding and cooperation, he set the pattern in motion to solve the Slovak's problems. At the Bishop's request, Father Furdek went to Europe to seek out priests who would serve the spiritual needs of the Catholic Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croatians.31 Besides Father Furdek, other Catholic clergymen-Rev. Paul Lisicky, Dr. Alexander Dianiska, Rev. Anton Gracik, Rev. Joseph Murgas, Msgr. Stephen Krasul'a, and others became dynamic leaders of the Slovaks in America.32 Slovak Catholics number about 85 % of the American Slovaks in this country.33 A look at our Church dignitaries shows Bishop Joseph A. Durick, Bishop Andrew G. Grutka, Bishop Paul Hnilica, Bishop Michael Rusnak (the first Bishop i-n over 1,100 years for the Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite); Abbots Theodore Kojis, Stanislav F. Gmuca, Jerome Koval; five with the rank of Protonotary Apostolic; over fifty prelates; and over 1,000 American,Slov,ak priests. There are seven friaries, one abbey, nine motherhouses for Sisters; nine institutions of higher learning; an orphanage; four old age homes; hundreds of elementary schools; and about 300 Slovak Catholic Parishes. 34 It was toward the maintaining of his Catholic faith that the Slovak Catholic immigrant devoted the greatest portion of his efforts. He did this by organizing parishes, schools, social clubs, and fraternal societies to keep the faith rooted in the young. He did it with whatever time and financial resources he had left after sending stipends back to relatives in the old country for payment of his passage to America or to help his next of kin to emigrate to this land of opportunity.35 Mine disasters and other tragedies often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family destitute and SLOVAKIA 153 without money for the funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits, a large number of societies grew up in the industrial and mining towns. Father Furdek organized these individual societies into a Union (Jednota) -the First Catholic Slovak Union (1890). He also organized the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892), the Slovak Institute (Matica Slovenska) (1893), The National Fund, and the Fund to Preserve National Heritage. 36 The First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest Slovak fraternal benefit society in the world (105,000 members), founded in Cleveland, on September 4, 1890, is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. He founded the organization's official organ, JEDNOT A (The Union), on May 12, 1891, and edited and published it and the KALENDAR JEDNOTA (Annual Jednota) for over a decade. 37 To write about the contributions of the Jednota to American-Slovak life would require a manuscript that could fill a good size book. In fact, on the society's 75th Anniversary in 1965, its history was published in a 560-page book: 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union), by Dr. Joseph Pauco. This book portrays the early struggles of the Slovak immigrant.:;, their traits of character, their involvement in events, both here and rn their fatherland, their progress from life in simple settlements to flourishing parishes and to the founding of religious, dducational, cultural and eharitable institutions. It presents thumbnail sketches of institutions like the Catholic Slovak Federation of men and women, the newly established Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome for the training of priests for Slovakia. It includes biographical sketches of notable persons in Slovak life, contemporary ,as well as past, persons whose names were household words in their day-Furdek, Jankola, Hrobak, Dianiska, Pavfo, Murga§, Husek, Kozak, Lach, Rovnianek-all active in American Slovak life.as The Immigrant Archives of the University of Minnesota is establishing a Slovak Room with materials and references from Jednota Press in Middletown, Pa. Other Slovak societies and institutions are making their resources available to the study.39 Another Slovak pioneer, Peter P. Rovnianek, an outstanding organizer, brilliant writer and speaker, organized 154 SLOVAKIA the National Slovak Society "for all the Slovaks" without regard to creed (1890). He was born in Dolny Hricov, Trencin County, Slovakia. 40 In al:idition to the National Slovak Society, the First Catholic Slovak Union, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, other Slovak fraternal benefit societies were organized: the Zivena Beneficial Society (1891), the Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union (1893), the Slovak Evangelical Union (1893), the Slovak Gymnastic Union (1896), the Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Ladies Union (1898), the Slovak Caitholic Sokol (1905), the Oanadian Slovak League (1932). The total membership of the Slovak fraternal benefit societies in the United States and Canada today is at the 500,000 mark.41 The newspapers were the sounding boards of popular oprmon as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Almanacs, such as the FIRST SLOVAK NATIONAL ALMANAC of the National Slovak Society (1893), and KALEND.AR JEDNOTA (Annual Jednota) (1896) of the First Catholic Slovak Union, provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays, reviews of important events, religious essays, articles on marriage, and articles pertaining to almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. Almanacs by the Slovak writers reached the American-Slovak public and became so popular that twenty-nine were published at one time.t2 Slovakia was a land of song and dancing and any celebration of even slight importance in America had to be combined with singing, dancing, and shouting of the most vigorous sort.43 The Slovaks have thousands of folk songs and the 'cardas' dance is the universal favorite. 41 Slovak dramatic clubs were organized at the Slovak parishes and the plays served as the handmaid of religion and stirred the audiences. The best remembered plays are "St. Elizabeth", "St. Genevieva", and "Fabiola", by Fr. Matthew Jankola, a man who foresaw the needs of the Slovak immigrants and did much for them, especially in the field of education. Often enacted were ... entertaining skits portraying the Foibles of human nature, each with a wholesome lesson.4s The Slovaks also organized political clubs, cultural societies, and literary circles, but these had to wait because the Slovaks were occupied with labor conflicts. The early SLOVAKIA 155 history of unions show the great part the Slovaks played in the labor movement. 46 The Slovaks made their contribution to agriculture in this country. Slovaktown, Arkansas, was a farm community near the town of Stuttgart, which was established by Slovak settlers from the "old country" who came there from the coal fields of Pennsylvania to produce dairy products and vegetables. Slovaktown was chartered in 1895, through the efforts of Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. Stephen Dzubaj, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Rev. Vaclav Panuska. 47 The first Slovak Catholic parochial school in America was established in 1889 in Streator, Illinois, by the Rev. Ervin E. Gelhoff. 48 Today there are over 200 parochial schools, several high schools, also : St. Andrew's Abbey of the Slovak Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio; the Slovak Franciscan Fathers of Uniontown, Pa., Pittsburgh, Pa., Valparaiso, Ind., Columbiana, Ohio, and Easton, Pa.; the Order of Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, Danville, Pa.; the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford, Mich.; the Slovak Vincentian Sisters, Perrysville, Pa., Bedford, Ohio; the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue, Pa., Lacon, Ill., and Bethlehem, Pa; and the Slovak Benedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill .49 Their contribution to the education and the life of the Slovak immigrants should be regarded with deep appreciation for the achievements and accomplishments for the Slovaks in America. They have fulfilled their mission and lived up to their motto "For God and Country" (Za Boha a narod ).50 There remains a whole list of Slovak pioneers, and, with those already mentioned in some detail, a whole volume can be written on each with ease. Perhaps the most fertile, imaginative mind among the Slovaks who came to this country belonged to Father Joseph Murgas. A man of many talents, a painter, and yet having literary skill, Father Murgas made outstanding contributions in the field of electronics. Working even before Marconi had perfected his wireless, Murgas pioneered in telegraphic communication. He perfected a method to transit messages to moving railroad trains and secured a series of patents for his invention which he called the "Tone System". With his financial resources exhausted, Fr. Murgas invited 156 SLOVAKIA Marconi and the famous Professor Fessendom of the University of Pittsburgh to assess his work. What followed is not too clear, but shortly the "Sonorous System" appeared on the commercial market that infringed upon Murgas' patents. The "System" was sold in Europe beyond the reach of U.S. patent courts. Father Murgas held twelve patents, all instrumental in making wireless communications between railroad trains possible. In Slovakia, a new radio station was named after him and the Slovak Republic issued a postage stamp in his memory. In United States during World War II, a Liberty Ship was named in his honor. Father Murgas is also the founder of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, a Slovak Catholic Action organization which came into existence on February 22, 1911, in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.st Just as the Slovak Catholic Federation of America was founded to promote Catholic Action, so on May 26, 1907, Father Furdek presided over 7,000 Slovaks in Cleveland, Ohio, representing all the Slovak societies and newspapers and clergy and laity of various religious and political convictions, to found the Slovak League of America. The purpose of the League was to unite all Americans of Slovak descent in the fight of the Slovak nation abroad. 52 The activities of the League and the Federation are a significant chapter in the life of the Slovak immigrants and they still function today with effectiveness. The League promotes Slovak culture and maintains the identity of the Slovak, and the Federation continues to promote Catholic Action. Another Slovak immigrant who "labored indefatigably" to preserve the Catholic faith among the people of his nationality was the Rev. Matthew Jankola. He not only took care of and built parishes in Hazleton, Pa., Pittston, Pa., and Bridgeport, Conn., but served as president of the First Catholic Slovak Union; was editor of JEDNOJ;'A (The Union); contributed to Slovak periodicals; and was responsible, after tremendous effort, of establishing a teaching community of Slovak Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius for the perpetuation of Catholic education among the Slovak people of America.53 It has been said that what Fr. SLOVAKIA 157 Furdek was to the national life of the Slovak immigrants, Father Jankola was to their religious life.54 CONCLUSION The Slovak pioneer has built the foundation and started the process of development in the religious field, in education, in fraternalism, in journalism, in literature, and in culture. He did this in a strange environment, living in big cities and small towns, with a frightening language barrier, but he enjoyed and breathed freedom. He was free to think, work, write, and worship as he wished. He grasped every opportunity to grow and prosper in this free land, and he did all this to good advantage, thereby reaping all the precious things necessary and peculiar to him in the new world. And, the Slovak pioneer did this within one generation! 55 The Slovak with his sons and their sons, the new generations, advanced rapidly and their activity in the business world, political life, sports, and social life became more pronounced. But it was the hundreds of thousands of Slovak workers-the peasants representing practically every village in Slovakia- who gave concrete meaning to the dream which brought them here.56 The immigrants and those of Slovak descent took on another task when they resolved in the spirit of America that their homeland, Slovakia, would some day be free and independent of alien rule. They worked for and were determined to see in their time, . . . that Slovakia some day would be master of its own household, free to work out its own destiny ·as on equal among the civilized nations of the eavth.57 Along with Father Furdek, countless others played a large role in this work. Among them were Michael Bosak, Sr., whose warm story follows the traditionally American "rags to riches" theme. He was the wealthiest American of Slovak descent in the entire country. 58 Then there was Joseph Rusek, who spent thirty-seven years as the editor of the JEDNOTA (The Union), the most widely read American-Slovak newspaper in the United States. Both these men were instrumental in getting Slovakia's problems before their fellow Americans.59 158 SLOVAKIA There were also many significant contributions by the American Slovaks in all the wars. Not only did the youth serve with distinction in the armed forces, but the Slovak leaders at home conducted huge War Bond drives. In World War II, headed by the Rev. John J. Lach of Whiting, Indiana, the Committee sold over $53 million in bonds. In recognition of this achievement, the Treasury Department credited the Slovak League with five bombers and named four "Liberty Ships" after famous Slovaks: "The Stephen Furdek", "The Mathias Kocak", "The General Milan R. t'itefanik", and "The Joseph Murgas". 60 In 1964, the Slovaks of America donated over one-half million dollars to build the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome, where young men are being trained to be priests so that one day they can serve Slovakia when it is free of communism. Another great contribution was the Chapel of Our Mother of Sorrows, a gift of the First Catholic Slovak Union which was dedicated on September 5, 1965 in the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, Washington, D. C. This occasion was also the Diamond Jubilee of the Jednota and over 15,000 American• Slovaks gathered in the nation's capital to hear Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio laud the achievements of the American Slovaks. 61 The Slovaks contributed a large quota of stars and stalwarts in the field of sports and athletics in American colleges and on the professional teams. 62 The names on the teams' rosters today are witness to this fact, but names like: Pafko, Lapchik, Musial, Bucha, Bednarik, Valo, Kralik and Mucha are familiar to most sports-minded Americans. Yes, indeed, the Slovakis were a part of the "great emigration and: ... they have definitely and permanently united their /destiny with the destiny of America. It was men like Furdek, Murgas, Jankola, Rovnianek, and others who came after them that aided and guided their fellow Slovaks. They interpret~d America to the Slovaks and likewise interpreted the psychology and ideals of the Slovaks to their American neighbors. Through their leadership and guidance the Slovaks of America were enabled to make their contribution to the material, cultural, and spiritual progress of their adopted land.6 3 The Slovak was similar in many ways to other im- SLOVAKIA 159 migrants in the assimilation process, but unlike the other ethnic groups, he was destined to play a role in the future of his homeland.64 In the last 25 years, over 15,000 Slovaks fled from their homeland to escape the vengeance of the communists and over 3,000 of these were Slovak intellectuals. Among the refugees from this tyranny are some of the best known Slovak novelists, journalists, poets, and writers. These writers preserved their literary creativeness and formed the Association of Slovak Writers and Artists and opened avenue to the greatest surge of literary efforts aboUlt Slovaks on several continents. More books have been published and distributed about the Slovak!s on this continent in the last ten years than in all the prevfous years put together.65 There is no question that these writers and historians will echo the deeds of their countrymen for posterity. What is still needed, however, are writers about the Slovaks in the English language. The Most Reverend Joseph A. Durick, D. D., Bishop, Diocese of Nashville, Tenn., speaking in 1965 in Washington, D. C.,summed it all up when in tribute to the Slovaks he said: The triumph of the Slov,aks has come about because of constant effort, faithful service, zeal for God's house and the willingness always to sacrifice. The Slovaks great triumph over innumerable odds has made ,t heir contribution to Church and Country a considerable one. By their loyalty to the Faith and subscription to the great fundamental fre~doms which they •have exemplified in the market place and in th~ home, they have helped to build the great city of God and the city of man in our beloved Country.66 FOOTNOTES 1) Victor R. Greene, " Sons of Hunkies: Men With A Past," SLOVAKI,\ , Vol. XVI (No. 39, 1966) , 80. 2) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946) , p. 176. 2a ) Ibid., p. 177. 3) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 178. 4 ) Gilbert L. Oddo, SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y. , 1960) , pp. 331-332. 5) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946),p. 168. 6) John Porubsky, "Lincoln And The Slovaks", KALEND'AR JEDNOTA, XLVII (1944), 129. 160 SLOVAKI A 7) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p. 332. 8 ) Konstantin Culen, DEJINY SLOVAKOV V AMERJKE (History of the Slovaks In America) (Slovakia, 1942), I, 24-25. 9 ) Ibid., p. 26-27. 10 ) Ibid. , p. 28. 11) Ibid., p . 29. 12) Emily Greene Balch, Ph.D., OUR SLAVIC FELLOW CITIZENS (New York, N. Y., 1910), p. 99. 13 ) James J. Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV ( 1965), 15. 14) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p. 333. 15) Emily Greene Balch, Ph.D., OUR SLAVIC CITIZENS (New York, N. Y., 1910) , p. 103. 16) James J . Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), 16. 17 ) Joseph M. Kirschbaum , LL.D., Ph.D., SLOVAKIA : NATION AT THE CROSSROA DS OF CENTRAL EUROPE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , p . 15. 17a ) Joseph N. Misany, Esq., "Father Andrew Hlinka", SLOVAKIA , xv (1965), p. 76. 18) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y. , 1960), p. 333. 19) Peter P . Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p . 157. 20) Bonaventu re S. Bue, Ph.D., SLOVAK NATIONAL ISM: ITS ORIGINS, CONFLICT S AND OBJECTIV ES (M.ddletow n, Pa., 1957), p. 60. 21) Oddo, op. cit., p. 334. 22) William Kona, M.A., "The Oldest Slovak Newpaper in the U.S.A.", S LOVAKIA, XV (1965), pp. 38-39. 23 ) Joseph Pauoo, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCK EJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Middletow n, Pa., 1965) , pp. 13-14. 24 ) Gilbert Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960 ), p. 169. 25 ) Joseph Skultety, SKETCHE S FROM SLOVAK HISTORY (Middletown, Pa., 1930), p. 10. 26) Konstantin Culen, DEJINY SLOVAKO V V AMERIKE (History of the Slovaks in America) (Slovakia, 1942), I, 114-115. 28) James J . Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), 28. 29) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960 ), p. 338. SLOVAKIA 161 30) "St. Joseph's Hazleton: Slovak Church Rebuilt", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV (1966) , p. 12. 31) Gilbert L. o'ddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 334. 32) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 169. 33) Oddo, op. cit., p. 337. 34) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrived", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965) , p. 65. 35) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 336. 36) Ibid., p. 335. 37) Ibid., p . 334. 38) Mother M. Emerentia, SS.C.M., "Book Reviews", SLOVAKIA, XV, (1965), pp. 152-155. 39) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Jednota Talk", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV, (1966), p. 5. 40) Dr. Peter Hletko, "The Founder of Our Society", ALMANAC FOR THE YEAR 1966, LXXIV (1966), 3. 41) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York. N. Y., 1960), p . 339. 42) James J. Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of the Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), p . 25. 43) Sr. Mary Eileen, SS.C.M., SLOVAK WEEK LECTURES: FEATURING ART AND MUSIC (Danville, Pa., 1957), p. 1. 44) James J . .Zatko, Ph.D., Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), p . 19. 45) Sr. M. Consuela Gregorovic, M .A., CONTRIBUTIONS OF MATTHEW JANKOLA TO SLOVAK EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Danville, Pa., 1959), pp. 11, 47. 46) .Zatko, op. cit. , p. 29. 47) James J . .Zatko, Ph.D., "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", SLOVAKIA , XV (1965), p. 30. 48) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Looking Back", JEDNOTA (The Union), LXXV ( 1966), p. 5. 49) Philip A. Hrobak, SLOVAK CATHOLIC PARISHES AND INSTITUTIONS (Middletown, Pa., 1955) , p. 23. 50) Ibid., p. 27. 51) Canon Joseph Altany, LL.D., "Joseph Murgas: Father of Wireless", DOBRY PASTIER (Good Shepherd), XXXVII (1964), p. 3. 52) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960) , pp. 343, 344. 53) Sr. M. Consuela Gregorovic, M.A., CONTRIBUTIONS OF MAT- 162 SLOVAKIA THEW JANKOLA TO SLOVAK EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Danville, Pa., 1959), p. 6. 54) Joseph Pauco, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Mid/dletown, Pa., 1965), .p . 306. 55) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 331. 56) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 157. 57) Gilbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y., 1960), p. 344. 58) Joseph Pauco, Ph.D., 75 ROKOV PRVEJ KATOLfCKEJ SLOVENSKEJ JEDNOTY (75 Year History of ,the First Catholic Slovak Union) (Middletown, Pa., 1965), p. 179. 59) Ibid., p. 344. 60) Oddo, op. cit., p. 338. 61) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrivejd", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965), pp. 66, 67. 62) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton,Pa., 1946),p.176. 63) Peter P. Yurchak, Esq., THE SLOVAKS (Scranton, Pa., 1946), p. 177. 64) Gilbert L. O~do, Ph.D., SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, N. Y.), p. 346. 65) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Slovaks Have Arrived", SLOVAKIA, XV (1965) , p. 65. 66) Joseph C. Krajsa, "Jednota's Glories and Future", JEDNOTA ANNUAL FURDEK, 1966, V (1966), pp. 4, 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY Altany, Joseph. " Rev. Joseph Murgas, Founder of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Recogniz~ as the 'Father of Wireless'", Dobry Pastier (Good Shepherd), XXXVII (1964). Balch, Emily G. Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, New York: Charities Publication, 1910. Consuela, Sr. M. Contributions of Reverend Matthew Jankola to Slovak Catholic Education in the United States. Danville, Pa., 1958. <'.'.:ulen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (History of the Slovaks in America), Bratislava, Slovakia, 1942. Eileen, Sr. M. Slovak Week Lectures: Featuring Art and Music. Danville, Pa., 1957. Emerentia, Mother M. "Book reviews", Slovakia, XV (1965). Greene, Victor R. "Sons of Hunkies: Men With a Past?", Slovakia, XVI, Middletown, Pa., (1966). Hletko, Peter. "The Founder of Our Society", Almanac for the Year 1966. LXXIV, Pittsburgh, Pa., (1966). SLOVAKIA 163 Hrobak, Philip. Slovak Catholic Parishes and Instituti ons. Midjdletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1955. Kirschbaum, Joseph. Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Kona, William. "The Oldest Slovak Newspaper in the U.S.A.", Slovakia , XV, Middletown, Pa., (1965). Krajsa, Joseph C. "St. Joseph, Hazleton: Slovak Church Rebuilt", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 3998 (1966). "Jednota Talk", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 3999 (1966). "Looking Back", Jednota (The Union), LXXV, No. 4000 (1966). "Je\foOlta Glories and Future", Jednota Annual Furdek. V, Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, (1960). "Slovaks Have Arrived", Slovakia. XV, Jednota Press, Middletown , Pa., (1965)°. Misany, Joseph N. "Father Andrew ffiinka", Slovakia, XV, Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa. ( 1965). Mother Tongue of the Foreign Born. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, United States Census of Population, 1960. Washington, D. C. (1966). Qido, Gilbert L. Slovakia and Its People. New York : Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Orth, Samuel P. Immigration and Labor. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1920. Pauco, Joseph. 75 Rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty (75 Year History of the First Catholic Slovak Union). Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1965. Porubsky, John Rev. "Lincoln and the Slovaks", Kalendar Jednota (Annual Jednota) XLVII, Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, (1944) . Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1930. Steiner, Edward A. The Immigrant Tide: Its Ebb and Flow. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1909. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, 1946. 2atko, James J. "Early Beginnings of Slovaks in America", Slovakia, XV, Middletown, Pa., Jednota Press, (1965). THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is dedicated to works of charity, materially and morally aids Slovaks, here and abroad, who may be in need of such aid; it supports the American Red Cross, United Fund Campaigns and other American charitable projects.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovaks: A Part of the Great Emigration to America Description An account of the resource Joseph John Krajsa Slovakia, Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971 pp. 145-163 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Krajsa, Joseph John Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1745346897ea3701aa89e1a6f33b4835.pdf 19a4811a83ce822f7acbcf2cfe8eac9d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 SLOV ANICS IN AMERICAN SEOONDARY SCHOOLS William S. Patala That the Slavic languages are not taught in our American schools - in our high schools especially, but also in our colleges and even grade schools - is a sad fact which is lately coming around to admitting this deficiency, and the need for a remedy; public opinion is stirring in a similar vein; and some statesmen are speaking up for a new progra;m to rectify the absence of courses in the Slav languages in our educational system. These groups are moved by a realization not only of the world position in which communism puts the Slovanic nations it controls, but also by an awareness of the rising prominence of these nations in the 20th century irrespective of that totalitariain regime, and then too by a recognition of the ever-increasing volume of travel and tourism, which is making contact - and will make contact much more when the Iron Curtain rises - witih the eastern half of Europe, the Slav world, as never before. 'Dhese considerations and others, are pressing more and more for Americans to learn a Slavic tongue a-s their second language. Of course, all ethnic groups of rectn immigration, including the Slovaks to be sure, have a long time recognized the value of American youths learning foreign languages, although each nationality insisted, as might be expected, on their own as the first to be learned. And these peoples, especially the Catholics among them because of their private schools, have tried to teach their descendants in America the ancestral tongue - at least to the first and second generation, where there was still living contact with the spoken foreign language. But these efforts of national groups are on the wane, so that if American youths are to learn a European language, and especially a Slavic one, it will have to be through the instrumentality of the regular American high schools. These schools already have in .their curricula the other European vernaculars: German, French, Spanish, but they do not have Slavic. �8 SLOVAKIA What Slavic Language? If our high schools should decid~ to introduce the Siovanic languages into their courses, however - and rising pressure may wen move them to do so soon - they will have to solve one outstanding difficulity which presents itself immediately. This difficulty must be settled before the composition of a text book oon even be undertaken. And that problem is, namely, which Slav language shall be taught? For O'bviously they cannot aJII be taught, since ther are some nine prominent ones. So the question is which one should be singled out for this honorable use. The first answer that presents itself is Russian. This is by far the largest Slavic tongue in use, and Russia naturally seems to be the mother of all the Slovanic naitions. Bult Russia has never filled thus "natural" position of a mother: whether communist or czarist, her interest in the other Slav countries has always been selfish. Although all these nations would each raise an objection to the choice of every language except their own, nevertheless their strongest dbjection would be to the use of Russian, since their feeling for Russia extends in genera!l from mistrust to hatred, the latter especially by Poland and the Ukraine. Other dif:filculties also attend t:Jhe use of Russian, above all the strange alphabet, then borrowed and original words, and again the oriental and Orthodox culture of that country, etc. This writer would recommend as the basic language to be taughrt in a course of "High School Sfovanics" the use of the Slovak tongue. My choice of Slovak for this highly-representative position stands on three arguments of varying force : First, a negative argument, whfoh is equally valid for the use of any O'f the Stavic tongues (except a fringe language like Rumanian) ; this proof is intended to show why Slovak should not be excluded by a prior judgment; and it is this, that any Slavic tongue is a key to all of them. Consider how similar the viarious - we could almost call them dialects - of the Slav race are, from the following selections. If you know Slovak well, you will easily enough gather the thought of each quotiation: �SLOVAKIA 9 (1) (Ruthenian or Rusin): "0 Bohorodice D'ivo Marije, radujsja, raduj nebes lelije. Solncem pribranna, vkryta duhoju, Marije cista, Hospod's Toboju." (2) (Church or Old Slovanic, or Bulgarian): (InternationaJ alpha) : "Pri:z;ri na mja i pomilum mja. Da priblicitsja molitva moja pred fa Hospodi, po slovesi tvojemu vrazumi mja." (3) (Czech): "Za tri tisice roku, ach, co tu bude Zmen, a co tu bude skoku pres hroby slavnych jmen !" (4) (Polish): "Jezeli domu sam Pan nie zbuluje, Daremnie nad nim rzemieslnik pracuje. Jok od pocz~tku byla tak i ninie, I na wiek wiekow niechaj zawsze slynie." (5) (Slovenian: "Sedaj prosi ljubega Boga, naj Ti odpusti vse Tvoje grehe, ki si se jih spovedal, a tudi grehe vsega Tvojega zivljenja." (6) (Croatian and Serbian): (International script) : "Pricekajte jedan minut. Gde su vojnici? Drago mi je poznati vas. Molim vas pomozite mi." (7) (Ukrainian): (International alphabet): "V nasich cerkvach je zvicaj otvirati dveri na pocatku Bozestvennoji Liturgiji." (8) (White Rusian): "Kaznamu, chto hetak vyjavic usie svaje hrachii klo jon scyra za ich zaleje, mozna dac sakramentalnaje razihresennie." (9) (Russian): (International alphabet) : "So mnoju liudi bez imion." Secondly, a practical reason for my picking Slovak as the one language to be taught is a Slovanic grammar. Since I am doing the selecting, I naturally choose the lianguage most familiar and most dear to me. This is Slovak. But finally, the conclusive argument, that shows Slovak to be the ideal tongue for use in a text book of Slovanics is its unique position in connection with all the Slavic tongues. Slovak is the one language best understood by all the Slav peoples! This is so because it has the closest relations with all the other Slavic vernaculars as any of them has: most words in common, most letters and constructions in common, least foreign additions, least changes of its own. Note the words of Professor John D. Prince of Columbia University in the News Bulletin of the Amer- �10 SLOVAKIA ican Association of Teachers of Slovanic and East European Lianguages, Dec. 15, 1943: "Of the nine principal Slovanic variants (Rus., Wh. Rus., Ukr., Cz., Pol., Serb., Croat. and Bulg.) Slovak contains the greatest number of forms common to all ... . To apply the pragmatic test, Slovak is of all the Slovanic tongues the most readily understood by other Slavs." And H. L. Menchken says in The American Language: "A peasant from Sfovakia enjoying the benefit of a central position in the Slavonic territory, is understood by a Slav from any other country." Therefore, in the words of the great reformer of the Slovak language, I',udovit Stur (1814-1856): "Slovak appears to us as a distinct and separate language, without which it would be impracticable to formulate a comparative grammar of Slavic tongues, because it forms a connecting link between them all." The Integration of the Basic Language With Elements of the Other Slav Tongues Now, having settled this problem regaroing the choice of one basic language - be it Slovak or some other we should next consider all the various elements which would combine to make the text book reaMy a Slovanic grammar, and not a grammar only of the language it features. Besides teaching the student one language, which is ,a key to all thke Slavic tongues, the Slovanic grammar would acquaint him with the various languages in other ways also. While presenting only one tongue, it would also give knowledge of the other Slavic nations and cultures. Thus it would be a genuine (and feasible, we think) compromise between all the tongues, which, as we have said, is impracticable, and teaching only one, which is too limited and insufficient, by itself. The SloV'anic text book would present the basic language completely; its declensions, conjugations, syntax, vocabulary, but at the same time it would also present the history of the Slavic race, a description of the individual nations with their geography and statistics, the salient points of their literature, music, art, and even some excerpts from their poetry and prose. In this way, the student would have a working mastery of one Slav language, through it a key to all the Slav tongues, and an under- �SLOVAKIA 11 standing of the position, history and culture of each nation. What better acquaintance than this could a person hope to have with nine languages, without studying each one of the individually? Let us consider in detail how these two elements: the one language and the various cultures, would appear in our S'lovanics book. The basic language would be presented pretty much th€ way it is in any (Siovak) grammar. We might, for this purpose, take Hrobak's Slovak Lessons, which is recognized as the best text-book of Slovak, to cover the first elemenit. Hrobak's Lessons gradually teaches the language, by use of the following sections and titles: voca:bulary, expressions, grammar, exercises, reading lessons, reviews, et<:. The other element, the various cultures, would be integrated with the lessons, and be presented by means of verbal explanations, pi,otures, selected words and exipressions (where possible), exercises and reading lessons from their national literatures (transliterated into Slovak), etc. Successive lessons could introduce such topics as these: The Slav race, the Christianization of the Slavic peoples, the submerged Slavs, the Slavic nations; then individual countries: the Slovaks, Rusins, Czechs, Poles, etc.; even the fringe naJtions: the Rumanians, Lithuanians. Particular subjedts could also be presented, such as: the General Characteristics of Slav Art, Temperament, etc. Finally, to the book several appendices could be added: one giving the Russian (and Old Slovanic) alphabet(s) and the equivalent in western script; another showing the various letter marks, like r, z, I, u, and their SfoV'ak transliterations; and then, a very valuable appendix showing somE key differences between Slovak and the other Slovanic languages: v. g. stating the rule where Polish uses w or g for Slovak v or h, where Czech has v and r for Slovak 1 and r, and the like. This last appendix would be a crowning offering of the grammar, making it possible for the energet,ic pupil to master to some extent all the Slovanic languages at once by means of these differences. rn conclusion, I admit that I am not an expert in the Slavic tongues, but it appears to me that the "High-School �12 SLOVAKIA Slovanics" grammar is a real possibility. I believe that it could be drawn up along the lines presented in this article. Of course, it would require the careful, studious efforts of someone well acquainted with the Slovanic languages or at least with one of them. But I feel it can be done. At least the possibility should be explored and an attempt made in .that direction. Perhaps if we Slovaks ignore this project, some one of our kindred Slavs may take it up, using his tongue instead of ours as the basis. The Slav languages certainly should be taught in our schools. But if they are to be, a Slovanic grammar is needed. Slovak can offer itself as the key ingredient in such a book, since it possesses the qualirty of representatives among the Slavic vernaculars. What is requisite, therefore, is a recognition of the needs for and feasibility of a "High School Slovanics" book, and then the efforts of our Slovak-American intelligentsia to prepare it. In this way, the great culture of our tiny nation would make still another contribution to the advancement of world knowledge and culture. - (MOST," Vol. 5, No. 2) . • • • THE BIRTH OF A SATELLITE By Bohdan Chudoba (It is ofiten maintained that Czecho-Slovaikiia became a s·a tellite of Moscow in February, 1948, when the communists gained full power in Prague. In the following article Pr<Yfessor Bohdan Chudio'ba of New York, a noted historian and forimer leading Czech -politician, very clearly -i lluminates the Czecho-Slovaik situation after World War II and the disastrous role that Czecho~ovaikia's foruner President Edward Benes played when, long before '1'94'8, he paved the way for the commun,ist seizure o,f full power in '1948.) When leading statesmen of the Allied Powers met at Teheran in 1943 and President Roosevelt ha,d to decide whether or not to support ChurchiH's plan to invade the Balkans and keep the Red Army out of Central Europe, the conference had the spectacle of Edward Benes journeying solemnly from London to Moscow where, on December 12, he signed a new treaty between Czecho-Slovalda and the Soviet Union, binding himself and his (provisional) government to dissolve all "anti-communist organizations � SLOVAKIA 7 SLOV ANICS IN AMERICAN SEOONDARY SCHOOLS William S. Patala That the Slavic languages are not taught in our American schools - in our high schools especially, but also in our colleges and even grade schools - is a sad fact which is lately coming around to admitting this deficiency, and the need for a remedy; public opinion is stirring in a similar vein; and some statesmen are speaking up for a new progra;m to rectify the absence of courses in the Slav languages in our educational system. These groups are moved by a realization not only of the world position in which communism puts the Slovanic nations it controls, but also by an awareness of the rising prominence of these nations in the 20th century irrespective of that totalitariain regime, and then too by a recognition of the ever-increasing volume of travel and tourism, which is making contact - and will make contact much more when the Iron Curtain rises - witih the eastern half of Europe, the Slav world, as never before. 'Dhese considerations and others, are pressing more and more for Americans to learn a Slavic tongue a-s their second language. Of course, all ethnic groups of rectn immigration, including the Slovaks to be sure, have a long time recognized the value of American youths learning foreign languages, although each nationality insisted, as might be expected, on their own as the first to be learned. And these peoples, especially the Catholics among them because of their private schools, have tried to teach their descendants in America the ancestral tongue - at least to the first and second generation, where there was still living contact with the spoken foreign language. But these efforts of national groups are on the wane, so that if American youths are to learn a European language, and especially a Slavic one, it will have to be through the instrumentality of the regular American high schools. These schools already have in .their curricula the other European vernaculars: German, French, Spanish, but they do not have Slavic. �8 SLOVAKIA What Slavic Language? If our high schools should decid~ to introduce the Siovanic languages into their courses, however - and rising pressure may wen move them to do so soon - they will have to solve one outstanding difficulity which presents itself immediately. This difficulty must be settled before the composition of a text book oon even be undertaken. And that problem is, namely, which Slav language shall be taught? For O'bviously they cannot aJII be taught, since ther are some nine prominent ones. So the question is which one should be singled out for this honorable use. The first answer that presents itself is Russian. This is by far the largest Slavic tongue in use, and Russia naturally seems to be the mother of all the Slovanic naitions. Bult Russia has never filled thus "natural" position of a mother: whether communist or czarist, her interest in the other Slav countries has always been selfish. Although all these nations would each raise an objection to the choice of every language except their own, nevertheless their strongest dbjection would be to the use of Russian, since their feeling for Russia extends in genera!l from mistrust to hatred, the latter especially by Poland and the Ukraine. Other dif:filculties also attend t:Jhe use of Russian, above all the strange alphabet, then borrowed and original words, and again the oriental and Orthodox culture of that country, etc. This writer would recommend as the basic language to be taughrt in a course of "High School Sfovanics" the use of the Slovak tongue. My choice of Slovak for this highly-representative position stands on three arguments of varying force : First, a negative argument, whfoh is equally valid for the use of any O'f the Stavic tongues (except a fringe language like Rumanian) ; this proof is intended to show why Slovak should not be excluded by a prior judgment; and it is this, that any Slavic tongue is a key to all of them. Consider how similar the viarious - we could almost call them dialects - of the Slav race are, from the following selections. If you know Slovak well, you will easily enough gather the thought of each quotiation: �SLOVAKIA 9 (1) (Ruthenian or Rusin): "0 Bohorodice D'ivo Marije, radujsja, raduj nebes lelije. Solncem pribranna, vkryta duhoju, Marije cista, Hospod's Toboju." (2) (Church or Old Slovanic, or Bulgarian): (InternationaJ alpha) : "Pri:z;ri na mja i pomilum mja. Da priblicitsja molitva moja pred fa Hospodi, po slovesi tvojemu vrazumi mja." (3) (Czech): "Za tri tisice roku, ach, co tu bude Zmen, a co tu bude skoku pres hroby slavnych jmen !" (4) (Polish): "Jezeli domu sam Pan nie zbuluje, Daremnie nad nim rzemieslnik pracuje. Jok od pocz~tku byla tak i ninie, I na wiek wiekow niechaj zawsze slynie." (5) (Slovenian: "Sedaj prosi ljubega Boga, naj Ti odpusti vse Tvoje grehe, ki si se jih spovedal, a tudi grehe vsega Tvojega zivljenja." (6) (Croatian and Serbian): (International script) : "Pricekajte jedan minut. Gde su vojnici? Drago mi je poznati vas. Molim vas pomozite mi." (7) (Ukrainian): (International alphabet): "V nasich cerkvach je zvicaj otvirati dveri na pocatku Bozestvennoji Liturgiji." (8) (White Rusian): "Kaznamu, chto hetak vyjavic usie svaje hrachii klo jon scyra za ich zaleje, mozna dac sakramentalnaje razihresennie." (9) (Russian): (International alphabet) : "So mnoju liudi bez imion." Secondly, a practical reason for my picking Slovak as the one language to be taught is a Slovanic grammar. Since I am doing the selecting, I naturally choose the lianguage most familiar and most dear to me. This is Slovak. But finally, the conclusive argument, that shows Slovak to be the ideal tongue for use in a text book of Slovanics is its unique position in connection with all the Slavic tongues. Slovak is the one language best understood by all the Slav peoples! This is so because it has the closest relations with all the other Slavic vernaculars as any of them has: most words in common, most letters and constructions in common, least foreign additions, least changes of its own. Note the words of Professor John D. Prince of Columbia University in the News Bulletin of the Amer- �10 SLOVAKIA ican Association of Teachers of Slovanic and East European Lianguages, Dec. 15, 1943: "Of the nine principal Slovanic variants (Rus., Wh. Rus., Ukr., Cz., Pol., Serb., Croat. and Bulg.) Slovak contains the greatest number of forms common to all ... . To apply the pragmatic test, Slovak is of all the Slovanic tongues the most readily understood by other Slavs." And H. L. Menchken says in The American Language: "A peasant from Sfovakia enjoying the benefit of a central position in the Slavonic territory, is understood by a Slav from any other country." Therefore, in the words of the great reformer of the Slovak language, I',udovit Stur (1814-1856): "Slovak appears to us as a distinct and separate language, without which it would be impracticable to formulate a comparative grammar of Slavic tongues, because it forms a connecting link between them all." The Integration of the Basic Language With Elements of the Other Slav Tongues Now, having settled this problem regaroing the choice of one basic language - be it Slovak or some other we should next consider all the various elements which would combine to make the text book reaMy a Slovanic grammar, and not a grammar only of the language it features. Besides teaching the student one language, which is ,a key to all thke Slavic tongues, the Slovanic grammar would acquaint him with the various languages in other ways also. While presenting only one tongue, it would also give knowledge of the other Slavic nations and cultures. Thus it would be a genuine (and feasible, we think) compromise between all the tongues, which, as we have said, is impracticable, and teaching only one, which is too limited and insufficient, by itself. The SloV'anic text book would present the basic language completely; its declensions, conjugations, syntax, vocabulary, but at the same time it would also present the history of the Slavic race, a description of the individual nations with their geography and statistics, the salient points of their literature, music, art, and even some excerpts from their poetry and prose. In this way, the student would have a working mastery of one Slav language, through it a key to all the Slav tongues, and an under- �SLOVAKIA 11 standing of the position, history and culture of each nation. What better acquaintance than this could a person hope to have with nine languages, without studying each one of the individually? Let us consider in detail how these two elements: the one language and the various cultures, would appear in our S'lovanics book. The basic language would be presented pretty much th€ way it is in any (Siovak) grammar. We might, for this purpose, take Hrobak's Slovak Lessons, which is recognized as the best text-book of Slovak, to cover the first elemenit. Hrobak's Lessons gradually teaches the language, by use of the following sections and titles: voca:bulary, expressions, grammar, exercises, reading lessons, reviews, et<:. The other element, the various cultures, would be integrated with the lessons, and be presented by means of verbal explanations, pi,otures, selected words and exipressions (where possible), exercises and reading lessons from their national literatures (transliterated into Slovak), etc. Successive lessons could introduce such topics as these: The Slav race, the Christianization of the Slavic peoples, the submerged Slavs, the Slavic nations; then individual countries: the Slovaks, Rusins, Czechs, Poles, etc.; even the fringe naJtions: the Rumanians, Lithuanians. Particular subjedts could also be presented, such as: the General Characteristics of Slav Art, Temperament, etc. Finally, to the book several appendices could be added: one giving the Russian (and Old Slovanic) alphabet(s) and the equivalent in western script; another showing the various letter marks, like r, z, I, u, and their SfoV'ak transliterations; and then, a very valuable appendix showing somE key differences between Slovak and the other Slovanic languages: v. g. stating the rule where Polish uses w or g for Slovak v or h, where Czech has v and r for Slovak 1 and r, and the like. This last appendix would be a crowning offering of the grammar, making it possible for the energet,ic pupil to master to some extent all the Slovanic languages at once by means of these differences. rn conclusion, I admit that I am not an expert in the Slavic tongues, but it appears to me that the "High-School �12 SLOVAKIA Slovanics" grammar is a real possibility. I believe that it could be drawn up along the lines presented in this article. Of course, it would require the careful, studious efforts of someone well acquainted with the Slovanic languages or at least with one of them. But I feel it can be done. At least the possibility should be explored and an attempt made in .that direction. Perhaps if we Slovaks ignore this project, some one of our kindred Slavs may take it up, using his tongue instead of ours as the basis. The Slav languages certainly should be taught in our schools. But if they are to be, a Slovanic grammar is needed. Slovak can offer itself as the key ingredient in such a book, since it possesses the qualirty of representatives among the Slavic vernaculars. What is requisite, therefore, is a recognition of the needs for and feasibility of a "High School Slovanics" book, and then the efforts of our Slovak-American intelligentsia to prepare it. In this way, the great culture of our tiny nation would make still another contribution to the advancement of world knowledge and culture. - (MOST," Vol. 5, No. 2) . • • • THE BIRTH OF A SATELLITE By Bohdan Chudoba (It is ofiten maintained that Czecho-Slovaikiia became a s·a tellite of Moscow in February, 1948, when the communists gained full power in Prague. In the following article Pr<Yfessor Bohdan Chudio'ba of New York, a noted historian and forimer leading Czech -politician, very clearly -i lluminates the Czecho-Slovaik situation after World War II and the disastrous role that Czecho~ovaikia's foruner President Edward Benes played when, long before '1'94'8, he paved the way for the commun,ist seizure o,f full power in '1948.) When leading statesmen of the Allied Powers met at Teheran in 1943 and President Roosevelt ha,d to decide whether or not to support ChurchiH's plan to invade the Balkans and keep the Red Army out of Central Europe, the conference had the spectacle of Edward Benes journeying solemnly from London to Moscow where, on December 12, he signed a new treaty between Czecho-Slovalda and the Soviet Union, binding himself and his (provisional) government to dissolve all "anti-communist organizations � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 SLOV ANICS IN AMERICAN SEOONDARY SCHOOLS William S. Patala That the Slavic languages are not taught in our American schools - in our high schools especially, but also in our colleges and even grade schools - is a sad fact which is lately coming around to admitting this deficiency, and the need for a remedy; public opinion is stirring in a similar vein; and some statesmen are speaking up for a new progra;m to rectify the absence of courses in the Slav languages in our educational system. These groups are moved by a realization not only of the world position in which communism puts the Slovanic nations it controls, but also by an awareness of the rising prominence of these nations in the 20th century irrespective of that totalitariain regime, and then too by a recognition of the ever-increasing volume of travel and tourism, which is making contact - and will make contact much more when the Iron Curtain rises - witih the eastern half of Europe, the Slav world, as never before. 'Dhese considerations and others, are pressing more and more for Americans to learn a Slavic tongue a-s their second language. Of course, all ethnic groups of rectn immigration, including the Slovaks to be sure, have a long time recognized the value of American youths learning foreign languages, although each nationality insisted, as might be expected, on their own as the first to be learned. And these peoples, especially the Catholics among them because of their private schools, have tried to teach their descendants in America the ancestral tongue - at least to the first and second generation, where there was still living contact with the spoken foreign language. But these efforts of national groups are on the wane, so that if American youths are to learn a European language, and especially a Slavic one, it will have to be through the instrumentality of the regular American high schools. These schools already have in .their curricula the other European vernaculars: German, French, Spanish, but they do not have Slavic. 8 SLOVAKIA What Slavic Language? If our high schools should decid~ to introduce the Siovanic languages into their courses, however - and rising pressure may wen move them to do so soon - they will have to solve one outstanding difficulity which presents itself immediately. This difficulty must be settled before the composition of a text book oon even be undertaken. And that problem is, namely, which Slav language shall be taught? For O'bviously they cannot aJII be taught, since ther are some nine prominent ones. So the question is which one should be singled out for this honorable use. The first answer that presents itself is Russian. This is by far the largest Slavic tongue in use, and Russia naturally seems to be the mother of all the Slovanic naitions. Bult Russia has never filled thus "natural" position of a mother: whether communist or czarist, her interest in the other Slav countries has always been selfish. Although all these nations would each raise an objection to the choice of every language except their own, nevertheless their strongest dbjection would be to the use of Russian, since their feeling for Russia extends in genera!l from mistrust to hatred, the latter especially by Poland and the Ukraine. Other dif:filculties also attend t:Jhe use of Russian, above all the strange alphabet, then borrowed and original words, and again the oriental and Orthodox culture of that country, etc. This writer would recommend as the basic language to be taughrt in a course of "High School Sfovanics" the use of the Slovak tongue. My choice of Slovak for this highly-representative position stands on three arguments of varying force : First, a negative argument, whfoh is equally valid for the use of any O'f the Stavic tongues (except a fringe language like Rumanian) ; this proof is intended to show why Slovak should not be excluded by a prior judgment; and it is this, that any Slavic tongue is a key to all of them. Consider how similar the viarious - we could almost call them dialects - of the Slav race are, from the following selections. If you know Slovak well, you will easily enough gather the thought of each quotiation: SLOVAKIA 9 (1) (Ruthenian or Rusin): "0 Bohorodice D'ivo Marije, radujsja, raduj nebes lelije. Solncem pribranna, vkryta duhoju, Marije cista, Hospod's Toboju." (2) (Church or Old Slovanic, or Bulgarian): (InternationaJ alpha) : "Pri:z;ri na mja i pomilum mja. Da priblicitsja molitva moja pred fa Hospodi, po slovesi tvojemu vrazumi mja." (3) (Czech): "Za tri tisice roku, ach, co tu bude Zmen, a co tu bude skoku pres hroby slavnych jmen !" (4) (Polish): "Jezeli domu sam Pan nie zbuluje, Daremnie nad nim rzemieslnik pracuje. Jok od pocz~tku byla tak i ninie, I na wiek wiekow niechaj zawsze slynie." (5) (Slovenian: "Sedaj prosi ljubega Boga, naj Ti odpusti vse Tvoje grehe, ki si se jih spovedal, a tudi grehe vsega Tvojega zivljenja." (6) (Croatian and Serbian): (International script) : "Pricekajte jedan minut. Gde su vojnici? Drago mi je poznati vas. Molim vas pomozite mi." (7) (Ukrainian): (International alphabet): "V nasich cerkvach je zvicaj otvirati dveri na pocatku Bozestvennoji Liturgiji." (8) (White Rusian): "Kaznamu, chto hetak vyjavic usie svaje hrachii klo jon scyra za ich zaleje, mozna dac sakramentalnaje razihresennie." (9) (Russian): (International alphabet) : "So mnoju liudi bez imion." Secondly, a practical reason for my picking Slovak as the one language to be taught is a Slovanic grammar. Since I am doing the selecting, I naturally choose the lianguage most familiar and most dear to me. This is Slovak. But finally, the conclusive argument, that shows Slovak to be the ideal tongue for use in a text book of Slovanics is its unique position in connection with all the Slavic tongues. Slovak is the one language best understood by all the Slav peoples! This is so because it has the closest relations with all the other Slavic vernaculars as any of them has: most words in common, most letters and constructions in common, least foreign additions, least changes of its own. Note the words of Professor John D. Prince of Columbia University in the News Bulletin of the Amer- 10 SLOVAKIA ican Association of Teachers of Slovanic and East European Lianguages, Dec. 15, 1943: "Of the nine principal Slovanic variants (Rus., Wh. Rus., Ukr., Cz., Pol., Serb., Croat. and Bulg.) Slovak contains the greatest number of forms common to all ... . To apply the pragmatic test, Slovak is of all the Slovanic tongues the most readily understood by other Slavs." And H. L. Menchken says in The American Language: "A peasant from Sfovakia enjoying the benefit of a central position in the Slavonic territory, is understood by a Slav from any other country." Therefore, in the words of the great reformer of the Slovak language, I',udovit Stur (1814-1856): "Slovak appears to us as a distinct and separate language, without which it would be impracticable to formulate a comparative grammar of Slavic tongues, because it forms a connecting link between them all." The Integration of the Basic Language With Elements of the Other Slav Tongues Now, having settled this problem regaroing the choice of one basic language - be it Slovak or some other we should next consider all the various elements which would combine to make the text book reaMy a Slovanic grammar, and not a grammar only of the language it features. Besides teaching the student one language, which is ,a key to all thke Slavic tongues, the Slovanic grammar would acquaint him with the various languages in other ways also. While presenting only one tongue, it would also give knowledge of the other Slavic nations and cultures. Thus it would be a genuine (and feasible, we think) compromise between all the tongues, which, as we have said, is impracticable, and teaching only one, which is too limited and insufficient, by itself. The SloV'anic text book would present the basic language completely; its declensions, conjugations, syntax, vocabulary, but at the same time it would also present the history of the Slavic race, a description of the individual nations with their geography and statistics, the salient points of their literature, music, art, and even some excerpts from their poetry and prose. In this way, the student would have a working mastery of one Slav language, through it a key to all the Slav tongues, and an under- SLOVAKIA 11 standing of the position, history and culture of each nation. What better acquaintance than this could a person hope to have with nine languages, without studying each one of the individually? Let us consider in detail how these two elements: the one language and the various cultures, would appear in our S'lovanics book. The basic language would be presented pretty much th€ way it is in any (Siovak) grammar. We might, for this purpose, take Hrobak's Slovak Lessons, which is recognized as the best text-book of Slovak, to cover the first elemenit. Hrobak's Lessons gradually teaches the language, by use of the following sections and titles: voca:bulary, expressions, grammar, exercises, reading lessons, reviews, et<:. The other element, the various cultures, would be integrated with the lessons, and be presented by means of verbal explanations, pi,otures, selected words and exipressions (where possible), exercises and reading lessons from their national literatures (transliterated into Slovak), etc. Successive lessons could introduce such topics as these: The Slav race, the Christianization of the Slavic peoples, the submerged Slavs, the Slavic nations; then individual countries: the Slovaks, Rusins, Czechs, Poles, etc.; even the fringe naJtions: the Rumanians, Lithuanians. Particular subjedts could also be presented, such as: the General Characteristics of Slav Art, Temperament, etc. Finally, to the book several appendices could be added: one giving the Russian (and Old Slovanic) alphabet(s) and the equivalent in western script; another showing the various letter marks, like r, z, I, u, and their SfoV'ak transliterations; and then, a very valuable appendix showing somE key differences between Slovak and the other Slovanic languages: v. g. stating the rule where Polish uses w or g for Slovak v or h, where Czech has v and r for Slovak 1 and r, and the like. This last appendix would be a crowning offering of the grammar, making it possible for the energet,ic pupil to master to some extent all the Slovanic languages at once by means of these differences. rn conclusion, I admit that I am not an expert in the Slavic tongues, but it appears to me that the "High-School 12 SLOVAKIA Slovanics" grammar is a real possibility. I believe that it could be drawn up along the lines presented in this article. Of course, it would require the careful, studious efforts of someone well acquainted with the Slovanic languages or at least with one of them. But I feel it can be done. At least the possibility should be explored and an attempt made in .that direction. Perhaps if we Slovaks ignore this project, some one of our kindred Slavs may take it up, using his tongue instead of ours as the basis. The Slav languages certainly should be taught in our schools. But if they are to be, a Slovanic grammar is needed. Slovak can offer itself as the key ingredient in such a book, since it possesses the qualirty of representatives among the Slavic vernaculars. What is requisite, therefore, is a recognition of the needs for and feasibility of a "High School Slovanics" book, and then the efforts of our Slovak-American intelligentsia to prepare it. In this way, the great culture of our tiny nation would make still another contribution to the advancement of world knowledge and culture. - (MOST," Vol. 5, No. 2) . • • • THE BIRTH OF A SATELLITE By Bohdan Chudoba (It is ofiten maintained that Czecho-Slovaikiia became a s·a tellite of Moscow in February, 1948, when the communists gained full power in Prague. In the following article Pr<Yfessor Bohdan Chudio'ba of New York, a noted historian and forimer leading Czech -politician, very clearly -i lluminates the Czecho-Slovaik situation after World War II and the disastrous role that Czecho~ovaikia's foruner President Edward Benes played when, long before '1'94'8, he paved the way for the commun,ist seizure o,f full power in '1948.) When leading statesmen of the Allied Powers met at Teheran in 1943 and President Roosevelt ha,d to decide whether or not to support ChurchiH's plan to invade the Balkans and keep the Red Army out of Central Europe, the conference had the spectacle of Edward Benes journeying solemnly from London to Moscow where, on December 12, he signed a new treaty between Czecho-Slovalda and the Soviet Union, binding himself and his (provisional) government to dissolve all "anti-communist organizations  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovanics in American Secondary Schools Description An account of the resource William S. Patala Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 6 (31), March-June 1960 pp. 7-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Patala, William S. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1960 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d352d02edfa2548419b221de6f069db8.pdf 8cd13b3a57a7c4417356143198918536 PDF Text Text 76 SLOVAKIA Some Observations on Devotional Literature and Culture: Response D av id P . D a niel In many resp ects the history of Slovakia during the seventeen th century is an orphan of recent Slavic studies. While there are a few noteworthy exceptions , scholars of Slova k history tend to co nce ntrate their work in the medieval era, co mm en cin g w ith the labors of Cyril a nd M eth od , or they focus their a ttentio n on the er a of the n ational revival and the political, social , a nd cultural d evelopm en ts of the ninetee nth a nd twentieth ce nturies. As a result, the hi sto ry of the Slovaks during the seventeenth century h as bee n in adequately examin ed. In light of this situ ation, the studies of Czech and Slovak d evotional lite rature by Ducreux , Vajda, and Sabo are mo st welcome. While M . E . Ducreu x's study of Catholic Czech h ymna ls of the late sixtee nth a nd seventeenth centuries indicates that over o ne-third of the hymns utilized were adapted or taken over intact from Protestant collect io ns, J. Vajda, in a sketch of the life and work of the most noted Lutheran h ymnodi st, Juraj Tranovsky, notes th at his h ymnal , the Cithara Sanctorum (Harp of the Saints) , h ad a significant impact on the d evotio nal life of Catholic as well as Lutheran Slovaks. G. Sabo, on the other hand, turns hi s attention to one of the very popular personal d evotio na l works of the seventeenth ce ntury, the H ortulus Animae Piae (Little Garden of the Pious Soul) , by the Lutheran Daniel Sina pius-Horcicka . Taken together , these essays proffer a n in structive, if primarily a nticip atory, glimpse of the oft-neglected riches of seventeenth ce ntury Slavic lite rature and, it is to be h oped, should gen erate greater interest in the study of this fascinating period of Slovak history. Certainly more ex te n sive in vest igation s of seventee nth- century Slovak hi story are warranted for it was a n era of momentous cha n ge for the peoples of Hun garia Superioris , Upper Hun gary, the territory roughly con gru ent with tha t of m odern-day Slovakia. It was durin g thi s ce ntury that a m ajority of the overwhelmingly Lutheran Slovaks were �SLOV AKIA 77 regained for the faith a nd p ract ice of post-Tridentine C a tholicism b y the Cath olic Coun ter-Refo rm a ti o n . It was durin g this century tha t num erou s, o ft en bl oody conflicts em er ged a s the Habsburgs sought to re-asse r t the ir undispu ted hegem on y ove r all o f Hun gary . But d espite the feroc ity of the rel igiou s a nd poli tical co nflicts o f the era, o r perhaps becau se of them , it w as a ce ntury o f conside ra ble lite rary activity and ri ch in cultu re. A s the intelli ge ntsia, the cl erics a nd teach ers sou ght to reach a nd influen ce the opinio n s a nd allegia n ces o f the Slavic populati o n , a po pul ar ve rn acul a r literature d eveloped . T o be sure, th e C zech Biblictin a or Kralictin a was o ften employed as sort o f a proto -Slovak literary la n gu age. But thi s u se of Czech , albe it in creasingly adapted b y the u se o f Slovaki sm s, se rved both to provide a lexicogra phic foundati on upo n which a mo re p ro per Slovak litera ry la ngu age could be codifi ed du r in g the eigh teenth a nd early ninetee nth ce nturies and to foster intellectu al co ntacts a nd exch a n ges betwee n Slovaks and C zech s. This m eant th at Slovak intellectu als would b e influ en ced b y a nd refl ect the b road er cultu ral and political movem ents of their age. This can be see n w ith pa rticul a r cl a rity in the d evotional literature of the seventee nth ce n tury. It is in works d esigned fo r the u se of the m asses th a t the esse nti al core of the ideology o f a specific group o r ind iv idu al, especially as it perta ins to the particul ar issu es being contested , is clearl y a nd forcefully enuncia ted . At the sa m e time, d evotional liter ature also tend s to codi fy the fo rmal u sage o f a la n gu a ge a nd sta bilize o r , in som e cases, retard its d evelopme n t. Bibles, h ymnbooks, prayerboo ks, catechi sm s, a n d o ther d evotio n al m aterials, therefore, ou ght to be carefull y studied fo r bo th the ir theological a nd the ir cultural or lingui sti c significance. Bu t it is p recisely the fo rm er stud ies th at are lackin g. While ther e have bee n m a n y inves ti gat io n s of the li nguistic as pects o f wo rks produ ced b y Slovaks d urin g the seve nteenth century, the a n alysis o f these works within the b road er co ntex t of Slovak , Slavic, a nd European history has bee n less t ha n a d equ ate. Y et, eve n a cursory examin a tio n of the wo rk s pen ned by Slovaks during thi s ce ntury will indicate tha t they ind eed were aware of a nd pa rticipated in the broad er m ovem en ts of seven tee nth ce ntury cul ture. Writte n durin g the age ge ne rally d eno mina ted b y hi sto ri a n s as Ba roqu e, Slovak a nd Czech d evotio n al wo rks reflect the theological stru ggles, con cern s, a nd emphases of the pe riod . Often w ritte n to edify a nd es pecially to con sole Christi a n s in a wo rld to rn b y �78 SLOVAKIA conflict in whi ch sufferin g had becom e all too fa mili a r , these works a ttempted to build up and confirm individu als in their faith , provide them with spiritual comfort in the face of excru cia ting h a rdships, a nd en coura ge ethical sta ndards of conduct. By examinin g the variou s specific emphases of these works, then , o n e can di scern th e p a rticul ar issu es and problems which were perceived as m ost significant by individual authors. H e nce, they help to identify and elucida te th e ge neral self-pe rceptio n of the age. In additio n , m ore deta iled examin atio n s of seve nteenth-ce ntury literature might also indicate that co mmo nly held histo rical interpretive traditions might have to be aba ndon ed or a t least carefull y reexamined . Tantalizing implications of the study of Du creu x a re first that the traditional view of the decisive decline of a form al, high Slavic langu age and culture in Bohemia a fte r White M ounta in mu st be ab a n doned , and second tha t the process of re-Catholicization of the predominantly P rotesta nt popula tio n mu st be m o re carefull y studied . While no one can igno re or di smiss ou t of ha nd the fac t tha t mu ch d epended on the milita ry support given to the cau se of Counte r-Reformation by the Habsburgs, there seem s to be some eviden ce that the program ofre-conver sion was made easie r b y the simil a rity of wo r ship form s a nd , m o re importantly, the d evotio n al m a terial s employed by C zech U traqui sts and C atholics and by Luthera n s and C a tholics in Slovakia . Even thou gh much more research n eed s to be done to substanti a te thi s h yp othesis, it would a ppear , o n the b as is of the evide nce availa ble, th a t a similarity in the tone, indeed , in som e of the contents, of seventeen th-century devotional m a terials, a ided the p rocess of re-Catholicizati on . It also a ided in the creation of a b roader Slavic " imperial " culture alo ngside the Germanic " imperial " culture of the H ab sburg d ynasty. On the on e ha nd , this repl aced the m edieval L a tin culture a nd community w hich h ad existed prior to the R e form a tion a nd fos tered the process of the pa rticul a riza tion of European sta tes. On the o ther ha nd , unlike that of the Hun garia n s, the Sla vic a nd G erma n cultura l fo rm s in sou th -eastern E urope we re not specifically or exclu sively identifi ed with a sin gle territory or sta te . Thu s, they were m o re acceptable to the H a bsburgs who endeavored to en ge nde r a m on g the peopl es over w hi ch they ruled a loyalty to the ir d y n asty and empire. Durin g the seve nteenth cen tury , the n , Slovak a nd Czech a uthors, often unwittingly, m ay h ave actu all y a ided in the creatio n of tha t very d y n astic system w hich , two ce ntu ries �SLOVAXIA 79 later, they would rend asunder over the question of their language rights and the attempts to actualize politically their own ethnic self-consciousness which had been fostered by seventeenth-century devotional literature. Prese nt ed as co mm entary in Panel 99, "Devotional Literature in Seventeenth Century Slovakia , " a t th e AAASS conve ntion in Washington , D.C. on 17 O ctober 1982. � 76 SLOVAKIA Some Observations on Devotional Literature and Culture: Response D av id P . D a niel In many resp ects the history of Slovakia during the seventeen th century is an orphan of recent Slavic studies. While there are a few noteworthy exceptions , scholars of Slova k history tend to co nce ntrate their work in the medieval era, co mm en cin g w ith the labors of Cyril a nd M eth od , or they focus their a ttentio n on the er a of the n ational revival and the political, social , a nd cultural d evelopm en ts of the ninetee nth a nd twentieth ce nturies. As a result, the hi sto ry of the Slovaks during the seventeenth century h as bee n in adequately examin ed. In light of this situ ation, the studies of Czech and Slovak d evotional lite rature by Ducreux , Vajda, and Sabo are mo st welcome. While M . E . Ducreu x's study of Catholic Czech h ymna ls of the late sixtee nth a nd seventeenth centuries indicates that over o ne-third of the hymns utilized were adapted or taken over intact from Protestant collect io ns, J. Vajda, in a sketch of the life and work of the most noted Lutheran h ymnodi st, Juraj Tranovsky, notes th at his h ymnal , the Cithara Sanctorum (Harp of the Saints) , h ad a significant impact on the d evotio nal life of Catholic as well as Lutheran Slovaks. G. Sabo, on the other hand, turns hi s attention to one of the very popular personal d evotio na l works of the seventeenth ce ntury, the H ortulus Animae Piae (Little Garden of the Pious Soul) , by the Lutheran Daniel Sina pius-Horcicka . Taken together , these essays proffer a n in structive, if primarily a nticip atory, glimpse of the oft-neglected riches of seventeenth ce ntury Slavic lite rature and, it is to be h oped, should gen erate greater interest in the study of this fascinating period of Slovak history. Certainly more ex te n sive in vest igation s of seventee nth- century Slovak hi story are warranted for it was a n era of momentous cha n ge for the peoples of Hun garia Superioris , Upper Hun gary, the territory roughly con gru ent with tha t of m odern-day Slovakia. It was durin g thi s ce ntury that a m ajority of the overwhelmingly Lutheran Slovaks were �SLOV AKIA 77 regained for the faith a nd p ract ice of post-Tridentine C a tholicism b y the Cath olic Coun ter-Refo rm a ti o n . It was durin g this century tha t num erou s, o ft en bl oody conflicts em er ged a s the Habsburgs sought to re-asse r t the ir undispu ted hegem on y ove r all o f Hun gary . But d espite the feroc ity of the rel igiou s a nd poli tical co nflicts o f the era, o r perhaps becau se of them , it w as a ce ntury o f conside ra ble lite rary activity and ri ch in cultu re. A s the intelli ge ntsia, the cl erics a nd teach ers sou ght to reach a nd influen ce the opinio n s a nd allegia n ces o f the Slavic populati o n , a po pul ar ve rn acul a r literature d eveloped . T o be sure, th e C zech Biblictin a or Kralictin a was o ften employed as sort o f a proto -Slovak literary la n gu age. But thi s u se of Czech , albe it in creasingly adapted b y the u se o f Slovaki sm s, se rved both to provide a lexicogra phic foundati on upo n which a mo re p ro per Slovak litera ry la ngu age could be codifi ed du r in g the eigh teenth a nd early ninetee nth ce nturies and to foster intellectu al co ntacts a nd exch a n ges betwee n Slovaks and C zech s. This m eant th at Slovak intellectu als would b e influ en ced b y a nd refl ect the b road er cultu ral and political movem ents of their age. This can be see n w ith pa rticul a r cl a rity in the d evotional literature of the seventee nth ce n tury. It is in works d esigned fo r the u se of the m asses th a t the esse nti al core of the ideology o f a specific group o r ind iv idu al, especially as it perta ins to the particul ar issu es being contested , is clearl y a nd forcefully enuncia ted . At the sa m e time, d evotional liter ature also tend s to codi fy the fo rmal u sage o f a la n gu a ge a nd sta bilize o r , in som e cases, retard its d evelopme n t. Bibles, h ymnbooks, prayerboo ks, catechi sm s, a n d o ther d evotio n al m aterials, therefore, ou ght to be carefull y studied fo r bo th the ir theological a nd the ir cultural or lingui sti c significance. Bu t it is p recisely the fo rm er stud ies th at are lackin g. While ther e have bee n m a n y inves ti gat io n s of the li nguistic as pects o f wo rks produ ced b y Slovaks d urin g the seve nteenth century, the a n alysis o f these works within the b road er co ntex t of Slovak , Slavic, a nd European history has bee n less t ha n a d equ ate. Y et, eve n a cursory examin a tio n of the wo rk s pen ned by Slovaks during thi s ce ntury will indicate tha t they ind eed were aware of a nd pa rticipated in the broad er m ovem en ts of seven tee nth ce ntury cul ture. Writte n durin g the age ge ne rally d eno mina ted b y hi sto ri a n s as Ba roqu e, Slovak a nd Czech d evotio n al wo rks reflect the theological stru ggles, con cern s, a nd emphases of the pe riod . Often w ritte n to edify a nd es pecially to con sole Christi a n s in a wo rld to rn b y �78 SLOVAKIA conflict in whi ch sufferin g had becom e all too fa mili a r , these works a ttempted to build up and confirm individu als in their faith , provide them with spiritual comfort in the face of excru cia ting h a rdships, a nd en coura ge ethical sta ndards of conduct. By examinin g the variou s specific emphases of these works, then , o n e can di scern th e p a rticul ar issu es and problems which were perceived as m ost significant by individual authors. H e nce, they help to identify and elucida te th e ge neral self-pe rceptio n of the age. In additio n , m ore deta iled examin atio n s of seve nteenth-ce ntury literature might also indicate that co mmo nly held histo rical interpretive traditions might have to be aba ndon ed or a t least carefull y reexamined . Tantalizing implications of the study of Du creu x a re first that the traditional view of the decisive decline of a form al, high Slavic langu age and culture in Bohemia a fte r White M ounta in mu st be ab a n doned , and second tha t the process of re-Catholicization of the predominantly P rotesta nt popula tio n mu st be m o re carefull y studied . While no one can igno re or di smiss ou t of ha nd the fac t tha t mu ch d epended on the milita ry support given to the cau se of Counte r-Reformation by the Habsburgs, there seem s to be some eviden ce that the program ofre-conver sion was made easie r b y the simil a rity of wo r ship form s a nd , m o re importantly, the d evotio n al m a terial s employed by C zech U traqui sts and C atholics and by Luthera n s and C a tholics in Slovakia . Even thou gh much more research n eed s to be done to substanti a te thi s h yp othesis, it would a ppear , o n the b as is of the evide nce availa ble, th a t a similarity in the tone, indeed , in som e of the contents, of seventeen th-century devotional m a terials, a ided the p rocess of re-Catholicizati on . It also a ided in the creation of a b roader Slavic " imperial " culture alo ngside the Germanic " imperial " culture of the H ab sburg d ynasty. On the on e ha nd , this repl aced the m edieval L a tin culture a nd community w hich h ad existed prior to the R e form a tion a nd fos tered the process of the pa rticul a riza tion of European sta tes. On the o ther ha nd , unlike that of the Hun garia n s, the Sla vic a nd G erma n cultura l fo rm s in sou th -eastern E urope we re not specifically or exclu sively identifi ed with a sin gle territory or sta te . Thu s, they were m o re acceptable to the H a bsburgs who endeavored to en ge nde r a m on g the peopl es over w hi ch they ruled a loyalty to the ir d y n asty and empire. Durin g the seve nteenth cen tury , the n , Slovak a nd Czech a uthors, often unwittingly, m ay h ave actu all y a ided in the creatio n of tha t very d y n astic system w hich , two ce ntu ries �SLOVAXIA 79 later, they would rend asunder over the question of their language rights and the attempts to actualize politically their own ethnic self-consciousness which had been fostered by seventeenth-century devotional literature. Prese nt ed as co mm entary in Panel 99, "Devotional Literature in Seventeenth Century Slovakia , " a t th e AAASS conve ntion in Washington , D.C. on 17 O ctober 1982. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1982-83, Vol. 30 Description An account of the resource Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 76 SLOVAKIA Some Observations on Devotional Literature and Culture: Response D av id P . D a niel In many resp ects the history of Slovakia during the seventeen th century is an orphan of recent Slavic studies. While there are a few noteworthy exceptions , scholars of Slova k history tend to co nce ntrate their work in the medieval era, co mm en cin g w ith the labors of Cyril a nd M eth od , or they focus their a ttentio n on the er a of the n ational revival and the political, social , a nd cultural d evelopm en ts of the ninetee nth a nd twentieth ce nturies. As a result, the hi sto ry of the Slovaks during the seventeenth century h as bee n in adequately examin ed. In light of this situ ation, the studies of Czech and Slovak d evotional lite rature by Ducreux , Vajda, and Sabo are mo st welcome. While M . E . Ducreu x's study of Catholic Czech h ymna ls of the late sixtee nth a nd seventeenth centuries indicates that over o ne-third of the hymns utilized were adapted or taken over intact from Protestant collect io ns, J. Vajda, in a sketch of the life and work of the most noted Lutheran h ymnodi st, Juraj Tranovsky, notes th at his h ymnal , the Cithara Sanctorum (Harp of the Saints) , h ad a significant impact on the d evotio nal life of Catholic as well as Lutheran Slovaks. G. Sabo, on the other hand, turns hi s attention to one of the very popular personal d evotio na l works of the seventeenth ce ntury, the H ortulus Animae Piae (Little Garden of the Pious Soul) , by the Lutheran Daniel Sina pius-Horcicka . Taken together , these essays proffer a n in structive, if primarily a nticip atory, glimpse of the oft-neglected riches of seventeenth ce ntury Slavic lite rature and, it is to be h oped, should gen erate greater interest in the study of this fascinating period of Slovak history. Certainly more ex te n sive in vest igation s of seventee nth- century Slovak hi story are warranted for it was a n era of momentous cha n ge for the peoples of Hun garia Superioris , Upper Hun gary, the territory roughly con gru ent with tha t of m odern-day Slovakia. It was durin g thi s ce ntury that a m ajority of the overwhelmingly Lutheran Slovaks were SLOV AKIA 77 regained for the faith a nd p ract ice of post-Tridentine C a tholicism b y the Cath olic Coun ter-Refo rm a ti o n . It was durin g this century tha t num erou s, o ft en bl oody conflicts em er ged a s the Habsburgs sought to re-asse r t the ir undispu ted hegem on y ove r all o f Hun gary . But d espite the feroc ity of the rel igiou s a nd poli tical co nflicts o f the era, o r perhaps becau se of them , it w as a ce ntury o f conside ra ble lite rary activity and ri ch in cultu re. A s the intelli ge ntsia, the cl erics a nd teach ers sou ght to reach a nd influen ce the opinio n s a nd allegia n ces o f the Slavic populati o n , a po pul ar ve rn acul a r literature d eveloped . T o be sure, th e C zech Biblictin a or Kralictin a was o ften employed as sort o f a proto -Slovak literary la n gu age. But thi s u se of Czech , albe it in creasingly adapted b y the u se o f Slovaki sm s, se rved both to provide a lexicogra phic foundati on upo n which a mo re p ro per Slovak litera ry la ngu age could be codifi ed du r in g the eigh teenth a nd early ninetee nth ce nturies and to foster intellectu al co ntacts a nd exch a n ges betwee n Slovaks and C zech s. This m eant th at Slovak intellectu als would b e influ en ced b y a nd refl ect the b road er cultu ral and political movem ents of their age. This can be see n w ith pa rticul a r cl a rity in the d evotional literature of the seventee nth ce n tury. It is in works d esigned fo r the u se of the m asses th a t the esse nti al core of the ideology o f a specific group o r ind iv idu al, especially as it perta ins to the particul ar issu es being contested , is clearl y a nd forcefully enuncia ted . At the sa m e time, d evotional liter ature also tend s to codi fy the fo rmal u sage o f a la n gu a ge a nd sta bilize o r , in som e cases, retard its d evelopme n t. Bibles, h ymnbooks, prayerboo ks, catechi sm s, a n d o ther d evotio n al m aterials, therefore, ou ght to be carefull y studied fo r bo th the ir theological a nd the ir cultural or lingui sti c significance. Bu t it is p recisely the fo rm er stud ies th at are lackin g. While ther e have bee n m a n y inves ti gat io n s of the li nguistic as pects o f wo rks produ ced b y Slovaks d urin g the seve nteenth century, the a n alysis o f these works within the b road er co ntex t of Slovak , Slavic, a nd European history has bee n less t ha n a d equ ate. Y et, eve n a cursory examin a tio n of the wo rk s pen ned by Slovaks during thi s ce ntury will indicate tha t they ind eed were aware of a nd pa rticipated in the broad er m ovem en ts of seven tee nth ce ntury cul ture. Writte n durin g the age ge ne rally d eno mina ted b y hi sto ri a n s as Ba roqu e, Slovak a nd Czech d evotio n al wo rks reflect the theological stru ggles, con cern s, a nd emphases of the pe riod . Often w ritte n to edify a nd es pecially to con sole Christi a n s in a wo rld to rn b y 78 SLOVAKIA conflict in whi ch sufferin g had becom e all too fa mili a r , these works a ttempted to build up and confirm individu als in their faith , provide them with spiritual comfort in the face of excru cia ting h a rdships, a nd en coura ge ethical sta ndards of conduct. By examinin g the variou s specific emphases of these works, then , o n e can di scern th e p a rticul ar issu es and problems which were perceived as m ost significant by individual authors. H e nce, they help to identify and elucida te th e ge neral self-pe rceptio n of the age. In additio n , m ore deta iled examin atio n s of seve nteenth-ce ntury literature might also indicate that co mmo nly held histo rical interpretive traditions might have to be aba ndon ed or a t least carefull y reexamined . Tantalizing implications of the study of Du creu x a re first that the traditional view of the decisive decline of a form al, high Slavic langu age and culture in Bohemia a fte r White M ounta in mu st be ab a n doned , and second tha t the process of re-Catholicization of the predominantly P rotesta nt popula tio n mu st be m o re carefull y studied . While no one can igno re or di smiss ou t of ha nd the fac t tha t mu ch d epended on the milita ry support given to the cau se of Counte r-Reformation by the Habsburgs, there seem s to be some eviden ce that the program ofre-conver sion was made easie r b y the simil a rity of wo r ship form s a nd , m o re importantly, the d evotio n al m a terial s employed by C zech U traqui sts and C atholics and by Luthera n s and C a tholics in Slovakia . Even thou gh much more research n eed s to be done to substanti a te thi s h yp othesis, it would a ppear , o n the b as is of the evide nce availa ble, th a t a similarity in the tone, indeed , in som e of the contents, of seventeen th-century devotional m a terials, a ided the p rocess of re-Catholicizati on . It also a ided in the creation of a b roader Slavic " imperial " culture alo ngside the Germanic " imperial " culture of the H ab sburg d ynasty. On the on e ha nd , this repl aced the m edieval L a tin culture a nd community w hich h ad existed prior to the R e form a tion a nd fos tered the process of the pa rticul a riza tion of European sta tes. On the o ther ha nd , unlike that of the Hun garia n s, the Sla vic a nd G erma n cultura l fo rm s in sou th -eastern E urope we re not specifically or exclu sively identifi ed with a sin gle territory or sta te . Thu s, they were m o re acceptable to the H a bsburgs who endeavored to en ge nde r a m on g the peopl es over w hi ch they ruled a loyalty to the ir d y n asty and empire. Durin g the seve nteenth cen tury , the n , Slovak a nd Czech a uthors, often unwittingly, m ay h ave actu all y a ided in the creatio n of tha t very d y n astic system w hich , two ce ntu ries SLOVAXIA 79 later, they would rend asunder over the question of their language rights and the attempts to actualize politically their own ethnic self-consciousness which had been fostered by seventeenth-century devotional literature. Prese nt ed as co mm entary in Panel 99, "Devotional Literature in Seventeenth Century Slovakia , " a t th e AAASS conve ntion in Washington , D.C. on 17 O ctober 1982.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Some Observations on Devotional Literature and Culture: Response Description An account of the resource David P. Daniel Slovakia, Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83 pp. 76-79 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Daniel, David P., 1940-2020 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/94e009273995fadc75925b7f68a42081.pdf fdb6871601db10592fbe17f31f33f364 PDF Text Text 92 SLOVAKIA Some Personal Observations on the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference By Susan Po j er, B .A. In March of 1973 I was asked to participate in the Slovak League of America Conference held on May 19, 1973, as a youth panel member, but was hesitant at first to accept because I felt that I had nothing of any value to contribute to such a gathering. Although I am a young Slovak-American and have a B.A. degree in European history, I must confess that I knew very little about the history and political development of Slovakia. My knowledge of the language and my ability to speak and understand Slovak had dwindled to a few words and phrases over the years. Fortunately for me, I still belong to a predominantly Slovak parish and my parents have maintained many of the Slovak customs and traditions so that I was not totally out of touch with my Slovak heritage. As I researched my own topic for discussion ( Slovak Folk Art) I began to get a glimpse into the nature of the Slovak people - their longing for beauty in the midst of poverty and hardship, their toughness and practicality in their everyday dealings with life and their piety and reverence for God and his creations. I started to experience a new-found pride in my ethnic background and in my ancestors which was strengthened at the Conference where I saw young and old come together to share their own feelings as to what means to be a Slovak-American. During the morning session, we were all separated into two panel groups (the youth and the older members) . During the youth session many areas were discussed covering a wide range of topics - the new Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act (Sen. Schweiker's Ethnic Studies Act), fraternal societies, a trip to Slovakia, Slovakia in �SLOVAKIA 93 history, and my own on Slovak folk art. After these talks were over, a general discussion ensued in which three major points were emphasized. The role of Slovak youth in educating the public and even re-educating their own parents as well as themselves was a topic heatedly discussed. Groups from many states elaborated on what they, as Slovak-Americans, were doing in their areas to help perpetuate the Slovak heritage and inform the public. Some had formed social clubs, others held language classes, while still others tried to get articles in their local papers on what the Slovaks in the community were doing. Another point discussed was the question of why there exists today so many different fraternal organizations. The concensus was that the unification of all fraternals into one large body with a substantial financial power could be a great new force in Slovak circles. We felt that the days of the dues-paying fraternals were numbered and that only one giant organization could keep the youth involved and interested in the ideals on which those many fraternals were originally founded. The third and most important point stressed throughout those morning discussions was the new Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act which had been passed by Congress in 1972. To date, however, no governmental funds have as yet been appropriated. Everyone agreed that the establishment of a Slovak ethnic studies center and the further government funding of existing academic, library, and Slovak language facilities was the most constructive way of educating the public and more important of providing our own youth with the educational opportunities (language courses, majors in Slovak studies for college students, a possible central publishing house and extensive monthly magazine or Slovak newspaper on events happening in Slovakia, etc.) to thoroughly investigate all aspects of the Slovak heritage and identity. The youth members present also requested the entire conference and heads of fraternals to support this Act by publishing in their journals, newspapers, and magazines a letter to encourage all readers to write to their legislators �94 SLOVAKIA to put pressure on the executive branch to fund these centers. During lunch, we heard a distinguished guest speaker, State Senator Michael A. O'Pake, of Pennsylvania. He encouraged us all to be proud of our Slovak heritage. Himself half Slovak, he pointed out the qualities in the Slovak people which we should be most proud of and pleaded to the assembly and to all Slovaks to become involved in the governmental system. He stated that, unlike other ethnic groups, the Slovaks never really took an interest in politics and it is high time that they did, as a group and as individuals. He also requested that we support local Slovak candidates for office. After lunch was over, we all assembled for a general meeting in which the youth and the older members informed one another of what had been discussed during their morning session. At the close of business, the Conference adjourned until next year. As I left the Statler Hilton Hotel, where the Conference had taken place, I had a feeling of rejuvenation, as if something inside of me had been reborn. I was also quite ashamed of my lack of knowledge of many aspects of Slovak culture as well as my almost total uncomprehension of the talks given in Slovak in which I could only catch a glimpse of a word here and there. I resolved to rectify both situations immediately. While riding home on the train, many ideas and thoughts for next year's Conference began to form in my mind and I would like to share them here. The major problem among the youth that I found when discussing a topic was the large age difference of the participants. Young people from 15 to 35 years of age were there and many discussions were beyond some. I feel that a Conference should be held for those ranging in age from 14 to 18 (high school level) and supervised by the young adult group. Or, at least next year, there should be separation into three age groups rather than two. As a college student and an M.A. candidate, I would hope to see in the near future a more scholarly symposium lasting perhaps a weekend with guest lecturers and speakers �SLOVAKIA 95 (university professors, Slovak political leaders, from here and from abroad, if possible, authors of books on Slovakia, etc.) in which students, teachers, and other interested parties could meet to discuss problems and topics on Slovak history, politics, language, literature and art. I would also like to see a weekend cultural fair as part of the Conference. It could include displays on all aspects of Slovak art, crafts, costumes, dancing, music as well as many others so that the non-Slovak public could also come and learn. Finally, I would like to see a quarterly or, if possible, monthly newsleter published for the young adult age group of 19 to 35. In it could be articles on what groups throughout the country were doing. This newsletter might also serve as a directory, constantly being up-dated, of, for example, where Slovak could be learned, what universities and colleges give courses in aspects of Slovak culture and ethnic studies, the availability of guest lecturers for groups, any news of trips to Slovakia, news of Slovak arts and crafts exhibits at local museums, etc., as well as language lessons, news items on what is happening in Slovakia from the press, and a listing of the latest books and articles published on Slovakia. I have tried to relate my own experiences at the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference. I have also made suggestions for future Conferences, proposed some new ideas. I would welcome any criticisms or further suggestions regarding the proposals I have presented. In summation I can say that this Conference has only wet my appetite to learn more about my Slovak heritage and my role as a Slovak-American. I look forward to the 1974 Conference with great anticipation and would encourage more youth to attend and voice their opinions. THE NOV .A SCENA dramatic company premiered Ivan Stodola's original ''Diogenes" version on the stage in Bratislava last May to celebrate the Slovak playwright's 85th birthday. � 92 SLOVAKIA Some Personal Observations on the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference By Susan Po j er, B .A. In March of 1973 I was asked to participate in the Slovak League of America Conference held on May 19, 1973, as a youth panel member, but was hesitant at first to accept because I felt that I had nothing of any value to contribute to such a gathering. Although I am a young Slovak-American and have a B.A. degree in European history, I must confess that I knew very little about the history and political development of Slovakia. My knowledge of the language and my ability to speak and understand Slovak had dwindled to a few words and phrases over the years. Fortunately for me, I still belong to a predominantly Slovak parish and my parents have maintained many of the Slovak customs and traditions so that I was not totally out of touch with my Slovak heritage. As I researched my own topic for discussion ( Slovak Folk Art) I began to get a glimpse into the nature of the Slovak people - their longing for beauty in the midst of poverty and hardship, their toughness and practicality in their everyday dealings with life and their piety and reverence for God and his creations. I started to experience a new-found pride in my ethnic background and in my ancestors which was strengthened at the Conference where I saw young and old come together to share their own feelings as to what means to be a Slovak-American. During the morning session, we were all separated into two panel groups (the youth and the older members) . During the youth session many areas were discussed covering a wide range of topics - the new Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act (Sen. Schweiker's Ethnic Studies Act), fraternal societies, a trip to Slovakia, Slovakia in �SLOVAKIA 93 history, and my own on Slovak folk art. After these talks were over, a general discussion ensued in which three major points were emphasized. The role of Slovak youth in educating the public and even re-educating their own parents as well as themselves was a topic heatedly discussed. Groups from many states elaborated on what they, as Slovak-Americans, were doing in their areas to help perpetuate the Slovak heritage and inform the public. Some had formed social clubs, others held language classes, while still others tried to get articles in their local papers on what the Slovaks in the community were doing. Another point discussed was the question of why there exists today so many different fraternal organizations. The concensus was that the unification of all fraternals into one large body with a substantial financial power could be a great new force in Slovak circles. We felt that the days of the dues-paying fraternals were numbered and that only one giant organization could keep the youth involved and interested in the ideals on which those many fraternals were originally founded. The third and most important point stressed throughout those morning discussions was the new Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act which had been passed by Congress in 1972. To date, however, no governmental funds have as yet been appropriated. Everyone agreed that the establishment of a Slovak ethnic studies center and the further government funding of existing academic, library, and Slovak language facilities was the most constructive way of educating the public and more important of providing our own youth with the educational opportunities (language courses, majors in Slovak studies for college students, a possible central publishing house and extensive monthly magazine or Slovak newspaper on events happening in Slovakia, etc.) to thoroughly investigate all aspects of the Slovak heritage and identity. The youth members present also requested the entire conference and heads of fraternals to support this Act by publishing in their journals, newspapers, and magazines a letter to encourage all readers to write to their legislators �94 SLOVAKIA to put pressure on the executive branch to fund these centers. During lunch, we heard a distinguished guest speaker, State Senator Michael A. O'Pake, of Pennsylvania. He encouraged us all to be proud of our Slovak heritage. Himself half Slovak, he pointed out the qualities in the Slovak people which we should be most proud of and pleaded to the assembly and to all Slovaks to become involved in the governmental system. He stated that, unlike other ethnic groups, the Slovaks never really took an interest in politics and it is high time that they did, as a group and as individuals. He also requested that we support local Slovak candidates for office. After lunch was over, we all assembled for a general meeting in which the youth and the older members informed one another of what had been discussed during their morning session. At the close of business, the Conference adjourned until next year. As I left the Statler Hilton Hotel, where the Conference had taken place, I had a feeling of rejuvenation, as if something inside of me had been reborn. I was also quite ashamed of my lack of knowledge of many aspects of Slovak culture as well as my almost total uncomprehension of the talks given in Slovak in which I could only catch a glimpse of a word here and there. I resolved to rectify both situations immediately. While riding home on the train, many ideas and thoughts for next year's Conference began to form in my mind and I would like to share them here. The major problem among the youth that I found when discussing a topic was the large age difference of the participants. Young people from 15 to 35 years of age were there and many discussions were beyond some. I feel that a Conference should be held for those ranging in age from 14 to 18 (high school level) and supervised by the young adult group. Or, at least next year, there should be separation into three age groups rather than two. As a college student and an M.A. candidate, I would hope to see in the near future a more scholarly symposium lasting perhaps a weekend with guest lecturers and speakers �SLOVAKIA 95 (university professors, Slovak political leaders, from here and from abroad, if possible, authors of books on Slovakia, etc.) in which students, teachers, and other interested parties could meet to discuss problems and topics on Slovak history, politics, language, literature and art. I would also like to see a weekend cultural fair as part of the Conference. It could include displays on all aspects of Slovak art, crafts, costumes, dancing, music as well as many others so that the non-Slovak public could also come and learn. Finally, I would like to see a quarterly or, if possible, monthly newsleter published for the young adult age group of 19 to 35. In it could be articles on what groups throughout the country were doing. This newsletter might also serve as a directory, constantly being up-dated, of, for example, where Slovak could be learned, what universities and colleges give courses in aspects of Slovak culture and ethnic studies, the availability of guest lecturers for groups, any news of trips to Slovakia, news of Slovak arts and crafts exhibits at local museums, etc., as well as language lessons, news items on what is happening in Slovakia from the press, and a listing of the latest books and articles published on Slovakia. I have tried to relate my own experiences at the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference. I have also made suggestions for future Conferences, proposed some new ideas. I would welcome any criticisms or further suggestions regarding the proposals I have presented. In summation I can say that this Conference has only wet my appetite to learn more about my Slovak heritage and my role as a Slovak-American. I look forward to the 1974 Conference with great anticipation and would encourage more youth to attend and voice their opinions. THE NOV .A SCENA dramatic company premiered Ivan Stodola's original ''Diogenes" version on the stage in Bratislava last May to celebrate the Slovak playwright's 85th birthday. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 92 SLOVAKIA Some Personal Observations on the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference By Susan Po j er, B .A. In March of 1973 I was asked to participate in the Slovak League of America Conference held on May 19, 1973, as a youth panel member, but was hesitant at first to accept because I felt that I had nothing of any value to contribute to such a gathering. Although I am a young Slovak-American and have a B.A. degree in European history, I must confess that I knew very little about the history and political development of Slovakia. My knowledge of the language and my ability to speak and understand Slovak had dwindled to a few words and phrases over the years. Fortunately for me, I still belong to a predominantly Slovak parish and my parents have maintained many of the Slovak customs and traditions so that I was not totally out of touch with my Slovak heritage. As I researched my own topic for discussion ( Slovak Folk Art) I began to get a glimpse into the nature of the Slovak people - their longing for beauty in the midst of poverty and hardship, their toughness and practicality in their everyday dealings with life and their piety and reverence for God and his creations. I started to experience a new-found pride in my ethnic background and in my ancestors which was strengthened at the Conference where I saw young and old come together to share their own feelings as to what means to be a Slovak-American. During the morning session, we were all separated into two panel groups (the youth and the older members) . During the youth session many areas were discussed covering a wide range of topics - the new Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act (Sen. Schweiker's Ethnic Studies Act), fraternal societies, a trip to Slovakia, Slovakia in SLOVAKIA 93 history, and my own on Slovak folk art. After these talks were over, a general discussion ensued in which three major points were emphasized. The role of Slovak youth in educating the public and even re-educating their own parents as well as themselves was a topic heatedly discussed. Groups from many states elaborated on what they, as Slovak-Americans, were doing in their areas to help perpetuate the Slovak heritage and inform the public. Some had formed social clubs, others held language classes, while still others tried to get articles in their local papers on what the Slovaks in the community were doing. Another point discussed was the question of why there exists today so many different fraternal organizations. The concensus was that the unification of all fraternals into one large body with a substantial financial power could be a great new force in Slovak circles. We felt that the days of the dues-paying fraternals were numbered and that only one giant organization could keep the youth involved and interested in the ideals on which those many fraternals were originally founded. The third and most important point stressed throughout those morning discussions was the new Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act which had been passed by Congress in 1972. To date, however, no governmental funds have as yet been appropriated. Everyone agreed that the establishment of a Slovak ethnic studies center and the further government funding of existing academic, library, and Slovak language facilities was the most constructive way of educating the public and more important of providing our own youth with the educational opportunities (language courses, majors in Slovak studies for college students, a possible central publishing house and extensive monthly magazine or Slovak newspaper on events happening in Slovakia, etc.) to thoroughly investigate all aspects of the Slovak heritage and identity. The youth members present also requested the entire conference and heads of fraternals to support this Act by publishing in their journals, newspapers, and magazines a letter to encourage all readers to write to their legislators 94 SLOVAKIA to put pressure on the executive branch to fund these centers. During lunch, we heard a distinguished guest speaker, State Senator Michael A. O'Pake, of Pennsylvania. He encouraged us all to be proud of our Slovak heritage. Himself half Slovak, he pointed out the qualities in the Slovak people which we should be most proud of and pleaded to the assembly and to all Slovaks to become involved in the governmental system. He stated that, unlike other ethnic groups, the Slovaks never really took an interest in politics and it is high time that they did, as a group and as individuals. He also requested that we support local Slovak candidates for office. After lunch was over, we all assembled for a general meeting in which the youth and the older members informed one another of what had been discussed during their morning session. At the close of business, the Conference adjourned until next year. As I left the Statler Hilton Hotel, where the Conference had taken place, I had a feeling of rejuvenation, as if something inside of me had been reborn. I was also quite ashamed of my lack of knowledge of many aspects of Slovak culture as well as my almost total uncomprehension of the talks given in Slovak in which I could only catch a glimpse of a word here and there. I resolved to rectify both situations immediately. While riding home on the train, many ideas and thoughts for next year's Conference began to form in my mind and I would like to share them here. The major problem among the youth that I found when discussing a topic was the large age difference of the participants. Young people from 15 to 35 years of age were there and many discussions were beyond some. I feel that a Conference should be held for those ranging in age from 14 to 18 (high school level) and supervised by the young adult group. Or, at least next year, there should be separation into three age groups rather than two. As a college student and an M.A. candidate, I would hope to see in the near future a more scholarly symposium lasting perhaps a weekend with guest lecturers and speakers SLOVAKIA 95 (university professors, Slovak political leaders, from here and from abroad, if possible, authors of books on Slovakia, etc.) in which students, teachers, and other interested parties could meet to discuss problems and topics on Slovak history, politics, language, literature and art. I would also like to see a weekend cultural fair as part of the Conference. It could include displays on all aspects of Slovak art, crafts, costumes, dancing, music as well as many others so that the non-Slovak public could also come and learn. Finally, I would like to see a quarterly or, if possible, monthly newsleter published for the young adult age group of 19 to 35. In it could be articles on what groups throughout the country were doing. This newsletter might also serve as a directory, constantly being up-dated, of, for example, where Slovak could be learned, what universities and colleges give courses in aspects of Slovak culture and ethnic studies, the availability of guest lecturers for groups, any news of trips to Slovakia, news of Slovak arts and crafts exhibits at local museums, etc., as well as language lessons, news items on what is happening in Slovakia from the press, and a listing of the latest books and articles published on Slovakia. I have tried to relate my own experiences at the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference. I have also made suggestions for future Conferences, proposed some new ideas. I would welcome any criticisms or further suggestions regarding the proposals I have presented. In summation I can say that this Conference has only wet my appetite to learn more about my Slovak heritage and my role as a Slovak-American. I look forward to the 1974 Conference with great anticipation and would encourage more youth to attend and voice their opinions. THE NOV .A SCENA dramatic company premiered Ivan Stodola's original ''Diogenes" version on the stage in Bratislava last May to celebrate the Slovak playwright's 85th birthday.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Some Personal Observations on the 1973 Slovak League of America Conference Description An account of the resource Susan Pojer, B.A. Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 92-95 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pojer, Susan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2459d0887b7c2d09ce8339baaf28b113.pdf cd98f5cf7cc4c1791d3ad267c8c81987 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 51 SOVIET RUSSIAN PUPPETS By Edward Delaney No better example can today than the oft repeated .seizure of Czecho-Slovakia, column in the Congressional A-4447. be spotlighted for the record lie concerning the Communist which is the heading on a Record of May 25, 1960, page In that column is the text of a letter written to the "'New York Times" by Dr. Peter Zenkl. The letter makes reference to the demand by the Czecho-Slovak government that our Secretary of State, Christian Herter, apologize for a remark recen:tly malde, to the effect that Communists seized power in that country by force in February 1948. It certainly is a brazen attempt to rewrite history, because the Communists seized power in Czecho-Slovakia in May 1945 and not in February 1948. Moreover, it was not necessary to use force. Communist control was accomplished months before, when .the former president of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Eduard Benes, went to Moscow and there signed an agreement with Josef Stalin, in which he betrayed his country and his people to Communist serfdom. As a reward for that gesture and aid to Soviet de.signs, Stalin permitted him to return to Prague in the guise of a "liberator." He was the "front" for the Soviet Union, contrary to volumes of words from his sychophants in an unsuccessful effort to show that he was not a willing collaborator with Moscow. In the Prague government headed by the Communist leader Klement Gottwald, was Peter Zenkl as his deputy or vice premier. Anti-Communists were either liquidated or imprisoned. So when Zenkl returned to Prague to begin his close association with the perfidious Benes he certainly was not one of the anti-Communists, or he would have been jailed wi1:h the genuine patriots who refused to be subservient to Moscow. It was reported that some thirty thousand anti-Com- �52 SLOVAKIA munists were rounded up and jailed. I cannot assert thaJ: number is correct, but I can declare that BartholomewStreet prison, one of the three largest in the city, was filled to severa:l times its capacity, for I was among the an:i-Communists incarcerated in that prison for a'bout six weeks. In the large cell in which I was confined, with prisoners being brought in or taken out all hours of the day and night, were, at various times, the former Mayor of Prague, leading bankers, industrialists, a colonel, a capt ain and two lieutenants of the local militia, who refused t o bow to the Reds, professional athletes, musicians, merchants and other genuine patriots. Zenkl was not among those freedom fighters. Most of the prisoners were Czechs. While Zenk! was vice-premier the most barbarous. terrorism and atrocities were inflicted on the anti-Commu-nists. Special inhumanities were imposed on the Slovaks who were and still are fiercely anti-Communist and on the Sudeten Germans. Zenk! cannot wash his hands of the blood that was. shed by the real patriots during the long period when he was deputy premier for the Communist dictator, Gottwald. He was a reliruble colh1:borator and vassal of Moscow ag. long as the Communists needeid his services. There is a striking contrast between Zenkl and other political leaders in that country who were and are unplacable and militant foes of Communists, whether they be Soviet or of any other nationality. Proposals were made by Moscow to the President, the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovakia - the independent state that existed from March 1939 to May 1945 - to re-· main in their respective offices and "front" for the Soviet Union, precisely as Benes had agreed to do in Prague. Because those leaders refused to betray their God and their people by collaborating with atheistic Communists of the Kremlin, they were marked for liquidation. It is a disgraceful chapter in the recorded events of those days, but it is indelliibly written on those pages that 1those Slovak pa:riots, those defiant anti-Communists, were delivered to Stalin and Benes by American military and civilian autho- �SLOVAKIA 53 rities- some to be executed and others for lifelong imprisonment. Dr. Peter Zenkl was high in the Communist councils of Czecho-Slovakia at that time. There is no record of him working for the freedom of those valiant antiCommunists. On .the contrary - he - now referred to as a leading Czech patriot - by his silence, gave tacit approval to the destruction of those genuine patriots. For the past fifteen years those of us who witnessed or are familiar with the incidents connected wilth the so-called seizure of Czecho~Slovakia, have stated in print and in public that it became a Soviet satellite in May 1945. The so~called "coup" said to have taken place in February 1948, was merely the consummation of a Soviet design for complete control of thaJt country. It is also a matter of record that the delivery of that country to the Soviet Union, in 1945, was with the approval of the hierar,c hy of our elect in Washington. Deny that charge though they will - they cannot erase the disgraceful reco11d. Those like Zenkl and certain other co-collaborationists with the Communists in that oppressed country, who through devious means and through the influence of certain elements gained admission to this country would like to perpetuate the fiction of a "coup" in 1948, which they say resulted in the seizure of Czecho-Slovakia by the Communists. It will then appear easier for them to whitewash themselves of the guilt they shared in the Communist crimes for the three years 1945 to 1948. Singularly enough, a coterie of those Communist collaborators from Prague has long been identified with the twin frauds , Radio Free Europe and Crusade for Freedom, where they carried on their proselyting for what they preferred to call the "socialist" State of Czecho-Slovakia - which is their verbal camouflage for a Communist state. For that reason we spotlight that column of the Congressional Record - at this time. THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound In cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY - by Joseph Skultety; 229 pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � SLOVAKIA 51 SOVIET RUSSIAN PUPPETS By Edward Delaney No better example can today than the oft repeated .seizure of Czecho-Slovakia, column in the Congressional A-4447. be spotlighted for the record lie concerning the Communist which is the heading on a Record of May 25, 1960, page In that column is the text of a letter written to the "'New York Times" by Dr. Peter Zenkl. The letter makes reference to the demand by the Czecho-Slovak government that our Secretary of State, Christian Herter, apologize for a remark recen:tly malde, to the effect that Communists seized power in that country by force in February 1948. It certainly is a brazen attempt to rewrite history, because the Communists seized power in Czecho-Slovakia in May 1945 and not in February 1948. Moreover, it was not necessary to use force. Communist control was accomplished months before, when .the former president of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Eduard Benes, went to Moscow and there signed an agreement with Josef Stalin, in which he betrayed his country and his people to Communist serfdom. As a reward for that gesture and aid to Soviet de.signs, Stalin permitted him to return to Prague in the guise of a "liberator." He was the "front" for the Soviet Union, contrary to volumes of words from his sychophants in an unsuccessful effort to show that he was not a willing collaborator with Moscow. In the Prague government headed by the Communist leader Klement Gottwald, was Peter Zenkl as his deputy or vice premier. Anti-Communists were either liquidated or imprisoned. So when Zenkl returned to Prague to begin his close association with the perfidious Benes he certainly was not one of the anti-Communists, or he would have been jailed wi1:h the genuine patriots who refused to be subservient to Moscow. It was reported that some thirty thousand anti-Com- �52 SLOVAKIA munists were rounded up and jailed. I cannot assert thaJ: number is correct, but I can declare that BartholomewStreet prison, one of the three largest in the city, was filled to severa:l times its capacity, for I was among the an:i-Communists incarcerated in that prison for a'bout six weeks. In the large cell in which I was confined, with prisoners being brought in or taken out all hours of the day and night, were, at various times, the former Mayor of Prague, leading bankers, industrialists, a colonel, a capt ain and two lieutenants of the local militia, who refused t o bow to the Reds, professional athletes, musicians, merchants and other genuine patriots. Zenkl was not among those freedom fighters. Most of the prisoners were Czechs. While Zenk! was vice-premier the most barbarous. terrorism and atrocities were inflicted on the anti-Commu-nists. Special inhumanities were imposed on the Slovaks who were and still are fiercely anti-Communist and on the Sudeten Germans. Zenk! cannot wash his hands of the blood that was. shed by the real patriots during the long period when he was deputy premier for the Communist dictator, Gottwald. He was a reliruble colh1:borator and vassal of Moscow ag. long as the Communists needeid his services. There is a striking contrast between Zenkl and other political leaders in that country who were and are unplacable and militant foes of Communists, whether they be Soviet or of any other nationality. Proposals were made by Moscow to the President, the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovakia - the independent state that existed from March 1939 to May 1945 - to re-· main in their respective offices and "front" for the Soviet Union, precisely as Benes had agreed to do in Prague. Because those leaders refused to betray their God and their people by collaborating with atheistic Communists of the Kremlin, they were marked for liquidation. It is a disgraceful chapter in the recorded events of those days, but it is indelliibly written on those pages that 1those Slovak pa:riots, those defiant anti-Communists, were delivered to Stalin and Benes by American military and civilian autho- �SLOVAKIA 53 rities- some to be executed and others for lifelong imprisonment. Dr. Peter Zenkl was high in the Communist councils of Czecho-Slovakia at that time. There is no record of him working for the freedom of those valiant antiCommunists. On .the contrary - he - now referred to as a leading Czech patriot - by his silence, gave tacit approval to the destruction of those genuine patriots. For the past fifteen years those of us who witnessed or are familiar with the incidents connected wilth the so-called seizure of Czecho~Slovakia, have stated in print and in public that it became a Soviet satellite in May 1945. The so~called "coup" said to have taken place in February 1948, was merely the consummation of a Soviet design for complete control of thaJt country. It is also a matter of record that the delivery of that country to the Soviet Union, in 1945, was with the approval of the hierar,c hy of our elect in Washington. Deny that charge though they will - they cannot erase the disgraceful reco11d. Those like Zenkl and certain other co-collaborationists with the Communists in that oppressed country, who through devious means and through the influence of certain elements gained admission to this country would like to perpetuate the fiction of a "coup" in 1948, which they say resulted in the seizure of Czecho-Slovakia by the Communists. It will then appear easier for them to whitewash themselves of the guilt they shared in the Communist crimes for the three years 1945 to 1948. Singularly enough, a coterie of those Communist collaborators from Prague has long been identified with the twin frauds , Radio Free Europe and Crusade for Freedom, where they carried on their proselyting for what they preferred to call the "socialist" State of Czecho-Slovakia - which is their verbal camouflage for a Communist state. For that reason we spotlight that column of the Congressional Record - at this time. THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound In cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY - by Joseph Skultety; 229 pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1961, Vol. 11 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 33), March-June 1961.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 34), September-December June 1961.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 51 SOVIET RUSSIAN PUPPETS By Edward Delaney No better example can today than the oft repeated .seizure of Czecho-Slovakia, column in the Congressional A-4447. be spotlighted for the record lie concerning the Communist which is the heading on a Record of May 25, 1960, page In that column is the text of a letter written to the "'New York Times" by Dr. Peter Zenkl. The letter makes reference to the demand by the Czecho-Slovak government that our Secretary of State, Christian Herter, apologize for a remark recen:tly malde, to the effect that Communists seized power in that country by force in February 1948. It certainly is a brazen attempt to rewrite history, because the Communists seized power in Czecho-Slovakia in May 1945 and not in February 1948. Moreover, it was not necessary to use force. Communist control was accomplished months before, when .the former president of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Eduard Benes, went to Moscow and there signed an agreement with Josef Stalin, in which he betrayed his country and his people to Communist serfdom. As a reward for that gesture and aid to Soviet de.signs, Stalin permitted him to return to Prague in the guise of a "liberator." He was the "front" for the Soviet Union, contrary to volumes of words from his sychophants in an unsuccessful effort to show that he was not a willing collaborator with Moscow. In the Prague government headed by the Communist leader Klement Gottwald, was Peter Zenkl as his deputy or vice premier. Anti-Communists were either liquidated or imprisoned. So when Zenkl returned to Prague to begin his close association with the perfidious Benes he certainly was not one of the anti-Communists, or he would have been jailed wi1:h the genuine patriots who refused to be subservient to Moscow. It was reported that some thirty thousand anti-Com- 52 SLOVAKIA munists were rounded up and jailed. I cannot assert thaJ: number is correct, but I can declare that BartholomewStreet prison, one of the three largest in the city, was filled to severa:l times its capacity, for I was among the an:i-Communists incarcerated in that prison for a'bout six weeks. In the large cell in which I was confined, with prisoners being brought in or taken out all hours of the day and night, were, at various times, the former Mayor of Prague, leading bankers, industrialists, a colonel, a capt ain and two lieutenants of the local militia, who refused t o bow to the Reds, professional athletes, musicians, merchants and other genuine patriots. Zenkl was not among those freedom fighters. Most of the prisoners were Czechs. While Zenk! was vice-premier the most barbarous. terrorism and atrocities were inflicted on the anti-Commu-nists. Special inhumanities were imposed on the Slovaks who were and still are fiercely anti-Communist and on the Sudeten Germans. Zenk! cannot wash his hands of the blood that was. shed by the real patriots during the long period when he was deputy premier for the Communist dictator, Gottwald. He was a reliruble colh1:borator and vassal of Moscow ag. long as the Communists needeid his services. There is a striking contrast between Zenkl and other political leaders in that country who were and are unplacable and militant foes of Communists, whether they be Soviet or of any other nationality. Proposals were made by Moscow to the President, the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovakia - the independent state that existed from March 1939 to May 1945 - to re-· main in their respective offices and "front" for the Soviet Union, precisely as Benes had agreed to do in Prague. Because those leaders refused to betray their God and their people by collaborating with atheistic Communists of the Kremlin, they were marked for liquidation. It is a disgraceful chapter in the recorded events of those days, but it is indelliibly written on those pages that 1those Slovak pa:riots, those defiant anti-Communists, were delivered to Stalin and Benes by American military and civilian autho- SLOVAKIA 53 rities- some to be executed and others for lifelong imprisonment. Dr. Peter Zenkl was high in the Communist councils of Czecho-Slovakia at that time. There is no record of him working for the freedom of those valiant antiCommunists. On .the contrary - he - now referred to as a leading Czech patriot - by his silence, gave tacit approval to the destruction of those genuine patriots. For the past fifteen years those of us who witnessed or are familiar with the incidents connected wilth the so-called seizure of Czecho~Slovakia, have stated in print and in public that it became a Soviet satellite in May 1945. The so~called "coup" said to have taken place in February 1948, was merely the consummation of a Soviet design for complete control of thaJt country. It is also a matter of record that the delivery of that country to the Soviet Union, in 1945, was with the approval of the hierar,c hy of our elect in Washington. Deny that charge though they will - they cannot erase the disgraceful reco11d. Those like Zenkl and certain other co-collaborationists with the Communists in that oppressed country, who through devious means and through the influence of certain elements gained admission to this country would like to perpetuate the fiction of a "coup" in 1948, which they say resulted in the seizure of Czecho-Slovakia by the Communists. It will then appear easier for them to whitewash themselves of the guilt they shared in the Communist crimes for the three years 1945 to 1948. Singularly enough, a coterie of those Communist collaborators from Prague has long been identified with the twin frauds , Radio Free Europe and Crusade for Freedom, where they carried on their proselyting for what they preferred to call the "socialist" State of Czecho-Slovakia - which is their verbal camouflage for a Communist state. For that reason we spotlight that column of the Congressional Record - at this time. THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound In cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY - by Joseph Skultety; 229 pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth $2.00; paper cover - $1.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Soviet Russian Puppets Description An account of the resource Edward Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (33), March-June 1961 pp. 51-53 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1961 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f0889b6e509447fe7e5207ea74a376f2.pdf f3ee84cb470dfeb7c01a92045869edf1 PDF Text Text 58 SLOVAKIA SS. Cyril And Methodius: Tl.lEIR FIRST TRIP TO ROME MIC.HAEIL LACKO, S. J. After forty months in Great Moravia, why did SS. Cyril and Methodius go to Rome? Another question that has puzzled many in past centuries: Did they set out for Rome or Constantinople (By,zantium) ? In the 1aTIE (biography) of Constantine-Cyril, written in Old Slovaik, it is noted that "after 40 months in Mora'V'ia, they (Cyril and Methodius) set out to ha,ve their disctples ordained" 1 . It is rather clear then that we are here concerned with their first journey to Rome. The Italian version of the ZITIE, referring to this journey, says: '4Manserunt autem in Moravia per annos quattuor et dim.idium ... " 2 • The la,tter version tells us that the trip to Rome was under.taken by the saintly brathers after they had spent four and a half years in the land of Rastislav, while the Old Slova!k text relates that they went to Rome after a:bout three and a half years in Great Moravia. F. Grivec explained this difference excellently: in the Old Slovak text only the time spent in Great Moravia is considered, while in the Italian text we have included also the time Cyril and Methodius spent with Kocel' (Pribina's son) and in Venice, as well as the time spent on their journey to Rome3 • The SloV'ak Arpostles came to Rome with their group shortly after the election of Pope Adrian IL that is, after December 14, 867. Therefore, they came to Great Moravia four and a half years prior to that date, that is, about the .b eginning of the summer of 863, and set out for Rome at the end of 866 or the beginning of 867. Why did they saintly brothers go to Rome at that time? To have their disciples ordained to the priesthood is the simple and usual reply of many authors. Some authors, however, claim that Pope Nicholas I called them directly to R'Ome when he had learned of their missionary activity. But from the Old SlovaJk text of the filTIE. it ie very much more probably that Pope Nicholas sent them an invitation (litteras aipostolicas) after they had arrived �SLOVAKIA 59 in Venice. Could there be any other reason why Cyril and fMethodius went to Rome just at that time ? l see an indirect reply to this question in one document which seems to have escaped the attention of historians: the "Responsa Papae Nicolai I ad consultationes Ludovici regis Germaniae per Salomonem episcopum Constantiensem translatas" 4 • The manuscript containing the "responsa" is not dated5 but the text allows us to conclude that Salomon, a messenger or representative of King Louis, came to Rome about Easter Day, 864, and, therefore, the "responsa" were issued shortly thereafter. The ninth point of this document is generally well known: it mentions Louis's preparations for war with Rastislav and his plans to meet with the Bulgarian King Boris at Tulln on the Danube. Point four, however, appears to be less known and even still less mentioned, though I think it throws much light on the question before us. Bishop Hartwig of Passau, according to the tex:t:,6 suffered from a stroke since 8l60 and could neither talk nor manage his diocese. Salomon therefore requested that a new bishop be appointed in Hartwig's place7 • The Pope replied that, according to ecclesiastical law, Hartwig should resign from his bishopric ("saltem scriipto") if he really cannot administer it. OtheIWise, the iPope continues, a new bishop cannot be appointed, but only a temporary administrator chosen by the clergy. We might ask why there was now suddenly expressed so much concern about getting a new bishop since Hartwig suffered the effects of the stroke for 4 years? It appears to me that the e~lanation may be found in the conditions prevailing in Great Moravia at that time. Salomon came to Rome about Easter Day of 864, that is, about eight months after SS. Cyril and Methodius began their :missionary activity in Great Moravia, the land of the Rast:islav Slovaks. He came to Rome to lodge a protest against their presence and their mission. The Slovak Apostles soon gained the love and trust of Rastislav's people, but at the same time also the enmity of the German missionaries whom they ha,d displaced. The latter said that the new missionaries from Byzantium came into the territory without the approval of the bishop of Passau; furthermore that they were using Slovak for liturgical servkes and following the Byzantium rite. The German mis- �60 SLOVAKIA inonaries resented being pushed out of the land of the Slovaks. This territory was under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Passau since 8219. Bishop Hartwig, how~r, was not able to intervene in the matter, because he had suffered a stroke. Pope Nicholas I, as we have seen above, could not appoint a new bishop as long as the old bishop did not r~sign9. History tells us that Hartwig did not resign; he remained bishop of Passau until his death at the end of 865 or the beginning of 86610 • In 866 a new bishop was elected, the agile and energetic H.ermanric (866-Dec. 26, 874). The new ordinary, however, could not tackle the Great Moravian problem at once, because shortly after his elevation he led a German missionary e~tion to Bulgaria. When he arrived there a:nd found a similar mission from Rome led by · Bishop Formosus, Hernnanric returned to Passau the same year. In all probability, Hermanric sojourned in Great Moravia, at the end of 866, on his return trip to Passau to ascertain just what was happenning there since the advent of the missionaries from Byzantium. SS. Cyril and Methodius, because of Bishop Hartwig's condition, performed their missionary work in the land of Rastislav without hindrance since 863. When Bishop Hermanric met with the saintly brothers, he undoubtedly asked them on whose authority were they in Great Moravia. Most likely the brothers replied that they came at the request of RastislaJV and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. Hermanric then told them that the territory already for several decades had been under the jurisdiction of the Pa.ssau bishopric and, therefore, under the authority of the patriarchate of Rome; they were there unla.'Wfully and should leave the territory as soon as possible. Now we can understand why SS. Cyril and Methodius soon thereafter, but not later than the beginning of 867, set out on their journey in 867: to straighten out the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the land of the Slovaks. With the aibove in mind, let us now analyze the question whether SS. Cyril and Methodius and their retinue went to Rome or Constantinople. Much has been written about this question. The thesis that they set out for Con- �SLOVAKIA 61 stantinople is defended by the Slavists: Novotny, Hauptmann, Teodorov-Balan, Ohienko, Weingart, Stanislav, and especially Dvornik11 • The intention to journey to Rome is claimed by Pastrne'.k, Lavrov, Hudeeek, Perels, Hrusovsky, and especially Grivec 12 • The first group bases its claim mainly on the words in the ":Zitie Metodovo" which state that the brothers "returned fr-om Moravia" (vyzvratistasja iz Moravy) 13, while the second group analyzes particularly the purpose of the trip: to settle the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the territory of Great Moravia which belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. I rum inclined to the opinion of the latter: the saintly brothers' prior intention was to travel to Rome. From the bove, it appears to be logical that Cyril and Methodius set out for Rome in 867. The territory of Great Moravia, ruled by Rastislav, belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. Constantinople had no authority over that territory; the saintly brothers could not defend their claims against the claims of the bishop of Passau in Constantinople. And when they decided to introduce the Slavak lan,g uage even into the liturgy of the Western Rite, they needed the approval of Rome and not of Constantinople. Similarly their disciples had to be ordained by the authority of the patriarchate on whose territory they were to labor and that was Rome and not Constantinople. There are other sources that clearly indicate the original intention of Cyril and Methodius to mruke their first trip to Rome; some of them come from their disciples, who probably made that trip with them and, hence, are sufficiently authentic. Because they are usually not considered by many writers, I mention them here: 1. Pochvalnoje slovo Kyrillu i Methodiju14 ; 2. Pochvala blazennago otca nasego i ucitera slovenskago Kyrila filosofa15; 3. Proloznoje Zitie Konstantina i Methodija16 ; 4. Zitie Nauma17 ; 5. Grooke Zitie sv. Klimenta18 . Because they knew that even Paul used to announce his glad tidings to the apostles, so Cyril and Methodius, too, hurried to Rome to show the Pope their translaJtion of the Holy Writ. Their trip was successful; they did not go there in vain19 • �62 SLOVAKIA These texts, which represent the original Cyrilo-Methodius tradition, clearly bear witness to the j-Ourney of the saintly brothers to Rome. The only text, which allegedly notes that St. Methodius was consecrated Bishop of Pannonia by the Patriarch of Constantinople, is in cuntradiction to all other sources and, hence, has no value in this respect20 • The phrase "return to Constantinople" (Navrat do Carihradu) refers to their return from the Kha.zar mission, before their departure to Great Moravia. When Cyril and Methodius left Moravia in 867, they were headed for Rome and not for Constantinople. REFERSNCE NOTES 1. IP. A. Lavrov: Materialy po istoriji vozniknovenija drevnejiej slavjanskoj pismennoati, Leningrad, 1930, p. 29. 2. P. iMeyvaert-P. Devos: Trois enigmes Cyrilo-Methodiennes de un document inedit. "Analecta la "Legende ltalique" resolues grace a Bolland1ana," IJXXlIIII (Bruxelles, 1955), p. 459. 3. F. Grivec: Vitae Constantini et Methodli. "Acta Academiae Velehradensis," X,V!N (IO!omouc, 1941), p. 89. 4. 1Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, Vol. Vil, pp. 290-293. 5. Coder Parisie11.sis latinus 10402. 6. 'I'he text in MGH, Ep., p. 292, reads: "De Hartwigo Pazzowensis civitatis episcopo, quem asseritis ante annos quattuor paralysi percussum, ita ut nil valeat loqui et ecclesia sibi commissa dissipetur et ad nihih.un r ed1gatur, du,m et omni pastorali cura destituta et nulla episcopali providentia circumspecta, si ita est, debet idem epi· scopus saltem scripto profiter! se officium lllud non posse peragere ... " 7. ]bidem Nr. 3. 8. Ibidem Nr. 4: 'ISit ergo cura rerum ecclesiasticarum oeconomo electo de proprlo clero iuxta sacros canones." 9. cA.rchbishop Adalwin of Salzburg was infoflmed of Pope Nicholas's reply: MGH, Eplstolae, Vol. VI, pp. 630-631. 10. .P. B. Gama (Series episcoporum Eccfesiae Catholica~, Ratis1bonae, 1873, p. 301) •s tates that Hartwig died on May 18, 866. A. Hauck, on the other hand, notes (Kirchengeschichte •Deutschlands, Bd . .FI, Leipzig, 193·5, Appendix) that Hartwig died in 864 or 865 •s ince it is not known whether he became bishop in 838 or 840. 11. .Frantisek. Dvornik: Les Legendes de Constantin et de Methode vues de Byzance, Prague, 1933, p. 234: ''111 est remar,quable que !es deux Legendes ne disent pas un mot du but du voyage et fassent intervenir le pape apres avoir indique le devlacement des deux freres et leur sejour a Venise. Cela indique qu'ils avaient bien l'intenttion de se rendr e a Constantinople et qu e c'est vral:ment !'intervention ponttficale qui !es empecha d'iexec1tter leur dessin et !es decida a aller a Rome." 12. 1F. Grivec: Konstantin und Method, Lehrer der Slaven, Wies/baden, 1960; par. 18, pp. 70-73: Nach Rom oder nach Konstant!nopel? 13, Lavrov, op. cit., p. 72. 14. 1libedem, PP. 84-86. 1 �SLOVAKIA 63 16. 16. 17. 18. lbid~, p . 97. IDbidem, p. 100. :l!bidem, p. 185. fN. L. Tunickij: Materialy dra istorii iizni i dejate.rnosti ucenikov svv. Kirilla i Methodija, Sergiev Posad, 1918, p. 70. 19. ¼n Stanislav: Osudy Cyrila a Methoda a ich ucenfkov v Zivote Klimentovom, Bratislava, 19-50, p. 68. 20. 1Proloznoje iitie sv. Methodija: Vy1,vrativsj.u sja Methodijn v Konstantin grady, patrijarchy ze svjati jego jeplskopa, posLa vy !Moravu v grady Kaan (=IPannonia) i tu mnoga stvori cudesa. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 103. OUR CONTRIBUTORS Jozef Cincik: emi.nent ~lovak artis,t a.nd dnterlor decorator. For• merly of Bratislava U.nivemity f ·r om which he holds a Ph. D. in philo• sophy. Cincfk makes hi,s home in Bedford, Ohio. P. A. Hrobak: Educator, lecturer, writer on Slovakia and Czecho• Slovakia; editor o·f the JEDNOTA, the official organ of the First Cath• olic Slovak Union, the past 2'5 years. lmrich Kruiliak: Slovak ihiistar:ian; former secretary-general of the Slovak League, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. - Brait<J.slava University. Heinrich Kuhn is secretairy•general of the Sudeten Germa.n Archives in Munich. Rev. Michael Lacko, S. J., :professor at the Gregorian University, Rome, i<s an expert on the Byzanhlne •rite rund the author of The Life and Work of SS Cyril and Metihodlus. Frantisek Lanak: s,Iovak eduoator; held a key ,position in the Department of Education, Bratislava, Slovakia. Philosophy, Ph.D. Eberhart Mahner is a staff w,rlter for the "Sudetendeutscher Arti- keldienst," Munich. Jozef Pauco: Ph.D. - University of Bratislava, Slovakia; author of ei.g,ht book>s and many articles ,relating to Slovaks in America a.nd in Slovakia; former ediitor-in•chief of -the SLOVAK dally of Brati,slava; a,ssistant editor of the JEIDNOTA, Middletown, Pa., the ,prust 13 years. Mary Piroch: active in Slovak religious and cultuTa.l affai<rs; lives in Emlen tO'll, Pa. Anton F. Wuschek is the editor of the Centra.l European review SUDET:IDN BULLE'DIN, Munich, Germany. � 58 SLOVAKIA SS. Cyril And Methodius: Tl.lEIR FIRST TRIP TO ROME MIC.HAEIL LACKO, S. J. After forty months in Great Moravia, why did SS. Cyril and Methodius go to Rome? Another question that has puzzled many in past centuries: Did they set out for Rome or Constantinople (By,zantium) ? In the 1aTIE (biography) of Constantine-Cyril, written in Old Slovaik, it is noted that "after 40 months in Mora'V'ia, they (Cyril and Methodius) set out to ha,ve their disctples ordained" 1 . It is rather clear then that we are here concerned with their first journey to Rome. The Italian version of the ZITIE, referring to this journey, says: '4Manserunt autem in Moravia per annos quattuor et dim.idium ... " 2 • The la,tter version tells us that the trip to Rome was under.taken by the saintly brathers after they had spent four and a half years in the land of Rastislav, while the Old Slova!k text relates that they went to Rome after a:bout three and a half years in Great Moravia. F. Grivec explained this difference excellently: in the Old Slovak text only the time spent in Great Moravia is considered, while in the Italian text we have included also the time Cyril and Methodius spent with Kocel' (Pribina's son) and in Venice, as well as the time spent on their journey to Rome3 • The SloV'ak Arpostles came to Rome with their group shortly after the election of Pope Adrian IL that is, after December 14, 867. Therefore, they came to Great Moravia four and a half years prior to that date, that is, about the .b eginning of the summer of 863, and set out for Rome at the end of 866 or the beginning of 867. Why did they saintly brothers go to Rome at that time? To have their disciples ordained to the priesthood is the simple and usual reply of many authors. Some authors, however, claim that Pope Nicholas I called them directly to R'Ome when he had learned of their missionary activity. But from the Old SlovaJk text of the filTIE. it ie very much more probably that Pope Nicholas sent them an invitation (litteras aipostolicas) after they had arrived �SLOVAKIA 59 in Venice. Could there be any other reason why Cyril and fMethodius went to Rome just at that time ? l see an indirect reply to this question in one document which seems to have escaped the attention of historians: the "Responsa Papae Nicolai I ad consultationes Ludovici regis Germaniae per Salomonem episcopum Constantiensem translatas" 4 • The manuscript containing the "responsa" is not dated5 but the text allows us to conclude that Salomon, a messenger or representative of King Louis, came to Rome about Easter Day, 864, and, therefore, the "responsa" were issued shortly thereafter. The ninth point of this document is generally well known: it mentions Louis's preparations for war with Rastislav and his plans to meet with the Bulgarian King Boris at Tulln on the Danube. Point four, however, appears to be less known and even still less mentioned, though I think it throws much light on the question before us. Bishop Hartwig of Passau, according to the tex:t:,6 suffered from a stroke since 8l60 and could neither talk nor manage his diocese. Salomon therefore requested that a new bishop be appointed in Hartwig's place7 • The Pope replied that, according to ecclesiastical law, Hartwig should resign from his bishopric ("saltem scriipto") if he really cannot administer it. OtheIWise, the iPope continues, a new bishop cannot be appointed, but only a temporary administrator chosen by the clergy. We might ask why there was now suddenly expressed so much concern about getting a new bishop since Hartwig suffered the effects of the stroke for 4 years? It appears to me that the e~lanation may be found in the conditions prevailing in Great Moravia at that time. Salomon came to Rome about Easter Day of 864, that is, about eight months after SS. Cyril and Methodius began their :missionary activity in Great Moravia, the land of the Rast:islav Slovaks. He came to Rome to lodge a protest against their presence and their mission. The Slovak Apostles soon gained the love and trust of Rastislav's people, but at the same time also the enmity of the German missionaries whom they ha,d displaced. The latter said that the new missionaries from Byzantium came into the territory without the approval of the bishop of Passau; furthermore that they were using Slovak for liturgical servkes and following the Byzantium rite. The German mis- �60 SLOVAKIA inonaries resented being pushed out of the land of the Slovaks. This territory was under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Passau since 8219. Bishop Hartwig, how~r, was not able to intervene in the matter, because he had suffered a stroke. Pope Nicholas I, as we have seen above, could not appoint a new bishop as long as the old bishop did not r~sign9. History tells us that Hartwig did not resign; he remained bishop of Passau until his death at the end of 865 or the beginning of 86610 • In 866 a new bishop was elected, the agile and energetic H.ermanric (866-Dec. 26, 874). The new ordinary, however, could not tackle the Great Moravian problem at once, because shortly after his elevation he led a German missionary e~tion to Bulgaria. When he arrived there a:nd found a similar mission from Rome led by · Bishop Formosus, Hernnanric returned to Passau the same year. In all probability, Hermanric sojourned in Great Moravia, at the end of 866, on his return trip to Passau to ascertain just what was happenning there since the advent of the missionaries from Byzantium. SS. Cyril and Methodius, because of Bishop Hartwig's condition, performed their missionary work in the land of Rastislav without hindrance since 863. When Bishop Hermanric met with the saintly brothers, he undoubtedly asked them on whose authority were they in Great Moravia. Most likely the brothers replied that they came at the request of RastislaJV and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. Hermanric then told them that the territory already for several decades had been under the jurisdiction of the Pa.ssau bishopric and, therefore, under the authority of the patriarchate of Rome; they were there unla.'Wfully and should leave the territory as soon as possible. Now we can understand why SS. Cyril and Methodius soon thereafter, but not later than the beginning of 867, set out on their journey in 867: to straighten out the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the land of the Slovaks. With the aibove in mind, let us now analyze the question whether SS. Cyril and Methodius and their retinue went to Rome or Constantinople. Much has been written about this question. The thesis that they set out for Con- �SLOVAKIA 61 stantinople is defended by the Slavists: Novotny, Hauptmann, Teodorov-Balan, Ohienko, Weingart, Stanislav, and especially Dvornik11 • The intention to journey to Rome is claimed by Pastrne'.k, Lavrov, Hudeeek, Perels, Hrusovsky, and especially Grivec 12 • The first group bases its claim mainly on the words in the ":Zitie Metodovo" which state that the brothers "returned fr-om Moravia" (vyzvratistasja iz Moravy) 13, while the second group analyzes particularly the purpose of the trip: to settle the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the territory of Great Moravia which belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. I rum inclined to the opinion of the latter: the saintly brothers' prior intention was to travel to Rome. From the bove, it appears to be logical that Cyril and Methodius set out for Rome in 867. The territory of Great Moravia, ruled by Rastislav, belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. Constantinople had no authority over that territory; the saintly brothers could not defend their claims against the claims of the bishop of Passau in Constantinople. And when they decided to introduce the Slavak lan,g uage even into the liturgy of the Western Rite, they needed the approval of Rome and not of Constantinople. Similarly their disciples had to be ordained by the authority of the patriarchate on whose territory they were to labor and that was Rome and not Constantinople. There are other sources that clearly indicate the original intention of Cyril and Methodius to mruke their first trip to Rome; some of them come from their disciples, who probably made that trip with them and, hence, are sufficiently authentic. Because they are usually not considered by many writers, I mention them here: 1. Pochvalnoje slovo Kyrillu i Methodiju14 ; 2. Pochvala blazennago otca nasego i ucitera slovenskago Kyrila filosofa15; 3. Proloznoje Zitie Konstantina i Methodija16 ; 4. Zitie Nauma17 ; 5. Grooke Zitie sv. Klimenta18 . Because they knew that even Paul used to announce his glad tidings to the apostles, so Cyril and Methodius, too, hurried to Rome to show the Pope their translaJtion of the Holy Writ. Their trip was successful; they did not go there in vain19 • �62 SLOVAKIA These texts, which represent the original Cyrilo-Methodius tradition, clearly bear witness to the j-Ourney of the saintly brothers to Rome. The only text, which allegedly notes that St. Methodius was consecrated Bishop of Pannonia by the Patriarch of Constantinople, is in cuntradiction to all other sources and, hence, has no value in this respect20 • The phrase "return to Constantinople" (Navrat do Carihradu) refers to their return from the Kha.zar mission, before their departure to Great Moravia. When Cyril and Methodius left Moravia in 867, they were headed for Rome and not for Constantinople. REFERSNCE NOTES 1. IP. A. Lavrov: Materialy po istoriji vozniknovenija drevnejiej slavjanskoj pismennoati, Leningrad, 1930, p. 29. 2. P. iMeyvaert-P. Devos: Trois enigmes Cyrilo-Methodiennes de un document inedit. "Analecta la "Legende ltalique" resolues grace a Bolland1ana," IJXXlIIII (Bruxelles, 1955), p. 459. 3. F. Grivec: Vitae Constantini et Methodli. "Acta Academiae Velehradensis," X,V!N (IO!omouc, 1941), p. 89. 4. 1Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, Vol. Vil, pp. 290-293. 5. Coder Parisie11.sis latinus 10402. 6. 'I'he text in MGH, Ep., p. 292, reads: "De Hartwigo Pazzowensis civitatis episcopo, quem asseritis ante annos quattuor paralysi percussum, ita ut nil valeat loqui et ecclesia sibi commissa dissipetur et ad nihih.un r ed1gatur, du,m et omni pastorali cura destituta et nulla episcopali providentia circumspecta, si ita est, debet idem epi· scopus saltem scripto profiter! se officium lllud non posse peragere ... " 7. ]bidem Nr. 3. 8. Ibidem Nr. 4: 'ISit ergo cura rerum ecclesiasticarum oeconomo electo de proprlo clero iuxta sacros canones." 9. cA.rchbishop Adalwin of Salzburg was infoflmed of Pope Nicholas's reply: MGH, Eplstolae, Vol. VI, pp. 630-631. 10. .P. B. Gama (Series episcoporum Eccfesiae Catholica~, Ratis1bonae, 1873, p. 301) •s tates that Hartwig died on May 18, 866. A. Hauck, on the other hand, notes (Kirchengeschichte •Deutschlands, Bd . .FI, Leipzig, 193·5, Appendix) that Hartwig died in 864 or 865 •s ince it is not known whether he became bishop in 838 or 840. 11. .Frantisek. Dvornik: Les Legendes de Constantin et de Methode vues de Byzance, Prague, 1933, p. 234: ''111 est remar,quable que !es deux Legendes ne disent pas un mot du but du voyage et fassent intervenir le pape apres avoir indique le devlacement des deux freres et leur sejour a Venise. Cela indique qu'ils avaient bien l'intenttion de se rendr e a Constantinople et qu e c'est vral:ment !'intervention ponttficale qui !es empecha d'iexec1tter leur dessin et !es decida a aller a Rome." 12. 1F. Grivec: Konstantin und Method, Lehrer der Slaven, Wies/baden, 1960; par. 18, pp. 70-73: Nach Rom oder nach Konstant!nopel? 13, Lavrov, op. cit., p. 72. 14. 1libedem, PP. 84-86. 1 �SLOVAKIA 63 16. 16. 17. 18. lbid~, p . 97. IDbidem, p. 100. :l!bidem, p. 185. fN. L. Tunickij: Materialy dra istorii iizni i dejate.rnosti ucenikov svv. Kirilla i Methodija, Sergiev Posad, 1918, p. 70. 19. ¼n Stanislav: Osudy Cyrila a Methoda a ich ucenfkov v Zivote Klimentovom, Bratislava, 19-50, p. 68. 20. 1Proloznoje iitie sv. Methodija: Vy1,vrativsj.u sja Methodijn v Konstantin grady, patrijarchy ze svjati jego jeplskopa, posLa vy !Moravu v grady Kaan (=IPannonia) i tu mnoga stvori cudesa. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 103. OUR CONTRIBUTORS Jozef Cincik: emi.nent ~lovak artis,t a.nd dnterlor decorator. For• merly of Bratislava U.nivemity f ·r om which he holds a Ph. D. in philo• sophy. Cincfk makes hi,s home in Bedford, Ohio. P. A. Hrobak: Educator, lecturer, writer on Slovakia and Czecho• Slovakia; editor o·f the JEDNOTA, the official organ of the First Cath• olic Slovak Union, the past 2'5 years. lmrich Kruiliak: Slovak ihiistar:ian; former secretary-general of the Slovak League, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. - Brait<J.slava University. Heinrich Kuhn is secretairy•general of the Sudeten Germa.n Archives in Munich. Rev. Michael Lacko, S. J., :professor at the Gregorian University, Rome, i<s an expert on the Byzanhlne •rite rund the author of The Life and Work of SS Cyril and Metihodlus. Frantisek Lanak: s,Iovak eduoator; held a key ,position in the Department of Education, Bratislava, Slovakia. Philosophy, Ph.D. Eberhart Mahner is a staff w,rlter for the "Sudetendeutscher Arti- keldienst," Munich. Jozef Pauco: Ph.D. - University of Bratislava, Slovakia; author of ei.g,ht book>s and many articles ,relating to Slovaks in America a.nd in Slovakia; former ediitor-in•chief of -the SLOVAK dally of Brati,slava; a,ssistant editor of the JEIDNOTA, Middletown, Pa., the ,prust 13 years. Mary Piroch: active in Slovak religious and cultuTa.l affai<rs; lives in Emlen tO'll, Pa. Anton F. Wuschek is the editor of the Centra.l European review SUDET:IDN BULLE'DIN, Munich, Germany. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVAKIA SS. Cyril And Methodius: Tl.lEIR FIRST TRIP TO ROME MIC.HAEIL LACKO, S. J. After forty months in Great Moravia, why did SS. Cyril and Methodius go to Rome? Another question that has puzzled many in past centuries: Did they set out for Rome or Constantinople (By,zantium) ? In the 1aTIE (biography) of Constantine-Cyril, written in Old Slovaik, it is noted that "after 40 months in Mora'V'ia, they (Cyril and Methodius) set out to ha,ve their disctples ordained" 1 . It is rather clear then that we are here concerned with their first journey to Rome. The Italian version of the ZITIE, referring to this journey, says: '4Manserunt autem in Moravia per annos quattuor et dim.idium ... " 2 • The la,tter version tells us that the trip to Rome was under.taken by the saintly brathers after they had spent four and a half years in the land of Rastislav, while the Old Slova!k text relates that they went to Rome after a:bout three and a half years in Great Moravia. F. Grivec explained this difference excellently: in the Old Slovak text only the time spent in Great Moravia is considered, while in the Italian text we have included also the time Cyril and Methodius spent with Kocel' (Pribina's son) and in Venice, as well as the time spent on their journey to Rome3 • The SloV'ak Arpostles came to Rome with their group shortly after the election of Pope Adrian IL that is, after December 14, 867. Therefore, they came to Great Moravia four and a half years prior to that date, that is, about the .b eginning of the summer of 863, and set out for Rome at the end of 866 or the beginning of 867. Why did they saintly brothers go to Rome at that time? To have their disciples ordained to the priesthood is the simple and usual reply of many authors. Some authors, however, claim that Pope Nicholas I called them directly to R'Ome when he had learned of their missionary activity. But from the Old SlovaJk text of the filTIE. it ie very much more probably that Pope Nicholas sent them an invitation (litteras aipostolicas) after they had arrived SLOVAKIA 59 in Venice. Could there be any other reason why Cyril and fMethodius went to Rome just at that time ? l see an indirect reply to this question in one document which seems to have escaped the attention of historians: the "Responsa Papae Nicolai I ad consultationes Ludovici regis Germaniae per Salomonem episcopum Constantiensem translatas" 4 • The manuscript containing the "responsa" is not dated5 but the text allows us to conclude that Salomon, a messenger or representative of King Louis, came to Rome about Easter Day, 864, and, therefore, the "responsa" were issued shortly thereafter. The ninth point of this document is generally well known: it mentions Louis's preparations for war with Rastislav and his plans to meet with the Bulgarian King Boris at Tulln on the Danube. Point four, however, appears to be less known and even still less mentioned, though I think it throws much light on the question before us. Bishop Hartwig of Passau, according to the tex:t:,6 suffered from a stroke since 8l60 and could neither talk nor manage his diocese. Salomon therefore requested that a new bishop be appointed in Hartwig's place7 • The Pope replied that, according to ecclesiastical law, Hartwig should resign from his bishopric ("saltem scriipto") if he really cannot administer it. OtheIWise, the iPope continues, a new bishop cannot be appointed, but only a temporary administrator chosen by the clergy. We might ask why there was now suddenly expressed so much concern about getting a new bishop since Hartwig suffered the effects of the stroke for 4 years? It appears to me that the e~lanation may be found in the conditions prevailing in Great Moravia at that time. Salomon came to Rome about Easter Day of 864, that is, about eight months after SS. Cyril and Methodius began their :missionary activity in Great Moravia, the land of the Rast:islav Slovaks. He came to Rome to lodge a protest against their presence and their mission. The Slovak Apostles soon gained the love and trust of Rastislav's people, but at the same time also the enmity of the German missionaries whom they ha,d displaced. The latter said that the new missionaries from Byzantium came into the territory without the approval of the bishop of Passau; furthermore that they were using Slovak for liturgical servkes and following the Byzantium rite. The German mis- 60 SLOVAKIA inonaries resented being pushed out of the land of the Slovaks. This territory was under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Passau since 8219. Bishop Hartwig, how~r, was not able to intervene in the matter, because he had suffered a stroke. Pope Nicholas I, as we have seen above, could not appoint a new bishop as long as the old bishop did not r~sign9. History tells us that Hartwig did not resign; he remained bishop of Passau until his death at the end of 865 or the beginning of 86610 • In 866 a new bishop was elected, the agile and energetic H.ermanric (866-Dec. 26, 874). The new ordinary, however, could not tackle the Great Moravian problem at once, because shortly after his elevation he led a German missionary e~tion to Bulgaria. When he arrived there a:nd found a similar mission from Rome led by · Bishop Formosus, Hernnanric returned to Passau the same year. In all probability, Hermanric sojourned in Great Moravia, at the end of 866, on his return trip to Passau to ascertain just what was happenning there since the advent of the missionaries from Byzantium. SS. Cyril and Methodius, because of Bishop Hartwig's condition, performed their missionary work in the land of Rastislav without hindrance since 863. When Bishop Hermanric met with the saintly brothers, he undoubtedly asked them on whose authority were they in Great Moravia. Most likely the brothers replied that they came at the request of RastislaJV and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. Hermanric then told them that the territory already for several decades had been under the jurisdiction of the Pa.ssau bishopric and, therefore, under the authority of the patriarchate of Rome; they were there unla.'Wfully and should leave the territory as soon as possible. Now we can understand why SS. Cyril and Methodius soon thereafter, but not later than the beginning of 867, set out on their journey in 867: to straighten out the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the land of the Slovaks. With the aibove in mind, let us now analyze the question whether SS. Cyril and Methodius and their retinue went to Rome or Constantinople. Much has been written about this question. The thesis that they set out for Con- SLOVAKIA 61 stantinople is defended by the Slavists: Novotny, Hauptmann, Teodorov-Balan, Ohienko, Weingart, Stanislav, and especially Dvornik11 • The intention to journey to Rome is claimed by Pastrne'.k, Lavrov, Hudeeek, Perels, Hrusovsky, and especially Grivec 12 • The first group bases its claim mainly on the words in the ":Zitie Metodovo" which state that the brothers "returned fr-om Moravia" (vyzvratistasja iz Moravy) 13, while the second group analyzes particularly the purpose of the trip: to settle the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the territory of Great Moravia which belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. I rum inclined to the opinion of the latter: the saintly brothers' prior intention was to travel to Rome. From the bove, it appears to be logical that Cyril and Methodius set out for Rome in 867. The territory of Great Moravia, ruled by Rastislav, belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. Constantinople had no authority over that territory; the saintly brothers could not defend their claims against the claims of the bishop of Passau in Constantinople. And when they decided to introduce the Slavak lan,g uage even into the liturgy of the Western Rite, they needed the approval of Rome and not of Constantinople. Similarly their disciples had to be ordained by the authority of the patriarchate on whose territory they were to labor and that was Rome and not Constantinople. There are other sources that clearly indicate the original intention of Cyril and Methodius to mruke their first trip to Rome; some of them come from their disciples, who probably made that trip with them and, hence, are sufficiently authentic. Because they are usually not considered by many writers, I mention them here: 1. Pochvalnoje slovo Kyrillu i Methodiju14 ; 2. Pochvala blazennago otca nasego i ucitera slovenskago Kyrila filosofa15; 3. Proloznoje Zitie Konstantina i Methodija16 ; 4. Zitie Nauma17 ; 5. Grooke Zitie sv. Klimenta18 . Because they knew that even Paul used to announce his glad tidings to the apostles, so Cyril and Methodius, too, hurried to Rome to show the Pope their translaJtion of the Holy Writ. Their trip was successful; they did not go there in vain19 • 62 SLOVAKIA These texts, which represent the original Cyrilo-Methodius tradition, clearly bear witness to the j-Ourney of the saintly brothers to Rome. The only text, which allegedly notes that St. Methodius was consecrated Bishop of Pannonia by the Patriarch of Constantinople, is in cuntradiction to all other sources and, hence, has no value in this respect20 • The phrase "return to Constantinople" (Navrat do Carihradu) refers to their return from the Kha.zar mission, before their departure to Great Moravia. When Cyril and Methodius left Moravia in 867, they were headed for Rome and not for Constantinople. REFERSNCE NOTES 1. IP. A. Lavrov: Materialy po istoriji vozniknovenija drevnejiej slavjanskoj pismennoati, Leningrad, 1930, p. 29. 2. P. iMeyvaert-P. Devos: Trois enigmes Cyrilo-Methodiennes de un document inedit. "Analecta la "Legende ltalique" resolues grace a Bolland1ana," IJXXlIIII (Bruxelles, 1955), p. 459. 3. F. Grivec: Vitae Constantini et Methodli. "Acta Academiae Velehradensis," X,V!N (IO!omouc, 1941), p. 89. 4. 1Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, Vol. Vil, pp. 290-293. 5. Coder Parisie11.sis latinus 10402. 6. 'I'he text in MGH, Ep., p. 292, reads: "De Hartwigo Pazzowensis civitatis episcopo, quem asseritis ante annos quattuor paralysi percussum, ita ut nil valeat loqui et ecclesia sibi commissa dissipetur et ad nihih.un r ed1gatur, du,m et omni pastorali cura destituta et nulla episcopali providentia circumspecta, si ita est, debet idem epi· scopus saltem scripto profiter! se officium lllud non posse peragere ... " 7. ]bidem Nr. 3. 8. Ibidem Nr. 4: 'ISit ergo cura rerum ecclesiasticarum oeconomo electo de proprlo clero iuxta sacros canones." 9. cA.rchbishop Adalwin of Salzburg was infoflmed of Pope Nicholas's reply: MGH, Eplstolae, Vol. VI, pp. 630-631. 10. .P. B. Gama (Series episcoporum Eccfesiae Catholica~, Ratis1bonae, 1873, p. 301) •s tates that Hartwig died on May 18, 866. A. Hauck, on the other hand, notes (Kirchengeschichte •Deutschlands, Bd . .FI, Leipzig, 193·5, Appendix) that Hartwig died in 864 or 865 •s ince it is not known whether he became bishop in 838 or 840. 11. .Frantisek. Dvornik: Les Legendes de Constantin et de Methode vues de Byzance, Prague, 1933, p. 234: ''111 est remar,quable que !es deux Legendes ne disent pas un mot du but du voyage et fassent intervenir le pape apres avoir indique le devlacement des deux freres et leur sejour a Venise. Cela indique qu'ils avaient bien l'intenttion de se rendr e a Constantinople et qu e c'est vral:ment !'intervention ponttficale qui !es empecha d'iexec1tter leur dessin et !es decida a aller a Rome." 12. 1F. Grivec: Konstantin und Method, Lehrer der Slaven, Wies/baden, 1960; par. 18, pp. 70-73: Nach Rom oder nach Konstant!nopel? 13, Lavrov, op. cit., p. 72. 14. 1libedem, PP. 84-86. 1 SLOVAKIA 63 16. 16. 17. 18. lbid~, p . 97. IDbidem, p. 100. :l!bidem, p. 185. fN. L. Tunickij: Materialy dra istorii iizni i dejate.rnosti ucenikov svv. Kirilla i Methodija, Sergiev Posad, 1918, p. 70. 19. ¼n Stanislav: Osudy Cyrila a Methoda a ich ucenfkov v Zivote Klimentovom, Bratislava, 19-50, p. 68. 20. 1Proloznoje iitie sv. Methodija: Vy1,vrativsj.u sja Methodijn v Konstantin grady, patrijarchy ze svjati jego jeplskopa, posLa vy !Moravu v grady Kaan (=IPannonia) i tu mnoga stvori cudesa. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 103. OUR CONTRIBUTORS Jozef Cincik: emi.nent ~lovak artis,t a.nd dnterlor decorator. For• merly of Bratislava U.nivemity f ·r om which he holds a Ph. D. in philo• sophy. Cincfk makes hi,s home in Bedford, Ohio. P. A. Hrobak: Educator, lecturer, writer on Slovakia and Czecho• Slovakia; editor o·f the JEDNOTA, the official organ of the First Cath• olic Slovak Union, the past 2'5 years. lmrich Kruiliak: Slovak ihiistar:ian; former secretary-general of the Slovak League, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. - Brait<J.slava University. Heinrich Kuhn is secretairy•general of the Sudeten Germa.n Archives in Munich. Rev. Michael Lacko, S. J., :professor at the Gregorian University, Rome, i<s an expert on the Byzanhlne •rite rund the author of The Life and Work of SS Cyril and Metihodlus. Frantisek Lanak: s,Iovak eduoator; held a key ,position in the Department of Education, Bratislava, Slovakia. Philosophy, Ph.D. Eberhart Mahner is a staff w,rlter for the "Sudetendeutscher Arti- keldienst," Munich. Jozef Pauco: Ph.D. - University of Bratislava, Slovakia; author of ei.g,ht book>s and many articles ,relating to Slovaks in America a.nd in Slovakia; former ediitor-in•chief of -the SLOVAK dally of Brati,slava; a,ssistant editor of the JEIDNOTA, Middletown, Pa., the ,prust 13 years. Mary Piroch: active in Slovak religious and cultuTa.l affai<rs; lives in Emlen tO'll, Pa. Anton F. Wuschek is the editor of the Centra.l European review SUDET:IDN BULLE'DIN, Munich, Germany.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource SS. Cyril and Methodius: Their First Trip to Rome Description An account of the resource Michael Lacko, S.J. Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 58-63 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lacko, Michael, 1920-1982 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a2d0affb0ebd5229faa0a0d6d9d871b7.pdf 9276dee27cc18c831a7a3d861fa2233c PDF Text Text 128 SLOVAKIA St. Cyril Ln Love A boy in a well-to-do bedroom, wound in rich blankets, tufted wool, his head resting on the hand-stitched cover of a feather pillow, bunched his legs to his chest and hugged himself tight as a spring, a boy with the mind of a man and the soul of a saint asleep in a curlicue like a baby in a cradle, not long since his mother's milk, her large, soft hands and wrap-around arms, her lullaby voice tucking him in. The one woman he dreamed, Sophia, the only woman he ever wanted to pursue, had features he couldn't quite make outa Roman profile, it seemed, the blank eyes of a Greek statue, but no distinct size or shape of nose and mouth, no color of iris or curve of the eyebrows, no crow's feet or squint lines, no identifying freckles or mole on her neck. She was like a lady one catches sight of in a marketplace and is struck by something in the walk, something about the fall of the hair over her shoulders, something, something that makes one think she is someone he knew a long time ago, met among guest at a banquet strolled with on a Sunday afternoon, talked with outside the ruins of a temple, or fell in love with in his sleep. Something about her stride, something about the lilt of her hair, sends him chasing after her, careening into the crowd, halting as if at a roadblock, then snaking through and breaking into a half-jog �SLOVAKIA 129 past men leading donkeys loaded with baskets, women balancing jugs on their heads, soldiers, girls haggling at fruit and vegetable stalls, pickpockets, children tussling and dodging the one who is "it" in a game of tag or crouching to shoot pebbles into circles drawn in the dirt, toddlers. And in the hurly-burly and haste he never catches up. The seven-year-old Constantine awoke, locked himself in his room in Thessalonica, read and searched, searched and read ( . . . the soul of man, the mind of God . . . ) , sought the image of the lady, a rumor of her whereabouts. The seven-year-old Constantine peered out his window, picked up his quill, dipped it in the inkhorn, made notes on a parchment scroll till he was sixteen and best friends with a genius and holy man as he went off to the imperial school to study grammar, rhetor-ic, logic, music, poetry, astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, theology and Scripture texts . Luke, the Blessed ( ... poring over Homer, Helen Virgin ... ). Arm-in-arm with Gregory Nazianzen, he pursued the icon lady, the come-alive statue in gold ornaments and jewels into the shadows of Hagia Sophia, the cathedral, where the bell struck in the dome, and he was twenty-two. There was no one he would marry, no godchild of a chancellor, not even with a hefty dowry and promise of a post at the emperor's court; for, dropping into the bulging mother of a church one day for his accustomed visit, �130 SLOVAKIA he had stood transfixed before the gilded altar and mosaics recognizing, as if for the first time, Mary the mother, speechless, following her son through the jostling mob, along the cobblestones, Veronica, aghast, wiping His blood and sweat, then left with the imprint on her veil of His smeared face and soggy, matted hair, the women of the city cuddling their babies and sobbing, suddenly hushed by Him-gratefulall these women in Jerusalem loving Him, hoping, believing far beyond death. Constantine saw the visage of Sophiathe look of the women, Veronica, Mary, knowing the skull and crossbones, a rolled-back stoneSophia, Christ, in one wordless gaze. So for years it was Maria Sophia and Mother Church as the philosopher fled from library to monastery then back to the public, a cleric in the chair of philosophy, the disputant with Arabs and iconoclasts, then off to hermitage again, until, at someone's beck and call, he left the monastery of St. Basil to join Methodius his brother on a mission to the Khazars. He converted hundreds of barbarians, freed Greek patriots, the booty of the Khan, journeyed through Fulla and choppe~ down a sacred oak engrafted with branches of a cherry tree, traveled on to the Crimea, dug up an anchor and the bones of Pope Clement on an island just off the quarries and salt mines of Cherson, and returned to Byzantium. But there was still something, something . . . This woman, Sophia, who was always before him, this woman whose eyes were Mary's and Veronica's, whose smile was a calmed-down mother's on the way of the cross, �SLOVAKIA 131 whose whole bearing breathed Scripture and liturgy, this mystical body, still somehow eluded him. She was always just ahead of him in the caravan, just beyond his grasp. So often they were almost neck-and-neck, and then she would vanishSophia, the spirit of a woman from another time, Sophia, an angel, a puff of smoke, a whiff of incense, a cloud wafting off ... Something about Sophia, like a word, a sacrament, was not quite flesh and blood, not quite concrete. Sophia, the one woman he dreamed, drew him to heaven but hid herself in the dust of horses' hooves. Then a missive to Emperor Michael from Rastislav, prince of the rivers Morava and Vah, called Methodius and Constantine to an alphabet, gospels, liturgical books, and an apostolate to the Slovaks. For Constantine, Sophia was becoming more and more the gypsythe whim and will-o'-the-wisp of God. The Tatry mountains, linden trees, fields of poppies Young girls striking their foreheads to the gods, bearing wreaths of flowers and dancing at the altars of Lada, tossing handfuls of flour into roadside bushes and shrubbery for Meluzina, for Lada, goddess of beauty, for Meluzina, goddess of the wind ... Peasant mothers pulling their children away from the doorways to hide their faces in the lacework of their aprons and the gathers of their skirts against the lightning and storm, muttering charms against the thundergod Perun, mumbling pleas to Morena and zivena, death and life, those goddesses, wanton as a scattering of pebbles underfoot, whimsical as autumn leaves skittering across the fields ... �132 SLOVAKIA These women with cocks and hearts, apples, tulips, and slit leeks embroidered on their bodices and sleeves, these women in lace caps and bonnets, these flush-faced girls who stole behind haystacks and their white-washed cottages to sing, these flush-faced girls, love-longing, who wove ribbons through their caps and danced, these girls and women, earthy pagans, stopped and listened. The men set aside their plows and haymows, laid down their hatchets and tools, and, God knows why, heard Constantine, mulled it all over as if weighing a bargain with a trader or considering the terms of a truce with an old foe, and turned to ask to be baptized. And suddenly, like lightning cracking through a gray dead tree, it struck him: there she was standing, fullface, bright-eyed and smiling, in front of a peasant's hut. This phantom, this gypsy, this poppy, Sophia . . . an old Slovak grandmother in a black kerchief, her face weatherbeaten with laughter and weeping. It was as simple as that, mused ConstantineSophia, wisdom, was, had always been, a folkwoman humming and listening to the wind. (A grandmother who was a mother rocking by a fireside, embroidering, tatting, telling stories, a mother who was an apple-cheeked girl, fancy in flowers, ribbons and fine stitchery, giggling, hiding-and-seeking, sighing, lovelorn, an apple-cheeked girl who was a child dressed in hemp underwear, a wooly halenka, a linen blouse and pinafore, a child squatting on the ground playing with dolls made of dried-out cornhusks, a child who was a helpless infant, naked, nursed, and lulled to sleep . . . ) Constantine had followed Sophia and found her, �SLOVAKIA 133 a toothless big-hearted grandmother, a sage old matriarch who taught her men to work, play, sing, survive catastrophe, to listen, learn, and lie down to dream. Sophia, Christ, among the Slovaks . . . Wisdom was the fondness with which he welled up, the awe and tenderness with which he poured water over the peasant's brow, whispered the words of baptism like sweet nothings and like a magic spell, and traced with his thumb a cross. This plain, unstudied wisdoma grandmother gumming dark bread, cabbage, cheese This lovethe sun, the wind, the land, the children, flesh and blood This carnival of joy .. . And Constantine was ready to go back to Rome, weakened, ill, to take to a monastery, change his name to Cyril, and retreat into a rough-hewn cell, to doze off under thin covers on a hard cot and pass away in a curlicue like a baby in a cradle, the unwinding of a clock, the bursting of a chick from an eggshell. Sister M. Pamela Smith, SS.C.M. Note: For many of the details of biography and the descriptions of costume, topography, and heritage, this poem is indebted to the following sources: Agnes Bocan, "An Introduction to Slovak Costume," Slovakia, 22 (1972), pp. 153-157. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakian Culture in the Light of History, (Cambridge, Mass.: Hampshire Press, 1954). Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M., Sts. Cyril and Methodius: The Glory of the Slavs, (Milwaukee: Catholic Life Publications, Bruce Press, 1963). � 128 SLOVAKIA St. Cyril Ln Love A boy in a well-to-do bedroom, wound in rich blankets, tufted wool, his head resting on the hand-stitched cover of a feather pillow, bunched his legs to his chest and hugged himself tight as a spring, a boy with the mind of a man and the soul of a saint asleep in a curlicue like a baby in a cradle, not long since his mother's milk, her large, soft hands and wrap-around arms, her lullaby voice tucking him in. The one woman he dreamed, Sophia, the only woman he ever wanted to pursue, had features he couldn't quite make outa Roman profile, it seemed, the blank eyes of a Greek statue, but no distinct size or shape of nose and mouth, no color of iris or curve of the eyebrows, no crow's feet or squint lines, no identifying freckles or mole on her neck. She was like a lady one catches sight of in a marketplace and is struck by something in the walk, something about the fall of the hair over her shoulders, something, something that makes one think she is someone he knew a long time ago, met among guest at a banquet strolled with on a Sunday afternoon, talked with outside the ruins of a temple, or fell in love with in his sleep. Something about her stride, something about the lilt of her hair, sends him chasing after her, careening into the crowd, halting as if at a roadblock, then snaking through and breaking into a half-jog �SLOVAKIA 129 past men leading donkeys loaded with baskets, women balancing jugs on their heads, soldiers, girls haggling at fruit and vegetable stalls, pickpockets, children tussling and dodging the one who is "it" in a game of tag or crouching to shoot pebbles into circles drawn in the dirt, toddlers. And in the hurly-burly and haste he never catches up. The seven-year-old Constantine awoke, locked himself in his room in Thessalonica, read and searched, searched and read ( . . . the soul of man, the mind of God . . . ) , sought the image of the lady, a rumor of her whereabouts. The seven-year-old Constantine peered out his window, picked up his quill, dipped it in the inkhorn, made notes on a parchment scroll till he was sixteen and best friends with a genius and holy man as he went off to the imperial school to study grammar, rhetor-ic, logic, music, poetry, astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, theology and Scripture texts . Luke, the Blessed ( ... poring over Homer, Helen Virgin ... ). Arm-in-arm with Gregory Nazianzen, he pursued the icon lady, the come-alive statue in gold ornaments and jewels into the shadows of Hagia Sophia, the cathedral, where the bell struck in the dome, and he was twenty-two. There was no one he would marry, no godchild of a chancellor, not even with a hefty dowry and promise of a post at the emperor's court; for, dropping into the bulging mother of a church one day for his accustomed visit, �130 SLOVAKIA he had stood transfixed before the gilded altar and mosaics recognizing, as if for the first time, Mary the mother, speechless, following her son through the jostling mob, along the cobblestones, Veronica, aghast, wiping His blood and sweat, then left with the imprint on her veil of His smeared face and soggy, matted hair, the women of the city cuddling their babies and sobbing, suddenly hushed by Him-gratefulall these women in Jerusalem loving Him, hoping, believing far beyond death. Constantine saw the visage of Sophiathe look of the women, Veronica, Mary, knowing the skull and crossbones, a rolled-back stoneSophia, Christ, in one wordless gaze. So for years it was Maria Sophia and Mother Church as the philosopher fled from library to monastery then back to the public, a cleric in the chair of philosophy, the disputant with Arabs and iconoclasts, then off to hermitage again, until, at someone's beck and call, he left the monastery of St. Basil to join Methodius his brother on a mission to the Khazars. He converted hundreds of barbarians, freed Greek patriots, the booty of the Khan, journeyed through Fulla and choppe~ down a sacred oak engrafted with branches of a cherry tree, traveled on to the Crimea, dug up an anchor and the bones of Pope Clement on an island just off the quarries and salt mines of Cherson, and returned to Byzantium. But there was still something, something . . . This woman, Sophia, who was always before him, this woman whose eyes were Mary's and Veronica's, whose smile was a calmed-down mother's on the way of the cross, �SLOVAKIA 131 whose whole bearing breathed Scripture and liturgy, this mystical body, still somehow eluded him. She was always just ahead of him in the caravan, just beyond his grasp. So often they were almost neck-and-neck, and then she would vanishSophia, the spirit of a woman from another time, Sophia, an angel, a puff of smoke, a whiff of incense, a cloud wafting off ... Something about Sophia, like a word, a sacrament, was not quite flesh and blood, not quite concrete. Sophia, the one woman he dreamed, drew him to heaven but hid herself in the dust of horses' hooves. Then a missive to Emperor Michael from Rastislav, prince of the rivers Morava and Vah, called Methodius and Constantine to an alphabet, gospels, liturgical books, and an apostolate to the Slovaks. For Constantine, Sophia was becoming more and more the gypsythe whim and will-o'-the-wisp of God. The Tatry mountains, linden trees, fields of poppies Young girls striking their foreheads to the gods, bearing wreaths of flowers and dancing at the altars of Lada, tossing handfuls of flour into roadside bushes and shrubbery for Meluzina, for Lada, goddess of beauty, for Meluzina, goddess of the wind ... Peasant mothers pulling their children away from the doorways to hide their faces in the lacework of their aprons and the gathers of their skirts against the lightning and storm, muttering charms against the thundergod Perun, mumbling pleas to Morena and zivena, death and life, those goddesses, wanton as a scattering of pebbles underfoot, whimsical as autumn leaves skittering across the fields ... �132 SLOVAKIA These women with cocks and hearts, apples, tulips, and slit leeks embroidered on their bodices and sleeves, these women in lace caps and bonnets, these flush-faced girls who stole behind haystacks and their white-washed cottages to sing, these flush-faced girls, love-longing, who wove ribbons through their caps and danced, these girls and women, earthy pagans, stopped and listened. The men set aside their plows and haymows, laid down their hatchets and tools, and, God knows why, heard Constantine, mulled it all over as if weighing a bargain with a trader or considering the terms of a truce with an old foe, and turned to ask to be baptized. And suddenly, like lightning cracking through a gray dead tree, it struck him: there she was standing, fullface, bright-eyed and smiling, in front of a peasant's hut. This phantom, this gypsy, this poppy, Sophia . . . an old Slovak grandmother in a black kerchief, her face weatherbeaten with laughter and weeping. It was as simple as that, mused ConstantineSophia, wisdom, was, had always been, a folkwoman humming and listening to the wind. (A grandmother who was a mother rocking by a fireside, embroidering, tatting, telling stories, a mother who was an apple-cheeked girl, fancy in flowers, ribbons and fine stitchery, giggling, hiding-and-seeking, sighing, lovelorn, an apple-cheeked girl who was a child dressed in hemp underwear, a wooly halenka, a linen blouse and pinafore, a child squatting on the ground playing with dolls made of dried-out cornhusks, a child who was a helpless infant, naked, nursed, and lulled to sleep . . . ) Constantine had followed Sophia and found her, �SLOVAKIA 133 a toothless big-hearted grandmother, a sage old matriarch who taught her men to work, play, sing, survive catastrophe, to listen, learn, and lie down to dream. Sophia, Christ, among the Slovaks . . . Wisdom was the fondness with which he welled up, the awe and tenderness with which he poured water over the peasant's brow, whispered the words of baptism like sweet nothings and like a magic spell, and traced with his thumb a cross. This plain, unstudied wisdoma grandmother gumming dark bread, cabbage, cheese This lovethe sun, the wind, the land, the children, flesh and blood This carnival of joy .. . And Constantine was ready to go back to Rome, weakened, ill, to take to a monastery, change his name to Cyril, and retreat into a rough-hewn cell, to doze off under thin covers on a hard cot and pass away in a curlicue like a baby in a cradle, the unwinding of a clock, the bursting of a chick from an eggshell. Sister M. Pamela Smith, SS.C.M. Note: For many of the details of biography and the descriptions of costume, topography, and heritage, this poem is indebted to the following sources: Agnes Bocan, "An Introduction to Slovak Costume," Slovakia, 22 (1972), pp. 153-157. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakian Culture in the Light of History, (Cambridge, Mass.: Hampshire Press, 1954). Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M., Sts. Cyril and Methodius: The Glory of the Slavs, (Milwaukee: Catholic Life Publications, Bruce Press, 1963). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 128 SLOVAKIA St. Cyril Ln Love A boy in a well-to-do bedroom, wound in rich blankets, tufted wool, his head resting on the hand-stitched cover of a feather pillow, bunched his legs to his chest and hugged himself tight as a spring, a boy with the mind of a man and the soul of a saint asleep in a curlicue like a baby in a cradle, not long since his mother's milk, her large, soft hands and wrap-around arms, her lullaby voice tucking him in. The one woman he dreamed, Sophia, the only woman he ever wanted to pursue, had features he couldn't quite make outa Roman profile, it seemed, the blank eyes of a Greek statue, but no distinct size or shape of nose and mouth, no color of iris or curve of the eyebrows, no crow's feet or squint lines, no identifying freckles or mole on her neck. She was like a lady one catches sight of in a marketplace and is struck by something in the walk, something about the fall of the hair over her shoulders, something, something that makes one think she is someone he knew a long time ago, met among guest at a banquet strolled with on a Sunday afternoon, talked with outside the ruins of a temple, or fell in love with in his sleep. Something about her stride, something about the lilt of her hair, sends him chasing after her, careening into the crowd, halting as if at a roadblock, then snaking through and breaking into a half-jog SLOVAKIA 129 past men leading donkeys loaded with baskets, women balancing jugs on their heads, soldiers, girls haggling at fruit and vegetable stalls, pickpockets, children tussling and dodging the one who is "it" in a game of tag or crouching to shoot pebbles into circles drawn in the dirt, toddlers. And in the hurly-burly and haste he never catches up. The seven-year-old Constantine awoke, locked himself in his room in Thessalonica, read and searched, searched and read ( . . . the soul of man, the mind of God . . . ) , sought the image of the lady, a rumor of her whereabouts. The seven-year-old Constantine peered out his window, picked up his quill, dipped it in the inkhorn, made notes on a parchment scroll till he was sixteen and best friends with a genius and holy man as he went off to the imperial school to study grammar, rhetor-ic, logic, music, poetry, astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, theology and Scripture texts . Luke, the Blessed ( ... poring over Homer, Helen Virgin ... ). Arm-in-arm with Gregory Nazianzen, he pursued the icon lady, the come-alive statue in gold ornaments and jewels into the shadows of Hagia Sophia, the cathedral, where the bell struck in the dome, and he was twenty-two. There was no one he would marry, no godchild of a chancellor, not even with a hefty dowry and promise of a post at the emperor's court; for, dropping into the bulging mother of a church one day for his accustomed visit, 130 SLOVAKIA he had stood transfixed before the gilded altar and mosaics recognizing, as if for the first time, Mary the mother, speechless, following her son through the jostling mob, along the cobblestones, Veronica, aghast, wiping His blood and sweat, then left with the imprint on her veil of His smeared face and soggy, matted hair, the women of the city cuddling their babies and sobbing, suddenly hushed by Him-gratefulall these women in Jerusalem loving Him, hoping, believing far beyond death. Constantine saw the visage of Sophiathe look of the women, Veronica, Mary, knowing the skull and crossbones, a rolled-back stoneSophia, Christ, in one wordless gaze. So for years it was Maria Sophia and Mother Church as the philosopher fled from library to monastery then back to the public, a cleric in the chair of philosophy, the disputant with Arabs and iconoclasts, then off to hermitage again, until, at someone's beck and call, he left the monastery of St. Basil to join Methodius his brother on a mission to the Khazars. He converted hundreds of barbarians, freed Greek patriots, the booty of the Khan, journeyed through Fulla and choppe~ down a sacred oak engrafted with branches of a cherry tree, traveled on to the Crimea, dug up an anchor and the bones of Pope Clement on an island just off the quarries and salt mines of Cherson, and returned to Byzantium. But there was still something, something . . . This woman, Sophia, who was always before him, this woman whose eyes were Mary's and Veronica's, whose smile was a calmed-down mother's on the way of the cross, SLOVAKIA 131 whose whole bearing breathed Scripture and liturgy, this mystical body, still somehow eluded him. She was always just ahead of him in the caravan, just beyond his grasp. So often they were almost neck-and-neck, and then she would vanishSophia, the spirit of a woman from another time, Sophia, an angel, a puff of smoke, a whiff of incense, a cloud wafting off ... Something about Sophia, like a word, a sacrament, was not quite flesh and blood, not quite concrete. Sophia, the one woman he dreamed, drew him to heaven but hid herself in the dust of horses' hooves. Then a missive to Emperor Michael from Rastislav, prince of the rivers Morava and Vah, called Methodius and Constantine to an alphabet, gospels, liturgical books, and an apostolate to the Slovaks. For Constantine, Sophia was becoming more and more the gypsythe whim and will-o'-the-wisp of God. The Tatry mountains, linden trees, fields of poppies Young girls striking their foreheads to the gods, bearing wreaths of flowers and dancing at the altars of Lada, tossing handfuls of flour into roadside bushes and shrubbery for Meluzina, for Lada, goddess of beauty, for Meluzina, goddess of the wind ... Peasant mothers pulling their children away from the doorways to hide their faces in the lacework of their aprons and the gathers of their skirts against the lightning and storm, muttering charms against the thundergod Perun, mumbling pleas to Morena and zivena, death and life, those goddesses, wanton as a scattering of pebbles underfoot, whimsical as autumn leaves skittering across the fields ... 132 SLOVAKIA These women with cocks and hearts, apples, tulips, and slit leeks embroidered on their bodices and sleeves, these women in lace caps and bonnets, these flush-faced girls who stole behind haystacks and their white-washed cottages to sing, these flush-faced girls, love-longing, who wove ribbons through their caps and danced, these girls and women, earthy pagans, stopped and listened. The men set aside their plows and haymows, laid down their hatchets and tools, and, God knows why, heard Constantine, mulled it all over as if weighing a bargain with a trader or considering the terms of a truce with an old foe, and turned to ask to be baptized. And suddenly, like lightning cracking through a gray dead tree, it struck him: there she was standing, fullface, bright-eyed and smiling, in front of a peasant's hut. This phantom, this gypsy, this poppy, Sophia . . . an old Slovak grandmother in a black kerchief, her face weatherbeaten with laughter and weeping. It was as simple as that, mused ConstantineSophia, wisdom, was, had always been, a folkwoman humming and listening to the wind. (A grandmother who was a mother rocking by a fireside, embroidering, tatting, telling stories, a mother who was an apple-cheeked girl, fancy in flowers, ribbons and fine stitchery, giggling, hiding-and-seeking, sighing, lovelorn, an apple-cheeked girl who was a child dressed in hemp underwear, a wooly halenka, a linen blouse and pinafore, a child squatting on the ground playing with dolls made of dried-out cornhusks, a child who was a helpless infant, naked, nursed, and lulled to sleep . . . ) Constantine had followed Sophia and found her, SLOVAKIA 133 a toothless big-hearted grandmother, a sage old matriarch who taught her men to work, play, sing, survive catastrophe, to listen, learn, and lie down to dream. Sophia, Christ, among the Slovaks . . . Wisdom was the fondness with which he welled up, the awe and tenderness with which he poured water over the peasant's brow, whispered the words of baptism like sweet nothings and like a magic spell, and traced with his thumb a cross. This plain, unstudied wisdoma grandmother gumming dark bread, cabbage, cheese This lovethe sun, the wind, the land, the children, flesh and blood This carnival of joy .. . And Constantine was ready to go back to Rome, weakened, ill, to take to a monastery, change his name to Cyril, and retreat into a rough-hewn cell, to doze off under thin covers on a hard cot and pass away in a curlicue like a baby in a cradle, the unwinding of a clock, the bursting of a chick from an eggshell. Sister M. Pamela Smith, SS.C.M. Note: For many of the details of biography and the descriptions of costume, topography, and heritage, this poem is indebted to the following sources: Agnes Bocan, "An Introduction to Slovak Costume," Slovakia, 22 (1972), pp. 153-157. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakian Culture in the Light of History, (Cambridge, Mass.: Hampshire Press, 1954). Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M., Sts. Cyril and Methodius: The Glory of the Slavs, (Milwaukee: Catholic Life Publications, Bruce Press, 1963).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. Cyril in Love Description An account of the resource Sister M. Pamela Smith, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 128-133 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Smith, Sister M. Pamela, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/db4fe92a0dc1d3e75eb069966e827948.pdf 680ad131f14bd4718b4eb7d84ce08d2e PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. X MARCH-JUNE, 1960 NO. 6 (31) ST. GERMAIN AND MUNICH Two events, the anniversaries of which were celebrated in 1958,left deep marks on European and world history: the founding of Czecho-Slovakia 40 years ago on October 28, 1918, and its cession to Germany of the Sudeten lands, the execution of which was regulated between England, France, Italy and Germany 20 years ago in the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938. Po1iticrul observers witlh but superficial knowledge of the domestic conditions in pre-war Czecho-Slovakia often see the Anschluss with Germany of the Sudetenland in the fall of 1938 solely as a consequence of Hitler's power policy and deny the existence of serious nationality pr,oblems in Masaryk's and Benes' little "model democracy." They therefore judge the material value of these events as results of dictatorial coercion, which they reject. It cannot be denied tha,t Hitler's interference affected the solution of the Sudeten German question in 1938. lt should not be overlooked, however, that Hitler neither creoced the Sudeten issue, nor did the Sudeten Germans ever form a fi:flth column within Czecho-Slovalria, as malevolenits sometimes maintain. The Sudeten issue had existed as an internal Czecho-Slovak problem ever since that country's very beginnings. Hitler, to be sure, raised this question to the level of international politics. Involuntarily h e was aided by the Cech governmenlt's rigid frustration of any fair agreement on the nationality issue with the Sudeten Germans from 1918 to 1938. The truth of this statement is proven by the debate in the Br1tish House of Oommons on October 3, 1938, where representatives of all parties expressed the convict ion that the Munich decision was but a .correction of a wrong inflicted upon the Sudeten Germans 20 years ago �2 SLOVAKIA at the peace conference of St. Germain. Neville Henderson, then British Ambassador to Berlin, summarized his judgment on the affuir in the words: Czecho-S[ovakia lost territories which better had not been inco~porated into the Czech State at the Versailles Peace Conference and which - except on the basis of a federation - could not have remained there forever. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish carefully bet ween the Anschluss of the Sudeten region with Germany in September-October, 1938, and Hitler's occupation of the Czech-inhabited parts of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, when the Reich .government established a protectorate over the Czech people. The Sudeten C'~rmans had nothing whatsoever to do with this aot of Hitler's. In fact, they disapproved of it because their experience during the first Czecho-Slovak Republic had taught them that a durable and peaceful settlement could not be reached within Central Europe u111less it was based on a strictJly equal treatment of both Czechs and Germans, and that any discriminatory policy of one of them toward the other would necessarily lead to unrest. The violation of this principle had caused the disruption of Czecho-S'lovakia; its neglect by Hirtler was also to have serious consequences. The physical and tempora:l proximity of Sudetenland's Anschluss with Germany in October, 1938, and Hitler's occupation of Prague in March, 1939, as well as his dmmaJtic pal'ticipation in both events, together with the anti-German war propaganda that shortly ensued, caused many persons to see in the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, a dishonest ·defeat of the democracies by Hitler's shrewd power politics. Even to<my there lingers an aftertaste of vacillating appeasemenrt when the Munich Agreement is mentioned. But "Munich" gained this ill repute unjustly. For the M'llllich Agreement did not contain a demand on CzechoSlovakia to cede to Germany the Sudeten territory, nor was Czecho-Slovakia forced by the agreement to such cession. The Czecho-Slovak governmenit had one week previously expressed to the ambassadors of France and �SLOVAKIA 3 Great Bdtai.n in Prague iJt.s willingness to band over to GeI'Illany the German-inhabited areas of western CzechoS'lovakia. Upon that declaration of cession the British and French heads of government had acted when they went to Munich to negotiate with Hitler on the procedure fur transferring the areas in question from Czech to German authority. (1) It is necessary to note in this context that t!he legaJlity of said cession was universally acknowledged at that time. Czecho-Slovakia Not Homogeneous In order to understand the internal causes of the 1938 Sudeten crisis it will be necessary to review briefly the conditions as they existed in pre-war -- Czecho-Slovakiia and to tra;ce the problem to its roots. Until 1918, the area known a-s Czecho-Slovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian mum-national empire. At the Paris Peace Oonference Benes demanded the dissolution of Austriia-Hungary and .the founding of a Czech State on the ground of national self-determination and certain historic claims. By resorting to fallsified population statistics and erroneously drawn maps he caused the forceful inclusion of more than three million Sudeten Germ.ans into the Czech State, at the same time denying those Germans - at the point of a gun - the very right of selfdetermination he had requested and obtained from the peace conference for his own nation. (2) Czecho-Slovakia was by no means a nationally homogeneous StaJte. The census of 1930 (naturally, inc'lined to favor tihe Czechs) revealed that country's population to number 7.2 million Czechs, 3.3 million Germans, 2.3 mHlion Slovaks, 700,000 Magyars, 550,000 Ukrainians, 190,000 Jews (3) , and 130,000 Poles and others. Almost one-half the country's population was non-Czech - accoirding to official Czech figures. That the Slovaks and Czechs together do not constitute a unitary nation, is obvious to anyone conversant with the history and language of these two peoples. The need to seek a workable agreement between the Czech government and the 7 million non-Czech people in �4 SLOVAKIA the CSR was well conceived by the participants of the peace conference, especially by the representatives of the United States. The American delegates objected strenuously to the violation of the self-determination right with respect to the Sudeten Germans and the drawing of boundruries on strategic principles. ( 4) Even the Commission ron the new State at the peace conference warned in its final report that "the prosperity and perhaps almost the existence of the new State will depend upon the success with which it incorporates the Germans as wirling citizens." Czech Discriminatory Measures But instead of realistically accepting the multi-national character of the State as a factor State poliicy must reckon with, the Czech leaders used shrewd administrative tactics to advance into the areas in which the other national groups were settled. Benes' solemn promise at the peace conference of St. Germain in 1918, to make of Czecho-Slovakia a sort of Switzerland, in which the various nationalri ties could live side by side and share equal rights (5), remained but an empty promise. To what extent the official State policy was guided by discriminatory lines becomes obvious by citing but a few exiamples: In 1919 the nobility was deprived of land in accordance with the land expropriation act. Between 1921 and 1924 about 1,500 acres of this land were turned over to Germans, while over 600,000 acres were given to Czech settlers, although the land in question lay almost exclusively within German territory. Thus the land reform be, came in fact an instrument of Czech penetration into German land. After the founding of ,tJhe Czecho-Slovak State, 60,000 German public servants were dismissed from office and replaced by Czechs who worked in areas exclusively Germain though often they were unable to wnderstand a single word of Germ'a n. rr,he number of pupils per classroom was raised from 40 to 60, resulting in the dissolution of more than 1,000 German elementary school cla:sses between 1921 and 1935. �SLOVAKIA 5 Concurrently there were set up palatial schools for the children of Czech officialdom in the Sudetenland for whom the above-mention ed figures did not apply. To denationalize the German areas, attempts were made to make the schools atJtractive to German children; unemployed persons were urged to send their children the-re with promises of a warm noon meal and ariticles of clothing, features which ,the poorly equipped German schools could not afford. The government made the placing of State orders with German industries dependent on whether or not a certain percenitage of Czech workers were employed. This led to dismissals of German workmen with the result that when tlhe economic depression of the 1930's struck, 500,000 of the tota'l 800,000 jobless in Czecho-Slova kia were of German ethnic origin. This meant that every sixth Sudeten German in Czecho-Slovak ia was jobless, while of the more than 11 mil.Jion non-German members of the population, only every 36th person had to live on the meager unemployment compensation . As the Czech government refused to take any action on the complaints of the Sudeten Germans, however justified, tfue Sudeten leaders were constrruined to register 22 complaints with the League of Nations, hoping that Czecho-Slovakia would be urged by that organization to live up to its obligations as provided in the peace treaty and the international treaty on the protection of minorities, which was part of the pea(!e settlement. Sudeten German Loyalty Lovd Runcima:n, British investigator and mediator, confirmed the facts and summarized his findings in a report to the British Prime Minister of September, 1938. "It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that the Czecho-Slovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by .tactlessness, lack of understanding , petty intolerance and discrimination , to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt." �6 SLOVAKIA Despite these grievances, the Sudeten Germans had loyally done their duty. Three major political parties tried to cooperate w1th the Czech government. Even Herillein's Sudeten German Party had soughit a solution for years on the basis of German-Czech reconciliation with the State. Up to the summer of 1938 its program called for Sudeten German "home rule." Before May 21, 1938, when Benes mobilized the Czecho-Slovak army, Hitler had not taken any conceivable interest in the Sudeten German grievances and it wou1d have been possible to solve the question on an internal 11ather than an international level, provided the Czech goviernment had shown "any readiness to remedy them on an adequate scale," as Lord Runciman put it. When Benes offered his so-caHed "Fourth Plan" which he later called a jest - fairly meeting the Sudeten German requests, the final decision was no longer his or Henlein's. The Sudeten question had already grown f.rom a domestic afifair into a serious international crisis. - S. B. (1) A detailed study wHh aimplle reiference to then conteimporary sources is to be found in Herman RaS:Ohh()lfer's "Die Sudetenfrage," Munich, 1953, and Wenzel Jaksch's "Europas Weg nach Potsdam," S'tuttgart, 1958. (2) On Maoch 4, 1<919, when Sudeten Gerlffians of all political affiliations protested pUiblicly a,gainst this denial of self-deterunir.,ation and foreed submission to Czech domination, the Cz<eeh army fired into the crowds causing 54 dead and man,y wounded. (3) In Czecho-Slovakia the Jews were considered as a separate nationality. (4) Of. H. Nicolsen, Peace Making, London, 1938. (5) 1Dr. Edward Benes in Aid Memoire m: ".Et is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak government ... to make of Czecho-Slovakia a sorit of Switzerland." • • • WHO SAID IT? "In Ozech ,politics, in Ozech national life, it is urgent that we COlffie to am understanding with the Communist Party . . . the COilnllllll.llllist party shahl remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our national life. . . . Oommg to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our politi<!al philosophy." - (1F erdinan.d Peroutka, a Benes Czech employed by Radio Free Europe, DNE~IDK, 2-9-48). � SLOV AKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. X MARCH-JUNE, 1960 NO. 6 (31) ST. GERMAIN AND MUNICH Two events, the anniversaries of which were celebrated in 1958,left deep marks on European and world history: the founding of Czecho-Slovakia 40 years ago on October 28, 1918, and its cession to Germany of the Sudeten lands, the execution of which was regulated between England, France, Italy and Germany 20 years ago in the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938. Po1iticrul observers witlh but superficial knowledge of the domestic conditions in pre-war Czecho-Slovakia often see the Anschluss with Germany of the Sudetenland in the fall of 1938 solely as a consequence of Hitler's power policy and deny the existence of serious nationality pr,oblems in Masaryk's and Benes' little "model democracy." They therefore judge the material value of these events as results of dictatorial coercion, which they reject. It cannot be denied tha,t Hitler's interference affected the solution of the Sudeten German question in 1938. lt should not be overlooked, however, that Hitler neither creoced the Sudeten issue, nor did the Sudeten Germans ever form a fi:flth column within Czecho-Slovalria, as malevolenits sometimes maintain. The Sudeten issue had existed as an internal Czecho-Slovak problem ever since that country's very beginnings. Hitler, to be sure, raised this question to the level of international politics. Involuntarily h e was aided by the Cech governmenlt's rigid frustration of any fair agreement on the nationality issue with the Sudeten Germans from 1918 to 1938. The truth of this statement is proven by the debate in the Br1tish House of Oommons on October 3, 1938, where representatives of all parties expressed the convict ion that the Munich decision was but a .correction of a wrong inflicted upon the Sudeten Germans 20 years ago �2 SLOVAKIA at the peace conference of St. Germain. Neville Henderson, then British Ambassador to Berlin, summarized his judgment on the affuir in the words: Czecho-S[ovakia lost territories which better had not been inco~porated into the Czech State at the Versailles Peace Conference and which - except on the basis of a federation - could not have remained there forever. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish carefully bet ween the Anschluss of the Sudeten region with Germany in September-October, 1938, and Hitler's occupation of the Czech-inhabited parts of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, when the Reich .government established a protectorate over the Czech people. The Sudeten C'~rmans had nothing whatsoever to do with this aot of Hitler's. In fact, they disapproved of it because their experience during the first Czecho-Slovak Republic had taught them that a durable and peaceful settlement could not be reached within Central Europe u111less it was based on a strictJly equal treatment of both Czechs and Germans, and that any discriminatory policy of one of them toward the other would necessarily lead to unrest. The violation of this principle had caused the disruption of Czecho-S'lovakia; its neglect by Hirtler was also to have serious consequences. The physical and tempora:l proximity of Sudetenland's Anschluss with Germany in October, 1938, and Hitler's occupation of Prague in March, 1939, as well as his dmmaJtic pal'ticipation in both events, together with the anti-German war propaganda that shortly ensued, caused many persons to see in the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, a dishonest ·defeat of the democracies by Hitler's shrewd power politics. Even to<my there lingers an aftertaste of vacillating appeasemenrt when the Munich Agreement is mentioned. But "Munich" gained this ill repute unjustly. For the M'llllich Agreement did not contain a demand on CzechoSlovakia to cede to Germany the Sudeten territory, nor was Czecho-Slovakia forced by the agreement to such cession. The Czecho-Slovak governmenit had one week previously expressed to the ambassadors of France and �SLOVAKIA 3 Great Bdtai.n in Prague iJt.s willingness to band over to GeI'Illany the German-inhabited areas of western CzechoS'lovakia. Upon that declaration of cession the British and French heads of government had acted when they went to Munich to negotiate with Hitler on the procedure fur transferring the areas in question from Czech to German authority. (1) It is necessary to note in this context that t!he legaJlity of said cession was universally acknowledged at that time. Czecho-Slovakia Not Homogeneous In order to understand the internal causes of the 1938 Sudeten crisis it will be necessary to review briefly the conditions as they existed in pre-war -- Czecho-Slovakiia and to tra;ce the problem to its roots. Until 1918, the area known a-s Czecho-Slovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian mum-national empire. At the Paris Peace Oonference Benes demanded the dissolution of Austriia-Hungary and .the founding of a Czech State on the ground of national self-determination and certain historic claims. By resorting to fallsified population statistics and erroneously drawn maps he caused the forceful inclusion of more than three million Sudeten Germ.ans into the Czech State, at the same time denying those Germans - at the point of a gun - the very right of selfdetermination he had requested and obtained from the peace conference for his own nation. (2) Czecho-Slovakia was by no means a nationally homogeneous StaJte. The census of 1930 (naturally, inc'lined to favor tihe Czechs) revealed that country's population to number 7.2 million Czechs, 3.3 million Germans, 2.3 mHlion Slovaks, 700,000 Magyars, 550,000 Ukrainians, 190,000 Jews (3) , and 130,000 Poles and others. Almost one-half the country's population was non-Czech - accoirding to official Czech figures. That the Slovaks and Czechs together do not constitute a unitary nation, is obvious to anyone conversant with the history and language of these two peoples. The need to seek a workable agreement between the Czech government and the 7 million non-Czech people in �4 SLOVAKIA the CSR was well conceived by the participants of the peace conference, especially by the representatives of the United States. The American delegates objected strenuously to the violation of the self-determination right with respect to the Sudeten Germans and the drawing of boundruries on strategic principles. ( 4) Even the Commission ron the new State at the peace conference warned in its final report that "the prosperity and perhaps almost the existence of the new State will depend upon the success with which it incorporates the Germans as wirling citizens." Czech Discriminatory Measures But instead of realistically accepting the multi-national character of the State as a factor State poliicy must reckon with, the Czech leaders used shrewd administrative tactics to advance into the areas in which the other national groups were settled. Benes' solemn promise at the peace conference of St. Germain in 1918, to make of Czecho-Slovakia a sort of Switzerland, in which the various nationalri ties could live side by side and share equal rights (5), remained but an empty promise. To what extent the official State policy was guided by discriminatory lines becomes obvious by citing but a few exiamples: In 1919 the nobility was deprived of land in accordance with the land expropriation act. Between 1921 and 1924 about 1,500 acres of this land were turned over to Germans, while over 600,000 acres were given to Czech settlers, although the land in question lay almost exclusively within German territory. Thus the land reform be, came in fact an instrument of Czech penetration into German land. After the founding of ,tJhe Czecho-Slovak State, 60,000 German public servants were dismissed from office and replaced by Czechs who worked in areas exclusively Germain though often they were unable to wnderstand a single word of Germ'a n. rr,he number of pupils per classroom was raised from 40 to 60, resulting in the dissolution of more than 1,000 German elementary school cla:sses between 1921 and 1935. �SLOVAKIA 5 Concurrently there were set up palatial schools for the children of Czech officialdom in the Sudetenland for whom the above-mention ed figures did not apply. To denationalize the German areas, attempts were made to make the schools atJtractive to German children; unemployed persons were urged to send their children the-re with promises of a warm noon meal and ariticles of clothing, features which ,the poorly equipped German schools could not afford. The government made the placing of State orders with German industries dependent on whether or not a certain percenitage of Czech workers were employed. This led to dismissals of German workmen with the result that when tlhe economic depression of the 1930's struck, 500,000 of the tota'l 800,000 jobless in Czecho-Slova kia were of German ethnic origin. This meant that every sixth Sudeten German in Czecho-Slovak ia was jobless, while of the more than 11 mil.Jion non-German members of the population, only every 36th person had to live on the meager unemployment compensation . As the Czech government refused to take any action on the complaints of the Sudeten Germans, however justified, tfue Sudeten leaders were constrruined to register 22 complaints with the League of Nations, hoping that Czecho-Slovakia would be urged by that organization to live up to its obligations as provided in the peace treaty and the international treaty on the protection of minorities, which was part of the pea(!e settlement. Sudeten German Loyalty Lovd Runcima:n, British investigator and mediator, confirmed the facts and summarized his findings in a report to the British Prime Minister of September, 1938. "It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that the Czecho-Slovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by .tactlessness, lack of understanding , petty intolerance and discrimination , to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt." �6 SLOVAKIA Despite these grievances, the Sudeten Germans had loyally done their duty. Three major political parties tried to cooperate w1th the Czech government. Even Herillein's Sudeten German Party had soughit a solution for years on the basis of German-Czech reconciliation with the State. Up to the summer of 1938 its program called for Sudeten German "home rule." Before May 21, 1938, when Benes mobilized the Czecho-Slovak army, Hitler had not taken any conceivable interest in the Sudeten German grievances and it wou1d have been possible to solve the question on an internal 11ather than an international level, provided the Czech goviernment had shown "any readiness to remedy them on an adequate scale," as Lord Runciman put it. When Benes offered his so-caHed "Fourth Plan" which he later called a jest - fairly meeting the Sudeten German requests, the final decision was no longer his or Henlein's. The Sudeten question had already grown f.rom a domestic afifair into a serious international crisis. - S. B. (1) A detailed study wHh aimplle reiference to then conteimporary sources is to be found in Herman RaS:Ohh()lfer's "Die Sudetenfrage," Munich, 1953, and Wenzel Jaksch's "Europas Weg nach Potsdam," S'tuttgart, 1958. (2) On Maoch 4, 1<919, when Sudeten Gerlffians of all political affiliations protested pUiblicly a,gainst this denial of self-deterunir.,ation and foreed submission to Czech domination, the Cz<eeh army fired into the crowds causing 54 dead and man,y wounded. (3) In Czecho-Slovakia the Jews were considered as a separate nationality. (4) Of. H. Nicolsen, Peace Making, London, 1938. (5) 1Dr. Edward Benes in Aid Memoire m: ".Et is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak government ... to make of Czecho-Slovakia a sorit of Switzerland." • • • WHO SAID IT? "In Ozech ,politics, in Ozech national life, it is urgent that we COlffie to am understanding with the Communist Party . . . the COilnllllll.llllist party shahl remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our national life. . . . Oommg to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our politi<!al philosophy." - (1F erdinan.d Peroutka, a Benes Czech employed by Radio Free Europe, DNE~IDK, 2-9-48). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. X MARCH-JUNE, 1960 NO. 6 (31) ST. GERMAIN AND MUNICH Two events, the anniversaries of which were celebrated in 1958,left deep marks on European and world history: the founding of Czecho-Slovakia 40 years ago on October 28, 1918, and its cession to Germany of the Sudeten lands, the execution of which was regulated between England, France, Italy and Germany 20 years ago in the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938. Po1iticrul observers witlh but superficial knowledge of the domestic conditions in pre-war Czecho-Slovakia often see the Anschluss with Germany of the Sudetenland in the fall of 1938 solely as a consequence of Hitler's power policy and deny the existence of serious nationality pr,oblems in Masaryk's and Benes' little "model democracy." They therefore judge the material value of these events as results of dictatorial coercion, which they reject. It cannot be denied tha,t Hitler's interference affected the solution of the Sudeten German question in 1938. lt should not be overlooked, however, that Hitler neither creoced the Sudeten issue, nor did the Sudeten Germans ever form a fi:flth column within Czecho-Slovalria, as malevolenits sometimes maintain. The Sudeten issue had existed as an internal Czecho-Slovak problem ever since that country's very beginnings. Hitler, to be sure, raised this question to the level of international politics. Involuntarily h e was aided by the Cech governmenlt's rigid frustration of any fair agreement on the nationality issue with the Sudeten Germans from 1918 to 1938. The truth of this statement is proven by the debate in the Br1tish House of Oommons on October 3, 1938, where representatives of all parties expressed the convict ion that the Munich decision was but a .correction of a wrong inflicted upon the Sudeten Germans 20 years ago 2 SLOVAKIA at the peace conference of St. Germain. Neville Henderson, then British Ambassador to Berlin, summarized his judgment on the affuir in the words: Czecho-S[ovakia lost territories which better had not been inco~porated into the Czech State at the Versailles Peace Conference and which - except on the basis of a federation - could not have remained there forever. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish carefully bet ween the Anschluss of the Sudeten region with Germany in September-October, 1938, and Hitler's occupation of the Czech-inhabited parts of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, when the Reich .government established a protectorate over the Czech people. The Sudeten C'~rmans had nothing whatsoever to do with this aot of Hitler's. In fact, they disapproved of it because their experience during the first Czecho-Slovak Republic had taught them that a durable and peaceful settlement could not be reached within Central Europe u111less it was based on a strictJly equal treatment of both Czechs and Germans, and that any discriminatory policy of one of them toward the other would necessarily lead to unrest. The violation of this principle had caused the disruption of Czecho-S'lovakia; its neglect by Hirtler was also to have serious consequences. The physical and tempora:l proximity of Sudetenland's Anschluss with Germany in October, 1938, and Hitler's occupation of Prague in March, 1939, as well as his dmmaJtic pal'ticipation in both events, together with the anti-German war propaganda that shortly ensued, caused many persons to see in the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, a dishonest ·defeat of the democracies by Hitler's shrewd power politics. Even to<my there lingers an aftertaste of vacillating appeasemenrt when the Munich Agreement is mentioned. But "Munich" gained this ill repute unjustly. For the M'llllich Agreement did not contain a demand on CzechoSlovakia to cede to Germany the Sudeten territory, nor was Czecho-Slovakia forced by the agreement to such cession. The Czecho-Slovak governmenit had one week previously expressed to the ambassadors of France and SLOVAKIA 3 Great Bdtai.n in Prague iJt.s willingness to band over to GeI'Illany the German-inhabited areas of western CzechoS'lovakia. Upon that declaration of cession the British and French heads of government had acted when they went to Munich to negotiate with Hitler on the procedure fur transferring the areas in question from Czech to German authority. (1) It is necessary to note in this context that t!he legaJlity of said cession was universally acknowledged at that time. Czecho-Slovakia Not Homogeneous In order to understand the internal causes of the 1938 Sudeten crisis it will be necessary to review briefly the conditions as they existed in pre-war -- Czecho-Slovakiia and to tra;ce the problem to its roots. Until 1918, the area known a-s Czecho-Slovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian mum-national empire. At the Paris Peace Oonference Benes demanded the dissolution of Austriia-Hungary and .the founding of a Czech State on the ground of national self-determination and certain historic claims. By resorting to fallsified population statistics and erroneously drawn maps he caused the forceful inclusion of more than three million Sudeten Germ.ans into the Czech State, at the same time denying those Germans - at the point of a gun - the very right of selfdetermination he had requested and obtained from the peace conference for his own nation. (2) Czecho-Slovakia was by no means a nationally homogeneous StaJte. The census of 1930 (naturally, inc'lined to favor tihe Czechs) revealed that country's population to number 7.2 million Czechs, 3.3 million Germans, 2.3 mHlion Slovaks, 700,000 Magyars, 550,000 Ukrainians, 190,000 Jews (3) , and 130,000 Poles and others. Almost one-half the country's population was non-Czech - accoirding to official Czech figures. That the Slovaks and Czechs together do not constitute a unitary nation, is obvious to anyone conversant with the history and language of these two peoples. The need to seek a workable agreement between the Czech government and the 7 million non-Czech people in 4 SLOVAKIA the CSR was well conceived by the participants of the peace conference, especially by the representatives of the United States. The American delegates objected strenuously to the violation of the self-determination right with respect to the Sudeten Germans and the drawing of boundruries on strategic principles. ( 4) Even the Commission ron the new State at the peace conference warned in its final report that "the prosperity and perhaps almost the existence of the new State will depend upon the success with which it incorporates the Germans as wirling citizens." Czech Discriminatory Measures But instead of realistically accepting the multi-national character of the State as a factor State poliicy must reckon with, the Czech leaders used shrewd administrative tactics to advance into the areas in which the other national groups were settled. Benes' solemn promise at the peace conference of St. Germain in 1918, to make of Czecho-Slovakia a sort of Switzerland, in which the various nationalri ties could live side by side and share equal rights (5), remained but an empty promise. To what extent the official State policy was guided by discriminatory lines becomes obvious by citing but a few exiamples: In 1919 the nobility was deprived of land in accordance with the land expropriation act. Between 1921 and 1924 about 1,500 acres of this land were turned over to Germans, while over 600,000 acres were given to Czech settlers, although the land in question lay almost exclusively within German territory. Thus the land reform be, came in fact an instrument of Czech penetration into German land. After the founding of ,tJhe Czecho-Slovak State, 60,000 German public servants were dismissed from office and replaced by Czechs who worked in areas exclusively Germain though often they were unable to wnderstand a single word of Germ'a n. rr,he number of pupils per classroom was raised from 40 to 60, resulting in the dissolution of more than 1,000 German elementary school cla:sses between 1921 and 1935. SLOVAKIA 5 Concurrently there were set up palatial schools for the children of Czech officialdom in the Sudetenland for whom the above-mention ed figures did not apply. To denationalize the German areas, attempts were made to make the schools atJtractive to German children; unemployed persons were urged to send their children the-re with promises of a warm noon meal and ariticles of clothing, features which ,the poorly equipped German schools could not afford. The government made the placing of State orders with German industries dependent on whether or not a certain percenitage of Czech workers were employed. This led to dismissals of German workmen with the result that when tlhe economic depression of the 1930's struck, 500,000 of the tota'l 800,000 jobless in Czecho-Slova kia were of German ethnic origin. This meant that every sixth Sudeten German in Czecho-Slovak ia was jobless, while of the more than 11 mil.Jion non-German members of the population, only every 36th person had to live on the meager unemployment compensation . As the Czech government refused to take any action on the complaints of the Sudeten Germans, however justified, tfue Sudeten leaders were constrruined to register 22 complaints with the League of Nations, hoping that Czecho-Slovakia would be urged by that organization to live up to its obligations as provided in the peace treaty and the international treaty on the protection of minorities, which was part of the pea(!e settlement. Sudeten German Loyalty Lovd Runcima:n, British investigator and mediator, confirmed the facts and summarized his findings in a report to the British Prime Minister of September, 1938. "It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that the Czecho-Slovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by .tactlessness, lack of understanding , petty intolerance and discrimination , to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt." 6 SLOVAKIA Despite these grievances, the Sudeten Germans had loyally done their duty. Three major political parties tried to cooperate w1th the Czech government. Even Herillein's Sudeten German Party had soughit a solution for years on the basis of German-Czech reconciliation with the State. Up to the summer of 1938 its program called for Sudeten German "home rule." Before May 21, 1938, when Benes mobilized the Czecho-Slovak army, Hitler had not taken any conceivable interest in the Sudeten German grievances and it wou1d have been possible to solve the question on an internal 11ather than an international level, provided the Czech goviernment had shown "any readiness to remedy them on an adequate scale," as Lord Runciman put it. When Benes offered his so-caHed "Fourth Plan" which he later called a jest - fairly meeting the Sudeten German requests, the final decision was no longer his or Henlein's. The Sudeten question had already grown f.rom a domestic afifair into a serious international crisis. - S. B. (1) A detailed study wHh aimplle reiference to then conteimporary sources is to be found in Herman RaS:Ohh()lfer's "Die Sudetenfrage," Munich, 1953, and Wenzel Jaksch's "Europas Weg nach Potsdam," S'tuttgart, 1958. (2) On Maoch 4, 1<919, when Sudeten Gerlffians of all political affiliations protested pUiblicly a,gainst this denial of self-deterunir.,ation and foreed submission to Czech domination, the Cz<eeh army fired into the crowds causing 54 dead and man,y wounded. (3) In Czecho-Slovakia the Jews were considered as a separate nationality. (4) Of. H. Nicolsen, Peace Making, London, 1938. (5) 1Dr. Edward Benes in Aid Memoire m: ".Et is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak government ... to make of Czecho-Slovakia a sorit of Switzerland." • • • WHO SAID IT? "In Ozech ,politics, in Ozech national life, it is urgent that we COlffie to am understanding with the Communist Party . . . the COilnllllll.llllist party shahl remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our national life. . . . Oommg to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our politi<!al philosophy." - (1F erdinan.d Peroutka, a Benes Czech employed by Radio Free Europe, DNE~IDK, 2-9-48).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. Germain and Munich Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 6 (31), March-June 1960 pp. 1-6 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1960 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2108696922e63094b9a5ce63d48e0a5d.pdf 5c904d52b3f1c6cfafcffbc7f3d73fe4 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 21 STATISTICS AND POLITICS Francis Vnuk I. On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, by an arbitrary award of Germany and Italy, Czecho-Slova kia was forced to cede to Hungary 10,432 km2 of Slovak territory in which there lived according to Slovak statistics: (1) 276,287 Slovaks, 505,808 Magyars, and 75,688 others (Germans, Jews, Ruthenes, etc.) and according to Magyar-Hung arian claims: (2) 727,297 Magyars, 121,890 Slovaks and 12,456 others (mostly Germans). The loss was considered by the Slovaks to be an utter disregard of justice and an improper application of ethnic principles. As such it was intensely resented and was a cause of constant friction between Slovakia and Hungary during the war period. Every student of modern European history must b struck by the tremendous discrepancies in statistical data claimed as correct by both contesting parties. It seems that in politica..l statistics even mathematics cease to be an "exact" science. In Vienna the Magyars had the advantage (which was a serious setback to the Slovaks) of demanding and then obtaining application of those rules which were used by the Germans in the solution of the Sudeten question. The Germans took the 1910 census as the guiding principle of "ethnic" r,atification of the "Versailles-Di ktait." Due to this most unfortunaite precedent the Magyars obtained at Vienna far more favorable treatment than they would have received if the actual ethnographic aspects were taken into account. The Slovaks contested the validity of the Hungarian statistics of 1910 on several grounds. They maintained that the statistics were not reliable since they did not consider nationality as such and that they were obtained by Magyar or pro-Magyar census takers at the peak of Magyarization to the subsequent detriment of the non-Ma- �22 SLOVAKIA gyar nationalities. (3) These arguments are worthy of a brief analysis. II. The concept of nationaUty in Magyar eyes had some puzzling and even contradictory features. The existence of nationality was admitted; its rights were legalized in one of the best nationality laws ever drafted.(4) Yet the law was an abysmal failure. It was never put into practice, but remained a dead letter. Normally where there is a nationality there is also a nation. But in Hungary, whi,le there was a Slovak nationality, according to S. Tisza "there was no such thing as the Slovak na:tion." In Magy,ar terminology one oould not be a Slovak, German or a Rumanian, but only a Slovak-, German-, or Rumani'an-speaking Hungarian. Consequently the census questionnaires did not inquire into one's nationality, but they wanted to know what language was used. (5) If a person spoke several languages and one of them was Magyar, that was a satisfactory qualificaition to classify him as a Magyar. It was left to Tiso to point out this unusual fact to the Hungarian negotiators in Komarno in Ootober 1938. When they ins1sted that the statistics of 1910 should be taken as a basis for discussion, Tiso told them bluntly: "That would be a blatant denial of justice. You know very we11 how these figures were arrived at. You never asked us what was our nationality. You simply said to us: 'You can speak Magyar, ergo you are Magyars.' In this manner I was counted as a Magyar 81gainst my wishes and feelings." (6) This is, in a nutshell, an eloquent example of "reliability" of the Hungarian statistics, but unfurtunately rut .that time such arguments did not carry much weight with the Germans whose opinion was to be decisive. (7) Bureaucratically trained German minds were still obsessed with the sanctity of written records and subconsciously sentimental about the Magyars as co-victims of a similar treatment to that imposed on the Germans in Versailles. Ill A close look at the official Hungarian statistics of the 1900-1910 decade reveals a very serious weakening of �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slov:ak element. Nowhere else in Hungary was the magyarization process making such inroads as in Slovakia (8) (which the Magyars preferred to call "Felvidek") 1-900 11910 Papula,tilOn Charuge I Total I % ·I 11dtal I % !Iner.ease !!Decrease I % Magyars 8,651,520j51.4 9,944,627•154.5111,293,'10711 + 14.9 GerJ'lj.ans 1,999,060111.9 11',903,357 )10.4 95.703 - 4.8 Srovaks 55,808- 2.8 12,002,16511.91,94'6,357,lll0.7 Rumanians 2,798,55916.6 2,>94!8,100 116.1 149,627 + 5.4 Yugoslaivs 629;169 3.7 656,324 3.6 39,496 + 6.3 R'll!thenes 4124,774 2.5 4164,270 2.5 27,155 + 6.4 Othe~s 33•3 ,308 2 .0 401,4'12 2.2 68,404 1+ 20.5 ------N ation,ality According to the above table the net population increase in 1900-1910 amounted to 1,426,278, which, however, included numerical decreases of two nationalities (Slovaks and Germans), small increases in other non-Magyar nationalities and an unpropor.tionaUy big increase in the dominant Magyar nationality. The figure becomes even more striking when one considers that out of each 1000 peI'sons in the 1900-1910 population increase 907 were Magyars and only 93 non-Magyars. The Magyar nationality increased by 14.9 per cent while the total increase of nonMagyar nationalities was only 1.6 per cent. The extent of the denationaHzation policy pursued by the Hungarian government becomes very revealing when the national increase, due to the difference between births and deaths and the migratory factors is considered. The number of births and the mortality figures .per 1,000 population are given in the following table for the years 1900 and 1910: YEAR 1900 Nati:onality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs - I •B om I Died 39.1 36.7 43.9 37.7 42.3 42.6 25.7 25.0 29.7 28.8 27.5 34.4 - -- YEAR 1910 ID.ised I Increase I Incre ase I !Bom I 13.4 11.7 14.2 8.9 14.8 8.2 -· I I 35.1 32.0 38.4 35.7 39.5 38.9 - ---- - I 22.0 I I 21.5 24.7 27.4 24.8 28.3 13.1 10.5 13.7 8.3 14.7 10.6 The table shows an even increase of various nationalities, and it is · interesting to note that on the birth and �SLOVAKIA 24 death basis the Ruthenes and Slovaks were the fastest growing nationalities of pre-war Hungary. There is, of course, another factor of significant importance which in the first decade of this century played an important part in the population structure of old Hungary, namely emigration. For simplicity's sake the year 1910 is taken as typical. The emigration figures per 1,000 population are as follows: Nationality I I Emigrat ion !balance Number •o f / Returned emigrants emigra,ruts -1.8 -6.8 -6.7 -4.1 -5.9 -2.5 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 8.8 9.3 5.1 8.2 3.8 Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs The population increase per 1,000 population in the census year 1910 should, therefore, be: increa,se per i IINet 1000 (derived I from, death a•nd Nationality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs I emi,g ration data) I 11.3 3.7 7.0 4.2 8.8 8.1 . . Percentual mcrea:se As estimated Actual from statistrcs 1.13 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.88 0.81 I I + 1.49 -0.48 -0.28 + 0.54 + 0.64 + 0.63 For the Slovaks these figures have a tragic significance. It was no empty threat that the Slovak nation was faced with its own extinction. The statistics show this. The decline of the Slovak nationality was catastrophically rapid. In the decade 1900-19100 the SloV1ak population should have increased by about 160,000; instead it decreased by more than 55,000. This represents a loss of about 215,000, i.e., nearly 11 per cent. The figures are really staggering. (9) The Slovaks contested that this out-of-all-proporti ons decrease cannot be explained otherwise than by contribut- �SLOVAKIA ing it to the falsification of results by the Hungarian census takers and/or .s tatisticians. They argued that even the forcible and tempting means which the Mo-gyars a:s the dominant nationality had at their disposal could not account for this terrifying decrease. There is ample evidencrthat Slovak resistance to magyarization was at least as good as that of the Rumani1a ns and better than that of the Ruthenes. And yet the latter two nationalities recorded an increase where the Slovaks showed unparalleled losses. Assimilation and denationalization are responsible for some, fals-ifiers for the rest, so run the Slovak arguments. The Slovak,s requested that the arbitrators in the Slovak-Magyar di-spute should rely on the Czecho-Slovak statistics of 1930 which, being of more recent date, give a more realistic picture of the actua:1 state of affairs. The Magyars, however, refused most steadfastly to accept the official Czecho-Slovak statistics, giving very much the same reasons as advanced by the Sloveks against the Magyar statistics. Apparently what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. IV. It must be admitted that the Czecho-Slov,ak statistics were not favorable to the Magyar minority in Slovakia, or at least not as generous as the Magyars would have liked them to be. Census returns show a considerable drop in numerical strength of the Magy,ar minority: 634,827 in 1921, 571,988 in 1930, a decrease of 9.9 per cent. It must, however, be remembered that in the same time the Slovak minority in Trianon Hungary decreased from 142,000 to 104,000 which represents a decrease of 26.78 per cent. And finally one has to look for the cause of statisti<!al discrepancies also in the population. There the question of nationa:lity is quite frequently motivated by utilitarian and opportunist as much as national sentiments. This is especially so with the bilingual section of the population and such indigenous groups as Jews and Gypsies who would inva,r iably be loyal to the regime of the day. In the old Hungarian statistics Jews and Gypsies were never considered as separate ethnic groups. On t·h e other hand they �26 SLOVAKIA were treated as such by Czecho-Slovak authorities. According to some estimates, this fact alone accounts for a numerical "decrease" of the Magyar minority in Slovakia, before and after World War I, by about 80,000. The Vienna arbitration was carried out in the atmosphere of "the spirit of the Munich Agreement." Magyar wrongdoing faded away in the distant past, while Czech wrongdoings - alleged or real - were still the order of the day. All the paraphernalia of the Czech-German dispute formed the background against which the SlovakMagyar settlement was projected. Due to the ethnographical complex of the issue it would have been impossible to fix the Slovak-Magyar boundary to the satisfaction of both parties were the arbitrator Solomon himself. It was very much easier to draw it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. But the arbitra,tors decided to satisfy one and wrong the other. The fateful concentration of circumstances was unfavorable to the Slovaks. Tiso, in his broadcast on November 2, 1938, announcing the results of the Vienna Award, poured out his countrymen's sorrow and bitterness; "We have become the victims of injustice. . . Our people, through no fault of its own, has been treated as an object and has come into a situaition which disposed of it as a defeated enemy, without its participation and therefore against it, and often in contradiction to the ethnic principle. 'l'he "Great Powers" have decided, there is nothing else to do but to bow our heads and to work; but no one can prevent us from proclaiming to the whole world that a great injustice has been done to the Slovak people. Under the dictated peace of Trianon, hardly 6 per cent of the Magyar people had to live in Slovakia, whereas under the new settlement of the Slovak frontiers nearly 20 per cent of the Slovak people will have to live in Hungary." (10) APPENDIX In the tables given below the ethnical evolution of ten towns of the Slovak-Magyar linguistic boundary is recorded. In all cases the Magyar element was on the increase in the period 1880-1910, at the expense of the Slovak and �27 SLOVAKIA German component. After 1919 the process was reversen. The rapid increase of the Slovak popufation was mostly due to the influx of rural population to towns, the newcomers being mostly exclusively of Slovak nationality. :POPULATION STRJUCTU'RE Tow.n and c,e nsus year Slovaks Total % Magyars Total % Germans Total % Bratislava 1857 1880 1890 1900 1910 1930 4,600 7,273 a,709 10,7115 U,67G 60,013 14.5 15.7 17,2 16.7 15.3 5'8.7 2,500 7,270 10,4-S3 20;102 31,705 18,'890 7.8 15.7 20.6 31.4 41.7 16.9 .24!,732 30,440 311,404' 33,202 32,790 32,801 77.7 65.6 62.2 51.9 43.0 29.4 4,3719 10,3,1,1 9,7113 9,244 6,5417 42,24;5 39.2 40.9 40.4 23.9 15.4 74.0 2,500 10,007 10,4'21 25,996 33,350 111,504 22.5 3'9.8 43 .4 67.0 77.2 20.1 4,200 4,218 3•,891 3,'189 3,354 37.8 16.8 16.0 8.9 7.4 5.2 3,403' 5,538 4,929 Ul,462 40. 7 36.9 30.'l 92:.4 2,990 7,'2119 9,754 96'1 35. 7 47.8 59.7 4.8 1,969 2,3'12 1,636 5'1>'8 23.6 15.3 10.2 2.8 1,41'9 ·565 449 2,781 54.3 20.4 16.2 ·86.0 1;127 2,167 2:,289 255 43.3 78.5 82.3 7.9 55 3'1 4'2 197 2.4 1.1 1.5 6,1 3,403 3,381 2,181 6,027 89,2 73•,8 ~-0 97.0 200 l •,1 07 2,300 5.2 24.2 2:15 15'8 51.>1 2.5 4'2 32 T78 785 5,106 7,449 8,7512: 4,974 81'.0 88.3 91.7 44.6 423 688 5,956 12.3 9.3 7.2 53.5 856 1,000 1,,6 75 8,71•5 18.0 10.4 13Jl 64.L 3,,6 09 8,1'87 10,634: 4,007 75.0 87.0 83.6 29.4 333 249 428 889 ------------ Kol;ic,e ''' 1857 1880 1890 1900 1<910 1930 3,446 "Ruthenes omitted Nitra 1880 1900 1910 1930 Jelsava 1880 1900 1910 H~30 Trebisov 1880 1900 1910 11930 88 5.6 2.0 0.9 0.5 Levice 1880 1900 11910 1930 198 199 214 6.7 2.4 2.,1 1..9 Lucenec 1880 1900 1910 1930 7.0 2.6 3.3 6.5 �SLOVAKIA 28 Rimavska Sobota 1:880 1900 1910 1930 443 322 468 2,939 9.5 5.3 6.9 44.8 4,102 5,424' 6,1199 3,504 ,88.0 '93.5 91.8 53.4 124 Roznava lr880 1900 1910 1930 400 233 406 2,506 9.9 4.5 6.3 42.7 3,884' 4,7,68 5,886 3,211 83,.8 92.2 9lr.2 54.4 Nove Zamky 1880 1900 1'910 1930 1,466 822 964 9,561 14.3 6.2 6.1 47.8 7,189 12,1,97 14,838 10,193 77.7 91.3 91.6 51.0 1 69 2.5 .1.2 91 116 1.8 259 173 159 170 6.3 3.3 2.5 2.9 813 8.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 340 3'77 256 u REFERENCE S: 1 Documents British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. III, p . 225. 2 Survey of International Afifairs rn38, Vol. Ill p. 105. 3 Cf. Tiso's conversation with Ribbentrop on October 19, 1~38, where Tiso said, "The Sl'ovarks hav,e determined and could pr,ove that the 1910 sta'tistks were incorrect a,n d t'hat they even had been falsified ." (Doc. Ger. F1or. Pol. D., Vol. IV, p. 87.) 4 The Law of Nati-onaiities (Act 44/ 1864) is rerpr:oduiced in R. W. Seton-Watson: Racial Problems in Hungary (Consrtahle, London, 1908), p. 4'299-4'33. Pr:ofessor Seton-Watson gives also a penetrating a,nd· scholarly a,na.lysis of this Act. poin'ting out the differences between lofty t,h eories a;nd l ow practices. 5 This practi,ce was followed till 1941, when for the first time in Magyar history the nationalirty of the inhaibi'tants otf Hurugary was ascertained. 6 A story was told in those days (most priolbalbly apocryiphal) that after th.is point,blank-Jired reminder of Tiso, a memlber c:,f the Hungarian delegation stood up an'd, instead of a long reply, answered in Magyar: "Igazad, s6g,or, de senrki sem .sLszi" (Y:ou are righit, brother, rbu't rnJlbody will believe you). 7 The litalians were eager to placarte the Magyars at somebody else's e~pense. The Slovaks knew v,e ry ,w ell tha t they could no t expect any und,erstanding for their point c:,f view fr:om the cynical Ciano. Jin their efforts to assure bett er terms they concenitr<ated exclusively on Ribbentrop. Unforituna-tely 'he had more will than skill to help them. 8 StaHstical data for this part oif the article come mostly from "Magyar s:zlta:tisztikai kozlemenyek" and "Annuaire statistique de la Repu blique Tchecoslorvaque." 9 The advance of magyarization in 1'880-1910 and the tur.n o,f the tide after 1'919 are best soon from the sta'tistical data taJbulated in .Aippen<lix. 10 "Prager Presse," November 4, 1938. - No need to say that Tiso was basing his statement on Czecho-Slovak ofific'ial statistics. 1 1 1 � SLOVAKIA 21 STATISTICS AND POLITICS Francis Vnuk I. On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, by an arbitrary award of Germany and Italy, Czecho-Slova kia was forced to cede to Hungary 10,432 km2 of Slovak territory in which there lived according to Slovak statistics: (1) 276,287 Slovaks, 505,808 Magyars, and 75,688 others (Germans, Jews, Ruthenes, etc.) and according to Magyar-Hung arian claims: (2) 727,297 Magyars, 121,890 Slovaks and 12,456 others (mostly Germans). The loss was considered by the Slovaks to be an utter disregard of justice and an improper application of ethnic principles. As such it was intensely resented and was a cause of constant friction between Slovakia and Hungary during the war period. Every student of modern European history must b struck by the tremendous discrepancies in statistical data claimed as correct by both contesting parties. It seems that in politica..l statistics even mathematics cease to be an "exact" science. In Vienna the Magyars had the advantage (which was a serious setback to the Slovaks) of demanding and then obtaining application of those rules which were used by the Germans in the solution of the Sudeten question. The Germans took the 1910 census as the guiding principle of "ethnic" r,atification of the "Versailles-Di ktait." Due to this most unfortunaite precedent the Magyars obtained at Vienna far more favorable treatment than they would have received if the actual ethnographic aspects were taken into account. The Slovaks contested the validity of the Hungarian statistics of 1910 on several grounds. They maintained that the statistics were not reliable since they did not consider nationality as such and that they were obtained by Magyar or pro-Magyar census takers at the peak of Magyarization to the subsequent detriment of the non-Ma- �22 SLOVAKIA gyar nationalities. (3) These arguments are worthy of a brief analysis. II. The concept of nationaUty in Magyar eyes had some puzzling and even contradictory features. The existence of nationality was admitted; its rights were legalized in one of the best nationality laws ever drafted.(4) Yet the law was an abysmal failure. It was never put into practice, but remained a dead letter. Normally where there is a nationality there is also a nation. But in Hungary, whi,le there was a Slovak nationality, according to S. Tisza "there was no such thing as the Slovak na:tion." In Magy,ar terminology one oould not be a Slovak, German or a Rumanian, but only a Slovak-, German-, or Rumani'an-speaking Hungarian. Consequently the census questionnaires did not inquire into one's nationality, but they wanted to know what language was used. (5) If a person spoke several languages and one of them was Magyar, that was a satisfactory qualificaition to classify him as a Magyar. It was left to Tiso to point out this unusual fact to the Hungarian negotiators in Komarno in Ootober 1938. When they ins1sted that the statistics of 1910 should be taken as a basis for discussion, Tiso told them bluntly: "That would be a blatant denial of justice. You know very we11 how these figures were arrived at. You never asked us what was our nationality. You simply said to us: 'You can speak Magyar, ergo you are Magyars.' In this manner I was counted as a Magyar 81gainst my wishes and feelings." (6) This is, in a nutshell, an eloquent example of "reliability" of the Hungarian statistics, but unfurtunately rut .that time such arguments did not carry much weight with the Germans whose opinion was to be decisive. (7) Bureaucratically trained German minds were still obsessed with the sanctity of written records and subconsciously sentimental about the Magyars as co-victims of a similar treatment to that imposed on the Germans in Versailles. Ill A close look at the official Hungarian statistics of the 1900-1910 decade reveals a very serious weakening of �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slov:ak element. Nowhere else in Hungary was the magyarization process making such inroads as in Slovakia (8) (which the Magyars preferred to call "Felvidek") 1-900 11910 Papula,tilOn Charuge I Total I % ·I 11dtal I % !Iner.ease !!Decrease I % Magyars 8,651,520j51.4 9,944,627•154.5111,293,'10711 + 14.9 GerJ'lj.ans 1,999,060111.9 11',903,357 )10.4 95.703 - 4.8 Srovaks 55,808- 2.8 12,002,16511.91,94'6,357,lll0.7 Rumanians 2,798,55916.6 2,>94!8,100 116.1 149,627 + 5.4 Yugoslaivs 629;169 3.7 656,324 3.6 39,496 + 6.3 R'll!thenes 4124,774 2.5 4164,270 2.5 27,155 + 6.4 Othe~s 33•3 ,308 2 .0 401,4'12 2.2 68,404 1+ 20.5 ------N ation,ality According to the above table the net population increase in 1900-1910 amounted to 1,426,278, which, however, included numerical decreases of two nationalities (Slovaks and Germans), small increases in other non-Magyar nationalities and an unpropor.tionaUy big increase in the dominant Magyar nationality. The figure becomes even more striking when one considers that out of each 1000 peI'sons in the 1900-1910 population increase 907 were Magyars and only 93 non-Magyars. The Magyar nationality increased by 14.9 per cent while the total increase of nonMagyar nationalities was only 1.6 per cent. The extent of the denationaHzation policy pursued by the Hungarian government becomes very revealing when the national increase, due to the difference between births and deaths and the migratory factors is considered. The number of births and the mortality figures .per 1,000 population are given in the following table for the years 1900 and 1910: YEAR 1900 Nati:onality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs - I •B om I Died 39.1 36.7 43.9 37.7 42.3 42.6 25.7 25.0 29.7 28.8 27.5 34.4 - -- YEAR 1910 ID.ised I Increase I Incre ase I !Bom I 13.4 11.7 14.2 8.9 14.8 8.2 -· I I 35.1 32.0 38.4 35.7 39.5 38.9 - ---- - I 22.0 I I 21.5 24.7 27.4 24.8 28.3 13.1 10.5 13.7 8.3 14.7 10.6 The table shows an even increase of various nationalities, and it is · interesting to note that on the birth and �SLOVAKIA 24 death basis the Ruthenes and Slovaks were the fastest growing nationalities of pre-war Hungary. There is, of course, another factor of significant importance which in the first decade of this century played an important part in the population structure of old Hungary, namely emigration. For simplicity's sake the year 1910 is taken as typical. The emigration figures per 1,000 population are as follows: Nationality I I Emigrat ion !balance Number •o f / Returned emigrants emigra,ruts -1.8 -6.8 -6.7 -4.1 -5.9 -2.5 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 8.8 9.3 5.1 8.2 3.8 Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs The population increase per 1,000 population in the census year 1910 should, therefore, be: increa,se per i IINet 1000 (derived I from, death a•nd Nationality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs I emi,g ration data) I 11.3 3.7 7.0 4.2 8.8 8.1 . . Percentual mcrea:se As estimated Actual from statistrcs 1.13 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.88 0.81 I I + 1.49 -0.48 -0.28 + 0.54 + 0.64 + 0.63 For the Slovaks these figures have a tragic significance. It was no empty threat that the Slovak nation was faced with its own extinction. The statistics show this. The decline of the Slovak nationality was catastrophically rapid. In the decade 1900-19100 the SloV1ak population should have increased by about 160,000; instead it decreased by more than 55,000. This represents a loss of about 215,000, i.e., nearly 11 per cent. The figures are really staggering. (9) The Slovaks contested that this out-of-all-proporti ons decrease cannot be explained otherwise than by contribut- �SLOVAKIA ing it to the falsification of results by the Hungarian census takers and/or .s tatisticians. They argued that even the forcible and tempting means which the Mo-gyars a:s the dominant nationality had at their disposal could not account for this terrifying decrease. There is ample evidencrthat Slovak resistance to magyarization was at least as good as that of the Rumani1a ns and better than that of the Ruthenes. And yet the latter two nationalities recorded an increase where the Slovaks showed unparalleled losses. Assimilation and denationalization are responsible for some, fals-ifiers for the rest, so run the Slovak arguments. The Slovak,s requested that the arbitrators in the Slovak-Magyar di-spute should rely on the Czecho-Slovak statistics of 1930 which, being of more recent date, give a more realistic picture of the actua:1 state of affairs. The Magyars, however, refused most steadfastly to accept the official Czecho-Slovak statistics, giving very much the same reasons as advanced by the Sloveks against the Magyar statistics. Apparently what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. IV. It must be admitted that the Czecho-Slov,ak statistics were not favorable to the Magyar minority in Slovakia, or at least not as generous as the Magyars would have liked them to be. Census returns show a considerable drop in numerical strength of the Magy,ar minority: 634,827 in 1921, 571,988 in 1930, a decrease of 9.9 per cent. It must, however, be remembered that in the same time the Slovak minority in Trianon Hungary decreased from 142,000 to 104,000 which represents a decrease of 26.78 per cent. And finally one has to look for the cause of statisti<!al discrepancies also in the population. There the question of nationa:lity is quite frequently motivated by utilitarian and opportunist as much as national sentiments. This is especially so with the bilingual section of the population and such indigenous groups as Jews and Gypsies who would inva,r iably be loyal to the regime of the day. In the old Hungarian statistics Jews and Gypsies were never considered as separate ethnic groups. On t·h e other hand they �26 SLOVAKIA were treated as such by Czecho-Slovak authorities. According to some estimates, this fact alone accounts for a numerical "decrease" of the Magyar minority in Slovakia, before and after World War I, by about 80,000. The Vienna arbitration was carried out in the atmosphere of "the spirit of the Munich Agreement." Magyar wrongdoing faded away in the distant past, while Czech wrongdoings - alleged or real - were still the order of the day. All the paraphernalia of the Czech-German dispute formed the background against which the SlovakMagyar settlement was projected. Due to the ethnographical complex of the issue it would have been impossible to fix the Slovak-Magyar boundary to the satisfaction of both parties were the arbitrator Solomon himself. It was very much easier to draw it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. But the arbitra,tors decided to satisfy one and wrong the other. The fateful concentration of circumstances was unfavorable to the Slovaks. Tiso, in his broadcast on November 2, 1938, announcing the results of the Vienna Award, poured out his countrymen's sorrow and bitterness; "We have become the victims of injustice. . . Our people, through no fault of its own, has been treated as an object and has come into a situaition which disposed of it as a defeated enemy, without its participation and therefore against it, and often in contradiction to the ethnic principle. 'l'he "Great Powers" have decided, there is nothing else to do but to bow our heads and to work; but no one can prevent us from proclaiming to the whole world that a great injustice has been done to the Slovak people. Under the dictated peace of Trianon, hardly 6 per cent of the Magyar people had to live in Slovakia, whereas under the new settlement of the Slovak frontiers nearly 20 per cent of the Slovak people will have to live in Hungary." (10) APPENDIX In the tables given below the ethnical evolution of ten towns of the Slovak-Magyar linguistic boundary is recorded. In all cases the Magyar element was on the increase in the period 1880-1910, at the expense of the Slovak and �27 SLOVAKIA German component. After 1919 the process was reversen. The rapid increase of the Slovak popufation was mostly due to the influx of rural population to towns, the newcomers being mostly exclusively of Slovak nationality. :POPULATION STRJUCTU'RE Tow.n and c,e nsus year Slovaks Total % Magyars Total % Germans Total % Bratislava 1857 1880 1890 1900 1910 1930 4,600 7,273 a,709 10,7115 U,67G 60,013 14.5 15.7 17,2 16.7 15.3 5'8.7 2,500 7,270 10,4-S3 20;102 31,705 18,'890 7.8 15.7 20.6 31.4 41.7 16.9 .24!,732 30,440 311,404' 33,202 32,790 32,801 77.7 65.6 62.2 51.9 43.0 29.4 4,3719 10,3,1,1 9,7113 9,244 6,5417 42,24;5 39.2 40.9 40.4 23.9 15.4 74.0 2,500 10,007 10,4'21 25,996 33,350 111,504 22.5 3'9.8 43 .4 67.0 77.2 20.1 4,200 4,218 3•,891 3,'189 3,354 37.8 16.8 16.0 8.9 7.4 5.2 3,403' 5,538 4,929 Ul,462 40. 7 36.9 30.'l 92:.4 2,990 7,'2119 9,754 96'1 35. 7 47.8 59.7 4.8 1,969 2,3'12 1,636 5'1>'8 23.6 15.3 10.2 2.8 1,41'9 ·565 449 2,781 54.3 20.4 16.2 ·86.0 1;127 2,167 2:,289 255 43.3 78.5 82.3 7.9 55 3'1 4'2 197 2.4 1.1 1.5 6,1 3,403 3,381 2,181 6,027 89,2 73•,8 ~-0 97.0 200 l •,1 07 2,300 5.2 24.2 2:15 15'8 51.>1 2.5 4'2 32 T78 785 5,106 7,449 8,7512: 4,974 81'.0 88.3 91.7 44.6 423 688 5,956 12.3 9.3 7.2 53.5 856 1,000 1,,6 75 8,71•5 18.0 10.4 13Jl 64.L 3,,6 09 8,1'87 10,634: 4,007 75.0 87.0 83.6 29.4 333 249 428 889 ------------ Kol;ic,e ''' 1857 1880 1890 1900 1<910 1930 3,446 "Ruthenes omitted Nitra 1880 1900 1910 1930 Jelsava 1880 1900 1910 H~30 Trebisov 1880 1900 1910 11930 88 5.6 2.0 0.9 0.5 Levice 1880 1900 11910 1930 198 199 214 6.7 2.4 2.,1 1..9 Lucenec 1880 1900 1910 1930 7.0 2.6 3.3 6.5 �SLOVAKIA 28 Rimavska Sobota 1:880 1900 1910 1930 443 322 468 2,939 9.5 5.3 6.9 44.8 4,102 5,424' 6,1199 3,504 ,88.0 '93.5 91.8 53.4 124 Roznava lr880 1900 1910 1930 400 233 406 2,506 9.9 4.5 6.3 42.7 3,884' 4,7,68 5,886 3,211 83,.8 92.2 9lr.2 54.4 Nove Zamky 1880 1900 1'910 1930 1,466 822 964 9,561 14.3 6.2 6.1 47.8 7,189 12,1,97 14,838 10,193 77.7 91.3 91.6 51.0 1 69 2.5 .1.2 91 116 1.8 259 173 159 170 6.3 3.3 2.5 2.9 813 8.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 340 3'77 256 u REFERENCE S: 1 Documents British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. III, p . 225. 2 Survey of International Afifairs rn38, Vol. Ill p. 105. 3 Cf. Tiso's conversation with Ribbentrop on October 19, 1~38, where Tiso said, "The Sl'ovarks hav,e determined and could pr,ove that the 1910 sta'tistks were incorrect a,n d t'hat they even had been falsified ." (Doc. Ger. F1or. Pol. D., Vol. IV, p. 87.) 4 The Law of Nati-onaiities (Act 44/ 1864) is rerpr:oduiced in R. W. Seton-Watson: Racial Problems in Hungary (Consrtahle, London, 1908), p. 4'299-4'33. Pr:ofessor Seton-Watson gives also a penetrating a,nd· scholarly a,na.lysis of this Act. poin'ting out the differences between lofty t,h eories a;nd l ow practices. 5 This practi,ce was followed till 1941, when for the first time in Magyar history the nationalirty of the inhaibi'tants otf Hurugary was ascertained. 6 A story was told in those days (most priolbalbly apocryiphal) that after th.is point,blank-Jired reminder of Tiso, a memlber c:,f the Hungarian delegation stood up an'd, instead of a long reply, answered in Magyar: "Igazad, s6g,or, de senrki sem .sLszi" (Y:ou are righit, brother, rbu't rnJlbody will believe you). 7 The litalians were eager to placarte the Magyars at somebody else's e~pense. The Slovaks knew v,e ry ,w ell tha t they could no t expect any und,erstanding for their point c:,f view fr:om the cynical Ciano. Jin their efforts to assure bett er terms they concenitr<ated exclusively on Ribbentrop. Unforituna-tely 'he had more will than skill to help them. 8 StaHstical data for this part oif the article come mostly from "Magyar s:zlta:tisztikai kozlemenyek" and "Annuaire statistique de la Repu blique Tchecoslorvaque." 9 The advance of magyarization in 1'880-1910 and the tur.n o,f the tide after 1'919 are best soon from the sta'tistical data taJbulated in .Aippen<lix. 10 "Prager Presse," November 4, 1938. - No need to say that Tiso was basing his statement on Czecho-Slovak ofific'ial statistics. 1 1 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 21 STATISTICS AND POLITICS Francis Vnuk I. On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, by an arbitrary award of Germany and Italy, Czecho-Slova kia was forced to cede to Hungary 10,432 km2 of Slovak territory in which there lived according to Slovak statistics: (1) 276,287 Slovaks, 505,808 Magyars, and 75,688 others (Germans, Jews, Ruthenes, etc.) and according to Magyar-Hung arian claims: (2) 727,297 Magyars, 121,890 Slovaks and 12,456 others (mostly Germans). The loss was considered by the Slovaks to be an utter disregard of justice and an improper application of ethnic principles. As such it was intensely resented and was a cause of constant friction between Slovakia and Hungary during the war period. Every student of modern European history must b struck by the tremendous discrepancies in statistical data claimed as correct by both contesting parties. It seems that in politica..l statistics even mathematics cease to be an "exact" science. In Vienna the Magyars had the advantage (which was a serious setback to the Slovaks) of demanding and then obtaining application of those rules which were used by the Germans in the solution of the Sudeten question. The Germans took the 1910 census as the guiding principle of "ethnic" r,atification of the "Versailles-Di ktait." Due to this most unfortunaite precedent the Magyars obtained at Vienna far more favorable treatment than they would have received if the actual ethnographic aspects were taken into account. The Slovaks contested the validity of the Hungarian statistics of 1910 on several grounds. They maintained that the statistics were not reliable since they did not consider nationality as such and that they were obtained by Magyar or pro-Magyar census takers at the peak of Magyarization to the subsequent detriment of the non-Ma- 22 SLOVAKIA gyar nationalities. (3) These arguments are worthy of a brief analysis. II. The concept of nationaUty in Magyar eyes had some puzzling and even contradictory features. The existence of nationality was admitted; its rights were legalized in one of the best nationality laws ever drafted.(4) Yet the law was an abysmal failure. It was never put into practice, but remained a dead letter. Normally where there is a nationality there is also a nation. But in Hungary, whi,le there was a Slovak nationality, according to S. Tisza "there was no such thing as the Slovak na:tion." In Magy,ar terminology one oould not be a Slovak, German or a Rumanian, but only a Slovak-, German-, or Rumani'an-speaking Hungarian. Consequently the census questionnaires did not inquire into one's nationality, but they wanted to know what language was used. (5) If a person spoke several languages and one of them was Magyar, that was a satisfactory qualificaition to classify him as a Magyar. It was left to Tiso to point out this unusual fact to the Hungarian negotiators in Komarno in Ootober 1938. When they ins1sted that the statistics of 1910 should be taken as a basis for discussion, Tiso told them bluntly: "That would be a blatant denial of justice. You know very we11 how these figures were arrived at. You never asked us what was our nationality. You simply said to us: 'You can speak Magyar, ergo you are Magyars.' In this manner I was counted as a Magyar 81gainst my wishes and feelings." (6) This is, in a nutshell, an eloquent example of "reliability" of the Hungarian statistics, but unfurtunately rut .that time such arguments did not carry much weight with the Germans whose opinion was to be decisive. (7) Bureaucratically trained German minds were still obsessed with the sanctity of written records and subconsciously sentimental about the Magyars as co-victims of a similar treatment to that imposed on the Germans in Versailles. Ill A close look at the official Hungarian statistics of the 1900-1910 decade reveals a very serious weakening of SLOVAKIA 23 the Slov:ak element. Nowhere else in Hungary was the magyarization process making such inroads as in Slovakia (8) (which the Magyars preferred to call "Felvidek") 1-900 11910 Papula,tilOn Charuge I Total I % ·I 11dtal I % !Iner.ease !!Decrease I % Magyars 8,651,520j51.4 9,944,627•154.5111,293,'10711 + 14.9 GerJ'lj.ans 1,999,060111.9 11',903,357 )10.4 95.703 - 4.8 Srovaks 55,808- 2.8 12,002,16511.91,94'6,357,lll0.7 Rumanians 2,798,55916.6 2,>94!8,100 116.1 149,627 + 5.4 Yugoslaivs 629;169 3.7 656,324 3.6 39,496 + 6.3 R'll!thenes 4124,774 2.5 4164,270 2.5 27,155 + 6.4 Othe~s 33•3 ,308 2 .0 401,4'12 2.2 68,404 1+ 20.5 ------N ation,ality According to the above table the net population increase in 1900-1910 amounted to 1,426,278, which, however, included numerical decreases of two nationalities (Slovaks and Germans), small increases in other non-Magyar nationalities and an unpropor.tionaUy big increase in the dominant Magyar nationality. The figure becomes even more striking when one considers that out of each 1000 peI'sons in the 1900-1910 population increase 907 were Magyars and only 93 non-Magyars. The Magyar nationality increased by 14.9 per cent while the total increase of nonMagyar nationalities was only 1.6 per cent. The extent of the denationaHzation policy pursued by the Hungarian government becomes very revealing when the national increase, due to the difference between births and deaths and the migratory factors is considered. The number of births and the mortality figures .per 1,000 population are given in the following table for the years 1900 and 1910: YEAR 1900 Nati:onality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs - I •B om I Died 39.1 36.7 43.9 37.7 42.3 42.6 25.7 25.0 29.7 28.8 27.5 34.4 - -- YEAR 1910 ID.ised I Increase I Incre ase I !Bom I 13.4 11.7 14.2 8.9 14.8 8.2 -· I I 35.1 32.0 38.4 35.7 39.5 38.9 - ---- - I 22.0 I I 21.5 24.7 27.4 24.8 28.3 13.1 10.5 13.7 8.3 14.7 10.6 The table shows an even increase of various nationalities, and it is · interesting to note that on the birth and SLOVAKIA 24 death basis the Ruthenes and Slovaks were the fastest growing nationalities of pre-war Hungary. There is, of course, another factor of significant importance which in the first decade of this century played an important part in the population structure of old Hungary, namely emigration. For simplicity's sake the year 1910 is taken as typical. The emigration figures per 1,000 population are as follows: Nationality I I Emigrat ion !balance Number •o f / Returned emigrants emigra,ruts -1.8 -6.8 -6.7 -4.1 -5.9 -2.5 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 8.8 9.3 5.1 8.2 3.8 Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs The population increase per 1,000 population in the census year 1910 should, therefore, be: increa,se per i IINet 1000 (derived I from, death a•nd Nationality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs I emi,g ration data) I 11.3 3.7 7.0 4.2 8.8 8.1 . . Percentual mcrea:se As estimated Actual from statistrcs 1.13 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.88 0.81 I I + 1.49 -0.48 -0.28 + 0.54 + 0.64 + 0.63 For the Slovaks these figures have a tragic significance. It was no empty threat that the Slovak nation was faced with its own extinction. The statistics show this. The decline of the Slovak nationality was catastrophically rapid. In the decade 1900-19100 the SloV1ak population should have increased by about 160,000; instead it decreased by more than 55,000. This represents a loss of about 215,000, i.e., nearly 11 per cent. The figures are really staggering. (9) The Slovaks contested that this out-of-all-proporti ons decrease cannot be explained otherwise than by contribut- SLOVAKIA ing it to the falsification of results by the Hungarian census takers and/or .s tatisticians. They argued that even the forcible and tempting means which the Mo-gyars a:s the dominant nationality had at their disposal could not account for this terrifying decrease. There is ample evidencrthat Slovak resistance to magyarization was at least as good as that of the Rumani1a ns and better than that of the Ruthenes. And yet the latter two nationalities recorded an increase where the Slovaks showed unparalleled losses. Assimilation and denationalization are responsible for some, fals-ifiers for the rest, so run the Slovak arguments. The Slovak,s requested that the arbitrators in the Slovak-Magyar di-spute should rely on the Czecho-Slovak statistics of 1930 which, being of more recent date, give a more realistic picture of the actua:1 state of affairs. The Magyars, however, refused most steadfastly to accept the official Czecho-Slovak statistics, giving very much the same reasons as advanced by the Sloveks against the Magyar statistics. Apparently what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. IV. It must be admitted that the Czecho-Slov,ak statistics were not favorable to the Magyar minority in Slovakia, or at least not as generous as the Magyars would have liked them to be. Census returns show a considerable drop in numerical strength of the Magy,ar minority: 634,827 in 1921, 571,988 in 1930, a decrease of 9.9 per cent. It must, however, be remembered that in the same time the Slovak minority in Trianon Hungary decreased from 142,000 to 104,000 which represents a decrease of 26.78 per cent. And finally one has to look for the cause of statisti<!al discrepancies also in the population. There the question of nationa:lity is quite frequently motivated by utilitarian and opportunist as much as national sentiments. This is especially so with the bilingual section of the population and such indigenous groups as Jews and Gypsies who would inva,r iably be loyal to the regime of the day. In the old Hungarian statistics Jews and Gypsies were never considered as separate ethnic groups. On t·h e other hand they 26 SLOVAKIA were treated as such by Czecho-Slovak authorities. According to some estimates, this fact alone accounts for a numerical "decrease" of the Magyar minority in Slovakia, before and after World War I, by about 80,000. The Vienna arbitration was carried out in the atmosphere of "the spirit of the Munich Agreement." Magyar wrongdoing faded away in the distant past, while Czech wrongdoings - alleged or real - were still the order of the day. All the paraphernalia of the Czech-German dispute formed the background against which the SlovakMagyar settlement was projected. Due to the ethnographical complex of the issue it would have been impossible to fix the Slovak-Magyar boundary to the satisfaction of both parties were the arbitrator Solomon himself. It was very much easier to draw it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. But the arbitra,tors decided to satisfy one and wrong the other. The fateful concentration of circumstances was unfavorable to the Slovaks. Tiso, in his broadcast on November 2, 1938, announcing the results of the Vienna Award, poured out his countrymen's sorrow and bitterness; "We have become the victims of injustice. . . Our people, through no fault of its own, has been treated as an object and has come into a situaition which disposed of it as a defeated enemy, without its participation and therefore against it, and often in contradiction to the ethnic principle. 'l'he "Great Powers" have decided, there is nothing else to do but to bow our heads and to work; but no one can prevent us from proclaiming to the whole world that a great injustice has been done to the Slovak people. Under the dictated peace of Trianon, hardly 6 per cent of the Magyar people had to live in Slovakia, whereas under the new settlement of the Slovak frontiers nearly 20 per cent of the Slovak people will have to live in Hungary." (10) APPENDIX In the tables given below the ethnical evolution of ten towns of the Slovak-Magyar linguistic boundary is recorded. In all cases the Magyar element was on the increase in the period 1880-1910, at the expense of the Slovak and 27 SLOVAKIA German component. After 1919 the process was reversen. The rapid increase of the Slovak popufation was mostly due to the influx of rural population to towns, the newcomers being mostly exclusively of Slovak nationality. :POPULATION STRJUCTU'RE Tow.n and c,e nsus year Slovaks Total % Magyars Total % Germans Total % Bratislava 1857 1880 1890 1900 1910 1930 4,600 7,273 a,709 10,7115 U,67G 60,013 14.5 15.7 17,2 16.7 15.3 5'8.7 2,500 7,270 10,4-S3 20;102 31,705 18,'890 7.8 15.7 20.6 31.4 41.7 16.9 .24!,732 30,440 311,404' 33,202 32,790 32,801 77.7 65.6 62.2 51.9 43.0 29.4 4,3719 10,3,1,1 9,7113 9,244 6,5417 42,24;5 39.2 40.9 40.4 23.9 15.4 74.0 2,500 10,007 10,4'21 25,996 33,350 111,504 22.5 3'9.8 43 .4 67.0 77.2 20.1 4,200 4,218 3•,891 3,'189 3,354 37.8 16.8 16.0 8.9 7.4 5.2 3,403' 5,538 4,929 Ul,462 40. 7 36.9 30.'l 92:.4 2,990 7,'2119 9,754 96'1 35. 7 47.8 59.7 4.8 1,969 2,3'12 1,636 5'1>'8 23.6 15.3 10.2 2.8 1,41'9 ·565 449 2,781 54.3 20.4 16.2 ·86.0 1;127 2,167 2:,289 255 43.3 78.5 82.3 7.9 55 3'1 4'2 197 2.4 1.1 1.5 6,1 3,403 3,381 2,181 6,027 89,2 73•,8 ~-0 97.0 200 l •,1 07 2,300 5.2 24.2 2:15 15'8 51.>1 2.5 4'2 32 T78 785 5,106 7,449 8,7512: 4,974 81'.0 88.3 91.7 44.6 423 688 5,956 12.3 9.3 7.2 53.5 856 1,000 1,,6 75 8,71•5 18.0 10.4 13Jl 64.L 3,,6 09 8,1'87 10,634: 4,007 75.0 87.0 83.6 29.4 333 249 428 889 ------------ Kol;ic,e ''' 1857 1880 1890 1900 1<910 1930 3,446 "Ruthenes omitted Nitra 1880 1900 1910 1930 Jelsava 1880 1900 1910 H~30 Trebisov 1880 1900 1910 11930 88 5.6 2.0 0.9 0.5 Levice 1880 1900 11910 1930 198 199 214 6.7 2.4 2.,1 1..9 Lucenec 1880 1900 1910 1930 7.0 2.6 3.3 6.5 SLOVAKIA 28 Rimavska Sobota 1:880 1900 1910 1930 443 322 468 2,939 9.5 5.3 6.9 44.8 4,102 5,424' 6,1199 3,504 ,88.0 '93.5 91.8 53.4 124 Roznava lr880 1900 1910 1930 400 233 406 2,506 9.9 4.5 6.3 42.7 3,884' 4,7,68 5,886 3,211 83,.8 92.2 9lr.2 54.4 Nove Zamky 1880 1900 1'910 1930 1,466 822 964 9,561 14.3 6.2 6.1 47.8 7,189 12,1,97 14,838 10,193 77.7 91.3 91.6 51.0 1 69 2.5 .1.2 91 116 1.8 259 173 159 170 6.3 3.3 2.5 2.9 813 8.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 340 3'77 256 u REFERENCE S: 1 Documents British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. III, p . 225. 2 Survey of International Afifairs rn38, Vol. Ill p. 105. 3 Cf. Tiso's conversation with Ribbentrop on October 19, 1~38, where Tiso said, "The Sl'ovarks hav,e determined and could pr,ove that the 1910 sta'tistks were incorrect a,n d t'hat they even had been falsified ." (Doc. Ger. F1or. Pol. D., Vol. IV, p. 87.) 4 The Law of Nati-onaiities (Act 44/ 1864) is rerpr:oduiced in R. W. Seton-Watson: Racial Problems in Hungary (Consrtahle, London, 1908), p. 4'299-4'33. Pr:ofessor Seton-Watson gives also a penetrating a,nd· scholarly a,na.lysis of this Act. poin'ting out the differences between lofty t,h eories a;nd l ow practices. 5 This practi,ce was followed till 1941, when for the first time in Magyar history the nationalirty of the inhaibi'tants otf Hurugary was ascertained. 6 A story was told in those days (most priolbalbly apocryiphal) that after th.is point,blank-Jired reminder of Tiso, a memlber c:,f the Hungarian delegation stood up an'd, instead of a long reply, answered in Magyar: "Igazad, s6g,or, de senrki sem .sLszi" (Y:ou are righit, brother, rbu't rnJlbody will believe you). 7 The litalians were eager to placarte the Magyars at somebody else's e~pense. The Slovaks knew v,e ry ,w ell tha t they could no t expect any und,erstanding for their point c:,f view fr:om the cynical Ciano. Jin their efforts to assure bett er terms they concenitr<ated exclusively on Ribbentrop. Unforituna-tely 'he had more will than skill to help them. 8 StaHstical data for this part oif the article come mostly from "Magyar s:zlta:tisztikai kozlemenyek" and "Annuaire statistique de la Repu blique Tchecoslorvaque." 9 The advance of magyarization in 1'880-1910 and the tur.n o,f the tide after 1'919 are best soon from the sta'tistical data taJbulated in .Aippen<lix. 10 "Prager Presse," November 4, 1938. - No need to say that Tiso was basing his statement on Czecho-Slovak ofific'ial statistics. 1 1 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Statistics and Politics Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 6 (31), March-June 1960 pp. 21-28 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1960 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fefdf2fe65fb24a9917b93ddea621275.pdf 54e1381f4acdff07d80d6fa6302c06c6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 9 Stefan Osusky's Attempts to Establish Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir JOSEPH STASKO The following is the recollection of my experiences as a young Slovak student in Paris during the critical years 1938-1939. Although this "first person narrative" is necessarily somewhat colored by subjective impressions, it should nonetheless shed light on some hithertofore undisclosed and/or unanalyzed information relating to events and personalities of the period. 1 On the international scene, Hitler's daring diplomatic moves, combined with military pressure , brought about not only the Munich Agreement (September 29/ 30 , 1938) but also the resignation of President Edvard Benes (October 5, 1938), followed by the Zilina Agreement (October 6, 1938), by virtue of which the Slovaks achieved political autonomy . For me , as a politically active federalist (autonomist), the Zilina Agreement represented the fulfillment of the Slovak political struggle , the federation of Czecho-Slovakia. In the second half of October, 1938 , I returned to Slovakia to witness the implementation of Slovak autonomy. The new autonomous government of Slovakia had commenced with enthusiasm, national pride , and hope . This euphoric atmosphere, however , did not last for long. The loss of a large part of Slovak territory to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 2 , 1938 was a tragic blow to the promising beginnings of Slovak self-rule . The overall mood in Slovakia was overshadowed by national grief, anger , and a feeling of powerlessness. �10 SLOVAKIA In the official circles of the Slovak government and among the general public there was no serious talk of separating Slovakia from the Czech lands. Both the government and judicial public viewed the Munich Agreement and the Vienna Award as diplomatic safeguards against Hitler's further penetration in Central Europe and also as an international guaranty against Hungarian territorial rapacity. There were, however, radical elements grouped around Alexander Mach, Karol Murgas, Jozef Jostiak, Jan Farkas , and Jan Dafc':lk who fomented anti-Czech feeling by ascribing the loss of Slovak territory to Benes and his policy toward Slovakia. In November, 1938, I returned to France convinced that the Slovaks considered their autonomy the satisfactory solution of their national and political interests. Before I left I was offered the assignment of foreign correspondent for the newspapers Slovak and Slovenska pravda , which I gladly accepted. By the end of November the Czechoslovak ambassador in France, Dr. Stefan Osusky, was returning to Paris from his visit to the newlyTelected president of Czecho-Slovakia , Dr. Emil Hacha and to the new foreign minister, Dr. Frantisek Chvalkovsky. As a foreign correspondent for the newspaper Slovak, I asked Osusky for an interview regarding his impressions of Czecho-Slovakia. Prior to the interview, he gave me a copy of his aide-memoire submitted to the French Foreign Office as a supplement to his official report. The main topics, as I recall, were descriptions of his audiences with President Hacha and Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky and of the apathy of the Czech people toward the latest tragic dismemberment of Bohemia in the Munich Agreement. Included in it was also a statement concerning the Slovak autonomous government's assurances of its wholehearted support for the Czecho-Slovak state. In my subsequent interview with Osusky he maintained that the French government had pledged to guarantee the security of the new Czecho-Slovakia. This part of the interview _was later published in the newspaper Slovak. After this interview with Osusky, my contacts with him became more frequent and proved to be very useful to me as a student and as a journalist. He encouraged me to study the question of minorities in Central Europe , offered me access to the embassy 's library, and invited me to the "five o'clock tea" on a �SLOVAKIA 11 regular weekly basis. He also arranged for me contacts with the Havas Press Agency, as well as with the newspaper Epoque, L'Oeuvre, and Le Temps . 2 In December, 1938, I was back in Slovakia on a journalistic assignment from Osusky to report on the Slovak parliamentary elections , held on December 18, 1938. After the opening of the first session of the new Slovak Parliament on January 19, 1939, I returned the next day to France. At one of our ''five o'clock tea'' meetings, Osusky explained his political views not only on international questions but on the internal problems of Czecho-Slovakia as well. He told me that although his position as the envoy of Czecho-Slovakia in Paris precluded his interference in the internal affairs of the state, he kept close contacts with many prominent politicians and expressed his political views freely. However, since he was unable to make public his own views, he suggested that I should try to put them in writing . I interpreted this as a mandate and asked 'him to set up dates for interviews on his position regarding political developments in Europe with a special focus on Central Europe and Czecho-Slovakia. On the basis of these interviews I submitted to him in February, 1939, a draft of "Dr. Osusky's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis.'' He approved my draft and asked me to supplement it with philosophical statements from his acceptance speech, delivered on February 5, 1936, on the occasion of his receipt of an honorary doctorate in law at the University of Dijon. I complied with his request. The resulting paper was reproduced for his Slovak friends; later a part of it was included in his booklet Cesko-Slovensko a jeho buducnost', which appeared in 1939. After the crisis of March, 1939, Osusky was looked upon as the only representative of Czecho-Slovakia in the free world who could claim the authority of a co-founder of the state. Following his refusal to deliver the Czecho-Slovak embassy in Paris to the Germans, he espoused the so-called ambassadorial theory of continuity, according to which he was the only legal representative of Czechoslovakia . Osusky's theory conflicted with the " presidential theory of continuity" of Benes, who considered himself the victim of Hitler's brutality and the sacrificial lamb of �12 SLOVAKIA the military and psychological weakness of France and Great Britain. The French government confirmed Osusky's legal status and continued to recognize him as the diplomatic representative of Post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. Osusky felt himself destined for the leading role in the resistance against Hitler. At this historical juncture , however, Osusky found himself isolated, without trustworthy collaborators at the embassy and with no close connections with the Slovaks and their organizations in France. His relations with his Slovak countrymen in France were sparse and those with the Czechs lacked mutual trust. The only employee at the embassy who devotedly served Osusky was Stefan Moncek, the treasurer. Other Slovaks at the embassy - Dr. Vladimir Palic, Dr. Alexander Kunosi, and later Dr. Fedor Hodza - either stayed there for only a short time or tendered their allegiance to others. All other personnel at the embassy espoused Benes' views and conspired against Osusky. This politically precarious situation necessitated an immediate remedy in two directions: Osusky's relations with the Slovaks and their organizations in France; and the reshaping of his staff at the embassy. In the first half of April, 1939 , Osusky inquired about my connections with Slovak organizations in France and in Slovakia. He needed broader support for his leadership. For this purpose he planned to secure the confidence of his Slovak co-nationals in France. In order to improve his image as the representative, not only of the Czechs, but also of the Slovaks (who now lived in the Slovak state), he intended to attract political friends from Slovakia. To help carry out the first part of his plan I offered my assistance in arranging a gathering of Slovaks in Argenteuil , near Paris. There Osusky would deliver his first campaign speech on political issues in general and on Czech-Slovak relations in particular. The timing was opportune. After March 14, 1939 , the majority of Slovaks in France, who expressed their trust in Prime Minister Jozef Tiso's government, were denounced by the Czechs as traitors and as such were reported to the French authorities who then persecuted them as pro-Nazis. The presence of Ambassador Osusky at the gathering was an occasion to present Slovak complaints to him and to ask for protection. �SLOVAKIA 13 The gathering of French Slovaks took place in April, 1939, and was quite successful. Osusky's speech was reproduced in special leaflets, and parts were published in his Cesko-Slovensko ajeho buducnost'. On the whole, Osusky's address was favorably accepted by the Slovaks, especially his promise to protect thqse Slovaks who did not spread anti-French or anti-Czech propaganda. 3 The daily influx into France of Czech political and military emigrants caused Osusky much concern because practically all of them supported Benes. This may have been one of the main reasons why he entrusted me with a secret mission to visit Slovakia to contact his friends, former political leaders, many government officials, and leading personalities in the cultural and economic life of the Slovak state. Osusky indicated that he would like me to bring personal messages to some of his friends and inquire into the possibility of having contacts with them through Budapest. He also suggested that I travel to Hungary to survey the situation of the Slovaks in occupied Southern Slovakia and contact their leaders. I accepted this mission as a sign of personal trust and asked for a few days to prepare a more detailed program for his approval. At the outset of our discussion Osusky had pointed out that this trip was supposed to appear as if it were my own undertaking, but he promised to inform the French authorities of my status and procure a diplomatic visa for me. He did so promptly. Among the persons I was to see and deliver messages to were: Dr. Anton Stefanek, Professor at the University of Bratislava; General Rudolf Viest, Inspector-General of the Slovak Army; Dr. Samuel Osusky, Lutheran Bishop and cousin of Osusky; Lutheran Bishop Fedor Ruppeldt; Dr. Matej Murtin at the Hypotecna a komunalna banka in Bratislava; the lawyer Dr. Ivan Pietor; economists Dr. Peter Zat'ko and Dr. Vladimir Fajnor; and the General Director of the Slovenska narodna banka, Dr. Imrich Karvas . My assignment included also contacts with Dr. Milos Vanco, Dr. Jan Spisiak, and Jan Teplansky. Osusky explained his wish to build communications with Bratislava through a liaison in Budapest to be funded half by him and the other half by the Slovak side . As for possible discussions with government officials, I could act in my name only. Osusky 's name could be mentioned in con- �14 SLOVAKIA nection with his warning about the risk of war and the need for the cooperation of Slovakia with the West. All other questions that Osusky gave me were for Prime Minister Tiso alone. Among them was the question of the Slovaks in France and their eventual mobilization in case of war in military units of a Czecho-Slovak Army. Another question of importance for both Slovakia and Osusky was the establishing of Slovak diplomatic missions in the West equipped with proper personalities and far-reaching political perspectives. He suggested also that I discuss some matters with Foreign Minister Ferdinand Durcansky . Before I left France on April 27 , 1939 , I helped to organize the participation of Slovaks at the Second Reunion of the Czechs and Slovaks in France, which was planned for April 29-30 at the Czechoslovak Colony in Paris . Benes 's adherents planned to declare him the leader of the '' Second Czechoslovak Struggle Abroad ,'' thus eliminating Osusky for good from any leading role in the exile movement. The outcome of that meeting was transmitted to me in Bratislava by Stefan Moncek, who had been given my telephone number. This information was important to my mission because success depended on Osusky 's retention of his leadership position abroad. In Bratislava I met freely with my friends and colleagues . Some of them already held high state offices and enjoyed their positions in the full swing of their zeal, devotion , and industry . They seemed to be unaware of the danger of war and believed that their happy days would have no end. To my surprise, some of them thought that Hitler was satisfied with his annexations and that the risk of war had been thus eliminated . This naive credulity was confirmed by my visits with Propaganda Chief Sano Mach, the Hlinka Guard leaders Karol Murgas and Jan Dafcik, and the majority of my own friends. The glorification of Hitler by Dr. Vojtech Tuka in his May 1, 1939, speech at Primizial Plaza in Bratislava was an ominous sign, as was the elimination of Karol Sidor from Slovak political affairs. The next day I was granted an audience with Prime Minister Tiso. It was arranged through Dr. Juraj Rajec , whom I knew when he was the educational counselor in the student residence Svoradov. I was admitted to Tiso as a reporter for the newspaper Slovak in France . �SLOVAKIA 15 Sitting in the corner of his office , overlooking the Danube, Tiso looked tired and somewhat restrained. He asked me about my studies and my journalistic experience in France. After I answered those questions I described the difficult position of the Slovaks in France as outlined earlier. This led me to Ambassador Osusky and his activities. I reported to Tiso the full details of Osusky 's speech in Argenteuil, handed him the leaflets of the Center of the Czechs and Slovaks Abroad concerning recruitment in the event of war, and finally submitted to him the document ' 'Dr. Osusky 's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis.'' With regard to the possibility of war, I indicated that there were about 50 ,000 Slovaks in France who could be recruited into a Czechoslovak Army and who would have to fight against the Slovak state for Benes' type of Czechoslovakia. I also told Tiso that Osusky favored a federated Czecho-Slovakia but faced the determined opposition of the Czechs and of some Slovak centralists, the so-called Czechoslovaks. Osusky had a few friends among the Czechs, and not many among the Slovaks. He was willing to set up separate Slovak military units in France, alongside the Czech ones, under a unified command, but there were no Slovak officers. Tiso listened to my briefing and then remarked that he did not consider Osusky to be the representative of the Slovak cause in the West because Osusky did not know Slovakia and the Slovaks did not know Osusky. Next I inquired whether it was true that the situation of Slovakia after the Treaty of Protection with Germany , which had been characterized in France as total dependence upon Germany, was similar to the situation in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. He rose from his chair, approached the window facing the Danube , and asked me if I could see the cannons on the other side of the Danube, which were aimed directly at his windows . This ''protection,'' he said, did not prevent the Slovaks from losing Petrzalka (part of Bratislava), but it was still preferable to their being divided between the Magyars and the Poles. To my querry about the limits of Slovak freedom in making foreign contacts, he responded that the new government expected to be recognized by most European states very quickly. This would make it difficult for the Germans to interfere and would provide �16 SLOVAKIA a legal basis for foreign contacts. Durcansky would give me more details on this point. I was curious about relations with the Magyars, for I had heard that there was no reaction from the Slovak side to the atrocities committed by the Magyars in Komjatice, Slovensky Meder, and Surany. Tiso replied that according to the Treaty of Protection with Germany, the Slovaks could not unilaterally decide on retaliatory measures against the Magyars in Slovakia; the Slovaks were thus denied the right of reprisal, he said . On the other hand , the Treaty provided for German protection of Slovak territory against constant Magyar incursions. And so the Slovak position toward Hungary was dictated by those factors. I inquired if it would be possible to use the Slovaks in France for some kind of support of a Slovak cause in the West in the event of war. Tiso said that that was not an immediate worry. First France would have to recognize the Slovak State , after which there would be more time for such discussions. I told him that Osusky would have no objection to the French government granting the Slovak state de facto recognition. He saw such circumstances as being favorable for building a bridge between France and Slovakia, provided that the proper person were appointed as head of the Slovak consulate. Tiso indicated that I would receive the answer to this question from f>urcansky. Tiso suggested publishing a Slovak-French bulletin in France and the possibility of a cultural exchange. He referred me to Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Secretary General of Slovenska liga , who would take care of it. In summarizing our discussion, Tiso reiterated his views , stressed the confidentiality of some of his remarks , and asked me about my immediate and future plans . I mentioned that I intended to visit Hungary to speak with Slovak representatives. He asked me if this had already been planned in Paris, which I affirmed. He concluded the interview with an invitation to contact him again before I left for France. That same day, in the Cafe Carlton, I was introduced by Vlado Houdek to Peter Pares , the British consul in Bratislava. He expressed a keen interest in my studies in France and my evaluation of the French political scene. He was eager to see me the next day at the same place, and I gladly consented. �SLOVAKIA 17 Later that day I was invited for dinner by Foreign Minister Durcansky at his private residence. To my surprise, he had already been informed of the issues discussed with the prime minister. Our friendly personal relations, based on close cooperation in the autonomist movement, allowed us to be absolutely frank with each other. After giving him an overall picture of French public opinion, I touched on the question of the Slovaks in France and also on Ambassador Osusky's actions. To this Durcansky added his brief analysis of the Slovak situation on the international level and outlined Slovak diplomatic ambitions. The discussion that followed could be summarized in the following points: I said that according to what I knew from Osusky and from the Polish embassy in Paris , the French and the British were hurridly mobilizing raw materials, increasing production of military hardware , building up public opinion against Hitler; in short they were preparing for war. In the diplomatic field , the French were repeating their pledges to stand by their treaties with Poland and Romania. Durcansky accepted the possibility of war but not earlier than in two years. As for the Slovaks in France, I asked if it could f10t be possible to organize them into a Slovak Legion and have them fight against Hitler and for the preservation of the Slovak state. Osusky, I continued, was opposed to Benes. He recognized a federated Czecho-Slovakia as the best form of government which would guarantee Slovak self-rule . Durcansky replied that he did not believe that France would agree on the formation of a Slovak Legion with the proviso that it fight for the preservation of the Slovak state. He, therefore, would accept the organization of Czech and Slovak military units under a unified command. This reasoning was parallel in general terms with that of Osusky 's. One of the most difficult questions , however, was where to find and how to commission 20 to 30 Slovak officers for this duty . This would be a political question of unforseeable complications. According to Durcansky , this could be done under different pretexts , such as through a cultural delegation, correspondents , students, businessmen, and the like. Under the present conditions, two things were required immediately: official recognition of Slovakia by the French government and money . As for the first �18 SLOVAKIA condition, Durcansky said that he had been already told by the French consul that recognition was on its way. The question of money would be solved by creation of the Institute for Slovaks Abroad , which for the time being would be associated with the Foreign Ministry. The money could be put aside from the ministerial budget. To do so , it would be necessary to prepare the statutes of the proposed Institute . He instructed me to meet the next day with Dr. Jozef Cieker, Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Emil Rusko , and their experts to prepare the final text of the statutes. After Durcansky had read "Osusky's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis" and gone through the material I had brought with me, he indicated that Osusky 's position might help the Slovak cause in the West if he would be willing to cooperate with the Slovak consul in Paris , using him as a liaison with Slovakia . I asked Durcansky if he already had in mind such a person for such a delicate mission; he mentioned the name of Ing. Milan Harminic. More explicitly than Tiso , Durcansky gave me details regarding his dealings with the Germans. This I later put in writing and sent to Ambassador Osusky through the French consulate in Bratislava. From the organizational point of view, Durcansky considered the existing Catholic mission in France an excellent focus for rallying the Slovaks , not only on religious, but also on cultural and political grounds. He knew the Reverend Jan Futak, the Head of the mission, vaguely but expressed confidence in him. He promised to send money to France from the planned Institute to help publish a periodical bulletin in French and Slovak. As the editor he planned to appoint the Reverend Vojtech Klein, a Catholic priest known for his work in the social field and in the publishing trade. Before taking leave of Durcansky I informed him of my trip to Hungary and asked for his advice as to whom I should contact and what concrete steps I should take to gather detailed information on the situation of the Slovaks there . He referred me to Dr. Ludovit Obtulovic , a lawyer in Nave Zamky who was the leader of the Slovaks in the occupied territory of Southern Slovakia, and to the Reverand Imrich Ko sec , a Catholic priest in the nearby village of Banovska Kesa . �SLOVAKIA 19 Durcansky planned to build a direct line of communication between Bratislava and Paris through an employee of the Slovak embassy in Budapest . During the discussion it became apparent to me that this communication was supposed to be rather a personal link between Durcansky and the Catholic mission in Argenteuil. Consequently, I did not mention at this point that Osusky too was looking for a liaison with Slovakia through a confidant in Budapest. While Durcansky hoped to build bridges to the West without the intermediary link of Osusky , the latter planned to use his contacts with Slovakia for bringing his political friends into exile. Before I left for Hungary I learned that on May 4, 1939 Great Britain had extended de facto recognition to the Slovak state and had confirmed the present British consul in Bratislava, Pares , as its official representative. This greatly furthered Slovak self-confidence. A special permit to cross the Slovak-Hungariaii border was given to me at the Hungarian consulate in Bratislava at the recommendation of Monsignor Augustin Hladik, Canon of the Cathedral of St. Martin in Bratislava, with whom I had been in contact for some years. He also made the arrangement for my travel to Hungary by car with Count Janos Eszterhazy, who was the official representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, in which capacity he was also a member of the Slovak Parliament. My first stop was at Dr. Obtulovic's office in Nave Zamky . With Obtulovic we visited the Reverend Imrich Kasee in Banovska Kesa and then traveled to Slovensky Meder and Komjatice; the next day we called on the Director of the Slovak gymnazium, Professor Jozef Hudec , and his colleague Professor lgnac Safar in the town of Surany. In all these villages I interviewed the Slovaks regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the Hungarian gendarmes against them for singing the Slovak national anthem and holding cultural meetings. After two days in Budapest , where I met with Professor Stefan Buran and others in the administration of Slovenska jednota, the Slovak newspaper which we wanted to become the journal of all Slovaks abroad and as such to be distributed also in France, I returned with Obtulovic to Bratislava. �20 SLOVAKIA I telephoned Durcansky to congratulate him on the British recognition of Slovakia. He sounded optimistic and explored possible ways to prompt the French government to recognize Slovakia as early as possible and thus establish legal contact with one more Western state. He invited Obtulovic and myself to see him the same day . At this meeting Durcansky suggested that Obtulovic go to Paris to investigate the possibility of obtaining early recognition of Slovakia and the accreditation of a Slovak consul in Paris. Through the intercession of Moncek, for whom I had prepared a confidential personal note, Obtulovic was to see Osusky and discuss with him the following: 1) The legal position of the Slovaks in France then and in case of war . Would Slovaks in France be mobilized into a Czechoslovak Army, or would they be recruited under the banner of a Slovak Legion? 2) A Slovak consulate in Paris and its relations to Osusky. 3) Would Osusky agree to communicate with Slovakia through the Slovak consulate in Paris , or would he suggest some other manner? 4) Distribution of Slovenska jednota among the Slovaks in France and possible cooperation with the editors of Slovenska jednota in Budapest. 5) ,'Publication of a Slovak-French Bulletin, by a neutral body , which could develop into a cultural and political organ for all Slovaks in France. For the time being it could be issued as a supplement to (Nas] Krajan, the organ of the Catholic mission in France. 6) Consider closer working relations between Osusky and the leadership of the Slovaks in Hungary. Obtulovic should propose to gather documentary. material on the Hungarian-German secret alliance with subsequent reference to Hitler's consent of the occupation of Southern Slovakia by the Hungarians. At this time I met with the British consul , Peter Pares , at the Hotel Carlton in Bratislava . I congratulated him on his confirmation as the British representative to the Slovak government. In response he mentioned that his French colleague had enjoyed very �SLOVAKIA 21 much talking with me. I was really surprized how quickly newsgathering in Bratislava functioned, because I had hardly returned from the French consulate. 4 The British rightly conjectured that my visit with Tiso and my trip to Hungary were somewhat connected with my mission from Osusky. He wanted to know more about these undertakings. Because of the risk involved. I remained cautious. A few days later I was invited by Obtulovic to join a ''fishing party" organized by him for Pares. This was a pleasant car trip from Bratislava to my native Orava and to Oravice, the region with brooks full of trout, a real haven for such a passionate fisherman as Pares. The three-day party was kept secret. We discussed mainly Slovak relations with the West. I was impressed by Pares' knowledge of the Slovak internal political scene. He showed a full understanding of the difficult international position of Slovakia and promised to keep his government informed about the real anti-Nazi feelings of the Slovaks. In his characterization of the leading Slovak politicians, he disapproved of Durcansky's precipitous acts and evident endeavors to prove the independence of Slovak diplomacy. On the other hand, Pares appreciated Tiso's policy and skill as shown in his dealings with internal as well as external affairs of state. Two communications sent by Pares to his superiors in London indicate the British consul's acute perceptions of the situation at this time and are worth quoting. 5 The first is a letter dated May 23, 1939 and reads as follows: Dear Troutbeck, Certain information has reached me from a reliable source which will, I think, interest you, but nevertheless, does not seem suitable for inclusion in a formal dispatch. I have been told by Dr. Obtulovic , who apparently enjoys the confidence of Dr. Tiso , that the Slovak government is keeping in contact with the group of Slovak exiles in Paris who are led by Dr. Osusky. A young student named Josef Stasko, who is studying at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, has recently been in Bratislava and had an interview with Dr. Tiso. He has now returned to Paris and I understand that he is a bearer of a message �22 SLOVAKIA from the Slovak government. My French colleague knows that the young man is in touch with Slovaks in Paris, but I doubt if he is aware of his connection with the Slovak government. I understand that Dr. Tiso has given formal approval to the formation of a Slovak Legion in France and that this is the message conveyed by Stasko to Paris . The object of these maneuvers seems to be to maintain contact with the Western powers whilst pursuing a policy of co-operation with the Germans for as long as is necessary - in other words, the policy of the Czechs before and during the Great War. The Slovaks are growing very apprehensive now about the possibility of war. They do not expect Germany to win, but realize that they are powerless to refuse anything she might ask in the event of war. So they are trying to ensure the good will of the Western powers in advance by secretly approving the plans of the exiles. That this is not a policy favoured by a small group, but rather the concerted action of the Slovak leaders as a whole is, I think , shown by the fact that the persons concerned in it are not only Dr. Tiso , but also Dr. Obtulovic, the official Slovak minority leader in Hungary, and the partisan of Sidor. My knowledge of Slovak is not very reliable, but from something said in a convention at which I was present, I gained the impression that Dr. Durcansky, the proGerman Foreign Minister, also knows of Stasko's mission. There have been reports that Durcansky is dissatisfied with Germany's treatment of Slovakia so it is possible that my impression may be correct. Yours ever, P. Pares A few comments on Pares ' report are in order. First, the French consul could not tell his British colleague the full story about my connection with the Slovak government because I was warned by Osusky that he was in the service of Benes , and �SLOVAKIA 23 therefore, there could have been a risk of political intrigue . Second, in my talks with Pares I never mentioned to him the essence of my discussion with Tiso, so I presume Obtulovic had informed him about it. It is also true that Tiso did not give formal approval to the formation of a Slovak Legion in France; but it had been my personal feeling that he considered the possibility of such a need later, and that is why he had referred me to Durcansky for more discussion about this matter. The following telegram by the British consul in Bratislava to his superiors in London presumes a discrete and confidential discussion of Pares with Obtulovic and clearly confirms that the Paris-Bratislava connection was still alive. The two-hour conversation of Obtulovic with the French consul also suggests the importance of the issues discussed. Here is the full text of the telegram: Telegram (en clair) from His Majesty's Consul (Bratislava) 3rd June , 1939. Dr. Obtulovic , who accompanied Stasko to Paris (see my porvate [sic] letter to Mr. Troutbeck, dated 23rd May, a copy of which was sent to the Foreign Office under cover of my dispatch No. 39 of 23rd May) has just returned to Bratislava. He had an interview with Osusky, who appears to have succeeded in convincing him that the French treatment of Czecho-Slovakia last autumn was not a betrayal, but the result of the pressure of circumstances. Dr. Obtulovic seems to have returned a Francophil and his report will no doubt influence the Slovak Government in favour of the Western Powers. Osusky's arguments have also convinced him that Germany is not strong enough to break the forces confronting her and he is therefore concerned for the future of Slovakia in the event of a German collapse. He says that he is to return to Paris once more and will visit also Belgium. I presume that he will make contact with the Slovak colony in that country which is fairly numerous. Today he had a conversation lasting two hours with the French consul here, in the course of which it must be �24 SLOVAKIA assumed that he discussed the standpoint of the Slovak Government to the Slovak exiles in Paris . Copy sent to Paris. I have to add that Obtulovic traveled to Paris alone , because I still expected an audience with Prime Minister Tiso and a meeting with Foreign Minister Durcansky. It is not true that Obtulovic returned from Paris a Francophil, thanks to Osusky . Obtulovic was a Francophil before his trip. The same could be said about the statement that only Osusky's arguments had convinced Obtulovic of the possible German defeat. It was precisely this presumption of the Slovak government - that in the event of war, Germany would not win - which had prompted Obtulovic's trip to Paris. The plan was that Obtulovic would return to Paris and would visit his countrymen in Belgium. This did not take place , however , because the Germans took notice of his travels, tracked his whereabouts , and inquired about his motives at the Slovak Foreign Ministry. The details of the German intervention in this matter were sent to me by the Reverend Kasee at my address at the Slovak Catholic mission in Argenteuil. A few days later Obtul6vic and Kasee were expelled from Hungary and returned to Bratislava. Back in Bratislava, after the fishing trip , I contacted Dr. Anton Stefanek, for whom I had a letter and an oral message from Osusky. He seemed to have little confidence in Osusky and was totally dismayed by Benes . Concerning the situation in Slovakia , it was his view that for the time being Slovakia was thriving and was much better off than the Czech lands . Of course , all this was relative to Hitler's plans . In the event of war, Slovakia would be eradicated as a state and much damage would be done to the nation . He confessed that he did not intend to go into exile and that he had no advice as to what course of action to take. He did not believe that the future form of life in Central Europe would be the same as before and stated that even Czecho-Slovakia would have to be restructured if it wished to survive. He asked me about Hodza, who he expected to come forward with his idea of a Central European Federation. �SLOVAKIA 25 My message from Osusky concerned the possibility of a mutual exchange of reports on international and domestic developments. To this Stefanek did not react. He wanted me to meet his colleagues at the university, and he set up a date for this meeting in his office . As I recall, this took place two days later. At that meeting only four of these colleagues were present: Dr. Peter Gula, Dr. Branislav Varsik, Dr. Jan Stanislav, and Dr. J. K. (still living in Bratislava). The only positive suggestion made at that meeting was to organize an exchange of professors and students with France and then to create a clearing-house at the Institut Slave in Paris for Slovak literature. All those present considered the war inevitable; all believed that Hitler would not win; and all were willing to accept the Czecho-Slovak state only in a federal form. My report from this meeting was sent in a diplomatic pouch to Osusky through the French consulate . Another letter and message I delivered was to General Rudolf Viest, who was Inspector-General of the Slovak Army. He asked me first for my credentials, then told me to see him the next day. At our subsequent meeting I informed him that Ambassador Osusky would be glad to see him in Paris in order to organize a Czecho-Slovak Army. To this General Viest answered that he did not believe war would break out and that he would stay where he was. (I did not know at that time that he had already promised Benes that he would soon join him). 6 In the remaining days I busied myself seeing personalities from Slovak political, cultural, and economic life . Among others , I visited Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Secretary General of Slovenska liga in Bratislava, who promised to send books, periodicals , films, pictures, and other cultural items to Paris. He also gave me some financial help and asked me to work in France for the Slovenska liga, represented then by Klement Sichmak. In Trnava I visited Monsignor Jan Pi:istenyi , the Director of the Spolok Sv. Vojtecha, who warmly received me. He gave me two packages of books for the Reverend Jan Futak in Argenteuil and also some financial assistance for lecturing among the Slovaks in France on behalf of Slovak religious awareness. At the "Slovensky klub" in the Cafe Redoute in Bratislava I met with the Minister of Economy , Dr. Gejza Medricky; Dr. Peter �26 SLOVAKIA Zat'ko of the Centrale of Slovak Industry; Dr. Alexander Hrncar of the Ministry of Finance; Dr. Imrich Karvas of the Slovak National Bank, and other economists. The invitation of this meeting had come from Medricky, whom I had known for some years in connection with autonomist political actions. The discussion concerned mostly the economy but also touched on politics. I included the main points of this debate in the report for Osusky. One of the most interesting, and at the same time most informative, meetings I had had in Bratislava was in the student residence Svoradov, where I met many of my colleagues. In their discussions they portrayed the events of March 14, 1939 with the utmost frankness. Most of them were adherents of Sidor and only a few supported the radical wing headed by Mach and Murgas. From their heated debate I learned that they did not consider Hitler to be a culprit but rather a ruthless politician. They expressed their doubts about the Western concept of European order. The West, they argued, had lost cultural preeminence, failed in political initiative , and)acked overall vitality. They dismissed the immediate danger of war and were quite philosophical about the future. To my outline of the Western mood of the public and a resolute resistance toward further concessions to Hitler, they offered a picture of Slovakia built on Christian principles and rallied politically around Tiso a·s the best safeguard against the eventualities of an armed peace. In sum, I was struck by two elements in Slovak political life: one was a real ambition to build the Slovak state as if it were an independent entity outside of the complexities of the European theater; the other was the unbelievable credulity in a simplified version of their capability for survival. There was an almost palpable feeling of nationalistic fervor everywhere . Listening to Foreign Minister Durcansky 's self-confidence and to his broadlybased diplomatic ambitions , I could not believe that he had taken the Treaty of Protection with Germany seriously. The German minority in Slovakia was small, their Nazism in most localities questionable, and as a political factor they did not play as yet a visible role. The overall mood of rural Slovakia was optimistic , almost careless in its disregard of international embroglios . �SLOVAKIA 27 Based on these experiences, it was difficult for me to draw a gloomy picture of the future, especially among those who achieved personal and material satisfaction, e.g., young Slovak intellectuals or businessmen who exploited fully the occasion of the revolutionary change. The Jewish question had been in the minds of the radicals in their newspapers or speeches , but their zealotry was tamed by the government's promotion of constructive primary economic projects . Prime Minister Tiso was considered a man of moral integrity , wise , and moderate. Sidor, on the other hand , was severely judged by both radicals for his lack of courage and by the '' old guard" for his indecisiveness. Durcansky was a "political technician,'' whose ideological armory supplied the energy for the running of the state machinery. He had a few followers and even fewer personal friends . Alexander Mach, Karol Murgas , Jan Farkas, Jozef Jostiak , Jan Dafcik, and others had some credit in the nation and among the students for their sacrifices in the past, but in this stage of rebuilding the Slovak society they represented a group of malcontents - radicals whose fighting spirit was not out of focus. Their pro-German leanings pushed them to the margin of the political stream. After Obtulovic left for Paris I remained a few more days in Slovakia for my second audience with Tiso and a meeting with Durcansky . In his monologue Tiso talked about the preservation of the Slovak state and believed that the West would concur with him in the self-determination principle , which, in his opinion, would respect the will of the people. He did not believe that Osusky would be willing to accept the existence of the Slovak state , but his struggle for a federal Czecho-Slovakia underlined the principle of self-determination. Tiso saw my point in stressing the political importance of the Slovak soldiers in France fighting against Hitler, but he hastened to add " and for the Slovak state .'' He repeated his original wish to send a '' cultural delegation " to France and advised me to remain in touch w ith the Slovak League in America , especially with Monsignor Francis Dubas . With these recommendations my audience with the prime minister ended. �28 SLOVAKIA With Foreign Minister Durcansky I discussed all the issues that had arisen during my visit to Slovakia. Durcansky planned to remain in contact with Paris through an employee of the Slovak embassy in Budapest, whose official assignment would be to communicate with the Slovak consulate in Paris. For the time being he intended to send some literature and messages to the Catholic mission in Argenteuil for the Reverend Futak. We also discussed at length the question of a Slovak Legion in France . Durcansky envisaged such a possible development . To this end he promised to send 15 to 20 ''students'' to Paris for the fall semester who could eventually become available for action in organizing the Slovaks as an independent military unit. The main object of my "mission" was to contact Osusky's friends and eventually to encourage them to go into exile. I talked with many of those whom Osusky suggested ! but none of them was willing to emigrate. This was the case with Emil Boleslav Lukac , Dr. Milos Vanco, Jan Teplansky, Dr. Martin Micura, Dr. Anton Stefanek, Dr. Peter Zat'ko, Dr. Alexander Hrncar , and Dr. Imrich Karvas. When asked to prepare and send to Osusky a statement on the situation in Slovakia and on plans for the future , not a single one of these individuals manifested any interest. I did not meet Bishops Osusky or Ruppeldt and those persons listed in the letters which they had picked up at the French consulate in Bratislava. I gathered all possible documents from Slovakia and sent them to Osusky in a diplomatic pouch through the French consul. Among the documents were a copy of the Schutzvertrag and the secret Protocols concerning the German claims in the territorial , economic, financial, or military field . Also included were my diary, packages for the Reverend Futak, photographs from occupied Southern Slovakia, brochures, proclamations, pamphlets , Hlinka Guard "orders," and various books and clippings from the daily press . Although I had planned to see Karol Sidor, I had no opportunity to do so. My message to him from Osusky was oral and involved a request for his comments on the March 14th events along with an invitation to join him in Paris. Sidor kept himself aloof from the public , and I was told that his movements were �SLOVAKIA 29 being monitored by the Gestapo. He therefore would not welcome my visit or interview. I had my passport restamped with the stamp of the Slovak Republic and returned safely to France. There I met Obtulovic, who had already spoken to the officials of the French Foreign Office and also with Osusky. The next day I gave Osusky a full report of my experiences in Slovakia and Hungary and also described my meetings with Osusky's friends and acquaintances. Osusky did not accept the idea that the Slovak consulate in Paris should be the communication link between him and Bratislava. He also was not in favor of a Slovak office in Paris, like Slovakotour, which could be used as a cover for the contacts with Bratislava. He did not make any qualified statement on mobilizing Slovaks in France into an independent Slovak military unit , but promised to fight for the right of the Slovaks to form their own units under Slovak officers in the framework of a CzechoSlovak Army. He touched vaguely on the question of the Slovaks in Hungary, postponing diplomatic steps for the postwar reshaping of Europe. Osusky was totally disappointed that there were no political leaders in Slovakia, especially from among the former officials of Czechoslo~akia, who manifested any interest of cooperation with the West and with him . Together with Obtulovic I visited Osusky the next evening. After repeating what he had told me, he openly asked Obtulovic if one of the leading Slovaks would be willing to join him. He stressed the diplomatic realities: the British and also the French might differentiate the fate of the Czechs and the Slovaks ; once war was declared, they would fight for the restoration of CzechoSlovakia. It was necessary, he said, on the part of the Slovak government to prepare an official memorandum indicating that the Slovaks had been acting under German pressure and that the Slovak state had been forced upon the Slovaks. Such a document could be interpreted as proof that whatever it did was justified to save the nation. He repeated again and again that he was resolutely opposed to the centralized form of Czechoslovakia and that his concept for the future was favorable to the Slovaks and acceptable to the West. This concept included the return of the occupied Southern Slovakia to the homeland. �30 SLOVAKIA Obtulovic responded with a more detailed explanation of the Slovak position and asked for time to reevaluate all aspects of the discussions with Tiso and Durcansky. It was agreed that Osusky would not hinder the work of the Slovak consul in Paris and that the Slovak government would send to Paris a persona grata to Osusky. Obtulovic stressed the question of the Slovaks in France in case of war, considering them to be an outpost of the Slovaks' true anti-Nazis feelings . He indicated that the Slovak government would send a "cultural delegation" and some " students" to France who would be advised to cooperate with the Slovaks in the United States organized in the Slovak League of America. Osusky did not reject the idea, but he claimed the allegiance of the Slovaks in the event of war to the leadership of the resistance. The contacts with Bratislava would continue, and Obtulovic would return to Paris as soon as the Slovak government , or rather Tiso and Durcansky, would consider it useful. There was a tacit understand.ing that Obtulovic would talk to Sidor and that both would meet Osusky's emissary in Budapest. There were, of course, differences in positions, but they were not insurmountable. One of them was the choice and location of the Slovak diplomatic personnel in the West, the other the insistence of Tiso on the preservation of the Slovak state . The surprisingly rapid development of the international crisis , however, prevented both the Slovak government and Osusky from establishing any direct contacts. Although France recognized the Slovak government de facto on July 14 , 1939, no Slovak consul in Paris was accredited. The contemplated candidate for this position, Ing . Milan Harminc , who presented himself personally at the French Foreign Office and was considered a leading pretender, had been in the meantime accredited as Slovak consul in London. Suggested for the Slovak consul in Paris was Dr. Bohdan Galvanek, whose proGerman leanings were generally known and who was flatly rejected by the French Foreign Office. Time lost in the protection of the accreditation process had been sufficiently long for the successful negative intervention of Czech politicians at the French Foreign Office . �SLOVAKIA 31 Gradually, with the arrival of more pro-Benes exiles in Paris, Osusky was losing hold of the leadership. By the end of August, 1939, after his discussion with Benes in London (August 24), he abandoned his firm Slovak stand on the independent Slovak military units and was instrumental in reaching an agreement with the French government (August 28) on the creation of a Czechoslovak Army in France with no independent Slovak units. The political consequences of this development buried Osusky as the leader of the Slovaks abroad and abolished all possible contacts with Slovakia. At this point my "mission" and my efforts to demonstrate Slovak anti-Nazi feelings to the West lost all meaning. NOTES 1 A more detailed discussion of this period will follow in further personal memoirs to be published by the author. 2 Dr. Stefan Osusky was born in Brezova pod Bradlom, Slovakia, on March 31, 1889 into a distinguished Lutheran family . After some harassment by the Magyars while in secondary school, he emigrated to the United States in 1906. He joined his sister in Chicago, where in 1915 he earned a doctorate in law from the University of Chicago . In 1916 he was named, together with Gustav Kosik, as a special delegate of the Slovak League of America to the CzechoSlovak Committee in Paris , headed by Dr. Edvard Benes. Next to Dr. Milan R. Stefanik, Osusky was the second leading Slovak who participated in winning recognition for the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. After the war Osusky represented Czechoslovakia at different international committees in Europe and eventually became the Czechoslovak ambassador in France (1921-1940) . His political views echoed in large part those of the first President of Czechoslovakia, Tomas G. Masaryk , whom Osusky greatly admired. He differed with Masaryk , however, on the question of the Czech and Slovak constitutional arrangement. Osusky was proud of his Slovak nationality and was sympathetic toward the Slovak movement for national self-determination . When Benes became president in 1935, Osusky expected to replace him as foreign minister. Benes, who disliked Osusky, named instead Dr. Kami! Krofta. Osusky remained in Paris bitterly resenting this " injustice. " Part of Osusky's political action in Paris after March , 1939 , is described in this memoir. While in Paris he enjoyed the political support of the French government, especially in his antagonism toward Benes. In London , however, he became totally isolated . His altercations with Benes in the London Czechoslovak exile government ended with a total break and animosity. After �32 SLOVAKIA the war Osusky emigrated to the United States , where he lectured occasionally and wrote an analysis of the democratic process in a thinking society entitled The Way of the Free (New York , 1951) . Among his earlier publications are Les Magyars et Pangermanistes (Paris , 1918) and George D. Herron , d6vernik Wilsonov pocas vojny (Brno, 1925) . While in Great Britain during World War II Osusky wrote political pamphlets - Pravda vit'azi (1942). "Rizena demokracie" pri praci (1942), Benes a Slovensko (1943). and Triedenie duchov nastalo (1943) - in which he sharply criticized Benes for his stubborn insistence on adhering to the old, centralized structure of Czechoslovakia . 3 The pertinent passage from Osusky's speech in Argenteuil reads as follows : '' . .. I hereby declare that a policy depriving the Slovak nation of its inalienable rights will never get my consent. Those Czechs and Slovaks who pursued such excessive centralism must publicly admit that their political conception has failed , is dead and rests in a tomb. Otherwise, the Slovaks will face similar ambitions for Czechoslovak unity with justified resistance . What matters now is the existence and future of Czecho-Slovakia . He who would threaten the Slovaks with centralism and persecution is the enemy of the restoration of the Republic , because without Slovakia there could nor would be Czecho-Slovakia. Finally, I must say to the Slovaks that the French authorities will tolerate no propaganda against France and for Nazism. As for myself, as an official representative of the Czecho-Slovak Republic , I will not protect those Slovaks who calumniate the Czechs, the Czecho-Slovak authorities and CzechoSlovakia. The Slovaks who look for the salvation of Slovakia in Hitler, should address themselves to him for livelihood and protection. They will fall into slavery instead of remaining free citizens . Only the Czecho-Slovak Republic will bring b.;ick freedom , independence, and the right to a dignified life to the Czechs and 'Slovaks. This is our conviction and our national belief.'' As quoted in Stefan Osusky, Cesko-Slovensko ajeho buducnost' (Paris , 1939). pp. 50-51 . 4 At the French consulate I picked up the mail sent to me from Paris . Osusky sent several personal letters to be delivered to Bishop Samuel Osusky , Bishop Fedor Ruppeldt , and Dr. Anton Stefanek, and a thick envelope of letters to be picked up later by someone mentioned in the delivered letters. There were also two reports: one , official from the embassy, dealing with the international situation; the other, a sketchy outline of the planned communication between Paris and Bratislava. 5 Documents FO 371 /22903 /338-39 and FO 371 /22903 /341 , British Foreign Office Files, Public Record Office, London. Copies of these documents were made available to me by Frantisek Vnuk . A Slovak translation of them can be found in Vnuk's Slovenska otazka na Zapade v rokoch 1939-1940 (Cleveland , 1974). pp. 54-56. 6 I met General Viest in Paris in the late summer of 1939 . He visited the " Political Club" Madame Sis. Once a week she received at her home invited guests of different political affiliations for open discussion. At such a friendly meeting General Viest made known his political allegiance to Benes . �SLOVAKIA 33 My next meeting with General Viest was in Beziers in Southern France at the Headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army. As a soldier at the nearby Czechoslovak Army Camp in Agde, I visited the Headquarters to plead for the Slovaks in the military prison, because they refused to fight for Benes's type of Czechoslovakia. (the "Fryvaldovsky Case"). General Viest did not allow me to see Fryvaldovsky and dismissed me without any answer. I submitted the complaint to the French Military Command . Although the outcome of this intervention was never revealed to me, Fryvaldovsky was repatriated to Slovakia in 1941. � SLOVAKIA 9 Stefan Osusky's Attempts to Establish Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir JOSEPH STASKO The following is the recollection of my experiences as a young Slovak student in Paris during the critical years 1938-1939. Although this "first person narrative" is necessarily somewhat colored by subjective impressions, it should nonetheless shed light on some hithertofore undisclosed and/or unanalyzed information relating to events and personalities of the period. 1 On the international scene, Hitler's daring diplomatic moves, combined with military pressure , brought about not only the Munich Agreement (September 29/ 30 , 1938) but also the resignation of President Edvard Benes (October 5, 1938), followed by the Zilina Agreement (October 6, 1938), by virtue of which the Slovaks achieved political autonomy . For me , as a politically active federalist (autonomist), the Zilina Agreement represented the fulfillment of the Slovak political struggle , the federation of Czecho-Slovakia. In the second half of October, 1938 , I returned to Slovakia to witness the implementation of Slovak autonomy. The new autonomous government of Slovakia had commenced with enthusiasm, national pride , and hope . This euphoric atmosphere, however , did not last for long. The loss of a large part of Slovak territory to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 2 , 1938 was a tragic blow to the promising beginnings of Slovak self-rule . The overall mood in Slovakia was overshadowed by national grief, anger , and a feeling of powerlessness. �10 SLOVAKIA In the official circles of the Slovak government and among the general public there was no serious talk of separating Slovakia from the Czech lands. Both the government and judicial public viewed the Munich Agreement and the Vienna Award as diplomatic safeguards against Hitler's further penetration in Central Europe and also as an international guaranty against Hungarian territorial rapacity. There were, however, radical elements grouped around Alexander Mach, Karol Murgas, Jozef Jostiak, Jan Farkas , and Jan Dafc':lk who fomented anti-Czech feeling by ascribing the loss of Slovak territory to Benes and his policy toward Slovakia. In November, 1938, I returned to France convinced that the Slovaks considered their autonomy the satisfactory solution of their national and political interests. Before I left I was offered the assignment of foreign correspondent for the newspapers Slovak and Slovenska pravda , which I gladly accepted. By the end of November the Czechoslovak ambassador in France, Dr. Stefan Osusky, was returning to Paris from his visit to the newlyTelected president of Czecho-Slovakia , Dr. Emil Hacha and to the new foreign minister, Dr. Frantisek Chvalkovsky. As a foreign correspondent for the newspaper Slovak, I asked Osusky for an interview regarding his impressions of Czecho-Slovakia. Prior to the interview, he gave me a copy of his aide-memoire submitted to the French Foreign Office as a supplement to his official report. The main topics, as I recall, were descriptions of his audiences with President Hacha and Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky and of the apathy of the Czech people toward the latest tragic dismemberment of Bohemia in the Munich Agreement. Included in it was also a statement concerning the Slovak autonomous government's assurances of its wholehearted support for the Czecho-Slovak state. In my subsequent interview with Osusky he maintained that the French government had pledged to guarantee the security of the new Czecho-Slovakia. This part of the interview _was later published in the newspaper Slovak. After this interview with Osusky, my contacts with him became more frequent and proved to be very useful to me as a student and as a journalist. He encouraged me to study the question of minorities in Central Europe , offered me access to the embassy 's library, and invited me to the "five o'clock tea" on a �SLOVAKIA 11 regular weekly basis. He also arranged for me contacts with the Havas Press Agency, as well as with the newspaper Epoque, L'Oeuvre, and Le Temps . 2 In December, 1938, I was back in Slovakia on a journalistic assignment from Osusky to report on the Slovak parliamentary elections , held on December 18, 1938. After the opening of the first session of the new Slovak Parliament on January 19, 1939, I returned the next day to France. At one of our ''five o'clock tea'' meetings, Osusky explained his political views not only on international questions but on the internal problems of Czecho-Slovakia as well. He told me that although his position as the envoy of Czecho-Slovakia in Paris precluded his interference in the internal affairs of the state, he kept close contacts with many prominent politicians and expressed his political views freely. However, since he was unable to make public his own views, he suggested that I should try to put them in writing . I interpreted this as a mandate and asked 'him to set up dates for interviews on his position regarding political developments in Europe with a special focus on Central Europe and Czecho-Slovakia. On the basis of these interviews I submitted to him in February, 1939, a draft of "Dr. Osusky's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis.'' He approved my draft and asked me to supplement it with philosophical statements from his acceptance speech, delivered on February 5, 1936, on the occasion of his receipt of an honorary doctorate in law at the University of Dijon. I complied with his request. The resulting paper was reproduced for his Slovak friends; later a part of it was included in his booklet Cesko-Slovensko a jeho buducnost', which appeared in 1939. After the crisis of March, 1939, Osusky was looked upon as the only representative of Czecho-Slovakia in the free world who could claim the authority of a co-founder of the state. Following his refusal to deliver the Czecho-Slovak embassy in Paris to the Germans, he espoused the so-called ambassadorial theory of continuity, according to which he was the only legal representative of Czechoslovakia . Osusky's theory conflicted with the " presidential theory of continuity" of Benes, who considered himself the victim of Hitler's brutality and the sacrificial lamb of �12 SLOVAKIA the military and psychological weakness of France and Great Britain. The French government confirmed Osusky's legal status and continued to recognize him as the diplomatic representative of Post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. Osusky felt himself destined for the leading role in the resistance against Hitler. At this historical juncture , however, Osusky found himself isolated, without trustworthy collaborators at the embassy and with no close connections with the Slovaks and their organizations in France. His relations with his Slovak countrymen in France were sparse and those with the Czechs lacked mutual trust. The only employee at the embassy who devotedly served Osusky was Stefan Moncek, the treasurer. Other Slovaks at the embassy - Dr. Vladimir Palic, Dr. Alexander Kunosi, and later Dr. Fedor Hodza - either stayed there for only a short time or tendered their allegiance to others. All other personnel at the embassy espoused Benes' views and conspired against Osusky. This politically precarious situation necessitated an immediate remedy in two directions: Osusky's relations with the Slovaks and their organizations in France; and the reshaping of his staff at the embassy. In the first half of April, 1939 , Osusky inquired about my connections with Slovak organizations in France and in Slovakia. He needed broader support for his leadership. For this purpose he planned to secure the confidence of his Slovak co-nationals in France. In order to improve his image as the representative, not only of the Czechs, but also of the Slovaks (who now lived in the Slovak state), he intended to attract political friends from Slovakia. To help carry out the first part of his plan I offered my assistance in arranging a gathering of Slovaks in Argenteuil , near Paris. There Osusky would deliver his first campaign speech on political issues in general and on Czech-Slovak relations in particular. The timing was opportune. After March 14, 1939 , the majority of Slovaks in France, who expressed their trust in Prime Minister Jozef Tiso's government, were denounced by the Czechs as traitors and as such were reported to the French authorities who then persecuted them as pro-Nazis. The presence of Ambassador Osusky at the gathering was an occasion to present Slovak complaints to him and to ask for protection. �SLOVAKIA 13 The gathering of French Slovaks took place in April, 1939, and was quite successful. Osusky's speech was reproduced in special leaflets, and parts were published in his Cesko-Slovensko ajeho buducnost'. On the whole, Osusky's address was favorably accepted by the Slovaks, especially his promise to protect thqse Slovaks who did not spread anti-French or anti-Czech propaganda. 3 The daily influx into France of Czech political and military emigrants caused Osusky much concern because practically all of them supported Benes. This may have been one of the main reasons why he entrusted me with a secret mission to visit Slovakia to contact his friends, former political leaders, many government officials, and leading personalities in the cultural and economic life of the Slovak state. Osusky indicated that he would like me to bring personal messages to some of his friends and inquire into the possibility of having contacts with them through Budapest. He also suggested that I travel to Hungary to survey the situation of the Slovaks in occupied Southern Slovakia and contact their leaders. I accepted this mission as a sign of personal trust and asked for a few days to prepare a more detailed program for his approval. At the outset of our discussion Osusky had pointed out that this trip was supposed to appear as if it were my own undertaking, but he promised to inform the French authorities of my status and procure a diplomatic visa for me. He did so promptly. Among the persons I was to see and deliver messages to were: Dr. Anton Stefanek, Professor at the University of Bratislava; General Rudolf Viest, Inspector-General of the Slovak Army; Dr. Samuel Osusky, Lutheran Bishop and cousin of Osusky; Lutheran Bishop Fedor Ruppeldt; Dr. Matej Murtin at the Hypotecna a komunalna banka in Bratislava; the lawyer Dr. Ivan Pietor; economists Dr. Peter Zat'ko and Dr. Vladimir Fajnor; and the General Director of the Slovenska narodna banka, Dr. Imrich Karvas . My assignment included also contacts with Dr. Milos Vanco, Dr. Jan Spisiak, and Jan Teplansky. Osusky explained his wish to build communications with Bratislava through a liaison in Budapest to be funded half by him and the other half by the Slovak side . As for possible discussions with government officials, I could act in my name only. Osusky 's name could be mentioned in con- �14 SLOVAKIA nection with his warning about the risk of war and the need for the cooperation of Slovakia with the West. All other questions that Osusky gave me were for Prime Minister Tiso alone. Among them was the question of the Slovaks in France and their eventual mobilization in case of war in military units of a Czecho-Slovak Army. Another question of importance for both Slovakia and Osusky was the establishing of Slovak diplomatic missions in the West equipped with proper personalities and far-reaching political perspectives. He suggested also that I discuss some matters with Foreign Minister Ferdinand Durcansky . Before I left France on April 27 , 1939 , I helped to organize the participation of Slovaks at the Second Reunion of the Czechs and Slovaks in France, which was planned for April 29-30 at the Czechoslovak Colony in Paris . Benes 's adherents planned to declare him the leader of the '' Second Czechoslovak Struggle Abroad ,'' thus eliminating Osusky for good from any leading role in the exile movement. The outcome of that meeting was transmitted to me in Bratislava by Stefan Moncek, who had been given my telephone number. This information was important to my mission because success depended on Osusky 's retention of his leadership position abroad. In Bratislava I met freely with my friends and colleagues . Some of them already held high state offices and enjoyed their positions in the full swing of their zeal, devotion , and industry . They seemed to be unaware of the danger of war and believed that their happy days would have no end. To my surprise, some of them thought that Hitler was satisfied with his annexations and that the risk of war had been thus eliminated . This naive credulity was confirmed by my visits with Propaganda Chief Sano Mach, the Hlinka Guard leaders Karol Murgas and Jan Dafcik, and the majority of my own friends. The glorification of Hitler by Dr. Vojtech Tuka in his May 1, 1939, speech at Primizial Plaza in Bratislava was an ominous sign, as was the elimination of Karol Sidor from Slovak political affairs. The next day I was granted an audience with Prime Minister Tiso. It was arranged through Dr. Juraj Rajec , whom I knew when he was the educational counselor in the student residence Svoradov. I was admitted to Tiso as a reporter for the newspaper Slovak in France . �SLOVAKIA 15 Sitting in the corner of his office , overlooking the Danube, Tiso looked tired and somewhat restrained. He asked me about my studies and my journalistic experience in France. After I answered those questions I described the difficult position of the Slovaks in France as outlined earlier. This led me to Ambassador Osusky and his activities. I reported to Tiso the full details of Osusky 's speech in Argenteuil, handed him the leaflets of the Center of the Czechs and Slovaks Abroad concerning recruitment in the event of war, and finally submitted to him the document ' 'Dr. Osusky 's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis.'' With regard to the possibility of war, I indicated that there were about 50 ,000 Slovaks in France who could be recruited into a Czechoslovak Army and who would have to fight against the Slovak state for Benes' type of Czechoslovakia. I also told Tiso that Osusky favored a federated Czecho-Slovakia but faced the determined opposition of the Czechs and of some Slovak centralists, the so-called Czechoslovaks. Osusky had a few friends among the Czechs, and not many among the Slovaks. He was willing to set up separate Slovak military units in France, alongside the Czech ones, under a unified command, but there were no Slovak officers. Tiso listened to my briefing and then remarked that he did not consider Osusky to be the representative of the Slovak cause in the West because Osusky did not know Slovakia and the Slovaks did not know Osusky. Next I inquired whether it was true that the situation of Slovakia after the Treaty of Protection with Germany , which had been characterized in France as total dependence upon Germany, was similar to the situation in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. He rose from his chair, approached the window facing the Danube , and asked me if I could see the cannons on the other side of the Danube, which were aimed directly at his windows . This ''protection,'' he said, did not prevent the Slovaks from losing Petrzalka (part of Bratislava), but it was still preferable to their being divided between the Magyars and the Poles. To my querry about the limits of Slovak freedom in making foreign contacts, he responded that the new government expected to be recognized by most European states very quickly. This would make it difficult for the Germans to interfere and would provide �16 SLOVAKIA a legal basis for foreign contacts. Durcansky would give me more details on this point. I was curious about relations with the Magyars, for I had heard that there was no reaction from the Slovak side to the atrocities committed by the Magyars in Komjatice, Slovensky Meder, and Surany. Tiso replied that according to the Treaty of Protection with Germany, the Slovaks could not unilaterally decide on retaliatory measures against the Magyars in Slovakia; the Slovaks were thus denied the right of reprisal, he said . On the other hand , the Treaty provided for German protection of Slovak territory against constant Magyar incursions. And so the Slovak position toward Hungary was dictated by those factors. I inquired if it would be possible to use the Slovaks in France for some kind of support of a Slovak cause in the West in the event of war. Tiso said that that was not an immediate worry. First France would have to recognize the Slovak State , after which there would be more time for such discussions. I told him that Osusky would have no objection to the French government granting the Slovak state de facto recognition. He saw such circumstances as being favorable for building a bridge between France and Slovakia, provided that the proper person were appointed as head of the Slovak consulate. Tiso indicated that I would receive the answer to this question from f>urcansky. Tiso suggested publishing a Slovak-French bulletin in France and the possibility of a cultural exchange. He referred me to Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Secretary General of Slovenska liga , who would take care of it. In summarizing our discussion, Tiso reiterated his views , stressed the confidentiality of some of his remarks , and asked me about my immediate and future plans . I mentioned that I intended to visit Hungary to speak with Slovak representatives. He asked me if this had already been planned in Paris, which I affirmed. He concluded the interview with an invitation to contact him again before I left for France. That same day, in the Cafe Carlton, I was introduced by Vlado Houdek to Peter Pares , the British consul in Bratislava. He expressed a keen interest in my studies in France and my evaluation of the French political scene. He was eager to see me the next day at the same place, and I gladly consented. �SLOVAKIA 17 Later that day I was invited for dinner by Foreign Minister Durcansky at his private residence. To my surprise, he had already been informed of the issues discussed with the prime minister. Our friendly personal relations, based on close cooperation in the autonomist movement, allowed us to be absolutely frank with each other. After giving him an overall picture of French public opinion, I touched on the question of the Slovaks in France and also on Ambassador Osusky's actions. To this Durcansky added his brief analysis of the Slovak situation on the international level and outlined Slovak diplomatic ambitions. The discussion that followed could be summarized in the following points: I said that according to what I knew from Osusky and from the Polish embassy in Paris , the French and the British were hurridly mobilizing raw materials, increasing production of military hardware , building up public opinion against Hitler; in short they were preparing for war. In the diplomatic field , the French were repeating their pledges to stand by their treaties with Poland and Romania. Durcansky accepted the possibility of war but not earlier than in two years. As for the Slovaks in France, I asked if it could f10t be possible to organize them into a Slovak Legion and have them fight against Hitler and for the preservation of the Slovak state. Osusky, I continued, was opposed to Benes. He recognized a federated Czecho-Slovakia as the best form of government which would guarantee Slovak self-rule . Durcansky replied that he did not believe that France would agree on the formation of a Slovak Legion with the proviso that it fight for the preservation of the Slovak state. He, therefore, would accept the organization of Czech and Slovak military units under a unified command. This reasoning was parallel in general terms with that of Osusky 's. One of the most difficult questions , however, was where to find and how to commission 20 to 30 Slovak officers for this duty . This would be a political question of unforseeable complications. According to Durcansky , this could be done under different pretexts , such as through a cultural delegation, correspondents , students, businessmen, and the like. Under the present conditions, two things were required immediately: official recognition of Slovakia by the French government and money . As for the first �18 SLOVAKIA condition, Durcansky said that he had been already told by the French consul that recognition was on its way. The question of money would be solved by creation of the Institute for Slovaks Abroad , which for the time being would be associated with the Foreign Ministry. The money could be put aside from the ministerial budget. To do so , it would be necessary to prepare the statutes of the proposed Institute . He instructed me to meet the next day with Dr. Jozef Cieker, Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Emil Rusko , and their experts to prepare the final text of the statutes. After Durcansky had read "Osusky's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis" and gone through the material I had brought with me, he indicated that Osusky 's position might help the Slovak cause in the West if he would be willing to cooperate with the Slovak consul in Paris , using him as a liaison with Slovakia . I asked Durcansky if he already had in mind such a person for such a delicate mission; he mentioned the name of Ing. Milan Harminic. More explicitly than Tiso , Durcansky gave me details regarding his dealings with the Germans. This I later put in writing and sent to Ambassador Osusky through the French consulate in Bratislava. From the organizational point of view, Durcansky considered the existing Catholic mission in France an excellent focus for rallying the Slovaks , not only on religious, but also on cultural and political grounds. He knew the Reverend Jan Futak, the Head of the mission, vaguely but expressed confidence in him. He promised to send money to France from the planned Institute to help publish a periodical bulletin in French and Slovak. As the editor he planned to appoint the Reverend Vojtech Klein, a Catholic priest known for his work in the social field and in the publishing trade. Before taking leave of Durcansky I informed him of my trip to Hungary and asked for his advice as to whom I should contact and what concrete steps I should take to gather detailed information on the situation of the Slovaks there . He referred me to Dr. Ludovit Obtulovic , a lawyer in Nave Zamky who was the leader of the Slovaks in the occupied territory of Southern Slovakia, and to the Reverand Imrich Ko sec , a Catholic priest in the nearby village of Banovska Kesa . �SLOVAKIA 19 Durcansky planned to build a direct line of communication between Bratislava and Paris through an employee of the Slovak embassy in Budapest . During the discussion it became apparent to me that this communication was supposed to be rather a personal link between Durcansky and the Catholic mission in Argenteuil. Consequently, I did not mention at this point that Osusky too was looking for a liaison with Slovakia through a confidant in Budapest. While Durcansky hoped to build bridges to the West without the intermediary link of Osusky , the latter planned to use his contacts with Slovakia for bringing his political friends into exile. Before I left for Hungary I learned that on May 4, 1939 Great Britain had extended de facto recognition to the Slovak state and had confirmed the present British consul in Bratislava, Pares , as its official representative. This greatly furthered Slovak self-confidence. A special permit to cross the Slovak-Hungariaii border was given to me at the Hungarian consulate in Bratislava at the recommendation of Monsignor Augustin Hladik, Canon of the Cathedral of St. Martin in Bratislava, with whom I had been in contact for some years. He also made the arrangement for my travel to Hungary by car with Count Janos Eszterhazy, who was the official representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, in which capacity he was also a member of the Slovak Parliament. My first stop was at Dr. Obtulovic's office in Nave Zamky . With Obtulovic we visited the Reverend Imrich Kasee in Banovska Kesa and then traveled to Slovensky Meder and Komjatice; the next day we called on the Director of the Slovak gymnazium, Professor Jozef Hudec , and his colleague Professor lgnac Safar in the town of Surany. In all these villages I interviewed the Slovaks regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the Hungarian gendarmes against them for singing the Slovak national anthem and holding cultural meetings. After two days in Budapest , where I met with Professor Stefan Buran and others in the administration of Slovenska jednota, the Slovak newspaper which we wanted to become the journal of all Slovaks abroad and as such to be distributed also in France, I returned with Obtulovic to Bratislava. �20 SLOVAKIA I telephoned Durcansky to congratulate him on the British recognition of Slovakia. He sounded optimistic and explored possible ways to prompt the French government to recognize Slovakia as early as possible and thus establish legal contact with one more Western state. He invited Obtulovic and myself to see him the same day . At this meeting Durcansky suggested that Obtulovic go to Paris to investigate the possibility of obtaining early recognition of Slovakia and the accreditation of a Slovak consul in Paris. Through the intercession of Moncek, for whom I had prepared a confidential personal note, Obtulovic was to see Osusky and discuss with him the following: 1) The legal position of the Slovaks in France then and in case of war . Would Slovaks in France be mobilized into a Czechoslovak Army, or would they be recruited under the banner of a Slovak Legion? 2) A Slovak consulate in Paris and its relations to Osusky. 3) Would Osusky agree to communicate with Slovakia through the Slovak consulate in Paris , or would he suggest some other manner? 4) Distribution of Slovenska jednota among the Slovaks in France and possible cooperation with the editors of Slovenska jednota in Budapest. 5) ,'Publication of a Slovak-French Bulletin, by a neutral body , which could develop into a cultural and political organ for all Slovaks in France. For the time being it could be issued as a supplement to (Nas] Krajan, the organ of the Catholic mission in France. 6) Consider closer working relations between Osusky and the leadership of the Slovaks in Hungary. Obtulovic should propose to gather documentary. material on the Hungarian-German secret alliance with subsequent reference to Hitler's consent of the occupation of Southern Slovakia by the Hungarians. At this time I met with the British consul , Peter Pares , at the Hotel Carlton in Bratislava . I congratulated him on his confirmation as the British representative to the Slovak government. In response he mentioned that his French colleague had enjoyed very �SLOVAKIA 21 much talking with me. I was really surprized how quickly newsgathering in Bratislava functioned, because I had hardly returned from the French consulate. 4 The British rightly conjectured that my visit with Tiso and my trip to Hungary were somewhat connected with my mission from Osusky. He wanted to know more about these undertakings. Because of the risk involved. I remained cautious. A few days later I was invited by Obtulovic to join a ''fishing party" organized by him for Pares. This was a pleasant car trip from Bratislava to my native Orava and to Oravice, the region with brooks full of trout, a real haven for such a passionate fisherman as Pares. The three-day party was kept secret. We discussed mainly Slovak relations with the West. I was impressed by Pares' knowledge of the Slovak internal political scene. He showed a full understanding of the difficult international position of Slovakia and promised to keep his government informed about the real anti-Nazi feelings of the Slovaks. In his characterization of the leading Slovak politicians, he disapproved of Durcansky's precipitous acts and evident endeavors to prove the independence of Slovak diplomacy. On the other hand, Pares appreciated Tiso's policy and skill as shown in his dealings with internal as well as external affairs of state. Two communications sent by Pares to his superiors in London indicate the British consul's acute perceptions of the situation at this time and are worth quoting. 5 The first is a letter dated May 23, 1939 and reads as follows: Dear Troutbeck, Certain information has reached me from a reliable source which will, I think, interest you, but nevertheless, does not seem suitable for inclusion in a formal dispatch. I have been told by Dr. Obtulovic , who apparently enjoys the confidence of Dr. Tiso , that the Slovak government is keeping in contact with the group of Slovak exiles in Paris who are led by Dr. Osusky. A young student named Josef Stasko, who is studying at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, has recently been in Bratislava and had an interview with Dr. Tiso. He has now returned to Paris and I understand that he is a bearer of a message �22 SLOVAKIA from the Slovak government. My French colleague knows that the young man is in touch with Slovaks in Paris, but I doubt if he is aware of his connection with the Slovak government. I understand that Dr. Tiso has given formal approval to the formation of a Slovak Legion in France and that this is the message conveyed by Stasko to Paris . The object of these maneuvers seems to be to maintain contact with the Western powers whilst pursuing a policy of co-operation with the Germans for as long as is necessary - in other words, the policy of the Czechs before and during the Great War. The Slovaks are growing very apprehensive now about the possibility of war. They do not expect Germany to win, but realize that they are powerless to refuse anything she might ask in the event of war. So they are trying to ensure the good will of the Western powers in advance by secretly approving the plans of the exiles. That this is not a policy favoured by a small group, but rather the concerted action of the Slovak leaders as a whole is, I think , shown by the fact that the persons concerned in it are not only Dr. Tiso , but also Dr. Obtulovic, the official Slovak minority leader in Hungary, and the partisan of Sidor. My knowledge of Slovak is not very reliable, but from something said in a convention at which I was present, I gained the impression that Dr. Durcansky, the proGerman Foreign Minister, also knows of Stasko's mission. There have been reports that Durcansky is dissatisfied with Germany's treatment of Slovakia so it is possible that my impression may be correct. Yours ever, P. Pares A few comments on Pares ' report are in order. First, the French consul could not tell his British colleague the full story about my connection with the Slovak government because I was warned by Osusky that he was in the service of Benes , and �SLOVAKIA 23 therefore, there could have been a risk of political intrigue . Second, in my talks with Pares I never mentioned to him the essence of my discussion with Tiso, so I presume Obtulovic had informed him about it. It is also true that Tiso did not give formal approval to the formation of a Slovak Legion in France; but it had been my personal feeling that he considered the possibility of such a need later, and that is why he had referred me to Durcansky for more discussion about this matter. The following telegram by the British consul in Bratislava to his superiors in London presumes a discrete and confidential discussion of Pares with Obtulovic and clearly confirms that the Paris-Bratislava connection was still alive. The two-hour conversation of Obtulovic with the French consul also suggests the importance of the issues discussed. Here is the full text of the telegram: Telegram (en clair) from His Majesty's Consul (Bratislava) 3rd June , 1939. Dr. Obtulovic , who accompanied Stasko to Paris (see my porvate [sic] letter to Mr. Troutbeck, dated 23rd May, a copy of which was sent to the Foreign Office under cover of my dispatch No. 39 of 23rd May) has just returned to Bratislava. He had an interview with Osusky, who appears to have succeeded in convincing him that the French treatment of Czecho-Slovakia last autumn was not a betrayal, but the result of the pressure of circumstances. Dr. Obtulovic seems to have returned a Francophil and his report will no doubt influence the Slovak Government in favour of the Western Powers. Osusky's arguments have also convinced him that Germany is not strong enough to break the forces confronting her and he is therefore concerned for the future of Slovakia in the event of a German collapse. He says that he is to return to Paris once more and will visit also Belgium. I presume that he will make contact with the Slovak colony in that country which is fairly numerous. Today he had a conversation lasting two hours with the French consul here, in the course of which it must be �24 SLOVAKIA assumed that he discussed the standpoint of the Slovak Government to the Slovak exiles in Paris . Copy sent to Paris. I have to add that Obtulovic traveled to Paris alone , because I still expected an audience with Prime Minister Tiso and a meeting with Foreign Minister Durcansky. It is not true that Obtulovic returned from Paris a Francophil, thanks to Osusky . Obtulovic was a Francophil before his trip. The same could be said about the statement that only Osusky's arguments had convinced Obtulovic of the possible German defeat. It was precisely this presumption of the Slovak government - that in the event of war, Germany would not win - which had prompted Obtulovic's trip to Paris. The plan was that Obtulovic would return to Paris and would visit his countrymen in Belgium. This did not take place , however , because the Germans took notice of his travels, tracked his whereabouts , and inquired about his motives at the Slovak Foreign Ministry. The details of the German intervention in this matter were sent to me by the Reverend Kasee at my address at the Slovak Catholic mission in Argenteuil. A few days later Obtul6vic and Kasee were expelled from Hungary and returned to Bratislava. Back in Bratislava, after the fishing trip , I contacted Dr. Anton Stefanek, for whom I had a letter and an oral message from Osusky. He seemed to have little confidence in Osusky and was totally dismayed by Benes . Concerning the situation in Slovakia , it was his view that for the time being Slovakia was thriving and was much better off than the Czech lands . Of course , all this was relative to Hitler's plans . In the event of war, Slovakia would be eradicated as a state and much damage would be done to the nation . He confessed that he did not intend to go into exile and that he had no advice as to what course of action to take. He did not believe that the future form of life in Central Europe would be the same as before and stated that even Czecho-Slovakia would have to be restructured if it wished to survive. He asked me about Hodza, who he expected to come forward with his idea of a Central European Federation. �SLOVAKIA 25 My message from Osusky concerned the possibility of a mutual exchange of reports on international and domestic developments. To this Stefanek did not react. He wanted me to meet his colleagues at the university, and he set up a date for this meeting in his office . As I recall, this took place two days later. At that meeting only four of these colleagues were present: Dr. Peter Gula, Dr. Branislav Varsik, Dr. Jan Stanislav, and Dr. J. K. (still living in Bratislava). The only positive suggestion made at that meeting was to organize an exchange of professors and students with France and then to create a clearing-house at the Institut Slave in Paris for Slovak literature. All those present considered the war inevitable; all believed that Hitler would not win; and all were willing to accept the Czecho-Slovak state only in a federal form. My report from this meeting was sent in a diplomatic pouch to Osusky through the French consulate . Another letter and message I delivered was to General Rudolf Viest, who was Inspector-General of the Slovak Army. He asked me first for my credentials, then told me to see him the next day. At our subsequent meeting I informed him that Ambassador Osusky would be glad to see him in Paris in order to organize a Czecho-Slovak Army. To this General Viest answered that he did not believe war would break out and that he would stay where he was. (I did not know at that time that he had already promised Benes that he would soon join him). 6 In the remaining days I busied myself seeing personalities from Slovak political, cultural, and economic life . Among others , I visited Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Secretary General of Slovenska liga in Bratislava, who promised to send books, periodicals , films, pictures, and other cultural items to Paris. He also gave me some financial help and asked me to work in France for the Slovenska liga, represented then by Klement Sichmak. In Trnava I visited Monsignor Jan Pi:istenyi , the Director of the Spolok Sv. Vojtecha, who warmly received me. He gave me two packages of books for the Reverend Jan Futak in Argenteuil and also some financial assistance for lecturing among the Slovaks in France on behalf of Slovak religious awareness. At the "Slovensky klub" in the Cafe Redoute in Bratislava I met with the Minister of Economy , Dr. Gejza Medricky; Dr. Peter �26 SLOVAKIA Zat'ko of the Centrale of Slovak Industry; Dr. Alexander Hrncar of the Ministry of Finance; Dr. Imrich Karvas of the Slovak National Bank, and other economists. The invitation of this meeting had come from Medricky, whom I had known for some years in connection with autonomist political actions. The discussion concerned mostly the economy but also touched on politics. I included the main points of this debate in the report for Osusky. One of the most interesting, and at the same time most informative, meetings I had had in Bratislava was in the student residence Svoradov, where I met many of my colleagues. In their discussions they portrayed the events of March 14, 1939 with the utmost frankness. Most of them were adherents of Sidor and only a few supported the radical wing headed by Mach and Murgas. From their heated debate I learned that they did not consider Hitler to be a culprit but rather a ruthless politician. They expressed their doubts about the Western concept of European order. The West, they argued, had lost cultural preeminence, failed in political initiative , and)acked overall vitality. They dismissed the immediate danger of war and were quite philosophical about the future. To my outline of the Western mood of the public and a resolute resistance toward further concessions to Hitler, they offered a picture of Slovakia built on Christian principles and rallied politically around Tiso a·s the best safeguard against the eventualities of an armed peace. In sum, I was struck by two elements in Slovak political life: one was a real ambition to build the Slovak state as if it were an independent entity outside of the complexities of the European theater; the other was the unbelievable credulity in a simplified version of their capability for survival. There was an almost palpable feeling of nationalistic fervor everywhere . Listening to Foreign Minister Durcansky 's self-confidence and to his broadlybased diplomatic ambitions , I could not believe that he had taken the Treaty of Protection with Germany seriously. The German minority in Slovakia was small, their Nazism in most localities questionable, and as a political factor they did not play as yet a visible role. The overall mood of rural Slovakia was optimistic , almost careless in its disregard of international embroglios . �SLOVAKIA 27 Based on these experiences, it was difficult for me to draw a gloomy picture of the future, especially among those who achieved personal and material satisfaction, e.g., young Slovak intellectuals or businessmen who exploited fully the occasion of the revolutionary change. The Jewish question had been in the minds of the radicals in their newspapers or speeches , but their zealotry was tamed by the government's promotion of constructive primary economic projects . Prime Minister Tiso was considered a man of moral integrity , wise , and moderate. Sidor, on the other hand , was severely judged by both radicals for his lack of courage and by the '' old guard" for his indecisiveness. Durcansky was a "political technician,'' whose ideological armory supplied the energy for the running of the state machinery. He had a few followers and even fewer personal friends . Alexander Mach, Karol Murgas , Jan Farkas, Jozef Jostiak , Jan Dafcik, and others had some credit in the nation and among the students for their sacrifices in the past, but in this stage of rebuilding the Slovak society they represented a group of malcontents - radicals whose fighting spirit was not out of focus. Their pro-German leanings pushed them to the margin of the political stream. After Obtulovic left for Paris I remained a few more days in Slovakia for my second audience with Tiso and a meeting with Durcansky . In his monologue Tiso talked about the preservation of the Slovak state and believed that the West would concur with him in the self-determination principle , which, in his opinion, would respect the will of the people. He did not believe that Osusky would be willing to accept the existence of the Slovak state , but his struggle for a federal Czecho-Slovakia underlined the principle of self-determination. Tiso saw my point in stressing the political importance of the Slovak soldiers in France fighting against Hitler, but he hastened to add " and for the Slovak state .'' He repeated his original wish to send a '' cultural delegation " to France and advised me to remain in touch w ith the Slovak League in America , especially with Monsignor Francis Dubas . With these recommendations my audience with the prime minister ended. �28 SLOVAKIA With Foreign Minister Durcansky I discussed all the issues that had arisen during my visit to Slovakia. Durcansky planned to remain in contact with Paris through an employee of the Slovak embassy in Budapest, whose official assignment would be to communicate with the Slovak consulate in Paris. For the time being he intended to send some literature and messages to the Catholic mission in Argenteuil for the Reverend Futak. We also discussed at length the question of a Slovak Legion in France . Durcansky envisaged such a possible development . To this end he promised to send 15 to 20 ''students'' to Paris for the fall semester who could eventually become available for action in organizing the Slovaks as an independent military unit. The main object of my "mission" was to contact Osusky's friends and eventually to encourage them to go into exile. I talked with many of those whom Osusky suggested ! but none of them was willing to emigrate. This was the case with Emil Boleslav Lukac , Dr. Milos Vanco, Jan Teplansky, Dr. Martin Micura, Dr. Anton Stefanek, Dr. Peter Zat'ko, Dr. Alexander Hrncar , and Dr. Imrich Karvas. When asked to prepare and send to Osusky a statement on the situation in Slovakia and on plans for the future , not a single one of these individuals manifested any interest. I did not meet Bishops Osusky or Ruppeldt and those persons listed in the letters which they had picked up at the French consulate in Bratislava. I gathered all possible documents from Slovakia and sent them to Osusky in a diplomatic pouch through the French consul. Among the documents were a copy of the Schutzvertrag and the secret Protocols concerning the German claims in the territorial , economic, financial, or military field . Also included were my diary, packages for the Reverend Futak, photographs from occupied Southern Slovakia, brochures, proclamations, pamphlets , Hlinka Guard "orders," and various books and clippings from the daily press . Although I had planned to see Karol Sidor, I had no opportunity to do so. My message to him from Osusky was oral and involved a request for his comments on the March 14th events along with an invitation to join him in Paris. Sidor kept himself aloof from the public , and I was told that his movements were �SLOVAKIA 29 being monitored by the Gestapo. He therefore would not welcome my visit or interview. I had my passport restamped with the stamp of the Slovak Republic and returned safely to France. There I met Obtulovic, who had already spoken to the officials of the French Foreign Office and also with Osusky. The next day I gave Osusky a full report of my experiences in Slovakia and Hungary and also described my meetings with Osusky's friends and acquaintances. Osusky did not accept the idea that the Slovak consulate in Paris should be the communication link between him and Bratislava. He also was not in favor of a Slovak office in Paris, like Slovakotour, which could be used as a cover for the contacts with Bratislava. He did not make any qualified statement on mobilizing Slovaks in France into an independent Slovak military unit , but promised to fight for the right of the Slovaks to form their own units under Slovak officers in the framework of a CzechoSlovak Army. He touched vaguely on the question of the Slovaks in Hungary, postponing diplomatic steps for the postwar reshaping of Europe. Osusky was totally disappointed that there were no political leaders in Slovakia, especially from among the former officials of Czechoslo~akia, who manifested any interest of cooperation with the West and with him . Together with Obtulovic I visited Osusky the next evening. After repeating what he had told me, he openly asked Obtulovic if one of the leading Slovaks would be willing to join him. He stressed the diplomatic realities: the British and also the French might differentiate the fate of the Czechs and the Slovaks ; once war was declared, they would fight for the restoration of CzechoSlovakia. It was necessary, he said, on the part of the Slovak government to prepare an official memorandum indicating that the Slovaks had been acting under German pressure and that the Slovak state had been forced upon the Slovaks. Such a document could be interpreted as proof that whatever it did was justified to save the nation. He repeated again and again that he was resolutely opposed to the centralized form of Czechoslovakia and that his concept for the future was favorable to the Slovaks and acceptable to the West. This concept included the return of the occupied Southern Slovakia to the homeland. �30 SLOVAKIA Obtulovic responded with a more detailed explanation of the Slovak position and asked for time to reevaluate all aspects of the discussions with Tiso and Durcansky. It was agreed that Osusky would not hinder the work of the Slovak consul in Paris and that the Slovak government would send to Paris a persona grata to Osusky. Obtulovic stressed the question of the Slovaks in France in case of war, considering them to be an outpost of the Slovaks' true anti-Nazis feelings . He indicated that the Slovak government would send a "cultural delegation" and some " students" to France who would be advised to cooperate with the Slovaks in the United States organized in the Slovak League of America. Osusky did not reject the idea, but he claimed the allegiance of the Slovaks in the event of war to the leadership of the resistance. The contacts with Bratislava would continue, and Obtulovic would return to Paris as soon as the Slovak government , or rather Tiso and Durcansky, would consider it useful. There was a tacit understand.ing that Obtulovic would talk to Sidor and that both would meet Osusky's emissary in Budapest. There were, of course, differences in positions, but they were not insurmountable. One of them was the choice and location of the Slovak diplomatic personnel in the West, the other the insistence of Tiso on the preservation of the Slovak state . The surprisingly rapid development of the international crisis , however, prevented both the Slovak government and Osusky from establishing any direct contacts. Although France recognized the Slovak government de facto on July 14 , 1939, no Slovak consul in Paris was accredited. The contemplated candidate for this position, Ing . Milan Harminc , who presented himself personally at the French Foreign Office and was considered a leading pretender, had been in the meantime accredited as Slovak consul in London. Suggested for the Slovak consul in Paris was Dr. Bohdan Galvanek, whose proGerman leanings were generally known and who was flatly rejected by the French Foreign Office. Time lost in the protection of the accreditation process had been sufficiently long for the successful negative intervention of Czech politicians at the French Foreign Office . �SLOVAKIA 31 Gradually, with the arrival of more pro-Benes exiles in Paris, Osusky was losing hold of the leadership. By the end of August, 1939, after his discussion with Benes in London (August 24), he abandoned his firm Slovak stand on the independent Slovak military units and was instrumental in reaching an agreement with the French government (August 28) on the creation of a Czechoslovak Army in France with no independent Slovak units. The political consequences of this development buried Osusky as the leader of the Slovaks abroad and abolished all possible contacts with Slovakia. At this point my "mission" and my efforts to demonstrate Slovak anti-Nazi feelings to the West lost all meaning. NOTES 1 A more detailed discussion of this period will follow in further personal memoirs to be published by the author. 2 Dr. Stefan Osusky was born in Brezova pod Bradlom, Slovakia, on March 31, 1889 into a distinguished Lutheran family . After some harassment by the Magyars while in secondary school, he emigrated to the United States in 1906. He joined his sister in Chicago, where in 1915 he earned a doctorate in law from the University of Chicago . In 1916 he was named, together with Gustav Kosik, as a special delegate of the Slovak League of America to the CzechoSlovak Committee in Paris , headed by Dr. Edvard Benes. Next to Dr. Milan R. Stefanik, Osusky was the second leading Slovak who participated in winning recognition for the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. After the war Osusky represented Czechoslovakia at different international committees in Europe and eventually became the Czechoslovak ambassador in France (1921-1940) . His political views echoed in large part those of the first President of Czechoslovakia, Tomas G. Masaryk , whom Osusky greatly admired. He differed with Masaryk , however, on the question of the Czech and Slovak constitutional arrangement. Osusky was proud of his Slovak nationality and was sympathetic toward the Slovak movement for national self-determination . When Benes became president in 1935, Osusky expected to replace him as foreign minister. Benes, who disliked Osusky, named instead Dr. Kami! Krofta. Osusky remained in Paris bitterly resenting this " injustice. " Part of Osusky's political action in Paris after March , 1939 , is described in this memoir. While in Paris he enjoyed the political support of the French government, especially in his antagonism toward Benes. In London , however, he became totally isolated . His altercations with Benes in the London Czechoslovak exile government ended with a total break and animosity. After �32 SLOVAKIA the war Osusky emigrated to the United States , where he lectured occasionally and wrote an analysis of the democratic process in a thinking society entitled The Way of the Free (New York , 1951) . Among his earlier publications are Les Magyars et Pangermanistes (Paris , 1918) and George D. Herron , d6vernik Wilsonov pocas vojny (Brno, 1925) . While in Great Britain during World War II Osusky wrote political pamphlets - Pravda vit'azi (1942). "Rizena demokracie" pri praci (1942), Benes a Slovensko (1943). and Triedenie duchov nastalo (1943) - in which he sharply criticized Benes for his stubborn insistence on adhering to the old, centralized structure of Czechoslovakia . 3 The pertinent passage from Osusky's speech in Argenteuil reads as follows : '' . .. I hereby declare that a policy depriving the Slovak nation of its inalienable rights will never get my consent. Those Czechs and Slovaks who pursued such excessive centralism must publicly admit that their political conception has failed , is dead and rests in a tomb. Otherwise, the Slovaks will face similar ambitions for Czechoslovak unity with justified resistance . What matters now is the existence and future of Czecho-Slovakia . He who would threaten the Slovaks with centralism and persecution is the enemy of the restoration of the Republic , because without Slovakia there could nor would be Czecho-Slovakia. Finally, I must say to the Slovaks that the French authorities will tolerate no propaganda against France and for Nazism. As for myself, as an official representative of the Czecho-Slovak Republic , I will not protect those Slovaks who calumniate the Czechs, the Czecho-Slovak authorities and CzechoSlovakia. The Slovaks who look for the salvation of Slovakia in Hitler, should address themselves to him for livelihood and protection. They will fall into slavery instead of remaining free citizens . Only the Czecho-Slovak Republic will bring b.;ick freedom , independence, and the right to a dignified life to the Czechs and 'Slovaks. This is our conviction and our national belief.'' As quoted in Stefan Osusky, Cesko-Slovensko ajeho buducnost' (Paris , 1939). pp. 50-51 . 4 At the French consulate I picked up the mail sent to me from Paris . Osusky sent several personal letters to be delivered to Bishop Samuel Osusky , Bishop Fedor Ruppeldt , and Dr. Anton Stefanek, and a thick envelope of letters to be picked up later by someone mentioned in the delivered letters. There were also two reports: one , official from the embassy, dealing with the international situation; the other, a sketchy outline of the planned communication between Paris and Bratislava. 5 Documents FO 371 /22903 /338-39 and FO 371 /22903 /341 , British Foreign Office Files, Public Record Office, London. Copies of these documents were made available to me by Frantisek Vnuk . A Slovak translation of them can be found in Vnuk's Slovenska otazka na Zapade v rokoch 1939-1940 (Cleveland , 1974). pp. 54-56. 6 I met General Viest in Paris in the late summer of 1939 . He visited the " Political Club" Madame Sis. Once a week she received at her home invited guests of different political affiliations for open discussion. At such a friendly meeting General Viest made known his political allegiance to Benes . �SLOVAKIA 33 My next meeting with General Viest was in Beziers in Southern France at the Headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army. As a soldier at the nearby Czechoslovak Army Camp in Agde, I visited the Headquarters to plead for the Slovaks in the military prison, because they refused to fight for Benes's type of Czechoslovakia. (the "Fryvaldovsky Case"). General Viest did not allow me to see Fryvaldovsky and dismissed me without any answer. I submitted the complaint to the French Military Command . Although the outcome of this intervention was never revealed to me, Fryvaldovsky was repatriated to Slovakia in 1941. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1985-86, Vol. 32 Description An account of the resource Vol. 32 (No. 58-59), 1985-86. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985-86 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 9 Stefan Osusky's Attempts to Establish Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir JOSEPH STASKO The following is the recollection of my experiences as a young Slovak student in Paris during the critical years 1938-1939. Although this "first person narrative" is necessarily somewhat colored by subjective impressions, it should nonetheless shed light on some hithertofore undisclosed and/or unanalyzed information relating to events and personalities of the period. 1 On the international scene, Hitler's daring diplomatic moves, combined with military pressure , brought about not only the Munich Agreement (September 29/ 30 , 1938) but also the resignation of President Edvard Benes (October 5, 1938), followed by the Zilina Agreement (October 6, 1938), by virtue of which the Slovaks achieved political autonomy . For me , as a politically active federalist (autonomist), the Zilina Agreement represented the fulfillment of the Slovak political struggle , the federation of Czecho-Slovakia. In the second half of October, 1938 , I returned to Slovakia to witness the implementation of Slovak autonomy. The new autonomous government of Slovakia had commenced with enthusiasm, national pride , and hope . This euphoric atmosphere, however , did not last for long. The loss of a large part of Slovak territory to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 2 , 1938 was a tragic blow to the promising beginnings of Slovak self-rule . The overall mood in Slovakia was overshadowed by national grief, anger , and a feeling of powerlessness. 10 SLOVAKIA In the official circles of the Slovak government and among the general public there was no serious talk of separating Slovakia from the Czech lands. Both the government and judicial public viewed the Munich Agreement and the Vienna Award as diplomatic safeguards against Hitler's further penetration in Central Europe and also as an international guaranty against Hungarian territorial rapacity. There were, however, radical elements grouped around Alexander Mach, Karol Murgas, Jozef Jostiak, Jan Farkas , and Jan Dafc':lk who fomented anti-Czech feeling by ascribing the loss of Slovak territory to Benes and his policy toward Slovakia. In November, 1938, I returned to France convinced that the Slovaks considered their autonomy the satisfactory solution of their national and political interests. Before I left I was offered the assignment of foreign correspondent for the newspapers Slovak and Slovenska pravda , which I gladly accepted. By the end of November the Czechoslovak ambassador in France, Dr. Stefan Osusky, was returning to Paris from his visit to the newlyTelected president of Czecho-Slovakia , Dr. Emil Hacha and to the new foreign minister, Dr. Frantisek Chvalkovsky. As a foreign correspondent for the newspaper Slovak, I asked Osusky for an interview regarding his impressions of Czecho-Slovakia. Prior to the interview, he gave me a copy of his aide-memoire submitted to the French Foreign Office as a supplement to his official report. The main topics, as I recall, were descriptions of his audiences with President Hacha and Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky and of the apathy of the Czech people toward the latest tragic dismemberment of Bohemia in the Munich Agreement. Included in it was also a statement concerning the Slovak autonomous government's assurances of its wholehearted support for the Czecho-Slovak state. In my subsequent interview with Osusky he maintained that the French government had pledged to guarantee the security of the new Czecho-Slovakia. This part of the interview _was later published in the newspaper Slovak. After this interview with Osusky, my contacts with him became more frequent and proved to be very useful to me as a student and as a journalist. He encouraged me to study the question of minorities in Central Europe , offered me access to the embassy 's library, and invited me to the "five o'clock tea" on a SLOVAKIA 11 regular weekly basis. He also arranged for me contacts with the Havas Press Agency, as well as with the newspaper Epoque, L'Oeuvre, and Le Temps . 2 In December, 1938, I was back in Slovakia on a journalistic assignment from Osusky to report on the Slovak parliamentary elections , held on December 18, 1938. After the opening of the first session of the new Slovak Parliament on January 19, 1939, I returned the next day to France. At one of our ''five o'clock tea'' meetings, Osusky explained his political views not only on international questions but on the internal problems of Czecho-Slovakia as well. He told me that although his position as the envoy of Czecho-Slovakia in Paris precluded his interference in the internal affairs of the state, he kept close contacts with many prominent politicians and expressed his political views freely. However, since he was unable to make public his own views, he suggested that I should try to put them in writing . I interpreted this as a mandate and asked 'him to set up dates for interviews on his position regarding political developments in Europe with a special focus on Central Europe and Czecho-Slovakia. On the basis of these interviews I submitted to him in February, 1939, a draft of "Dr. Osusky's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis.'' He approved my draft and asked me to supplement it with philosophical statements from his acceptance speech, delivered on February 5, 1936, on the occasion of his receipt of an honorary doctorate in law at the University of Dijon. I complied with his request. The resulting paper was reproduced for his Slovak friends; later a part of it was included in his booklet Cesko-Slovensko a jeho buducnost', which appeared in 1939. After the crisis of March, 1939, Osusky was looked upon as the only representative of Czecho-Slovakia in the free world who could claim the authority of a co-founder of the state. Following his refusal to deliver the Czecho-Slovak embassy in Paris to the Germans, he espoused the so-called ambassadorial theory of continuity, according to which he was the only legal representative of Czechoslovakia . Osusky's theory conflicted with the " presidential theory of continuity" of Benes, who considered himself the victim of Hitler's brutality and the sacrificial lamb of 12 SLOVAKIA the military and psychological weakness of France and Great Britain. The French government confirmed Osusky's legal status and continued to recognize him as the diplomatic representative of Post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. Osusky felt himself destined for the leading role in the resistance against Hitler. At this historical juncture , however, Osusky found himself isolated, without trustworthy collaborators at the embassy and with no close connections with the Slovaks and their organizations in France. His relations with his Slovak countrymen in France were sparse and those with the Czechs lacked mutual trust. The only employee at the embassy who devotedly served Osusky was Stefan Moncek, the treasurer. Other Slovaks at the embassy - Dr. Vladimir Palic, Dr. Alexander Kunosi, and later Dr. Fedor Hodza - either stayed there for only a short time or tendered their allegiance to others. All other personnel at the embassy espoused Benes' views and conspired against Osusky. This politically precarious situation necessitated an immediate remedy in two directions: Osusky's relations with the Slovaks and their organizations in France; and the reshaping of his staff at the embassy. In the first half of April, 1939 , Osusky inquired about my connections with Slovak organizations in France and in Slovakia. He needed broader support for his leadership. For this purpose he planned to secure the confidence of his Slovak co-nationals in France. In order to improve his image as the representative, not only of the Czechs, but also of the Slovaks (who now lived in the Slovak state), he intended to attract political friends from Slovakia. To help carry out the first part of his plan I offered my assistance in arranging a gathering of Slovaks in Argenteuil , near Paris. There Osusky would deliver his first campaign speech on political issues in general and on Czech-Slovak relations in particular. The timing was opportune. After March 14, 1939 , the majority of Slovaks in France, who expressed their trust in Prime Minister Jozef Tiso's government, were denounced by the Czechs as traitors and as such were reported to the French authorities who then persecuted them as pro-Nazis. The presence of Ambassador Osusky at the gathering was an occasion to present Slovak complaints to him and to ask for protection. SLOVAKIA 13 The gathering of French Slovaks took place in April, 1939, and was quite successful. Osusky's speech was reproduced in special leaflets, and parts were published in his Cesko-Slovensko ajeho buducnost'. On the whole, Osusky's address was favorably accepted by the Slovaks, especially his promise to protect thqse Slovaks who did not spread anti-French or anti-Czech propaganda. 3 The daily influx into France of Czech political and military emigrants caused Osusky much concern because practically all of them supported Benes. This may have been one of the main reasons why he entrusted me with a secret mission to visit Slovakia to contact his friends, former political leaders, many government officials, and leading personalities in the cultural and economic life of the Slovak state. Osusky indicated that he would like me to bring personal messages to some of his friends and inquire into the possibility of having contacts with them through Budapest. He also suggested that I travel to Hungary to survey the situation of the Slovaks in occupied Southern Slovakia and contact their leaders. I accepted this mission as a sign of personal trust and asked for a few days to prepare a more detailed program for his approval. At the outset of our discussion Osusky had pointed out that this trip was supposed to appear as if it were my own undertaking, but he promised to inform the French authorities of my status and procure a diplomatic visa for me. He did so promptly. Among the persons I was to see and deliver messages to were: Dr. Anton Stefanek, Professor at the University of Bratislava; General Rudolf Viest, Inspector-General of the Slovak Army; Dr. Samuel Osusky, Lutheran Bishop and cousin of Osusky; Lutheran Bishop Fedor Ruppeldt; Dr. Matej Murtin at the Hypotecna a komunalna banka in Bratislava; the lawyer Dr. Ivan Pietor; economists Dr. Peter Zat'ko and Dr. Vladimir Fajnor; and the General Director of the Slovenska narodna banka, Dr. Imrich Karvas . My assignment included also contacts with Dr. Milos Vanco, Dr. Jan Spisiak, and Jan Teplansky. Osusky explained his wish to build communications with Bratislava through a liaison in Budapest to be funded half by him and the other half by the Slovak side . As for possible discussions with government officials, I could act in my name only. Osusky 's name could be mentioned in con- 14 SLOVAKIA nection with his warning about the risk of war and the need for the cooperation of Slovakia with the West. All other questions that Osusky gave me were for Prime Minister Tiso alone. Among them was the question of the Slovaks in France and their eventual mobilization in case of war in military units of a Czecho-Slovak Army. Another question of importance for both Slovakia and Osusky was the establishing of Slovak diplomatic missions in the West equipped with proper personalities and far-reaching political perspectives. He suggested also that I discuss some matters with Foreign Minister Ferdinand Durcansky . Before I left France on April 27 , 1939 , I helped to organize the participation of Slovaks at the Second Reunion of the Czechs and Slovaks in France, which was planned for April 29-30 at the Czechoslovak Colony in Paris . Benes 's adherents planned to declare him the leader of the '' Second Czechoslovak Struggle Abroad ,'' thus eliminating Osusky for good from any leading role in the exile movement. The outcome of that meeting was transmitted to me in Bratislava by Stefan Moncek, who had been given my telephone number. This information was important to my mission because success depended on Osusky 's retention of his leadership position abroad. In Bratislava I met freely with my friends and colleagues . Some of them already held high state offices and enjoyed their positions in the full swing of their zeal, devotion , and industry . They seemed to be unaware of the danger of war and believed that their happy days would have no end. To my surprise, some of them thought that Hitler was satisfied with his annexations and that the risk of war had been thus eliminated . This naive credulity was confirmed by my visits with Propaganda Chief Sano Mach, the Hlinka Guard leaders Karol Murgas and Jan Dafcik, and the majority of my own friends. The glorification of Hitler by Dr. Vojtech Tuka in his May 1, 1939, speech at Primizial Plaza in Bratislava was an ominous sign, as was the elimination of Karol Sidor from Slovak political affairs. The next day I was granted an audience with Prime Minister Tiso. It was arranged through Dr. Juraj Rajec , whom I knew when he was the educational counselor in the student residence Svoradov. I was admitted to Tiso as a reporter for the newspaper Slovak in France . SLOVAKIA 15 Sitting in the corner of his office , overlooking the Danube, Tiso looked tired and somewhat restrained. He asked me about my studies and my journalistic experience in France. After I answered those questions I described the difficult position of the Slovaks in France as outlined earlier. This led me to Ambassador Osusky and his activities. I reported to Tiso the full details of Osusky 's speech in Argenteuil, handed him the leaflets of the Center of the Czechs and Slovaks Abroad concerning recruitment in the event of war, and finally submitted to him the document ' 'Dr. Osusky 's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis.'' With regard to the possibility of war, I indicated that there were about 50 ,000 Slovaks in France who could be recruited into a Czechoslovak Army and who would have to fight against the Slovak state for Benes' type of Czechoslovakia. I also told Tiso that Osusky favored a federated Czecho-Slovakia but faced the determined opposition of the Czechs and of some Slovak centralists, the so-called Czechoslovaks. Osusky had a few friends among the Czechs, and not many among the Slovaks. He was willing to set up separate Slovak military units in France, alongside the Czech ones, under a unified command, but there were no Slovak officers. Tiso listened to my briefing and then remarked that he did not consider Osusky to be the representative of the Slovak cause in the West because Osusky did not know Slovakia and the Slovaks did not know Osusky. Next I inquired whether it was true that the situation of Slovakia after the Treaty of Protection with Germany , which had been characterized in France as total dependence upon Germany, was similar to the situation in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. He rose from his chair, approached the window facing the Danube , and asked me if I could see the cannons on the other side of the Danube, which were aimed directly at his windows . This ''protection,'' he said, did not prevent the Slovaks from losing Petrzalka (part of Bratislava), but it was still preferable to their being divided between the Magyars and the Poles. To my querry about the limits of Slovak freedom in making foreign contacts, he responded that the new government expected to be recognized by most European states very quickly. This would make it difficult for the Germans to interfere and would provide 16 SLOVAKIA a legal basis for foreign contacts. Durcansky would give me more details on this point. I was curious about relations with the Magyars, for I had heard that there was no reaction from the Slovak side to the atrocities committed by the Magyars in Komjatice, Slovensky Meder, and Surany. Tiso replied that according to the Treaty of Protection with Germany, the Slovaks could not unilaterally decide on retaliatory measures against the Magyars in Slovakia; the Slovaks were thus denied the right of reprisal, he said . On the other hand , the Treaty provided for German protection of Slovak territory against constant Magyar incursions. And so the Slovak position toward Hungary was dictated by those factors. I inquired if it would be possible to use the Slovaks in France for some kind of support of a Slovak cause in the West in the event of war. Tiso said that that was not an immediate worry. First France would have to recognize the Slovak State , after which there would be more time for such discussions. I told him that Osusky would have no objection to the French government granting the Slovak state de facto recognition. He saw such circumstances as being favorable for building a bridge between France and Slovakia, provided that the proper person were appointed as head of the Slovak consulate. Tiso indicated that I would receive the answer to this question from f>urcansky. Tiso suggested publishing a Slovak-French bulletin in France and the possibility of a cultural exchange. He referred me to Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Secretary General of Slovenska liga , who would take care of it. In summarizing our discussion, Tiso reiterated his views , stressed the confidentiality of some of his remarks , and asked me about my immediate and future plans . I mentioned that I intended to visit Hungary to speak with Slovak representatives. He asked me if this had already been planned in Paris, which I affirmed. He concluded the interview with an invitation to contact him again before I left for France. That same day, in the Cafe Carlton, I was introduced by Vlado Houdek to Peter Pares , the British consul in Bratislava. He expressed a keen interest in my studies in France and my evaluation of the French political scene. He was eager to see me the next day at the same place, and I gladly consented. SLOVAKIA 17 Later that day I was invited for dinner by Foreign Minister Durcansky at his private residence. To my surprise, he had already been informed of the issues discussed with the prime minister. Our friendly personal relations, based on close cooperation in the autonomist movement, allowed us to be absolutely frank with each other. After giving him an overall picture of French public opinion, I touched on the question of the Slovaks in France and also on Ambassador Osusky's actions. To this Durcansky added his brief analysis of the Slovak situation on the international level and outlined Slovak diplomatic ambitions. The discussion that followed could be summarized in the following points: I said that according to what I knew from Osusky and from the Polish embassy in Paris , the French and the British were hurridly mobilizing raw materials, increasing production of military hardware , building up public opinion against Hitler; in short they were preparing for war. In the diplomatic field , the French were repeating their pledges to stand by their treaties with Poland and Romania. Durcansky accepted the possibility of war but not earlier than in two years. As for the Slovaks in France, I asked if it could f10t be possible to organize them into a Slovak Legion and have them fight against Hitler and for the preservation of the Slovak state. Osusky, I continued, was opposed to Benes. He recognized a federated Czecho-Slovakia as the best form of government which would guarantee Slovak self-rule . Durcansky replied that he did not believe that France would agree on the formation of a Slovak Legion with the proviso that it fight for the preservation of the Slovak state. He, therefore, would accept the organization of Czech and Slovak military units under a unified command. This reasoning was parallel in general terms with that of Osusky 's. One of the most difficult questions , however, was where to find and how to commission 20 to 30 Slovak officers for this duty . This would be a political question of unforseeable complications. According to Durcansky , this could be done under different pretexts , such as through a cultural delegation, correspondents , students, businessmen, and the like. Under the present conditions, two things were required immediately: official recognition of Slovakia by the French government and money . As for the first 18 SLOVAKIA condition, Durcansky said that he had been already told by the French consul that recognition was on its way. The question of money would be solved by creation of the Institute for Slovaks Abroad , which for the time being would be associated with the Foreign Ministry. The money could be put aside from the ministerial budget. To do so , it would be necessary to prepare the statutes of the proposed Institute . He instructed me to meet the next day with Dr. Jozef Cieker, Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Emil Rusko , and their experts to prepare the final text of the statutes. After Durcansky had read "Osusky's Views and Opinions on the European Crisis" and gone through the material I had brought with me, he indicated that Osusky 's position might help the Slovak cause in the West if he would be willing to cooperate with the Slovak consul in Paris , using him as a liaison with Slovakia . I asked Durcansky if he already had in mind such a person for such a delicate mission; he mentioned the name of Ing. Milan Harminic. More explicitly than Tiso , Durcansky gave me details regarding his dealings with the Germans. This I later put in writing and sent to Ambassador Osusky through the French consulate in Bratislava. From the organizational point of view, Durcansky considered the existing Catholic mission in France an excellent focus for rallying the Slovaks , not only on religious, but also on cultural and political grounds. He knew the Reverend Jan Futak, the Head of the mission, vaguely but expressed confidence in him. He promised to send money to France from the planned Institute to help publish a periodical bulletin in French and Slovak. As the editor he planned to appoint the Reverend Vojtech Klein, a Catholic priest known for his work in the social field and in the publishing trade. Before taking leave of Durcansky I informed him of my trip to Hungary and asked for his advice as to whom I should contact and what concrete steps I should take to gather detailed information on the situation of the Slovaks there . He referred me to Dr. Ludovit Obtulovic , a lawyer in Nave Zamky who was the leader of the Slovaks in the occupied territory of Southern Slovakia, and to the Reverand Imrich Ko sec , a Catholic priest in the nearby village of Banovska Kesa . SLOVAKIA 19 Durcansky planned to build a direct line of communication between Bratislava and Paris through an employee of the Slovak embassy in Budapest . During the discussion it became apparent to me that this communication was supposed to be rather a personal link between Durcansky and the Catholic mission in Argenteuil. Consequently, I did not mention at this point that Osusky too was looking for a liaison with Slovakia through a confidant in Budapest. While Durcansky hoped to build bridges to the West without the intermediary link of Osusky , the latter planned to use his contacts with Slovakia for bringing his political friends into exile. Before I left for Hungary I learned that on May 4, 1939 Great Britain had extended de facto recognition to the Slovak state and had confirmed the present British consul in Bratislava, Pares , as its official representative. This greatly furthered Slovak self-confidence. A special permit to cross the Slovak-Hungariaii border was given to me at the Hungarian consulate in Bratislava at the recommendation of Monsignor Augustin Hladik, Canon of the Cathedral of St. Martin in Bratislava, with whom I had been in contact for some years. He also made the arrangement for my travel to Hungary by car with Count Janos Eszterhazy, who was the official representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, in which capacity he was also a member of the Slovak Parliament. My first stop was at Dr. Obtulovic's office in Nave Zamky . With Obtulovic we visited the Reverend Imrich Kasee in Banovska Kesa and then traveled to Slovensky Meder and Komjatice; the next day we called on the Director of the Slovak gymnazium, Professor Jozef Hudec , and his colleague Professor lgnac Safar in the town of Surany. In all these villages I interviewed the Slovaks regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the Hungarian gendarmes against them for singing the Slovak national anthem and holding cultural meetings. After two days in Budapest , where I met with Professor Stefan Buran and others in the administration of Slovenska jednota, the Slovak newspaper which we wanted to become the journal of all Slovaks abroad and as such to be distributed also in France, I returned with Obtulovic to Bratislava. 20 SLOVAKIA I telephoned Durcansky to congratulate him on the British recognition of Slovakia. He sounded optimistic and explored possible ways to prompt the French government to recognize Slovakia as early as possible and thus establish legal contact with one more Western state. He invited Obtulovic and myself to see him the same day . At this meeting Durcansky suggested that Obtulovic go to Paris to investigate the possibility of obtaining early recognition of Slovakia and the accreditation of a Slovak consul in Paris. Through the intercession of Moncek, for whom I had prepared a confidential personal note, Obtulovic was to see Osusky and discuss with him the following: 1) The legal position of the Slovaks in France then and in case of war . Would Slovaks in France be mobilized into a Czechoslovak Army, or would they be recruited under the banner of a Slovak Legion? 2) A Slovak consulate in Paris and its relations to Osusky. 3) Would Osusky agree to communicate with Slovakia through the Slovak consulate in Paris , or would he suggest some other manner? 4) Distribution of Slovenska jednota among the Slovaks in France and possible cooperation with the editors of Slovenska jednota in Budapest. 5) ,'Publication of a Slovak-French Bulletin, by a neutral body , which could develop into a cultural and political organ for all Slovaks in France. For the time being it could be issued as a supplement to (Nas] Krajan, the organ of the Catholic mission in France. 6) Consider closer working relations between Osusky and the leadership of the Slovaks in Hungary. Obtulovic should propose to gather documentary. material on the Hungarian-German secret alliance with subsequent reference to Hitler's consent of the occupation of Southern Slovakia by the Hungarians. At this time I met with the British consul , Peter Pares , at the Hotel Carlton in Bratislava . I congratulated him on his confirmation as the British representative to the Slovak government. In response he mentioned that his French colleague had enjoyed very SLOVAKIA 21 much talking with me. I was really surprized how quickly newsgathering in Bratislava functioned, because I had hardly returned from the French consulate. 4 The British rightly conjectured that my visit with Tiso and my trip to Hungary were somewhat connected with my mission from Osusky. He wanted to know more about these undertakings. Because of the risk involved. I remained cautious. A few days later I was invited by Obtulovic to join a ''fishing party" organized by him for Pares. This was a pleasant car trip from Bratislava to my native Orava and to Oravice, the region with brooks full of trout, a real haven for such a passionate fisherman as Pares. The three-day party was kept secret. We discussed mainly Slovak relations with the West. I was impressed by Pares' knowledge of the Slovak internal political scene. He showed a full understanding of the difficult international position of Slovakia and promised to keep his government informed about the real anti-Nazi feelings of the Slovaks. In his characterization of the leading Slovak politicians, he disapproved of Durcansky's precipitous acts and evident endeavors to prove the independence of Slovak diplomacy. On the other hand, Pares appreciated Tiso's policy and skill as shown in his dealings with internal as well as external affairs of state. Two communications sent by Pares to his superiors in London indicate the British consul's acute perceptions of the situation at this time and are worth quoting. 5 The first is a letter dated May 23, 1939 and reads as follows: Dear Troutbeck, Certain information has reached me from a reliable source which will, I think, interest you, but nevertheless, does not seem suitable for inclusion in a formal dispatch. I have been told by Dr. Obtulovic , who apparently enjoys the confidence of Dr. Tiso , that the Slovak government is keeping in contact with the group of Slovak exiles in Paris who are led by Dr. Osusky. A young student named Josef Stasko, who is studying at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, has recently been in Bratislava and had an interview with Dr. Tiso. He has now returned to Paris and I understand that he is a bearer of a message 22 SLOVAKIA from the Slovak government. My French colleague knows that the young man is in touch with Slovaks in Paris, but I doubt if he is aware of his connection with the Slovak government. I understand that Dr. Tiso has given formal approval to the formation of a Slovak Legion in France and that this is the message conveyed by Stasko to Paris . The object of these maneuvers seems to be to maintain contact with the Western powers whilst pursuing a policy of co-operation with the Germans for as long as is necessary - in other words, the policy of the Czechs before and during the Great War. The Slovaks are growing very apprehensive now about the possibility of war. They do not expect Germany to win, but realize that they are powerless to refuse anything she might ask in the event of war. So they are trying to ensure the good will of the Western powers in advance by secretly approving the plans of the exiles. That this is not a policy favoured by a small group, but rather the concerted action of the Slovak leaders as a whole is, I think , shown by the fact that the persons concerned in it are not only Dr. Tiso , but also Dr. Obtulovic, the official Slovak minority leader in Hungary, and the partisan of Sidor. My knowledge of Slovak is not very reliable, but from something said in a convention at which I was present, I gained the impression that Dr. Durcansky, the proGerman Foreign Minister, also knows of Stasko's mission. There have been reports that Durcansky is dissatisfied with Germany's treatment of Slovakia so it is possible that my impression may be correct. Yours ever, P. Pares A few comments on Pares ' report are in order. First, the French consul could not tell his British colleague the full story about my connection with the Slovak government because I was warned by Osusky that he was in the service of Benes , and SLOVAKIA 23 therefore, there could have been a risk of political intrigue . Second, in my talks with Pares I never mentioned to him the essence of my discussion with Tiso, so I presume Obtulovic had informed him about it. It is also true that Tiso did not give formal approval to the formation of a Slovak Legion in France; but it had been my personal feeling that he considered the possibility of such a need later, and that is why he had referred me to Durcansky for more discussion about this matter. The following telegram by the British consul in Bratislava to his superiors in London presumes a discrete and confidential discussion of Pares with Obtulovic and clearly confirms that the Paris-Bratislava connection was still alive. The two-hour conversation of Obtulovic with the French consul also suggests the importance of the issues discussed. Here is the full text of the telegram: Telegram (en clair) from His Majesty's Consul (Bratislava) 3rd June , 1939. Dr. Obtulovic , who accompanied Stasko to Paris (see my porvate [sic] letter to Mr. Troutbeck, dated 23rd May, a copy of which was sent to the Foreign Office under cover of my dispatch No. 39 of 23rd May) has just returned to Bratislava. He had an interview with Osusky, who appears to have succeeded in convincing him that the French treatment of Czecho-Slovakia last autumn was not a betrayal, but the result of the pressure of circumstances. Dr. Obtulovic seems to have returned a Francophil and his report will no doubt influence the Slovak Government in favour of the Western Powers. Osusky's arguments have also convinced him that Germany is not strong enough to break the forces confronting her and he is therefore concerned for the future of Slovakia in the event of a German collapse. He says that he is to return to Paris once more and will visit also Belgium. I presume that he will make contact with the Slovak colony in that country which is fairly numerous. Today he had a conversation lasting two hours with the French consul here, in the course of which it must be 24 SLOVAKIA assumed that he discussed the standpoint of the Slovak Government to the Slovak exiles in Paris . Copy sent to Paris. I have to add that Obtulovic traveled to Paris alone , because I still expected an audience with Prime Minister Tiso and a meeting with Foreign Minister Durcansky. It is not true that Obtulovic returned from Paris a Francophil, thanks to Osusky . Obtulovic was a Francophil before his trip. The same could be said about the statement that only Osusky's arguments had convinced Obtulovic of the possible German defeat. It was precisely this presumption of the Slovak government - that in the event of war, Germany would not win - which had prompted Obtulovic's trip to Paris. The plan was that Obtulovic would return to Paris and would visit his countrymen in Belgium. This did not take place , however , because the Germans took notice of his travels, tracked his whereabouts , and inquired about his motives at the Slovak Foreign Ministry. The details of the German intervention in this matter were sent to me by the Reverend Kasee at my address at the Slovak Catholic mission in Argenteuil. A few days later Obtul6vic and Kasee were expelled from Hungary and returned to Bratislava. Back in Bratislava, after the fishing trip , I contacted Dr. Anton Stefanek, for whom I had a letter and an oral message from Osusky. He seemed to have little confidence in Osusky and was totally dismayed by Benes . Concerning the situation in Slovakia , it was his view that for the time being Slovakia was thriving and was much better off than the Czech lands . Of course , all this was relative to Hitler's plans . In the event of war, Slovakia would be eradicated as a state and much damage would be done to the nation . He confessed that he did not intend to go into exile and that he had no advice as to what course of action to take. He did not believe that the future form of life in Central Europe would be the same as before and stated that even Czecho-Slovakia would have to be restructured if it wished to survive. He asked me about Hodza, who he expected to come forward with his idea of a Central European Federation. SLOVAKIA 25 My message from Osusky concerned the possibility of a mutual exchange of reports on international and domestic developments. To this Stefanek did not react. He wanted me to meet his colleagues at the university, and he set up a date for this meeting in his office . As I recall, this took place two days later. At that meeting only four of these colleagues were present: Dr. Peter Gula, Dr. Branislav Varsik, Dr. Jan Stanislav, and Dr. J. K. (still living in Bratislava). The only positive suggestion made at that meeting was to organize an exchange of professors and students with France and then to create a clearing-house at the Institut Slave in Paris for Slovak literature. All those present considered the war inevitable; all believed that Hitler would not win; and all were willing to accept the Czecho-Slovak state only in a federal form. My report from this meeting was sent in a diplomatic pouch to Osusky through the French consulate . Another letter and message I delivered was to General Rudolf Viest, who was Inspector-General of the Slovak Army. He asked me first for my credentials, then told me to see him the next day. At our subsequent meeting I informed him that Ambassador Osusky would be glad to see him in Paris in order to organize a Czecho-Slovak Army. To this General Viest answered that he did not believe war would break out and that he would stay where he was. (I did not know at that time that he had already promised Benes that he would soon join him). 6 In the remaining days I busied myself seeing personalities from Slovak political, cultural, and economic life . Among others , I visited Dr. Vojtech Brestensky, Secretary General of Slovenska liga in Bratislava, who promised to send books, periodicals , films, pictures, and other cultural items to Paris. He also gave me some financial help and asked me to work in France for the Slovenska liga, represented then by Klement Sichmak. In Trnava I visited Monsignor Jan Pi:istenyi , the Director of the Spolok Sv. Vojtecha, who warmly received me. He gave me two packages of books for the Reverend Jan Futak in Argenteuil and also some financial assistance for lecturing among the Slovaks in France on behalf of Slovak religious awareness. At the "Slovensky klub" in the Cafe Redoute in Bratislava I met with the Minister of Economy , Dr. Gejza Medricky; Dr. Peter 26 SLOVAKIA Zat'ko of the Centrale of Slovak Industry; Dr. Alexander Hrncar of the Ministry of Finance; Dr. Imrich Karvas of the Slovak National Bank, and other economists. The invitation of this meeting had come from Medricky, whom I had known for some years in connection with autonomist political actions. The discussion concerned mostly the economy but also touched on politics. I included the main points of this debate in the report for Osusky. One of the most interesting, and at the same time most informative, meetings I had had in Bratislava was in the student residence Svoradov, where I met many of my colleagues. In their discussions they portrayed the events of March 14, 1939 with the utmost frankness. Most of them were adherents of Sidor and only a few supported the radical wing headed by Mach and Murgas. From their heated debate I learned that they did not consider Hitler to be a culprit but rather a ruthless politician. They expressed their doubts about the Western concept of European order. The West, they argued, had lost cultural preeminence, failed in political initiative , and)acked overall vitality. They dismissed the immediate danger of war and were quite philosophical about the future. To my outline of the Western mood of the public and a resolute resistance toward further concessions to Hitler, they offered a picture of Slovakia built on Christian principles and rallied politically around Tiso a·s the best safeguard against the eventualities of an armed peace. In sum, I was struck by two elements in Slovak political life: one was a real ambition to build the Slovak state as if it were an independent entity outside of the complexities of the European theater; the other was the unbelievable credulity in a simplified version of their capability for survival. There was an almost palpable feeling of nationalistic fervor everywhere . Listening to Foreign Minister Durcansky 's self-confidence and to his broadlybased diplomatic ambitions , I could not believe that he had taken the Treaty of Protection with Germany seriously. The German minority in Slovakia was small, their Nazism in most localities questionable, and as a political factor they did not play as yet a visible role. The overall mood of rural Slovakia was optimistic , almost careless in its disregard of international embroglios . SLOVAKIA 27 Based on these experiences, it was difficult for me to draw a gloomy picture of the future, especially among those who achieved personal and material satisfaction, e.g., young Slovak intellectuals or businessmen who exploited fully the occasion of the revolutionary change. The Jewish question had been in the minds of the radicals in their newspapers or speeches , but their zealotry was tamed by the government's promotion of constructive primary economic projects . Prime Minister Tiso was considered a man of moral integrity , wise , and moderate. Sidor, on the other hand , was severely judged by both radicals for his lack of courage and by the '' old guard" for his indecisiveness. Durcansky was a "political technician,'' whose ideological armory supplied the energy for the running of the state machinery. He had a few followers and even fewer personal friends . Alexander Mach, Karol Murgas , Jan Farkas, Jozef Jostiak , Jan Dafcik, and others had some credit in the nation and among the students for their sacrifices in the past, but in this stage of rebuilding the Slovak society they represented a group of malcontents - radicals whose fighting spirit was not out of focus. Their pro-German leanings pushed them to the margin of the political stream. After Obtulovic left for Paris I remained a few more days in Slovakia for my second audience with Tiso and a meeting with Durcansky . In his monologue Tiso talked about the preservation of the Slovak state and believed that the West would concur with him in the self-determination principle , which, in his opinion, would respect the will of the people. He did not believe that Osusky would be willing to accept the existence of the Slovak state , but his struggle for a federal Czecho-Slovakia underlined the principle of self-determination. Tiso saw my point in stressing the political importance of the Slovak soldiers in France fighting against Hitler, but he hastened to add " and for the Slovak state .'' He repeated his original wish to send a '' cultural delegation " to France and advised me to remain in touch w ith the Slovak League in America , especially with Monsignor Francis Dubas . With these recommendations my audience with the prime minister ended. 28 SLOVAKIA With Foreign Minister Durcansky I discussed all the issues that had arisen during my visit to Slovakia. Durcansky planned to remain in contact with Paris through an employee of the Slovak embassy in Budapest, whose official assignment would be to communicate with the Slovak consulate in Paris. For the time being he intended to send some literature and messages to the Catholic mission in Argenteuil for the Reverend Futak. We also discussed at length the question of a Slovak Legion in France . Durcansky envisaged such a possible development . To this end he promised to send 15 to 20 ''students'' to Paris for the fall semester who could eventually become available for action in organizing the Slovaks as an independent military unit. The main object of my "mission" was to contact Osusky's friends and eventually to encourage them to go into exile. I talked with many of those whom Osusky suggested ! but none of them was willing to emigrate. This was the case with Emil Boleslav Lukac , Dr. Milos Vanco, Jan Teplansky, Dr. Martin Micura, Dr. Anton Stefanek, Dr. Peter Zat'ko, Dr. Alexander Hrncar , and Dr. Imrich Karvas. When asked to prepare and send to Osusky a statement on the situation in Slovakia and on plans for the future , not a single one of these individuals manifested any interest. I did not meet Bishops Osusky or Ruppeldt and those persons listed in the letters which they had picked up at the French consulate in Bratislava. I gathered all possible documents from Slovakia and sent them to Osusky in a diplomatic pouch through the French consul. Among the documents were a copy of the Schutzvertrag and the secret Protocols concerning the German claims in the territorial , economic, financial, or military field . Also included were my diary, packages for the Reverend Futak, photographs from occupied Southern Slovakia, brochures, proclamations, pamphlets , Hlinka Guard "orders," and various books and clippings from the daily press . Although I had planned to see Karol Sidor, I had no opportunity to do so. My message to him from Osusky was oral and involved a request for his comments on the March 14th events along with an invitation to join him in Paris. Sidor kept himself aloof from the public , and I was told that his movements were SLOVAKIA 29 being monitored by the Gestapo. He therefore would not welcome my visit or interview. I had my passport restamped with the stamp of the Slovak Republic and returned safely to France. There I met Obtulovic, who had already spoken to the officials of the French Foreign Office and also with Osusky. The next day I gave Osusky a full report of my experiences in Slovakia and Hungary and also described my meetings with Osusky's friends and acquaintances. Osusky did not accept the idea that the Slovak consulate in Paris should be the communication link between him and Bratislava. He also was not in favor of a Slovak office in Paris, like Slovakotour, which could be used as a cover for the contacts with Bratislava. He did not make any qualified statement on mobilizing Slovaks in France into an independent Slovak military unit , but promised to fight for the right of the Slovaks to form their own units under Slovak officers in the framework of a CzechoSlovak Army. He touched vaguely on the question of the Slovaks in Hungary, postponing diplomatic steps for the postwar reshaping of Europe. Osusky was totally disappointed that there were no political leaders in Slovakia, especially from among the former officials of Czechoslo~akia, who manifested any interest of cooperation with the West and with him . Together with Obtulovic I visited Osusky the next evening. After repeating what he had told me, he openly asked Obtulovic if one of the leading Slovaks would be willing to join him. He stressed the diplomatic realities: the British and also the French might differentiate the fate of the Czechs and the Slovaks ; once war was declared, they would fight for the restoration of CzechoSlovakia. It was necessary, he said, on the part of the Slovak government to prepare an official memorandum indicating that the Slovaks had been acting under German pressure and that the Slovak state had been forced upon the Slovaks. Such a document could be interpreted as proof that whatever it did was justified to save the nation. He repeated again and again that he was resolutely opposed to the centralized form of Czechoslovakia and that his concept for the future was favorable to the Slovaks and acceptable to the West. This concept included the return of the occupied Southern Slovakia to the homeland. 30 SLOVAKIA Obtulovic responded with a more detailed explanation of the Slovak position and asked for time to reevaluate all aspects of the discussions with Tiso and Durcansky. It was agreed that Osusky would not hinder the work of the Slovak consul in Paris and that the Slovak government would send to Paris a persona grata to Osusky. Obtulovic stressed the question of the Slovaks in France in case of war, considering them to be an outpost of the Slovaks' true anti-Nazis feelings . He indicated that the Slovak government would send a "cultural delegation" and some " students" to France who would be advised to cooperate with the Slovaks in the United States organized in the Slovak League of America. Osusky did not reject the idea, but he claimed the allegiance of the Slovaks in the event of war to the leadership of the resistance. The contacts with Bratislava would continue, and Obtulovic would return to Paris as soon as the Slovak government , or rather Tiso and Durcansky, would consider it useful. There was a tacit understand.ing that Obtulovic would talk to Sidor and that both would meet Osusky's emissary in Budapest. There were, of course, differences in positions, but they were not insurmountable. One of them was the choice and location of the Slovak diplomatic personnel in the West, the other the insistence of Tiso on the preservation of the Slovak state . The surprisingly rapid development of the international crisis , however, prevented both the Slovak government and Osusky from establishing any direct contacts. Although France recognized the Slovak government de facto on July 14 , 1939, no Slovak consul in Paris was accredited. The contemplated candidate for this position, Ing . Milan Harminc , who presented himself personally at the French Foreign Office and was considered a leading pretender, had been in the meantime accredited as Slovak consul in London. Suggested for the Slovak consul in Paris was Dr. Bohdan Galvanek, whose proGerman leanings were generally known and who was flatly rejected by the French Foreign Office. Time lost in the protection of the accreditation process had been sufficiently long for the successful negative intervention of Czech politicians at the French Foreign Office . SLOVAKIA 31 Gradually, with the arrival of more pro-Benes exiles in Paris, Osusky was losing hold of the leadership. By the end of August, 1939, after his discussion with Benes in London (August 24), he abandoned his firm Slovak stand on the independent Slovak military units and was instrumental in reaching an agreement with the French government (August 28) on the creation of a Czechoslovak Army in France with no independent Slovak units. The political consequences of this development buried Osusky as the leader of the Slovaks abroad and abolished all possible contacts with Slovakia. At this point my "mission" and my efforts to demonstrate Slovak anti-Nazi feelings to the West lost all meaning. NOTES 1 A more detailed discussion of this period will follow in further personal memoirs to be published by the author. 2 Dr. Stefan Osusky was born in Brezova pod Bradlom, Slovakia, on March 31, 1889 into a distinguished Lutheran family . After some harassment by the Magyars while in secondary school, he emigrated to the United States in 1906. He joined his sister in Chicago, where in 1915 he earned a doctorate in law from the University of Chicago . In 1916 he was named, together with Gustav Kosik, as a special delegate of the Slovak League of America to the CzechoSlovak Committee in Paris , headed by Dr. Edvard Benes. Next to Dr. Milan R. Stefanik, Osusky was the second leading Slovak who participated in winning recognition for the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. After the war Osusky represented Czechoslovakia at different international committees in Europe and eventually became the Czechoslovak ambassador in France (1921-1940) . His political views echoed in large part those of the first President of Czechoslovakia, Tomas G. Masaryk , whom Osusky greatly admired. He differed with Masaryk , however, on the question of the Czech and Slovak constitutional arrangement. Osusky was proud of his Slovak nationality and was sympathetic toward the Slovak movement for national self-determination . When Benes became president in 1935, Osusky expected to replace him as foreign minister. Benes, who disliked Osusky, named instead Dr. Kami! Krofta. Osusky remained in Paris bitterly resenting this " injustice. " Part of Osusky's political action in Paris after March , 1939 , is described in this memoir. While in Paris he enjoyed the political support of the French government, especially in his antagonism toward Benes. In London , however, he became totally isolated . His altercations with Benes in the London Czechoslovak exile government ended with a total break and animosity. After 32 SLOVAKIA the war Osusky emigrated to the United States , where he lectured occasionally and wrote an analysis of the democratic process in a thinking society entitled The Way of the Free (New York , 1951) . Among his earlier publications are Les Magyars et Pangermanistes (Paris , 1918) and George D. Herron , d6vernik Wilsonov pocas vojny (Brno, 1925) . While in Great Britain during World War II Osusky wrote political pamphlets - Pravda vit'azi (1942). "Rizena demokracie" pri praci (1942), Benes a Slovensko (1943). and Triedenie duchov nastalo (1943) - in which he sharply criticized Benes for his stubborn insistence on adhering to the old, centralized structure of Czechoslovakia . 3 The pertinent passage from Osusky's speech in Argenteuil reads as follows : '' . .. I hereby declare that a policy depriving the Slovak nation of its inalienable rights will never get my consent. Those Czechs and Slovaks who pursued such excessive centralism must publicly admit that their political conception has failed , is dead and rests in a tomb. Otherwise, the Slovaks will face similar ambitions for Czechoslovak unity with justified resistance . What matters now is the existence and future of Czecho-Slovakia . He who would threaten the Slovaks with centralism and persecution is the enemy of the restoration of the Republic , because without Slovakia there could nor would be Czecho-Slovakia. Finally, I must say to the Slovaks that the French authorities will tolerate no propaganda against France and for Nazism. As for myself, as an official representative of the Czecho-Slovak Republic , I will not protect those Slovaks who calumniate the Czechs, the Czecho-Slovak authorities and CzechoSlovakia. The Slovaks who look for the salvation of Slovakia in Hitler, should address themselves to him for livelihood and protection. They will fall into slavery instead of remaining free citizens . Only the Czecho-Slovak Republic will bring b.;ick freedom , independence, and the right to a dignified life to the Czechs and 'Slovaks. This is our conviction and our national belief.'' As quoted in Stefan Osusky, Cesko-Slovensko ajeho buducnost' (Paris , 1939). pp. 50-51 . 4 At the French consulate I picked up the mail sent to me from Paris . Osusky sent several personal letters to be delivered to Bishop Samuel Osusky , Bishop Fedor Ruppeldt , and Dr. Anton Stefanek, and a thick envelope of letters to be picked up later by someone mentioned in the delivered letters. There were also two reports: one , official from the embassy, dealing with the international situation; the other, a sketchy outline of the planned communication between Paris and Bratislava. 5 Documents FO 371 /22903 /338-39 and FO 371 /22903 /341 , British Foreign Office Files, Public Record Office, London. Copies of these documents were made available to me by Frantisek Vnuk . A Slovak translation of them can be found in Vnuk's Slovenska otazka na Zapade v rokoch 1939-1940 (Cleveland , 1974). pp. 54-56. 6 I met General Viest in Paris in the late summer of 1939 . He visited the " Political Club" Madame Sis. Once a week she received at her home invited guests of different political affiliations for open discussion. At such a friendly meeting General Viest made known his political allegiance to Benes . SLOVAKIA 33 My next meeting with General Viest was in Beziers in Southern France at the Headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army. As a soldier at the nearby Czechoslovak Army Camp in Agde, I visited the Headquarters to plead for the Slovaks in the military prison, because they refused to fight for Benes's type of Czechoslovakia. (the "Fryvaldovsky Case"). General Viest did not allow me to see Fryvaldovsky and dismissed me without any answer. I submitted the complaint to the French Military Command . Although the outcome of this intervention was never revealed to me, Fryvaldovsky was repatriated to Slovakia in 1941.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Štefan Osuský's Attempts to Establish Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir Description An account of the resource Joseph Stasko Slovakia, Vol. 32 (No. 58-59), 1985-86 pp. 9-33 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Staško, Jozef, 1917-1999 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985-86 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/86bf2d02aa25064a624b1220f105fe79.pdf 1399999b641e54eabac86c6715c9429e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 Stephen B. Ro1nan - Slovak Tycoon J . M . Ki Ts C h b au m For more than ten years I was tempted to write something like "One of the most amazing characters I have met in my life," and a few years ago I prepared an outline for a book I thought should be entitled "The Defiant Tycoon." Odd circumstances prevented me from accomplishing either of these plans. On April 21, 1971, Stephen B. Roman will pass the threshold of the half-century mark of his extraordinary life, full of amazing success, uneven struggles and varied activities which made him nationally Stephen e. Roman and internationally known. The "Roman Story" re-written and re-published in numerous languages in Canada, Europe and the United States gives an example of one of the most spectacular careers in Canadian finance and industry and we will attempt to outline here at least the most interesting periods. Stephen B . Roman was born in Vel'ky Ruskov, Eastern Slovakia. According to his reminiscences, he grew up in a tightly knit family and his boyhood was happy and geared to farm life. An irresistible desire to see the world prompted him, however, as a teenager to leave his studies at the Agricultural College in a town near his home and to accompany his older brother George to Canada. They arrived in Canada on June 15, 1937, with two thousand dollars to buy a farm. For the following three years he worked for 50¢ a day on a farm near Port Perry, Ontario, �8 SLOVAKIA an experience about which he can talk with great humor. Then, after a short period of service in the Canadian Army, he worked on the assembly line at General Motors, but an awakening interest in the Canadian economy, in investments and in speculation led him to spend his time in a variety of studies from business to corporate law, history and politics. During this period, he became a Canadian citizen and in 1945 he married the former Betty Gardon, also a native of Slovakia. The following ten years skyrocketted him into wealth and fame. 1 On the treshold of his 50 birthday, we can say without any exaggeration that S. B. Roman made the most important and most spectacular contribution to the Canadian development of industry, finance and agriculture in the post-war II period. He over-shadowed the success of any Canadian of his generation and ranks with the nation's most successful and financially the most powerful Canadian, whose profiles were ably outlined in P. C. Newman's Flame of Power.2 In Canada's national economic community, the name of Stephen Roman became synonymous with the leadership of one of the richest and most powerful industrial organizations in the country, Denison Mines Limited and Roman Corporation Limited, both active in mining, oil and cement production and in a variety of other major enterprises. Denison Mines became universally known as the largest uranium mine in the world and its billion dollar asset together with the holdings of Roman Corporation hais often been called by financial journals the "Roman Empire." Together with its dynamic founder and chairman, Denison Mines have been the subject of numerous articles in Canadian and international financial publications, books, and newpapers. 3 Except for E. P. Taylor, there has not been a Canadian industrialist who has attracted as much of the attention of the national and international press, as did S. B. Roman, whose views on economic questions have been sought by the nation's press, radio and television, and respected for their candor and independence of thought. �SLOVAKIA 9 The Way to the Spectacular Success In the beginning, S. B. Roman's moves did not amount to much, hampered as he was by lack of capital and experience. His will to succeed, however, was stronger than the odds against which he had to fight and his persistence swept friends along with his enthusiasm. In 1946, he organized the Concord Mining Syndicate, converted it into Concord Mines Limited years later, and moved rapidly into oil exploration just as the oil industry was agog with the discovery of the Leduc fields in Alberta. In another move, he created a new company through further reorganization, the New Concord Development Corpora~ion, with himself as President. Success took on a broad dimension for Stephen B. Roman and his company's operations found profits not only in Alberta but also in the United States and provided funds of the size which would permit Roman to meet the test of his lifetime's greatest opportunity: uranium in the Blind River-Algom a Camp. The opportunity came when two independent stakers4 from the vast area of bush north of the Trans-Canada Highway between Sudbury and Sault Ste. Marie, where Dr. F. R. Joubin discovered the largest deposits of uranium, turned to him for support. In January 1954, Roman made the critical decision to invest money in these Blind River -Algoma claims from the sale of his shares in Concord. Thus he fashioned Consolidated Denison Mines Limited. At 34 years of age, he began making mining history and the "Roman Story" was published in multiple variations more times on the American Continent and in Europe than any other in the past 20 years,5 Residing in a stately 17-roomed house with his family of four boys and three daughters in rolling farmland some 20 miles from Metropolitan Toronto, S. B. Roman made also noteworthy contribution to Canadian agriculture. On his 1,350 acres of choice farming land he proved as successful and imaginative in the breeding and development of Holstein-Frie sian cattle as in industry and finance. His Romandale herd is recognized throughout the world as a producer of oustanding breeding stock and many breeders in various countries have selected Romandale animals for their own breeding programs. He takes justifi- �10 SLOVAKIA able pride in the fact that his is the only herd in the breed's history which had the distinction of winning, more often than any other breed, both the Premier Breeder and Premier Exhibitor awards at all three major North American shows: in Canada, at the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair, Toronto, Ontario; in the U.S. A. at the National Dairy Congress, Waterloo, Iowa, the International Dairy Exposition, Chicago, Illinois and All American Shows at Pittsburgh, Pa. S. B. Roman's Personality and Motivation Whoever knows S. B. Roman from his business or social contacts, cannot be but baffled by his complex personality, his easily changing mood from friendly laughter and smooth conversation to a temperamental eruption of criticism or rage--short lasting anyhow. "I never hold a grudge against anybody," is the frequent remark one can hear in conversation with him. Or insisting on the necessity of humility after an acerbic criticism of somebody-may it be the Pope, the President of the United States (not Nixon) or the Prime Minister of Canada-he would say: " I am, of course, sometime rough, but it is with a purpose in mind." Though one can make a guess, it is very hard to make a statement about Roman's motivation. Not only in the angry fight for the principle of free enterprise with Prime Minister Trudeau in March 1970, who stopped the sale of Denison Mines, but on many other occasions, S. B. Roman insisted that money was not his ultimate goal. A Toronto newspaper wrote on one occasion that it is the liberation of Slovakia, which has undoubtedly been very close to his heart, but even a close association with Roman provides only vague and uncertain hints about his motivation. As the most spectacularly successful Canadian of his generation-and the only non-Anglo-Saxon -who can be counted among the financial empire builders in Canada, he views, as the other Canadian magnates did, the free enterprise system as a fore-ordained to reward the most able.6 There are indications that he also shares with them other views. Like all of them, he regards the successful business corporation as the highest manifestation of man's �SLOVAKIA 11 superiority and many of his business ventures would indicate that he believes in large corporatio ns. Even though Roman's complex personality shows genuine features of his race, he also has many characteris tics in common with the other Canadian financial magnates. Of course, he is not the multi-milli onaire mine maker who spent long years prospectin g in the bush like Harry Oaks or Gilbert Labine. He belongs to the new generation of mine makers who used the promoters ' phone and the stock exchange, shrewd deals and good timing for developing Canadian industry and increasing his wealth. Among the Canadian "empire builders" Roman seems to be the closest to Sir James Dunn,7 the carpenter's son from Bathurst, N. B., who had "all the assets and all the liabilities of a promoter" , and though he was a totally self-made man and proud of it, he became Canada's most flamboyan t multi-milli onaire. Roman shares-pe rhaps unconscio usly-with Sir James Dunn the belief that handouts keep people from working. 11 Like Dunn, he gave large amounts of money to hospitals, churches and universitie s and received his first honorary degree from St. Francis University in Antigonish , N. S., as Sir James Dunn did. Furthermo re, he has in common with Dunn the love for "dreams that open new frontiers and build for greatness "-the dreams which are "not the thin vapourings of the idle mind, but rather the vision of a busy brain." In pursuing the realization of his dreams, Roman like Dunn seems to be hampered only by his impulses and always insists on his own way in all things, regardless of the number of enemies it may make him. Led by intuition and putting stress on "logic", sometimes his own logic, he would repeat: "Do not be afraid to be hurt or kicked, the time comes when you kick back." Roman's beautiful residence near Toronto, furnished with many rare pieces of furniture or paintings, as well as his palatial second residence in the millionaire 's oasis of Lyford Cay in Nassau9 , bring him also close to Sir James Dunn whose insistence on palatial surroundin gs reflected -accordin g to his biography -his efforts to compensat e �12 SLOVAKIA for the oppressive poverty of his childhood. Roman had a happy even if modest childhood, but his first years in Canada were undoubtedly those of immigrants working for 50¢ a day from dawn to late night and he never forgot them. In some other respects Roman reminds one of Sir Herbert Holt, as portrayed by P. Newman10 • H. Holt was not a business administrator and promoted his fortune by refining the sleight-of-hand process involved in the acquisition of corporate control through the trading and re-trading of stock. So was to a great degree S. B. Roman. He also likes sometimes to sit behind a desk at the end of his luxurious office and visitors leave with the impression that he has strong beliefs and does not accept easily to be contradicted. But he also meets his visitors in the reception room with a broad, friendly smile and a strong handshake, if he is in a good disposition, and sits with them around a coffee table. Roman's interest in politics and his warnings against Communism also resemble those of Sir Herbert Holt who, in 1931, said: "People do not realize the Russian menace. The spread of Communism is not a matter to laugh at." Roman was preaching anti-Communism since the outbreak of the Second World War and his visits to Moscow or to his native Slovakia, oppressed by Moscow, did not change his attitude. As a man convinced that only free enterprise can give people incentive for good work, and as a religious man, Roman could not remain indifferent to Communism. 11 Unlike Holt who according to his •c olleagues in the Conservative Party "really understood nothing about politics except how to manage ministers," Roman has been his whole life an ardent student of politics, national and international. His table conversations at home or elsewhere always ended in discussion on politics or religion-the second subject of his genuine interest. Of course, he can be sometimes an impatient listener, rather inclined to lecture authoritatively and arguing willingly on any subjeGt. On the other hand, he can be very warm and friendly in personal discussions. As a result, he appears a different personality in his office, at board meetings and in the seclusion of his residence where on weekends he invites �SLOVAKIA 13 his friends and quite often a bishop or a priest to celebrate a Sunday Mass and to share a dinner with his family. In his office a senior executive, referring to Roman's dynamism and impatience, used to say: "it takes a strong boiler which makes 15 pots to boil and sometimes even tremble." And he was not far from the truth. The Roman Legend Why around some persons legends grow fast or are created at all, nobody has yet explained. It is one of the mysterious gifts which the Lord gives at his pleasure and not always according to our human logic. In the life of many successful or outstanding men there are ingredients which can give birth to a legend, but only a few of them became legendary. Extraordinary deeds or success in many cases remain unknown or belittled by jealousy of associates or contemporaries, while in some cases everything is magnified by wishful thinking and creative fantasy into legendary proportions. The 'hero' is credited with deeds, connections and power he does not possess or, if he does, in a considerably diminished measure. In the life of S. B. Roman there have been no doubt many ingredients for a legend. God gave him also that rare gift of striking the imagination of people in a positive way. It is not only his wealth which attracts so many people in high positions to him. S. B. Roman together with his elegantly dressed wife, Betty, can also be superb hosts, and many people try to get close to the Romans and flatter them in order to gain some advantage. Roman's sharp eye can easily spot this, but he had a good laugh when a visitor tried to convince him that he should accept some function or to be a speaker because he will attract people. "Why do you think I will attract them?", asked Roman of his visitor. "You remember what happened to Moses when he led his flock from Egyptian captivity and went to the mountain to talk to the Lord", answered the visitor, "half of the flock began to worship the golden veal ... " Roman looked at his visitor with one eye and with a laugh told him: "Thank you very much." �14 SLOVAKIA Roman differs from many people who orbit the Stock Exchange and made money in the post-war boom in industry and speculation, also in some other respect. He is an avid reader and his lib:rary was built not only for the purpose of ornating his residence. Especially during the years of his ascension to wealth and social position he read diligently books from many fields and his conversations showed that his good memory helped him to learn more in some fields than many academics retained from university studies. Roman received from God among other gifts not only a good memory but also the gift of logic and ability to grasp the essentials of the problems. Discussions with him on many subjects were a pleasure in those years. From the discussions on religion which has been for years his second subject to politics-never business at table--one has the impression that the concept of eastern Christianity, with the stress on the spiritual and the mystical rather than the legalistic and the philosophical, is his religion not only formally-he belongs to the Byzantine Catholic Rite-but also conforms with his personality. It is not in carrying out the technical word that a Christian should participate in the world of God on the earth, but in fulfilling his specific role-seems to be his basic religious concept. Of many changes triggered by the Vatican Council at which he was one of the lay observers, Roman can be more critical than non-Catholics or dissident priests, being inclined to express his opinion in strong terms. Among other gifts Roman received from God also love for beautiful surroundings with a sense of proportion and good taste. If we believed in reincarnation, we could apply it to him and explain many things in the life of this extraordinary "farm boy from Slovakia." However, even without belief in reincarnation, one can explain some features of his life and character. Slovakia, that comperatively unknown land in Canada, is a romantic hilly country with hundreds of castles, fortresses, and former aristocratic domains. For centuries it was a bulwark in the defense of Europe against invasions from Asia. The Huns, the Magyars, the Tartars, the Turks overran the �SLOVAKIA 15 country and the aristocracy who ruled from castles and fortresses over the Slovak population was international rather than national. For some inexplicable reason, this historical heritage became apparent in Slovakia more abroad than in their own country. The leaders of the Hungarian struggle for independence, L. Kossuth and A. Pet6fi, or several Hungarian cardinals were of Slovak ancestry, the "king 0f Madagascar" M. Benovsky was from Slovakia, the founders of Pan-Slavism were of Slovak origin (but enriched Czech culture) as was T. G. Masaryk who freed Czechs from Austrian domination, and the famous astronomer and one of the youngest French generals, Milan R. t>tefanik who made a career outside his native country. Roman's life and character may have its roots in this peculiar feature of the Slovak people and in the history of Slovakia. Indeed, Jeanne Dixon, who had the ear-so rumor goes-of some American presidents and predicted J. F. Kennedy's death, gave one day a halting look at Roman, whom she had met for the first time, and exclaimed: "You are a descendant of Genghis Khan." Roman had a good laugh and some of his friends too, but in view of the invasions and history of Slovakia, even this far-fetched possibility is not excluded. S. B. Roman and Slovakia The "Roman Story" became a legend also in his native country after his two trips to Slovakia--one in his own jet plane. It made believe millions of Slovaks that Roman will help their country, suffering under Communism and foreign rule, to regain freedom and a better future and that he will use his great wealth for building mines, factories, hotels in the beautiful Tatra Mountains or churches in Slovak towns. For his activities among Slovaks abroad and for his successful tour of his native country, he became the best known Slovak of his generation among the Slovaks in the free world as well as in his native Slovakia and great hopes and expectations have surrounded his name. In fact Roman was genuinely interested in the organizational life of the Slovak group and from the end of the Second World War, also in the fate of Slovakia. He served �16 SLOVAKIA as the editor of a Slovak weekly, was active in the Canadian Slovak League, and was deeply involved in organizing cultural programmes for Slovak Canadians, setting up debates, concerts and trying to help his native country to freedom and independence. On his initiative in 1946 a memorandum was sent to the United Nations by Slovak organizations in Canada in which they proposed to the Delegates of the World Security Conference that, "since the Slovak People in Slovakia are a distinct and separate nation, the Security Conference provide and obtain either; "First, if the Conference choose, that the Slovak People of Slovakia could be granted complete independence from the Czech nation or state, and from any other nation in the anticipated European post-war organization of which she will be a part; "Or Second, that the Slovak people decide for themselves by a free and unhampered secret ballot under the supervision of the United Nations Military Committee, first whether they, the Slovak People of Slovakia desire to be completely independent and severed from the Czech nation and state and from any other nation in the anticipated post-war organization of Europe of which Slovakia will be a part, or second whether they desire to be an autonomous, self-governing part of the Czecho-Slovak dual State in the post-war organization of Europe of which she will be a part. N. B. In this latter case, the spelling of the name 'Czecho-Slovak' should be hyphenated and this should be its official spelling." Later he supported activities of Slovak political exiles and helped to publish books and became a sought-for speaker at celebrations, Slovak days or banquets. As he moved up in the social ladder, S. B. Roman used his connections to help the Slovak cause also on higheroften international levels. His relations with the Vatican12 helped not only the consolidation of the church organization of the Slovak Byzantine Catholics in Canada who obtained a bishop of their nationality, but also in Slovakia. He made great efforts in obtaining Slovak spiritual leaders for some 500,000 Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in the United States13 and memorable in this respect will remain �SLOVAKIA 17 the huge celebrations of the 11th Centennial of Christianity in Slovakia which took place in Toronto in 1963. The main ceremony was attended by 18 Archbishops and Bishops, representatives of the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments, as well as by the Apostolic delegate and some 20,000 persons. 14 If Canadian Slovaks played a role of greater importance than their number would warrant, either among the other ethnic groups or generally in Canadian life, it was due mostly to his continuous contributions. This has been acknowledged on many occasions by the ethnic press in which S. B. Roman yearly published elaborate messages on special occasions like Christmas, elections or national days. 15 He also supported academic periodicals and the Conferences on Canadian Slavs ,a nd earned great respect among the leaders of the ethnic groups in Canada. Believing in organized work and concentrated effort, S. B. Roman was also instrumental in organizing the First Slovak World Congress which took place in June 1970 and was one of the most successful events among Slovaks in the free world since the end of the Second World War. Unanimously, delegates of Slovak organizations from many countries around the world elected him as the First President of the Slovak World Congress. Roman's authority and popularity with the Slovak people grew incessantly since his appointment to the Vatican Council, his close acquaintance with President Nixon, his participation at a NATO meeting in Paris as a member of the Canadian delegation and his "red carpet" reception by the government representatives in Bratislava and Prague in 1968. For all this Slovaks surrounded Roman with great hopes and expectations. In fact, his connections and his wealth gave him better possibilities to further the Slovak cause in the free world than to any other Slovak of his generation and he has been aware of it. Looking back on the life and success of S. B. Roman , one becomes aware of the old truth that for societies as for men, there can be no growth without challenge. Progress �SLOVAKIA 18 is a battle just as life is a struggle. S. B. Roman has been winning the battles because he was not afraid of the challenge. On the threshold of his 50th birthday, a great number of Slovaks and many of his acquaintances of other ethnic backgrounds will undoubtedly wish him to continue winning his battles and contributing to progress and happiness of his fellowmen, as well as to freedom of his native Slovakia. 1) Fortune (New York) , September 1966. According to Fortune, the top-ranking international monthly for business executives, "In the last twenty years, Roman has wheeled and wildcatted his way to a business empire whose worth is conservatively estimated at 2.5 billion dollars." 2) Newman presents in his Flame of Power (Toronto, 1959) eleven intimate profiles of Canadian greatest businessmen. After reading the book one has a strong feeling that Roman belongs to this category of economic empire bui:tders. 3) Among the books see: D. H. LeBourdais, Canada and the Atomic Revolution, (Toronto, 1959), p. 111-2, George Lonn, About Men and Mines, (Toronto, 1962), and Builders of Fortune, (Toronto, 1963), p. 55-60 and Businessmen Around the Globe, by the editors of Fortune (Harrisburg, Pa. 1967), p. 69-70. Among Magazines: Fortune (New York) September 1966, Executive, January 1960, Monetary Times, April 1967. In French: Enterprise (Paris, April 1967), as well as Paris dailies of September 1966. Roman also received wide television, radio and press coverage behind the Iron Curtain when he visited his native Slovakta on his own plane in 1966. 4) The book Business Around the Globe mentions a mining engineer, Art Stollery, as one of the stakers and says: "In one of the complicated financial deals at which he excels, Roman bought the claims from Stollery and his frienlds for $30,000.00 and transferred them to North Denison Mines, an old copper-and-nickel company. In return he got one million shares in what eventually became Denison Mines Limited, which he divided with Stollery's group. Soon afterwards, uranium was struck, and Denison's stock shot up from 30¢ to $12.00 within a year." Op. cit., p. 60. In September 1967, it was quoted at $85.00 on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 5) For more details on S. B. Roman's life anld success, see my book Slovaks in Canada (Canadian Ethnic Press Associaition, Toronto, 1967), pp. 374-380. 6) S. B. Roman's philosophy on free enterprise was reflected in his speech to the Rotary Club, '11oronto, in October 1970, as well as the Brief which Denison Mines submitted to the Federal Government in 1970 on the White Paper dealing with Capital Gains Tax. The Brief said that the proposal to tax economy is a form of "intellectual colonialism that ill befits a pioneering vigorous �SLOVAKIA 19 country." In S. B. Roman's opinion, in the economy of the next century, part of the profits will be divided between capital and labour. He admitted that Denison Mines does not share profits with employees because "we are as much coward as anybody else." See "The Telegram" June 23, 1970. On his speech at the Rotary Club, see 'The Northern Miner", October 29, 1970. 7) All quotations on Sir James Dunn are taken from Peter Newman's book Flame of Power. 8) See his speech in the Toronto Kiwanis Club, January 13, 1971, in which he said, among other things, "It is high time that we ~evise a formula that allows us to differentiate between people who really are not capable of looking after themselves and people who are lazy or not willing to work" . . . "I am certain every thinking Canadian must be disturbed by the developments they see occurring, developments leading to more and more irresponsibility and unwillingness to work. The ]danger is that it is a most infectious cancer in that ,i t can--and will--spread to those, now willing to work, who by seeing compatriots leaning on welfare, start to wonder about ,the wisdom of working themselves." See excerpts in The Toronto Telegram, January 14, 1971, as well as The Star, January 14, 1971. 9) See Zena Cherry, "Home Away from Home-Beach Lot for $1,000.00 a foot," Globe and Mail, May 2, 1968. 10) Ibid. 11) When the Soviets, together with their satellites, occupied CzechoSlovakia, he was the main speaker at a rally in Toronto denouncing the brutal act of Soviet impel'ialism. 12) He was not only the lay observer ,at the Vatican Council but in 1963 he also received the Order of the Knight Commander of Saint Gregory. On his participatioN at the Council, see my series of articles in Kana'.lsky Slovak and Slovak v Amerike, NovemberDecember 1966, and January 1967. 13) On this subject, he also published English and Slovak articles in the Slovak Press in Canada and the United States. 14) For more details, see my book Slovaks in Canada, op. cit., p. 263. 15) In one of such messages, he made the following appeal under the title "Democracy's Most Precious Gift": . .. "To those of us who have left our native lands for Canalda and its precious gifts of democracy, has fallen the privilege of citizenship and the responsibilities of the vote. To us has befallen the choice of government and its leadership and the survival of all that we hold dear. It has now become our task to listen and learn, that we may judge the posture of the party and the stature of the man, anld to decide and compare what is best in our own particular communities, for our own particular needs" ... � SLOVAKIA 7 Stephen B. Ro1nan - Slovak Tycoon J . M . Ki Ts C h b au m For more than ten years I was tempted to write something like "One of the most amazing characters I have met in my life," and a few years ago I prepared an outline for a book I thought should be entitled "The Defiant Tycoon." Odd circumstances prevented me from accomplishing either of these plans. On April 21, 1971, Stephen B. Roman will pass the threshold of the half-century mark of his extraordinary life, full of amazing success, uneven struggles and varied activities which made him nationally Stephen e. Roman and internationally known. The "Roman Story" re-written and re-published in numerous languages in Canada, Europe and the United States gives an example of one of the most spectacular careers in Canadian finance and industry and we will attempt to outline here at least the most interesting periods. Stephen B . Roman was born in Vel'ky Ruskov, Eastern Slovakia. According to his reminiscences, he grew up in a tightly knit family and his boyhood was happy and geared to farm life. An irresistible desire to see the world prompted him, however, as a teenager to leave his studies at the Agricultural College in a town near his home and to accompany his older brother George to Canada. They arrived in Canada on June 15, 1937, with two thousand dollars to buy a farm. For the following three years he worked for 50¢ a day on a farm near Port Perry, Ontario, �8 SLOVAKIA an experience about which he can talk with great humor. Then, after a short period of service in the Canadian Army, he worked on the assembly line at General Motors, but an awakening interest in the Canadian economy, in investments and in speculation led him to spend his time in a variety of studies from business to corporate law, history and politics. During this period, he became a Canadian citizen and in 1945 he married the former Betty Gardon, also a native of Slovakia. The following ten years skyrocketted him into wealth and fame. 1 On the treshold of his 50 birthday, we can say without any exaggeration that S. B. Roman made the most important and most spectacular contribution to the Canadian development of industry, finance and agriculture in the post-war II period. He over-shadowed the success of any Canadian of his generation and ranks with the nation's most successful and financially the most powerful Canadian, whose profiles were ably outlined in P. C. Newman's Flame of Power.2 In Canada's national economic community, the name of Stephen Roman became synonymous with the leadership of one of the richest and most powerful industrial organizations in the country, Denison Mines Limited and Roman Corporation Limited, both active in mining, oil and cement production and in a variety of other major enterprises. Denison Mines became universally known as the largest uranium mine in the world and its billion dollar asset together with the holdings of Roman Corporation hais often been called by financial journals the "Roman Empire." Together with its dynamic founder and chairman, Denison Mines have been the subject of numerous articles in Canadian and international financial publications, books, and newpapers. 3 Except for E. P. Taylor, there has not been a Canadian industrialist who has attracted as much of the attention of the national and international press, as did S. B. Roman, whose views on economic questions have been sought by the nation's press, radio and television, and respected for their candor and independence of thought. �SLOVAKIA 9 The Way to the Spectacular Success In the beginning, S. B. Roman's moves did not amount to much, hampered as he was by lack of capital and experience. His will to succeed, however, was stronger than the odds against which he had to fight and his persistence swept friends along with his enthusiasm. In 1946, he organized the Concord Mining Syndicate, converted it into Concord Mines Limited years later, and moved rapidly into oil exploration just as the oil industry was agog with the discovery of the Leduc fields in Alberta. In another move, he created a new company through further reorganization, the New Concord Development Corpora~ion, with himself as President. Success took on a broad dimension for Stephen B. Roman and his company's operations found profits not only in Alberta but also in the United States and provided funds of the size which would permit Roman to meet the test of his lifetime's greatest opportunity: uranium in the Blind River-Algom a Camp. The opportunity came when two independent stakers4 from the vast area of bush north of the Trans-Canada Highway between Sudbury and Sault Ste. Marie, where Dr. F. R. Joubin discovered the largest deposits of uranium, turned to him for support. In January 1954, Roman made the critical decision to invest money in these Blind River -Algoma claims from the sale of his shares in Concord. Thus he fashioned Consolidated Denison Mines Limited. At 34 years of age, he began making mining history and the "Roman Story" was published in multiple variations more times on the American Continent and in Europe than any other in the past 20 years,5 Residing in a stately 17-roomed house with his family of four boys and three daughters in rolling farmland some 20 miles from Metropolitan Toronto, S. B. Roman made also noteworthy contribution to Canadian agriculture. On his 1,350 acres of choice farming land he proved as successful and imaginative in the breeding and development of Holstein-Frie sian cattle as in industry and finance. His Romandale herd is recognized throughout the world as a producer of oustanding breeding stock and many breeders in various countries have selected Romandale animals for their own breeding programs. He takes justifi- �10 SLOVAKIA able pride in the fact that his is the only herd in the breed's history which had the distinction of winning, more often than any other breed, both the Premier Breeder and Premier Exhibitor awards at all three major North American shows: in Canada, at the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair, Toronto, Ontario; in the U.S. A. at the National Dairy Congress, Waterloo, Iowa, the International Dairy Exposition, Chicago, Illinois and All American Shows at Pittsburgh, Pa. S. B. Roman's Personality and Motivation Whoever knows S. B. Roman from his business or social contacts, cannot be but baffled by his complex personality, his easily changing mood from friendly laughter and smooth conversation to a temperamental eruption of criticism or rage--short lasting anyhow. "I never hold a grudge against anybody," is the frequent remark one can hear in conversation with him. Or insisting on the necessity of humility after an acerbic criticism of somebody-may it be the Pope, the President of the United States (not Nixon) or the Prime Minister of Canada-he would say: " I am, of course, sometime rough, but it is with a purpose in mind." Though one can make a guess, it is very hard to make a statement about Roman's motivation. Not only in the angry fight for the principle of free enterprise with Prime Minister Trudeau in March 1970, who stopped the sale of Denison Mines, but on many other occasions, S. B. Roman insisted that money was not his ultimate goal. A Toronto newspaper wrote on one occasion that it is the liberation of Slovakia, which has undoubtedly been very close to his heart, but even a close association with Roman provides only vague and uncertain hints about his motivation. As the most spectacularly successful Canadian of his generation-and the only non-Anglo-Saxon -who can be counted among the financial empire builders in Canada, he views, as the other Canadian magnates did, the free enterprise system as a fore-ordained to reward the most able.6 There are indications that he also shares with them other views. Like all of them, he regards the successful business corporation as the highest manifestation of man's �SLOVAKIA 11 superiority and many of his business ventures would indicate that he believes in large corporatio ns. Even though Roman's complex personality shows genuine features of his race, he also has many characteris tics in common with the other Canadian financial magnates. Of course, he is not the multi-milli onaire mine maker who spent long years prospectin g in the bush like Harry Oaks or Gilbert Labine. He belongs to the new generation of mine makers who used the promoters ' phone and the stock exchange, shrewd deals and good timing for developing Canadian industry and increasing his wealth. Among the Canadian "empire builders" Roman seems to be the closest to Sir James Dunn,7 the carpenter's son from Bathurst, N. B., who had "all the assets and all the liabilities of a promoter" , and though he was a totally self-made man and proud of it, he became Canada's most flamboyan t multi-milli onaire. Roman shares-pe rhaps unconscio usly-with Sir James Dunn the belief that handouts keep people from working. 11 Like Dunn, he gave large amounts of money to hospitals, churches and universitie s and received his first honorary degree from St. Francis University in Antigonish , N. S., as Sir James Dunn did. Furthermo re, he has in common with Dunn the love for "dreams that open new frontiers and build for greatness "-the dreams which are "not the thin vapourings of the idle mind, but rather the vision of a busy brain." In pursuing the realization of his dreams, Roman like Dunn seems to be hampered only by his impulses and always insists on his own way in all things, regardless of the number of enemies it may make him. Led by intuition and putting stress on "logic", sometimes his own logic, he would repeat: "Do not be afraid to be hurt or kicked, the time comes when you kick back." Roman's beautiful residence near Toronto, furnished with many rare pieces of furniture or paintings, as well as his palatial second residence in the millionaire 's oasis of Lyford Cay in Nassau9 , bring him also close to Sir James Dunn whose insistence on palatial surroundin gs reflected -accordin g to his biography -his efforts to compensat e �12 SLOVAKIA for the oppressive poverty of his childhood. Roman had a happy even if modest childhood, but his first years in Canada were undoubtedly those of immigrants working for 50¢ a day from dawn to late night and he never forgot them. In some other respects Roman reminds one of Sir Herbert Holt, as portrayed by P. Newman10 • H. Holt was not a business administrator and promoted his fortune by refining the sleight-of-hand process involved in the acquisition of corporate control through the trading and re-trading of stock. So was to a great degree S. B. Roman. He also likes sometimes to sit behind a desk at the end of his luxurious office and visitors leave with the impression that he has strong beliefs and does not accept easily to be contradicted. But he also meets his visitors in the reception room with a broad, friendly smile and a strong handshake, if he is in a good disposition, and sits with them around a coffee table. Roman's interest in politics and his warnings against Communism also resemble those of Sir Herbert Holt who, in 1931, said: "People do not realize the Russian menace. The spread of Communism is not a matter to laugh at." Roman was preaching anti-Communism since the outbreak of the Second World War and his visits to Moscow or to his native Slovakia, oppressed by Moscow, did not change his attitude. As a man convinced that only free enterprise can give people incentive for good work, and as a religious man, Roman could not remain indifferent to Communism. 11 Unlike Holt who according to his •c olleagues in the Conservative Party "really understood nothing about politics except how to manage ministers," Roman has been his whole life an ardent student of politics, national and international. His table conversations at home or elsewhere always ended in discussion on politics or religion-the second subject of his genuine interest. Of course, he can be sometimes an impatient listener, rather inclined to lecture authoritatively and arguing willingly on any subjeGt. On the other hand, he can be very warm and friendly in personal discussions. As a result, he appears a different personality in his office, at board meetings and in the seclusion of his residence where on weekends he invites �SLOVAKIA 13 his friends and quite often a bishop or a priest to celebrate a Sunday Mass and to share a dinner with his family. In his office a senior executive, referring to Roman's dynamism and impatience, used to say: "it takes a strong boiler which makes 15 pots to boil and sometimes even tremble." And he was not far from the truth. The Roman Legend Why around some persons legends grow fast or are created at all, nobody has yet explained. It is one of the mysterious gifts which the Lord gives at his pleasure and not always according to our human logic. In the life of many successful or outstanding men there are ingredients which can give birth to a legend, but only a few of them became legendary. Extraordinary deeds or success in many cases remain unknown or belittled by jealousy of associates or contemporaries, while in some cases everything is magnified by wishful thinking and creative fantasy into legendary proportions. The 'hero' is credited with deeds, connections and power he does not possess or, if he does, in a considerably diminished measure. In the life of S. B. Roman there have been no doubt many ingredients for a legend. God gave him also that rare gift of striking the imagination of people in a positive way. It is not only his wealth which attracts so many people in high positions to him. S. B. Roman together with his elegantly dressed wife, Betty, can also be superb hosts, and many people try to get close to the Romans and flatter them in order to gain some advantage. Roman's sharp eye can easily spot this, but he had a good laugh when a visitor tried to convince him that he should accept some function or to be a speaker because he will attract people. "Why do you think I will attract them?", asked Roman of his visitor. "You remember what happened to Moses when he led his flock from Egyptian captivity and went to the mountain to talk to the Lord", answered the visitor, "half of the flock began to worship the golden veal ... " Roman looked at his visitor with one eye and with a laugh told him: "Thank you very much." �14 SLOVAKIA Roman differs from many people who orbit the Stock Exchange and made money in the post-war boom in industry and speculation, also in some other respect. He is an avid reader and his lib:rary was built not only for the purpose of ornating his residence. Especially during the years of his ascension to wealth and social position he read diligently books from many fields and his conversations showed that his good memory helped him to learn more in some fields than many academics retained from university studies. Roman received from God among other gifts not only a good memory but also the gift of logic and ability to grasp the essentials of the problems. Discussions with him on many subjects were a pleasure in those years. From the discussions on religion which has been for years his second subject to politics-never business at table--one has the impression that the concept of eastern Christianity, with the stress on the spiritual and the mystical rather than the legalistic and the philosophical, is his religion not only formally-he belongs to the Byzantine Catholic Rite-but also conforms with his personality. It is not in carrying out the technical word that a Christian should participate in the world of God on the earth, but in fulfilling his specific role-seems to be his basic religious concept. Of many changes triggered by the Vatican Council at which he was one of the lay observers, Roman can be more critical than non-Catholics or dissident priests, being inclined to express his opinion in strong terms. Among other gifts Roman received from God also love for beautiful surroundings with a sense of proportion and good taste. If we believed in reincarnation, we could apply it to him and explain many things in the life of this extraordinary "farm boy from Slovakia." However, even without belief in reincarnation, one can explain some features of his life and character. Slovakia, that comperatively unknown land in Canada, is a romantic hilly country with hundreds of castles, fortresses, and former aristocratic domains. For centuries it was a bulwark in the defense of Europe against invasions from Asia. The Huns, the Magyars, the Tartars, the Turks overran the �SLOVAKIA 15 country and the aristocracy who ruled from castles and fortresses over the Slovak population was international rather than national. For some inexplicable reason, this historical heritage became apparent in Slovakia more abroad than in their own country. The leaders of the Hungarian struggle for independence, L. Kossuth and A. Pet6fi, or several Hungarian cardinals were of Slovak ancestry, the "king 0f Madagascar" M. Benovsky was from Slovakia, the founders of Pan-Slavism were of Slovak origin (but enriched Czech culture) as was T. G. Masaryk who freed Czechs from Austrian domination, and the famous astronomer and one of the youngest French generals, Milan R. t>tefanik who made a career outside his native country. Roman's life and character may have its roots in this peculiar feature of the Slovak people and in the history of Slovakia. Indeed, Jeanne Dixon, who had the ear-so rumor goes-of some American presidents and predicted J. F. Kennedy's death, gave one day a halting look at Roman, whom she had met for the first time, and exclaimed: "You are a descendant of Genghis Khan." Roman had a good laugh and some of his friends too, but in view of the invasions and history of Slovakia, even this far-fetched possibility is not excluded. S. B. Roman and Slovakia The "Roman Story" became a legend also in his native country after his two trips to Slovakia--one in his own jet plane. It made believe millions of Slovaks that Roman will help their country, suffering under Communism and foreign rule, to regain freedom and a better future and that he will use his great wealth for building mines, factories, hotels in the beautiful Tatra Mountains or churches in Slovak towns. For his activities among Slovaks abroad and for his successful tour of his native country, he became the best known Slovak of his generation among the Slovaks in the free world as well as in his native Slovakia and great hopes and expectations have surrounded his name. In fact Roman was genuinely interested in the organizational life of the Slovak group and from the end of the Second World War, also in the fate of Slovakia. He served �16 SLOVAKIA as the editor of a Slovak weekly, was active in the Canadian Slovak League, and was deeply involved in organizing cultural programmes for Slovak Canadians, setting up debates, concerts and trying to help his native country to freedom and independence. On his initiative in 1946 a memorandum was sent to the United Nations by Slovak organizations in Canada in which they proposed to the Delegates of the World Security Conference that, "since the Slovak People in Slovakia are a distinct and separate nation, the Security Conference provide and obtain either; "First, if the Conference choose, that the Slovak People of Slovakia could be granted complete independence from the Czech nation or state, and from any other nation in the anticipated European post-war organization of which she will be a part; "Or Second, that the Slovak people decide for themselves by a free and unhampered secret ballot under the supervision of the United Nations Military Committee, first whether they, the Slovak People of Slovakia desire to be completely independent and severed from the Czech nation and state and from any other nation in the anticipated post-war organization of Europe of which Slovakia will be a part, or second whether they desire to be an autonomous, self-governing part of the Czecho-Slovak dual State in the post-war organization of Europe of which she will be a part. N. B. In this latter case, the spelling of the name 'Czecho-Slovak' should be hyphenated and this should be its official spelling." Later he supported activities of Slovak political exiles and helped to publish books and became a sought-for speaker at celebrations, Slovak days or banquets. As he moved up in the social ladder, S. B. Roman used his connections to help the Slovak cause also on higheroften international levels. His relations with the Vatican12 helped not only the consolidation of the church organization of the Slovak Byzantine Catholics in Canada who obtained a bishop of their nationality, but also in Slovakia. He made great efforts in obtaining Slovak spiritual leaders for some 500,000 Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in the United States13 and memorable in this respect will remain �SLOVAKIA 17 the huge celebrations of the 11th Centennial of Christianity in Slovakia which took place in Toronto in 1963. The main ceremony was attended by 18 Archbishops and Bishops, representatives of the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments, as well as by the Apostolic delegate and some 20,000 persons. 14 If Canadian Slovaks played a role of greater importance than their number would warrant, either among the other ethnic groups or generally in Canadian life, it was due mostly to his continuous contributions. This has been acknowledged on many occasions by the ethnic press in which S. B. Roman yearly published elaborate messages on special occasions like Christmas, elections or national days. 15 He also supported academic periodicals and the Conferences on Canadian Slavs ,a nd earned great respect among the leaders of the ethnic groups in Canada. Believing in organized work and concentrated effort, S. B. Roman was also instrumental in organizing the First Slovak World Congress which took place in June 1970 and was one of the most successful events among Slovaks in the free world since the end of the Second World War. Unanimously, delegates of Slovak organizations from many countries around the world elected him as the First President of the Slovak World Congress. Roman's authority and popularity with the Slovak people grew incessantly since his appointment to the Vatican Council, his close acquaintance with President Nixon, his participation at a NATO meeting in Paris as a member of the Canadian delegation and his "red carpet" reception by the government representatives in Bratislava and Prague in 1968. For all this Slovaks surrounded Roman with great hopes and expectations. In fact, his connections and his wealth gave him better possibilities to further the Slovak cause in the free world than to any other Slovak of his generation and he has been aware of it. Looking back on the life and success of S. B. Roman , one becomes aware of the old truth that for societies as for men, there can be no growth without challenge. Progress �SLOVAKIA 18 is a battle just as life is a struggle. S. B. Roman has been winning the battles because he was not afraid of the challenge. On the threshold of his 50th birthday, a great number of Slovaks and many of his acquaintances of other ethnic backgrounds will undoubtedly wish him to continue winning his battles and contributing to progress and happiness of his fellowmen, as well as to freedom of his native Slovakia. 1) Fortune (New York) , September 1966. According to Fortune, the top-ranking international monthly for business executives, "In the last twenty years, Roman has wheeled and wildcatted his way to a business empire whose worth is conservatively estimated at 2.5 billion dollars." 2) Newman presents in his Flame of Power (Toronto, 1959) eleven intimate profiles of Canadian greatest businessmen. After reading the book one has a strong feeling that Roman belongs to this category of economic empire bui:tders. 3) Among the books see: D. H. LeBourdais, Canada and the Atomic Revolution, (Toronto, 1959), p. 111-2, George Lonn, About Men and Mines, (Toronto, 1962), and Builders of Fortune, (Toronto, 1963), p. 55-60 and Businessmen Around the Globe, by the editors of Fortune (Harrisburg, Pa. 1967), p. 69-70. Among Magazines: Fortune (New York) September 1966, Executive, January 1960, Monetary Times, April 1967. In French: Enterprise (Paris, April 1967), as well as Paris dailies of September 1966. Roman also received wide television, radio and press coverage behind the Iron Curtain when he visited his native Slovakta on his own plane in 1966. 4) The book Business Around the Globe mentions a mining engineer, Art Stollery, as one of the stakers and says: "In one of the complicated financial deals at which he excels, Roman bought the claims from Stollery and his frienlds for $30,000.00 and transferred them to North Denison Mines, an old copper-and-nickel company. In return he got one million shares in what eventually became Denison Mines Limited, which he divided with Stollery's group. Soon afterwards, uranium was struck, and Denison's stock shot up from 30¢ to $12.00 within a year." Op. cit., p. 60. In September 1967, it was quoted at $85.00 on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 5) For more details on S. B. Roman's life anld success, see my book Slovaks in Canada (Canadian Ethnic Press Associaition, Toronto, 1967), pp. 374-380. 6) S. B. Roman's philosophy on free enterprise was reflected in his speech to the Rotary Club, '11oronto, in October 1970, as well as the Brief which Denison Mines submitted to the Federal Government in 1970 on the White Paper dealing with Capital Gains Tax. The Brief said that the proposal to tax economy is a form of "intellectual colonialism that ill befits a pioneering vigorous �SLOVAKIA 19 country." In S. B. Roman's opinion, in the economy of the next century, part of the profits will be divided between capital and labour. He admitted that Denison Mines does not share profits with employees because "we are as much coward as anybody else." See "The Telegram" June 23, 1970. On his speech at the Rotary Club, see 'The Northern Miner", October 29, 1970. 7) All quotations on Sir James Dunn are taken from Peter Newman's book Flame of Power. 8) See his speech in the Toronto Kiwanis Club, January 13, 1971, in which he said, among other things, "It is high time that we ~evise a formula that allows us to differentiate between people who really are not capable of looking after themselves and people who are lazy or not willing to work" . . . "I am certain every thinking Canadian must be disturbed by the developments they see occurring, developments leading to more and more irresponsibility and unwillingness to work. The ]danger is that it is a most infectious cancer in that ,i t can--and will--spread to those, now willing to work, who by seeing compatriots leaning on welfare, start to wonder about ,the wisdom of working themselves." See excerpts in The Toronto Telegram, January 14, 1971, as well as The Star, January 14, 1971. 9) See Zena Cherry, "Home Away from Home-Beach Lot for $1,000.00 a foot," Globe and Mail, May 2, 1968. 10) Ibid. 11) When the Soviets, together with their satellites, occupied CzechoSlovakia, he was the main speaker at a rally in Toronto denouncing the brutal act of Soviet impel'ialism. 12) He was not only the lay observer ,at the Vatican Council but in 1963 he also received the Order of the Knight Commander of Saint Gregory. On his participatioN at the Council, see my series of articles in Kana'.lsky Slovak and Slovak v Amerike, NovemberDecember 1966, and January 1967. 13) On this subject, he also published English and Slovak articles in the Slovak Press in Canada and the United States. 14) For more details, see my book Slovaks in Canada, op. cit., p. 263. 15) In one of such messages, he made the following appeal under the title "Democracy's Most Precious Gift": . .. "To those of us who have left our native lands for Canalda and its precious gifts of democracy, has fallen the privilege of citizenship and the responsibilities of the vote. To us has befallen the choice of government and its leadership and the survival of all that we hold dear. It has now become our task to listen and learn, that we may judge the posture of the party and the stature of the man, anld to decide and compare what is best in our own particular communities, for our own particular needs" ... � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1971, Vol. 21 Description An account of the resource Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 Stephen B. Ro1nan - Slovak Tycoon J . M . Ki Ts C h b au m For more than ten years I was tempted to write something like "One of the most amazing characters I have met in my life," and a few years ago I prepared an outline for a book I thought should be entitled "The Defiant Tycoon." Odd circumstances prevented me from accomplishing either of these plans. On April 21, 1971, Stephen B. Roman will pass the threshold of the half-century mark of his extraordinary life, full of amazing success, uneven struggles and varied activities which made him nationally Stephen e. Roman and internationally known. The "Roman Story" re-written and re-published in numerous languages in Canada, Europe and the United States gives an example of one of the most spectacular careers in Canadian finance and industry and we will attempt to outline here at least the most interesting periods. Stephen B . Roman was born in Vel'ky Ruskov, Eastern Slovakia. According to his reminiscences, he grew up in a tightly knit family and his boyhood was happy and geared to farm life. An irresistible desire to see the world prompted him, however, as a teenager to leave his studies at the Agricultural College in a town near his home and to accompany his older brother George to Canada. They arrived in Canada on June 15, 1937, with two thousand dollars to buy a farm. For the following three years he worked for 50¢ a day on a farm near Port Perry, Ontario, 8 SLOVAKIA an experience about which he can talk with great humor. Then, after a short period of service in the Canadian Army, he worked on the assembly line at General Motors, but an awakening interest in the Canadian economy, in investments and in speculation led him to spend his time in a variety of studies from business to corporate law, history and politics. During this period, he became a Canadian citizen and in 1945 he married the former Betty Gardon, also a native of Slovakia. The following ten years skyrocketted him into wealth and fame. 1 On the treshold of his 50 birthday, we can say without any exaggeration that S. B. Roman made the most important and most spectacular contribution to the Canadian development of industry, finance and agriculture in the post-war II period. He over-shadowed the success of any Canadian of his generation and ranks with the nation's most successful and financially the most powerful Canadian, whose profiles were ably outlined in P. C. Newman's Flame of Power.2 In Canada's national economic community, the name of Stephen Roman became synonymous with the leadership of one of the richest and most powerful industrial organizations in the country, Denison Mines Limited and Roman Corporation Limited, both active in mining, oil and cement production and in a variety of other major enterprises. Denison Mines became universally known as the largest uranium mine in the world and its billion dollar asset together with the holdings of Roman Corporation hais often been called by financial journals the "Roman Empire." Together with its dynamic founder and chairman, Denison Mines have been the subject of numerous articles in Canadian and international financial publications, books, and newpapers. 3 Except for E. P. Taylor, there has not been a Canadian industrialist who has attracted as much of the attention of the national and international press, as did S. B. Roman, whose views on economic questions have been sought by the nation's press, radio and television, and respected for their candor and independence of thought. SLOVAKIA 9 The Way to the Spectacular Success In the beginning, S. B. Roman's moves did not amount to much, hampered as he was by lack of capital and experience. His will to succeed, however, was stronger than the odds against which he had to fight and his persistence swept friends along with his enthusiasm. In 1946, he organized the Concord Mining Syndicate, converted it into Concord Mines Limited years later, and moved rapidly into oil exploration just as the oil industry was agog with the discovery of the Leduc fields in Alberta. In another move, he created a new company through further reorganization, the New Concord Development Corpora~ion, with himself as President. Success took on a broad dimension for Stephen B. Roman and his company's operations found profits not only in Alberta but also in the United States and provided funds of the size which would permit Roman to meet the test of his lifetime's greatest opportunity: uranium in the Blind River-Algom a Camp. The opportunity came when two independent stakers4 from the vast area of bush north of the Trans-Canada Highway between Sudbury and Sault Ste. Marie, where Dr. F. R. Joubin discovered the largest deposits of uranium, turned to him for support. In January 1954, Roman made the critical decision to invest money in these Blind River -Algoma claims from the sale of his shares in Concord. Thus he fashioned Consolidated Denison Mines Limited. At 34 years of age, he began making mining history and the "Roman Story" was published in multiple variations more times on the American Continent and in Europe than any other in the past 20 years,5 Residing in a stately 17-roomed house with his family of four boys and three daughters in rolling farmland some 20 miles from Metropolitan Toronto, S. B. Roman made also noteworthy contribution to Canadian agriculture. On his 1,350 acres of choice farming land he proved as successful and imaginative in the breeding and development of Holstein-Frie sian cattle as in industry and finance. His Romandale herd is recognized throughout the world as a producer of oustanding breeding stock and many breeders in various countries have selected Romandale animals for their own breeding programs. He takes justifi- 10 SLOVAKIA able pride in the fact that his is the only herd in the breed's history which had the distinction of winning, more often than any other breed, both the Premier Breeder and Premier Exhibitor awards at all three major North American shows: in Canada, at the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair, Toronto, Ontario; in the U.S. A. at the National Dairy Congress, Waterloo, Iowa, the International Dairy Exposition, Chicago, Illinois and All American Shows at Pittsburgh, Pa. S. B. Roman's Personality and Motivation Whoever knows S. B. Roman from his business or social contacts, cannot be but baffled by his complex personality, his easily changing mood from friendly laughter and smooth conversation to a temperamental eruption of criticism or rage--short lasting anyhow. "I never hold a grudge against anybody," is the frequent remark one can hear in conversation with him. Or insisting on the necessity of humility after an acerbic criticism of somebody-may it be the Pope, the President of the United States (not Nixon) or the Prime Minister of Canada-he would say: " I am, of course, sometime rough, but it is with a purpose in mind." Though one can make a guess, it is very hard to make a statement about Roman's motivation. Not only in the angry fight for the principle of free enterprise with Prime Minister Trudeau in March 1970, who stopped the sale of Denison Mines, but on many other occasions, S. B. Roman insisted that money was not his ultimate goal. A Toronto newspaper wrote on one occasion that it is the liberation of Slovakia, which has undoubtedly been very close to his heart, but even a close association with Roman provides only vague and uncertain hints about his motivation. As the most spectacularly successful Canadian of his generation-and the only non-Anglo-Saxon -who can be counted among the financial empire builders in Canada, he views, as the other Canadian magnates did, the free enterprise system as a fore-ordained to reward the most able.6 There are indications that he also shares with them other views. Like all of them, he regards the successful business corporation as the highest manifestation of man's SLOVAKIA 11 superiority and many of his business ventures would indicate that he believes in large corporatio ns. Even though Roman's complex personality shows genuine features of his race, he also has many characteris tics in common with the other Canadian financial magnates. Of course, he is not the multi-milli onaire mine maker who spent long years prospectin g in the bush like Harry Oaks or Gilbert Labine. He belongs to the new generation of mine makers who used the promoters ' phone and the stock exchange, shrewd deals and good timing for developing Canadian industry and increasing his wealth. Among the Canadian "empire builders" Roman seems to be the closest to Sir James Dunn,7 the carpenter's son from Bathurst, N. B., who had "all the assets and all the liabilities of a promoter" , and though he was a totally self-made man and proud of it, he became Canada's most flamboyan t multi-milli onaire. Roman shares-pe rhaps unconscio usly-with Sir James Dunn the belief that handouts keep people from working. 11 Like Dunn, he gave large amounts of money to hospitals, churches and universitie s and received his first honorary degree from St. Francis University in Antigonish , N. S., as Sir James Dunn did. Furthermo re, he has in common with Dunn the love for "dreams that open new frontiers and build for greatness "-the dreams which are "not the thin vapourings of the idle mind, but rather the vision of a busy brain." In pursuing the realization of his dreams, Roman like Dunn seems to be hampered only by his impulses and always insists on his own way in all things, regardless of the number of enemies it may make him. Led by intuition and putting stress on "logic", sometimes his own logic, he would repeat: "Do not be afraid to be hurt or kicked, the time comes when you kick back." Roman's beautiful residence near Toronto, furnished with many rare pieces of furniture or paintings, as well as his palatial second residence in the millionaire 's oasis of Lyford Cay in Nassau9 , bring him also close to Sir James Dunn whose insistence on palatial surroundin gs reflected -accordin g to his biography -his efforts to compensat e 12 SLOVAKIA for the oppressive poverty of his childhood. Roman had a happy even if modest childhood, but his first years in Canada were undoubtedly those of immigrants working for 50¢ a day from dawn to late night and he never forgot them. In some other respects Roman reminds one of Sir Herbert Holt, as portrayed by P. Newman10 • H. Holt was not a business administrator and promoted his fortune by refining the sleight-of-hand process involved in the acquisition of corporate control through the trading and re-trading of stock. So was to a great degree S. B. Roman. He also likes sometimes to sit behind a desk at the end of his luxurious office and visitors leave with the impression that he has strong beliefs and does not accept easily to be contradicted. But he also meets his visitors in the reception room with a broad, friendly smile and a strong handshake, if he is in a good disposition, and sits with them around a coffee table. Roman's interest in politics and his warnings against Communism also resemble those of Sir Herbert Holt who, in 1931, said: "People do not realize the Russian menace. The spread of Communism is not a matter to laugh at." Roman was preaching anti-Communism since the outbreak of the Second World War and his visits to Moscow or to his native Slovakia, oppressed by Moscow, did not change his attitude. As a man convinced that only free enterprise can give people incentive for good work, and as a religious man, Roman could not remain indifferent to Communism. 11 Unlike Holt who according to his •c olleagues in the Conservative Party "really understood nothing about politics except how to manage ministers," Roman has been his whole life an ardent student of politics, national and international. His table conversations at home or elsewhere always ended in discussion on politics or religion-the second subject of his genuine interest. Of course, he can be sometimes an impatient listener, rather inclined to lecture authoritatively and arguing willingly on any subjeGt. On the other hand, he can be very warm and friendly in personal discussions. As a result, he appears a different personality in his office, at board meetings and in the seclusion of his residence where on weekends he invites SLOVAKIA 13 his friends and quite often a bishop or a priest to celebrate a Sunday Mass and to share a dinner with his family. In his office a senior executive, referring to Roman's dynamism and impatience, used to say: "it takes a strong boiler which makes 15 pots to boil and sometimes even tremble." And he was not far from the truth. The Roman Legend Why around some persons legends grow fast or are created at all, nobody has yet explained. It is one of the mysterious gifts which the Lord gives at his pleasure and not always according to our human logic. In the life of many successful or outstanding men there are ingredients which can give birth to a legend, but only a few of them became legendary. Extraordinary deeds or success in many cases remain unknown or belittled by jealousy of associates or contemporaries, while in some cases everything is magnified by wishful thinking and creative fantasy into legendary proportions. The 'hero' is credited with deeds, connections and power he does not possess or, if he does, in a considerably diminished measure. In the life of S. B. Roman there have been no doubt many ingredients for a legend. God gave him also that rare gift of striking the imagination of people in a positive way. It is not only his wealth which attracts so many people in high positions to him. S. B. Roman together with his elegantly dressed wife, Betty, can also be superb hosts, and many people try to get close to the Romans and flatter them in order to gain some advantage. Roman's sharp eye can easily spot this, but he had a good laugh when a visitor tried to convince him that he should accept some function or to be a speaker because he will attract people. "Why do you think I will attract them?", asked Roman of his visitor. "You remember what happened to Moses when he led his flock from Egyptian captivity and went to the mountain to talk to the Lord", answered the visitor, "half of the flock began to worship the golden veal ... " Roman looked at his visitor with one eye and with a laugh told him: "Thank you very much." 14 SLOVAKIA Roman differs from many people who orbit the Stock Exchange and made money in the post-war boom in industry and speculation, also in some other respect. He is an avid reader and his lib:rary was built not only for the purpose of ornating his residence. Especially during the years of his ascension to wealth and social position he read diligently books from many fields and his conversations showed that his good memory helped him to learn more in some fields than many academics retained from university studies. Roman received from God among other gifts not only a good memory but also the gift of logic and ability to grasp the essentials of the problems. Discussions with him on many subjects were a pleasure in those years. From the discussions on religion which has been for years his second subject to politics-never business at table--one has the impression that the concept of eastern Christianity, with the stress on the spiritual and the mystical rather than the legalistic and the philosophical, is his religion not only formally-he belongs to the Byzantine Catholic Rite-but also conforms with his personality. It is not in carrying out the technical word that a Christian should participate in the world of God on the earth, but in fulfilling his specific role-seems to be his basic religious concept. Of many changes triggered by the Vatican Council at which he was one of the lay observers, Roman can be more critical than non-Catholics or dissident priests, being inclined to express his opinion in strong terms. Among other gifts Roman received from God also love for beautiful surroundings with a sense of proportion and good taste. If we believed in reincarnation, we could apply it to him and explain many things in the life of this extraordinary "farm boy from Slovakia." However, even without belief in reincarnation, one can explain some features of his life and character. Slovakia, that comperatively unknown land in Canada, is a romantic hilly country with hundreds of castles, fortresses, and former aristocratic domains. For centuries it was a bulwark in the defense of Europe against invasions from Asia. The Huns, the Magyars, the Tartars, the Turks overran the SLOVAKIA 15 country and the aristocracy who ruled from castles and fortresses over the Slovak population was international rather than national. For some inexplicable reason, this historical heritage became apparent in Slovakia more abroad than in their own country. The leaders of the Hungarian struggle for independence, L. Kossuth and A. Pet6fi, or several Hungarian cardinals were of Slovak ancestry, the "king 0f Madagascar" M. Benovsky was from Slovakia, the founders of Pan-Slavism were of Slovak origin (but enriched Czech culture) as was T. G. Masaryk who freed Czechs from Austrian domination, and the famous astronomer and one of the youngest French generals, Milan R. t>tefanik who made a career outside his native country. Roman's life and character may have its roots in this peculiar feature of the Slovak people and in the history of Slovakia. Indeed, Jeanne Dixon, who had the ear-so rumor goes-of some American presidents and predicted J. F. Kennedy's death, gave one day a halting look at Roman, whom she had met for the first time, and exclaimed: "You are a descendant of Genghis Khan." Roman had a good laugh and some of his friends too, but in view of the invasions and history of Slovakia, even this far-fetched possibility is not excluded. S. B. Roman and Slovakia The "Roman Story" became a legend also in his native country after his two trips to Slovakia--one in his own jet plane. It made believe millions of Slovaks that Roman will help their country, suffering under Communism and foreign rule, to regain freedom and a better future and that he will use his great wealth for building mines, factories, hotels in the beautiful Tatra Mountains or churches in Slovak towns. For his activities among Slovaks abroad and for his successful tour of his native country, he became the best known Slovak of his generation among the Slovaks in the free world as well as in his native Slovakia and great hopes and expectations have surrounded his name. In fact Roman was genuinely interested in the organizational life of the Slovak group and from the end of the Second World War, also in the fate of Slovakia. He served 16 SLOVAKIA as the editor of a Slovak weekly, was active in the Canadian Slovak League, and was deeply involved in organizing cultural programmes for Slovak Canadians, setting up debates, concerts and trying to help his native country to freedom and independence. On his initiative in 1946 a memorandum was sent to the United Nations by Slovak organizations in Canada in which they proposed to the Delegates of the World Security Conference that, "since the Slovak People in Slovakia are a distinct and separate nation, the Security Conference provide and obtain either; "First, if the Conference choose, that the Slovak People of Slovakia could be granted complete independence from the Czech nation or state, and from any other nation in the anticipated European post-war organization of which she will be a part; "Or Second, that the Slovak people decide for themselves by a free and unhampered secret ballot under the supervision of the United Nations Military Committee, first whether they, the Slovak People of Slovakia desire to be completely independent and severed from the Czech nation and state and from any other nation in the anticipated post-war organization of Europe of which Slovakia will be a part, or second whether they desire to be an autonomous, self-governing part of the Czecho-Slovak dual State in the post-war organization of Europe of which she will be a part. N. B. In this latter case, the spelling of the name 'Czecho-Slovak' should be hyphenated and this should be its official spelling." Later he supported activities of Slovak political exiles and helped to publish books and became a sought-for speaker at celebrations, Slovak days or banquets. As he moved up in the social ladder, S. B. Roman used his connections to help the Slovak cause also on higheroften international levels. His relations with the Vatican12 helped not only the consolidation of the church organization of the Slovak Byzantine Catholics in Canada who obtained a bishop of their nationality, but also in Slovakia. He made great efforts in obtaining Slovak spiritual leaders for some 500,000 Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in the United States13 and memorable in this respect will remain SLOVAKIA 17 the huge celebrations of the 11th Centennial of Christianity in Slovakia which took place in Toronto in 1963. The main ceremony was attended by 18 Archbishops and Bishops, representatives of the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments, as well as by the Apostolic delegate and some 20,000 persons. 14 If Canadian Slovaks played a role of greater importance than their number would warrant, either among the other ethnic groups or generally in Canadian life, it was due mostly to his continuous contributions. This has been acknowledged on many occasions by the ethnic press in which S. B. Roman yearly published elaborate messages on special occasions like Christmas, elections or national days. 15 He also supported academic periodicals and the Conferences on Canadian Slavs ,a nd earned great respect among the leaders of the ethnic groups in Canada. Believing in organized work and concentrated effort, S. B. Roman was also instrumental in organizing the First Slovak World Congress which took place in June 1970 and was one of the most successful events among Slovaks in the free world since the end of the Second World War. Unanimously, delegates of Slovak organizations from many countries around the world elected him as the First President of the Slovak World Congress. Roman's authority and popularity with the Slovak people grew incessantly since his appointment to the Vatican Council, his close acquaintance with President Nixon, his participation at a NATO meeting in Paris as a member of the Canadian delegation and his "red carpet" reception by the government representatives in Bratislava and Prague in 1968. For all this Slovaks surrounded Roman with great hopes and expectations. In fact, his connections and his wealth gave him better possibilities to further the Slovak cause in the free world than to any other Slovak of his generation and he has been aware of it. Looking back on the life and success of S. B. Roman , one becomes aware of the old truth that for societies as for men, there can be no growth without challenge. Progress SLOVAKIA 18 is a battle just as life is a struggle. S. B. Roman has been winning the battles because he was not afraid of the challenge. On the threshold of his 50th birthday, a great number of Slovaks and many of his acquaintances of other ethnic backgrounds will undoubtedly wish him to continue winning his battles and contributing to progress and happiness of his fellowmen, as well as to freedom of his native Slovakia. 1) Fortune (New York) , September 1966. According to Fortune, the top-ranking international monthly for business executives, "In the last twenty years, Roman has wheeled and wildcatted his way to a business empire whose worth is conservatively estimated at 2.5 billion dollars." 2) Newman presents in his Flame of Power (Toronto, 1959) eleven intimate profiles of Canadian greatest businessmen. After reading the book one has a strong feeling that Roman belongs to this category of economic empire bui:tders. 3) Among the books see: D. H. LeBourdais, Canada and the Atomic Revolution, (Toronto, 1959), p. 111-2, George Lonn, About Men and Mines, (Toronto, 1962), and Builders of Fortune, (Toronto, 1963), p. 55-60 and Businessmen Around the Globe, by the editors of Fortune (Harrisburg, Pa. 1967), p. 69-70. Among Magazines: Fortune (New York) September 1966, Executive, January 1960, Monetary Times, April 1967. In French: Enterprise (Paris, April 1967), as well as Paris dailies of September 1966. Roman also received wide television, radio and press coverage behind the Iron Curtain when he visited his native Slovakta on his own plane in 1966. 4) The book Business Around the Globe mentions a mining engineer, Art Stollery, as one of the stakers and says: "In one of the complicated financial deals at which he excels, Roman bought the claims from Stollery and his frienlds for $30,000.00 and transferred them to North Denison Mines, an old copper-and-nickel company. In return he got one million shares in what eventually became Denison Mines Limited, which he divided with Stollery's group. Soon afterwards, uranium was struck, and Denison's stock shot up from 30¢ to $12.00 within a year." Op. cit., p. 60. In September 1967, it was quoted at $85.00 on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 5) For more details on S. B. Roman's life anld success, see my book Slovaks in Canada (Canadian Ethnic Press Associaition, Toronto, 1967), pp. 374-380. 6) S. B. Roman's philosophy on free enterprise was reflected in his speech to the Rotary Club, '11oronto, in October 1970, as well as the Brief which Denison Mines submitted to the Federal Government in 1970 on the White Paper dealing with Capital Gains Tax. The Brief said that the proposal to tax economy is a form of "intellectual colonialism that ill befits a pioneering vigorous SLOVAKIA 19 country." In S. B. Roman's opinion, in the economy of the next century, part of the profits will be divided between capital and labour. He admitted that Denison Mines does not share profits with employees because "we are as much coward as anybody else." See "The Telegram" June 23, 1970. On his speech at the Rotary Club, see 'The Northern Miner", October 29, 1970. 7) All quotations on Sir James Dunn are taken from Peter Newman's book Flame of Power. 8) See his speech in the Toronto Kiwanis Club, January 13, 1971, in which he said, among other things, "It is high time that we ~evise a formula that allows us to differentiate between people who really are not capable of looking after themselves and people who are lazy or not willing to work" . . . "I am certain every thinking Canadian must be disturbed by the developments they see occurring, developments leading to more and more irresponsibility and unwillingness to work. The ]danger is that it is a most infectious cancer in that ,i t can--and will--spread to those, now willing to work, who by seeing compatriots leaning on welfare, start to wonder about ,the wisdom of working themselves." See excerpts in The Toronto Telegram, January 14, 1971, as well as The Star, January 14, 1971. 9) See Zena Cherry, "Home Away from Home-Beach Lot for $1,000.00 a foot," Globe and Mail, May 2, 1968. 10) Ibid. 11) When the Soviets, together with their satellites, occupied CzechoSlovakia, he was the main speaker at a rally in Toronto denouncing the brutal act of Soviet impel'ialism. 12) He was not only the lay observer ,at the Vatican Council but in 1963 he also received the Order of the Knight Commander of Saint Gregory. On his participatioN at the Council, see my series of articles in Kana'.lsky Slovak and Slovak v Amerike, NovemberDecember 1966, and January 1967. 13) On this subject, he also published English and Slovak articles in the Slovak Press in Canada and the United States. 14) For more details, see my book Slovaks in Canada, op. cit., p. 263. 15) In one of such messages, he made the following appeal under the title "Democracy's Most Precious Gift": . .. "To those of us who have left our native lands for Canalda and its precious gifts of democracy, has fallen the privilege of citizenship and the responsibilities of the vote. To us has befallen the choice of government and its leadership and the survival of all that we hold dear. It has now become our task to listen and learn, that we may judge the posture of the party and the stature of the man, anld to decide and compare what is best in our own particular communities, for our own particular needs" ...  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Stephen B. Roman - Slovak Tycoon Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971 pp. 7-19 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/460e5a702ebd3ed54ba269409452a768.pdf d6fd783faf2ed8f1b10456590990fb51 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 �66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. �SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business �68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47). � SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 �66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. �SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business �68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business 68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Stephen Osuský and March 1939 Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 65-68 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/dc25c9bbc01e9f568ce99331ce6c2f36.pdf 8f902d800812ac58bbf18f3f3c29e691 PDF Text Text 34 SLOVAKIA STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT P.A. Hrobak John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets, had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew : to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics, Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur. These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures. Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se. riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk "SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds. Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and therefore we must travel the thorny road of life! That young man was Louis Shir. Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent �SLOVAKIA 36 Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles, excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men. Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he was from Beckov and two years younger than himself; but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a talk with him. The young man later admitted that what Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group. That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters. Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of }()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future. Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation, unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to the task of providing them. Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_ tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful, foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit- �36 SLOVAKIA erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own ,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of Europe. The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing." lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies, newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur told his people. The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth. From the forties of the last century down to our times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur. Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son that Slovakia gave to mankind. Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur �SLOVAKIA 37 give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights of the subjugated and oppressed. In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess, there was a great difference between them. One entered the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_ ond Stur. Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not particular people "We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament. "But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom," continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free. dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little. If our towns had more freedom, even our people would have never fallen into such thraildom." Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion: "That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com. munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly." It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom. Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly: "Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand 1 �38 SLOVAKIA of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being. When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club of the -lords." Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position. Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave had inundated Hungary. The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation. Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny" prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho>Ttcomi:ngs and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials would be just as actual today as they were in his time. �SLOVAKIA 39 No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent rights of the Slovak naition. Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of individual persons and even though individuals harm us, the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:; ·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL ately abandoned the cause itself. . . " Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations. To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's: "Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!" StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination. Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_ alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on! • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia," CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946). � 34 SLOVAKIA STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT P.A. Hrobak John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets, had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew : to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics, Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur. These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures. Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se. riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk "SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds. Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and therefore we must travel the thorny road of life! That young man was Louis Shir. Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent �SLOVAKIA 36 Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles, excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men. Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he was from Beckov and two years younger than himself; but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a talk with him. The young man later admitted that what Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group. That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters. Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of }()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future. Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation, unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to the task of providing them. Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_ tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful, foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit- �36 SLOVAKIA erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own ,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of Europe. The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing." lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies, newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur told his people. The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth. From the forties of the last century down to our times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur. Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son that Slovakia gave to mankind. Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur �SLOVAKIA 37 give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights of the subjugated and oppressed. In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess, there was a great difference between them. One entered the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_ ond Stur. Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not particular people "We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament. "But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom," continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free. dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little. If our towns had more freedom, even our people would have never fallen into such thraildom." Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion: "That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com. munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly." It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom. Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly: "Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand 1 �38 SLOVAKIA of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being. When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club of the -lords." Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position. Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave had inundated Hungary. The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation. Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny" prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho>Ttcomi:ngs and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials would be just as actual today as they were in his time. �SLOVAKIA 39 No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent rights of the Slovak naition. Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of individual persons and even though individuals harm us, the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:; ·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL ately abandoned the cause itself. . . " Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations. To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's: "Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!" StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination. Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_ alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on! • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia," CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 34 SLOVAKIA STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT P.A. Hrobak John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets, had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew : to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics, Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur. These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures. Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se. riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk "SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds. Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and therefore we must travel the thorny road of life! That young man was Louis Shir. Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent SLOVAKIA 36 Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles, excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men. Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he was from Beckov and two years younger than himself; but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a talk with him. The young man later admitted that what Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group. That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters. Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of }()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future. Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation, unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to the task of providing them. Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_ tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful, foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit- 36 SLOVAKIA erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own ,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of Europe. The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing." lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies, newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur told his people. The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth. From the forties of the last century down to our times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur. Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son that Slovakia gave to mankind. Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur SLOVAKIA 37 give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights of the subjugated and oppressed. In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess, there was a great difference between them. One entered the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_ ond Stur. Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not particular people "We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament. "But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom," continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free. dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little. If our towns had more freedom, even our people would have never fallen into such thraildom." Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion: "That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com. munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly." It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom. Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly: "Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand 1 38 SLOVAKIA of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being. When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club of the -lords." Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position. Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave had inundated Hungary. The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation. Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny" prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho>Ttcomi:ngs and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials would be just as actual today as they were in his time. SLOVAKIA 39 No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent rights of the Slovak naition. Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of individual persons and even though individuals harm us, the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:; ·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL ately abandoned the cause itself. . . " Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations. To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's: "Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!" StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination. Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_ alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on! • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia," CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Štúr and the Slovak Independence Movement Description An account of the resource P. A. Hrobak Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956 pp. 34-39 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource P. A. Hrobak LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/94c1d1026b44c4673ea2f6736dca92f9.pdf d0930017799086d61978cab8dca4a544 PDF Text Text 6 SLOVAK1IA tions under which the nation lives at .ho~e under Communism, it is our moral duty to acquaint ourselves with the endeavons of those who a:lready over a hundred years ago .warned us against the plague of Oommunism. With r-egard to the political mission of our geineratiO!Il, it wouild be to our advantage to. study the ideas of Stur, because then we shall learn that the credo and politicaJl legacy of Louis Stur was: "So that we ourselves might be revived and take the place in history which according to our strength and abilities belongs to us, we must once and for all free ourselves from the hated, alien yoke and gain state independence for ourselves: because a nation which is enslaved has lits hands tied, its spirit stifled, and is forever threatened with the danger that sooner or later it will perish." 1 • • • STOR : FATHER OF MODERN SIJOVAK NATIONALISM Marian ~iar In 1948 !Slovaks had an o,pportunity to assess the revolutionary events of a hundred years ago•. ,r t was our duty at that time to recall the legacy of Stur and his folJl.owers and to appraise their ,political program. Unfortunate:ly, due to circumstances !beyond our control, the year 1948 was not ·an opportune time for a ceJebration of such g,reat significance and extent as was the revolution of 11848-49. In 1956, however, during the .centennial of Stur's death, another opportunity presents itself to ponder over the fate, the Jife, the struggle, and the aim of the entire generation of Stur. Stephen Krcmery, eminent historian of Slova,k literature, said that Stu.r's generation .began "a new chapter in the rustle-fbu'Stle of a thousand years." Representatives of the previous generation - Holly, Kollar and Safarik - still lived, Slovak poets still argued aibout rythm and accent, and the nation still looked for consolation in Svatopluk's Great Moravian Empire (iHolly), or to RusS:ia - to that Slav "giant oak," a:s Kollar ca111ed: i t when suddenly new people began to appear and new voices were heard. Kuzmany, from the distant and wide scope of his predecessors, drew attention of the world to the heart �SLOVAKIA and morality of the .Slovak people. But in all thes.e manifestations there was as yet no revolutionary dynamics, a political program was sadly la0king, and, it seems, only poets dreamed romantically about the better days to come. Hollly and Kollar enlivened Slovak life by 'l ooking back to Slovak history and around themselves; •b ut that was not enough for the period ahead. When Stur and his foliowers came upon the scene they recognized the fact that the cultural process, ,beg,un in Slovakia already with the activity of the JUnilversity of Trnava and formulated and propagated by Bernolak, had to ,be completed and had to serve as a basis for the political ascension of the nation. What was realized by the· merits of Stur, Hur,ban and Hodza in our country in the cultura1 field - the codification of a uniform literary langua,ge - that was on[y the harvest of the products planted by past generations from the time of Balthazar Magin, Hugoiin Gavlovi,c, and others before them. Thanks to. the followers of Stur that they became '3Jware of the pollitical necessity of having an independent Slovak literary language, that they did not philo.: sophize about the maturity of Slovak nationalism but accepted it as something granted which had to be pl-aced on a proper basis and given a :Proper place. Stu•r understood that in hris time the Slovak nationaU process had matured and that Slovakia must appear on the scene of history as an independent political factor. It is in this that Stur's greatest merit lies. The question did not concern any Cze., cho-S:lovak separation, a:bout which those like to talk who do not want to understand natural law in the develqiment of nations. The people of 1Sloivakia never ceased truLkmg in Slovak and "Bible Czech" was always aUien to the Slovaks even though the Slo.va:k iProtestants used it for their reli-gious services, and even if some used it as a medium of Slovak literatuTe. Jaroslav Vlcek himself says in reference to this: "Such a situation of things was impossible; that was the feeling of all the better Slovak spirits . . . Evangelical clergymen wrote in a language that was not spoken anywhere in the world; it was not typical, lacked euphony and regularity." 1 �8 SLOVAKIA No foreign language, not even Czech, could move the SlovaJk people politically; only the Slovak language could do that. iin five short years the J.atter ,perfovmed a miracle; it not only .stirred up life rin the entire na;tio;n, but placed it under the revolutionary banners of Hwrban. In short: Stur was the first to formulate the Slova!k problem, the first one moved to armed r ebellion for the rights of the Slova;k nation, and the first (Sept. 1848) to proclaim the independence of Slovaikia ("We hereby proc}aim ourselves independent of the Mrugyars"). In the history of the 'Slovak nation, no one <lid as much in so short a time as St-t1r, who was only 41 whe:n he died. This was possible an1ly •b ecause the ground for the ascension of the new generation was ripe and properly prepared. Stur approved what already existed in Slovakia; he formulated what the nation felt and demanded. Stiir caUISed quite a sensation with his article "Zaloby a ponosy Slova!kov v Uhorsku" (Accusations and Complaints of the S'lovruks in Hungary), published in Le1pzig in 1843, in which he excoriated the chief inspecto r of the Evangelical Church and Schools in Hungary, Count Zay, for wanting to Magyarize the Slovaks. for political reasons. Count Zay, aware of the political currents in Slova:kia, in ,principle divided the inhabitants of Slovakia into three groUJps: the fir,s.t concerns itse~f harmlessly with the Slovak language; the second yearns to establish a western-Slav kingdom under the crown of Austria; the third has secret contacts with Russia. Whether these groups reaHy grasped the situation of those times or noit is debatable, but it is quite certain .that all ,w ere occupied with one thought: t,o save the 1Slova1ks from Magyarization and t,o secure for the Slovak nation an independent political status within the framewol"k of the Habsburg Empire. "We do not want ,r ights est·aiblished on favor, 'but we demand our rights on the basii,s of rig.ht," Stur declared. And these w,o vds became the foundation of al;J. petitioos and demands which were presented in Vienna and the Hungarian iDiet in Bratislava. From thJs moral and democratic viewpoint also issued aH of Stuir's controversies with Louis Kossuth. Writing in the name of his nation Stur demanded 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 9 ".p eace based on right and mutual understanding," declaring: "In the Pest Hirlap, Kossuth is fighting for equality of rights, but in the Diet he wants to give the orders to investigate and punish those who stand up for their rights ... That is his freedom and liberalism!" Art the Slav Coingress in Prague, 1848, again it was Stur who together with Safari.i1k defined the political direction of the entire Congress. Safarik spoike like a prophet, but Stur was aJlready forming a cilear .p olitical p11ogram. "Our aim should be t,o preserve ourselves! First of all we must serve ourselves, then others. Thus far Austria has existed but we have been perishing. What would the world say to us if we would stand for nothing else but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slovanic communities under the government of Austria!'' Strur's articles in the "Narodnje Noviny," his manifestations and ,p etitions in the Hungarian Diet, his letters to his friends - all these clearly state a clear political view: Slovakia as an independent crown land under the Habsburg,s; the Slovaks mu:Slt be recognized and respected as an equrul partner of the other nations in the empire. Sholl!ld we wish to ex.press Soo.r's politica:l ,p rogram in terms of the political terminology of today, we would have to say: Stiir was for a program to federalize central Europe. He was the first Slovak who demanded equality with the rest of the nations for his o,wn nation in the Central-EurQpean political constellation. He opposed Pa.Jacky's Austrophi-lism and sharply condemned Kossuth, who demanded the Magyarization of the 1Slovaks in the name of ,t he right of the Hungarian State. Stur inter,preted the Slo,vaik standpoint democratically by res,pecting the rights of others; he said: "Each nation is only one part of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move for itself and educate itself as it sees fit ..." The way to Slova:k independeince was supposed to• start �SLOVAKIA from the rebellion of 1848. The w:hole of Europe was once again in motion. After Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Italy, revolutionary explosions resounded also Hungary. It is not important that this revOilution was squaslhed; nor is it important that Vienna failed to, fll!lfill the promises and eXipectations of the Slo.v aks. For history and for our generation it is only necessary to know that the Slovaks afready one hundred years ago fought to change the po~ litical structure of Centra;l Burope, that they demanded an jndependent status for their nation within the framework of a solid federation ,b uilt on the ,p rinciples of justice and equality. Louis Stur, preeminent leader of the SlovaJk movement for independence apparently was quite ahead of his time. His philosQphica;l views, his democra,tic thinkiing and principles, his social demands, and his admiration for ,t he democratic system in the West call for serious study and interpretation. The controversies between Stur and Kossuth are very interesting from the democratic point of view; they tell us how Stuir and his foHowers interpreted their poJitica!l and social program in comparison to Kossuth, who wanted democracy only for the Magyars at the expense of the other nations of Hungary. ·S tur, a memlber of the Protestant Evangelical Church, was not afraid to accept and complete the wo,11k of ,p receding Cathohlc generations to preserve the heritage of the Slovruk nation. We must recall foir ourselves and for the free worid that the Slovaiks played a serious poilitica:l role in the revolutionary movement in Central Burope in 1'848-49, and that a!lready at thaJt time they clearly formulated a political program which satisfies even t'he demands of the prese1D.t time, so that on it the contempo~ rary Slovak generation can build its own, modern program orf federrulizaJtion. Stur belongs among the greatest of :European revoJ,u_, tli.onaries of his time. The Mrugyars gratefully built Kossuth a monument in free America, and the Cizechs haJVe one of Masaryk in Chicago. If they deserved to be reimembeired, surely Stur, who was a greater apostle of democracy and freedom for all people, should be no less honored in the �11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the � 6 SLOVAK1IA tions under which the nation lives at .ho~e under Communism, it is our moral duty to acquaint ourselves with the endeavons of those who a:lready over a hundred years ago .warned us against the plague of Oommunism. With r-egard to the political mission of our geineratiO!Il, it wouild be to our advantage to. study the ideas of Stur, because then we shall learn that the credo and politicaJl legacy of Louis Stur was: "So that we ourselves might be revived and take the place in history which according to our strength and abilities belongs to us, we must once and for all free ourselves from the hated, alien yoke and gain state independence for ourselves: because a nation which is enslaved has lits hands tied, its spirit stifled, and is forever threatened with the danger that sooner or later it will perish." 1 • • • STOR : FATHER OF MODERN SIJOVAK NATIONALISM Marian ~iar In 1948 !Slovaks had an o,pportunity to assess the revolutionary events of a hundred years ago•. ,r t was our duty at that time to recall the legacy of Stur and his folJl.owers and to appraise their ,political program. Unfortunate:ly, due to circumstances !beyond our control, the year 1948 was not ·an opportune time for a ceJebration of such g,reat significance and extent as was the revolution of 11848-49. In 1956, however, during the .centennial of Stur's death, another opportunity presents itself to ponder over the fate, the Jife, the struggle, and the aim of the entire generation of Stur. Stephen Krcmery, eminent historian of Slova,k literature, said that Stu.r's generation .began "a new chapter in the rustle-fbu'Stle of a thousand years." Representatives of the previous generation - Holly, Kollar and Safarik - still lived, Slovak poets still argued aibout rythm and accent, and the nation still looked for consolation in Svatopluk's Great Moravian Empire (iHolly), or to RusS:ia - to that Slav "giant oak," a:s Kollar ca111ed: i t when suddenly new people began to appear and new voices were heard. Kuzmany, from the distant and wide scope of his predecessors, drew attention of the world to the heart �SLOVAKIA and morality of the .Slovak people. But in all thes.e manifestations there was as yet no revolutionary dynamics, a political program was sadly la0king, and, it seems, only poets dreamed romantically about the better days to come. Hollly and Kollar enlivened Slovak life by 'l ooking back to Slovak history and around themselves; •b ut that was not enough for the period ahead. When Stur and his foliowers came upon the scene they recognized the fact that the cultural process, ,beg,un in Slovakia already with the activity of the JUnilversity of Trnava and formulated and propagated by Bernolak, had to ,be completed and had to serve as a basis for the political ascension of the nation. What was realized by the· merits of Stur, Hur,ban and Hodza in our country in the cultura1 field - the codification of a uniform literary langua,ge - that was on[y the harvest of the products planted by past generations from the time of Balthazar Magin, Hugoiin Gavlovi,c, and others before them. Thanks to. the followers of Stur that they became '3Jware of the pollitical necessity of having an independent Slovak literary language, that they did not philo.: sophize about the maturity of Slovak nationalism but accepted it as something granted which had to be pl-aced on a proper basis and given a :Proper place. Stu•r understood that in hris time the Slovak nationaU process had matured and that Slovakia must appear on the scene of history as an independent political factor. It is in this that Stur's greatest merit lies. The question did not concern any Cze., cho-S:lovak separation, a:bout which those like to talk who do not want to understand natural law in the develqiment of nations. The people of 1Sloivakia never ceased truLkmg in Slovak and "Bible Czech" was always aUien to the Slovaks even though the Slo.va:k iProtestants used it for their reli-gious services, and even if some used it as a medium of Slovak literatuTe. Jaroslav Vlcek himself says in reference to this: "Such a situation of things was impossible; that was the feeling of all the better Slovak spirits . . . Evangelical clergymen wrote in a language that was not spoken anywhere in the world; it was not typical, lacked euphony and regularity." 1 �8 SLOVAKIA No foreign language, not even Czech, could move the SlovaJk people politically; only the Slovak language could do that. iin five short years the J.atter ,perfovmed a miracle; it not only .stirred up life rin the entire na;tio;n, but placed it under the revolutionary banners of Hwrban. In short: Stur was the first to formulate the Slova!k problem, the first one moved to armed r ebellion for the rights of the Slova;k nation, and the first (Sept. 1848) to proclaim the independence of Slovaikia ("We hereby proc}aim ourselves independent of the Mrugyars"). In the history of the 'Slovak nation, no one <lid as much in so short a time as St-t1r, who was only 41 whe:n he died. This was possible an1ly •b ecause the ground for the ascension of the new generation was ripe and properly prepared. Stur approved what already existed in Slovakia; he formulated what the nation felt and demanded. Stiir caUISed quite a sensation with his article "Zaloby a ponosy Slova!kov v Uhorsku" (Accusations and Complaints of the S'lovruks in Hungary), published in Le1pzig in 1843, in which he excoriated the chief inspecto r of the Evangelical Church and Schools in Hungary, Count Zay, for wanting to Magyarize the Slovaks. for political reasons. Count Zay, aware of the political currents in Slova:kia, in ,principle divided the inhabitants of Slovakia into three groUJps: the fir,s.t concerns itse~f harmlessly with the Slovak language; the second yearns to establish a western-Slav kingdom under the crown of Austria; the third has secret contacts with Russia. Whether these groups reaHy grasped the situation of those times or noit is debatable, but it is quite certain .that all ,w ere occupied with one thought: t,o save the 1Slova1ks from Magyarization and t,o secure for the Slovak nation an independent political status within the framewol"k of the Habsburg Empire. "We do not want ,r ights est·aiblished on favor, 'but we demand our rights on the basii,s of rig.ht," Stur declared. And these w,o vds became the foundation of al;J. petitioos and demands which were presented in Vienna and the Hungarian iDiet in Bratislava. From thJs moral and democratic viewpoint also issued aH of Stuir's controversies with Louis Kossuth. Writing in the name of his nation Stur demanded 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 9 ".p eace based on right and mutual understanding," declaring: "In the Pest Hirlap, Kossuth is fighting for equality of rights, but in the Diet he wants to give the orders to investigate and punish those who stand up for their rights ... That is his freedom and liberalism!" Art the Slav Coingress in Prague, 1848, again it was Stur who together with Safari.i1k defined the political direction of the entire Congress. Safarik spoike like a prophet, but Stur was aJlready forming a cilear .p olitical p11ogram. "Our aim should be t,o preserve ourselves! First of all we must serve ourselves, then others. Thus far Austria has existed but we have been perishing. What would the world say to us if we would stand for nothing else but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slovanic communities under the government of Austria!'' Strur's articles in the "Narodnje Noviny," his manifestations and ,p etitions in the Hungarian Diet, his letters to his friends - all these clearly state a clear political view: Slovakia as an independent crown land under the Habsburg,s; the Slovaks mu:Slt be recognized and respected as an equrul partner of the other nations in the empire. Sholl!ld we wish to ex.press Soo.r's politica:l ,p rogram in terms of the political terminology of today, we would have to say: Stiir was for a program to federalize central Europe. He was the first Slovak who demanded equality with the rest of the nations for his o,wn nation in the Central-EurQpean political constellation. He opposed Pa.Jacky's Austrophi-lism and sharply condemned Kossuth, who demanded the Magyarization of the 1Slovaks in the name of ,t he right of the Hungarian State. Stur inter,preted the Slo,vaik standpoint democratically by res,pecting the rights of others; he said: "Each nation is only one part of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move for itself and educate itself as it sees fit ..." The way to Slova:k independeince was supposed to• start �SLOVAKIA from the rebellion of 1848. The w:hole of Europe was once again in motion. After Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Italy, revolutionary explosions resounded also Hungary. It is not important that this revOilution was squaslhed; nor is it important that Vienna failed to, fll!lfill the promises and eXipectations of the Slo.v aks. For history and for our generation it is only necessary to know that the Slovaks afready one hundred years ago fought to change the po~ litical structure of Centra;l Burope, that they demanded an jndependent status for their nation within the framework of a solid federation ,b uilt on the ,p rinciples of justice and equality. Louis Stur, preeminent leader of the SlovaJk movement for independence apparently was quite ahead of his time. His philosQphica;l views, his democra,tic thinkiing and principles, his social demands, and his admiration for ,t he democratic system in the West call for serious study and interpretation. The controversies between Stur and Kossuth are very interesting from the democratic point of view; they tell us how Stuir and his foHowers interpreted their poJitica!l and social program in comparison to Kossuth, who wanted democracy only for the Magyars at the expense of the other nations of Hungary. ·S tur, a memlber of the Protestant Evangelical Church, was not afraid to accept and complete the wo,11k of ,p receding Cathohlc generations to preserve the heritage of the Slovruk nation. We must recall foir ourselves and for the free worid that the Slovaiks played a serious poilitica:l role in the revolutionary movement in Central Burope in 1'848-49, and that a!lready at thaJt time they clearly formulated a political program which satisfies even t'he demands of the prese1D.t time, so that on it the contempo~ rary Slovak generation can build its own, modern program orf federrulizaJtion. Stur belongs among the greatest of :European revoJ,u_, tli.onaries of his time. The Mrugyars gratefully built Kossuth a monument in free America, and the Cizechs haJVe one of Masaryk in Chicago. If they deserved to be reimembeired, surely Stur, who was a greater apostle of democracy and freedom for all people, should be no less honored in the �11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6 SLOVAK1IA tions under which the nation lives at .ho~e under Communism, it is our moral duty to acquaint ourselves with the endeavons of those who a:lready over a hundred years ago .warned us against the plague of Oommunism. With r-egard to the political mission of our geineratiO!Il, it wouild be to our advantage to. study the ideas of Stur, because then we shall learn that the credo and politicaJl legacy of Louis Stur was: "So that we ourselves might be revived and take the place in history which according to our strength and abilities belongs to us, we must once and for all free ourselves from the hated, alien yoke and gain state independence for ourselves: because a nation which is enslaved has lits hands tied, its spirit stifled, and is forever threatened with the danger that sooner or later it will perish." 1 • • • STOR : FATHER OF MODERN SIJOVAK NATIONALISM Marian ~iar In 1948 !Slovaks had an o,pportunity to assess the revolutionary events of a hundred years ago•. ,r t was our duty at that time to recall the legacy of Stur and his folJl.owers and to appraise their ,political program. Unfortunate:ly, due to circumstances !beyond our control, the year 1948 was not ·an opportune time for a ceJebration of such g,reat significance and extent as was the revolution of 11848-49. In 1956, however, during the .centennial of Stur's death, another opportunity presents itself to ponder over the fate, the Jife, the struggle, and the aim of the entire generation of Stur. Stephen Krcmery, eminent historian of Slova,k literature, said that Stu.r's generation .began "a new chapter in the rustle-fbu'Stle of a thousand years." Representatives of the previous generation - Holly, Kollar and Safarik - still lived, Slovak poets still argued aibout rythm and accent, and the nation still looked for consolation in Svatopluk's Great Moravian Empire (iHolly), or to RusS:ia - to that Slav "giant oak," a:s Kollar ca111ed: i t when suddenly new people began to appear and new voices were heard. Kuzmany, from the distant and wide scope of his predecessors, drew attention of the world to the heart SLOVAKIA and morality of the .Slovak people. But in all thes.e manifestations there was as yet no revolutionary dynamics, a political program was sadly la0king, and, it seems, only poets dreamed romantically about the better days to come. Hollly and Kollar enlivened Slovak life by 'l ooking back to Slovak history and around themselves; •b ut that was not enough for the period ahead. When Stur and his foliowers came upon the scene they recognized the fact that the cultural process, ,beg,un in Slovakia already with the activity of the JUnilversity of Trnava and formulated and propagated by Bernolak, had to ,be completed and had to serve as a basis for the political ascension of the nation. What was realized by the· merits of Stur, Hur,ban and Hodza in our country in the cultura1 field - the codification of a uniform literary langua,ge - that was on[y the harvest of the products planted by past generations from the time of Balthazar Magin, Hugoiin Gavlovi,c, and others before them. Thanks to. the followers of Stur that they became '3Jware of the pollitical necessity of having an independent Slovak literary language, that they did not philo.: sophize about the maturity of Slovak nationalism but accepted it as something granted which had to be pl-aced on a proper basis and given a :Proper place. Stu•r understood that in hris time the Slovak nationaU process had matured and that Slovakia must appear on the scene of history as an independent political factor. It is in this that Stur's greatest merit lies. The question did not concern any Cze., cho-S:lovak separation, a:bout which those like to talk who do not want to understand natural law in the develqiment of nations. The people of 1Sloivakia never ceased truLkmg in Slovak and "Bible Czech" was always aUien to the Slovaks even though the Slo.va:k iProtestants used it for their reli-gious services, and even if some used it as a medium of Slovak literatuTe. Jaroslav Vlcek himself says in reference to this: "Such a situation of things was impossible; that was the feeling of all the better Slovak spirits . . . Evangelical clergymen wrote in a language that was not spoken anywhere in the world; it was not typical, lacked euphony and regularity." 1 8 SLOVAKIA No foreign language, not even Czech, could move the SlovaJk people politically; only the Slovak language could do that. iin five short years the J.atter ,perfovmed a miracle; it not only .stirred up life rin the entire na;tio;n, but placed it under the revolutionary banners of Hwrban. In short: Stur was the first to formulate the Slova!k problem, the first one moved to armed r ebellion for the rights of the Slova;k nation, and the first (Sept. 1848) to proclaim the independence of Slovaikia ("We hereby proc}aim ourselves independent of the Mrugyars"). In the history of the 'Slovak nation, no one <lid as much in so short a time as St-t1r, who was only 41 whe:n he died. This was possible an1ly •b ecause the ground for the ascension of the new generation was ripe and properly prepared. Stur approved what already existed in Slovakia; he formulated what the nation felt and demanded. Stiir caUISed quite a sensation with his article "Zaloby a ponosy Slova!kov v Uhorsku" (Accusations and Complaints of the S'lovruks in Hungary), published in Le1pzig in 1843, in which he excoriated the chief inspecto r of the Evangelical Church and Schools in Hungary, Count Zay, for wanting to Magyarize the Slovaks. for political reasons. Count Zay, aware of the political currents in Slova:kia, in ,principle divided the inhabitants of Slovakia into three groUJps: the fir,s.t concerns itse~f harmlessly with the Slovak language; the second yearns to establish a western-Slav kingdom under the crown of Austria; the third has secret contacts with Russia. Whether these groups reaHy grasped the situation of those times or noit is debatable, but it is quite certain .that all ,w ere occupied with one thought: t,o save the 1Slova1ks from Magyarization and t,o secure for the Slovak nation an independent political status within the framewol"k of the Habsburg Empire. "We do not want ,r ights est·aiblished on favor, 'but we demand our rights on the basii,s of rig.ht," Stur declared. And these w,o vds became the foundation of al;J. petitioos and demands which were presented in Vienna and the Hungarian iDiet in Bratislava. From thJs moral and democratic viewpoint also issued aH of Stuir's controversies with Louis Kossuth. Writing in the name of his nation Stur demanded 1 1 SLOVAKIA 9 ".p eace based on right and mutual understanding," declaring: "In the Pest Hirlap, Kossuth is fighting for equality of rights, but in the Diet he wants to give the orders to investigate and punish those who stand up for their rights ... That is his freedom and liberalism!" Art the Slav Coingress in Prague, 1848, again it was Stur who together with Safari.i1k defined the political direction of the entire Congress. Safarik spoike like a prophet, but Stur was aJlready forming a cilear .p olitical p11ogram. "Our aim should be t,o preserve ourselves! First of all we must serve ourselves, then others. Thus far Austria has existed but we have been perishing. What would the world say to us if we would stand for nothing else but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slovanic communities under the government of Austria!'' Strur's articles in the "Narodnje Noviny," his manifestations and ,p etitions in the Hungarian Diet, his letters to his friends - all these clearly state a clear political view: Slovakia as an independent crown land under the Habsburg,s; the Slovaks mu:Slt be recognized and respected as an equrul partner of the other nations in the empire. Sholl!ld we wish to ex.press Soo.r's politica:l ,p rogram in terms of the political terminology of today, we would have to say: Stiir was for a program to federalize central Europe. He was the first Slovak who demanded equality with the rest of the nations for his o,wn nation in the Central-EurQpean political constellation. He opposed Pa.Jacky's Austrophi-lism and sharply condemned Kossuth, who demanded the Magyarization of the 1Slovaks in the name of ,t he right of the Hungarian State. Stur inter,preted the Slo,vaik standpoint democratically by res,pecting the rights of others; he said: "Each nation is only one part of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move for itself and educate itself as it sees fit ..." The way to Slova:k independeince was supposed to• start SLOVAKIA from the rebellion of 1848. The w:hole of Europe was once again in motion. After Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Italy, revolutionary explosions resounded also Hungary. It is not important that this revOilution was squaslhed; nor is it important that Vienna failed to, fll!lfill the promises and eXipectations of the Slo.v aks. For history and for our generation it is only necessary to know that the Slovaks afready one hundred years ago fought to change the po~ litical structure of Centra;l Burope, that they demanded an jndependent status for their nation within the framework of a solid federation ,b uilt on the ,p rinciples of justice and equality. Louis Stur, preeminent leader of the SlovaJk movement for independence apparently was quite ahead of his time. His philosQphica;l views, his democra,tic thinkiing and principles, his social demands, and his admiration for ,t he democratic system in the West call for serious study and interpretation. The controversies between Stur and Kossuth are very interesting from the democratic point of view; they tell us how Stuir and his foHowers interpreted their poJitica!l and social program in comparison to Kossuth, who wanted democracy only for the Magyars at the expense of the other nations of Hungary. ·S tur, a memlber of the Protestant Evangelical Church, was not afraid to accept and complete the wo,11k of ,p receding Cathohlc generations to preserve the heritage of the Slovruk nation. We must recall foir ourselves and for the free worid that the Slovaiks played a serious poilitica:l role in the revolutionary movement in Central Burope in 1'848-49, and that a!lready at thaJt time they clearly formulated a political program which satisfies even t'he demands of the prese1D.t time, so that on it the contempo~ rary Slovak generation can build its own, modern program orf federrulizaJtion. Stur belongs among the greatest of :European revoJ,u_, tli.onaries of his time. The Mrugyars gratefully built Kossuth a monument in free America, and the Cizechs haJVe one of Masaryk in Chicago. If they deserved to be reimembeired, surely Stur, who was a greater apostle of democracy and freedom for all people, should be no less honored in the 11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Štúr: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism Description An account of the resource Marián Žiar Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), March 1956 pp. 6-11 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Žiar, Marian Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1956 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/21906f2f1049cc8658279f2e578b39a1.pdf f38c069687658f8faf29870166a6b8fc PDF Text Text 11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the �12 SLOVAKIA Slovak pUiblic. The •~Plody" (Fruits), "Jitfonka" (Morning Star), HU!I"ban's "Nitra," Pa1kovic's "Tatranka" (Tatra News), Kuzmany's "Hro:nka" (Hron News), and Fej.erpa~ ta!ky's "Novy i stary vlastenecky ka.!lendar" (The New and the Old Patriotic Almanac)- all these worthy periodicals resuilted from the enthusiasm of clean hearts and the noble characters of Stu,r 's group. These endeavors, as well as the contacts of the youth with the public during vacation, were the next to the last step for the Sturites in thek preparation to devote themselves with all their strength to the needs of the people. They had hardly left their school benches when the in~ terest of their people became one of their desires; all were willing to serve in the capacity they were best fitted for. When they left school the foUowers of Stur returned to their people, lived with them, toiled with them, and b,ore the burdens of the day with them. They kneiw the virtues and shortcomings of the Slovaks. They realized that socia'l and economic ill,s were caused by the ruling Magyars and decided to do sometliing about it. They knew that to save their peo,ple, they had to educate them politicalJy and correct the mistakes of the past (1). After God, the people were nearest and dearest to the Stu.rites. They did not fea:r the peorple, despite the fact that the S1ovaks were referred to in the most derogatory manner. The Magyars said that the Slovaks were stupid, but the Sturites knew that the Slo:va1ks were a simple but very able and capable people. Probably the greatest fatrlt of the Slovaks was that they were very obedient and addicted to certain failings. The latter, however, couJd be removed, and the Stu.rites set themselves to that very task (2). The greater the press,u re of the owosition, the more profound the reaction of the Sturites. Pressure evoked re~ sistance; as one voice there resounded in Slovakia: "Everything for our 1Slovak people" (3). They helped their humiliated and neglected people by a!ll means at their disposal, because they knew that above all else it was necessary to lead the people to the point where it could lriberate itself from the misrakes and symptoms of slavery, and then complete freedom would follow. �SLOVAKIA 13 That meant that the Stu.rites were for the peo,ple with their whole being; they listened patiently to a,11 complaints and proitesrt:s, and sympathized with their misery; and, orf course, were detel'Inined to fight against all injustices ( 4). One of them summarized the wo:rik of the followers of Stur thus'l y: "Stu.r's school became 0111e of the most effective factors in the life of the Sloivruk nratiion" (5). The foliowers of Stur concerned themselves with the welfare of the entire nation. They fought to improve their economy, but they ailso fought with equa1 vigor against alcoholism, indifference, and illiteracy. They lrubored to uplift the spirit and to rouse nation consciousness not only by speaking and writing, but biY their practical work among all classes of their people, visiting even the lowliest to transform their minds and to use their strength so that they might save themselves from ruin (6). And the ,Slova:k people responded wholeheartedly when Stur began to pUJb1ish his "SloiVensikje Narodnje Novini" and the "Orol Tatransky" -which became a ,power that had to :b e rec!koned with, because they found favor with the common peo,ple, the intelligentsia and the gentry (7). Without unity there could be no strength, but there could be no unity without education and mutual understanding. The Stu.rites preached respect for individuals, but in all consideraticms the nation as a whole came first, and the nation's welfare called for sacrifices (8). They pointed to the com-· mon property, the heritage of the Slova:k people - its language, morals, customs and its homeland - w'hich unites the nation as a whole and commands it to go forward toward its goal unitedly. It is in this union that we must seek the rights of individuals, the assurance of freedom, prosperity and spiritual values. Words, written or spoken, help, but without deeds they mean nothing. Work and more persevering work is necessary. The nation must feel that some one is backing it up, · really concerned about its welfare. Sentiment and justice must protect everyone equally. Thus we can elevate the peopie and help it; and only thus can we attain complete national unity. People must be dealt with humanely; this applies to, individuals and entire grouips, as well. �14 SLOVAKIA The Sturites dealt humanly with their nation; they elevated and united it into one moral unit, so that it would not fail in its resolves, but that its nationa.'l feelings, its nobility and aJl its desires would get proper exipression. Material and spiritual servitude hurt equally - both tend to :kill - and, therefore, the united nation must oppose both resolutely (9). The followers of Stur knew why they had to appeal to the mind, the feelin,g s and the character of their nation; aJso w'hy they had to hit those who oppressed it. The Slovaks were threatened with complete annihilation. There was danger that the one and the other side might resort to extremes. The Stu.rites had to 'harden the Slovaks to face realities; they 'lrn.ew that every battle was won by those who were stronger, bctteT .p repared and ha.rdened(lO). Stur and his fo1lowers knew they co.uid gam practica,lly nothing without first uniting their nation. They took their work seriously and were guided by the principle that renegades are punished even by God, because they sin grievously against the rights of their peop:Je (11). Their task was not to con:. vert renegades, but to teach their people to help themselves, to recognize and fight for their God-'given rights. Stur realized the importance of newspa,pers, hence took it uipon himself to establish a 1Sl01Vak newspa,per. He applied for permission to publish a Slovalk newspaper, but his request was not allowed until three yea.TS later, after many trips and letters to Budaipest and Vienna. When the SL0~ VENS1KJE NARODNJID NOV[NI ( S'loivalk National News) and its supplement, the TA'IIB.ANSKY" OiROL (Eagle of the Tatras), finally were issued, the Slovaks received them with great joy and subscribed to them. The papers served their mission well for three years, when they were confiscated by the government, uniting the ,people, teaching and entertaining them, and encouraging them during the most · stirring times in their history. Stur's newspapers served all strata of Slovaks, the intelligentsia, the laiborer, the peasant, the minister of the Gospel, the merchant, and the tradesman. The MagyaTs soon realized what the .papers were doing for the Slova:k people and raised an alarum to have them outlawed. But there can be no, denying the fact 1 �SLOVAKIA 15 that they had fulfilled their mission well. The Slovaks did awaken nationally; without the newspapers Srur and his followers wol.cld not have achieved the success .they did in uniting the Slovaks in so short a time. Stur and his followers were realists. They ,c ame out of the ,peop1'e and worked with the ,p eople to uplift them. They knew their jois am.d sorrows, the difficulties that beset them; the misery and injustices suffered by them. Burt they knew, too, that complaining and ,w hining a;borut the sad lot of the Slovaik,s wouM not he1p to do away with injustice and poverty. So, they encouraged the ,p eople to help themselves by over.coming indolence and ignorance, and becoming ente11prising; to abandon ancient methods in the trades and agriculture and the schools and to iearn the new, more efficient ways of doing things in all fields of endeavor. Stur and his school are responsible for a wealth of literature about the school question, the :necessity of cultivating the native language, the significance of enlightenment, the theatre, reading societies and libraries, Slovaik agric'lrlture and indwstry, money, taxes, animal husbandry, and a host of other subjects. They organized temperance societies and ctdtural and social institutions; and taught in Sunday scho.ols. The movement of Sbur was ,probably the most interesting movement of all time ~n Slovakia. Stur and hIB followers were not idle dreamers, but practical idealists who really had the welfare and security of their Slovak people at heart.. They shall always be remembered by a grateful S'lovwk nation. 1. Compare 'Mi1an Pisut: "Pociatky basnickej i!ikoly Sturov ej" (The !Beginnings of Stur's Poetical Sc'hool), Bratislava, 1938, pp. 116, 251. 2. "Slovenskje Narodiije Novini," Vol . 2, No. 61, p. 244. 3. P . Z. Hosti!llSkY in I/he SiNN, Vol. 4, No. 278, p. 1109. 4. SNN, Vol. 2, No. 84, p. 333, etc. 6. Jan Fr,a ncis,ci: "VJ.a.stny zivotopis" (1My Own Biogr,aphy), Turc. Sv. Martin, 1909, p. 38. · 6. This is upheld also by Dr. Jos•e,ph Miloslav Hurban in his biography of Stur: "Slov,enske Pohfady" (Slov,a;k Views), 1833, p. 74, etc. 7. Daniel Ra1>ant •CaJIIle to t'he same conclusion in his "Dejiny slovenskeho povstainia r. 1848-49" (:Book 1, p.,170), wher-e he states: "Stur',s newspapers were read .in the towns and villages, even in the court• yrurds of the more sensitive -and nationally more preserved. lower �16 8. 9. 10. 11. SLOVAKIA n obility. T·h e voice of tJhis na tion al organ und er S tur was a r eal pow,e r that 'h,a d t o be r eckoned wit'h." C ompare M. P isut, above, p . 181. L . St u r in the articl'e "Na se polozeiij e vo v1asti" (Our Situation in the Homeland), ,Slov. Nar. No'V'mi, Vol. 2, Nos. 117-120, pp. 467-68 ; 471-72; 47 5-7 6; 4W-80. Stur in t h e met, Marnh 10, 1848 : " I oo ,not like to ref ea- to historical r ights, beeause I b>elieve that h e who shows ·s trength also assumes th e right ... ", .SN N, Vol. 3, No . 270, p. 1078. M. P isu t, a bove, p. 188. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Communism not only commits outrageous injustice against wll civil ,s ociety ... , but it also ruin,s all personal initiative, self-determination, endeavor, and enthusiasm; it abso[utely precludes generous, active fraternal charity.... It divides the family, it destroys the household and thus it opens wide the door to every t:w>e of immorality, dissolution, and indulgence. It shatter,s all the bonds of socia.'l living. In place of holy ties, it offers pmfiteering, rioting, and their l:iJke and thus it degrades man to animal ~evel. "Communi1sm, then, has matured to, the same degree as athe:i!sm and defection from Christianity ... In all types of communtsm, whatever their classification may be, the outlook is only toward a dismal life denied any ennob~ing joys. It brings in its wa!ke despotism of the grossest kind. "Let commll!Il1SiII1 1bu:sy itself, making every endeavrnr and every righteous representatiolll it will, protesting that it aims to secure the rights, orf the people, the fact remains that it know:s :nothing wbout humanity. It degrades it deplor1tbly. And !because it cleaves to its tenets wh!Lch are impractical and ll!Ilreaii•za;ble, it ranks among the wildest of offohooits ever conceived by the human brain." - (Louis Stur: SLOVAlNiSTVO A SVET BU!DUC'NIOS'N (:SlaJVdom and the World of the Future) . • • • You can help the righteous cause ·of the Slovak people - their fight against Communism and for their freedom and independence - by sending a contribution t.o the Slovak League of America: Mr. ·Milan V. Blazek, treasurer, 4922 S. Leclaire A venue, Chicago 38, Ill. � 11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the �12 SLOVAKIA Slovak pUiblic. The •~Plody" (Fruits), "Jitfonka" (Morning Star), HU!I"ban's "Nitra," Pa1kovic's "Tatranka" (Tatra News), Kuzmany's "Hro:nka" (Hron News), and Fej.erpa~ ta!ky's "Novy i stary vlastenecky ka.!lendar" (The New and the Old Patriotic Almanac)- all these worthy periodicals resuilted from the enthusiasm of clean hearts and the noble characters of Stu,r 's group. These endeavors, as well as the contacts of the youth with the public during vacation, were the next to the last step for the Sturites in thek preparation to devote themselves with all their strength to the needs of the people. They had hardly left their school benches when the in~ terest of their people became one of their desires; all were willing to serve in the capacity they were best fitted for. When they left school the foUowers of Stur returned to their people, lived with them, toiled with them, and b,ore the burdens of the day with them. They kneiw the virtues and shortcomings of the Slovaks. They realized that socia'l and economic ill,s were caused by the ruling Magyars and decided to do sometliing about it. They knew that to save their peo,ple, they had to educate them politicalJy and correct the mistakes of the past (1). After God, the people were nearest and dearest to the Stu.rites. They did not fea:r the peorple, despite the fact that the S1ovaks were referred to in the most derogatory manner. The Magyars said that the Slovaks were stupid, but the Sturites knew that the Slo:va1ks were a simple but very able and capable people. Probably the greatest fatrlt of the Slovaks was that they were very obedient and addicted to certain failings. The latter, however, couJd be removed, and the Stu.rites set themselves to that very task (2). The greater the press,u re of the owosition, the more profound the reaction of the Sturites. Pressure evoked re~ sistance; as one voice there resounded in Slovakia: "Everything for our 1Slovak people" (3). They helped their humiliated and neglected people by a!ll means at their disposal, because they knew that above all else it was necessary to lead the people to the point where it could lriberate itself from the misrakes and symptoms of slavery, and then complete freedom would follow. �SLOVAKIA 13 That meant that the Stu.rites were for the peo,ple with their whole being; they listened patiently to a,11 complaints and proitesrt:s, and sympathized with their misery; and, orf course, were detel'Inined to fight against all injustices ( 4). One of them summarized the wo:rik of the followers of Stur thus'l y: "Stu.r's school became 0111e of the most effective factors in the life of the Sloivruk nratiion" (5). The foliowers of Stur concerned themselves with the welfare of the entire nation. They fought to improve their economy, but they ailso fought with equa1 vigor against alcoholism, indifference, and illiteracy. They lrubored to uplift the spirit and to rouse nation consciousness not only by speaking and writing, but biY their practical work among all classes of their people, visiting even the lowliest to transform their minds and to use their strength so that they might save themselves from ruin (6). And the ,Slova:k people responded wholeheartedly when Stur began to pUJb1ish his "SloiVensikje Narodnje Novini" and the "Orol Tatransky" -which became a ,power that had to :b e rec!koned with, because they found favor with the common peo,ple, the intelligentsia and the gentry (7). Without unity there could be no strength, but there could be no unity without education and mutual understanding. The Stu.rites preached respect for individuals, but in all consideraticms the nation as a whole came first, and the nation's welfare called for sacrifices (8). They pointed to the com-· mon property, the heritage of the Slova:k people - its language, morals, customs and its homeland - w'hich unites the nation as a whole and commands it to go forward toward its goal unitedly. It is in this union that we must seek the rights of individuals, the assurance of freedom, prosperity and spiritual values. Words, written or spoken, help, but without deeds they mean nothing. Work and more persevering work is necessary. The nation must feel that some one is backing it up, · really concerned about its welfare. Sentiment and justice must protect everyone equally. Thus we can elevate the peopie and help it; and only thus can we attain complete national unity. People must be dealt with humanely; this applies to, individuals and entire grouips, as well. �14 SLOVAKIA The Sturites dealt humanly with their nation; they elevated and united it into one moral unit, so that it would not fail in its resolves, but that its nationa.'l feelings, its nobility and aJl its desires would get proper exipression. Material and spiritual servitude hurt equally - both tend to :kill - and, therefore, the united nation must oppose both resolutely (9). The followers of Stur knew why they had to appeal to the mind, the feelin,g s and the character of their nation; aJso w'hy they had to hit those who oppressed it. The Slovaks were threatened with complete annihilation. There was danger that the one and the other side might resort to extremes. The Stu.rites had to 'harden the Slovaks to face realities; they 'lrn.ew that every battle was won by those who were stronger, bctteT .p repared and ha.rdened(lO). Stur and his fo1lowers knew they co.uid gam practica,lly nothing without first uniting their nation. They took their work seriously and were guided by the principle that renegades are punished even by God, because they sin grievously against the rights of their peop:Je (11). Their task was not to con:. vert renegades, but to teach their people to help themselves, to recognize and fight for their God-'given rights. Stur realized the importance of newspa,pers, hence took it uipon himself to establish a 1Sl01Vak newspa,per. He applied for permission to publish a Slovalk newspaper, but his request was not allowed until three yea.TS later, after many trips and letters to Budaipest and Vienna. When the SL0~ VENS1KJE NARODNJID NOV[NI ( S'loivalk National News) and its supplement, the TA'IIB.ANSKY" OiROL (Eagle of the Tatras), finally were issued, the Slovaks received them with great joy and subscribed to them. The papers served their mission well for three years, when they were confiscated by the government, uniting the ,people, teaching and entertaining them, and encouraging them during the most · stirring times in their history. Stur's newspapers served all strata of Slovaks, the intelligentsia, the laiborer, the peasant, the minister of the Gospel, the merchant, and the tradesman. The MagyaTs soon realized what the .papers were doing for the Slova:k people and raised an alarum to have them outlawed. But there can be no, denying the fact 1 �SLOVAKIA 15 that they had fulfilled their mission well. The Slovaks did awaken nationally; without the newspapers Srur and his followers wol.cld not have achieved the success .they did in uniting the Slovaks in so short a time. Stur and his followers were realists. They ,c ame out of the ,peop1'e and worked with the ,p eople to uplift them. They knew their jois am.d sorrows, the difficulties that beset them; the misery and injustices suffered by them. Burt they knew, too, that complaining and ,w hining a;borut the sad lot of the Slovaik,s wouM not he1p to do away with injustice and poverty. So, they encouraged the ,p eople to help themselves by over.coming indolence and ignorance, and becoming ente11prising; to abandon ancient methods in the trades and agriculture and the schools and to iearn the new, more efficient ways of doing things in all fields of endeavor. Stur and his school are responsible for a wealth of literature about the school question, the :necessity of cultivating the native language, the significance of enlightenment, the theatre, reading societies and libraries, Slovaik agric'lrlture and indwstry, money, taxes, animal husbandry, and a host of other subjects. They organized temperance societies and ctdtural and social institutions; and taught in Sunday scho.ols. The movement of Sbur was ,probably the most interesting movement of all time ~n Slovakia. Stur and hIB followers were not idle dreamers, but practical idealists who really had the welfare and security of their Slovak people at heart.. They shall always be remembered by a grateful S'lovwk nation. 1. Compare 'Mi1an Pisut: "Pociatky basnickej i!ikoly Sturov ej" (The !Beginnings of Stur's Poetical Sc'hool), Bratislava, 1938, pp. 116, 251. 2. "Slovenskje Narodiije Novini," Vol . 2, No. 61, p. 244. 3. P . Z. Hosti!llSkY in I/he SiNN, Vol. 4, No. 278, p. 1109. 4. SNN, Vol. 2, No. 84, p. 333, etc. 6. Jan Fr,a ncis,ci: "VJ.a.stny zivotopis" (1My Own Biogr,aphy), Turc. Sv. Martin, 1909, p. 38. · 6. This is upheld also by Dr. Jos•e,ph Miloslav Hurban in his biography of Stur: "Slov,enske Pohfady" (Slov,a;k Views), 1833, p. 74, etc. 7. Daniel Ra1>ant •CaJIIle to t'he same conclusion in his "Dejiny slovenskeho povstainia r. 1848-49" (:Book 1, p.,170), wher-e he states: "Stur',s newspapers were read .in the towns and villages, even in the court• yrurds of the more sensitive -and nationally more preserved. lower �16 8. 9. 10. 11. SLOVAKIA n obility. T·h e voice of tJhis na tion al organ und er S tur was a r eal pow,e r that 'h,a d t o be r eckoned wit'h." C ompare M. P isut, above, p . 181. L . St u r in the articl'e "Na se polozeiij e vo v1asti" (Our Situation in the Homeland), ,Slov. Nar. No'V'mi, Vol. 2, Nos. 117-120, pp. 467-68 ; 471-72; 47 5-7 6; 4W-80. Stur in t h e met, Marnh 10, 1848 : " I oo ,not like to ref ea- to historical r ights, beeause I b>elieve that h e who shows ·s trength also assumes th e right ... ", .SN N, Vol. 3, No . 270, p. 1078. M. P isu t, a bove, p. 188. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Communism not only commits outrageous injustice against wll civil ,s ociety ... , but it also ruin,s all personal initiative, self-determination, endeavor, and enthusiasm; it abso[utely precludes generous, active fraternal charity.... It divides the family, it destroys the household and thus it opens wide the door to every t:w>e of immorality, dissolution, and indulgence. It shatter,s all the bonds of socia.'l living. In place of holy ties, it offers pmfiteering, rioting, and their l:iJke and thus it degrades man to animal ~evel. "Communi1sm, then, has matured to, the same degree as athe:i!sm and defection from Christianity ... In all types of communtsm, whatever their classification may be, the outlook is only toward a dismal life denied any ennob~ing joys. It brings in its wa!ke despotism of the grossest kind. "Let commll!Il1SiII1 1bu:sy itself, making every endeavrnr and every righteous representatiolll it will, protesting that it aims to secure the rights, orf the people, the fact remains that it know:s :nothing wbout humanity. It degrades it deplor1tbly. And !because it cleaves to its tenets wh!Lch are impractical and ll!Ilreaii•za;ble, it ranks among the wildest of offohooits ever conceived by the human brain." - (Louis Stur: SLOVAlNiSTVO A SVET BU!DUC'NIOS'N (:SlaJVdom and the World of the Future) . • • • You can help the righteous cause ·of the Slovak people - their fight against Communism and for their freedom and independence - by sending a contribution t.o the Slovak League of America: Mr. ·Milan V. Blazek, treasurer, 4922 S. Leclaire A venue, Chicago 38, Ill. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the 12 SLOVAKIA Slovak pUiblic. The •~Plody" (Fruits), "Jitfonka" (Morning Star), HU!I"ban's "Nitra," Pa1kovic's "Tatranka" (Tatra News), Kuzmany's "Hro:nka" (Hron News), and Fej.erpa~ ta!ky's "Novy i stary vlastenecky ka.!lendar" (The New and the Old Patriotic Almanac)- all these worthy periodicals resuilted from the enthusiasm of clean hearts and the noble characters of Stu,r 's group. These endeavors, as well as the contacts of the youth with the public during vacation, were the next to the last step for the Sturites in thek preparation to devote themselves with all their strength to the needs of the people. They had hardly left their school benches when the in~ terest of their people became one of their desires; all were willing to serve in the capacity they were best fitted for. When they left school the foUowers of Stur returned to their people, lived with them, toiled with them, and b,ore the burdens of the day with them. They kneiw the virtues and shortcomings of the Slovaks. They realized that socia'l and economic ill,s were caused by the ruling Magyars and decided to do sometliing about it. They knew that to save their peo,ple, they had to educate them politicalJy and correct the mistakes of the past (1). After God, the people were nearest and dearest to the Stu.rites. They did not fea:r the peorple, despite the fact that the S1ovaks were referred to in the most derogatory manner. The Magyars said that the Slovaks were stupid, but the Sturites knew that the Slo:va1ks were a simple but very able and capable people. Probably the greatest fatrlt of the Slovaks was that they were very obedient and addicted to certain failings. The latter, however, couJd be removed, and the Stu.rites set themselves to that very task (2). The greater the press,u re of the owosition, the more profound the reaction of the Sturites. Pressure evoked re~ sistance; as one voice there resounded in Slovakia: "Everything for our 1Slovak people" (3). They helped their humiliated and neglected people by a!ll means at their disposal, because they knew that above all else it was necessary to lead the people to the point where it could lriberate itself from the misrakes and symptoms of slavery, and then complete freedom would follow. SLOVAKIA 13 That meant that the Stu.rites were for the peo,ple with their whole being; they listened patiently to a,11 complaints and proitesrt:s, and sympathized with their misery; and, orf course, were detel'Inined to fight against all injustices ( 4). One of them summarized the wo:rik of the followers of Stur thus'l y: "Stu.r's school became 0111e of the most effective factors in the life of the Sloivruk nratiion" (5). The foliowers of Stur concerned themselves with the welfare of the entire nation. They fought to improve their economy, but they ailso fought with equa1 vigor against alcoholism, indifference, and illiteracy. They lrubored to uplift the spirit and to rouse nation consciousness not only by speaking and writing, but biY their practical work among all classes of their people, visiting even the lowliest to transform their minds and to use their strength so that they might save themselves from ruin (6). And the ,Slova:k people responded wholeheartedly when Stur began to pUJb1ish his "SloiVensikje Narodnje Novini" and the "Orol Tatransky" -which became a ,power that had to :b e rec!koned with, because they found favor with the common peo,ple, the intelligentsia and the gentry (7). Without unity there could be no strength, but there could be no unity without education and mutual understanding. The Stu.rites preached respect for individuals, but in all consideraticms the nation as a whole came first, and the nation's welfare called for sacrifices (8). They pointed to the com-· mon property, the heritage of the Slova:k people - its language, morals, customs and its homeland - w'hich unites the nation as a whole and commands it to go forward toward its goal unitedly. It is in this union that we must seek the rights of individuals, the assurance of freedom, prosperity and spiritual values. Words, written or spoken, help, but without deeds they mean nothing. Work and more persevering work is necessary. The nation must feel that some one is backing it up, · really concerned about its welfare. Sentiment and justice must protect everyone equally. Thus we can elevate the peopie and help it; and only thus can we attain complete national unity. People must be dealt with humanely; this applies to, individuals and entire grouips, as well. 14 SLOVAKIA The Sturites dealt humanly with their nation; they elevated and united it into one moral unit, so that it would not fail in its resolves, but that its nationa.'l feelings, its nobility and aJl its desires would get proper exipression. Material and spiritual servitude hurt equally - both tend to :kill - and, therefore, the united nation must oppose both resolutely (9). The followers of Stur knew why they had to appeal to the mind, the feelin,g s and the character of their nation; aJso w'hy they had to hit those who oppressed it. The Slovaks were threatened with complete annihilation. There was danger that the one and the other side might resort to extremes. The Stu.rites had to 'harden the Slovaks to face realities; they 'lrn.ew that every battle was won by those who were stronger, bctteT .p repared and ha.rdened(lO). Stur and his fo1lowers knew they co.uid gam practica,lly nothing without first uniting their nation. They took their work seriously and were guided by the principle that renegades are punished even by God, because they sin grievously against the rights of their peop:Je (11). Their task was not to con:. vert renegades, but to teach their people to help themselves, to recognize and fight for their God-'given rights. Stur realized the importance of newspa,pers, hence took it uipon himself to establish a 1Sl01Vak newspa,per. He applied for permission to publish a Slovalk newspaper, but his request was not allowed until three yea.TS later, after many trips and letters to Budaipest and Vienna. When the SL0~ VENS1KJE NARODNJID NOV[NI ( S'loivalk National News) and its supplement, the TA'IIB.ANSKY" OiROL (Eagle of the Tatras), finally were issued, the Slovaks received them with great joy and subscribed to them. The papers served their mission well for three years, when they were confiscated by the government, uniting the ,people, teaching and entertaining them, and encouraging them during the most · stirring times in their history. Stur's newspapers served all strata of Slovaks, the intelligentsia, the laiborer, the peasant, the minister of the Gospel, the merchant, and the tradesman. The MagyaTs soon realized what the .papers were doing for the Slova:k people and raised an alarum to have them outlawed. But there can be no, denying the fact 1 SLOVAKIA 15 that they had fulfilled their mission well. The Slovaks did awaken nationally; without the newspapers Srur and his followers wol.cld not have achieved the success .they did in uniting the Slovaks in so short a time. Stur and his followers were realists. They ,c ame out of the ,peop1'e and worked with the ,p eople to uplift them. They knew their jois am.d sorrows, the difficulties that beset them; the misery and injustices suffered by them. Burt they knew, too, that complaining and ,w hining a;borut the sad lot of the Slovaik,s wouM not he1p to do away with injustice and poverty. So, they encouraged the ,p eople to help themselves by over.coming indolence and ignorance, and becoming ente11prising; to abandon ancient methods in the trades and agriculture and the schools and to iearn the new, more efficient ways of doing things in all fields of endeavor. Stur and his school are responsible for a wealth of literature about the school question, the :necessity of cultivating the native language, the significance of enlightenment, the theatre, reading societies and libraries, Slovaik agric'lrlture and indwstry, money, taxes, animal husbandry, and a host of other subjects. They organized temperance societies and ctdtural and social institutions; and taught in Sunday scho.ols. The movement of Sbur was ,probably the most interesting movement of all time ~n Slovakia. Stur and hIB followers were not idle dreamers, but practical idealists who really had the welfare and security of their Slovak people at heart.. They shall always be remembered by a grateful S'lovwk nation. 1. Compare 'Mi1an Pisut: "Pociatky basnickej i!ikoly Sturov ej" (The !Beginnings of Stur's Poetical Sc'hool), Bratislava, 1938, pp. 116, 251. 2. "Slovenskje Narodiije Novini," Vol . 2, No. 61, p. 244. 3. P . Z. Hosti!llSkY in I/he SiNN, Vol. 4, No. 278, p. 1109. 4. SNN, Vol. 2, No. 84, p. 333, etc. 6. Jan Fr,a ncis,ci: "VJ.a.stny zivotopis" (1My Own Biogr,aphy), Turc. Sv. Martin, 1909, p. 38. · 6. This is upheld also by Dr. Jos•e,ph Miloslav Hurban in his biography of Stur: "Slov,enske Pohfady" (Slov,a;k Views), 1833, p. 74, etc. 7. Daniel Ra1>ant •CaJIIle to t'he same conclusion in his "Dejiny slovenskeho povstainia r. 1848-49" (:Book 1, p.,170), wher-e he states: "Stur',s newspapers were read .in the towns and villages, even in the court• yrurds of the more sensitive -and nationally more preserved. lower 16 8. 9. 10. 11. SLOVAKIA n obility. T·h e voice of tJhis na tion al organ und er S tur was a r eal pow,e r that 'h,a d t o be r eckoned wit'h." C ompare M. P isut, above, p . 181. L . St u r in the articl'e "Na se polozeiij e vo v1asti" (Our Situation in the Homeland), ,Slov. Nar. No'V'mi, Vol. 2, Nos. 117-120, pp. 467-68 ; 471-72; 47 5-7 6; 4W-80. Stur in t h e met, Marnh 10, 1848 : " I oo ,not like to ref ea- to historical r ights, beeause I b>elieve that h e who shows ·s trength also assumes th e right ... ", .SN N, Vol. 3, No . 270, p. 1078. M. P isu t, a bove, p. 188. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Communism not only commits outrageous injustice against wll civil ,s ociety ... , but it also ruin,s all personal initiative, self-determination, endeavor, and enthusiasm; it abso[utely precludes generous, active fraternal charity.... It divides the family, it destroys the household and thus it opens wide the door to every t:w>e of immorality, dissolution, and indulgence. It shatter,s all the bonds of socia.'l living. In place of holy ties, it offers pmfiteering, rioting, and their l:iJke and thus it degrades man to animal ~evel. "Communi1sm, then, has matured to, the same degree as athe:i!sm and defection from Christianity ... In all types of communtsm, whatever their classification may be, the outlook is only toward a dismal life denied any ennob~ing joys. It brings in its wa!ke despotism of the grossest kind. "Let commll!Il1SiII1 1bu:sy itself, making every endeavrnr and every righteous representatiolll it will, protesting that it aims to secure the rights, orf the people, the fact remains that it know:s :nothing wbout humanity. It degrades it deplor1tbly. And !because it cleaves to its tenets wh!Lch are impractical and ll!Ilreaii•za;ble, it ranks among the wildest of offohooits ever conceived by the human brain." - (Louis Stur: SLOVAlNiSTVO A SVET BU!DUC'NIOS'N (:SlaJVdom and the World of the Future) . • • • You can help the righteous cause ·of the Slovak people - their fight against Communism and for their freedom and independence - by sending a contribution t.o the Slovak League of America: Mr. ·Milan V. Blazek, treasurer, 4922 S. Leclaire A venue, Chicago 38, Ill.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Štúr's Group in the Service of the People Description An account of the resource Joseph Paučo Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), March 1956 pp. 11-16 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1956 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/82c911652f06669a035681777a59135b.pdf 4a24bd63f4ddad2faf45a79ce0d14d70 PDF Text Text 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926. � 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 44 SLOVAKIA tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special interest, because they are creations of the common people. In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects. The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training. • • • • SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe. Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes; and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths. The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about 125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons. The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes. Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927. lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be vis!ted with ease. Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Subterranean Caves of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 p. 44 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8cd7764b11c24fe842f572e803779957.pdf b04c3ecb3b5d6c21bccaf9b002f2b9c8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 133 Success Story ALVENA SECKAR ''Take Lybushka back with you to America,'' urged my uncle. "She' 11 become rich like your mother." "Like my mother!" I repeated to myself. Yes, from the way they looked at it, my mother had done quite well. She had come to America, had married, bore two children, educated them and now owned two houses. They did not know what kind of houses, but that did not alter the basic fact. True, my mother had committed a few sins on the way, like getting divorced and remarrying. She had fallen into a few pitfalls, now and then, but they were past now. Such things are forgiven. The end justifies the means. Lybushka would be a success, too, and her children would be like me. I stared at my uncle. This man was my mother's brother. The resemblance to my mother was startling. He had the same slight build, the same line worn broad face with high cheekbones, and the identical worried looking deep sunken blue gray eyes. He was a little boy when my mother last saw him forty years ago. This was back in the early 1900s when my mother was sixteen, the same age as Lybushka now was. She took off for the mythical land of America to pick the gold off its streets. Her two older sisters who had preceded her were either too ashamed to write back to dispel the fable or else felt that misery should have company and did nothing to prevent my mother from joining them. I looked around. My mother had left this self-same high peaked log house nestled in these unchanging mountains in northern Slovakia. My mind went back to those rare instances when my mother permitted herself to be sentimental, usually after some adverse fortune, and recalled this home with tears in her eyes. My uncle had never left it. He was the only son of a family of four surviving girls. The other children, all seven of them, had died in infancy. His father, my grandfather, had died of pneumonia when my uncle was a little boy and his was the responsibility of continuing the Alvena Seckar is a highly prized writer of children' s stories . This story appears here for the first time. �134 SLOVAKIA family. At first , it had not been too difficult with the additional inheritance of the three sisters who had gone away. True , there had been some squabbles over land ownership with the remaining sister, but they were nothing serious . But now, his family of seven daughters and only one son (Alas!) made it too crowded . " Lybushka was smart in school," continued my uncle. "She learned the Catechism from cover to cover before anyone else! ' ' So had my mother, I mused , in Hungarian, in a school of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. She had learned it by heart, but she had never learned to read or to write. Fortified with such knowledge, my mother had sailed for America . When she talks of that trip, she relates how the first class passengers amused themselves by throwing oranges down to steerage, where she was , to watch the wretched mob scramble , and perhaps fight , for the precious fruit. My remembrance of the trip is identified with that cluster of deep gouged out scars of her upper arm. They are the result of the vaccination against small pox some well meaning but callous civil servant inflicted upon her when she reached these shores. At the dock, her sisters greeted her by stripping her of her hand woven dresses and linens, which they later secretly sold, already wise to their market value. After "Americanizing" her with a cheap cotton dress , they dropped her off as a domestic in a home where there was no verbal communication possible with her new mistress . ''Take the cover off the baby's face!' ' her mistress yelled from the fifth floor down to my mother airing the baby in her carriage down on the sidewalk. My mother wrapped her closer. '' She ' 11 smother! '' the woman screamed . My mother bundled the baby tighter. " You 're fired! " screeched the exasperated woman as she puffed from the exertion of running down the four flights of the sidewalk. The last order with explicit motions was plainly understood . " I didn 't mind," said my mother to me many years later. " She never gave me enough to eat. ' ' Somehow, someway, she found another job, and later, many other jobs for the seven years she remained single. Small pay, starvation and extraordinary hard work characterized this period , first in New York , then in Pittsburgh, where she went with a rlewly found girlfriend on the information that many rich men from the coal mines· and the steel mills were there. This was the boom period when World War I had already started in Europe. �SLOVAKIA 135 Such trials only intensi.fied my mother's efforts to get the gold for which her trip had been made. By this time, if nothing better came her way, she had decided to go back home and directed all her energies toward that goal. She kept her savings for the trip in a roll in her stocking under her long skirt which was then the fashion. A bank as a place to deposit money was not thought of. Just as she almost had enough, she discovered one day that it was gone! With it, her final chance to go back home . World War I was spreading and the miners, now working every day, came into Pittsburgh on their occasional day off. They put on a big front with their lavish spending and my mother must have been swept off her feet by the show of one of them, who became my father . It would be proper to give my mother the benefit of the doubt and say that she fell in love with my father and was not overcome by his display of money. Her married life, as much as I know of it those first few years, will not permit me to state this unequivocally. I know it was a stormy time. Her frugal habits were in continual conflict with my father ' s easy going nature. It deprived him of much pleasure. The excuse of the long hours he worked was of no avail with my mother. By the time the work at the mines slowed down after the war, my mother had saved enough money from his salary, from her taking in other people's wash, and from the two boarders who occupied one of the two bedrooms in the house (My brother and I slept with our parents.), to put a down payment on a farm in distant Connecticut. When she found that my father took to carousing instead of farm work, she gave up the whole idea and moved back to the mines . The next time she accumulated enough money, she was talked into investing it into the founding of a coal mine which turned out to be a grand swindle. The water in the mine could not be pumped out. By this time my father must have been rather weary of such unending and unremunerative effort and took to drinking with even greater gusto. One of the boarders who put up a good show of having money and property found my mother willing to transfer her affections. This happened when I was eight and my brother six. Again, for years, I gave my mother the benefit of the doubt for leaving this man by telling myself and the world that she did so when she found out he was a coal company spy . Actually, he did not have the money or the houses with which he seduced her. In all fairness , though the evidence so far warrants it, I cannot accuse my mother of using wealth as the prime criteria of her attitude toward men. She met the man who was to become my stepfather, legally, when he was working in the hard coal mines . She remained �136 SLOVAKIA loyal to him during a long coal strike, even loaned him some of her hard earned money she made in the shirt factory in which she worked. However, the same painstaking accumulation of money ensued with my stepfather. First, however, his one foible for gambling had to be crushed. This my mother did by unerringly locating where the game was in progress and promptly making a scene on the premises. It was not long before my stepfather was unable to find a place to do his gambling and he resigned himself to go along with my mother. After awhile it was no longer difficult. Their first monetary venture proved no more successful than any of the others my mother had engaged in. Real estate swindlers from a distant industrial city induced them to purchase some house lots on the installment plan. " We have a job for you in a factory there, " they promised. That sounded good to my stepfather who was blacklisted from working in the hard coal mine where he had been on strike. When we all got to the city, the factory job lasted one month before the establishment collapsed in the first throes of the post-war depression. It took longer for my parents to find out the lots were equally spurious . After the last payment was made , several years later, my parents discovered that they and hundreds of others from the coal regions had been defrauded. Since none of the people involved knew each other or what to do , nothing was done and the real estate thieves went on with their merciless racket. Times were hard in the city and my stepfather was part of the large army of unemployed during the depression. My mother came to the rescue and got a job in a tobacco factory. The smell of the tobacco was overpowering and I remember that for weeks she came home vomiting, unable to eat until the tobacco odor was out of her system . " You' 11 get used to it , " said the forelady . My mother did. Another job was hard to get. Not to be outdone, my stepfather set up a small shoe repair shop where he did all the work by hand. His meager earnings together with my mother's were enough to continue payments on the nonexistent lots and even to put some aside. This was done by the utmost economy. Only the smallest electric bulbs were used in our house and the electricity w¥ on only when absolutely necessary. Reading was not a necessity at any time guring my entire childhood and it was left to me to read in my adult life many of the books I should have read as a child. We had no central heating and coal was used very sparingly in our one and only kitchen stove . Even the ashes were carefully picked over for reuse of the partially burned coal. �SLOVAKIA 137 It was bad enough for me at school to be so different from the other children - most of them ~ith American-born parents, for we lived on the fringe of a well-to-do ' area. Added to this self-consciousness in attitude was the discomfiture I felt in my old fashioned home made clothes. The one art which my mother never mastered was sewing. To this day, I feel pained when I look at photographs of myself in some of those homely and shapeless concoctions from reused cloth. In recent years I found out it was due to her poor eyesight, but she would not spare the money for glasses! Only the possession of my own money offered a solution to me. Though I was only twelve, the neighborhood we lived in did provide some opportunities if I could but take them. A Greek restaurant was next door. The bachelor owner often tried to invite me into his back room kitchen. ''I'll give you a nickel,' ' he urged. I shook my head. " I'll give you a quarter!" He was insistent. My mother's call or a customer invariably saved me. Behind us lived a tinsmith. He was from Vienna where his wife and three children lived. He, too, was accumulating money feverishly and unstintingly. He did his own cooking, cleaning and sewing. America was a corrupt land of materialism to him but he was here to make himself a fortune with which he would live the rest of his life in luxury in his beloved Vienna. He tried to be friends with me. "On pay day, I'll give you a dime, " he coaxed. "No," I answered. "I'll take you to the movies," he continued. My mother would find out so I ran away . On the corner was a barber shop. The man who owned it often stood outside as I passed on my way home from school. He smiled, and as he did so showed his ugly shiny front gold tooth. He jingled the coins in his pocket. " Come on in," he invited. Someone would see me. I walked on. Not all our neighbors were set to ensnare me. Near-by was an Italian grocery. From the street it smelled of stale, pungent cheeses and decaying vegetable matter. Mr. and Mrs. Natalo and all seven of their children always filled the store with noise and laughter. I am sure they were their best customers , but they were generous with me, too, asking nothing of me in return. They had no money to give me, but they did give me the taste for the bitter crinkled ripe olives in large open barrels in front of the counter and for the numerous hard Italian �138 SLOVAKIA cheeses which hung in disarray all around the shop . I did not feel out of place in their home. When some money was again gotten together, we moved to another neighborhood, hardly an improvement over the other, but I was more at home in the new school where a polyglot of nationalities mingled. My mother opened up a small lunch room on the basis of her brief experience in the Greek restaurant next door when she lost her job at the tobacco factory . Her first customers were the men who worked with my stepfather on a WP A badly needed sewer project in front of the house. My mother is a good cook and financially things went well, but I was in my early teens and was desperately conscious of my status and appearance. I needed and wanted money more than ever . If I did not succumb to the spurious invitations of the men in the neighborhood, of whom there were many, it was only because stealing money from my unmathematical mother was easier . This I did with a clear conscience for the money was used for what I considered absolute necessities. I was able to take piano lessons because I told my mother they were half the price of what they actually were. I also paid for my dental care and thus saved my teeth. My brother, unfortunately, had to lose several of his molars because my mother with her false teeth never understood the necessity for dental care. I also used the money to purchase better quality clothing than the money my mother gave me permitted. In spite of this minor leak in my mother's resources, enough money was soon saved to purchase a small house on another street. It was not much of a house. It had no bathroom or central heating but the cellar was almost street level and my stepfather converted it into a small lunch room - which also served as our entrance to the upstairs part of the house . Life went on as before with perhaps less privacy. My mother was in the store from dawn to late at night seven days a week. She even indulged in a little back room bootlegging during prohibition. (For which she had to pay off the local police every month.) This time the money was put into a local bank. She also grudgingly spared some to pay for violin lessons for my brother. ·\ This time the money grew a little faster. •Unforlunately, the bank crash of the thirties took most of it. Undaunted , life went on in the same way. Nothing drastic occurred to alter the further course of monetary gain, except perhaps a rather heavy drain when the problem of schooling came up . �SLOVAKIA 139 My desire for an education was not taken too seriously because of the conflict between my mother and myself over my going out with boys. Her solution of my awareness of the opposite sex was one of violent objection. •\ '' All men only want to use you ,'' she counselled. ' 'They ' 11 only get you into trouble!" she insisted . I believed her for a long time. It was then that I learned that the two children that one of her older sisters had (one died in early adulthood of tuberculosis) were each born illigitimately during her relations with two different men , neither of whom married her. Her other sister, in my mother's opinion , did not fare any better. She had five very small children in as many years , and if her husband had not been killed in a mining accident, she would have had many more . Her conclusion was that a man did not care . A woman had to be independent, smart and take care of herself. Nevertheless, I managed to get through college with help from her and many others. Mostly I worked. My brother , on the other hand , received other advice. " Don 't let any woman make a fool of you, " admonished my mother. " I won 't ," answered my brother. He was immersed in secretly reading a pornographic novel. He was already following her advice in an affair he was having with one of his schoolmates. His schooling was more pleasant than mine for he did not have to work his way , nor did he have to depend on anyone else's charity. When he finally got married, he apologetically explained to my mother , '' I'm sorry for her!' ' Today , he is surprised to see the antagonisms between her and his wife . With both her children out of the way , my mother and my stepfather have no drain on their income except themselves. They live as sparingly as they ever did even in the days when there was very little money. Though their home now has central heating, they keep it so low that a sweater or a jacket is their permanent home attire during the cold weather. They permit themselves no luxuries . The money accumulates. I flatly refused to assist my uncle in bringing Lybushka to America . � SLOVAKIA 133 Success Story ALVENA SECKAR ''Take Lybushka back with you to America,'' urged my uncle. "She' 11 become rich like your mother." "Like my mother!" I repeated to myself. Yes, from the way they looked at it, my mother had done quite well. She had come to America, had married, bore two children, educated them and now owned two houses. They did not know what kind of houses, but that did not alter the basic fact. True, my mother had committed a few sins on the way, like getting divorced and remarrying. She had fallen into a few pitfalls, now and then, but they were past now. Such things are forgiven. The end justifies the means. Lybushka would be a success, too, and her children would be like me. I stared at my uncle. This man was my mother's brother. The resemblance to my mother was startling. He had the same slight build, the same line worn broad face with high cheekbones, and the identical worried looking deep sunken blue gray eyes. He was a little boy when my mother last saw him forty years ago. This was back in the early 1900s when my mother was sixteen, the same age as Lybushka now was. She took off for the mythical land of America to pick the gold off its streets. Her two older sisters who had preceded her were either too ashamed to write back to dispel the fable or else felt that misery should have company and did nothing to prevent my mother from joining them. I looked around. My mother had left this self-same high peaked log house nestled in these unchanging mountains in northern Slovakia. My mind went back to those rare instances when my mother permitted herself to be sentimental, usually after some adverse fortune, and recalled this home with tears in her eyes. My uncle had never left it. He was the only son of a family of four surviving girls. The other children, all seven of them, had died in infancy. His father, my grandfather, had died of pneumonia when my uncle was a little boy and his was the responsibility of continuing the Alvena Seckar is a highly prized writer of children' s stories . This story appears here for the first time. �134 SLOVAKIA family. At first , it had not been too difficult with the additional inheritance of the three sisters who had gone away. True , there had been some squabbles over land ownership with the remaining sister, but they were nothing serious . But now, his family of seven daughters and only one son (Alas!) made it too crowded . " Lybushka was smart in school," continued my uncle. "She learned the Catechism from cover to cover before anyone else! ' ' So had my mother, I mused , in Hungarian, in a school of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. She had learned it by heart, but she had never learned to read or to write. Fortified with such knowledge, my mother had sailed for America . When she talks of that trip, she relates how the first class passengers amused themselves by throwing oranges down to steerage, where she was , to watch the wretched mob scramble , and perhaps fight , for the precious fruit. My remembrance of the trip is identified with that cluster of deep gouged out scars of her upper arm. They are the result of the vaccination against small pox some well meaning but callous civil servant inflicted upon her when she reached these shores. At the dock, her sisters greeted her by stripping her of her hand woven dresses and linens, which they later secretly sold, already wise to their market value. After "Americanizing" her with a cheap cotton dress , they dropped her off as a domestic in a home where there was no verbal communication possible with her new mistress . ''Take the cover off the baby's face!' ' her mistress yelled from the fifth floor down to my mother airing the baby in her carriage down on the sidewalk. My mother wrapped her closer. '' She ' 11 smother! '' the woman screamed . My mother bundled the baby tighter. " You 're fired! " screeched the exasperated woman as she puffed from the exertion of running down the four flights of the sidewalk. The last order with explicit motions was plainly understood . " I didn 't mind," said my mother to me many years later. " She never gave me enough to eat. ' ' Somehow, someway, she found another job, and later, many other jobs for the seven years she remained single. Small pay, starvation and extraordinary hard work characterized this period , first in New York , then in Pittsburgh, where she went with a rlewly found girlfriend on the information that many rich men from the coal mines· and the steel mills were there. This was the boom period when World War I had already started in Europe. �SLOVAKIA 135 Such trials only intensi.fied my mother's efforts to get the gold for which her trip had been made. By this time, if nothing better came her way, she had decided to go back home and directed all her energies toward that goal. She kept her savings for the trip in a roll in her stocking under her long skirt which was then the fashion. A bank as a place to deposit money was not thought of. Just as she almost had enough, she discovered one day that it was gone! With it, her final chance to go back home . World War I was spreading and the miners, now working every day, came into Pittsburgh on their occasional day off. They put on a big front with their lavish spending and my mother must have been swept off her feet by the show of one of them, who became my father . It would be proper to give my mother the benefit of the doubt and say that she fell in love with my father and was not overcome by his display of money. Her married life, as much as I know of it those first few years, will not permit me to state this unequivocally. I know it was a stormy time. Her frugal habits were in continual conflict with my father ' s easy going nature. It deprived him of much pleasure. The excuse of the long hours he worked was of no avail with my mother. By the time the work at the mines slowed down after the war, my mother had saved enough money from his salary, from her taking in other people's wash, and from the two boarders who occupied one of the two bedrooms in the house (My brother and I slept with our parents.), to put a down payment on a farm in distant Connecticut. When she found that my father took to carousing instead of farm work, she gave up the whole idea and moved back to the mines . The next time she accumulated enough money, she was talked into investing it into the founding of a coal mine which turned out to be a grand swindle. The water in the mine could not be pumped out. By this time my father must have been rather weary of such unending and unremunerative effort and took to drinking with even greater gusto. One of the boarders who put up a good show of having money and property found my mother willing to transfer her affections. This happened when I was eight and my brother six. Again, for years, I gave my mother the benefit of the doubt for leaving this man by telling myself and the world that she did so when she found out he was a coal company spy . Actually, he did not have the money or the houses with which he seduced her. In all fairness , though the evidence so far warrants it, I cannot accuse my mother of using wealth as the prime criteria of her attitude toward men. She met the man who was to become my stepfather, legally, when he was working in the hard coal mines . She remained �136 SLOVAKIA loyal to him during a long coal strike, even loaned him some of her hard earned money she made in the shirt factory in which she worked. However, the same painstaking accumulation of money ensued with my stepfather. First, however, his one foible for gambling had to be crushed. This my mother did by unerringly locating where the game was in progress and promptly making a scene on the premises. It was not long before my stepfather was unable to find a place to do his gambling and he resigned himself to go along with my mother. After awhile it was no longer difficult. Their first monetary venture proved no more successful than any of the others my mother had engaged in. Real estate swindlers from a distant industrial city induced them to purchase some house lots on the installment plan. " We have a job for you in a factory there, " they promised. That sounded good to my stepfather who was blacklisted from working in the hard coal mine where he had been on strike. When we all got to the city, the factory job lasted one month before the establishment collapsed in the first throes of the post-war depression. It took longer for my parents to find out the lots were equally spurious . After the last payment was made , several years later, my parents discovered that they and hundreds of others from the coal regions had been defrauded. Since none of the people involved knew each other or what to do , nothing was done and the real estate thieves went on with their merciless racket. Times were hard in the city and my stepfather was part of the large army of unemployed during the depression. My mother came to the rescue and got a job in a tobacco factory. The smell of the tobacco was overpowering and I remember that for weeks she came home vomiting, unable to eat until the tobacco odor was out of her system . " You' 11 get used to it , " said the forelady . My mother did. Another job was hard to get. Not to be outdone, my stepfather set up a small shoe repair shop where he did all the work by hand. His meager earnings together with my mother's were enough to continue payments on the nonexistent lots and even to put some aside. This was done by the utmost economy. Only the smallest electric bulbs were used in our house and the electricity w¥ on only when absolutely necessary. Reading was not a necessity at any time guring my entire childhood and it was left to me to read in my adult life many of the books I should have read as a child. We had no central heating and coal was used very sparingly in our one and only kitchen stove . Even the ashes were carefully picked over for reuse of the partially burned coal. �SLOVAKIA 137 It was bad enough for me at school to be so different from the other children - most of them ~ith American-born parents, for we lived on the fringe of a well-to-do ' area. Added to this self-consciousness in attitude was the discomfiture I felt in my old fashioned home made clothes. The one art which my mother never mastered was sewing. To this day, I feel pained when I look at photographs of myself in some of those homely and shapeless concoctions from reused cloth. In recent years I found out it was due to her poor eyesight, but she would not spare the money for glasses! Only the possession of my own money offered a solution to me. Though I was only twelve, the neighborhood we lived in did provide some opportunities if I could but take them. A Greek restaurant was next door. The bachelor owner often tried to invite me into his back room kitchen. ''I'll give you a nickel,' ' he urged. I shook my head. " I'll give you a quarter!" He was insistent. My mother's call or a customer invariably saved me. Behind us lived a tinsmith. He was from Vienna where his wife and three children lived. He, too, was accumulating money feverishly and unstintingly. He did his own cooking, cleaning and sewing. America was a corrupt land of materialism to him but he was here to make himself a fortune with which he would live the rest of his life in luxury in his beloved Vienna. He tried to be friends with me. "On pay day, I'll give you a dime, " he coaxed. "No," I answered. "I'll take you to the movies," he continued. My mother would find out so I ran away . On the corner was a barber shop. The man who owned it often stood outside as I passed on my way home from school. He smiled, and as he did so showed his ugly shiny front gold tooth. He jingled the coins in his pocket. " Come on in," he invited. Someone would see me. I walked on. Not all our neighbors were set to ensnare me. Near-by was an Italian grocery. From the street it smelled of stale, pungent cheeses and decaying vegetable matter. Mr. and Mrs. Natalo and all seven of their children always filled the store with noise and laughter. I am sure they were their best customers , but they were generous with me, too, asking nothing of me in return. They had no money to give me, but they did give me the taste for the bitter crinkled ripe olives in large open barrels in front of the counter and for the numerous hard Italian �138 SLOVAKIA cheeses which hung in disarray all around the shop . I did not feel out of place in their home. When some money was again gotten together, we moved to another neighborhood, hardly an improvement over the other, but I was more at home in the new school where a polyglot of nationalities mingled. My mother opened up a small lunch room on the basis of her brief experience in the Greek restaurant next door when she lost her job at the tobacco factory . Her first customers were the men who worked with my stepfather on a WP A badly needed sewer project in front of the house. My mother is a good cook and financially things went well, but I was in my early teens and was desperately conscious of my status and appearance. I needed and wanted money more than ever . If I did not succumb to the spurious invitations of the men in the neighborhood, of whom there were many, it was only because stealing money from my unmathematical mother was easier . This I did with a clear conscience for the money was used for what I considered absolute necessities. I was able to take piano lessons because I told my mother they were half the price of what they actually were. I also paid for my dental care and thus saved my teeth. My brother, unfortunately, had to lose several of his molars because my mother with her false teeth never understood the necessity for dental care. I also used the money to purchase better quality clothing than the money my mother gave me permitted. In spite of this minor leak in my mother's resources, enough money was soon saved to purchase a small house on another street. It was not much of a house. It had no bathroom or central heating but the cellar was almost street level and my stepfather converted it into a small lunch room - which also served as our entrance to the upstairs part of the house . Life went on as before with perhaps less privacy. My mother was in the store from dawn to late at night seven days a week. She even indulged in a little back room bootlegging during prohibition. (For which she had to pay off the local police every month.) This time the money was put into a local bank. She also grudgingly spared some to pay for violin lessons for my brother. ·\ This time the money grew a little faster. •Unforlunately, the bank crash of the thirties took most of it. Undaunted , life went on in the same way. Nothing drastic occurred to alter the further course of monetary gain, except perhaps a rather heavy drain when the problem of schooling came up . �SLOVAKIA 139 My desire for an education was not taken too seriously because of the conflict between my mother and myself over my going out with boys. Her solution of my awareness of the opposite sex was one of violent objection. •\ '' All men only want to use you ,'' she counselled. ' 'They ' 11 only get you into trouble!" she insisted . I believed her for a long time. It was then that I learned that the two children that one of her older sisters had (one died in early adulthood of tuberculosis) were each born illigitimately during her relations with two different men , neither of whom married her. Her other sister, in my mother's opinion , did not fare any better. She had five very small children in as many years , and if her husband had not been killed in a mining accident, she would have had many more . Her conclusion was that a man did not care . A woman had to be independent, smart and take care of herself. Nevertheless, I managed to get through college with help from her and many others. Mostly I worked. My brother , on the other hand , received other advice. " Don 't let any woman make a fool of you, " admonished my mother. " I won 't ," answered my brother. He was immersed in secretly reading a pornographic novel. He was already following her advice in an affair he was having with one of his schoolmates. His schooling was more pleasant than mine for he did not have to work his way , nor did he have to depend on anyone else's charity. When he finally got married, he apologetically explained to my mother , '' I'm sorry for her!' ' Today , he is surprised to see the antagonisms between her and his wife . With both her children out of the way , my mother and my stepfather have no drain on their income except themselves. They live as sparingly as they ever did even in the days when there was very little money. Though their home now has central heating, they keep it so low that a sweater or a jacket is their permanent home attire during the cold weather. They permit themselves no luxuries . The money accumulates. I flatly refused to assist my uncle in bringing Lybushka to America . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1978-79, Vol. 28 Description An account of the resource Vol. 28 (No. 51-52), 1978-79. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1978-79 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 133 Success Story ALVENA SECKAR ''Take Lybushka back with you to America,'' urged my uncle. "She' 11 become rich like your mother." "Like my mother!" I repeated to myself. Yes, from the way they looked at it, my mother had done quite well. She had come to America, had married, bore two children, educated them and now owned two houses. They did not know what kind of houses, but that did not alter the basic fact. True, my mother had committed a few sins on the way, like getting divorced and remarrying. She had fallen into a few pitfalls, now and then, but they were past now. Such things are forgiven. The end justifies the means. Lybushka would be a success, too, and her children would be like me. I stared at my uncle. This man was my mother's brother. The resemblance to my mother was startling. He had the same slight build, the same line worn broad face with high cheekbones, and the identical worried looking deep sunken blue gray eyes. He was a little boy when my mother last saw him forty years ago. This was back in the early 1900s when my mother was sixteen, the same age as Lybushka now was. She took off for the mythical land of America to pick the gold off its streets. Her two older sisters who had preceded her were either too ashamed to write back to dispel the fable or else felt that misery should have company and did nothing to prevent my mother from joining them. I looked around. My mother had left this self-same high peaked log house nestled in these unchanging mountains in northern Slovakia. My mind went back to those rare instances when my mother permitted herself to be sentimental, usually after some adverse fortune, and recalled this home with tears in her eyes. My uncle had never left it. He was the only son of a family of four surviving girls. The other children, all seven of them, had died in infancy. His father, my grandfather, had died of pneumonia when my uncle was a little boy and his was the responsibility of continuing the Alvena Seckar is a highly prized writer of children' s stories . This story appears here for the first time. 134 SLOVAKIA family. At first , it had not been too difficult with the additional inheritance of the three sisters who had gone away. True , there had been some squabbles over land ownership with the remaining sister, but they were nothing serious . But now, his family of seven daughters and only one son (Alas!) made it too crowded . " Lybushka was smart in school," continued my uncle. "She learned the Catechism from cover to cover before anyone else! ' ' So had my mother, I mused , in Hungarian, in a school of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. She had learned it by heart, but she had never learned to read or to write. Fortified with such knowledge, my mother had sailed for America . When she talks of that trip, she relates how the first class passengers amused themselves by throwing oranges down to steerage, where she was , to watch the wretched mob scramble , and perhaps fight , for the precious fruit. My remembrance of the trip is identified with that cluster of deep gouged out scars of her upper arm. They are the result of the vaccination against small pox some well meaning but callous civil servant inflicted upon her when she reached these shores. At the dock, her sisters greeted her by stripping her of her hand woven dresses and linens, which they later secretly sold, already wise to their market value. After "Americanizing" her with a cheap cotton dress , they dropped her off as a domestic in a home where there was no verbal communication possible with her new mistress . ''Take the cover off the baby's face!' ' her mistress yelled from the fifth floor down to my mother airing the baby in her carriage down on the sidewalk. My mother wrapped her closer. '' She ' 11 smother! '' the woman screamed . My mother bundled the baby tighter. " You 're fired! " screeched the exasperated woman as she puffed from the exertion of running down the four flights of the sidewalk. The last order with explicit motions was plainly understood . " I didn 't mind," said my mother to me many years later. " She never gave me enough to eat. ' ' Somehow, someway, she found another job, and later, many other jobs for the seven years she remained single. Small pay, starvation and extraordinary hard work characterized this period , first in New York , then in Pittsburgh, where she went with a rlewly found girlfriend on the information that many rich men from the coal mines· and the steel mills were there. This was the boom period when World War I had already started in Europe. SLOVAKIA 135 Such trials only intensi.fied my mother's efforts to get the gold for which her trip had been made. By this time, if nothing better came her way, she had decided to go back home and directed all her energies toward that goal. She kept her savings for the trip in a roll in her stocking under her long skirt which was then the fashion. A bank as a place to deposit money was not thought of. Just as she almost had enough, she discovered one day that it was gone! With it, her final chance to go back home . World War I was spreading and the miners, now working every day, came into Pittsburgh on their occasional day off. They put on a big front with their lavish spending and my mother must have been swept off her feet by the show of one of them, who became my father . It would be proper to give my mother the benefit of the doubt and say that she fell in love with my father and was not overcome by his display of money. Her married life, as much as I know of it those first few years, will not permit me to state this unequivocally. I know it was a stormy time. Her frugal habits were in continual conflict with my father ' s easy going nature. It deprived him of much pleasure. The excuse of the long hours he worked was of no avail with my mother. By the time the work at the mines slowed down after the war, my mother had saved enough money from his salary, from her taking in other people's wash, and from the two boarders who occupied one of the two bedrooms in the house (My brother and I slept with our parents.), to put a down payment on a farm in distant Connecticut. When she found that my father took to carousing instead of farm work, she gave up the whole idea and moved back to the mines . The next time she accumulated enough money, she was talked into investing it into the founding of a coal mine which turned out to be a grand swindle. The water in the mine could not be pumped out. By this time my father must have been rather weary of such unending and unremunerative effort and took to drinking with even greater gusto. One of the boarders who put up a good show of having money and property found my mother willing to transfer her affections. This happened when I was eight and my brother six. Again, for years, I gave my mother the benefit of the doubt for leaving this man by telling myself and the world that she did so when she found out he was a coal company spy . Actually, he did not have the money or the houses with which he seduced her. In all fairness , though the evidence so far warrants it, I cannot accuse my mother of using wealth as the prime criteria of her attitude toward men. She met the man who was to become my stepfather, legally, when he was working in the hard coal mines . She remained 136 SLOVAKIA loyal to him during a long coal strike, even loaned him some of her hard earned money she made in the shirt factory in which she worked. However, the same painstaking accumulation of money ensued with my stepfather. First, however, his one foible for gambling had to be crushed. This my mother did by unerringly locating where the game was in progress and promptly making a scene on the premises. It was not long before my stepfather was unable to find a place to do his gambling and he resigned himself to go along with my mother. After awhile it was no longer difficult. Their first monetary venture proved no more successful than any of the others my mother had engaged in. Real estate swindlers from a distant industrial city induced them to purchase some house lots on the installment plan. " We have a job for you in a factory there, " they promised. That sounded good to my stepfather who was blacklisted from working in the hard coal mine where he had been on strike. When we all got to the city, the factory job lasted one month before the establishment collapsed in the first throes of the post-war depression. It took longer for my parents to find out the lots were equally spurious . After the last payment was made , several years later, my parents discovered that they and hundreds of others from the coal regions had been defrauded. Since none of the people involved knew each other or what to do , nothing was done and the real estate thieves went on with their merciless racket. Times were hard in the city and my stepfather was part of the large army of unemployed during the depression. My mother came to the rescue and got a job in a tobacco factory. The smell of the tobacco was overpowering and I remember that for weeks she came home vomiting, unable to eat until the tobacco odor was out of her system . " You' 11 get used to it , " said the forelady . My mother did. Another job was hard to get. Not to be outdone, my stepfather set up a small shoe repair shop where he did all the work by hand. His meager earnings together with my mother's were enough to continue payments on the nonexistent lots and even to put some aside. This was done by the utmost economy. Only the smallest electric bulbs were used in our house and the electricity w¥ on only when absolutely necessary. Reading was not a necessity at any time guring my entire childhood and it was left to me to read in my adult life many of the books I should have read as a child. We had no central heating and coal was used very sparingly in our one and only kitchen stove . Even the ashes were carefully picked over for reuse of the partially burned coal. SLOVAKIA 137 It was bad enough for me at school to be so different from the other children - most of them ~ith American-born parents, for we lived on the fringe of a well-to-do ' area. Added to this self-consciousness in attitude was the discomfiture I felt in my old fashioned home made clothes. The one art which my mother never mastered was sewing. To this day, I feel pained when I look at photographs of myself in some of those homely and shapeless concoctions from reused cloth. In recent years I found out it was due to her poor eyesight, but she would not spare the money for glasses! Only the possession of my own money offered a solution to me. Though I was only twelve, the neighborhood we lived in did provide some opportunities if I could but take them. A Greek restaurant was next door. The bachelor owner often tried to invite me into his back room kitchen. ''I'll give you a nickel,' ' he urged. I shook my head. " I'll give you a quarter!" He was insistent. My mother's call or a customer invariably saved me. Behind us lived a tinsmith. He was from Vienna where his wife and three children lived. He, too, was accumulating money feverishly and unstintingly. He did his own cooking, cleaning and sewing. America was a corrupt land of materialism to him but he was here to make himself a fortune with which he would live the rest of his life in luxury in his beloved Vienna. He tried to be friends with me. "On pay day, I'll give you a dime, " he coaxed. "No," I answered. "I'll take you to the movies," he continued. My mother would find out so I ran away . On the corner was a barber shop. The man who owned it often stood outside as I passed on my way home from school. He smiled, and as he did so showed his ugly shiny front gold tooth. He jingled the coins in his pocket. " Come on in," he invited. Someone would see me. I walked on. Not all our neighbors were set to ensnare me. Near-by was an Italian grocery. From the street it smelled of stale, pungent cheeses and decaying vegetable matter. Mr. and Mrs. Natalo and all seven of their children always filled the store with noise and laughter. I am sure they were their best customers , but they were generous with me, too, asking nothing of me in return. They had no money to give me, but they did give me the taste for the bitter crinkled ripe olives in large open barrels in front of the counter and for the numerous hard Italian 138 SLOVAKIA cheeses which hung in disarray all around the shop . I did not feel out of place in their home. When some money was again gotten together, we moved to another neighborhood, hardly an improvement over the other, but I was more at home in the new school where a polyglot of nationalities mingled. My mother opened up a small lunch room on the basis of her brief experience in the Greek restaurant next door when she lost her job at the tobacco factory . Her first customers were the men who worked with my stepfather on a WP A badly needed sewer project in front of the house. My mother is a good cook and financially things went well, but I was in my early teens and was desperately conscious of my status and appearance. I needed and wanted money more than ever . If I did not succumb to the spurious invitations of the men in the neighborhood, of whom there were many, it was only because stealing money from my unmathematical mother was easier . This I did with a clear conscience for the money was used for what I considered absolute necessities. I was able to take piano lessons because I told my mother they were half the price of what they actually were. I also paid for my dental care and thus saved my teeth. My brother, unfortunately, had to lose several of his molars because my mother with her false teeth never understood the necessity for dental care. I also used the money to purchase better quality clothing than the money my mother gave me permitted. In spite of this minor leak in my mother's resources, enough money was soon saved to purchase a small house on another street. It was not much of a house. It had no bathroom or central heating but the cellar was almost street level and my stepfather converted it into a small lunch room - which also served as our entrance to the upstairs part of the house . Life went on as before with perhaps less privacy. My mother was in the store from dawn to late at night seven days a week. She even indulged in a little back room bootlegging during prohibition. (For which she had to pay off the local police every month.) This time the money was put into a local bank. She also grudgingly spared some to pay for violin lessons for my brother. ·\ This time the money grew a little faster. •Unforlunately, the bank crash of the thirties took most of it. Undaunted , life went on in the same way. Nothing drastic occurred to alter the further course of monetary gain, except perhaps a rather heavy drain when the problem of schooling came up . SLOVAKIA 139 My desire for an education was not taken too seriously because of the conflict between my mother and myself over my going out with boys. Her solution of my awareness of the opposite sex was one of violent objection. •\ '' All men only want to use you ,'' she counselled. ' 'They ' 11 only get you into trouble!" she insisted . I believed her for a long time. It was then that I learned that the two children that one of her older sisters had (one died in early adulthood of tuberculosis) were each born illigitimately during her relations with two different men , neither of whom married her. Her other sister, in my mother's opinion , did not fare any better. She had five very small children in as many years , and if her husband had not been killed in a mining accident, she would have had many more . Her conclusion was that a man did not care . A woman had to be independent, smart and take care of herself. Nevertheless, I managed to get through college with help from her and many others. Mostly I worked. My brother , on the other hand , received other advice. " Don 't let any woman make a fool of you, " admonished my mother. " I won 't ," answered my brother. He was immersed in secretly reading a pornographic novel. He was already following her advice in an affair he was having with one of his schoolmates. His schooling was more pleasant than mine for he did not have to work his way , nor did he have to depend on anyone else's charity. When he finally got married, he apologetically explained to my mother , '' I'm sorry for her!' ' Today , he is surprised to see the antagonisms between her and his wife . With both her children out of the way , my mother and my stepfather have no drain on their income except themselves. They live as sparingly as they ever did even in the days when there was very little money. Though their home now has central heating, they keep it so low that a sweater or a jacket is their permanent home attire during the cold weather. They permit themselves no luxuries . The money accumulates. I flatly refused to assist my uncle in bringing Lybushka to America .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Success Story Description An account of the resource Alvena Seckar Slovakia, Vol. 28 (No. 51-52), 1978-79 pp. 133-139 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Seckar, Alvena, 1916-2012 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1978-79 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/109d7f19e362e41b2328ae36c9ec4019.pdf da2eb74c7748262fb494020a40361424 PDF Text Text 68 SLOVAKIA SUDETEN GERMAN DAYS: MAY 19-22, 1961 The month of May, 1961, saw more than 200,000 Sudeten German expellees again convene - this year in the Rhine metropolis of Cologne - to be counted among those refusing to relinquish claims to native lands now under Soviet rule. Events that extended over four days (May 19-22) were highlighted by messages by U. S. Congressmen Morgan M. Moulder (Dem., Mo.), Gordon H. Scherer (Rep., 0 .), Roy A. Taylor (Dem., N. C.), Henry C. Schadeberg (Rep., Wis.), who flew to Cologne expressly to participate in the Sudeten German rally. The United States was also represented in the person of Philip A. Hrobak, President of the Slovak League of America and editor of the Slovak publication Jednota, who was awarded the Sudeten German Karl's Prize for his untiring efforts toward harmony among the peoples of East Central Europe. The Karl's Prize, named for Karl IV, King of Bohemia and Emperor of Germany, of the House of Luxemburg (1346-1378), is awarded each year to a political leader, scientist or publicist who has made an outstanding contribution to the concept of a United Europe. Reminiscent of a Scout jamboree, 3,500 Sudeten German boys and girls pitched their tents on the Cologne city fair grounds and camped there during the rally. Although most of them are too young to remember their native homes in Sudetenland from which their families were expelled in 1945-46, they have pledged their allegiance to a Europe in which all peoples and ethnic groups shall live in peace, freedom and harmony and, like their parents, refuse to give up their just claim to their homes now behind the iron curtain. At the grand youth finale, ruling Burgomaster of Berlin, Willy Brandt, addressed 15,000 listeners, scoring a demand for "unity, justice and freedom." A voice-speaking choir of South Moravians intoned the tragedy of a divided Germany, eager for reunification but incapable of �SLOVAKIA 69 true unity unless it be achieved in freedom and not at the expense of freedom. Said Oskar Boese as spokesman of the Sudeten German Youth: The younger genera,tion o'f the Sudeten Germans, wants to contrilbute to the endeavors eventually leadin,g to a r-e al and long riange reconici'Hation between the peo,pl-es of Centra,l and East EurQPe and !Minister of Transportation Dr. Hans-Christoph Seebohm, congratulates recip,ient of European Charles Prize, Mr. Philip A. Hrobak, President of the Slovak League of America. �70 SLOVAKIA to help briidge the gaip between Germany aml her eastern neighbors, a gaip caused by war antl post-w,ar events. According to the speaker, the Sudeten German Youth considers it its task to strengthen among the young people the many spiritual and social duties towards the people of other continents. The principle emphasis of this work lies on the dignity and freedom of the human being. Concluded Mr. Boese: We fully recognize a,n d adhere to the basic huma,n, rughlts, the in,violalbii.ity of the legally acquired homeland, the right olf self-detel"!Jllin,ation, and the ideals and duties of deanocralcy. Dr. Hans-Christoph Seebohm, German Federal Minister and President of the Sudeten German Council, one of the main speakers of the Sudeten rally in Cologne, emphasized that Sudeten expellees are using solely peaceful means to achieve their goals of repatriation and self-determination. Addressing the many thousands gathered at the Cologne fair grounds he said: You have come here voluntariiLy and at great per-sonal sacrifice O!f time ,a nd m001ey to rededlioaite yourselves to our homelamd, the Sudetenlantl aind ito prove before the world that we Sudeten German-s exist as an ethnic group aoo are resolved to deanand that the r,i,ght to the h-0meiand and to selif-detemni,n,ation in our homelarud eventuaUy be re,alized. We do not claim this right merely for ourselves, but fur aill peolJ)le and for all nations and ethnic g,r oups all -0ver the world, beca use we know that only by the realization O!f these rig•h ts can a lasting peace, based on a recoI11Ciiliation and coo:peration, C1f peoples and eth111k groups, be ushered in as a genuiiine and equal partnership. We are working toward this goal with the peaceful means of the law. We rejelct force, booause force would lead to new injustices whkh would endanger the future of •posterity. We do not intend to peripetua,t e the irujusti.ce of the exipulsi10n by add'i•ng new expulsions. The ri'ght O!f seld'-d•etermin,ation, which cannot be exercised periodli,cally Hke an election, is inseparaUJly 11inked to the right of the individual to his homeland antl can on,ly be exe-rci,red iin c-0njunction with that righlt. The Bolshevist wo,r ld pays l!ip service to the right Olf self-determination and hlas only used it as an enticement. It believes that the rig,ht Olf selif-deter,mination ended with the expulsion. We say, h'owever, the dght to the home'La<rud can never be crushed 'by force . Only the indiividual can relinquish i,t by giving up his ties with his peOI)le and his homela,n<ii as an aict of free will and conscience. Conscience cannot ·be silenced by force; it cannot even be siilenced by deportation and enslla~emenit. A:s long as poople stand by their �SLOVAKIA 71 native land, as long ais they remain lo)'lal to their people or ethnic group, they will retain this right to their hoonetand and the right to sel.f-detemninati-0n within thalt homeland. We do not believe that the .£utur.e oo Europe cam, be made saife by the restoroitiion of oubwom forms of national States. In vi-ew of the overlapping aireas of se!Jtlement of Oenltral European peoples and ethnic groups which stJil'l. exist despite the eJOI)'lllsron oo the Germans, a new, supra-naUonal order is needled. Peace a,nd harmony can be assured to these peoples onily when all natioml'l ambttions and lust for hegemony are bra•nded as a vio1'ation o.f the coomnonly estalblished order. Tolerance a•nd partnership wiU ha'V'e to overcome eidstiing tensions. We Sudeten Germans have renounced all thought oif reverrge, retlalliia'tioon and force ,i n the Charrt;er of the Elcpellees and the Wiesbaden A1gree:ment (signed by General Lev Ptchala for the Czech nati-ooo:l Counicil in London; and Dr. Rudold' Lodgman von Auen, Hans Schiltz and Rii:chard Rteitznoer o!ll, behallf of the Association for the Protection of Sudeiten German Interests). Guests of honor a,t Sudeten German Day (left to l"i9ht): Mr. Mouser, U. S. Embassy; the Hon. Ray A. Taylor, Gordon H. Scherer, Henry C. Schadeberg, members of U. S. Congress; General Lev Prchala, Czech National Council, and Hon. Morgan M. Moulder, Member U. S. Congress. �72 SLOVAKIA We want the peOII)les living today m Mioraiviia, Si,lesia, and Slo• vakra to know: We recognize, Czechs and Slovaks, your right to the homeland and your right of self-determinatioin just as we expect you to recogn,ize our respective rights. We want freedom for you, we want justice for you. We want you to live in a democratic and supranationally organized European order. We want to serve as equal and conscientious partners, the great aim: Freedom, justice and peace for all of Central Eastern Europe. Dr. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, West Ger m an Minister of E xpellee and Refugee Affairs, speaking fo r t h e F eder al Chancellor and t h e German F ederal Government , said: When you ask to be 3Jble to retur,n. to your homeland, to your free homeLand, it has nothing whatsoever to do w.ith [Plans ~md id€.as as expressed by the National Socialists. It is the nart:urail ex· -p ression of love .for on,e's native soil!. Your ethnic group is under fire by Eastern propaganda. How· ever , you are not in bad company if people accuse you oif being "revengists," •n,or is this accusation borne out me,re}y by constant repetitio•n. ]t simply shows how sensifaveliy the Eas,t reacts to our pledge of allegrian,c,e to your hiomeland and t he .right to thart 'homeland• - which is one of the most n,aitural cxf all rights. You are not seeking revenge. We who are the most recent victims of re· ven,ge ar e the first om~s ,to break its vicious circl.e. The expellees ha:ve fong srin•ce 3Jbandoned a•ny thought of revenge and retaliation ... The Gerunan Bumd·estaog, in a soleimn declaraltion made in 1,950, stated that the right to the homeland is an inalien-3Jble claim of man a1nd that irt raises protest agairnst tire su:nrender oif this right of the homeland belon ging to those Germans from Ozeicho-Slovakiia en,tr,usted to the caire of the West Ger.man Federal RepulblLc. Th~ Fed,eirail Government has repeatedly spoken out in this vein on behalif of the prinlciplie of the r1ght to the homeland and the rioght ad' selif-determination for all Ger,ma·ns. 1 The Hon. Gordon H. Scherer, member of t he U. S. House of Representatives, addressing t he Sudenten Germ an expellees, gathered at Cologne's fair grounds said : I brin•g you the warmest greetings od' the Congress a•nd the people of the United states of America. This meeting is imp ortant becaus·e you a·r e courageously facing up to the g,r e·a test issue oif thris generation, that .issue before which all oth1ers pass into ionsiogn,it.fioance. It is the fight w.ith the So·v iet Uniorn for survival, with the international Communist conspiracy 1by aill those people on borth sides of the ioron curtain who love and want lilberty and the right of se'hf-d•ete-run ination. I am cme of those, however, who does not beliieve that we a,r e going to have all-o ut nuclear war. Why? Simply because today the fire·pQlWer between the Eaist and the W es't is fairly well balanced and neither side is going to risk the total ,destruction of its cities. �SLOVAKIA 73 The Russians -are not dumb. Wh,y should they risk a1lmost total annihilation? As ·long as the Communist empire corutinues to move for,ward , how, as a practical matter, c,a n the Sudeten. Ge.rmans expect to have their lands -andi propertiies returned to 'them? Hoiw can you or any of the people behind the iron curtain ex,pe'Ct the right of selfdetenmin.ation as long as the despots in the KremHn continue cynica11,y to maniipuliare the strings thiat control theiJ- puppets in Czecho,Slov.a'kia, Pola•nd, Ru.mania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, China, Tibet and, yes, EJa,sit Germany? Onl,y aifter we in the .free world, with the help of millions cxf our secret a'llies behind the iron, and ballnfboo curtaiiin6, turn the tide of arthei,sti.c, godJ:ess Communism, will Su,d,e'ten Ge:rnnans be alble to realire their cheiriished goals of "restoraltion of their homelands" and "seltf-detel'trll1i:n,a,tion." Congressman Roy A. Taylor, praised the Sudeten Garmans as one of the greatest anti-Communist forces in the 1T he main speakers at Sudeten German Day. (Left to right): Wenzel Jaksch, President of Sudeten German Federal Assembly; Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin; Ha.ns-Christoph Seebohm, President of the Sudeten German Council. �74 SLOVAKIA world, saying they had greatly contributed to the struggle for the preservation of freedom. The Sudetens know, he stated, what it means to suffer at the hands of Communism. "Through your actions you have won the admiration of all free people of the world. "We need to believe that right in the world will triumph over might, and that truth crushed to earth will rise again. We want you to know that we in America are anxious to help correct the injustices of the past and recover the world's greatest lost treasure, which is world peace." Representative Henry C. Schadeberg declared that: Sud>eten Germ~ms have the title to thei·r homeland as aM other people of the world arud Communist measures must be tolerated in no ease. be ,t hey directed ag,ainst the Po,!es or the Germans. Your magnificent way to demonstrate for cooperation with the Slovak people by awarding the Charles Prize to the President of the Slovak League of America is a manifestation for cooperation with all other nations of Eastern Europe. y;our attitud e is greatly ,a·ppreciated by keed01m-loving people in Amer,k!a a,nd <in al11 of the free world. We believe with you tha.t freedom will not oisappear from this world - that freedom and not Communist tyrianny is the "w.ave of the fut ure," and tha,t faiith !in God wHl str,e ngthen and :remain ,t he buliwark of tree men, in the West. Our work .and your work wiU be successful becaus e freedom is righ't and tyranny is wrong. 1 From Congressman Morgan M. Moulder the audience heard that the Communists were following quite clear aims by expelling the Sudeten Germans from their homelands. Said he: The Communists wanted to pus:h the borders of their ter,r itocy as fa:r west a<s possible. They br,iJbed followers by oistri'buting Germain, expellees' propel1ty; thereby they were able to colle1etivize Sudeten German and East German agriculture ,a nd industry, -and have tried to corrupt the morale of a-11 East Gernnan peoples and create ete11na1l hatred between the Germans on th·e one hand and the Czechs and the Poles on the other. Every Amerilcan who loves freedom should condemn these Communist aims. Every Almer,iican should support the rapprochement between n,ations that have become victims of Coonmunism. It Ls our belief that this ra'PProchement must be based on justice. We believe that aU people h<l!Ve a right to th•eir h'Omeland and that the inj,usti-ces committed since world Oommun,ism arose must be removed. We ,b elieve that the nations long for and deserve full freedom a,nd sellf-deternnin-ati'on. The Sudeten Germans shoUJ1d haive the r ~g,ht to return to their centuries-Old hoone1'and and to their sebf-determination. Wenzel Jaksch, member of the German Federal Par- �SLOVAKIA 75 1iament and President of the Sudeten German Federal Assembly, Wiesbaden, told the Cologne rally: ]f we look at the Sudeten problem as an isolated question, it becomes one rnf the most diif£icult ones Ln Europe todlay. Today, as in the past, it is our hilstoriic perseverance thait will decide the fUJture of our hooneland. A homeland' that is written o<flf the books is lost forever. We are ,c alled illusionists because we do not want to fonreit the old homela,n,d. Yet those who beHeve they can retain West Gerunainiy ,p ermanently, irf they yield East Germanry .and the Sudetenland, ar,e even greater illusionists. At this pOlint we a,r e faced wilth an in,n.er decision between political deifensi~ and political offensi:ve thinking. 'J.1he malking of that decision is a,n unesoa,paible ta.sk. An European democracy that thinks offensively should see in the loya,ty of Sudeten a•nd East Germans to their hooneJ,and its most va,l1U1aible aUies. Any over.all Euroipean pea'ce plan Olf the uniited democracies cannot a.Jif-Ord to ex!Clude the reparation of the expulJ,sions. This i-s no biased Germain, demand but a prerequ1si<te oo fr,eedom and self-d•eteriminaiion of the East European peoples. The price of freed om for all European peoples is their restriction to histm:iically confiruned bounda<ries Olf settlemerut and respect for the neighlbor's boundM-ies dra,wn by the plowsha•re and not by the sword. Willy Brandt, popular Burgomaster (Mayor) of Berlin, made a special trip to Cologne to address the Sudeten German rally. In his speech Brandt said: The citizens of Berlin today, even as the eX!pel:lees in the post,war era , are syim1bolica1ly shouldering the load for the entire niaition. Berlin is the brid•ge between the people -Orf our divided country. If the lights should go out iln, Berllin, darrkness would set in for the entire Gerunan Federail Repwblic. We in Berlin f.eel that we need no counter-ideology. The East Block ide·ology i1S not such a Herculean thing that we can or.Jy meet it on the deifensiive. The Ber>lin questi,on is not the cause but the result of tensions ,b etween East and West a1nd of Gerunany's partition. There is no isolated Berlin solution. What there may be, until the rees·talb1ishment of Ge11ma•ny's unity in freedom and in a·greemen,t with the ju,sitiJie-d securiity initerests of aU coruc,erned, is a sett:,ament of solely practilcal maitters. The following points rema·in essen,tia~: 1. The right of Berlin's citizens freely to decide their own matters. 2. The rights and d,uties of the A,llied Protecting Powers to prov,i de for access to Berlin a•nd for preparations for a peace treaty with an a1l-German governime.nt. 3. '!\he indissolUJble conneicti·on between West Berlin and the economic a•n.d legal system -0f the German F1ede-rall Repulblic. 4. The community of the population, of both sectors of Berlin, which must no't ,b e jeo,pa;rdfael by changing the d'emar>cation line of ,t he ci,ty into State boundaries. - "Sudeten Bulletin." � 68 SLOVAKIA SUDETEN GERMAN DAYS: MAY 19-22, 1961 The month of May, 1961, saw more than 200,000 Sudeten German expellees again convene - this year in the Rhine metropolis of Cologne - to be counted among those refusing to relinquish claims to native lands now under Soviet rule. Events that extended over four days (May 19-22) were highlighted by messages by U. S. Congressmen Morgan M. Moulder (Dem., Mo.), Gordon H. Scherer (Rep., 0 .), Roy A. Taylor (Dem., N. C.), Henry C. Schadeberg (Rep., Wis.), who flew to Cologne expressly to participate in the Sudeten German rally. The United States was also represented in the person of Philip A. Hrobak, President of the Slovak League of America and editor of the Slovak publication Jednota, who was awarded the Sudeten German Karl's Prize for his untiring efforts toward harmony among the peoples of East Central Europe. The Karl's Prize, named for Karl IV, King of Bohemia and Emperor of Germany, of the House of Luxemburg (1346-1378), is awarded each year to a political leader, scientist or publicist who has made an outstanding contribution to the concept of a United Europe. Reminiscent of a Scout jamboree, 3,500 Sudeten German boys and girls pitched their tents on the Cologne city fair grounds and camped there during the rally. Although most of them are too young to remember their native homes in Sudetenland from which their families were expelled in 1945-46, they have pledged their allegiance to a Europe in which all peoples and ethnic groups shall live in peace, freedom and harmony and, like their parents, refuse to give up their just claim to their homes now behind the iron curtain. At the grand youth finale, ruling Burgomaster of Berlin, Willy Brandt, addressed 15,000 listeners, scoring a demand for "unity, justice and freedom." A voice-speaking choir of South Moravians intoned the tragedy of a divided Germany, eager for reunification but incapable of �SLOVAKIA 69 true unity unless it be achieved in freedom and not at the expense of freedom. Said Oskar Boese as spokesman of the Sudeten German Youth: The younger genera,tion o'f the Sudeten Germans, wants to contrilbute to the endeavors eventually leadin,g to a r-e al and long riange reconici'Hation between the peo,pl-es of Centra,l and East EurQPe and !Minister of Transportation Dr. Hans-Christoph Seebohm, congratulates recip,ient of European Charles Prize, Mr. Philip A. Hrobak, President of the Slovak League of America. �70 SLOVAKIA to help briidge the gaip between Germany aml her eastern neighbors, a gaip caused by war antl post-w,ar events. According to the speaker, the Sudeten German Youth considers it its task to strengthen among the young people the many spiritual and social duties towards the people of other continents. The principle emphasis of this work lies on the dignity and freedom of the human being. Concluded Mr. Boese: We fully recognize a,n d adhere to the basic huma,n, rughlts, the in,violalbii.ity of the legally acquired homeland, the right olf self-detel"!Jllin,ation, and the ideals and duties of deanocralcy. Dr. Hans-Christoph Seebohm, German Federal Minister and President of the Sudeten German Council, one of the main speakers of the Sudeten rally in Cologne, emphasized that Sudeten expellees are using solely peaceful means to achieve their goals of repatriation and self-determination. Addressing the many thousands gathered at the Cologne fair grounds he said: You have come here voluntariiLy and at great per-sonal sacrifice O!f time ,a nd m001ey to rededlioaite yourselves to our homelamd, the Sudetenlantl aind ito prove before the world that we Sudeten German-s exist as an ethnic group aoo are resolved to deanand that the r,i,ght to the h-0meiand and to selif-detemni,n,ation in our homelarud eventuaUy be re,alized. We do not claim this right merely for ourselves, but fur aill peolJ)le and for all nations and ethnic g,r oups all -0ver the world, beca use we know that only by the realization O!f these rig•h ts can a lasting peace, based on a recoI11Ciiliation and coo:peration, C1f peoples and eth111k groups, be ushered in as a genuiiine and equal partnership. We are working toward this goal with the peaceful means of the law. We rejelct force, booause force would lead to new injustices whkh would endanger the future of •posterity. We do not intend to peripetua,t e the irujusti.ce of the exipulsi10n by add'i•ng new expulsions. The ri'ght O!f seld'-d•etermin,ation, which cannot be exercised periodli,cally Hke an election, is inseparaUJly 11inked to the right of the individual to his homeland antl can on,ly be exe-rci,red iin c-0njunction with that righlt. The Bolshevist wo,r ld pays l!ip service to the right Olf self-determination and hlas only used it as an enticement. It believes that the rig,ht Olf selif-deter,mination ended with the expulsion. We say, h'owever, the dght to the home'La<rud can never be crushed 'by force . Only the indiividual can relinquish i,t by giving up his ties with his peOI)le and his homela,n<ii as an aict of free will and conscience. Conscience cannot ·be silenced by force; it cannot even be siilenced by deportation and enslla~emenit. A:s long as poople stand by their �SLOVAKIA 71 native land, as long ais they remain lo)'lal to their people or ethnic group, they will retain this right to their hoonetand and the right to sel.f-detemninati-0n within thalt homeland. We do not believe that the .£utur.e oo Europe cam, be made saife by the restoroitiion of oubwom forms of national States. In vi-ew of the overlapping aireas of se!Jtlement of Oenltral European peoples and ethnic groups which stJil'l. exist despite the eJOI)'lllsron oo the Germans, a new, supra-naUonal order is needled. Peace a,nd harmony can be assured to these peoples onily when all natioml'l ambttions and lust for hegemony are bra•nded as a vio1'ation o.f the coomnonly estalblished order. Tolerance a•nd partnership wiU ha'V'e to overcome eidstiing tensions. We Sudeten Germans have renounced all thought oif reverrge, retlalliia'tioon and force ,i n the Charrt;er of the Elcpellees and the Wiesbaden A1gree:ment (signed by General Lev Ptchala for the Czech nati-ooo:l Counicil in London; and Dr. Rudold' Lodgman von Auen, Hans Schiltz and Rii:chard Rteitznoer o!ll, behallf of the Association for the Protection of Sudeiten German Interests). Guests of honor a,t Sudeten German Day (left to l"i9ht): Mr. Mouser, U. S. Embassy; the Hon. Ray A. Taylor, Gordon H. Scherer, Henry C. Schadeberg, members of U. S. Congress; General Lev Prchala, Czech National Council, and Hon. Morgan M. Moulder, Member U. S. Congress. �72 SLOVAKIA We want the peOII)les living today m Mioraiviia, Si,lesia, and Slo• vakra to know: We recognize, Czechs and Slovaks, your right to the homeland and your right of self-determinatioin just as we expect you to recogn,ize our respective rights. We want freedom for you, we want justice for you. We want you to live in a democratic and supranationally organized European order. We want to serve as equal and conscientious partners, the great aim: Freedom, justice and peace for all of Central Eastern Europe. Dr. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, West Ger m an Minister of E xpellee and Refugee Affairs, speaking fo r t h e F eder al Chancellor and t h e German F ederal Government , said: When you ask to be 3Jble to retur,n. to your homeland, to your free homeLand, it has nothing whatsoever to do w.ith [Plans ~md id€.as as expressed by the National Socialists. It is the nart:urail ex· -p ression of love .for on,e's native soil!. Your ethnic group is under fire by Eastern propaganda. How· ever , you are not in bad company if people accuse you oif being "revengists," •n,or is this accusation borne out me,re}y by constant repetitio•n. ]t simply shows how sensifaveliy the Eas,t reacts to our pledge of allegrian,c,e to your hiomeland and t he .right to thart 'homeland• - which is one of the most n,aitural cxf all rights. You are not seeking revenge. We who are the most recent victims of re· ven,ge ar e the first om~s ,to break its vicious circl.e. The expellees ha:ve fong srin•ce 3Jbandoned a•ny thought of revenge and retaliation ... The Gerunan Bumd·estaog, in a soleimn declaraltion made in 1,950, stated that the right to the homeland is an inalien-3Jble claim of man a1nd that irt raises protest agairnst tire su:nrender oif this right of the homeland belon ging to those Germans from Ozeicho-Slovakiia en,tr,usted to the caire of the West Ger.man Federal RepulblLc. Th~ Fed,eirail Government has repeatedly spoken out in this vein on behalif of the prinlciplie of the r1ght to the homeland and the rioght ad' selif-determination for all Ger,ma·ns. 1 The Hon. Gordon H. Scherer, member of t he U. S. House of Representatives, addressing t he Sudenten Germ an expellees, gathered at Cologne's fair grounds said : I brin•g you the warmest greetings od' the Congress a•nd the people of the United states of America. This meeting is imp ortant becaus·e you a·r e courageously facing up to the g,r e·a test issue oif thris generation, that .issue before which all oth1ers pass into ionsiogn,it.fioance. It is the fight w.ith the So·v iet Uniorn for survival, with the international Communist conspiracy 1by aill those people on borth sides of the ioron curtain who love and want lilberty and the right of se'hf-d•ete-run ination. I am cme of those, however, who does not beliieve that we a,r e going to have all-o ut nuclear war. Why? Simply because today the fire·pQlWer between the Eaist and the W es't is fairly well balanced and neither side is going to risk the total ,destruction of its cities. �SLOVAKIA 73 The Russians -are not dumb. Wh,y should they risk a1lmost total annihilation? As ·long as the Communist empire corutinues to move for,ward , how, as a practical matter, c,a n the Sudeten. Ge.rmans expect to have their lands -andi propertiies returned to 'them? Hoiw can you or any of the people behind the iron curtain ex,pe'Ct the right of selfdetenmin.ation as long as the despots in the KremHn continue cynica11,y to maniipuliare the strings thiat control theiJ- puppets in Czecho,Slov.a'kia, Pola•nd, Ru.mania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, China, Tibet and, yes, EJa,sit Germany? Onl,y aifter we in the .free world, with the help of millions cxf our secret a'llies behind the iron, and ballnfboo curtaiiin6, turn the tide of arthei,sti.c, godJ:ess Communism, will Su,d,e'ten Ge:rnnans be alble to realire their cheiriished goals of "restoraltion of their homelands" and "seltf-detel'trll1i:n,a,tion." Congressman Roy A. Taylor, praised the Sudeten Garmans as one of the greatest anti-Communist forces in the 1T he main speakers at Sudeten German Day. (Left to right): Wenzel Jaksch, President of Sudeten German Federal Assembly; Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin; Ha.ns-Christoph Seebohm, President of the Sudeten German Council. �74 SLOVAKIA world, saying they had greatly contributed to the struggle for the preservation of freedom. The Sudetens know, he stated, what it means to suffer at the hands of Communism. "Through your actions you have won the admiration of all free people of the world. "We need to believe that right in the world will triumph over might, and that truth crushed to earth will rise again. We want you to know that we in America are anxious to help correct the injustices of the past and recover the world's greatest lost treasure, which is world peace." Representative Henry C. Schadeberg declared that: Sud>eten Germ~ms have the title to thei·r homeland as aM other people of the world arud Communist measures must be tolerated in no ease. be ,t hey directed ag,ainst the Po,!es or the Germans. Your magnificent way to demonstrate for cooperation with the Slovak people by awarding the Charles Prize to the President of the Slovak League of America is a manifestation for cooperation with all other nations of Eastern Europe. y;our attitud e is greatly ,a·ppreciated by keed01m-loving people in Amer,k!a a,nd <in al11 of the free world. We believe with you tha.t freedom will not oisappear from this world - that freedom and not Communist tyrianny is the "w.ave of the fut ure," and tha,t faiith !in God wHl str,e ngthen and :remain ,t he buliwark of tree men, in the West. Our work .and your work wiU be successful becaus e freedom is righ't and tyranny is wrong. 1 From Congressman Morgan M. Moulder the audience heard that the Communists were following quite clear aims by expelling the Sudeten Germans from their homelands. Said he: The Communists wanted to pus:h the borders of their ter,r itocy as fa:r west a<s possible. They br,iJbed followers by oistri'buting Germain, expellees' propel1ty; thereby they were able to colle1etivize Sudeten German and East German agriculture ,a nd industry, -and have tried to corrupt the morale of a-11 East Gernnan peoples and create ete11na1l hatred between the Germans on th·e one hand and the Czechs and the Poles on the other. Every Amerilcan who loves freedom should condemn these Communist aims. Every Almer,iican should support the rapprochement between n,ations that have become victims of Coonmunism. It Ls our belief that this ra'PProchement must be based on justice. We believe that aU people h<l!Ve a right to th•eir h'Omeland and that the inj,usti-ces committed since world Oommun,ism arose must be removed. We ,b elieve that the nations long for and deserve full freedom a,nd sellf-deternnin-ati'on. The Sudeten Germans shoUJ1d haive the r ~g,ht to return to their centuries-Old hoone1'and and to their sebf-determination. Wenzel Jaksch, member of the German Federal Par- �SLOVAKIA 75 1iament and President of the Sudeten German Federal Assembly, Wiesbaden, told the Cologne rally: ]f we look at the Sudeten problem as an isolated question, it becomes one rnf the most diif£icult ones Ln Europe todlay. Today, as in the past, it is our hilstoriic perseverance thait will decide the fUJture of our hooneland. A homeland' that is written o<flf the books is lost forever. We are ,c alled illusionists because we do not want to fonreit the old homela,n,d. Yet those who beHeve they can retain West Gerunainiy ,p ermanently, irf they yield East Germanry .and the Sudetenland, ar,e even greater illusionists. At this pOlint we a,r e faced wilth an in,n.er decision between political deifensi~ and political offensi:ve thinking. 'J.1he malking of that decision is a,n unesoa,paible ta.sk. An European democracy that thinks offensively should see in the loya,ty of Sudeten a•nd East Germans to their hooneJ,and its most va,l1U1aible aUies. Any over.all Euroipean pea'ce plan Olf the uniited democracies cannot a.Jif-Ord to ex!Clude the reparation of the expulJ,sions. This i-s no biased Germain, demand but a prerequ1si<te oo fr,eedom and self-d•eteriminaiion of the East European peoples. The price of freed om for all European peoples is their restriction to histm:iically confiruned bounda<ries Olf settlemerut and respect for the neighlbor's boundM-ies dra,wn by the plowsha•re and not by the sword. Willy Brandt, popular Burgomaster (Mayor) of Berlin, made a special trip to Cologne to address the Sudeten German rally. In his speech Brandt said: The citizens of Berlin today, even as the eX!pel:lees in the post,war era , are syim1bolica1ly shouldering the load for the entire niaition. Berlin is the brid•ge between the people -Orf our divided country. If the lights should go out iln, Berllin, darrkness would set in for the entire Gerunan Federail Repwblic. We in Berlin f.eel that we need no counter-ideology. The East Block ide·ology i1S not such a Herculean thing that we can or.Jy meet it on the deifensiive. The Ber>lin questi,on is not the cause but the result of tensions ,b etween East and West a1nd of Gerunany's partition. There is no isolated Berlin solution. What there may be, until the rees·talb1ishment of Ge11ma•ny's unity in freedom and in a·greemen,t with the ju,sitiJie-d securiity initerests of aU coruc,erned, is a sett:,ament of solely practilcal maitters. The following points rema·in essen,tia~: 1. The right of Berlin's citizens freely to decide their own matters. 2. The rights and d,uties of the A,llied Protecting Powers to prov,i de for access to Berlin a•nd for preparations for a peace treaty with an a1l-German governime.nt. 3. '!\he indissolUJble conneicti·on between West Berlin and the economic a•n.d legal system -0f the German F1ede-rall Repulblic. 4. The community of the population, of both sectors of Berlin, which must no't ,b e jeo,pa;rdfael by changing the d'emar>cation line of ,t he ci,ty into State boundaries. - "Sudeten Bulletin." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1961, Vol. 11 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 33), March-June 1961.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 34), September-December June 1961.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 68 SLOVAKIA SUDETEN GERMAN DAYS: MAY 19-22, 1961 The month of May, 1961, saw more than 200,000 Sudeten German expellees again convene - this year in the Rhine metropolis of Cologne - to be counted among those refusing to relinquish claims to native lands now under Soviet rule. Events that extended over four days (May 19-22) were highlighted by messages by U. S. Congressmen Morgan M. Moulder (Dem., Mo.), Gordon H. Scherer (Rep., 0 .), Roy A. Taylor (Dem., N. C.), Henry C. Schadeberg (Rep., Wis.), who flew to Cologne expressly to participate in the Sudeten German rally. The United States was also represented in the person of Philip A. Hrobak, President of the Slovak League of America and editor of the Slovak publication Jednota, who was awarded the Sudeten German Karl's Prize for his untiring efforts toward harmony among the peoples of East Central Europe. The Karl's Prize, named for Karl IV, King of Bohemia and Emperor of Germany, of the House of Luxemburg (1346-1378), is awarded each year to a political leader, scientist or publicist who has made an outstanding contribution to the concept of a United Europe. Reminiscent of a Scout jamboree, 3,500 Sudeten German boys and girls pitched their tents on the Cologne city fair grounds and camped there during the rally. Although most of them are too young to remember their native homes in Sudetenland from which their families were expelled in 1945-46, they have pledged their allegiance to a Europe in which all peoples and ethnic groups shall live in peace, freedom and harmony and, like their parents, refuse to give up their just claim to their homes now behind the iron curtain. At the grand youth finale, ruling Burgomaster of Berlin, Willy Brandt, addressed 15,000 listeners, scoring a demand for "unity, justice and freedom." A voice-speaking choir of South Moravians intoned the tragedy of a divided Germany, eager for reunification but incapable of SLOVAKIA 69 true unity unless it be achieved in freedom and not at the expense of freedom. Said Oskar Boese as spokesman of the Sudeten German Youth: The younger genera,tion o'f the Sudeten Germans, wants to contrilbute to the endeavors eventually leadin,g to a r-e al and long riange reconici'Hation between the peo,pl-es of Centra,l and East EurQPe and !Minister of Transportation Dr. Hans-Christoph Seebohm, congratulates recip,ient of European Charles Prize, Mr. Philip A. Hrobak, President of the Slovak League of America. 70 SLOVAKIA to help briidge the gaip between Germany aml her eastern neighbors, a gaip caused by war antl post-w,ar events. According to the speaker, the Sudeten German Youth considers it its task to strengthen among the young people the many spiritual and social duties towards the people of other continents. The principle emphasis of this work lies on the dignity and freedom of the human being. Concluded Mr. Boese: We fully recognize a,n d adhere to the basic huma,n, rughlts, the in,violalbii.ity of the legally acquired homeland, the right olf self-detel"!Jllin,ation, and the ideals and duties of deanocralcy. Dr. Hans-Christoph Seebohm, German Federal Minister and President of the Sudeten German Council, one of the main speakers of the Sudeten rally in Cologne, emphasized that Sudeten expellees are using solely peaceful means to achieve their goals of repatriation and self-determination. Addressing the many thousands gathered at the Cologne fair grounds he said: You have come here voluntariiLy and at great per-sonal sacrifice O!f time ,a nd m001ey to rededlioaite yourselves to our homelamd, the Sudetenlantl aind ito prove before the world that we Sudeten German-s exist as an ethnic group aoo are resolved to deanand that the r,i,ght to the h-0meiand and to selif-detemni,n,ation in our homelarud eventuaUy be re,alized. We do not claim this right merely for ourselves, but fur aill peolJ)le and for all nations and ethnic g,r oups all -0ver the world, beca use we know that only by the realization O!f these rig•h ts can a lasting peace, based on a recoI11Ciiliation and coo:peration, C1f peoples and eth111k groups, be ushered in as a genuiiine and equal partnership. We are working toward this goal with the peaceful means of the law. We rejelct force, booause force would lead to new injustices whkh would endanger the future of •posterity. We do not intend to peripetua,t e the irujusti.ce of the exipulsi10n by add'i•ng new expulsions. The ri'ght O!f seld'-d•etermin,ation, which cannot be exercised periodli,cally Hke an election, is inseparaUJly 11inked to the right of the individual to his homeland antl can on,ly be exe-rci,red iin c-0njunction with that righlt. The Bolshevist wo,r ld pays l!ip service to the right Olf self-determination and hlas only used it as an enticement. It believes that the rig,ht Olf selif-deter,mination ended with the expulsion. We say, h'owever, the dght to the home'La<rud can never be crushed 'by force . Only the indiividual can relinquish i,t by giving up his ties with his peOI)le and his homela,n<ii as an aict of free will and conscience. Conscience cannot ·be silenced by force; it cannot even be siilenced by deportation and enslla~emenit. A:s long as poople stand by their SLOVAKIA 71 native land, as long ais they remain lo)'lal to their people or ethnic group, they will retain this right to their hoonetand and the right to sel.f-detemninati-0n within thalt homeland. We do not believe that the .£utur.e oo Europe cam, be made saife by the restoroitiion of oubwom forms of national States. In vi-ew of the overlapping aireas of se!Jtlement of Oenltral European peoples and ethnic groups which stJil'l. exist despite the eJOI)'lllsron oo the Germans, a new, supra-naUonal order is needled. Peace a,nd harmony can be assured to these peoples onily when all natioml'l ambttions and lust for hegemony are bra•nded as a vio1'ation o.f the coomnonly estalblished order. Tolerance a•nd partnership wiU ha'V'e to overcome eidstiing tensions. We Sudeten Germans have renounced all thought oif reverrge, retlalliia'tioon and force ,i n the Charrt;er of the Elcpellees and the Wiesbaden A1gree:ment (signed by General Lev Ptchala for the Czech nati-ooo:l Counicil in London; and Dr. Rudold' Lodgman von Auen, Hans Schiltz and Rii:chard Rteitznoer o!ll, behallf of the Association for the Protection of Sudeiten German Interests). Guests of honor a,t Sudeten German Day (left to l"i9ht): Mr. Mouser, U. S. Embassy; the Hon. Ray A. Taylor, Gordon H. Scherer, Henry C. Schadeberg, members of U. S. Congress; General Lev Prchala, Czech National Council, and Hon. Morgan M. Moulder, Member U. S. Congress. 72 SLOVAKIA We want the peOII)les living today m Mioraiviia, Si,lesia, and Slo• vakra to know: We recognize, Czechs and Slovaks, your right to the homeland and your right of self-determinatioin just as we expect you to recogn,ize our respective rights. We want freedom for you, we want justice for you. We want you to live in a democratic and supranationally organized European order. We want to serve as equal and conscientious partners, the great aim: Freedom, justice and peace for all of Central Eastern Europe. Dr. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, West Ger m an Minister of E xpellee and Refugee Affairs, speaking fo r t h e F eder al Chancellor and t h e German F ederal Government , said: When you ask to be 3Jble to retur,n. to your homeland, to your free homeLand, it has nothing whatsoever to do w.ith [Plans ~md id€.as as expressed by the National Socialists. It is the nart:urail ex· -p ression of love .for on,e's native soil!. Your ethnic group is under fire by Eastern propaganda. How· ever , you are not in bad company if people accuse you oif being "revengists," •n,or is this accusation borne out me,re}y by constant repetitio•n. ]t simply shows how sensifaveliy the Eas,t reacts to our pledge of allegrian,c,e to your hiomeland and t he .right to thart 'homeland• - which is one of the most n,aitural cxf all rights. You are not seeking revenge. We who are the most recent victims of re· ven,ge ar e the first om~s ,to break its vicious circl.e. The expellees ha:ve fong srin•ce 3Jbandoned a•ny thought of revenge and retaliation ... The Gerunan Bumd·estaog, in a soleimn declaraltion made in 1,950, stated that the right to the homeland is an inalien-3Jble claim of man a1nd that irt raises protest agairnst tire su:nrender oif this right of the homeland belon ging to those Germans from Ozeicho-Slovakiia en,tr,usted to the caire of the West Ger.man Federal RepulblLc. Th~ Fed,eirail Government has repeatedly spoken out in this vein on behalif of the prinlciplie of the r1ght to the homeland and the rioght ad' selif-determination for all Ger,ma·ns. 1 The Hon. Gordon H. Scherer, member of t he U. S. House of Representatives, addressing t he Sudenten Germ an expellees, gathered at Cologne's fair grounds said : I brin•g you the warmest greetings od' the Congress a•nd the people of the United states of America. This meeting is imp ortant becaus·e you a·r e courageously facing up to the g,r e·a test issue oif thris generation, that .issue before which all oth1ers pass into ionsiogn,it.fioance. It is the fight w.ith the So·v iet Uniorn for survival, with the international Communist conspiracy 1by aill those people on borth sides of the ioron curtain who love and want lilberty and the right of se'hf-d•ete-run ination. I am cme of those, however, who does not beliieve that we a,r e going to have all-o ut nuclear war. Why? Simply because today the fire·pQlWer between the Eaist and the W es't is fairly well balanced and neither side is going to risk the total ,destruction of its cities. SLOVAKIA 73 The Russians -are not dumb. Wh,y should they risk a1lmost total annihilation? As ·long as the Communist empire corutinues to move for,ward , how, as a practical matter, c,a n the Sudeten. Ge.rmans expect to have their lands -andi propertiies returned to 'them? Hoiw can you or any of the people behind the iron curtain ex,pe'Ct the right of selfdetenmin.ation as long as the despots in the KremHn continue cynica11,y to maniipuliare the strings thiat control theiJ- puppets in Czecho,Slov.a'kia, Pola•nd, Ru.mania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, China, Tibet and, yes, EJa,sit Germany? Onl,y aifter we in the .free world, with the help of millions cxf our secret a'llies behind the iron, and ballnfboo curtaiiin6, turn the tide of arthei,sti.c, godJ:ess Communism, will Su,d,e'ten Ge:rnnans be alble to realire their cheiriished goals of "restoraltion of their homelands" and "seltf-detel'trll1i:n,a,tion." Congressman Roy A. Taylor, praised the Sudeten Garmans as one of the greatest anti-Communist forces in the 1T he main speakers at Sudeten German Day. (Left to right): Wenzel Jaksch, President of Sudeten German Federal Assembly; Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin; Ha.ns-Christoph Seebohm, President of the Sudeten German Council. 74 SLOVAKIA world, saying they had greatly contributed to the struggle for the preservation of freedom. The Sudetens know, he stated, what it means to suffer at the hands of Communism. "Through your actions you have won the admiration of all free people of the world. "We need to believe that right in the world will triumph over might, and that truth crushed to earth will rise again. We want you to know that we in America are anxious to help correct the injustices of the past and recover the world's greatest lost treasure, which is world peace." Representative Henry C. Schadeberg declared that: Sud>eten Germ~ms have the title to thei·r homeland as aM other people of the world arud Communist measures must be tolerated in no ease. be ,t hey directed ag,ainst the Po,!es or the Germans. Your magnificent way to demonstrate for cooperation with the Slovak people by awarding the Charles Prize to the President of the Slovak League of America is a manifestation for cooperation with all other nations of Eastern Europe. y;our attitud e is greatly ,a·ppreciated by keed01m-loving people in Amer,k!a a,nd <in al11 of the free world. We believe with you tha.t freedom will not oisappear from this world - that freedom and not Communist tyrianny is the "w.ave of the fut ure," and tha,t faiith !in God wHl str,e ngthen and :remain ,t he buliwark of tree men, in the West. Our work .and your work wiU be successful becaus e freedom is righ't and tyranny is wrong. 1 From Congressman Morgan M. Moulder the audience heard that the Communists were following quite clear aims by expelling the Sudeten Germans from their homelands. Said he: The Communists wanted to pus:h the borders of their ter,r itocy as fa:r west a<s possible. They br,iJbed followers by oistri'buting Germain, expellees' propel1ty; thereby they were able to colle1etivize Sudeten German and East German agriculture ,a nd industry, -and have tried to corrupt the morale of a-11 East Gernnan peoples and create ete11na1l hatred between the Germans on th·e one hand and the Czechs and the Poles on the other. Every Amerilcan who loves freedom should condemn these Communist aims. Every Almer,iican should support the rapprochement between n,ations that have become victims of Coonmunism. It Ls our belief that this ra'PProchement must be based on justice. We believe that aU people h<l!Ve a right to th•eir h'Omeland and that the inj,usti-ces committed since world Oommun,ism arose must be removed. We ,b elieve that the nations long for and deserve full freedom a,nd sellf-deternnin-ati'on. The Sudeten Germans shoUJ1d haive the r ~g,ht to return to their centuries-Old hoone1'and and to their sebf-determination. Wenzel Jaksch, member of the German Federal Par- SLOVAKIA 75 1iament and President of the Sudeten German Federal Assembly, Wiesbaden, told the Cologne rally: ]f we look at the Sudeten problem as an isolated question, it becomes one rnf the most diif£icult ones Ln Europe todlay. Today, as in the past, it is our hilstoriic perseverance thait will decide the fUJture of our hooneland. A homeland' that is written o<flf the books is lost forever. We are ,c alled illusionists because we do not want to fonreit the old homela,n,d. Yet those who beHeve they can retain West Gerunainiy ,p ermanently, irf they yield East Germanry .and the Sudetenland, ar,e even greater illusionists. At this pOlint we a,r e faced wilth an in,n.er decision between political deifensi~ and political offensi:ve thinking. 'J.1he malking of that decision is a,n unesoa,paible ta.sk. An European democracy that thinks offensively should see in the loya,ty of Sudeten a•nd East Germans to their hooneJ,and its most va,l1U1aible aUies. Any over.all Euroipean pea'ce plan Olf the uniited democracies cannot a.Jif-Ord to ex!Clude the reparation of the expulJ,sions. This i-s no biased Germain, demand but a prerequ1si<te oo fr,eedom and self-d•eteriminaiion of the East European peoples. The price of freed om for all European peoples is their restriction to histm:iically confiruned bounda<ries Olf settlemerut and respect for the neighlbor's boundM-ies dra,wn by the plowsha•re and not by the sword. Willy Brandt, popular Burgomaster (Mayor) of Berlin, made a special trip to Cologne to address the Sudeten German rally. In his speech Brandt said: The citizens of Berlin today, even as the eX!pel:lees in the post,war era , are syim1bolica1ly shouldering the load for the entire niaition. Berlin is the brid•ge between the people -Orf our divided country. If the lights should go out iln, Berllin, darrkness would set in for the entire Gerunan Federail Repwblic. We in Berlin f.eel that we need no counter-ideology. The East Block ide·ology i1S not such a Herculean thing that we can or.Jy meet it on the deifensiive. The Ber>lin questi,on is not the cause but the result of tensions ,b etween East and West a1nd of Gerunany's partition. There is no isolated Berlin solution. What there may be, until the rees·talb1ishment of Ge11ma•ny's unity in freedom and in a·greemen,t with the ju,sitiJie-d securiity initerests of aU coruc,erned, is a sett:,ament of solely practilcal maitters. The following points rema·in essen,tia~: 1. The right of Berlin's citizens freely to decide their own matters. 2. The rights and d,uties of the A,llied Protecting Powers to prov,i de for access to Berlin a•nd for preparations for a peace treaty with an a1l-German governime.nt. 3. '!\he indissolUJble conneicti·on between West Berlin and the economic a•n.d legal system -0f the German F1ede-rall Repulblic. 4. The community of the population, of both sectors of Berlin, which must no't ,b e jeo,pa;rdfael by changing the d'emar>cation line of ,t he ci,ty into State boundaries. - "Sudeten Bulletin."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Sudeten German Days: May 19-22, 1961 Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 11, No. 2 (34), September-December 1961 pp. 68-75 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1961 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3bd6b8d67e6244e70a9cfdeafefe3d2f.pdf 3159be9185a023845d86ca8c2474ffcf PDF Text Text 120 SLOVAKIA Survey Research and Ethnic Studies Steven I. M i l l e r , Ph.D. The basic purpose of survey research ( or broadly speaking, empirical research) is to find relationships be tween variables. 1 If a relationship, or association, can be established, than it becomes possible to predict one variable from another. Thus, if we know that the variable IQ and achievement test scores are related to one another, it then becomes possible (within limits) to predict one from the other. That is, if we know a person's IQ score, we can say with some degree of certainty what his score may be on the particular achievement test. 2 The idea of accurate prediction is one of the most important assumptions underlying the scientific method in general, and its specific applications to the field of social science. In addition to prediction, however, the idea of a relationship between two variables gives us other important information. For one, it tells us that two things that we probably did not think were associated in any meaningful way turn out to be so. We might find out, for instance, that there is a relationship between the arrival of various Slovak immigrants and their political behavior; or that compared to Polish immigrants, Slovak immigrants have voted more consistently for a particular political party.3 The idea of looking for a relationships also has consequences in terms of constructing a coherent body of propositions that can give us a clear and comprehensive picture of a field of study, i.e., Slovak immigrant behavior. In a similar view, if it is possible to establish valid empirical generalization about a specific group, then it may be possible to extend these findings to other groups. In this way, it is possible to extend the theoretical base for a field of inquiry. 4 �SLOVAKIA 121 THE LOGIC OF PROCEDURE In the search for relationship in the social world, there is a definite procedure that can be utilized. There are certain logical steps that help us proceed with the investigation in such a way so as to determine the meaning of our problem. 5 The first step, then, would be to identify a problem that is of interest to us. The area of investigation should be one that is in need of clarification. Let us choose for our problem the following: Do all Slovaks concern themselves in similar ways with the political and religious problems of Slovakia? Why choose this particular issue? That would entirely depend on what we were concerned with? There are, of course, hundreds of different issues that we could turn our direction to. But let us assume that the present one is important to us because we suspect (for whatever reason) that interest in political and religious affairs in Slovakia is decreasing; it could also be the opposite: interest is increasing. Perhaps, however, we believe the first assertion is correct. Furthermore, we have some previous information from which to draw on which indicates that immigrants who have lived in their adopted country for a period of time will become socialized into the norms of that society, and will increasingly become interested in the concerns of their adopted country rather than their native one. If we had a larger context in which to place our specific problem, then, in a very broad sense, we have some type of theory. Having a "theory" of behavior enables us to focus our attention more clearly on the specific problem, as well as presenting possibilities of generalizing from our findings .6 Once we have the problem in focus, the next step is to place it in more precise and formal language. This is called an hypothesis. An hypothesis is "a conjectural statement about the relationship between two or more variables." 7 We can state the problem in the following way: there is a relationship between length of residence in the adopted country and interest in political (religious) affairs of the �122 SLOVAKIA native country. This is, of course, a very broad hypothesis, but it sets the boundaries of our investigation. It tells us, minimally, that we are interested in determining a relationship between two things: length of residence and political interest. There are many other aspects that are left open to investigation. We will examine these a little later. LOOKING FOR A RELATIONSHIP The first step is to determine whether our two variables are related. We want to know, in other words, if the independent variable length of residence is affecting the dependent variable, political interest. Residence is our independent variable because we can see that a person's length of residence may influence his political beliefs, but a person's political beliefs would not normally "cause" his length of residence. 8 To see if the variables are associated, it is necessary to show that the independent variable can be divided into at least two mutually exhaustive and inclusive categories.9 For instance, we could divide our independent variable into the categories of "old residents" and "new residents," or into more precise categories of years-perhaps every ten years. For our purposes, let us say "old residents" will be those coming to the United States from 1939 to 1950, while "new" residents will be those coming from 1950 to 1970. Let us further assume that we are dealing only with those individuals who were at least fifteen years or older when they emigrated, and who were therefore at last somewhat politically aware. To continue, let us also say that we have gotten a representative sample of Slovaks, and that through the use of a questionaire information has been received on a range of topics. In terms of political interest, we could ask, for example, whether or not they have a strong, personal interest in the political affairs of Slovakia. The responses could be measured by constructing a scale that would be a valid and reliable measure of this particular attitude. 10 Let us represent our hypothetical findings by the following table: �123 SLOVAKIA TABLE 1 Interest in Slovak Political Affairs by Length of Residence in United States (Hypothetical Data) PERCENTAGE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS "Old" Residents 35% (1000) "New" Residents 75% (1000) Residence The table shows us that our two variables are related.11 There is a 40 percentage point difference indicating that the newer residents are more interested in Slovak political affairs than the older residents. Now if we found this type of relationship in our data, we would report the relationship and leave it at that. This would give us some information, but it would be a very restricted sort of information. One logical question we might want to ask is "why is there such a relationship?" Once we ask the "why," we are in the realm of explanatory research.12 That is, we are now interested in extending our original findings. But how can we explain the original relationship? There are many possibilities. We may argue, for example, that our original independent and dependent variables were not clearly defined, and therefore, our findings is incorrect; or that our sampling was not done correctly. These, of course, could be legitimate criticisms. But let us assume that we have satifactorily overcome these problems. We must now attempt to find another reason why the original relationship is there. To do this requires thinking of some other factors that may be of importance. One may be age. We could argue that the "older" residents are chronologically older than the "younger" residents and that the difference in political interest is simply one of the effects of age. It would, of course, be helpful to have some type of theory or data which suggests a relationship between age and political interest. When we think another factor is responsible for our original relationship, and we wish to see if it is having any effect on the original relationship, then we say we are "controlling for," or "holding constant" this factor. 13 Or �124 SLOVAKIA put somewhat differently, we are saying "were it not for age, the original relationsb,ip would disappear or be substantially reduced." That is, we think that age is the reason why there is a relationship between residence and political interest. What we want to do, then, is to make people "alike" on age and see what happens. How shall we divide people in our sample by age? A very rough measure would be to look at people over sixty and under sixty years of age. This is represented in the following Table. TABLE 2 The Relationship of Political Interest and Residence by Age (Hypothetical Data) % STRONG POLITICAL INTEREST Old -60 10 (300) New 40 (600) Age 10 (700) Residence 40 (400) The table shows that even when we control for age, the original relationship is maintained: new residents are still more likely to have strong political interests regardless of age. How it is possible that when we controlled for age the original relationship could have "disappeared." 14 If this had happened, we would have concluded that age was the reason for the association, and that our original finding had been "spurious." 15 Since age is not the factor we are looking for, other variables must be considered. For example, one possibility would be a person's sex. That is, the reason why we observed the original relationship was because there were differences among men and women in terms of political interest. There may, of course, be many other potential explanatory variables-educational level, rural-urban residence, level of intelligence, socioeconomic status to mention just a few. No matter what variable(s) we decide to use as test factors, there should be some (often tbere is not) a priori reason for selecting them. 16 Tn return to our example, let us say we chose educational level as our test factor. OUr guess is that a person's �125 SLOVAKIA educational level is related to political interest regardless of whether or not he has resided in the United States a particular period of time. Table three illustrates this. TABLE 3 Relationship of Political Interest and Residence by Education (Hypothetical Data) % STRONG POLITlCAL INTEREST Less than H.S. Educational Level High School College Old 20 (400) 30 (300) 50 (100) New 20 (200) 30 (500) 40 (500) Residence Table three shows that when educational level is introduced as a test factor, our original relationship between residence and political activity disappears. What we are saying is that while there were more college-educated Slovaks that had a high degree of political interest, it did not matter, at any educational level whether or not the Slovaks were new or old residents. Our educational breakdowns, are of course, rather crude, and it is seldom the case that a table would appear as it does above. In addition, there would be some other problems that would require additional attention. We would want to know, for the new residents as well as the old, at what point in time the highest educational level was being measured. Thus, it would be possible to have certain members of the new residents who had not completed their formal education at the time of the study. It is also possible, for our old residents, to have a significant number fifteen years old in 1940. It would, however, be possible to ask for the highest educational level attained. Thus, one could still determine the amount of education received by the old residents after 1940. If, on the other hand, there was a large group of fifteen-year-olds who arrived in 1968, and assuming the study was done around that time, it would be possible through other means, to estimate their highest educational level of attainment. �126 SLOVAKIA EXTENDING RELATIONSHIPS: INTERVENING ANTECEDENT AND EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES A point worth noting is that if we were interested in understanding the behavior of Slovaks, and if the empirical method were chosen to do this, then the type of information received is only one segment of a larger causal chain. What we attempt to do is to examine only one part of a large and very complex pattern of behavior, and possibly relate the findings to other patterns so as to form a complete picture. Again we are asking, "why is this variable influencing that variable?" Even when we find that two variables are related, we are still faced with several problems of interpretation. For instance, in our previous example, it was found that when educational level was controlled, the original relationship disappeared. Well, what does it mean to say that the original relationship "disappears?" There are several possibilities here. One is the search for intervening variables. 17 This means that the original relationship is "caused" by the intervention of a third variable. This third variable, however, is related to the independent and dependent variables in a special way. It logically comes between the independent and dependent variables, and when controlled for, makes the original relationship disappear. For example, we might discover that Slovak-Americans and Polish-Americans differ in the amount of "ethnic consciousness" they display. 13 Let us assume that Slovak-Americans demonstrate higher levels of ethnic consciousness. We now have an original relationship between the independent variable "ethnicity" and the dependent variable "ethnic consciousness." We are again faced with the problem of trying to explain the relationship. One way would be to search for an intervening variable. The intervening variable is in effect another independent variable. The intervening variable must also logically come after the original independent variable. For our example, such a variable could be education. We could argue that ethnicity precedes education, and that education has an effect on level of consciousness. The relationship would look like the following: Ethnicity ♦ (Independent) Education ♦ (Intervening) Consciousness (Dependent) �127 SLOVAKIA We are saying here that a person's ethnic background is related to his level of education and his level of education is responsible for his degree of ethnic consciousness. Let us look at some other possiblities. One principal objective of survey research is to trace out a "causal chain." This means that in addition to looking for intervening variables, we are also finding a causal link in which a variable precedes the original independent variable, is related to it, and in which the original independent variable is then related to the dependent variable. In order to construct this chain of events, Rosenberg lists three conditions that must be set. 19 1. All three variables must be related. 2. When the antecedent variable is controlled, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables should not disappear. 3. When the independent variable is controlled, the relationship between the antecedent and dependent variables should disappear. As an illustration, let us suppose that we find a relationship between liberal and conservative Slovak-Americans and degree of alienation. Specifically, we find that conservative Slovak-Americans are more alienated. In this case, however, we are interested in looking for an antecedent variable; one that comes before political orientation and is related to it. We might postulate that such a variable could be religion. Thus, we are saying that a person's religion influences his political orientation and his political orientation influence his degree of alienation. Schematically it would be as follows: Religion • (Antecedent) Political Orientation (Independent) • Alienation (Dependent ) In order to be considered a true antecedent relationship, it would have to meet all three of Rosenberg's conditions. We would first control on religion. If the relationship is maintained between political orientation and alienation, then we are on the right track. We would next want to control on political orientation. If the relationship between religion and alienation disappears, we have found the correct antecedent variable. Let us consider one additional relationship before �SLOVAKIA 128 closing the discussion. This is called looking the extraneous variables. The logic here is this: we find a relationship between two variables, introduce a test factor, and the original relationship disappears. Let us assume further that the test factor precedes the independent factor, and therefore, is not an intervening one. If the relationship disappears, we then conclude that it was "spurious"-that another variable ( the test factor) was producing the original results. For instance, in our original example, we found that Slovaks who were "newer" residents had a higher level of political interest than "older" residents. We concluded that the reason was education. Education, in this instance, could be considered an extraneous variable. That is, there is no inherent link between the original independent and dependent variables. Rather, both are related separately to the extraneous variable education.20 The relationship would be as follows: ♦ Residence (Independent) ♦ Political Interest (Dependent) Education (Extraneous) Here we are saying that the reason why residence was associated with political interest was because education was separately related to residence and to political interest. The newer residents had more education than the older ones, and people who have lower levels of education may be less politically motivated. SUMMARY If Slovaks, whether native-born or American, are interested in maintaining their ethnic heritage, then new research efforts must be undertaken. These research efforts should at least in part use the logic and methodology of the social sciences. Although this is only one of many approaches to the understanding of social phenomena, it is an important one because it enables us to probe deeply into the motivations underlying human behavior. The above has been an elementary attempt to show some of the thinking, or logic of procedure, behind that part of empirical inquiry called survey analysis. While the procedure has many and complex facets to it, in its most �SLOVAKIA 129 general form it attempts to establish relationships between variables and then elaborates on those relationships . REFERENC ES 1) Stephen Cole, The Sociological Method (Chicago: Markham, 1972), Ch. 4. 2) Harry L. Miller and Roger R. Woock, Social Foundations of Urban Education (Hindale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 401-412. 3) See, for example, Djuro J. Vrga, "Different Associational Involvement of Successive Ethnic Immigrants: An Indicator of Ethno-Religious Factionalism and Alienation of Immigrants," Social Forces, 50 (December, 1971), pp. 239-249. 4) See, generally, Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), Ch. 1 and 2. 5) One of the best volumes in this connection is Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1968). I will draw heavily from Rosenberg in the remaining discussion. 6) For theory building in the social sciences, see Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free Press, 1969) , Ch. 1 and 2. 7) Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 20. 8) Cole, The Sociological Method, Ch. 2. 9) James A. Davis, Elementary Survey Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 9-10. 10) See Max D. Engelhart, Methods of Educational Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), Ch. 7. 11) Here we are only interested in establishing a percentage point difference. We are not analyzing all the cells (4) of the table, nor are we discussing "significant" differences. There are appropriate methods for this that go beyond this discussion. 12) Cole, The Sociological Method, pp. 101-106. 13) Travis Hirschi and Hanan C. Selven, Delinquency Research: An Appraisal of Analytical Methods (New York: The Free Press, 1967) , pp. 37-51; and Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, Ch. 2 and 3. 14) "Disappear" in this context usually means that an original relationship is substantially reduced when the test factor is introduced. 15) Cole and Rosenberg give this term a slightly different meaning. We are using it in Rosenberg's sense of a relationship existing because it is an effect of a common cause, pp. 23-82. 16) Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, pp. 37-39. 17) Ibid., pp. 54-82. 18 ) We will assume there is some way of measuring "ethnic consciousness." 19) Rosenberg, Logic of Survey Analysis, pp. 68-69. 20) Ibid., pp. 27-4-0. � 120 SLOVAKIA Survey Research and Ethnic Studies Steven I. M i l l e r , Ph.D. The basic purpose of survey research ( or broadly speaking, empirical research) is to find relationships be tween variables. 1 If a relationship, or association, can be established, than it becomes possible to predict one variable from another. Thus, if we know that the variable IQ and achievement test scores are related to one another, it then becomes possible (within limits) to predict one from the other. That is, if we know a person's IQ score, we can say with some degree of certainty what his score may be on the particular achievement test. 2 The idea of accurate prediction is one of the most important assumptions underlying the scientific method in general, and its specific applications to the field of social science. In addition to prediction, however, the idea of a relationship between two variables gives us other important information. For one, it tells us that two things that we probably did not think were associated in any meaningful way turn out to be so. We might find out, for instance, that there is a relationship between the arrival of various Slovak immigrants and their political behavior; or that compared to Polish immigrants, Slovak immigrants have voted more consistently for a particular political party.3 The idea of looking for a relationships also has consequences in terms of constructing a coherent body of propositions that can give us a clear and comprehensive picture of a field of study, i.e., Slovak immigrant behavior. In a similar view, if it is possible to establish valid empirical generalization about a specific group, then it may be possible to extend these findings to other groups. In this way, it is possible to extend the theoretical base for a field of inquiry. 4 �SLOVAKIA 121 THE LOGIC OF PROCEDURE In the search for relationship in the social world, there is a definite procedure that can be utilized. There are certain logical steps that help us proceed with the investigation in such a way so as to determine the meaning of our problem. 5 The first step, then, would be to identify a problem that is of interest to us. The area of investigation should be one that is in need of clarification. Let us choose for our problem the following: Do all Slovaks concern themselves in similar ways with the political and religious problems of Slovakia? Why choose this particular issue? That would entirely depend on what we were concerned with? There are, of course, hundreds of different issues that we could turn our direction to. But let us assume that the present one is important to us because we suspect (for whatever reason) that interest in political and religious affairs in Slovakia is decreasing; it could also be the opposite: interest is increasing. Perhaps, however, we believe the first assertion is correct. Furthermore, we have some previous information from which to draw on which indicates that immigrants who have lived in their adopted country for a period of time will become socialized into the norms of that society, and will increasingly become interested in the concerns of their adopted country rather than their native one. If we had a larger context in which to place our specific problem, then, in a very broad sense, we have some type of theory. Having a "theory" of behavior enables us to focus our attention more clearly on the specific problem, as well as presenting possibilities of generalizing from our findings .6 Once we have the problem in focus, the next step is to place it in more precise and formal language. This is called an hypothesis. An hypothesis is "a conjectural statement about the relationship between two or more variables." 7 We can state the problem in the following way: there is a relationship between length of residence in the adopted country and interest in political (religious) affairs of the �122 SLOVAKIA native country. This is, of course, a very broad hypothesis, but it sets the boundaries of our investigation. It tells us, minimally, that we are interested in determining a relationship between two things: length of residence and political interest. There are many other aspects that are left open to investigation. We will examine these a little later. LOOKING FOR A RELATIONSHIP The first step is to determine whether our two variables are related. We want to know, in other words, if the independent variable length of residence is affecting the dependent variable, political interest. Residence is our independent variable because we can see that a person's length of residence may influence his political beliefs, but a person's political beliefs would not normally "cause" his length of residence. 8 To see if the variables are associated, it is necessary to show that the independent variable can be divided into at least two mutually exhaustive and inclusive categories.9 For instance, we could divide our independent variable into the categories of "old residents" and "new residents," or into more precise categories of years-perhaps every ten years. For our purposes, let us say "old residents" will be those coming to the United States from 1939 to 1950, while "new" residents will be those coming from 1950 to 1970. Let us further assume that we are dealing only with those individuals who were at least fifteen years or older when they emigrated, and who were therefore at last somewhat politically aware. To continue, let us also say that we have gotten a representative sample of Slovaks, and that through the use of a questionaire information has been received on a range of topics. In terms of political interest, we could ask, for example, whether or not they have a strong, personal interest in the political affairs of Slovakia. The responses could be measured by constructing a scale that would be a valid and reliable measure of this particular attitude. 10 Let us represent our hypothetical findings by the following table: �123 SLOVAKIA TABLE 1 Interest in Slovak Political Affairs by Length of Residence in United States (Hypothetical Data) PERCENTAGE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS "Old" Residents 35% (1000) "New" Residents 75% (1000) Residence The table shows us that our two variables are related.11 There is a 40 percentage point difference indicating that the newer residents are more interested in Slovak political affairs than the older residents. Now if we found this type of relationship in our data, we would report the relationship and leave it at that. This would give us some information, but it would be a very restricted sort of information. One logical question we might want to ask is "why is there such a relationship?" Once we ask the "why," we are in the realm of explanatory research.12 That is, we are now interested in extending our original findings. But how can we explain the original relationship? There are many possibilities. We may argue, for example, that our original independent and dependent variables were not clearly defined, and therefore, our findings is incorrect; or that our sampling was not done correctly. These, of course, could be legitimate criticisms. But let us assume that we have satifactorily overcome these problems. We must now attempt to find another reason why the original relationship is there. To do this requires thinking of some other factors that may be of importance. One may be age. We could argue that the "older" residents are chronologically older than the "younger" residents and that the difference in political interest is simply one of the effects of age. It would, of course, be helpful to have some type of theory or data which suggests a relationship between age and political interest. When we think another factor is responsible for our original relationship, and we wish to see if it is having any effect on the original relationship, then we say we are "controlling for," or "holding constant" this factor. 13 Or �124 SLOVAKIA put somewhat differently, we are saying "were it not for age, the original relationsb,ip would disappear or be substantially reduced." That is, we think that age is the reason why there is a relationship between residence and political interest. What we want to do, then, is to make people "alike" on age and see what happens. How shall we divide people in our sample by age? A very rough measure would be to look at people over sixty and under sixty years of age. This is represented in the following Table. TABLE 2 The Relationship of Political Interest and Residence by Age (Hypothetical Data) % STRONG POLITICAL INTEREST Old -60 10 (300) New 40 (600) Age 10 (700) Residence 40 (400) The table shows that even when we control for age, the original relationship is maintained: new residents are still more likely to have strong political interests regardless of age. How it is possible that when we controlled for age the original relationship could have "disappeared." 14 If this had happened, we would have concluded that age was the reason for the association, and that our original finding had been "spurious." 15 Since age is not the factor we are looking for, other variables must be considered. For example, one possibility would be a person's sex. That is, the reason why we observed the original relationship was because there were differences among men and women in terms of political interest. There may, of course, be many other potential explanatory variables-educational level, rural-urban residence, level of intelligence, socioeconomic status to mention just a few. No matter what variable(s) we decide to use as test factors, there should be some (often tbere is not) a priori reason for selecting them. 16 Tn return to our example, let us say we chose educational level as our test factor. OUr guess is that a person's �125 SLOVAKIA educational level is related to political interest regardless of whether or not he has resided in the United States a particular period of time. Table three illustrates this. TABLE 3 Relationship of Political Interest and Residence by Education (Hypothetical Data) % STRONG POLITlCAL INTEREST Less than H.S. Educational Level High School College Old 20 (400) 30 (300) 50 (100) New 20 (200) 30 (500) 40 (500) Residence Table three shows that when educational level is introduced as a test factor, our original relationship between residence and political activity disappears. What we are saying is that while there were more college-educated Slovaks that had a high degree of political interest, it did not matter, at any educational level whether or not the Slovaks were new or old residents. Our educational breakdowns, are of course, rather crude, and it is seldom the case that a table would appear as it does above. In addition, there would be some other problems that would require additional attention. We would want to know, for the new residents as well as the old, at what point in time the highest educational level was being measured. Thus, it would be possible to have certain members of the new residents who had not completed their formal education at the time of the study. It is also possible, for our old residents, to have a significant number fifteen years old in 1940. It would, however, be possible to ask for the highest educational level attained. Thus, one could still determine the amount of education received by the old residents after 1940. If, on the other hand, there was a large group of fifteen-year-olds who arrived in 1968, and assuming the study was done around that time, it would be possible through other means, to estimate their highest educational level of attainment. �126 SLOVAKIA EXTENDING RELATIONSHIPS: INTERVENING ANTECEDENT AND EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES A point worth noting is that if we were interested in understanding the behavior of Slovaks, and if the empirical method were chosen to do this, then the type of information received is only one segment of a larger causal chain. What we attempt to do is to examine only one part of a large and very complex pattern of behavior, and possibly relate the findings to other patterns so as to form a complete picture. Again we are asking, "why is this variable influencing that variable?" Even when we find that two variables are related, we are still faced with several problems of interpretation. For instance, in our previous example, it was found that when educational level was controlled, the original relationship disappeared. Well, what does it mean to say that the original relationship "disappears?" There are several possibilities here. One is the search for intervening variables. 17 This means that the original relationship is "caused" by the intervention of a third variable. This third variable, however, is related to the independent and dependent variables in a special way. It logically comes between the independent and dependent variables, and when controlled for, makes the original relationship disappear. For example, we might discover that Slovak-Americans and Polish-Americans differ in the amount of "ethnic consciousness" they display. 13 Let us assume that Slovak-Americans demonstrate higher levels of ethnic consciousness. We now have an original relationship between the independent variable "ethnicity" and the dependent variable "ethnic consciousness." We are again faced with the problem of trying to explain the relationship. One way would be to search for an intervening variable. The intervening variable is in effect another independent variable. The intervening variable must also logically come after the original independent variable. For our example, such a variable could be education. We could argue that ethnicity precedes education, and that education has an effect on level of consciousness. The relationship would look like the following: Ethnicity ♦ (Independent) Education ♦ (Intervening) Consciousness (Dependent) �127 SLOVAKIA We are saying here that a person's ethnic background is related to his level of education and his level of education is responsible for his degree of ethnic consciousness. Let us look at some other possiblities. One principal objective of survey research is to trace out a "causal chain." This means that in addition to looking for intervening variables, we are also finding a causal link in which a variable precedes the original independent variable, is related to it, and in which the original independent variable is then related to the dependent variable. In order to construct this chain of events, Rosenberg lists three conditions that must be set. 19 1. All three variables must be related. 2. When the antecedent variable is controlled, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables should not disappear. 3. When the independent variable is controlled, the relationship between the antecedent and dependent variables should disappear. As an illustration, let us suppose that we find a relationship between liberal and conservative Slovak-Americans and degree of alienation. Specifically, we find that conservative Slovak-Americans are more alienated. In this case, however, we are interested in looking for an antecedent variable; one that comes before political orientation and is related to it. We might postulate that such a variable could be religion. Thus, we are saying that a person's religion influences his political orientation and his political orientation influence his degree of alienation. Schematically it would be as follows: Religion • (Antecedent) Political Orientation (Independent) • Alienation (Dependent ) In order to be considered a true antecedent relationship, it would have to meet all three of Rosenberg's conditions. We would first control on religion. If the relationship is maintained between political orientation and alienation, then we are on the right track. We would next want to control on political orientation. If the relationship between religion and alienation disappears, we have found the correct antecedent variable. Let us consider one additional relationship before �SLOVAKIA 128 closing the discussion. This is called looking the extraneous variables. The logic here is this: we find a relationship between two variables, introduce a test factor, and the original relationship disappears. Let us assume further that the test factor precedes the independent factor, and therefore, is not an intervening one. If the relationship disappears, we then conclude that it was "spurious"-that another variable ( the test factor) was producing the original results. For instance, in our original example, we found that Slovaks who were "newer" residents had a higher level of political interest than "older" residents. We concluded that the reason was education. Education, in this instance, could be considered an extraneous variable. That is, there is no inherent link between the original independent and dependent variables. Rather, both are related separately to the extraneous variable education.20 The relationship would be as follows: ♦ Residence (Independent) ♦ Political Interest (Dependent) Education (Extraneous) Here we are saying that the reason why residence was associated with political interest was because education was separately related to residence and to political interest. The newer residents had more education than the older ones, and people who have lower levels of education may be less politically motivated. SUMMARY If Slovaks, whether native-born or American, are interested in maintaining their ethnic heritage, then new research efforts must be undertaken. These research efforts should at least in part use the logic and methodology of the social sciences. Although this is only one of many approaches to the understanding of social phenomena, it is an important one because it enables us to probe deeply into the motivations underlying human behavior. The above has been an elementary attempt to show some of the thinking, or logic of procedure, behind that part of empirical inquiry called survey analysis. While the procedure has many and complex facets to it, in its most �SLOVAKIA 129 general form it attempts to establish relationships between variables and then elaborates on those relationships . REFERENC ES 1) Stephen Cole, The Sociological Method (Chicago: Markham, 1972), Ch. 4. 2) Harry L. Miller and Roger R. Woock, Social Foundations of Urban Education (Hindale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 401-412. 3) See, for example, Djuro J. Vrga, "Different Associational Involvement of Successive Ethnic Immigrants: An Indicator of Ethno-Religious Factionalism and Alienation of Immigrants," Social Forces, 50 (December, 1971), pp. 239-249. 4) See, generally, Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), Ch. 1 and 2. 5) One of the best volumes in this connection is Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1968). I will draw heavily from Rosenberg in the remaining discussion. 6) For theory building in the social sciences, see Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free Press, 1969) , Ch. 1 and 2. 7) Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 20. 8) Cole, The Sociological Method, Ch. 2. 9) James A. Davis, Elementary Survey Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 9-10. 10) See Max D. Engelhart, Methods of Educational Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), Ch. 7. 11) Here we are only interested in establishing a percentage point difference. We are not analyzing all the cells (4) of the table, nor are we discussing "significant" differences. There are appropriate methods for this that go beyond this discussion. 12) Cole, The Sociological Method, pp. 101-106. 13) Travis Hirschi and Hanan C. Selven, Delinquency Research: An Appraisal of Analytical Methods (New York: The Free Press, 1967) , pp. 37-51; and Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, Ch. 2 and 3. 14) "Disappear" in this context usually means that an original relationship is substantially reduced when the test factor is introduced. 15) Cole and Rosenberg give this term a slightly different meaning. We are using it in Rosenberg's sense of a relationship existing because it is an effect of a common cause, pp. 23-82. 16) Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, pp. 37-39. 17) Ibid., pp. 54-82. 18 ) We will assume there is some way of measuring "ethnic consciousness." 19) Rosenberg, Logic of Survey Analysis, pp. 68-69. 20) Ibid., pp. 27-4-0. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 120 SLOVAKIA Survey Research and Ethnic Studies Steven I. M i l l e r , Ph.D. The basic purpose of survey research ( or broadly speaking, empirical research) is to find relationships be tween variables. 1 If a relationship, or association, can be established, than it becomes possible to predict one variable from another. Thus, if we know that the variable IQ and achievement test scores are related to one another, it then becomes possible (within limits) to predict one from the other. That is, if we know a person's IQ score, we can say with some degree of certainty what his score may be on the particular achievement test. 2 The idea of accurate prediction is one of the most important assumptions underlying the scientific method in general, and its specific applications to the field of social science. In addition to prediction, however, the idea of a relationship between two variables gives us other important information. For one, it tells us that two things that we probably did not think were associated in any meaningful way turn out to be so. We might find out, for instance, that there is a relationship between the arrival of various Slovak immigrants and their political behavior; or that compared to Polish immigrants, Slovak immigrants have voted more consistently for a particular political party.3 The idea of looking for a relationships also has consequences in terms of constructing a coherent body of propositions that can give us a clear and comprehensive picture of a field of study, i.e., Slovak immigrant behavior. In a similar view, if it is possible to establish valid empirical generalization about a specific group, then it may be possible to extend these findings to other groups. In this way, it is possible to extend the theoretical base for a field of inquiry. 4 SLOVAKIA 121 THE LOGIC OF PROCEDURE In the search for relationship in the social world, there is a definite procedure that can be utilized. There are certain logical steps that help us proceed with the investigation in such a way so as to determine the meaning of our problem. 5 The first step, then, would be to identify a problem that is of interest to us. The area of investigation should be one that is in need of clarification. Let us choose for our problem the following: Do all Slovaks concern themselves in similar ways with the political and religious problems of Slovakia? Why choose this particular issue? That would entirely depend on what we were concerned with? There are, of course, hundreds of different issues that we could turn our direction to. But let us assume that the present one is important to us because we suspect (for whatever reason) that interest in political and religious affairs in Slovakia is decreasing; it could also be the opposite: interest is increasing. Perhaps, however, we believe the first assertion is correct. Furthermore, we have some previous information from which to draw on which indicates that immigrants who have lived in their adopted country for a period of time will become socialized into the norms of that society, and will increasingly become interested in the concerns of their adopted country rather than their native one. If we had a larger context in which to place our specific problem, then, in a very broad sense, we have some type of theory. Having a "theory" of behavior enables us to focus our attention more clearly on the specific problem, as well as presenting possibilities of generalizing from our findings .6 Once we have the problem in focus, the next step is to place it in more precise and formal language. This is called an hypothesis. An hypothesis is "a conjectural statement about the relationship between two or more variables." 7 We can state the problem in the following way: there is a relationship between length of residence in the adopted country and interest in political (religious) affairs of the 122 SLOVAKIA native country. This is, of course, a very broad hypothesis, but it sets the boundaries of our investigation. It tells us, minimally, that we are interested in determining a relationship between two things: length of residence and political interest. There are many other aspects that are left open to investigation. We will examine these a little later. LOOKING FOR A RELATIONSHIP The first step is to determine whether our two variables are related. We want to know, in other words, if the independent variable length of residence is affecting the dependent variable, political interest. Residence is our independent variable because we can see that a person's length of residence may influence his political beliefs, but a person's political beliefs would not normally "cause" his length of residence. 8 To see if the variables are associated, it is necessary to show that the independent variable can be divided into at least two mutually exhaustive and inclusive categories.9 For instance, we could divide our independent variable into the categories of "old residents" and "new residents," or into more precise categories of years-perhaps every ten years. For our purposes, let us say "old residents" will be those coming to the United States from 1939 to 1950, while "new" residents will be those coming from 1950 to 1970. Let us further assume that we are dealing only with those individuals who were at least fifteen years or older when they emigrated, and who were therefore at last somewhat politically aware. To continue, let us also say that we have gotten a representative sample of Slovaks, and that through the use of a questionaire information has been received on a range of topics. In terms of political interest, we could ask, for example, whether or not they have a strong, personal interest in the political affairs of Slovakia. The responses could be measured by constructing a scale that would be a valid and reliable measure of this particular attitude. 10 Let us represent our hypothetical findings by the following table: 123 SLOVAKIA TABLE 1 Interest in Slovak Political Affairs by Length of Residence in United States (Hypothetical Data) PERCENTAGE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS "Old" Residents 35% (1000) "New" Residents 75% (1000) Residence The table shows us that our two variables are related.11 There is a 40 percentage point difference indicating that the newer residents are more interested in Slovak political affairs than the older residents. Now if we found this type of relationship in our data, we would report the relationship and leave it at that. This would give us some information, but it would be a very restricted sort of information. One logical question we might want to ask is "why is there such a relationship?" Once we ask the "why," we are in the realm of explanatory research.12 That is, we are now interested in extending our original findings. But how can we explain the original relationship? There are many possibilities. We may argue, for example, that our original independent and dependent variables were not clearly defined, and therefore, our findings is incorrect; or that our sampling was not done correctly. These, of course, could be legitimate criticisms. But let us assume that we have satifactorily overcome these problems. We must now attempt to find another reason why the original relationship is there. To do this requires thinking of some other factors that may be of importance. One may be age. We could argue that the "older" residents are chronologically older than the "younger" residents and that the difference in political interest is simply one of the effects of age. It would, of course, be helpful to have some type of theory or data which suggests a relationship between age and political interest. When we think another factor is responsible for our original relationship, and we wish to see if it is having any effect on the original relationship, then we say we are "controlling for," or "holding constant" this factor. 13 Or 124 SLOVAKIA put somewhat differently, we are saying "were it not for age, the original relationsb,ip would disappear or be substantially reduced." That is, we think that age is the reason why there is a relationship between residence and political interest. What we want to do, then, is to make people "alike" on age and see what happens. How shall we divide people in our sample by age? A very rough measure would be to look at people over sixty and under sixty years of age. This is represented in the following Table. TABLE 2 The Relationship of Political Interest and Residence by Age (Hypothetical Data) % STRONG POLITICAL INTEREST Old -60 10 (300) New 40 (600) Age 10 (700) Residence 40 (400) The table shows that even when we control for age, the original relationship is maintained: new residents are still more likely to have strong political interests regardless of age. How it is possible that when we controlled for age the original relationship could have "disappeared." 14 If this had happened, we would have concluded that age was the reason for the association, and that our original finding had been "spurious." 15 Since age is not the factor we are looking for, other variables must be considered. For example, one possibility would be a person's sex. That is, the reason why we observed the original relationship was because there were differences among men and women in terms of political interest. There may, of course, be many other potential explanatory variables-educational level, rural-urban residence, level of intelligence, socioeconomic status to mention just a few. No matter what variable(s) we decide to use as test factors, there should be some (often tbere is not) a priori reason for selecting them. 16 Tn return to our example, let us say we chose educational level as our test factor. OUr guess is that a person's 125 SLOVAKIA educational level is related to political interest regardless of whether or not he has resided in the United States a particular period of time. Table three illustrates this. TABLE 3 Relationship of Political Interest and Residence by Education (Hypothetical Data) % STRONG POLITlCAL INTEREST Less than H.S. Educational Level High School College Old 20 (400) 30 (300) 50 (100) New 20 (200) 30 (500) 40 (500) Residence Table three shows that when educational level is introduced as a test factor, our original relationship between residence and political activity disappears. What we are saying is that while there were more college-educated Slovaks that had a high degree of political interest, it did not matter, at any educational level whether or not the Slovaks were new or old residents. Our educational breakdowns, are of course, rather crude, and it is seldom the case that a table would appear as it does above. In addition, there would be some other problems that would require additional attention. We would want to know, for the new residents as well as the old, at what point in time the highest educational level was being measured. Thus, it would be possible to have certain members of the new residents who had not completed their formal education at the time of the study. It is also possible, for our old residents, to have a significant number fifteen years old in 1940. It would, however, be possible to ask for the highest educational level attained. Thus, one could still determine the amount of education received by the old residents after 1940. If, on the other hand, there was a large group of fifteen-year-olds who arrived in 1968, and assuming the study was done around that time, it would be possible through other means, to estimate their highest educational level of attainment. 126 SLOVAKIA EXTENDING RELATIONSHIPS: INTERVENING ANTECEDENT AND EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES A point worth noting is that if we were interested in understanding the behavior of Slovaks, and if the empirical method were chosen to do this, then the type of information received is only one segment of a larger causal chain. What we attempt to do is to examine only one part of a large and very complex pattern of behavior, and possibly relate the findings to other patterns so as to form a complete picture. Again we are asking, "why is this variable influencing that variable?" Even when we find that two variables are related, we are still faced with several problems of interpretation. For instance, in our previous example, it was found that when educational level was controlled, the original relationship disappeared. Well, what does it mean to say that the original relationship "disappears?" There are several possibilities here. One is the search for intervening variables. 17 This means that the original relationship is "caused" by the intervention of a third variable. This third variable, however, is related to the independent and dependent variables in a special way. It logically comes between the independent and dependent variables, and when controlled for, makes the original relationship disappear. For example, we might discover that Slovak-Americans and Polish-Americans differ in the amount of "ethnic consciousness" they display. 13 Let us assume that Slovak-Americans demonstrate higher levels of ethnic consciousness. We now have an original relationship between the independent variable "ethnicity" and the dependent variable "ethnic consciousness." We are again faced with the problem of trying to explain the relationship. One way would be to search for an intervening variable. The intervening variable is in effect another independent variable. The intervening variable must also logically come after the original independent variable. For our example, such a variable could be education. We could argue that ethnicity precedes education, and that education has an effect on level of consciousness. The relationship would look like the following: Ethnicity ♦ (Independent) Education ♦ (Intervening) Consciousness (Dependent) 127 SLOVAKIA We are saying here that a person's ethnic background is related to his level of education and his level of education is responsible for his degree of ethnic consciousness. Let us look at some other possiblities. One principal objective of survey research is to trace out a "causal chain." This means that in addition to looking for intervening variables, we are also finding a causal link in which a variable precedes the original independent variable, is related to it, and in which the original independent variable is then related to the dependent variable. In order to construct this chain of events, Rosenberg lists three conditions that must be set. 19 1. All three variables must be related. 2. When the antecedent variable is controlled, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables should not disappear. 3. When the independent variable is controlled, the relationship between the antecedent and dependent variables should disappear. As an illustration, let us suppose that we find a relationship between liberal and conservative Slovak-Americans and degree of alienation. Specifically, we find that conservative Slovak-Americans are more alienated. In this case, however, we are interested in looking for an antecedent variable; one that comes before political orientation and is related to it. We might postulate that such a variable could be religion. Thus, we are saying that a person's religion influences his political orientation and his political orientation influence his degree of alienation. Schematically it would be as follows: Religion • (Antecedent) Political Orientation (Independent) • Alienation (Dependent ) In order to be considered a true antecedent relationship, it would have to meet all three of Rosenberg's conditions. We would first control on religion. If the relationship is maintained between political orientation and alienation, then we are on the right track. We would next want to control on political orientation. If the relationship between religion and alienation disappears, we have found the correct antecedent variable. Let us consider one additional relationship before SLOVAKIA 128 closing the discussion. This is called looking the extraneous variables. The logic here is this: we find a relationship between two variables, introduce a test factor, and the original relationship disappears. Let us assume further that the test factor precedes the independent factor, and therefore, is not an intervening one. If the relationship disappears, we then conclude that it was "spurious"-that another variable ( the test factor) was producing the original results. For instance, in our original example, we found that Slovaks who were "newer" residents had a higher level of political interest than "older" residents. We concluded that the reason was education. Education, in this instance, could be considered an extraneous variable. That is, there is no inherent link between the original independent and dependent variables. Rather, both are related separately to the extraneous variable education.20 The relationship would be as follows: ♦ Residence (Independent) ♦ Political Interest (Dependent) Education (Extraneous) Here we are saying that the reason why residence was associated with political interest was because education was separately related to residence and to political interest. The newer residents had more education than the older ones, and people who have lower levels of education may be less politically motivated. SUMMARY If Slovaks, whether native-born or American, are interested in maintaining their ethnic heritage, then new research efforts must be undertaken. These research efforts should at least in part use the logic and methodology of the social sciences. Although this is only one of many approaches to the understanding of social phenomena, it is an important one because it enables us to probe deeply into the motivations underlying human behavior. The above has been an elementary attempt to show some of the thinking, or logic of procedure, behind that part of empirical inquiry called survey analysis. While the procedure has many and complex facets to it, in its most SLOVAKIA 129 general form it attempts to establish relationships between variables and then elaborates on those relationships . REFERENC ES 1) Stephen Cole, The Sociological Method (Chicago: Markham, 1972), Ch. 4. 2) Harry L. Miller and Roger R. Woock, Social Foundations of Urban Education (Hindale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 401-412. 3) See, for example, Djuro J. Vrga, "Different Associational Involvement of Successive Ethnic Immigrants: An Indicator of Ethno-Religious Factionalism and Alienation of Immigrants," Social Forces, 50 (December, 1971), pp. 239-249. 4) See, generally, Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), Ch. 1 and 2. 5) One of the best volumes in this connection is Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1968). I will draw heavily from Rosenberg in the remaining discussion. 6) For theory building in the social sciences, see Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free Press, 1969) , Ch. 1 and 2. 7) Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 20. 8) Cole, The Sociological Method, Ch. 2. 9) James A. Davis, Elementary Survey Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 9-10. 10) See Max D. Engelhart, Methods of Educational Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), Ch. 7. 11) Here we are only interested in establishing a percentage point difference. We are not analyzing all the cells (4) of the table, nor are we discussing "significant" differences. There are appropriate methods for this that go beyond this discussion. 12) Cole, The Sociological Method, pp. 101-106. 13) Travis Hirschi and Hanan C. Selven, Delinquency Research: An Appraisal of Analytical Methods (New York: The Free Press, 1967) , pp. 37-51; and Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, Ch. 2 and 3. 14) "Disappear" in this context usually means that an original relationship is substantially reduced when the test factor is introduced. 15) Cole and Rosenberg give this term a slightly different meaning. We are using it in Rosenberg's sense of a relationship existing because it is an effect of a common cause, pp. 23-82. 16) Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, pp. 37-39. 17) Ibid., pp. 54-82. 18 ) We will assume there is some way of measuring "ethnic consciousness." 19) Rosenberg, Logic of Survey Analysis, pp. 68-69. 20) Ibid., pp. 27-4-0.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Survey Research and Ethnic Studies Description An account of the resource Steven I. Miller, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 120-129 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Miller, Steven I. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/41c5c4e4a7537be7f2b42199ad687ee4.pdf 3e132eeb4e29481927e19b13a01fbee7 PDF Text Text 134 SLOVAKIA 31) Ibid., p . 192. 32) Ibid. 33) Stephanie 0. Rusek, op. cit., p. 182. BIBLIOGRAPHY Harrison, S. Czechoslovakia in European History, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 196-283. Husek, Stephanie 0 . Ph.D. "General Milan Ra:stislav Stefanik in America," in Jednota Katolicky Kalerzt:lar, 1938, pp. 181-192. Kerner, Robert J . (ed). Czechoslovakia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940. Masaryk, Thomas Garigue, The Making of a State, New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927. Oddo, Gilbert L. Slovakia And Its People, New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1943. Weiss, Louise. "The Founders of the Czech Republic," in Current H istory, Vol. 11, pp. 287-289. (SECOND PRIZE AWARD) Svatopluk: Political Opportunist or National Hero? Mary Susan Sabol Great Moravia, founded in the early ninth century, was the first political organization established by the Danubian Slavs without foreign leadership or foreign interference. Because of the Frankish pressure on the Slavs after the Avar's fall, the Slavs under Mojmir I determined to create an independent state, with its power centers at Devin and Nitra, based on the tradition of the previous Samo state. Great Moravia achieved its greatest power and influence under Svatopluk, of the Mojmirid line, from 871 to 894.1 In 870, Svatopluk, regent of Nitra, plotted with German backing against his uncle, Rastislav, ruler of the Great Moravian Empire. 2 When Rastislav heard of the plot, he challenged Svatopluk to do battle. Rastislav, however, was defeated and taken prisoner by the Germans. Svatopluk was entrusted with Great Moravia by Carloman, son of Louis the German. Soon Svatopluk lost the confidence of the Germans; was deposed and imprisoned. �SLOVAKIA 135 Louis the German feared Svatopluk was building a strong Slavic state that could pose a threat to his German Empire. Consequently, Slavomir, a Moravian prince, was elected by the Slavs to take over Svatopluk's position of leadership, and initiated a rebellion against the Germans.3 Svatopluk eonvinced Carloman to allow him to direct a siege of the fortress of Devin, where he betrayed his troops, destroyed the German army, and again became the ruler of the Great Moravian Empire. He pressed the offensive against the Germans, and in 873, he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman sought a truce, and in 874, he signed a treaty with Svatopluk at Forsheim which acknowledged the independence of Great Moravia. Svatopluk then waged wars against Panonia, Bohemia, the Vislanians, and the Lusatian Serbs to extend the frontier of his empire. Because Carloman's son and successor as one of the claimants of the German Empire, Arnulf, also feared a large Slavic state on his eastern border, he sought an alliance with the Magyars against Great Moravia and attacked Devin several times during the remainder of Svatopluk's reign. The empire always repulsed those attacks as long as Svatopluk lived. 4 It is almost impossible to determine the motives of a man who lived oved a millenium ago, yet the question arises whether Svatopluk sought control and expansion of the ~reat Moravian Empire to satisfy his own powerlust, or whether he was convinced of the importance and necessity of a united Slavic peoples, and determined to create such a union. Svatopluk's first move for power appears to be a traitorous one. It is doubtful that he questioned his uncle's statesmanship and loyalty to the Slavic state, because Rastislav considered the independence of his country most important. He was painfully aware of the German military and cultural imperialistic foreign policy.5 Consequently, he strengthened his country militarily. Fortresses were built, a strong army was trained, and support was obtained from the other Moravian princes who still retained their lands after the fall of Mojmir, the predecessor of Rastislav. Rastislav was able to defeat the attacking German armies in 855, thus gaining even greater support from the local princes.6 By this time, �136 SLOVAKIA Great Moravia was secure, and Rastislav was able to concentrate on the domestic problems in his country. Rastislav publicly opposed the Carolingian brand of Christianity the German missionaries were imposing on the Slavs in a foreign language. He realized that the Christian culture spread by the German clerics would inevitably cause the ebbing of Slavonic community among his people and a gradual German takeover of the Great Moravian Empire. 7 However, Rastislav was aware of the political advantage Christianity held for the Slavs. If the Slavic people accepted it, the Christian faith might be an invaluable link in the alliance of the Slavs against their enemies.8 He turned to the East and asked Michael III, Emperor at Constantinople, to send missionaries who would teach in the Slavonic language.9 In 863, Rastislav welcomed the brothers, Constantine and Methodius to his domain to teach Christianity in the vernacular. 10 The German bishops in Salzburg, Passau, and Regensburg and the Bavarian missionaries in Moravia protested against the activities of the eastern missionaries, accusing them of initiating dangerous liturgical reforms and ignoring German ecclesiastical authority. Constantine and Methodius were called to Rome to defend themselves.11 After convincing the papacy of their orthodoxy, and then, after Constantine's untimely death, Methodius returned alone to Great Moravia as archbishop and papal legate with the authority to organize the Church among the Slavs, and with the permission to use the Slavonic liturgy. 12 The German bishops flouted the papacy's approval of Methodius' apostolate and imprisoned him. At this time, Church-state affairs were considerably integrated. Papal authority in secular affairs developed as a result of fifth century papal thinking, which held that ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions were distinct, but papal authority was considered superior to secular power because the papacy had sovereign authority, whereas the secular leadership had only derivative administrative authority.13 Theoretically under the pope's authority, the Church's bishops, who were often from aristocratic families, asserted their leadership and influence in major European cities. They created the only effective replace- �SLOVAKIA 137 ment for the diminishing secular organization of society, becoming the main secular power of their districts. However, because of their own power bases, the bishops were often tempted and often did, in fact, flout the pope's dictates, creating division not necessarily between the pope and secular ruler, but between the pope and bishops, with the secular . ruler siding with either one, as occured in the Great Moravia case. 14 Svatopluk, during his regency at Nitra, championed the German opposition in the Moravian religious controversy in order to gain the German backing for his attempt to usurp Rastis1av's power. 15 Thus, Svatopluk's first major powerplay was made after his extensive effort to form a strong political alliance with the Germans succeeded. Svatopluk proved to be a strong and independent ruler once in control of the Great Moravian Empire. Having achieved the headship of state, he sought the absolute control of the Moravian Empire. Soon, however, the Germans suspected his loyalty to the German Empire. Consequently, in 871, Svatopluk was deposed and imprisoned, despite his denial of charges for having plotted against the German Crown. 16 Svatopluk continued to play his political games with the Germans despite his temporary loss of a power base. Carloman was unable to suppress, after several attempts, Slavomir's rebellion. Therefore, Svatopluk asked to lead an army against Slavomir.17 Carloman finally decided to risk Svatopluk's leadership, and sent the Slav in command of the German army to put down the Moravian uprising, trusting for the success of the arrangement to Svatopluk's gratitude and to the division among the Moravian princes. 18 When the army reached Devin, Svatopluk ordered his men to encamp below the fortress while he went up to the castle under the pretenses of persuading the Moravians under Slavomir to surrender without a fight. 19 However, since the most he could receive from a German victory was limited control of Great Moravia under German hegemony, although he would more likely be imprisoned eventually for trying to build a strong Moravian Empire again, Svatopluk decided that the Germans had outlived their usefulness to his quest for power. Consequently, he �138 SLOVAKIA reversed his loyalties, betrayed his command, and told Slavomfr of a plan he had to defeat the German army. Then, taking command of the Moravian forces, Svatopluk waged a surprise attack on the men he was commanding the previous day. The German troops were crushed under the savage attack. 20 Svatopluk continued to press the offensive against Carloman until the German sought a truce in 873. The following year at Forsheim, Carloman signed an agreement recognizing the independence of the Great Moravian Empire.21 Svatopluk's ambition to have absolute control of Great Moravia was finally realized. It was no longer politically expedient for Svatopluk to curry German favor, so he turned to his Slav neighbors to strengthen his power position. He married the sister of the Czech duke, Botivoj, to broaden the sphere of his influence to include Bohemia.22 He brought the Pannonians and the Lusatian Serbs under his rule and defeated the powerful pagan ruler of the Vislanian Poles. His extended Great Moravian Empire appears to have been more of a federation than an empire, which was created by the alliances of the overpowered Slavic princes under the leadership of Svatopluk.23 The foreign policy of the Great Moravian Empire under Rastislav was reshaped by Svatopluk. He wanted to gain the support of the papacy in Rome rather than that of the Byzantine Emperor.24 In 879, the relationship between the East Frankish. Empire and Rome was cool, and the Byzantine Empire was considered a theological threat to Christianity. Svatopluk reasoned that the pope would want and need an ally. Therefore, he sent his personal envoy, Zemezizeit, along with Archbishop Methodius, who had been freed in 873 from his German captors, to secure for his empire the recognition and "protection" of the papacy. 25 However, Svatopluk did not return the favor to Methodius and back his position on ecclesiastical matters. Methodius had been freed after three years of German imprisonment, through the efforts of Pope John VIII, who suspended the German bishops and thretened them with excommunication.26 In 879, however, Methodius was �SLOVAKIA 139 summoned to Rome again to appear before the Roman Synod. Through the instigation of Wiching, a German Benedictine who Svatopluk appointed Bishop of Nitra during Methodius' imprisonment, the German bishops charged Methodius with supporting and teaching the Greek heresy of the Single Procession. Again, Methodius defended himself successfully, convinced the pope that he accepted his authority, and returned to Moravia with the pope's blessing.27 After this contrived issue was resolved, the actual dispute was brought to a head. The German bishops were determined to prove the Slavonic liturgy unlawful, and to abolish the Archbishopric of Moravia. They declared that the use of the "barbarous" Slavonic language in the liturgy degraded the religious service. Their argument was a reference in the scriptures which described the inscription Pilate had written on the Cross in Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Methodius argued than on Pentecost, the apostles taught about the Christ in all the languages so that all present could understand. The pope rejected the German clergy's argument, and, once again, sanctioned the apostolic works of Methodius.28 Svatopluk found it convenient to side with the German bishops on this issue. Pope John suggested that Svatopluk and his courtiers could use the Latin liturgy at his court, if they really felt that strongly about the liturgy issue. 29 Pope John also made a statement concerning Svatopluk's appointment of Wiching as Bishop of Nitra. The pope was aware of Svatopluk's intention to counterbalance the authority of Methodius. Therefore, he agreed to recognize the appointment provided that Wiching was subordinate to Methodius. John also recommended that Svatopluk appoints future bishops with Methodius' advice and consent. 30 Of course, the pope was protecting his own political interests. Methodius was the safer party to back, rather than the German bishops, whose first loyalties were always to the German Empire. Svatopluk even used Methodius when his political position would be enhanced. He subtly used Methodius' presence in Rome to try to obtain the recognition of his Great Moravian Empire by the papacy in 879. However, �140 SLOVAKIA Svatopluk generally opposed the efforts of the missionary, because of his fierce hatred for Methodius.31 Svatopluk was a nominal Christian who still followed pagan practices. His behavior made Methodius' task of creating a solid organization among the Slavs more difficult, since their leader did not take the Christian faith seriously. It appears as though Methodius reproached him on occasion for his irresponsibility, and Svatopluk naturally resented it.32 The hostility that existed between Methodius and Svatopluk might have eventually resulted in the exile or death of the archbishop, had not the relations between Svatopluk and Arnulf become cold because of Arnulf's growing influence in Pannonia. Svatopluk's preocupation with Arnulf's menacing prevented the Moravian ruler from taking stronger action against Methodius. However, after Methodius' death in 885, Svatopluk rejected the archbishop's chosen successor, Gorazd, warmed his relations with An1ulf, and expelled Methodius' closest followers from Moravia. Slavic services were outlowed by Svatopluk; a new pope was elected in Rome, who condoned Svatopluk's action; and the German priests of the Latin rite took control of the church organization in the Great Moravian Empire.33 Arnulf never trusted the strong Moravian ruler on his borders. Therefore, he sought an alliance with the Magyars, who had recently migrated to the vicinity, to destroy the i>lavic empire. Yet, despite the nwnerous German-Magyar attacks, Great Moravia thrived until the death of Svatopluk in 894. 34 Svatopluk's record as ruler of the Great Moravian Empire is almost a flawless case study for Hans Morgenthau's power school theory, which asserts that all politics is a struggle for power. 35 The evidence shows that throughout his public life, Svatopluk would use any means to gain and maintain power. His initial rise to power was cloaked in treachery. After he lost his power, he managed to persuade his captor to trust him with an army which was to attack Svatopluk's countrymen, only to betray his army and seize control of Great Moravia again. He waged wars recurrently to extend his influence over the Slavs, and to stand up to the Germans. He negotiated �SLOVAKIA 141 alliances when they would strengthen his position. It appears that he always gave his support or sought support only when it was politically expedient. Since every move Svatopluk made seemed to be a politically expedient one, one of his official policies does not fit into the pattern. For the most part, he actively opposed the Christianization of the Great Moravian Empire in the Slavonic language. He rejected Rastislav's contention that Slavonic Christianity would enhance the ethnic community of the Great Moravian Empire, fortify it from German culture, and, especially, create a strong bond among the Slavic peoples. Svatopluk must have realized that his own power could only be strengthened under such circumstances, yet, he continually opposed Methodius' activities. Historians propose that Svatopluk was against the archbishop because Methodius rebuked him for his pagan ways, which hindered the effectiveness of the apostle's mission. Svatopluk's relations with Methodius seem to be the one major contradiction in the former's career. For the wily Svatopluk to jeopardize his power over a personality conflict seems out of character, which leads one to suspect that he might have considered Methodius to be larger threat to his power than the Germans were. Though the German bishops were temporal princes as well as spiritual leaders, Svatopluk was probably confident in his ability to deal with them. He might have feared Methodius because of the missionary's widespread popularity and influence over all the Slavs, which could have easily been used to the advantage of the archbishop if he sought temporal power as the German bishops did. If Svatopluk did consider Methodius a threat to his power, and not just a bothersome conscience, such a threat would be far more immediate to Svatopluk than a German cultural-imperialistic foreign policy, and therefore, his antagonism toward Methodius would be understandable. The evidence, construed from the few known facts about Svatopluk, would suggest that Svatopluk was indeed a political opportunist. However, the Slovak romantic writers of the nineteenth century, in an effort to create a feeling of a glorious national past among their people, �142 SLOVAKIA cast Svatopluk into the role of a great national hero whose sole intention was to build a strong Slavic state for the Slavis in East Central Europe. Jan Holly, a leading Slovak poet, in his epic, "Svatopluk," gives an exaggerated picture of Svatopluk's victories in his military campaigns for independence and enlargement of the Great Moravian Empire. 36 Most of the nineteenth century writers embroidered legend over fact to create a very noble Svatopluk, downplaying his crimes because, according to their sources, he repented in the end anyway. Slovak romantics wanted a national hero with integrity, selfless motivation, and absolute devotion to the Slavic Empire. Consequently, they squeezed Svatopluk into their conceived mold of a national hero, rewriting history in the process. Too many kings and soldiers who tremendously increased the power and prestige of a nation are either remembered mainly for their treachery and cruelty, or are recast into noble superhuman King Arthurs and Lancelots, while some bishops and priests, who may have weakened the national consciousness and national independence by preaching foremost loyalty to the Church, are revered and even considered "symbols of a distinctive national life."38 Svatopluk was a cruel and unscrupulous antagonist of Methodius and his disciples. He was treacherous in usurping his uncle's power. He was a talented politician who used every legitimate, as well as illegitimate, form of statescraft to increase his power. He was a political opportunist. Svatopluk was on the opposite side of the spectrum from the virtuous hero the nineteenth century romantics wanted to make him. Yet, from the objective nationalistic viewpoint, he did establish Slavic greatness. He did champion the independence of the Slavic Empire. He did defend the Great Moravian Empire against the barbaric Magyar invaders. 39 Under Svatopluk's leadership, Great Moravia became the center of a strong Slavic alliance. Svatopluk wielded an authority over the Slav princes which was at least equal to that of the German Emperor over the princes which were subject to him. 40 The impact of Svatopluk's unified Slavic state has influenced Slavic political history throughout the last �SLOVAKIA 143 twelve hundred years. Sviitopluk developed the tradition of unity. FOOTNOTES Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization (New York, 1952 ) , p. 25; hereafter cited as Haleckrl.. 2) Gilbert L. Oddo, Slovaki a and Its People (New York, N . Y. , 1960 ), p. 15; hereafter cited as Oddo. 1) 3 ) 0&10, p. 16. 4 ) Od/do, pp. 17-18. 5 ) Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middletown, Pa., 1930 ), p. 10; hereafter cited as Skultety. 6) P. Yurchak, The Slovaks (Scranton, Pa. , 1946 ), p. 35; hereafter cited as Yurchak. 7 ) Skultety, p. 10. 8) C. Edmund Maurice, Bohemia (New York, 1896) , p. 10; hereafter 9) 10 ) 11 ) 12 ) 13 ) 14) 15) 16 ) 17 ) 18 ) 19) 20 ) 21 ) 22 ) 23 ) 24 ) 25 ) 26) 27 ) 28) 29 ) 30 ) 31 ) 32 ) cited as Maurice. Oddo, p. 12. Maurice, p. 10. Yurchak, p. 51 . Yurchak, p. 52. Norman Cantor, Western Civili zation Its Genesis and Destiny (Glenview, Ill., 1969), p. 301 ; hereafter citdd as Cantor. Cantor, p. 301 . Maurice, p. 11 . Oddo, p. 16. Oddo, p. 16. Yurchak, p. 36. Oddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Maurice, p . 12. Yurchak, p. 37. Frantisek Kavka, A n Outline of Czechoslovak Hist ory (Prague, 1963 ) , p. 18; hereafter cited as Kavka. ojddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Maurice, p. 14. Maurice, p. 15. Maurice, p. 15. Maurice, p. 15. R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Hamden, Conn., 1965 ), p. 13 ; hereafter cited as Seton-Watson. Oddo, p. 18. �144 SLOVAKIA 33) Maurice, p. 16. 34) Frederick G. Heymann, Poland and Czechoslovakia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J ., 1966), p. 27. 35 ) Hans J . Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1967 ), 4th dd., p . 3. 36) Yurchak, p. 37. 37 ) Seton-Watson, p. 25. 38 ) Maurice, p. 18. 39 ) Maurice, p. 19. 40) Maurice, p. 19. BIBLIOGRAPHY Cantor, Norman. Western Civilization Its Genesis and Destiny. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1969. Halecki, Oscar. Borderlands of Western Civilizati on. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. Heymann, Frederick C. Poland and Czechoslovaki a. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1966. Kavka, Franti.sek. An Outline of Czechoslovak History. Prague: Orbis, 1963. Krofta, Kamil. A Short History of Czechoslovakia. London: Williams and Norgate L~d., 1935. Lutzow, Count. Bohemi a: An Historical Sketch. London: J. M . Dent and Sons, 1910 Maurice, C. Edmund. Bohemia. New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1896. Monroe, W. S. Bohemia and the Czechs. London: L. C. Page and Co. Inc., 1910. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Od\do, Gilbert L. Slov akia and Its People. New York : Robert ,Speller and Sons, Publishers, 1960. Rechcigl, Miloslav, ed. The Czec hoslovak Contribution to World Cul.titre. The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964. Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1930. Wiskeman, Elizabeth. Czechs and Germans. London: Oxforid University Press, 1938. Yurchak, P. The Slovaks. Scranton, Pa. 1946. (THIRD PRIZE AWARD) � 134 SLOVAKIA 31) Ibid., p . 192. 32) Ibid. 33) Stephanie 0. Rusek, op. cit., p. 182. BIBLIOGRAPHY Harrison, S. Czechoslovakia in European History, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 196-283. Husek, Stephanie 0 . Ph.D. "General Milan Ra:stislav Stefanik in America," in Jednota Katolicky Kalerzt:lar, 1938, pp. 181-192. Kerner, Robert J . (ed). Czechoslovakia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940. Masaryk, Thomas Garigue, The Making of a State, New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927. Oddo, Gilbert L. Slovakia And Its People, New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1943. Weiss, Louise. "The Founders of the Czech Republic," in Current H istory, Vol. 11, pp. 287-289. (SECOND PRIZE AWARD) Svatopluk: Political Opportunist or National Hero? Mary Susan Sabol Great Moravia, founded in the early ninth century, was the first political organization established by the Danubian Slavs without foreign leadership or foreign interference. Because of the Frankish pressure on the Slavs after the Avar's fall, the Slavs under Mojmir I determined to create an independent state, with its power centers at Devin and Nitra, based on the tradition of the previous Samo state. Great Moravia achieved its greatest power and influence under Svatopluk, of the Mojmirid line, from 871 to 894.1 In 870, Svatopluk, regent of Nitra, plotted with German backing against his uncle, Rastislav, ruler of the Great Moravian Empire. 2 When Rastislav heard of the plot, he challenged Svatopluk to do battle. Rastislav, however, was defeated and taken prisoner by the Germans. Svatopluk was entrusted with Great Moravia by Carloman, son of Louis the German. Soon Svatopluk lost the confidence of the Germans; was deposed and imprisoned. �SLOVAKIA 135 Louis the German feared Svatopluk was building a strong Slavic state that could pose a threat to his German Empire. Consequently, Slavomir, a Moravian prince, was elected by the Slavs to take over Svatopluk's position of leadership, and initiated a rebellion against the Germans.3 Svatopluk eonvinced Carloman to allow him to direct a siege of the fortress of Devin, where he betrayed his troops, destroyed the German army, and again became the ruler of the Great Moravian Empire. He pressed the offensive against the Germans, and in 873, he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman sought a truce, and in 874, he signed a treaty with Svatopluk at Forsheim which acknowledged the independence of Great Moravia. Svatopluk then waged wars against Panonia, Bohemia, the Vislanians, and the Lusatian Serbs to extend the frontier of his empire. Because Carloman's son and successor as one of the claimants of the German Empire, Arnulf, also feared a large Slavic state on his eastern border, he sought an alliance with the Magyars against Great Moravia and attacked Devin several times during the remainder of Svatopluk's reign. The empire always repulsed those attacks as long as Svatopluk lived. 4 It is almost impossible to determine the motives of a man who lived oved a millenium ago, yet the question arises whether Svatopluk sought control and expansion of the ~reat Moravian Empire to satisfy his own powerlust, or whether he was convinced of the importance and necessity of a united Slavic peoples, and determined to create such a union. Svatopluk's first move for power appears to be a traitorous one. It is doubtful that he questioned his uncle's statesmanship and loyalty to the Slavic state, because Rastislav considered the independence of his country most important. He was painfully aware of the German military and cultural imperialistic foreign policy.5 Consequently, he strengthened his country militarily. Fortresses were built, a strong army was trained, and support was obtained from the other Moravian princes who still retained their lands after the fall of Mojmir, the predecessor of Rastislav. Rastislav was able to defeat the attacking German armies in 855, thus gaining even greater support from the local princes.6 By this time, �136 SLOVAKIA Great Moravia was secure, and Rastislav was able to concentrate on the domestic problems in his country. Rastislav publicly opposed the Carolingian brand of Christianity the German missionaries were imposing on the Slavs in a foreign language. He realized that the Christian culture spread by the German clerics would inevitably cause the ebbing of Slavonic community among his people and a gradual German takeover of the Great Moravian Empire. 7 However, Rastislav was aware of the political advantage Christianity held for the Slavs. If the Slavic people accepted it, the Christian faith might be an invaluable link in the alliance of the Slavs against their enemies.8 He turned to the East and asked Michael III, Emperor at Constantinople, to send missionaries who would teach in the Slavonic language.9 In 863, Rastislav welcomed the brothers, Constantine and Methodius to his domain to teach Christianity in the vernacular. 10 The German bishops in Salzburg, Passau, and Regensburg and the Bavarian missionaries in Moravia protested against the activities of the eastern missionaries, accusing them of initiating dangerous liturgical reforms and ignoring German ecclesiastical authority. Constantine and Methodius were called to Rome to defend themselves.11 After convincing the papacy of their orthodoxy, and then, after Constantine's untimely death, Methodius returned alone to Great Moravia as archbishop and papal legate with the authority to organize the Church among the Slavs, and with the permission to use the Slavonic liturgy. 12 The German bishops flouted the papacy's approval of Methodius' apostolate and imprisoned him. At this time, Church-state affairs were considerably integrated. Papal authority in secular affairs developed as a result of fifth century papal thinking, which held that ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions were distinct, but papal authority was considered superior to secular power because the papacy had sovereign authority, whereas the secular leadership had only derivative administrative authority.13 Theoretically under the pope's authority, the Church's bishops, who were often from aristocratic families, asserted their leadership and influence in major European cities. They created the only effective replace- �SLOVAKIA 137 ment for the diminishing secular organization of society, becoming the main secular power of their districts. However, because of their own power bases, the bishops were often tempted and often did, in fact, flout the pope's dictates, creating division not necessarily between the pope and secular ruler, but between the pope and bishops, with the secular . ruler siding with either one, as occured in the Great Moravia case. 14 Svatopluk, during his regency at Nitra, championed the German opposition in the Moravian religious controversy in order to gain the German backing for his attempt to usurp Rastis1av's power. 15 Thus, Svatopluk's first major powerplay was made after his extensive effort to form a strong political alliance with the Germans succeeded. Svatopluk proved to be a strong and independent ruler once in control of the Great Moravian Empire. Having achieved the headship of state, he sought the absolute control of the Moravian Empire. Soon, however, the Germans suspected his loyalty to the German Empire. Consequently, in 871, Svatopluk was deposed and imprisoned, despite his denial of charges for having plotted against the German Crown. 16 Svatopluk continued to play his political games with the Germans despite his temporary loss of a power base. Carloman was unable to suppress, after several attempts, Slavomir's rebellion. Therefore, Svatopluk asked to lead an army against Slavomir.17 Carloman finally decided to risk Svatopluk's leadership, and sent the Slav in command of the German army to put down the Moravian uprising, trusting for the success of the arrangement to Svatopluk's gratitude and to the division among the Moravian princes. 18 When the army reached Devin, Svatopluk ordered his men to encamp below the fortress while he went up to the castle under the pretenses of persuading the Moravians under Slavomir to surrender without a fight. 19 However, since the most he could receive from a German victory was limited control of Great Moravia under German hegemony, although he would more likely be imprisoned eventually for trying to build a strong Moravian Empire again, Svatopluk decided that the Germans had outlived their usefulness to his quest for power. Consequently, he �138 SLOVAKIA reversed his loyalties, betrayed his command, and told Slavomfr of a plan he had to defeat the German army. Then, taking command of the Moravian forces, Svatopluk waged a surprise attack on the men he was commanding the previous day. The German troops were crushed under the savage attack. 20 Svatopluk continued to press the offensive against Carloman until the German sought a truce in 873. The following year at Forsheim, Carloman signed an agreement recognizing the independence of the Great Moravian Empire.21 Svatopluk's ambition to have absolute control of Great Moravia was finally realized. It was no longer politically expedient for Svatopluk to curry German favor, so he turned to his Slav neighbors to strengthen his power position. He married the sister of the Czech duke, Botivoj, to broaden the sphere of his influence to include Bohemia.22 He brought the Pannonians and the Lusatian Serbs under his rule and defeated the powerful pagan ruler of the Vislanian Poles. His extended Great Moravian Empire appears to have been more of a federation than an empire, which was created by the alliances of the overpowered Slavic princes under the leadership of Svatopluk.23 The foreign policy of the Great Moravian Empire under Rastislav was reshaped by Svatopluk. He wanted to gain the support of the papacy in Rome rather than that of the Byzantine Emperor.24 In 879, the relationship between the East Frankish. Empire and Rome was cool, and the Byzantine Empire was considered a theological threat to Christianity. Svatopluk reasoned that the pope would want and need an ally. Therefore, he sent his personal envoy, Zemezizeit, along with Archbishop Methodius, who had been freed in 873 from his German captors, to secure for his empire the recognition and "protection" of the papacy. 25 However, Svatopluk did not return the favor to Methodius and back his position on ecclesiastical matters. Methodius had been freed after three years of German imprisonment, through the efforts of Pope John VIII, who suspended the German bishops and thretened them with excommunication.26 In 879, however, Methodius was �SLOVAKIA 139 summoned to Rome again to appear before the Roman Synod. Through the instigation of Wiching, a German Benedictine who Svatopluk appointed Bishop of Nitra during Methodius' imprisonment, the German bishops charged Methodius with supporting and teaching the Greek heresy of the Single Procession. Again, Methodius defended himself successfully, convinced the pope that he accepted his authority, and returned to Moravia with the pope's blessing.27 After this contrived issue was resolved, the actual dispute was brought to a head. The German bishops were determined to prove the Slavonic liturgy unlawful, and to abolish the Archbishopric of Moravia. They declared that the use of the "barbarous" Slavonic language in the liturgy degraded the religious service. Their argument was a reference in the scriptures which described the inscription Pilate had written on the Cross in Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Methodius argued than on Pentecost, the apostles taught about the Christ in all the languages so that all present could understand. The pope rejected the German clergy's argument, and, once again, sanctioned the apostolic works of Methodius.28 Svatopluk found it convenient to side with the German bishops on this issue. Pope John suggested that Svatopluk and his courtiers could use the Latin liturgy at his court, if they really felt that strongly about the liturgy issue. 29 Pope John also made a statement concerning Svatopluk's appointment of Wiching as Bishop of Nitra. The pope was aware of Svatopluk's intention to counterbalance the authority of Methodius. Therefore, he agreed to recognize the appointment provided that Wiching was subordinate to Methodius. John also recommended that Svatopluk appoints future bishops with Methodius' advice and consent. 30 Of course, the pope was protecting his own political interests. Methodius was the safer party to back, rather than the German bishops, whose first loyalties were always to the German Empire. Svatopluk even used Methodius when his political position would be enhanced. He subtly used Methodius' presence in Rome to try to obtain the recognition of his Great Moravian Empire by the papacy in 879. However, �140 SLOVAKIA Svatopluk generally opposed the efforts of the missionary, because of his fierce hatred for Methodius.31 Svatopluk was a nominal Christian who still followed pagan practices. His behavior made Methodius' task of creating a solid organization among the Slavs more difficult, since their leader did not take the Christian faith seriously. It appears as though Methodius reproached him on occasion for his irresponsibility, and Svatopluk naturally resented it.32 The hostility that existed between Methodius and Svatopluk might have eventually resulted in the exile or death of the archbishop, had not the relations between Svatopluk and Arnulf become cold because of Arnulf's growing influence in Pannonia. Svatopluk's preocupation with Arnulf's menacing prevented the Moravian ruler from taking stronger action against Methodius. However, after Methodius' death in 885, Svatopluk rejected the archbishop's chosen successor, Gorazd, warmed his relations with An1ulf, and expelled Methodius' closest followers from Moravia. Slavic services were outlowed by Svatopluk; a new pope was elected in Rome, who condoned Svatopluk's action; and the German priests of the Latin rite took control of the church organization in the Great Moravian Empire.33 Arnulf never trusted the strong Moravian ruler on his borders. Therefore, he sought an alliance with the Magyars, who had recently migrated to the vicinity, to destroy the i>lavic empire. Yet, despite the nwnerous German-Magyar attacks, Great Moravia thrived until the death of Svatopluk in 894. 34 Svatopluk's record as ruler of the Great Moravian Empire is almost a flawless case study for Hans Morgenthau's power school theory, which asserts that all politics is a struggle for power. 35 The evidence shows that throughout his public life, Svatopluk would use any means to gain and maintain power. His initial rise to power was cloaked in treachery. After he lost his power, he managed to persuade his captor to trust him with an army which was to attack Svatopluk's countrymen, only to betray his army and seize control of Great Moravia again. He waged wars recurrently to extend his influence over the Slavs, and to stand up to the Germans. He negotiated �SLOVAKIA 141 alliances when they would strengthen his position. It appears that he always gave his support or sought support only when it was politically expedient. Since every move Svatopluk made seemed to be a politically expedient one, one of his official policies does not fit into the pattern. For the most part, he actively opposed the Christianization of the Great Moravian Empire in the Slavonic language. He rejected Rastislav's contention that Slavonic Christianity would enhance the ethnic community of the Great Moravian Empire, fortify it from German culture, and, especially, create a strong bond among the Slavic peoples. Svatopluk must have realized that his own power could only be strengthened under such circumstances, yet, he continually opposed Methodius' activities. Historians propose that Svatopluk was against the archbishop because Methodius rebuked him for his pagan ways, which hindered the effectiveness of the apostle's mission. Svatopluk's relations with Methodius seem to be the one major contradiction in the former's career. For the wily Svatopluk to jeopardize his power over a personality conflict seems out of character, which leads one to suspect that he might have considered Methodius to be larger threat to his power than the Germans were. Though the German bishops were temporal princes as well as spiritual leaders, Svatopluk was probably confident in his ability to deal with them. He might have feared Methodius because of the missionary's widespread popularity and influence over all the Slavs, which could have easily been used to the advantage of the archbishop if he sought temporal power as the German bishops did. If Svatopluk did consider Methodius a threat to his power, and not just a bothersome conscience, such a threat would be far more immediate to Svatopluk than a German cultural-imperialistic foreign policy, and therefore, his antagonism toward Methodius would be understandable. The evidence, construed from the few known facts about Svatopluk, would suggest that Svatopluk was indeed a political opportunist. However, the Slovak romantic writers of the nineteenth century, in an effort to create a feeling of a glorious national past among their people, �142 SLOVAKIA cast Svatopluk into the role of a great national hero whose sole intention was to build a strong Slavic state for the Slavis in East Central Europe. Jan Holly, a leading Slovak poet, in his epic, "Svatopluk," gives an exaggerated picture of Svatopluk's victories in his military campaigns for independence and enlargement of the Great Moravian Empire. 36 Most of the nineteenth century writers embroidered legend over fact to create a very noble Svatopluk, downplaying his crimes because, according to their sources, he repented in the end anyway. Slovak romantics wanted a national hero with integrity, selfless motivation, and absolute devotion to the Slavic Empire. Consequently, they squeezed Svatopluk into their conceived mold of a national hero, rewriting history in the process. Too many kings and soldiers who tremendously increased the power and prestige of a nation are either remembered mainly for their treachery and cruelty, or are recast into noble superhuman King Arthurs and Lancelots, while some bishops and priests, who may have weakened the national consciousness and national independence by preaching foremost loyalty to the Church, are revered and even considered "symbols of a distinctive national life."38 Svatopluk was a cruel and unscrupulous antagonist of Methodius and his disciples. He was treacherous in usurping his uncle's power. He was a talented politician who used every legitimate, as well as illegitimate, form of statescraft to increase his power. He was a political opportunist. Svatopluk was on the opposite side of the spectrum from the virtuous hero the nineteenth century romantics wanted to make him. Yet, from the objective nationalistic viewpoint, he did establish Slavic greatness. He did champion the independence of the Slavic Empire. He did defend the Great Moravian Empire against the barbaric Magyar invaders. 39 Under Svatopluk's leadership, Great Moravia became the center of a strong Slavic alliance. Svatopluk wielded an authority over the Slav princes which was at least equal to that of the German Emperor over the princes which were subject to him. 40 The impact of Svatopluk's unified Slavic state has influenced Slavic political history throughout the last �SLOVAKIA 143 twelve hundred years. Sviitopluk developed the tradition of unity. FOOTNOTES Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization (New York, 1952 ) , p. 25; hereafter cited as Haleckrl.. 2) Gilbert L. Oddo, Slovaki a and Its People (New York, N . Y. , 1960 ), p. 15; hereafter cited as Oddo. 1) 3 ) 0&10, p. 16. 4 ) Od/do, pp. 17-18. 5 ) Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middletown, Pa., 1930 ), p. 10; hereafter cited as Skultety. 6) P. Yurchak, The Slovaks (Scranton, Pa. , 1946 ), p. 35; hereafter cited as Yurchak. 7 ) Skultety, p. 10. 8) C. Edmund Maurice, Bohemia (New York, 1896) , p. 10; hereafter 9) 10 ) 11 ) 12 ) 13 ) 14) 15) 16 ) 17 ) 18 ) 19) 20 ) 21 ) 22 ) 23 ) 24 ) 25 ) 26) 27 ) 28) 29 ) 30 ) 31 ) 32 ) cited as Maurice. Oddo, p. 12. Maurice, p. 10. Yurchak, p. 51 . Yurchak, p. 52. Norman Cantor, Western Civili zation Its Genesis and Destiny (Glenview, Ill., 1969), p. 301 ; hereafter citdd as Cantor. Cantor, p. 301 . Maurice, p. 11 . Oddo, p. 16. Oddo, p. 16. Yurchak, p. 36. Oddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Maurice, p . 12. Yurchak, p. 37. Frantisek Kavka, A n Outline of Czechoslovak Hist ory (Prague, 1963 ) , p. 18; hereafter cited as Kavka. ojddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Maurice, p. 14. Maurice, p. 15. Maurice, p. 15. Maurice, p. 15. R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Hamden, Conn., 1965 ), p. 13 ; hereafter cited as Seton-Watson. Oddo, p. 18. �144 SLOVAKIA 33) Maurice, p. 16. 34) Frederick G. Heymann, Poland and Czechoslovakia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J ., 1966), p. 27. 35 ) Hans J . Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1967 ), 4th dd., p . 3. 36) Yurchak, p. 37. 37 ) Seton-Watson, p. 25. 38 ) Maurice, p. 18. 39 ) Maurice, p. 19. 40) Maurice, p. 19. BIBLIOGRAPHY Cantor, Norman. Western Civilization Its Genesis and Destiny. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1969. Halecki, Oscar. Borderlands of Western Civilizati on. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. Heymann, Frederick C. Poland and Czechoslovaki a. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1966. Kavka, Franti.sek. An Outline of Czechoslovak History. Prague: Orbis, 1963. Krofta, Kamil. A Short History of Czechoslovakia. London: Williams and Norgate L~d., 1935. Lutzow, Count. Bohemi a: An Historical Sketch. London: J. M . Dent and Sons, 1910 Maurice, C. Edmund. Bohemia. New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1896. Monroe, W. S. Bohemia and the Czechs. London: L. C. Page and Co. Inc., 1910. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Od\do, Gilbert L. Slov akia and Its People. New York : Robert ,Speller and Sons, Publishers, 1960. Rechcigl, Miloslav, ed. The Czec hoslovak Contribution to World Cul.titre. The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964. Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1930. Wiskeman, Elizabeth. Czechs and Germans. London: Oxforid University Press, 1938. Yurchak, P. The Slovaks. Scranton, Pa. 1946. (THIRD PRIZE AWARD) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1971, Vol. 21 Description An account of the resource Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 134 SLOVAKIA 31) Ibid., p . 192. 32) Ibid. 33) Stephanie 0. Rusek, op. cit., p. 182. BIBLIOGRAPHY Harrison, S. Czechoslovakia in European History, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 196-283. Husek, Stephanie 0 . Ph.D. "General Milan Ra:stislav Stefanik in America," in Jednota Katolicky Kalerzt:lar, 1938, pp. 181-192. Kerner, Robert J . (ed). Czechoslovakia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940. Masaryk, Thomas Garigue, The Making of a State, New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927. Oddo, Gilbert L. Slovakia And Its People, New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960. Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1943. Weiss, Louise. "The Founders of the Czech Republic," in Current H istory, Vol. 11, pp. 287-289. (SECOND PRIZE AWARD) Svatopluk: Political Opportunist or National Hero? Mary Susan Sabol Great Moravia, founded in the early ninth century, was the first political organization established by the Danubian Slavs without foreign leadership or foreign interference. Because of the Frankish pressure on the Slavs after the Avar's fall, the Slavs under Mojmir I determined to create an independent state, with its power centers at Devin and Nitra, based on the tradition of the previous Samo state. Great Moravia achieved its greatest power and influence under Svatopluk, of the Mojmirid line, from 871 to 894.1 In 870, Svatopluk, regent of Nitra, plotted with German backing against his uncle, Rastislav, ruler of the Great Moravian Empire. 2 When Rastislav heard of the plot, he challenged Svatopluk to do battle. Rastislav, however, was defeated and taken prisoner by the Germans. Svatopluk was entrusted with Great Moravia by Carloman, son of Louis the German. Soon Svatopluk lost the confidence of the Germans; was deposed and imprisoned. SLOVAKIA 135 Louis the German feared Svatopluk was building a strong Slavic state that could pose a threat to his German Empire. Consequently, Slavomir, a Moravian prince, was elected by the Slavs to take over Svatopluk's position of leadership, and initiated a rebellion against the Germans.3 Svatopluk eonvinced Carloman to allow him to direct a siege of the fortress of Devin, where he betrayed his troops, destroyed the German army, and again became the ruler of the Great Moravian Empire. He pressed the offensive against the Germans, and in 873, he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman sought a truce, and in 874, he signed a treaty with Svatopluk at Forsheim which acknowledged the independence of Great Moravia. Svatopluk then waged wars against Panonia, Bohemia, the Vislanians, and the Lusatian Serbs to extend the frontier of his empire. Because Carloman's son and successor as one of the claimants of the German Empire, Arnulf, also feared a large Slavic state on his eastern border, he sought an alliance with the Magyars against Great Moravia and attacked Devin several times during the remainder of Svatopluk's reign. The empire always repulsed those attacks as long as Svatopluk lived. 4 It is almost impossible to determine the motives of a man who lived oved a millenium ago, yet the question arises whether Svatopluk sought control and expansion of the ~reat Moravian Empire to satisfy his own powerlust, or whether he was convinced of the importance and necessity of a united Slavic peoples, and determined to create such a union. Svatopluk's first move for power appears to be a traitorous one. It is doubtful that he questioned his uncle's statesmanship and loyalty to the Slavic state, because Rastislav considered the independence of his country most important. He was painfully aware of the German military and cultural imperialistic foreign policy.5 Consequently, he strengthened his country militarily. Fortresses were built, a strong army was trained, and support was obtained from the other Moravian princes who still retained their lands after the fall of Mojmir, the predecessor of Rastislav. Rastislav was able to defeat the attacking German armies in 855, thus gaining even greater support from the local princes.6 By this time, 136 SLOVAKIA Great Moravia was secure, and Rastislav was able to concentrate on the domestic problems in his country. Rastislav publicly opposed the Carolingian brand of Christianity the German missionaries were imposing on the Slavs in a foreign language. He realized that the Christian culture spread by the German clerics would inevitably cause the ebbing of Slavonic community among his people and a gradual German takeover of the Great Moravian Empire. 7 However, Rastislav was aware of the political advantage Christianity held for the Slavs. If the Slavic people accepted it, the Christian faith might be an invaluable link in the alliance of the Slavs against their enemies.8 He turned to the East and asked Michael III, Emperor at Constantinople, to send missionaries who would teach in the Slavonic language.9 In 863, Rastislav welcomed the brothers, Constantine and Methodius to his domain to teach Christianity in the vernacular. 10 The German bishops in Salzburg, Passau, and Regensburg and the Bavarian missionaries in Moravia protested against the activities of the eastern missionaries, accusing them of initiating dangerous liturgical reforms and ignoring German ecclesiastical authority. Constantine and Methodius were called to Rome to defend themselves.11 After convincing the papacy of their orthodoxy, and then, after Constantine's untimely death, Methodius returned alone to Great Moravia as archbishop and papal legate with the authority to organize the Church among the Slavs, and with the permission to use the Slavonic liturgy. 12 The German bishops flouted the papacy's approval of Methodius' apostolate and imprisoned him. At this time, Church-state affairs were considerably integrated. Papal authority in secular affairs developed as a result of fifth century papal thinking, which held that ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions were distinct, but papal authority was considered superior to secular power because the papacy had sovereign authority, whereas the secular leadership had only derivative administrative authority.13 Theoretically under the pope's authority, the Church's bishops, who were often from aristocratic families, asserted their leadership and influence in major European cities. They created the only effective replace- SLOVAKIA 137 ment for the diminishing secular organization of society, becoming the main secular power of their districts. However, because of their own power bases, the bishops were often tempted and often did, in fact, flout the pope's dictates, creating division not necessarily between the pope and secular ruler, but between the pope and bishops, with the secular . ruler siding with either one, as occured in the Great Moravia case. 14 Svatopluk, during his regency at Nitra, championed the German opposition in the Moravian religious controversy in order to gain the German backing for his attempt to usurp Rastis1av's power. 15 Thus, Svatopluk's first major powerplay was made after his extensive effort to form a strong political alliance with the Germans succeeded. Svatopluk proved to be a strong and independent ruler once in control of the Great Moravian Empire. Having achieved the headship of state, he sought the absolute control of the Moravian Empire. Soon, however, the Germans suspected his loyalty to the German Empire. Consequently, in 871, Svatopluk was deposed and imprisoned, despite his denial of charges for having plotted against the German Crown. 16 Svatopluk continued to play his political games with the Germans despite his temporary loss of a power base. Carloman was unable to suppress, after several attempts, Slavomir's rebellion. Therefore, Svatopluk asked to lead an army against Slavomir.17 Carloman finally decided to risk Svatopluk's leadership, and sent the Slav in command of the German army to put down the Moravian uprising, trusting for the success of the arrangement to Svatopluk's gratitude and to the division among the Moravian princes. 18 When the army reached Devin, Svatopluk ordered his men to encamp below the fortress while he went up to the castle under the pretenses of persuading the Moravians under Slavomir to surrender without a fight. 19 However, since the most he could receive from a German victory was limited control of Great Moravia under German hegemony, although he would more likely be imprisoned eventually for trying to build a strong Moravian Empire again, Svatopluk decided that the Germans had outlived their usefulness to his quest for power. Consequently, he 138 SLOVAKIA reversed his loyalties, betrayed his command, and told Slavomfr of a plan he had to defeat the German army. Then, taking command of the Moravian forces, Svatopluk waged a surprise attack on the men he was commanding the previous day. The German troops were crushed under the savage attack. 20 Svatopluk continued to press the offensive against Carloman until the German sought a truce in 873. The following year at Forsheim, Carloman signed an agreement recognizing the independence of the Great Moravian Empire.21 Svatopluk's ambition to have absolute control of Great Moravia was finally realized. It was no longer politically expedient for Svatopluk to curry German favor, so he turned to his Slav neighbors to strengthen his power position. He married the sister of the Czech duke, Botivoj, to broaden the sphere of his influence to include Bohemia.22 He brought the Pannonians and the Lusatian Serbs under his rule and defeated the powerful pagan ruler of the Vislanian Poles. His extended Great Moravian Empire appears to have been more of a federation than an empire, which was created by the alliances of the overpowered Slavic princes under the leadership of Svatopluk.23 The foreign policy of the Great Moravian Empire under Rastislav was reshaped by Svatopluk. He wanted to gain the support of the papacy in Rome rather than that of the Byzantine Emperor.24 In 879, the relationship between the East Frankish. Empire and Rome was cool, and the Byzantine Empire was considered a theological threat to Christianity. Svatopluk reasoned that the pope would want and need an ally. Therefore, he sent his personal envoy, Zemezizeit, along with Archbishop Methodius, who had been freed in 873 from his German captors, to secure for his empire the recognition and "protection" of the papacy. 25 However, Svatopluk did not return the favor to Methodius and back his position on ecclesiastical matters. Methodius had been freed after three years of German imprisonment, through the efforts of Pope John VIII, who suspended the German bishops and thretened them with excommunication.26 In 879, however, Methodius was SLOVAKIA 139 summoned to Rome again to appear before the Roman Synod. Through the instigation of Wiching, a German Benedictine who Svatopluk appointed Bishop of Nitra during Methodius' imprisonment, the German bishops charged Methodius with supporting and teaching the Greek heresy of the Single Procession. Again, Methodius defended himself successfully, convinced the pope that he accepted his authority, and returned to Moravia with the pope's blessing.27 After this contrived issue was resolved, the actual dispute was brought to a head. The German bishops were determined to prove the Slavonic liturgy unlawful, and to abolish the Archbishopric of Moravia. They declared that the use of the "barbarous" Slavonic language in the liturgy degraded the religious service. Their argument was a reference in the scriptures which described the inscription Pilate had written on the Cross in Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Methodius argued than on Pentecost, the apostles taught about the Christ in all the languages so that all present could understand. The pope rejected the German clergy's argument, and, once again, sanctioned the apostolic works of Methodius.28 Svatopluk found it convenient to side with the German bishops on this issue. Pope John suggested that Svatopluk and his courtiers could use the Latin liturgy at his court, if they really felt that strongly about the liturgy issue. 29 Pope John also made a statement concerning Svatopluk's appointment of Wiching as Bishop of Nitra. The pope was aware of Svatopluk's intention to counterbalance the authority of Methodius. Therefore, he agreed to recognize the appointment provided that Wiching was subordinate to Methodius. John also recommended that Svatopluk appoints future bishops with Methodius' advice and consent. 30 Of course, the pope was protecting his own political interests. Methodius was the safer party to back, rather than the German bishops, whose first loyalties were always to the German Empire. Svatopluk even used Methodius when his political position would be enhanced. He subtly used Methodius' presence in Rome to try to obtain the recognition of his Great Moravian Empire by the papacy in 879. However, 140 SLOVAKIA Svatopluk generally opposed the efforts of the missionary, because of his fierce hatred for Methodius.31 Svatopluk was a nominal Christian who still followed pagan practices. His behavior made Methodius' task of creating a solid organization among the Slavs more difficult, since their leader did not take the Christian faith seriously. It appears as though Methodius reproached him on occasion for his irresponsibility, and Svatopluk naturally resented it.32 The hostility that existed between Methodius and Svatopluk might have eventually resulted in the exile or death of the archbishop, had not the relations between Svatopluk and Arnulf become cold because of Arnulf's growing influence in Pannonia. Svatopluk's preocupation with Arnulf's menacing prevented the Moravian ruler from taking stronger action against Methodius. However, after Methodius' death in 885, Svatopluk rejected the archbishop's chosen successor, Gorazd, warmed his relations with An1ulf, and expelled Methodius' closest followers from Moravia. Slavic services were outlowed by Svatopluk; a new pope was elected in Rome, who condoned Svatopluk's action; and the German priests of the Latin rite took control of the church organization in the Great Moravian Empire.33 Arnulf never trusted the strong Moravian ruler on his borders. Therefore, he sought an alliance with the Magyars, who had recently migrated to the vicinity, to destroy the i>lavic empire. Yet, despite the nwnerous German-Magyar attacks, Great Moravia thrived until the death of Svatopluk in 894. 34 Svatopluk's record as ruler of the Great Moravian Empire is almost a flawless case study for Hans Morgenthau's power school theory, which asserts that all politics is a struggle for power. 35 The evidence shows that throughout his public life, Svatopluk would use any means to gain and maintain power. His initial rise to power was cloaked in treachery. After he lost his power, he managed to persuade his captor to trust him with an army which was to attack Svatopluk's countrymen, only to betray his army and seize control of Great Moravia again. He waged wars recurrently to extend his influence over the Slavs, and to stand up to the Germans. He negotiated SLOVAKIA 141 alliances when they would strengthen his position. It appears that he always gave his support or sought support only when it was politically expedient. Since every move Svatopluk made seemed to be a politically expedient one, one of his official policies does not fit into the pattern. For the most part, he actively opposed the Christianization of the Great Moravian Empire in the Slavonic language. He rejected Rastislav's contention that Slavonic Christianity would enhance the ethnic community of the Great Moravian Empire, fortify it from German culture, and, especially, create a strong bond among the Slavic peoples. Svatopluk must have realized that his own power could only be strengthened under such circumstances, yet, he continually opposed Methodius' activities. Historians propose that Svatopluk was against the archbishop because Methodius rebuked him for his pagan ways, which hindered the effectiveness of the apostle's mission. Svatopluk's relations with Methodius seem to be the one major contradiction in the former's career. For the wily Svatopluk to jeopardize his power over a personality conflict seems out of character, which leads one to suspect that he might have considered Methodius to be larger threat to his power than the Germans were. Though the German bishops were temporal princes as well as spiritual leaders, Svatopluk was probably confident in his ability to deal with them. He might have feared Methodius because of the missionary's widespread popularity and influence over all the Slavs, which could have easily been used to the advantage of the archbishop if he sought temporal power as the German bishops did. If Svatopluk did consider Methodius a threat to his power, and not just a bothersome conscience, such a threat would be far more immediate to Svatopluk than a German cultural-imperialistic foreign policy, and therefore, his antagonism toward Methodius would be understandable. The evidence, construed from the few known facts about Svatopluk, would suggest that Svatopluk was indeed a political opportunist. However, the Slovak romantic writers of the nineteenth century, in an effort to create a feeling of a glorious national past among their people, 142 SLOVAKIA cast Svatopluk into the role of a great national hero whose sole intention was to build a strong Slavic state for the Slavis in East Central Europe. Jan Holly, a leading Slovak poet, in his epic, "Svatopluk," gives an exaggerated picture of Svatopluk's victories in his military campaigns for independence and enlargement of the Great Moravian Empire. 36 Most of the nineteenth century writers embroidered legend over fact to create a very noble Svatopluk, downplaying his crimes because, according to their sources, he repented in the end anyway. Slovak romantics wanted a national hero with integrity, selfless motivation, and absolute devotion to the Slavic Empire. Consequently, they squeezed Svatopluk into their conceived mold of a national hero, rewriting history in the process. Too many kings and soldiers who tremendously increased the power and prestige of a nation are either remembered mainly for their treachery and cruelty, or are recast into noble superhuman King Arthurs and Lancelots, while some bishops and priests, who may have weakened the national consciousness and national independence by preaching foremost loyalty to the Church, are revered and even considered "symbols of a distinctive national life."38 Svatopluk was a cruel and unscrupulous antagonist of Methodius and his disciples. He was treacherous in usurping his uncle's power. He was a talented politician who used every legitimate, as well as illegitimate, form of statescraft to increase his power. He was a political opportunist. Svatopluk was on the opposite side of the spectrum from the virtuous hero the nineteenth century romantics wanted to make him. Yet, from the objective nationalistic viewpoint, he did establish Slavic greatness. He did champion the independence of the Slavic Empire. He did defend the Great Moravian Empire against the barbaric Magyar invaders. 39 Under Svatopluk's leadership, Great Moravia became the center of a strong Slavic alliance. Svatopluk wielded an authority over the Slav princes which was at least equal to that of the German Emperor over the princes which were subject to him. 40 The impact of Svatopluk's unified Slavic state has influenced Slavic political history throughout the last SLOVAKIA 143 twelve hundred years. Sviitopluk developed the tradition of unity. FOOTNOTES Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization (New York, 1952 ) , p. 25; hereafter cited as Haleckrl.. 2) Gilbert L. Oddo, Slovaki a and Its People (New York, N . Y. , 1960 ), p. 15; hereafter cited as Oddo. 1) 3 ) 0&10, p. 16. 4 ) Od/do, pp. 17-18. 5 ) Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middletown, Pa., 1930 ), p. 10; hereafter cited as Skultety. 6) P. Yurchak, The Slovaks (Scranton, Pa. , 1946 ), p. 35; hereafter cited as Yurchak. 7 ) Skultety, p. 10. 8) C. Edmund Maurice, Bohemia (New York, 1896) , p. 10; hereafter 9) 10 ) 11 ) 12 ) 13 ) 14) 15) 16 ) 17 ) 18 ) 19) 20 ) 21 ) 22 ) 23 ) 24 ) 25 ) 26) 27 ) 28) 29 ) 30 ) 31 ) 32 ) cited as Maurice. Oddo, p. 12. Maurice, p. 10. Yurchak, p. 51 . Yurchak, p. 52. Norman Cantor, Western Civili zation Its Genesis and Destiny (Glenview, Ill., 1969), p. 301 ; hereafter citdd as Cantor. Cantor, p. 301 . Maurice, p. 11 . Oddo, p. 16. Oddo, p. 16. Yurchak, p. 36. Oddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Maurice, p . 12. Yurchak, p. 37. Frantisek Kavka, A n Outline of Czechoslovak Hist ory (Prague, 1963 ) , p. 18; hereafter cited as Kavka. ojddo, p. 17. Oddo, p. 17. Maurice, p. 14. Maurice, p. 15. Maurice, p. 15. Maurice, p. 15. R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Hamden, Conn., 1965 ), p. 13 ; hereafter cited as Seton-Watson. Oddo, p. 18. 144 SLOVAKIA 33) Maurice, p. 16. 34) Frederick G. Heymann, Poland and Czechoslovakia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J ., 1966), p. 27. 35 ) Hans J . Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1967 ), 4th dd., p . 3. 36) Yurchak, p. 37. 37 ) Seton-Watson, p. 25. 38 ) Maurice, p. 18. 39 ) Maurice, p. 19. 40) Maurice, p. 19. BIBLIOGRAPHY Cantor, Norman. Western Civilization Its Genesis and Destiny. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1969. Halecki, Oscar. Borderlands of Western Civilizati on. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. Heymann, Frederick C. Poland and Czechoslovaki a. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1966. Kavka, Franti.sek. An Outline of Czechoslovak History. Prague: Orbis, 1963. Krofta, Kamil. A Short History of Czechoslovakia. London: Williams and Norgate L~d., 1935. Lutzow, Count. Bohemi a: An Historical Sketch. London: J. M . Dent and Sons, 1910 Maurice, C. Edmund. Bohemia. New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1896. Monroe, W. S. Bohemia and the Czechs. London: L. C. Page and Co. Inc., 1910. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Od\do, Gilbert L. Slov akia and Its People. New York : Robert ,Speller and Sons, Publishers, 1960. Rechcigl, Miloslav, ed. The Czec hoslovak Contribution to World Cul.titre. The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964. Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown, Pa.: Jednota Press, 1930. Wiskeman, Elizabeth. Czechs and Germans. London: Oxforid University Press, 1938. Yurchak, P. The Slovaks. Scranton, Pa. 1946. (THIRD PRIZE AWARD)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Svätopluk: Political Opportunist or National Hero? Description An account of the resource Mary Susan Sabol Slovakia, Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971 pp. 134-144 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sabol, Mary Susan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a4e4be273902bd0b9c3f5c3e5061d44f.pdf 05780bcaf6956f5072fb1f0dd69a84c6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 11 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. �32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is �SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- �SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full �SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. �36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism �SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do. � SLOVAKIA 11 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. �32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is �SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- �SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full �SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. �36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism �SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 31 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. 32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. 36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The "Russia First" Boys in Radio Free Europe Description An account of the resource Kurt Glaser Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 31-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1bb283910ed6a8ea38ad73e24d74aa8e.pdf e82bddf6053a97a11377379245df8d8e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 175 The 15th Anniversary of the Untimely Death of Prof. Franci Hrusovsky J. M. Kirschbaum, Ph.D. On September 9, 1971, it wiil be 15 years since the Slovak cultural and political life in the free world lost one of its best representatives, Prof. Francis Hrusovsky. Even though he dedicated his life in Slovakia primarily to education and history, after leaving Slovakia in 1945, he became one of the most important political leaders among Slovaks in the free world. A very close personal and political friend of Karol Sidor who represented Slovakia during the War in the Vatican, Hrusovsky looked for contacts with Sidor a few months after leaving his native country and summoned him to organize political action of all Slovak exiles against the Communist and Czech rule in Slovakia. The message signed by several prominent Slovak politicians and intellectuals was sent first to me in Switzerland with the request to use the diplomatic channels of the Vatican to forward it to Minister Sidor. It was, therefore, only natural that later Hrusovsky became one of the closest co-operators of Karol Sidor when in 1948 we founded in the Vatican City the Slovak National Council Abroad. Being one of the first Slovak exiles admitted to the United States, Hrusovsky deserves recognition that the Slovak National Council Abroad was accepted by the main American Slovak organizations as the only representative of the Slovak exile movement for regaining freedom and independence. A man of outstanding qualities and warm personality, he gained friends very soon among all the Slovak leaders in the United States and used his time and enegy to help, on the one side, the Slovak refugees in Europe and, on the other side, he played an important role in Slovak political and cultural endeavors. He chose for his new home Cleveland, Ohio, one of the cities where the first important Slovak political document �176 SLOVAKIA was signed in the first World War and where the only Slovak religious Order, the Benedictine Fathers, had their headquarters and schools. Highly respected and liked by the Abbot of the Benedictine Fathers, Rt. Rev. T. Kojis, Hrusovsky became a professor again but, at the same time, he was working on several valuable historical works either on Slovakia ("This is Slovakia") or on the history of the religious Orders in the United States. He was also a cofounder of the Slovak Institute, of a Slovak newspaper in Cleveland, and whole-heartedly supported the activities of the Slovak National Council Abroad. When in 1953 Karol Sidor suddenly died, Prof. Hrusovsky took his place and became the leader of the Slovak exiles working for freedom, democracy and independence of their native country. Unfortunately, he did not stay for a long time at the helm of this struggle. On September 9, 1956, he left the scene of the Slovak exile life. It was the third tragic loss among Slovaks in exile and thousands of Slovaks livings on this side of the Iron Curtain were stunned by the unexpected news announcing the sudden death of Dr. Francis Hrusovsky. He was admired and deeply respected not only as the President of the Slovak National Council Abroad, but also as an outstanding patriot, eminent historian and educator, and a man of sterling moral calibre. Among prominent representatives of a Slovak generation to which it was given to see their cherished dream of Slovakia's independence and statehood fulfilled only to be ruthlessly destroyed within a few years, Dr. Hrusovsk}· personified the best traditions and characteristics which distinguished Slovak intellectuals, mercilessly hounded to extermination by the Communists. The loss of Dr. Hrusovsky was very keenly felt both because of what he was per se and because of what he meant to the nation. Because of these reasons Slovaks abroad realized that no blow could have been more grievous in their ranks than the death of Dr. Hrusovsky. It sorely afflicted all Slovak communities in the free world but �SLOVAKIA 177 especially Slovak emigres dedicated to the vindication of Slovakia's liberation from foreign rule. It has been an unhappy lot of Slovaks in the free world to suffer three irreparable losses within the span of three consecutive years: the passing of Karol Sidor, diplomat, politician, and key leader of the Slovak exile movement, the political assassination of Matus Cernak, a diplomat and the most valuable force among Slovak exiles in Germany; and then the untimely death of Dr. Hrusovsky, called in the prime of his career at the age of 53. Only a year before, when Dr. Hrusovsky accepted the chief executive responsibilities of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovaks abroad rejoiced in being under his capable leadership. We confidently fixed all our prospects on him as being the individual best qualified to effect a united effort of all Slovak exiled groups engaged in the struggle to attain Slovakia's liberation and independence. Mild-mannered and unassuming as he was, Dr. Hrusovsky commanded the respect of Slovaks of both the old and new immigrants. His personal inclination and preference were not for the tensions and strategems of a political career 1 but he did not decline wholehearted service to his nation in this difficult post when it was evident that the need of the hour required it of him. The Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS wrote of him : "In less than a decade in his adopted country he became a beloved figure in Slovak circles everywhere. Everyone who met him was impressed by his personality. Those who knew him learned to admire his scholarship, to respect his unwavering devotion to principles and to love him for his boundless charity. Seldom can one expect to meet a man of his moral stature, dignity, idealism and faith." The primary interest of Dr. Hrusovsky's life was teaching-as we mentioned above-specifically the teaching of history and the pursuit of historical research. His innate love of his people and his instinctive devotion to youth prompted him to choose education as his profession. He attained distinction in this field and it was as an aducator and a historian that he entered the political arena. Here �178 SLOVAKIA he looked upon all his political functions and commitments as a service to his nation's highest interest and hence he worked with a sense of dedication to public duty. Specializing as he did in medieval history, Dr. Hrusovsky published several fully documented studies on Great Moravia, the first Slovak and Slav state on the Danube. He also prepared a Slovak history text for secondary schools which established a precedent in the Slovak publishing world. In its second edition this book was velcomed with such wide acclaim that it became a national best seller. Translated into Geman, the book was the first serious history book on Slovakia for scholars outside Slovakia. In the early part of his exile, during his sojourn in Rome and in the United States, Dr. Hrusovsky prepared a scholarly work on the earliest Slovak rulers and an exhaustive study investigating the relations of the Slovak rulers of Great Moravia with the Holy See, which was published first in Slovak and later in English translation in Slovak Studi es - Cyrillo-Methodian a (Slovak Institute, Rome, 1963 ). Slovak letters as well as American Slovak history were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying the growth and expansion of Slovak religious orders in the United States. 3 This book incidentally develops a great deal of the cultural history of American citizens of Slovak descent, and would certainly deserve an edition in English.3 Besides these books, Dr. Hrusovsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numerous addresses delivered on various occasions. Unfortunately, so far no bibliography of his writings was published except that in Literarny Almanach.4 Reflecting on some of the work and life of Dr. Hrusovsky, we find that our sentiments, too, correspond with the expression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak cultural life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for work and his unfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow." We can safely say that all true Slovaks on both sides �SLOVAKIA 179 of the Iron Curtain bear with regret the loss of Dr. Hrusovsky. Our one comfort and consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of Dr. Hrusovsky's moral stature and defenders of a nation's rights and liberties share the prerogative of great soldiers who never die. Thus indeed will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live among us; his courage, his vision, his selflessness serving as an undying example for coming generations of Slovaks, inspiring them to win for their country that freedom, that independence and intenationally recognized state for which Hrusovsky worked literally to his dying breath. FOOTNOTES 1) Hrusovsky was best known in Slovakia as a director of a secondary Catholic school with old national traditions in Klafu>r pod Znievom. Slovenske Rehole v Amerike (Slovak Religious Orders in America) , Slovensky ustav, Cleveland, Ohio, 1955. 3) His only book in English is: "This is Slovakia" (Obrana Press, Inc., Scranton, Pa.) 1953, which was the first objective presentation of Slovakia to Americans of Slovak origin as well as to all who read English. 2) 4) See Litercirny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike, Ed. Dr. J. Pauco, Middletown, Pa., 1967. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is dedicated to American Democracy, the American way of life, and encourages Americans of Slovak descent to be loyal and alert citizens of America; it urges and aids Slovak emigrants to become U. S. citizens by publishing appropriate manuals and brochures in Slovak and English. " THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA through its Ladies .kwdliary, the "VCIELKY" (Bees), sponsors Slovak cultttrai displays. concerts, lectures, art exhibits, folk festivals, social evenings, etc. Our aim is to have a "Hive" of our "V~ielky" in every large Slovak community. � SLOVAKIA 175 The 15th Anniversary of the Untimely Death of Prof. Franci Hrusovsky J. M. Kirschbaum, Ph.D. On September 9, 1971, it wiil be 15 years since the Slovak cultural and political life in the free world lost one of its best representatives, Prof. Francis Hrusovsky. Even though he dedicated his life in Slovakia primarily to education and history, after leaving Slovakia in 1945, he became one of the most important political leaders among Slovaks in the free world. A very close personal and political friend of Karol Sidor who represented Slovakia during the War in the Vatican, Hrusovsky looked for contacts with Sidor a few months after leaving his native country and summoned him to organize political action of all Slovak exiles against the Communist and Czech rule in Slovakia. The message signed by several prominent Slovak politicians and intellectuals was sent first to me in Switzerland with the request to use the diplomatic channels of the Vatican to forward it to Minister Sidor. It was, therefore, only natural that later Hrusovsky became one of the closest co-operators of Karol Sidor when in 1948 we founded in the Vatican City the Slovak National Council Abroad. Being one of the first Slovak exiles admitted to the United States, Hrusovsky deserves recognition that the Slovak National Council Abroad was accepted by the main American Slovak organizations as the only representative of the Slovak exile movement for regaining freedom and independence. A man of outstanding qualities and warm personality, he gained friends very soon among all the Slovak leaders in the United States and used his time and enegy to help, on the one side, the Slovak refugees in Europe and, on the other side, he played an important role in Slovak political and cultural endeavors. He chose for his new home Cleveland, Ohio, one of the cities where the first important Slovak political document �176 SLOVAKIA was signed in the first World War and where the only Slovak religious Order, the Benedictine Fathers, had their headquarters and schools. Highly respected and liked by the Abbot of the Benedictine Fathers, Rt. Rev. T. Kojis, Hrusovsky became a professor again but, at the same time, he was working on several valuable historical works either on Slovakia ("This is Slovakia") or on the history of the religious Orders in the United States. He was also a cofounder of the Slovak Institute, of a Slovak newspaper in Cleveland, and whole-heartedly supported the activities of the Slovak National Council Abroad. When in 1953 Karol Sidor suddenly died, Prof. Hrusovsky took his place and became the leader of the Slovak exiles working for freedom, democracy and independence of their native country. Unfortunately, he did not stay for a long time at the helm of this struggle. On September 9, 1956, he left the scene of the Slovak exile life. It was the third tragic loss among Slovaks in exile and thousands of Slovaks livings on this side of the Iron Curtain were stunned by the unexpected news announcing the sudden death of Dr. Francis Hrusovsky. He was admired and deeply respected not only as the President of the Slovak National Council Abroad, but also as an outstanding patriot, eminent historian and educator, and a man of sterling moral calibre. Among prominent representatives of a Slovak generation to which it was given to see their cherished dream of Slovakia's independence and statehood fulfilled only to be ruthlessly destroyed within a few years, Dr. Hrusovsk}· personified the best traditions and characteristics which distinguished Slovak intellectuals, mercilessly hounded to extermination by the Communists. The loss of Dr. Hrusovsky was very keenly felt both because of what he was per se and because of what he meant to the nation. Because of these reasons Slovaks abroad realized that no blow could have been more grievous in their ranks than the death of Dr. Hrusovsky. It sorely afflicted all Slovak communities in the free world but �SLOVAKIA 177 especially Slovak emigres dedicated to the vindication of Slovakia's liberation from foreign rule. It has been an unhappy lot of Slovaks in the free world to suffer three irreparable losses within the span of three consecutive years: the passing of Karol Sidor, diplomat, politician, and key leader of the Slovak exile movement, the political assassination of Matus Cernak, a diplomat and the most valuable force among Slovak exiles in Germany; and then the untimely death of Dr. Hrusovsky, called in the prime of his career at the age of 53. Only a year before, when Dr. Hrusovsky accepted the chief executive responsibilities of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovaks abroad rejoiced in being under his capable leadership. We confidently fixed all our prospects on him as being the individual best qualified to effect a united effort of all Slovak exiled groups engaged in the struggle to attain Slovakia's liberation and independence. Mild-mannered and unassuming as he was, Dr. Hrusovsky commanded the respect of Slovaks of both the old and new immigrants. His personal inclination and preference were not for the tensions and strategems of a political career 1 but he did not decline wholehearted service to his nation in this difficult post when it was evident that the need of the hour required it of him. The Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS wrote of him : "In less than a decade in his adopted country he became a beloved figure in Slovak circles everywhere. Everyone who met him was impressed by his personality. Those who knew him learned to admire his scholarship, to respect his unwavering devotion to principles and to love him for his boundless charity. Seldom can one expect to meet a man of his moral stature, dignity, idealism and faith." The primary interest of Dr. Hrusovsky's life was teaching-as we mentioned above-specifically the teaching of history and the pursuit of historical research. His innate love of his people and his instinctive devotion to youth prompted him to choose education as his profession. He attained distinction in this field and it was as an aducator and a historian that he entered the political arena. Here �178 SLOVAKIA he looked upon all his political functions and commitments as a service to his nation's highest interest and hence he worked with a sense of dedication to public duty. Specializing as he did in medieval history, Dr. Hrusovsky published several fully documented studies on Great Moravia, the first Slovak and Slav state on the Danube. He also prepared a Slovak history text for secondary schools which established a precedent in the Slovak publishing world. In its second edition this book was velcomed with such wide acclaim that it became a national best seller. Translated into Geman, the book was the first serious history book on Slovakia for scholars outside Slovakia. In the early part of his exile, during his sojourn in Rome and in the United States, Dr. Hrusovsky prepared a scholarly work on the earliest Slovak rulers and an exhaustive study investigating the relations of the Slovak rulers of Great Moravia with the Holy See, which was published first in Slovak and later in English translation in Slovak Studi es - Cyrillo-Methodian a (Slovak Institute, Rome, 1963 ). Slovak letters as well as American Slovak history were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying the growth and expansion of Slovak religious orders in the United States. 3 This book incidentally develops a great deal of the cultural history of American citizens of Slovak descent, and would certainly deserve an edition in English.3 Besides these books, Dr. Hrusovsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numerous addresses delivered on various occasions. Unfortunately, so far no bibliography of his writings was published except that in Literarny Almanach.4 Reflecting on some of the work and life of Dr. Hrusovsky, we find that our sentiments, too, correspond with the expression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak cultural life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for work and his unfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow." We can safely say that all true Slovaks on both sides �SLOVAKIA 179 of the Iron Curtain bear with regret the loss of Dr. Hrusovsky. Our one comfort and consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of Dr. Hrusovsky's moral stature and defenders of a nation's rights and liberties share the prerogative of great soldiers who never die. Thus indeed will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live among us; his courage, his vision, his selflessness serving as an undying example for coming generations of Slovaks, inspiring them to win for their country that freedom, that independence and intenationally recognized state for which Hrusovsky worked literally to his dying breath. FOOTNOTES 1) Hrusovsky was best known in Slovakia as a director of a secondary Catholic school with old national traditions in Klafu>r pod Znievom. Slovenske Rehole v Amerike (Slovak Religious Orders in America) , Slovensky ustav, Cleveland, Ohio, 1955. 3) His only book in English is: "This is Slovakia" (Obrana Press, Inc., Scranton, Pa.) 1953, which was the first objective presentation of Slovakia to Americans of Slovak origin as well as to all who read English. 2) 4) See Litercirny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike, Ed. Dr. J. Pauco, Middletown, Pa., 1967. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is dedicated to American Democracy, the American way of life, and encourages Americans of Slovak descent to be loyal and alert citizens of America; it urges and aids Slovak emigrants to become U. S. citizens by publishing appropriate manuals and brochures in Slovak and English. " THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA through its Ladies .kwdliary, the "VCIELKY" (Bees), sponsors Slovak cultttrai displays. concerts, lectures, art exhibits, folk festivals, social evenings, etc. Our aim is to have a "Hive" of our "V~ielky" in every large Slovak community. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1971, Vol. 21 Description An account of the resource Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 175 The 15th Anniversary of the Untimely Death of Prof. Franci Hrusovsky J. M. Kirschbaum, Ph.D. On September 9, 1971, it wiil be 15 years since the Slovak cultural and political life in the free world lost one of its best representatives, Prof. Francis Hrusovsky. Even though he dedicated his life in Slovakia primarily to education and history, after leaving Slovakia in 1945, he became one of the most important political leaders among Slovaks in the free world. A very close personal and political friend of Karol Sidor who represented Slovakia during the War in the Vatican, Hrusovsky looked for contacts with Sidor a few months after leaving his native country and summoned him to organize political action of all Slovak exiles against the Communist and Czech rule in Slovakia. The message signed by several prominent Slovak politicians and intellectuals was sent first to me in Switzerland with the request to use the diplomatic channels of the Vatican to forward it to Minister Sidor. It was, therefore, only natural that later Hrusovsky became one of the closest co-operators of Karol Sidor when in 1948 we founded in the Vatican City the Slovak National Council Abroad. Being one of the first Slovak exiles admitted to the United States, Hrusovsky deserves recognition that the Slovak National Council Abroad was accepted by the main American Slovak organizations as the only representative of the Slovak exile movement for regaining freedom and independence. A man of outstanding qualities and warm personality, he gained friends very soon among all the Slovak leaders in the United States and used his time and enegy to help, on the one side, the Slovak refugees in Europe and, on the other side, he played an important role in Slovak political and cultural endeavors. He chose for his new home Cleveland, Ohio, one of the cities where the first important Slovak political document 176 SLOVAKIA was signed in the first World War and where the only Slovak religious Order, the Benedictine Fathers, had their headquarters and schools. Highly respected and liked by the Abbot of the Benedictine Fathers, Rt. Rev. T. Kojis, Hrusovsky became a professor again but, at the same time, he was working on several valuable historical works either on Slovakia ("This is Slovakia") or on the history of the religious Orders in the United States. He was also a cofounder of the Slovak Institute, of a Slovak newspaper in Cleveland, and whole-heartedly supported the activities of the Slovak National Council Abroad. When in 1953 Karol Sidor suddenly died, Prof. Hrusovsky took his place and became the leader of the Slovak exiles working for freedom, democracy and independence of their native country. Unfortunately, he did not stay for a long time at the helm of this struggle. On September 9, 1956, he left the scene of the Slovak exile life. It was the third tragic loss among Slovaks in exile and thousands of Slovaks livings on this side of the Iron Curtain were stunned by the unexpected news announcing the sudden death of Dr. Francis Hrusovsky. He was admired and deeply respected not only as the President of the Slovak National Council Abroad, but also as an outstanding patriot, eminent historian and educator, and a man of sterling moral calibre. Among prominent representatives of a Slovak generation to which it was given to see their cherished dream of Slovakia's independence and statehood fulfilled only to be ruthlessly destroyed within a few years, Dr. Hrusovsk}· personified the best traditions and characteristics which distinguished Slovak intellectuals, mercilessly hounded to extermination by the Communists. The loss of Dr. Hrusovsky was very keenly felt both because of what he was per se and because of what he meant to the nation. Because of these reasons Slovaks abroad realized that no blow could have been more grievous in their ranks than the death of Dr. Hrusovsky. It sorely afflicted all Slovak communities in the free world but SLOVAKIA 177 especially Slovak emigres dedicated to the vindication of Slovakia's liberation from foreign rule. It has been an unhappy lot of Slovaks in the free world to suffer three irreparable losses within the span of three consecutive years: the passing of Karol Sidor, diplomat, politician, and key leader of the Slovak exile movement, the political assassination of Matus Cernak, a diplomat and the most valuable force among Slovak exiles in Germany; and then the untimely death of Dr. Hrusovsky, called in the prime of his career at the age of 53. Only a year before, when Dr. Hrusovsky accepted the chief executive responsibilities of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovaks abroad rejoiced in being under his capable leadership. We confidently fixed all our prospects on him as being the individual best qualified to effect a united effort of all Slovak exiled groups engaged in the struggle to attain Slovakia's liberation and independence. Mild-mannered and unassuming as he was, Dr. Hrusovsky commanded the respect of Slovaks of both the old and new immigrants. His personal inclination and preference were not for the tensions and strategems of a political career 1 but he did not decline wholehearted service to his nation in this difficult post when it was evident that the need of the hour required it of him. The Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS wrote of him : "In less than a decade in his adopted country he became a beloved figure in Slovak circles everywhere. Everyone who met him was impressed by his personality. Those who knew him learned to admire his scholarship, to respect his unwavering devotion to principles and to love him for his boundless charity. Seldom can one expect to meet a man of his moral stature, dignity, idealism and faith." The primary interest of Dr. Hrusovsky's life was teaching-as we mentioned above-specifically the teaching of history and the pursuit of historical research. His innate love of his people and his instinctive devotion to youth prompted him to choose education as his profession. He attained distinction in this field and it was as an aducator and a historian that he entered the political arena. Here 178 SLOVAKIA he looked upon all his political functions and commitments as a service to his nation's highest interest and hence he worked with a sense of dedication to public duty. Specializing as he did in medieval history, Dr. Hrusovsky published several fully documented studies on Great Moravia, the first Slovak and Slav state on the Danube. He also prepared a Slovak history text for secondary schools which established a precedent in the Slovak publishing world. In its second edition this book was velcomed with such wide acclaim that it became a national best seller. Translated into Geman, the book was the first serious history book on Slovakia for scholars outside Slovakia. In the early part of his exile, during his sojourn in Rome and in the United States, Dr. Hrusovsky prepared a scholarly work on the earliest Slovak rulers and an exhaustive study investigating the relations of the Slovak rulers of Great Moravia with the Holy See, which was published first in Slovak and later in English translation in Slovak Studi es - Cyrillo-Methodian a (Slovak Institute, Rome, 1963 ). Slovak letters as well as American Slovak history were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying the growth and expansion of Slovak religious orders in the United States. 3 This book incidentally develops a great deal of the cultural history of American citizens of Slovak descent, and would certainly deserve an edition in English.3 Besides these books, Dr. Hrusovsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numerous addresses delivered on various occasions. Unfortunately, so far no bibliography of his writings was published except that in Literarny Almanach.4 Reflecting on some of the work and life of Dr. Hrusovsky, we find that our sentiments, too, correspond with the expression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak cultural life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for work and his unfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow." We can safely say that all true Slovaks on both sides SLOVAKIA 179 of the Iron Curtain bear with regret the loss of Dr. Hrusovsky. Our one comfort and consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of Dr. Hrusovsky's moral stature and defenders of a nation's rights and liberties share the prerogative of great soldiers who never die. Thus indeed will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live among us; his courage, his vision, his selflessness serving as an undying example for coming generations of Slovaks, inspiring them to win for their country that freedom, that independence and intenationally recognized state for which Hrusovsky worked literally to his dying breath. FOOTNOTES 1) Hrusovsky was best known in Slovakia as a director of a secondary Catholic school with old national traditions in Klafu>r pod Znievom. Slovenske Rehole v Amerike (Slovak Religious Orders in America) , Slovensky ustav, Cleveland, Ohio, 1955. 3) His only book in English is: "This is Slovakia" (Obrana Press, Inc., Scranton, Pa.) 1953, which was the first objective presentation of Slovakia to Americans of Slovak origin as well as to all who read English. 2) 4) See Litercirny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike, Ed. Dr. J. Pauco, Middletown, Pa., 1967. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is dedicated to American Democracy, the American way of life, and encourages Americans of Slovak descent to be loyal and alert citizens of America; it urges and aids Slovak emigrants to become U. S. citizens by publishing appropriate manuals and brochures in Slovak and English. " THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA through its Ladies .kwdliary, the "VCIELKY" (Bees), sponsors Slovak cultttrai displays. concerts, lectures, art exhibits, folk festivals, social evenings, etc. Our aim is to have a "Hive" of our "V~ielky" in every large Slovak community.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 15th Anniversary of the Untimely Death of Prof. Francis Hrušovský Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971 pp. 175-179 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e25920766948699563a0acbdefd75be7.pdf 311692e45aaaa2d1efd87f6847f19be0 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA-2015 7 THE 1919 CENSUS ON THE TERRITORY OF SLOV AKIA 1 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova When the First World War ended in 1918, the four empires that had determined the shape of state and social relations within and beyond their borders - the Habsburg, the German, the Russian, and the Ottoman - had dissolved. A state system based on the principle of national self-determination took their place in East Central Europe, in which citizenship and state belonging were seen through a national lens. Unrest and anarchy were characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere in many regions of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the fall of 1918. In Slovakia, that instability was part of the larger struggle for the future of the newly bounded territory . Unlike other regions of former Hungary being incorporated into the new or transformed successor states, like Croatia (Yugoslavia) or Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia had never been administratively defined on its own, but solely as sixteen counties and four municipalities of northern Hungary. By the end of the war, the collapse of the old order without replacement by the new left Slovakia in a chaotic condition. Amid the upheaval, looting, and anti-Jewish excesses that typified the period, local National Councils had formed with the goal of consolidating the new state. But they were too weak to decisively resist regional Hungarian opposition and Budapest's efforts to maintain the territory. 2 While Czechoslovakia's birth was announced in Prague on October 28, 1918, the view from Slovakia was far less definitive. It was not a foregone conclusion that Slovakia would indeed be incorporated into the new state. Slovakia was in a precarious position, loosened from defeated Hungary, but not yet officially joined with Bohemia and Moravia. 1 This article is a version of a chapter originally published in my book Mapping Jewish Loyalties in !nterwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 I 5). This material appears courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. 2 Cubomir Liptak, "Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Elena Mannova, ed ., A Concise History of Slovakia. Studia Historica Slovaca XXI (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2000), 239 . �8 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovak historians characterize the unstable "Prevrat " era as the "Struggle for Slovakia," a view that highlights Slovakia's contested status between the Magyars and the Czechs. Save for a handful of Slovak national leaders, the Slovaks themselves moved through this picture as a frustrated underclass, taking advantage of the volatile, chaotic climate to set upon state administrators, notaries, policemen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the propertied . Slovaks found themselves in a moment of great release. It offered them a chance to vent their anger and frustration at the war and the Hungarian system . The newly-formed local National Councils sought to mitigate these widespread outbreaks of violence. Yet these local organs had little control, or the ability to quell Hungarian resistance to the power transfer, which was further impeded by the power structure of the old state, still in place . A Hungarian demand for a referendum on the changes surfaced, relying on the fragmentation of the population along regional and social lines, degrees of national consciousness, and lack of information about the political transformation . It was the first time Budapest asked Slovaks for their opinions . The views of ordinary people, "varied from enthusiastic welcoming of the new state and the 'liberation' of Slovakia, through apathy and desire for peace, to fear of a new unknown situation, of uncertain permanence and threaten3 ing new bloodshed and military solutions. " The Hungarian National Council in Budapest came into being only on October 25, 1918, somewhat later than those of the national minorities. It was established by Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was widely believed to be the emperor-king's obvious choice for the new Prime Minister. Oszkar Jaszi, the progressive Hungarian social scientist, historian, and politician, drafted the Hungarian National Council's twelve-point program. It called for Hungarian independence, an immediate and separate peace treaty with the Allies, universal suffrage with a secret ballot, land reform, and recognition of the 4 rights of the national minorities within a federalized Hungary . When Emperor-King Charles appointed Count Janos Hadik instead, massive anti-government demonstrations broke out, demanding Karolyi. 5 3 Ibid. Peter Hanak, ed. , The Corvina History of Hungary: From Earliest Times Until lhe Present Day (Budapest: Corvina Books, 1991 ), 164. 5 Laszl6 Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 328. 4 �SLOV AKIA-2015 9 It was October 28, the same day as the declaration of the new Czechoslovak Republic in Prague. By the night of October 30 through 31, crowds of soldiers and civilians demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. They later occupied public buildings, prevented troops loyal to Karolyi from moving out of the city, captured Budapest's military governor, and freed political prisoners as in 1848. Soldiers tore off the emblems on their uniforms and replaced them with asters and rosettes. Emperor-King Charles retreated and Karolyi formed a new independent Hungarian government. Vanquished Hungary appeared to be on the path to democratization. 6 Meanwhile, Slovak national leaders, mostly from central Slovakia converged in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and established the Slovak National Council. They had little news of what was happening in Prague, Budapest, or Europe more broadly . The Council wished, however, to take a stand on the dramatically unfolding events . The Slovak politician Milan Hodza had been negotiating with Karolyi in Budapest. He arrived in Martin on October 30 just as the Council was about to issue the Martin Declaration, announcing the secession of Slovakia from Hungary, Slovak self-determination and a desire for inclusion in the Czechoslovak state, which fulfilled Prague's wishes .7 The Slovak National Council had no army, so it could not enforce its program or maintain order. Individual militias sprang up in towns and cities across Slovakia, engaging in a power struggle with the newly-formed Hungarian National Councils. It was a highly unstable environment. Demobilized Slovak soldiers (from the Hungarian army) formed the mainstay of active Slovak participation in the evolving power struggle. They created paramilitary groups in the forests, especially in western Slovakia, with about four thousand soldiers active around Bratislava. To dispel the threat of anarchy and establish control over the territory, the Czechoslovak National Council brought Slovak representatives into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in early November of 1918. 8 Slovakia's first provisional "Slovak Government" was set up in Western Slovakia near the Moravia-Slovak border by the Czechoslo6 Hanak, ed ., Corvino History of Hungary , 164-5. Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1 987 (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1988), 40-41 . 8 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in th e 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 239 . 7 �10 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak government in Prague, and began to function on November 6. It was led by Vavro Srobar, Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. On Decemberl2, it was replaced by a Ministry for Slovakia, which Srobar established in Zilina in the midst of a combined Czech, French and Italian effort to drive Hungarian troops out of Slovak territory. 9 Less than two weeks later, on December 21, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Benes successfully negotiated French 10 recognition of a demarcation line of the Slovak territory . Entente forces would drive Hungarian troops past the demarcation line on January 20, 1919. That line more or less became the country's official border with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. 11 When Srobar's administration grew too large for Zilina, he deliberated with Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman from Modra near Pressburg (later Bratislava) who was the principal author of the Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, on where Slovakia's central government should be moved . They decided in early January of 1919 to move the capital to Pressburg on February 4, 1919. Zoch was placed in charge of the Pressburg district administration (zupan), and orchestrated the Czechoslovak takeover of the city from January 1, 1919. "Bratislava" became the city's standard official name in March of 1919. 12 Hungary would make one more sustained military effort toward maintaining its prewar borders. Under Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, lasting for 133 days beginning March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Red Army made significant inroads into Slovakia. It was driven out following an ultimatum by the Entente powers at the end of June 1919. The Hungarian Red Army finally retreated from Slovakia on June 30, 1919, and by July 24 the Czechoslovak government held the entire territory. 13 9 Peter Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of Pressburg/Pozsony/Presporok, I 918-19," Austrian History Yearbook 35 (2004 ): 221. IOibid ., 213. 11 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 243. 12 Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City," 221 . 13 For a detailed discussion of the series of revolutions in Hungary see: Laszlo Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) chapter VII "In Search of an Identity" , 324-344; Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919. Nine Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971 ); Andras Sikl6s, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 1918 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1988); Rudolf I. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian �SLOV AKIA-2015 11 On the Czechoslovak state level, the Struggle for Slovakia entailed not only the physical, geographic aspect of territorial incorporation, but also the more slippery aspect of drawing the multinational population of Slovakia into the mental landscape of the new state. Coming to terms with the World War I Czech argument that the Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation, and so should together form the dominant national group within the Czechoslovak nation-state, required a shift in direction . The events of the "Prevrat" underscore the tense relations between, first and foremost, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Jews and Slovaks, but also, increasingly between Czechs and Slovaks. These relationships would influence shifts in overall understandings of nationhood and nationality, as well as national political programs within the new state. Czechoslovakia was a nation-state in formation. Successful Czechoslovak state building required incorporating the territory and peoples of Slovakia. This was not to be accomplished by gradually building popular consensus, but through military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering. 14 Drawing the borders in this way would have significant implications for Czechoslovakia's domestic and international nationalities problems. Prague needed the Slovaks, a "state forming nation," 15 or there would be no independent Czechoslovakia. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs could not form a majority in the parliament and legitimately create a viable state. The Slovaks likewise needed the Czechs to help them leave Hungary. They needed the Czechs to help them establish a functioning civil and governmental infrastructure in Slovakia, and to create an educational system for producing Slovak national elites ready to take control of the developing infrastructure. The help the Slovaks desired was temporary_ 16 Soviet Republic (published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University by New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 14 Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires (Lo ndon, NY: Routledge, 200 I), I 62. 15 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. Czechs alone formed only 49 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population without the Slovaks. Whereas, accordin g to the 1921 Czechoslovak census, "Czechoslovaks" formed 65 .51 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population, and "Germans" 23.36 percent. 16 Liptak, "Vll. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. �12 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the introduction to hi s memoir on the formative years 1918 through 1920, Osvobodene Slovensko (Liberated Slovakia), Vavro Srobar recounted hi s first meeting with R.W. Seton-Watson, the influential British historian and political activist who brought nationality questions in Austria-Hungary to the world's attention. In 1907 Seton-Watson came to R6zsahegy (Ruzomberok) in the central Slovak Low Tatra region, where Srobar was then working, while researching the national question for what would be his first major work, Racial Problems in Hungary. 17 Due to the objectivity and calm with which Seton-Watson di scussed Magyarization, Srobar found himself unable to discern where his visitor stood on the issue. Before they parted, Seton-Watson surprised Srobar with a question : "And what is your state program?" he asked. After a moment's hesitation, Srobar replied, "Great Moravia, 18 with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Pannonia," which Seton-Watson "accepted without commentary." "That [conversation] took place seven years before the outbreak of the world war," continued Srobar, "and eleven years afterward 'Great Moravia' received the name the 'Czechoslovak State."' 19 Language was the connection between the "Czechoslovak tribes" that Srobar professed in his memoir, from their ancient roots to the present. Even the establishment of a new literary language in Slovakia, thanks to I:udovit Stur's nineteenth century codification of the central Slovak dialect, "did not for a moment disturb the consciousness of Czechoslovak tribal unity," he asserted. "The longing for close cultural, economic, and political unity increased yearly in proportion to the growing pressure of brutal Magyarization," he added. 20 Srobar underscored a romantic one-thousand year story of the unitary Czechoslovak nation/tribe - focusing on shared language, history, 17 London : Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908 . "Great Moravia," a large Slavic state that existed between 833 and 906, was an important component of the Czechoslovak romantic national idea as well as the development of Slovak nationalism. Considered to have bridged the western Slavs with the Slavonic tribes in the Balkans and with Byzantium, the weakening state collapsed under attack by the Magyar tribes who settled in the Danube Basin in approximately 896. The Czech and Slovak tribes then underwent separate development. For more on Great Moravia see Jan Dekan, Vel'ka Morava: Doba a umenie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1976). 19 Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko. Pamdti z rokov 191 8-1920, Svazok Prvy (Prague, 1928), 7-8. 20 Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko, 11. 18 �SLOV AKIA-2015 13 interests, and ancestral ties - that had been so successful in garnering international support for the Czechoslovak state building project during the war in his celebratory and didactic jubilee year volume. While the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation prevailed internationally, the most compelling connection between the Czechs and Slovaks for the prospects of independent statehood was demographic. Though Czechs constituted a majority in Bohemia and Moravia, they feared that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would spell their incorporation into a Greater Germany, due to the existence of a substantial German minority in these lands . At the beginning of the war, Czech leaders first sought a reorganization of the Monarchy along federal lines with a large degree of autonomy for the Czechs, though soon discarded the plan as unfeasib!e.21 In working toward the ultimate goal of independence, the idea of incorporating the estimated three million strong Slovak population became an increasingly attractive solution to counterbalancing the significant German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. 22 By the end of the war T.G. Masaryk and Benes had the commitment of the Entente powers to an independent Czechoslovakia. The Slovak population became the key to the Czechoslovak nation's demographic legitimacy in its new multinational national state. The Paris Peace Conference called upon the Czechoslovak delegation to statistically demonstrate the dominance of the Slovaks in the multinational territory of Slovakia. The viability of the Czechoslovak state depended upon it. In order to collect the necessary data, the Czechoslovak government organized a provisional census for Slovakia. Such a census could not be carried out until the borders of the territory were defined and secured, and military upheavals had ceased . This meant waiting until the ultimatum given by the Entente powers had driven Bela Kun's Red Army troops out of Slovakia at the end of June 1919, and until the Czechoslovak government had control over the territory at the end of July. While the change of regimes was not officially over, and the borders were not fixed by law until Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, I 920, Czechoslovakia held the de facto borders securely enough by August 1919 that it was feasible to set the census in motion. The primary goal of the census was : 21 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. A History o[. East Central Europe, vol. 9 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 76. 2 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 35. �14 SLOV AKIA-2015 [To gather] the necessary information for the Peace Conference concerning how many Slovaks there [were] in the occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary, so that it would be possible to correct and prove false the Hungarian census of 1910, as well as to ascertain other general national proportions in Slovak communities, namely the [extent of] the Magyarization of these communities, the Magyarization of schools and churches. "23 The 1919 census was the first attempt by the Czechoslovak government to map the territory of Slovakia for state building purposes. Mapping Slovakia meant reframing the national ratios of multinational/ethnic/linguistic Slovakia in terms of Slovak, and thus Czechoslovak, dominance. The Czechoslovak government had to prove that the former government sought to create Magyar demographic superiority in the same lands through forced assimilation and manipulation of statistics. The aim of the census was, in other words, to find the ethnic Slovaks whose numbers would prove that a "falsification," or deliberate Magyarization of the nationalities had taken place in the decades before the war. Josef Mraz of the newly-created Czechoslovak State Statistical Office24 set out from Prague to Zilina, 25 the provisional capital of Slovakia, in mid-January 1919 to propose his ideas for the upcoming Slovak census to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia.26 His talks with Srobar lasted an exhausting four days, during which time they debated how the structure, method, and concept of the census could best meet its chief goal: to find out how many Slovaks there were in Slovakia. Upon his arrival in Prague, he wrote up a report of the Zilina proceedings and the census instructions up23 Slovensky narodny archiv (hereafter SNA), file : Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, hereafter MPS, box 277, inv. no. 74. "Prozatimni scitani lidu na Slovensku." In this transitional period before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, Slovakia was often denoted as the "occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary." 24 Josef Mraz (1882-1934) was one of the co-founders of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, who had begun his work as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom. He is noted for his work on the first census in Slovakia ( I 9 I 9), as well as on statistical theory and agricultural statistics. Federalni statisticky ui'ad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Praha, 1989), 194. 25 :Z:ilina was the provisional capital of Slovakia from December 12, 1918 through February 4, 1919, when Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) became the capital. 26 Vavro Srobar was the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (Ministers plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, MPS). �SLOV AKIA-2015 15 on which they had agreed. He sent the instructions to be translated into Slovak, Magyar, and German. 27 Mraz included in hi s report a new, subjective definition of nationality that would challenge prewar methods of counting and classifyi ng th e population based on language. This definition would be th e point of departure for fresh debates and reevaluations of nationhood in the evolving circumstances of the interwar Czechoslovak state. He argued that, "In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept 'nationality' means adherence to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambi guous way, similar to reli gious conviction," and that it follows from this conclusion that Jews should have the option of declaring either for their own Jewish nationality, or for the nationality of others, without regard for religious affiliation.28 Debates over "Jewish nationali ty" formed the centerpiece of the overall reevaluation of nationality and nationhood in Czechoslovakia. Jewi sh nationality came to be used as an exceptional example in formulating opposing positions on the meaning, classification, and function of nationality in the new state. Through it, Czechoslovakia shifted the concept of nationality closer to an ethnic or racial understanding of the term, rather than a linguistic or cultural one. The Czechoslovak government, together with the multinational population of the state, initiated th e process of actualizing theoretical concepts of nationality and nationhood through the 1919 census in Slovakia. Responses to the 1919 census gave nationality meaning in the postwar environment, in the context of new states created on the principle of national self-determination . In the process of creating the 1919 Slovak census, Czechoslovak demographers also came to a preliminary decision regarding how 29 Czechoslovakia would "see" and count Jewish nationality . The Jewish case was especially problematic because Czechoslovakia did not consider the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia to possess its own national language, even in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia where Yiddish language usage was more widespread, but never27 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. IOI. From the report by Josef Mraz, "Prozatfmnf scftanf lidu na Slovensku," February 8, 1919 . 28 SNA, f. MPS , box 277, inv. No. 76 . "Prozatfmnf scitani lidu na Slovensku" 29 See: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), for thinking about ways the state "sees" the populat ion and makes it "legible." �16 SLOV AKIA-2015 theless did not dispute Jewish national status within the state. An influential work on national questions published in Prague in early 1919 declared: "Language forms the distinguishing characteristic of the nation : a nation must have its own language, otherwise it is not a nation." 30 How would the Czechoslovak state square its recognition of Jewish national status with the alleged lack of a distinctive national language among the Jews of Czechoslovakia? Debates surrounding Jewish nationality and its codification for census purposes lay at the core of a Czechoslovak reevaluation of the overall meaning of nationality in the postwar period . Decisions regarding the meaning and function of Jewish nationality within the Czechoslovak context went hand in hand with the process of integrating Slovakia into the Czechoslovak state. The Jewish case illuminates the way the process of Czechoslovak state building - including the interrelated efforts to arrive at the true number of Slovaks and Czechs, and to reconcile the dissonant linguistic-national circumstances of the Jewish population so as to codify Jewish nationality within Czechoslovakia - led to an increased unbundling of language from nationality as an absolute indicator of national belonging, and movement toward a definition of nationality as an internal conviction. To begin, it is helpful to take a step back to look at the relationship between language, nationalism, and nationhood; and then to consider their relationship as applied to the institutionalized collection of data for census purposes. First of all, for the peoples of East Central Europe, including the Jews, the nation building process was a fundamental component of modem politics. Nation building required raising the national consciousness of the members of the group, as well as making a convincing case to the world that the group was indeed a real nationality. The most important proof of national existence was language: a special, unique language belonging to the national group alone.31 Nineteenth century nationalism deemed language the most important characteristic marking one nation from another. Language 30 Bohdan Klineberger, Ncirod a ncirodnost (Praha, 1919), 53 . Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 31 �SLOV AKIA-2015 17 was the primary determinant of nationhood .32 Nationalism assumes that people naturally group themselves into nations, that these nations have identifiable characteristics, and that their only legitimate form of government is self-government. 33 Making language central to nationalism, argues Elie Kedourie, erases the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism, because then the conception of nationalism itself contains all linguistic, racial, religious and other features. The connection between language and ethnicity is also heightened. 34 Nation - "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" 35 - has been variously defined as dependent more on "objective" factors including language, religion and customs, territory and institutions; and alternatively as coalescing from "subjective" factors like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. 36 The features deemed "objective" have been conceived to mark the boundaries of nations, and features deemed "subjective" to give it internal cohesion and solidarity. "Objective" criteria like language are not enough in and of themselves to establish whether a group is a nation or not. Rather, suggests Walker Connor, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." 37 His conception closely agrees with Ernest Gellner's, where a common language does not bind a group into a nation without mutual recognition of each other. "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to 32 "Let us fo llow our own path ... let all men speak we ll or ill of our nati on, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough," 8 . Suphan, ed. , Johann Gottfried Herder, Sdmmtliche Werke (Berlin: Weidmann), in Smith, Nationalism, 27. 33 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London : Hutchinson, 1961 ), 68. 34 1bid. 35 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975 ), 6. 36 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001 ), I I. 37 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994 ), 197. �18 SLOV AKIA-2015 each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. "38 A people must feel its nationhood. That feeling of nationhood, the condition of being a nation, has been theorized in two main ways in its European context. The first is considered to derive more from a sense of mutual belonging to a political community in which equal citizens participate in a common culture; while the second is regarded as more related to a sense of mutual belonging to an ethnocultural community of descent with political ambitions.39 Neither is exclusive, nor analogous to the state. States can be defined by their autonomous institutional activity, and by their "legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory," but the state itself is not the national political community. 40 Anthony Smith's paired conceptions of nation and ethnie highlight the group's internal cohesion, solidarity, and mutual loyalty. Smith defines nation as "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members;" as distinguished from ethnie "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites."41 Smith's concept of the ethnie is especially important in the Jewish case for understanding the coherence of the group without territory and without a special, unique, shared vernacular. Late nineteenth century Jewish nationalism relied on "subjective" characteristics for modem Jewish nation building; above all a common heritage and shared historical experience. Language was conspicuously absent from the short list. "Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language?" Theodor Herzl famously asked in 1896.42 38 Ernest Geitner, Nations and Natio nalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7. 39 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 40 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 41 Ibid ., 13 . 42 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), 145. �SLOV AKIA-2015 19 How then do you count "nationality" on the census? What, in fact, is being counted? Census-creating demographers differ from theorists in their need to count and quantify, classify and categorize state populations. Definitions of nation push and pull against the institutional demands of the state. The real question here is how the complex and fluctuating "nation" is tagged and boxed and bureaucratized for use by the state. What does it mean and how is it used ? Nation indeed becomes, as Rogers Brubaker explains, a "practical category, institutionalized form, contingent event, and category of prac43 tice." "We should not ask 'what is a nation,"' he writes, "but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?" 44 The crystallization of Jewish nationality in Czechoslovakia exemplifies the process by which nation is bureaucratized and given institutional form in interwar East Central Europe. Jewish nationality became an exceptional category of practice within the borders of interwar Czechoslovakia; it was the only nationality in East Central Europe not bound by language . Demographers began to answer the question of how to count nationality on the census at the meeting of the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg in 1872. There, they agreed that language was the primary marker of nationality, and that counting nationality according to language was the most effective means of capturing and recording nationality for the interests of the state. The question of how to codify nationality in a state census had first been debated at the 1857 Congress in Vienna, but without conclusive results. The St. Petersburg Congress decided that language was the best objective indicator of nationality, the most reliable one, and the least confusing, as "each perfectly knows the language used since childhood to think and express oneself." 45 But how should the census ask about language? The conclusions of the St. Petersburg conference point to 43 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 44 1bid, 16. 45 Dominique Arel , "Language categories in censuses : backward- or forward-looking?" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel , eds. , Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2002), 95. �20 SLOV AKIA-2015 an acceptance of mother tongue as the most valid language situation type to use in codifying nationality for the census. Other language situation types include, but are not limited to: language most commonly used, language of daily use, family language, language in which one prays, and the language that one speaks with one's children. 46 Language was first counted on the Austrian and the Hungarian census in 1880. In Austria, language was counted according to "language of daily use" (Umgangssprache); while in the Kingdom of Hungary, language was counted according to "mother tongue" (anyanyelv). When Czechoslovakia came into existence after the First World War, it brought together two traditions of national codification through language proxy.In discussing the relationship of language to nationality for the development of the census, Czechoslovak demographers favored "mother tongue," as nationality was counted in the Kingdom of Hungary, over "language of daily use," as it was done in Austria. They argued that counting according to language of daily use had led to an under representation of Czechs on the Austrian census, and inherently underestimated the numbers of minority national groups where the official language was that of the dominant national group . The dependent position of the Czechs had resulted in more Czechs declaring themselves as Germans when counted this way, they asserted, because a Czech in a German language environment would indeed have used that language on a daily basis. Counting according to mother tongue had led to even greater statistical manipulations in the Kingdom of Hungary. Czechoslovak demographers contended that corruption of the census process in Hungary for the purpose of statistically increasing the number of Magyars had resulted in a gross underestimation of the number of ethnic Slovaks. Consequently, Slovaks as a people suffered more in Hungary than the Czechs in Austria. Yet they agreed that if the census were carried out properly, counting nationality by mother tongue would yield the most accurate and objective picture of 46 David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, Identity formation and the struggle for political power," in Kertzer and Arel, eds., 26, and Dominique Arel, "Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?" in Kertzer and Arel, eds. , 97. �SLOVAKIA-2015 21 47 the demographic composition of the state. Czechoslovak demographers accepted the definition of mother tongue as "the language which is most familiar to a person since childhood and with which they think, or simply the language which their parents taught them in their earliest youth. "48 Josef Mraz worked with the definition of mother tongue as well as its caveat, used on the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary to make the mother tongue category as broad as possible, in reformulating the conception of nationality for the 1919 Slovak census. He did not dispute the Hungarian definition's core: mother tongue is the language "to which one confesses as one's own and with which one best and most gladly speaks. "49 It was the caveat that troubled him: Although mother tongue is identical with the language which everyone learned in their childhood in the majority of cases, usually from their mother, it can nevertheless happen that a child has another mother tongue than the mother, especially when the child acquired it in child-care (!), in school (!), or as a result of circumstances by which the parents have different mother tongues, another language than the language of the child's mother. 50 By broadening the definition of mother tongue so that it became disengaged from the language one's mother actually spoke, Hungarian demographers allowed for a greater number of people to declare for the Magyar mother tongue than would have otherwise been possible. While this definition may have obtained in a number of cases due to widespread linguistic assimilation in the Kingdom of Hungary, it left the door open for abuses . ... (Co ntinuation: Next page with Statistical Tables) 47 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" Ceskoslovensky statisticky vestnik (CSV) II ( 1921 ): 49, and Antonin Bohac, "Slovensko ve svetle statistiky -kniha Josefa Mraza," CSV II (1921): 225-6. 48 Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV II ( 1921 ): 187. 49 JosefMraz, Slovensko ve svetle statistiky (Praze, 1920), 33 . 50 Jbid. Exclamation marks in the original. �SLOV AKIA-2015 22 Table 2.1: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population According to Religion in 1910 According to Absolute Number Hungarian Total 10,888,138 5,924,665 Roman Catholic 304,570 2,025,508 Greek Catholic 2,573,683 2,621,329 Calvinist 418,449 1,340,143 Lutheran 2,987, 163 40,851 Greek Orthodox 74,296 73,267 Unitarian 932,458 705,488 Jewish 9,602 17,452 Other 20,886,487 10,050,5 75 Total Rusvn Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total German Slovak Romanian 1,372,103 1,406,207 8,531 1,785 79,338 1,133,671 26,964 429,687 2,494 10,645 463,912 706 1,412 1,592 1,799,255 168 203,230 1,004 2,037,435 64 5,830 1,268 1,967,9 70 559 991 3,021 2,949,032 Croatian Other Serbian 5,109 1,810,302 3,892 357,329 463,604 9,511 1,908 31,121 57 56 1,03 1 1,028 791 860 49 128 1,099,386 7,491 25,528 42,580 4 2,702 24 472,587 7 10,387 276 1,833,162 21 91 996 1,106,471 206 3,739 3,739 469,255 According to Absolute Percentage Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total Total 52.1 Hungarian 54.4 German 12.6 9.7 15.0 0.1 3.9 56.0 12.6 6.4 14.3 98.2 31.2 1.4 1.0 32.1 0.1 0.4 34.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 60.3 0.3 4.5 0.1 100 98.6 75.7 55.0 0.2 21.8 5.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 0.8 0.1 17.3 Slovak Romanian 12.9 0.1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other 23 0.1 16.6 0.0 3.3 22.9 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 0.3 1.9 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.3 0.4 7.2 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXIII. I 9 I 5 (Budapest, 1918), 20, chart 13, "A nepesseg anyanyelve vallasok szerint 1910-ben." Table 2.2: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population in 1900 and 1910 Total Population Mother Tongue of the Population Hungary Magyar Geman Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other Total non Magyar Total 1900 absolute number 1910 percentage 8,651,520 1,999,060 2,002,165 2,798,559 424,774 191,432 437,737 333,008 8,186,735 16,838,255 absolute number 51.4 11.9 11.9 16.6 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.0 48.6 100 Percentage 9,944,627 1,903,357 1,946,357 2,948,186 464,270 194,808 461,516 401,412 8,319,906 18,264,533 54.4 10.4 10.7 16.1 2.5 1.1 2.5 2.9 45.5 100 CroatiaSlavonia Magyar German Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other 90,781 136,121 17,476 920 4,673 1,490,672 610,908 64,753 3.8 5.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 61.7 25.3 2.7 105,948 134,078 21,613 846 8,317 1,638,354 644,955 67,843 4.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 62.5 24.6 2.6 �24 Total non-Magyar Total SLOV AKIA-2015 2,325,523 96.2 2,516,006 95.9 2,416,304 100 2,621,954 100 Hungarian Kingdom Magyar 8,742,301 45.4 10,050,575 48.1 German 2,135,181 2,037,435 11.1 9.8 Slovak 2,019.641 10.5 1,967,970 9.4 Romanian 2,799,479 2,949,032 14.5 14.1 Rusyn 429,447 2.2 472,587 2.3 Croatian 1,682,104 8.7 1,833,162 8.8 Serbian 1,048,645 1,106,471 5.5 5.3 Other 397,761 469,255 2.1 2.2 Total 10,512,258 54.6 10,835,912 51.9 non-Magyar Total 19,254,559 100 20,886,487 100 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXl/l. 1915 (Budapest, 1918), 15, chart 11 , "A nepesseg anyanyelve es magyarul tudasa 1900-ban es 19 I 0-ben." In their analysis, and in their own efforts to bolster Slovak mnnbers, Czechoslovak demographers were uninterested in linguistic assimilation, seeking instead to strip the inhabitants of Slovakia down to their national skins . Their efforts illustrate what Dominique Arel has explained as a backward looking orientation toward language categories in censuses. Arel argues that, even though nationalists portray linguistic assimilation as "forced, unnatural, and fundamentally illegitimate, the result of destructive policies by an 'imperialist' state," it is in reality a normal and expected occurrence. Among speakers of a less prestigious language, there are individuals who will choose to linguistically assimilate for social advancement. 51 In those cases declaration of mother tongue as the "language one best and most gladly speaks" may well differ from the language of one's mother. According to this reasoning, Czechoslovak demographers were backwards-looking because they sought to discover the "real" nationality of the inhabitants of Slovakia, their "true group belong- 51 Arel, "Language categories in censuses," in Census and Identity, Kertzer and Arel, eds., 93 . �SLOV AKIA-2015 25 ing" based on their ancestral origins, rather than linguistic assimilation: whether coerced, statistically falsified, or voluntary. Czechoslovak demographers sought to demonstrate the unreliability of the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary through critical comparative examination of the data collected within the language categories of "mother tongue" and "language knowledge. "52 In a typical example, Jan Auerhan 53 pointed to the 301,694 Magyars with knowledge of Slovak counted on the 1910 census within the sixteen counties and four municipalities of the Kingdom of Hungary which in whole or part became Slovakia. Two-thirds of them were likely to be ethnic Slovaks, he concluded. Counting them as Slovaks, instead of as Magyars with Slovak language knowledge, would raise the ethnic Slovak number from 1,708,592 to 1,900,000.54 The likelihood that a Slovak would be proficient in the Magyar language in an environment where Magyar was the official language - the language of instruction in schools, the language used in government offices and the court system - was incomparably greater than a Magyar proficient in Slovak. Mother tongue was not a perfect indicator of nationality, but what could be offered in its stead to collect national data? Mraz, in his Zilina report, strikingly concluded that "nationality" alone be used. Rather than employ language proxy, the census should ask the people directly for their nationality. This was a controversial method due its high level of subjectivity. Nationality declaration would not be linked to language as an external marker. Considering the ways in which Czechoslovak demographers regarded mother tongue to have been manipulated on the censuses of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mraz wrote: 52 Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?"; Mraz,"Dva dukazy o falesnosti mad'arskych dat o feci matefske na zaklade dat o znalosti feci," ; and Hora.eek, "Narodnostni statistika," all in CSV II (1921). 53 Jan Auerhan (1880-1942) worked as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom from 1906, and became the undersecretary to the president of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office at its founding in January 1919. He is most noted for his work in the demographic and anthro-geographic fields, the study of Czech and Slovak minorities abroad, and minority questions more generally. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky, 186. 54 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" CSV II ( 1921 ): 51 . �26 SLOV AKIA-2015 In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept "nationality" means confession to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambiguous way, similar to religious conviction . That confession to a certain nationality is the only correct one for ascertaining national ratios. "Mother tongue" has for this reason been eliminated from the demographic markers and as a surrogate question for "nationality." In connection with this is the question at hand, whether a separate "Jewish nationality" should be accepted without regard to religious affiliation. It follows from the concept of nationality described that it is not possible to force someone to declare a separate Jewish nationality, if [that declaration] is to express their internal conviction; because the Jews indeed form a separate race, there will, however, be no recommendation in the instructions for this procedure, except that Jewish nationality shall be left to the rubric of "Other nationality." The Jews should be left the option of declaring themselves either for their own separate nationality or for the nationality of others, which with the influence of environment and education or the like they have accepted as their own. For the stating of the Jewish race the remaining rules of the statement of affiliation to the Jewish confession shall suffice.55 Mraz's interpretation of nationality as an "internal conviction" was most closely related to the definition advanced by Karoly Keleti at the International Statistical Congress meeting in St. Petersburg in 1872. Keleti was the first director of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau founded one year earlier. He helped create the 1867 and the 1880 censuses for the Kingdom of Hungary. 56 The 1872 St. Petersburg Congress not only debated nationality enumeration on the census, but the meaning of nationality itself. Three conceptions of nationality emerged from the deliberations : I) political, in which nationality is equivalent to state belonging; 2) physical, in which nationality is defined racially; and 3) psychical, in which nationality is understood as a psychological community penetrating individual feeling and collective endeavors. 57 Keleti took the 55 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. 76. Italics added. Karoly Keleti (born 1833, Pozsony [Pressburg, Bratislava] - died 1892, Budapest) Eletrajzi lexikon. www.kereso.hu-yrk-Ryrgenwm/7502 accessed June 17, 2005 . 57 Bohac, "Narodnost ci jazyk?" CSV II (1921 ): 50. 56 �SLOV AKIA-2015 27 position that nationality cannot be equivalent to state belonging, as that is so-called political nationality, common in Western Europe, but not in the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nor does ethnic (Stamm) belonging answer to nationality, even if its main marker is language. Nationality was best defined, according to Keleti, as a "subjective state internal to the individual, a feeling analogous to religion that depends on origin and the environment in which a person lives and grows ."58 Keleti's definition was based on social-psychological criteria for which it is difficult to secure an objective external marker. It moved away from language as a definite indicator of nationality, leav ing room for belonging to a nationality whose language one may not use daily or that is not considered a viable national language (like Hebrew or Yiddish in the view of the Czechoslovak state). This was a big plus for Mraz and hi s colleagues, but also ambiguous enough to allow for pressures and fal sifications, like those they presumed embedded in the last Hungarian census before the war. Yet Keleti 's definition was attractive to the Czechoslovak demographers preparing the 1919 Slovak census. This definition would enable the indivi dual to confess nationality as directly as religion, as an expression of his/her internal conviction and self-understanding. Czechoslovak demographers hoped it would un cover the numbers of ethnic Slovaks who had previously been hidden from view because they were counted as Magyar-speakers. They would now be recorded under the banner of their "real" nationality, free to directly profess their "true" group belonging. Jews, too, would be able to declare their "true" group belonging for the first time; not only as a religion, but also as a distinct nationality . Antonin Bohac 59 found Keleti's definition to coincide with concepts of ethno-racial group belonging. "Since the means for express58 Ibid. , 49. Keleti publ is hed his views on nationality in 1880 in the Stalistische Monatschrift under the title "Zur Frage der Volksziihlung." [Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV I ( 1920): 187.] 59 Antonin Bohac ( 1882-1 950) is regarded as the fo under of Czechoslovak demographics, especially with regard to questi ons of nationality. He was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 19 19, and worked fo r the Czechos lovak State Statistical Office upon his return. Bohac was the deputy chairman of the Society for the Study of Nationality Questi ons. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Prague, 1989), 195. Bohac was also associate professor of demography at the Charles Uni versity Faculty of Science where he lee- �28 SLOV AKIA-2015 ing psychological states is language," Bohac wrote, "as Keleti [elsewhere] has stated, the concept of nationality in this sense is quite close to the concept of nationality as ethnic/racial belonging (kmenova prislusnost), for which language is the main connecting bond and main external marker."60 Bohac was correct to observe that Keleti's definition bore a strong resemblance to a physical understanding of nationality, which gave race and/or ethnicity an expanded role. Language remained the main outward indicator of nationality, but was no longer considered identical to nationality itself. Espousing this conception moved nationality closer to ethnicity. It elevated ethnic understandings of the self and the group . The final formulation of the 1919 census shows that the Czechoslovak administration and its demographers accepted Mraz's definition of nationality, based on Keleti's: "an individual national-political conviction according to ethnic belonging to a certain national unit or nation ."61 Five sub-headings were placed under Nationality on the form: Slovaks and Czechs, Rusyns, Magyars, Germans, and Others .62 Czechoslovak demographers understood Jewish nationality to be included under the subheading "Others." While "Jewish nationality" was an available option, though not a requirement, for the Jewish population, the category remained invisible on the actual census form in 1919. The 1919 census asked directly for nationality without the intermediary of language. *** In the late August heat of 1919, census takers dispersed across the territory of Slovakia to ask the people about their nationality. Many complained that the whole endeavor was disorganized and insufficiently thought through. Census takers expressed frustration that they had not received the census forms with time enough to look tured on the "Basics of Population Science." He introduced the usage of punch card technology for processing Czechoslovak census data."Historie statistiky v Cechach po roce 1918," The Czech Statistical Office http ://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.ns£'i/historie_statistiky_ v_cechach_po_roce_ l 918 (accessed January 9, 2012). 60 Federalni statisticky urad, 50. 61 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77* (cast textova). 62 SNA, f. MPS, box 277 . This carton contains the original hand-written forms used for collecting the raw data for the 1919 census. �SLOV AKIA-2015 29 them over, nor so that they could fill one out to use as an example. Due to lack of funds and inadequate organization, many found themselves forced to sleep in train stations and on park benches during the census period, which surely affected their ability to fulfill their duties. One census taker reported that his census materials were stolen from him while he slept! The population, and oftentimes even local community officials, had not been informed about the purpose of the census, nor when it would take place.63 If these complaints are accurate, they undermine the seriousness with which the Czechoslovak administrators prepared the foundation of the 1919 census, as well as the importance they placed upon it as a means of accurately proving national ratios in Slovakia. Yet last minute pre-census agitation to prepare the Slovak population did take place. The prominent Slovak national newspaper Narodnie noviny called on Slovaks " ... to consciously and openly confess their Slovak stock ... to let the beautiful words: 'I am Slovak' 64 consciously and boldly sound from the mouths of loyal citizens. " This example is atypical, however, as the agitation took place in the central Slovak town of Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and home to the Matica slovenska, the Slovak cultural society. Narodnie noviny explained that the purpose of the census was to prove that Slovakia was Slovak, and that it was essential for building its own independent country. Every citizen could participate in building that independent state through the census, the article stressed, an idea meant to reinforce the democratic spirit of the new era.65 "You have no reason to be ashamed of [declaring Slovak nationality]," counseled the leading newspaper in Saris county, a region of eastern Slovakia where national consciousness remained weak, "the Czechoslovak name has the best reputation not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia." The paper ran boldface announcements at the foot of its pages urging all Slovaks to proudly declare to the census taker that they were Slovaks. 66 These reassurances did little to assuage prevalent Slovak fears about the real purpose of the census. This terribly urgent appeal itself 63 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. nos. 7, 8-9. Scitani lidu na Slovensku 1919. Anketa mezi popisujicimi povei'niky. 64 "Scitanie l'udu," Nizrodnie noviny (Turciansky Svaty Martin), August 22, 1919. 65 Ibid. 66 "Slovaci!" Sari.fake hlasy (Presov), August 24, 1919. �30 SLOVAKIA-2015 may have caused anxiety for a population with a low-level of national consciousness. Suspicions ranged from the belief that the goal was to raise or introduce new taxes, undertake military recruitment, or to carry out a plebiscite to divide the territory . The military rumor was the most widespread. Many Slovaks worried that a war would soon break out between the Poles and Magyars, and the job of the census takers was to find able-bodied men to fight. Whoever declared Slovak nationality would be conscripted to fight once again, while other nationalities would be freed from that duty. While it was later revealed that the rumor began in Magyar circles, many people in the border counties still held back from declaring themselves Slovak. Others believed the census to be connected to imminent requisitioning of cattle and grain. Some, more optimistically, believed more satisfactory food and fuel distribution would follow, and possibly a more advantageous land distribution. Still others imagined the census to be an exercise in identifying foreigners (especially Magyars, Poles, and Magyarone Slovaks) and expelling them from Czechoslovakia.67 Widespread fears and suspicions about the real intentions of the 1919 census underscored the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in Slovakia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak state building project, as well as contributed to a certain level of inaccuracy in the results. Of the four national groups which were the most interesting to the state: Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and Jews, the greatest difficulties arose in recording the nationality of the Slovaks and the Jews. Magyars and Germans were by-and-large ready for the census and decisive in their national declarations. Within the ethnic Magyar population, only state and municipal employees exhibited uncertainty in their national declarations. 68 Magyar language use, national uncertainty, fear and mistrust accounted for the greatest difficulties in recording the highest possible number of Slovaks on the 1919 census. Magyar or Magyarone Slovak census takers were known to record entire ethnic Slovak or mixed nationality villages as Magyar, or count individuals as Magyar because they were able to communicate with Magyar-speaking cen67 Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921 ): 133134. 68 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "O Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech" �SLOV AKIA-2015 31 sus takers without the help of an interpreter. 69 The latter illustrates precisely what Mraz and his colleagues had hoped to avoid in bypassing language as identical with or as a surrogate for nationality . They did not want ethnic Slovaks counted as Magyars based on their Magyar language proficiency. Other problems stemmed from uncertainty surrounding the meaning of nationality (primarily in eastern Slovakia). Many Slovaks feared what might happen to them if they did not declare themselves as Magyars. They distrusted the "godless Czechs" and "false prophets from Prague" who came to their doors. 70 The Slovak population tended to be more religious than the highly secularized Czech one, and Slovak national leaders expressed wari71 ness about the "agnostic progressivism" of the Czech intelligentsia. Common answers among Slovaks when asked about their nationality included: Slovak and Magyar ("aji Slovak, aji Mad'ar"), it doesn't matter ("to vsetko jedno"), and Hungarian Slovak ("Uhorsky Slovak"). 72 In eastern Slovakia, other answers included : I speak Slovak and Magyar ("hutorim 73 po slovensky i po mad'arsky"), I pray in Slovak ("modlim sa po slovensky"), and Catholic ("katolik") . Mraz noted in his analysis of the results that Slovaks often confused religion with nationality. 74 Interestingly, this observation recalls the proximity of religious and national feeling within Czechoslovakia's re-conceptualization of nationality, as well as the fine distinction made between them in rec69 Ibid., 7. "O opravnych navrzich pro pfisti scitani. Ibid., 5. "O nepfistojnostech pfi scitani," and Josef Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921): 135 . 71 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 23. 72 All the Slavic languages differentiate the word "Hungarian" from ,,Magyar." The former refers to citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas the latter refers to the predominant ethnic group in that Kingdom. In Slovak, these terms are "Mad'ar" (ethnic Hungarian), Uhorsko (the Kingdom of Hungary), and uhorsky (deriving from the Kingdom of Hungary) . In the early 19 th century, Magyar nationalists followed the lead of Count Istvan Szechenyi in equating "Magyar" and "Hungarian" in foreign languages as part of their drive to assimilate all the non-Magyar nationalities into Magyar language and culture. The non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary rejected the equating of "Magyar" with "Hungarian" and still do. For more on Szechyni ' s activities see Dejiny S/ovenska II ( 1526-1848), ed. Samuel Cambel (Bratislava: VEDA, 1987), 488-90. 73 "Hutorit'" is the Saris form of "hovorit'," to speak. 74 JosefMraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II ( 192 1): 135. II 70 �32 SLOV AKIA-2015 ognizing "Jewish nationality." Nationality was something to be understood and felt as an "internal conviction, similar to religious confession," but consciously separated, and given a higher position than religion in the hierarchy of self and group values of definition. One's nationality, not one's religion, was of the greatest interest to the state. One's nationality, not one's religion, was the primary indicator of one's most strongly held inner values and loyalties. For the Jewish population, answers to the question of nationality were most striking for their variety. Census takers disparaged the eclecticism of the Jewish response, attributing it to opportunism . In some cases, they remarked, national declarations among Jews reached comical proportions: the head of one household declared as a Slovak, his wife as a German, and the children as Hungarians . They noted, however, that often Jews stuck to Jewish nationality so that they would not have to affiliate with any of the other nationality choices.75 The majority of Jews in Slovakia chose the Jewish nationality option on the 1919 census, officially recorded as "Other." Census takers recommended that a separate column be made available on the next census for Jewish nationality because so many Jews had expressly asked for it. 76 In the uncertain environment which prevailed in Slovakia in August 1919, shortly after the rollback of Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army forces but before the de jure securing of the Czechoslovak borders, Jews in Slovakia wished to avoid a difficult and possibly treacherous national affiliation decision through declaring Jewish nationality. Many Jews viewed Jewish nationality as an escape from the nationality conflict. Choosing Jewish nationality appeared to be a good way to opt out, to take a neutral position, to make the safest bet on an unpredictable future. Basing the decision to declare for Jewish nationality on these criteria made it more a strategic and less a heart-felt choice. For the time being, at least, it had less to do with deep-seated feelings of belonging to a Jewish national group, and more to do with trying to make the best possible choice in 75 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech." JosefMniz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (192 1): 129. Unfortunately, the demographic breakdown of those who chose "Other" on the 1919 Slovak census is unavailable, so the conclusion that the majority of Jews declared for Jewish nationality comes from census taker reports and their insistence that it be included as a separate column on the next census. See footnote : Statni ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77*. 76 �SLOV AKIA-2015 33 a high-stakes gamble. The Jewish population in Slovakia overall, counted by religion and nationality, numbered 135,918 according to the 1921 statewide Czechoslovak census, and 354,342 in the state as a whole. 77 Slovaks, counted only under the nationality rubric "Czechoslovak" on the interwar censuses, numbered 1,954,446 in 1919 and 2,025,003 in 1921, a positive change of 3.61 percent. 78 The popularity of the Jewish nationality declaration on the 1919 Slovak census (as "Other"), combined with a majority of ethnic Slovaks declaring as "Slovak" 79 led to a significant decrease in the number of Magyars recorded in Slovakia compared with the last prewar census. This decline heightened the Czechoslovak administration's awareness of further potential benefits rendered to the state by Jewish nationality . If the Jews, who traditionally affiliated with Germanspeakers in Bohemia and Moravia, and Magyar-speakers in Slovakia, declared for Jewish nationality, then the statistical legitimacy of the Czechoslovak nation-state would rise as the numbers of Germans and Hungarians fell. "Jewish nationality" would work to the advantage of the dominant "Czechoslovak" nationality and national state. If, as this argument goes, Jewish nationality favored the Czechoslovak nationality in solving the state's nationalities problems, then declaring Jewish nationality was not really a way of opting out. It was not a neutral position. It could not be an escape from the nationality conflict if it meant - once again - casting one's lot with the dominant state nationality. Jewish nationality may have seemed like an exit, but this was an illusion. One could not avoid taking sides in the interwar nationality conflicts . *** It is a valid and important point that the Czechoslovak government would favor Jewish nationality for its ability to statistically reduce the number of Germans and Magyars in the state. But that con77 Antonin Bohac, Narodnostni mapa republiky ceskoslovenske. Podrobny popis narodnostnich hranic, ostrovu a mensin (Prague, 1926), pp. 148-155 . 78 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora I 92 / Prague, 19240, Table 74: Narodnosti na Slovensku podle scitani lidu z roku 1919 a 1921 . 79 Slovaks who declared as Slovak, according to the options presented on the 1919 Slovak census, were recorded as "Czechoslovak." Slovaks were not recorded as "Slovak" until the 1930 statewide census. �34 SLOV AKIA-2015 clusion neglects the deeper meaning of its inclusion beyond the statistical benefits it could render. Creating a Jewish nationality category manifested the ways in which the meaning of national affiliation had transformed through the cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment of East Central European successor states based on the national principle. Josef Mraz elegantly and succinctly summed up these changes when he stated that declaring for a certain nationality was an expression of internal conviction . Because the very meaning of national affiliation had changed, "Jewish nationality" emerged as a recognized nationality category . Nationality had taken on the problematic role of the manifestation of one's personal convictions, inner values, and ultimate loyalty . Nationality moved ever closer to an essential ethnic or racial understandings of "true" group belonging. The methods and results of the 1919 special census in Slovakia were useful in providing a tested model of nationality investigation based on subjective, internal, ethnic/racial criteria, already approved before an international body (the Paris Peace Conference). The 1919 census had been an experiment in bringing methods of counting and recording the population into line with the new postwar vision of the national state. The 1921 census would build on 1919 methods in circumstances which required more than securing the new borders; they required filling the demarcated territory with meaning, as well as answering the dual questions of what Czechoslovakia was and how nationality and nationhood would function in this state. Examining the 1919 Slovak census offers insight into how Czechoslovakia understood itself as the manifestation of Czechoslovak: self-determination, and the place of the rights of the other nationalities to their own self-determination within this framework. � SLOV AKIA-2015 7 THE 1919 CENSUS ON THE TERRITORY OF SLOV AKIA 1 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova When the First World War ended in 1918, the four empires that had determined the shape of state and social relations within and beyond their borders - the Habsburg, the German, the Russian, and the Ottoman - had dissolved. A state system based on the principle of national self-determination took their place in East Central Europe, in which citizenship and state belonging were seen through a national lens. Unrest and anarchy were characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere in many regions of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the fall of 1918. In Slovakia, that instability was part of the larger struggle for the future of the newly bounded territory . Unlike other regions of former Hungary being incorporated into the new or transformed successor states, like Croatia (Yugoslavia) or Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia had never been administratively defined on its own, but solely as sixteen counties and four municipalities of northern Hungary. By the end of the war, the collapse of the old order without replacement by the new left Slovakia in a chaotic condition. Amid the upheaval, looting, and anti-Jewish excesses that typified the period, local National Councils had formed with the goal of consolidating the new state. But they were too weak to decisively resist regional Hungarian opposition and Budapest's efforts to maintain the territory. 2 While Czechoslovakia's birth was announced in Prague on October 28, 1918, the view from Slovakia was far less definitive. It was not a foregone conclusion that Slovakia would indeed be incorporated into the new state. Slovakia was in a precarious position, loosened from defeated Hungary, but not yet officially joined with Bohemia and Moravia. 1 This article is a version of a chapter originally published in my book Mapping Jewish Loyalties in !nterwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 I 5). This material appears courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. 2 Cubomir Liptak, "Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Elena Mannova, ed ., A Concise History of Slovakia. Studia Historica Slovaca XXI (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2000), 239 . �8 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovak historians characterize the unstable "Prevrat " era as the "Struggle for Slovakia," a view that highlights Slovakia's contested status between the Magyars and the Czechs. Save for a handful of Slovak national leaders, the Slovaks themselves moved through this picture as a frustrated underclass, taking advantage of the volatile, chaotic climate to set upon state administrators, notaries, policemen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the propertied . Slovaks found themselves in a moment of great release. It offered them a chance to vent their anger and frustration at the war and the Hungarian system . The newly-formed local National Councils sought to mitigate these widespread outbreaks of violence. Yet these local organs had little control, or the ability to quell Hungarian resistance to the power transfer, which was further impeded by the power structure of the old state, still in place . A Hungarian demand for a referendum on the changes surfaced, relying on the fragmentation of the population along regional and social lines, degrees of national consciousness, and lack of information about the political transformation . It was the first time Budapest asked Slovaks for their opinions . The views of ordinary people, "varied from enthusiastic welcoming of the new state and the 'liberation' of Slovakia, through apathy and desire for peace, to fear of a new unknown situation, of uncertain permanence and threaten3 ing new bloodshed and military solutions. " The Hungarian National Council in Budapest came into being only on October 25, 1918, somewhat later than those of the national minorities. It was established by Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was widely believed to be the emperor-king's obvious choice for the new Prime Minister. Oszkar Jaszi, the progressive Hungarian social scientist, historian, and politician, drafted the Hungarian National Council's twelve-point program. It called for Hungarian independence, an immediate and separate peace treaty with the Allies, universal suffrage with a secret ballot, land reform, and recognition of the 4 rights of the national minorities within a federalized Hungary . When Emperor-King Charles appointed Count Janos Hadik instead, massive anti-government demonstrations broke out, demanding Karolyi. 5 3 Ibid. Peter Hanak, ed. , The Corvina History of Hungary: From Earliest Times Until lhe Present Day (Budapest: Corvina Books, 1991 ), 164. 5 Laszl6 Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 328. 4 �SLOV AKIA-2015 9 It was October 28, the same day as the declaration of the new Czechoslovak Republic in Prague. By the night of October 30 through 31, crowds of soldiers and civilians demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. They later occupied public buildings, prevented troops loyal to Karolyi from moving out of the city, captured Budapest's military governor, and freed political prisoners as in 1848. Soldiers tore off the emblems on their uniforms and replaced them with asters and rosettes. Emperor-King Charles retreated and Karolyi formed a new independent Hungarian government. Vanquished Hungary appeared to be on the path to democratization. 6 Meanwhile, Slovak national leaders, mostly from central Slovakia converged in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and established the Slovak National Council. They had little news of what was happening in Prague, Budapest, or Europe more broadly . The Council wished, however, to take a stand on the dramatically unfolding events . The Slovak politician Milan Hodza had been negotiating with Karolyi in Budapest. He arrived in Martin on October 30 just as the Council was about to issue the Martin Declaration, announcing the secession of Slovakia from Hungary, Slovak self-determination and a desire for inclusion in the Czechoslovak state, which fulfilled Prague's wishes .7 The Slovak National Council had no army, so it could not enforce its program or maintain order. Individual militias sprang up in towns and cities across Slovakia, engaging in a power struggle with the newly-formed Hungarian National Councils. It was a highly unstable environment. Demobilized Slovak soldiers (from the Hungarian army) formed the mainstay of active Slovak participation in the evolving power struggle. They created paramilitary groups in the forests, especially in western Slovakia, with about four thousand soldiers active around Bratislava. To dispel the threat of anarchy and establish control over the territory, the Czechoslovak National Council brought Slovak representatives into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in early November of 1918. 8 Slovakia's first provisional "Slovak Government" was set up in Western Slovakia near the Moravia-Slovak border by the Czechoslo6 Hanak, ed ., Corvino History of Hungary , 164-5. Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1 987 (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1988), 40-41 . 8 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in th e 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 239 . 7 �10 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak government in Prague, and began to function on November 6. It was led by Vavro Srobar, Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. On Decemberl2, it was replaced by a Ministry for Slovakia, which Srobar established in Zilina in the midst of a combined Czech, French and Italian effort to drive Hungarian troops out of Slovak territory. 9 Less than two weeks later, on December 21, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Benes successfully negotiated French 10 recognition of a demarcation line of the Slovak territory . Entente forces would drive Hungarian troops past the demarcation line on January 20, 1919. That line more or less became the country's official border with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. 11 When Srobar's administration grew too large for Zilina, he deliberated with Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman from Modra near Pressburg (later Bratislava) who was the principal author of the Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, on where Slovakia's central government should be moved . They decided in early January of 1919 to move the capital to Pressburg on February 4, 1919. Zoch was placed in charge of the Pressburg district administration (zupan), and orchestrated the Czechoslovak takeover of the city from January 1, 1919. "Bratislava" became the city's standard official name in March of 1919. 12 Hungary would make one more sustained military effort toward maintaining its prewar borders. Under Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, lasting for 133 days beginning March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Red Army made significant inroads into Slovakia. It was driven out following an ultimatum by the Entente powers at the end of June 1919. The Hungarian Red Army finally retreated from Slovakia on June 30, 1919, and by July 24 the Czechoslovak government held the entire territory. 13 9 Peter Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of Pressburg/Pozsony/Presporok, I 918-19," Austrian History Yearbook 35 (2004 ): 221. IOibid ., 213. 11 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 243. 12 Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City," 221 . 13 For a detailed discussion of the series of revolutions in Hungary see: Laszlo Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) chapter VII "In Search of an Identity" , 324-344; Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919. Nine Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971 ); Andras Sikl6s, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 1918 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1988); Rudolf I. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian �SLOV AKIA-2015 11 On the Czechoslovak state level, the Struggle for Slovakia entailed not only the physical, geographic aspect of territorial incorporation, but also the more slippery aspect of drawing the multinational population of Slovakia into the mental landscape of the new state. Coming to terms with the World War I Czech argument that the Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation, and so should together form the dominant national group within the Czechoslovak nation-state, required a shift in direction . The events of the "Prevrat" underscore the tense relations between, first and foremost, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Jews and Slovaks, but also, increasingly between Czechs and Slovaks. These relationships would influence shifts in overall understandings of nationhood and nationality, as well as national political programs within the new state. Czechoslovakia was a nation-state in formation. Successful Czechoslovak state building required incorporating the territory and peoples of Slovakia. This was not to be accomplished by gradually building popular consensus, but through military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering. 14 Drawing the borders in this way would have significant implications for Czechoslovakia's domestic and international nationalities problems. Prague needed the Slovaks, a "state forming nation," 15 or there would be no independent Czechoslovakia. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs could not form a majority in the parliament and legitimately create a viable state. The Slovaks likewise needed the Czechs to help them leave Hungary. They needed the Czechs to help them establish a functioning civil and governmental infrastructure in Slovakia, and to create an educational system for producing Slovak national elites ready to take control of the developing infrastructure. The help the Slovaks desired was temporary_ 16 Soviet Republic (published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University by New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 14 Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires (Lo ndon, NY: Routledge, 200 I), I 62. 15 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. Czechs alone formed only 49 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population without the Slovaks. Whereas, accordin g to the 1921 Czechoslovak census, "Czechoslovaks" formed 65 .51 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population, and "Germans" 23.36 percent. 16 Liptak, "Vll. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. �12 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the introduction to hi s memoir on the formative years 1918 through 1920, Osvobodene Slovensko (Liberated Slovakia), Vavro Srobar recounted hi s first meeting with R.W. Seton-Watson, the influential British historian and political activist who brought nationality questions in Austria-Hungary to the world's attention. In 1907 Seton-Watson came to R6zsahegy (Ruzomberok) in the central Slovak Low Tatra region, where Srobar was then working, while researching the national question for what would be his first major work, Racial Problems in Hungary. 17 Due to the objectivity and calm with which Seton-Watson di scussed Magyarization, Srobar found himself unable to discern where his visitor stood on the issue. Before they parted, Seton-Watson surprised Srobar with a question : "And what is your state program?" he asked. After a moment's hesitation, Srobar replied, "Great Moravia, 18 with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Pannonia," which Seton-Watson "accepted without commentary." "That [conversation] took place seven years before the outbreak of the world war," continued Srobar, "and eleven years afterward 'Great Moravia' received the name the 'Czechoslovak State."' 19 Language was the connection between the "Czechoslovak tribes" that Srobar professed in his memoir, from their ancient roots to the present. Even the establishment of a new literary language in Slovakia, thanks to I:udovit Stur's nineteenth century codification of the central Slovak dialect, "did not for a moment disturb the consciousness of Czechoslovak tribal unity," he asserted. "The longing for close cultural, economic, and political unity increased yearly in proportion to the growing pressure of brutal Magyarization," he added. 20 Srobar underscored a romantic one-thousand year story of the unitary Czechoslovak nation/tribe - focusing on shared language, history, 17 London : Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908 . "Great Moravia," a large Slavic state that existed between 833 and 906, was an important component of the Czechoslovak romantic national idea as well as the development of Slovak nationalism. Considered to have bridged the western Slavs with the Slavonic tribes in the Balkans and with Byzantium, the weakening state collapsed under attack by the Magyar tribes who settled in the Danube Basin in approximately 896. The Czech and Slovak tribes then underwent separate development. For more on Great Moravia see Jan Dekan, Vel'ka Morava: Doba a umenie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1976). 19 Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko. Pamdti z rokov 191 8-1920, Svazok Prvy (Prague, 1928), 7-8. 20 Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko, 11. 18 �SLOV AKIA-2015 13 interests, and ancestral ties - that had been so successful in garnering international support for the Czechoslovak state building project during the war in his celebratory and didactic jubilee year volume. While the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation prevailed internationally, the most compelling connection between the Czechs and Slovaks for the prospects of independent statehood was demographic. Though Czechs constituted a majority in Bohemia and Moravia, they feared that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would spell their incorporation into a Greater Germany, due to the existence of a substantial German minority in these lands . At the beginning of the war, Czech leaders first sought a reorganization of the Monarchy along federal lines with a large degree of autonomy for the Czechs, though soon discarded the plan as unfeasib!e.21 In working toward the ultimate goal of independence, the idea of incorporating the estimated three million strong Slovak population became an increasingly attractive solution to counterbalancing the significant German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. 22 By the end of the war T.G. Masaryk and Benes had the commitment of the Entente powers to an independent Czechoslovakia. The Slovak population became the key to the Czechoslovak nation's demographic legitimacy in its new multinational national state. The Paris Peace Conference called upon the Czechoslovak delegation to statistically demonstrate the dominance of the Slovaks in the multinational territory of Slovakia. The viability of the Czechoslovak state depended upon it. In order to collect the necessary data, the Czechoslovak government organized a provisional census for Slovakia. Such a census could not be carried out until the borders of the territory were defined and secured, and military upheavals had ceased . This meant waiting until the ultimatum given by the Entente powers had driven Bela Kun's Red Army troops out of Slovakia at the end of June 1919, and until the Czechoslovak government had control over the territory at the end of July. While the change of regimes was not officially over, and the borders were not fixed by law until Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, I 920, Czechoslovakia held the de facto borders securely enough by August 1919 that it was feasible to set the census in motion. The primary goal of the census was : 21 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. A History o[. East Central Europe, vol. 9 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 76. 2 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 35. �14 SLOV AKIA-2015 [To gather] the necessary information for the Peace Conference concerning how many Slovaks there [were] in the occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary, so that it would be possible to correct and prove false the Hungarian census of 1910, as well as to ascertain other general national proportions in Slovak communities, namely the [extent of] the Magyarization of these communities, the Magyarization of schools and churches. "23 The 1919 census was the first attempt by the Czechoslovak government to map the territory of Slovakia for state building purposes. Mapping Slovakia meant reframing the national ratios of multinational/ethnic/linguistic Slovakia in terms of Slovak, and thus Czechoslovak, dominance. The Czechoslovak government had to prove that the former government sought to create Magyar demographic superiority in the same lands through forced assimilation and manipulation of statistics. The aim of the census was, in other words, to find the ethnic Slovaks whose numbers would prove that a "falsification," or deliberate Magyarization of the nationalities had taken place in the decades before the war. Josef Mraz of the newly-created Czechoslovak State Statistical Office24 set out from Prague to Zilina, 25 the provisional capital of Slovakia, in mid-January 1919 to propose his ideas for the upcoming Slovak census to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia.26 His talks with Srobar lasted an exhausting four days, during which time they debated how the structure, method, and concept of the census could best meet its chief goal: to find out how many Slovaks there were in Slovakia. Upon his arrival in Prague, he wrote up a report of the Zilina proceedings and the census instructions up23 Slovensky narodny archiv (hereafter SNA), file : Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, hereafter MPS, box 277, inv. no. 74. "Prozatimni scitani lidu na Slovensku." In this transitional period before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, Slovakia was often denoted as the "occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary." 24 Josef Mraz (1882-1934) was one of the co-founders of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, who had begun his work as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom. He is noted for his work on the first census in Slovakia ( I 9 I 9), as well as on statistical theory and agricultural statistics. Federalni statisticky ui'ad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Praha, 1989), 194. 25 :Z:ilina was the provisional capital of Slovakia from December 12, 1918 through February 4, 1919, when Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) became the capital. 26 Vavro Srobar was the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (Ministers plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, MPS). �SLOV AKIA-2015 15 on which they had agreed. He sent the instructions to be translated into Slovak, Magyar, and German. 27 Mraz included in hi s report a new, subjective definition of nationality that would challenge prewar methods of counting and classifyi ng th e population based on language. This definition would be th e point of departure for fresh debates and reevaluations of nationhood in the evolving circumstances of the interwar Czechoslovak state. He argued that, "In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept 'nationality' means adherence to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambi guous way, similar to reli gious conviction," and that it follows from this conclusion that Jews should have the option of declaring either for their own Jewish nationality, or for the nationality of others, without regard for religious affiliation.28 Debates over "Jewish nationali ty" formed the centerpiece of the overall reevaluation of nationality and nationhood in Czechoslovakia. Jewi sh nationality came to be used as an exceptional example in formulating opposing positions on the meaning, classification, and function of nationality in the new state. Through it, Czechoslovakia shifted the concept of nationality closer to an ethnic or racial understanding of the term, rather than a linguistic or cultural one. The Czechoslovak government, together with the multinational population of the state, initiated th e process of actualizing theoretical concepts of nationality and nationhood through the 1919 census in Slovakia. Responses to the 1919 census gave nationality meaning in the postwar environment, in the context of new states created on the principle of national self-determination . In the process of creating the 1919 Slovak census, Czechoslovak demographers also came to a preliminary decision regarding how 29 Czechoslovakia would "see" and count Jewish nationality . The Jewish case was especially problematic because Czechoslovakia did not consider the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia to possess its own national language, even in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia where Yiddish language usage was more widespread, but never27 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. IOI. From the report by Josef Mraz, "Prozatfmnf scftanf lidu na Slovensku," February 8, 1919 . 28 SNA, f. MPS , box 277, inv. No. 76 . "Prozatfmnf scitani lidu na Slovensku" 29 See: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), for thinking about ways the state "sees" the populat ion and makes it "legible." �16 SLOV AKIA-2015 theless did not dispute Jewish national status within the state. An influential work on national questions published in Prague in early 1919 declared: "Language forms the distinguishing characteristic of the nation : a nation must have its own language, otherwise it is not a nation." 30 How would the Czechoslovak state square its recognition of Jewish national status with the alleged lack of a distinctive national language among the Jews of Czechoslovakia? Debates surrounding Jewish nationality and its codification for census purposes lay at the core of a Czechoslovak reevaluation of the overall meaning of nationality in the postwar period . Decisions regarding the meaning and function of Jewish nationality within the Czechoslovak context went hand in hand with the process of integrating Slovakia into the Czechoslovak state. The Jewish case illuminates the way the process of Czechoslovak state building - including the interrelated efforts to arrive at the true number of Slovaks and Czechs, and to reconcile the dissonant linguistic-national circumstances of the Jewish population so as to codify Jewish nationality within Czechoslovakia - led to an increased unbundling of language from nationality as an absolute indicator of national belonging, and movement toward a definition of nationality as an internal conviction. To begin, it is helpful to take a step back to look at the relationship between language, nationalism, and nationhood; and then to consider their relationship as applied to the institutionalized collection of data for census purposes. First of all, for the peoples of East Central Europe, including the Jews, the nation building process was a fundamental component of modem politics. Nation building required raising the national consciousness of the members of the group, as well as making a convincing case to the world that the group was indeed a real nationality. The most important proof of national existence was language: a special, unique language belonging to the national group alone.31 Nineteenth century nationalism deemed language the most important characteristic marking one nation from another. Language 30 Bohdan Klineberger, Ncirod a ncirodnost (Praha, 1919), 53 . Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 31 �SLOV AKIA-2015 17 was the primary determinant of nationhood .32 Nationalism assumes that people naturally group themselves into nations, that these nations have identifiable characteristics, and that their only legitimate form of government is self-government. 33 Making language central to nationalism, argues Elie Kedourie, erases the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism, because then the conception of nationalism itself contains all linguistic, racial, religious and other features. The connection between language and ethnicity is also heightened. 34 Nation - "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" 35 - has been variously defined as dependent more on "objective" factors including language, religion and customs, territory and institutions; and alternatively as coalescing from "subjective" factors like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. 36 The features deemed "objective" have been conceived to mark the boundaries of nations, and features deemed "subjective" to give it internal cohesion and solidarity. "Objective" criteria like language are not enough in and of themselves to establish whether a group is a nation or not. Rather, suggests Walker Connor, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." 37 His conception closely agrees with Ernest Gellner's, where a common language does not bind a group into a nation without mutual recognition of each other. "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to 32 "Let us fo llow our own path ... let all men speak we ll or ill of our nati on, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough," 8 . Suphan, ed. , Johann Gottfried Herder, Sdmmtliche Werke (Berlin: Weidmann), in Smith, Nationalism, 27. 33 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London : Hutchinson, 1961 ), 68. 34 1bid. 35 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975 ), 6. 36 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001 ), I I. 37 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994 ), 197. �18 SLOV AKIA-2015 each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. "38 A people must feel its nationhood. That feeling of nationhood, the condition of being a nation, has been theorized in two main ways in its European context. The first is considered to derive more from a sense of mutual belonging to a political community in which equal citizens participate in a common culture; while the second is regarded as more related to a sense of mutual belonging to an ethnocultural community of descent with political ambitions.39 Neither is exclusive, nor analogous to the state. States can be defined by their autonomous institutional activity, and by their "legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory," but the state itself is not the national political community. 40 Anthony Smith's paired conceptions of nation and ethnie highlight the group's internal cohesion, solidarity, and mutual loyalty. Smith defines nation as "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members;" as distinguished from ethnie "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites."41 Smith's concept of the ethnie is especially important in the Jewish case for understanding the coherence of the group without territory and without a special, unique, shared vernacular. Late nineteenth century Jewish nationalism relied on "subjective" characteristics for modem Jewish nation building; above all a common heritage and shared historical experience. Language was conspicuously absent from the short list. "Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language?" Theodor Herzl famously asked in 1896.42 38 Ernest Geitner, Nations and Natio nalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7. 39 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 40 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 41 Ibid ., 13 . 42 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), 145. �SLOV AKIA-2015 19 How then do you count "nationality" on the census? What, in fact, is being counted? Census-creating demographers differ from theorists in their need to count and quantify, classify and categorize state populations. Definitions of nation push and pull against the institutional demands of the state. The real question here is how the complex and fluctuating "nation" is tagged and boxed and bureaucratized for use by the state. What does it mean and how is it used ? Nation indeed becomes, as Rogers Brubaker explains, a "practical category, institutionalized form, contingent event, and category of prac43 tice." "We should not ask 'what is a nation,"' he writes, "but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?" 44 The crystallization of Jewish nationality in Czechoslovakia exemplifies the process by which nation is bureaucratized and given institutional form in interwar East Central Europe. Jewish nationality became an exceptional category of practice within the borders of interwar Czechoslovakia; it was the only nationality in East Central Europe not bound by language . Demographers began to answer the question of how to count nationality on the census at the meeting of the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg in 1872. There, they agreed that language was the primary marker of nationality, and that counting nationality according to language was the most effective means of capturing and recording nationality for the interests of the state. The question of how to codify nationality in a state census had first been debated at the 1857 Congress in Vienna, but without conclusive results. The St. Petersburg Congress decided that language was the best objective indicator of nationality, the most reliable one, and the least confusing, as "each perfectly knows the language used since childhood to think and express oneself." 45 But how should the census ask about language? The conclusions of the St. Petersburg conference point to 43 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 44 1bid, 16. 45 Dominique Arel , "Language categories in censuses : backward- or forward-looking?" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel , eds. , Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2002), 95. �20 SLOV AKIA-2015 an acceptance of mother tongue as the most valid language situation type to use in codifying nationality for the census. Other language situation types include, but are not limited to: language most commonly used, language of daily use, family language, language in which one prays, and the language that one speaks with one's children. 46 Language was first counted on the Austrian and the Hungarian census in 1880. In Austria, language was counted according to "language of daily use" (Umgangssprache); while in the Kingdom of Hungary, language was counted according to "mother tongue" (anyanyelv). When Czechoslovakia came into existence after the First World War, it brought together two traditions of national codification through language proxy.In discussing the relationship of language to nationality for the development of the census, Czechoslovak demographers favored "mother tongue," as nationality was counted in the Kingdom of Hungary, over "language of daily use," as it was done in Austria. They argued that counting according to language of daily use had led to an under representation of Czechs on the Austrian census, and inherently underestimated the numbers of minority national groups where the official language was that of the dominant national group . The dependent position of the Czechs had resulted in more Czechs declaring themselves as Germans when counted this way, they asserted, because a Czech in a German language environment would indeed have used that language on a daily basis. Counting according to mother tongue had led to even greater statistical manipulations in the Kingdom of Hungary. Czechoslovak demographers contended that corruption of the census process in Hungary for the purpose of statistically increasing the number of Magyars had resulted in a gross underestimation of the number of ethnic Slovaks. Consequently, Slovaks as a people suffered more in Hungary than the Czechs in Austria. Yet they agreed that if the census were carried out properly, counting nationality by mother tongue would yield the most accurate and objective picture of 46 David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, Identity formation and the struggle for political power," in Kertzer and Arel, eds., 26, and Dominique Arel, "Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?" in Kertzer and Arel, eds. , 97. �SLOVAKIA-2015 21 47 the demographic composition of the state. Czechoslovak demographers accepted the definition of mother tongue as "the language which is most familiar to a person since childhood and with which they think, or simply the language which their parents taught them in their earliest youth. "48 Josef Mraz worked with the definition of mother tongue as well as its caveat, used on the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary to make the mother tongue category as broad as possible, in reformulating the conception of nationality for the 1919 Slovak census. He did not dispute the Hungarian definition's core: mother tongue is the language "to which one confesses as one's own and with which one best and most gladly speaks. "49 It was the caveat that troubled him: Although mother tongue is identical with the language which everyone learned in their childhood in the majority of cases, usually from their mother, it can nevertheless happen that a child has another mother tongue than the mother, especially when the child acquired it in child-care (!), in school (!), or as a result of circumstances by which the parents have different mother tongues, another language than the language of the child's mother. 50 By broadening the definition of mother tongue so that it became disengaged from the language one's mother actually spoke, Hungarian demographers allowed for a greater number of people to declare for the Magyar mother tongue than would have otherwise been possible. While this definition may have obtained in a number of cases due to widespread linguistic assimilation in the Kingdom of Hungary, it left the door open for abuses . ... (Co ntinuation: Next page with Statistical Tables) 47 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" Ceskoslovensky statisticky vestnik (CSV) II ( 1921 ): 49, and Antonin Bohac, "Slovensko ve svetle statistiky -kniha Josefa Mraza," CSV II (1921): 225-6. 48 Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV II ( 1921 ): 187. 49 JosefMraz, Slovensko ve svetle statistiky (Praze, 1920), 33 . 50 Jbid. Exclamation marks in the original. �SLOV AKIA-2015 22 Table 2.1: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population According to Religion in 1910 According to Absolute Number Hungarian Total 10,888,138 5,924,665 Roman Catholic 304,570 2,025,508 Greek Catholic 2,573,683 2,621,329 Calvinist 418,449 1,340,143 Lutheran 2,987, 163 40,851 Greek Orthodox 74,296 73,267 Unitarian 932,458 705,488 Jewish 9,602 17,452 Other 20,886,487 10,050,5 75 Total Rusvn Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total German Slovak Romanian 1,372,103 1,406,207 8,531 1,785 79,338 1,133,671 26,964 429,687 2,494 10,645 463,912 706 1,412 1,592 1,799,255 168 203,230 1,004 2,037,435 64 5,830 1,268 1,967,9 70 559 991 3,021 2,949,032 Croatian Other Serbian 5,109 1,810,302 3,892 357,329 463,604 9,511 1,908 31,121 57 56 1,03 1 1,028 791 860 49 128 1,099,386 7,491 25,528 42,580 4 2,702 24 472,587 7 10,387 276 1,833,162 21 91 996 1,106,471 206 3,739 3,739 469,255 According to Absolute Percentage Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total Total 52.1 Hungarian 54.4 German 12.6 9.7 15.0 0.1 3.9 56.0 12.6 6.4 14.3 98.2 31.2 1.4 1.0 32.1 0.1 0.4 34.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 60.3 0.3 4.5 0.1 100 98.6 75.7 55.0 0.2 21.8 5.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 0.8 0.1 17.3 Slovak Romanian 12.9 0.1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other 23 0.1 16.6 0.0 3.3 22.9 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 0.3 1.9 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.3 0.4 7.2 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXIII. I 9 I 5 (Budapest, 1918), 20, chart 13, "A nepesseg anyanyelve vallasok szerint 1910-ben." Table 2.2: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population in 1900 and 1910 Total Population Mother Tongue of the Population Hungary Magyar Geman Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other Total non Magyar Total 1900 absolute number 1910 percentage 8,651,520 1,999,060 2,002,165 2,798,559 424,774 191,432 437,737 333,008 8,186,735 16,838,255 absolute number 51.4 11.9 11.9 16.6 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.0 48.6 100 Percentage 9,944,627 1,903,357 1,946,357 2,948,186 464,270 194,808 461,516 401,412 8,319,906 18,264,533 54.4 10.4 10.7 16.1 2.5 1.1 2.5 2.9 45.5 100 CroatiaSlavonia Magyar German Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other 90,781 136,121 17,476 920 4,673 1,490,672 610,908 64,753 3.8 5.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 61.7 25.3 2.7 105,948 134,078 21,613 846 8,317 1,638,354 644,955 67,843 4.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 62.5 24.6 2.6 �24 Total non-Magyar Total SLOV AKIA-2015 2,325,523 96.2 2,516,006 95.9 2,416,304 100 2,621,954 100 Hungarian Kingdom Magyar 8,742,301 45.4 10,050,575 48.1 German 2,135,181 2,037,435 11.1 9.8 Slovak 2,019.641 10.5 1,967,970 9.4 Romanian 2,799,479 2,949,032 14.5 14.1 Rusyn 429,447 2.2 472,587 2.3 Croatian 1,682,104 8.7 1,833,162 8.8 Serbian 1,048,645 1,106,471 5.5 5.3 Other 397,761 469,255 2.1 2.2 Total 10,512,258 54.6 10,835,912 51.9 non-Magyar Total 19,254,559 100 20,886,487 100 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXl/l. 1915 (Budapest, 1918), 15, chart 11 , "A nepesseg anyanyelve es magyarul tudasa 1900-ban es 19 I 0-ben." In their analysis, and in their own efforts to bolster Slovak mnnbers, Czechoslovak demographers were uninterested in linguistic assimilation, seeking instead to strip the inhabitants of Slovakia down to their national skins . Their efforts illustrate what Dominique Arel has explained as a backward looking orientation toward language categories in censuses. Arel argues that, even though nationalists portray linguistic assimilation as "forced, unnatural, and fundamentally illegitimate, the result of destructive policies by an 'imperialist' state," it is in reality a normal and expected occurrence. Among speakers of a less prestigious language, there are individuals who will choose to linguistically assimilate for social advancement. 51 In those cases declaration of mother tongue as the "language one best and most gladly speaks" may well differ from the language of one's mother. According to this reasoning, Czechoslovak demographers were backwards-looking because they sought to discover the "real" nationality of the inhabitants of Slovakia, their "true group belong- 51 Arel, "Language categories in censuses," in Census and Identity, Kertzer and Arel, eds., 93 . �SLOV AKIA-2015 25 ing" based on their ancestral origins, rather than linguistic assimilation: whether coerced, statistically falsified, or voluntary. Czechoslovak demographers sought to demonstrate the unreliability of the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary through critical comparative examination of the data collected within the language categories of "mother tongue" and "language knowledge. "52 In a typical example, Jan Auerhan 53 pointed to the 301,694 Magyars with knowledge of Slovak counted on the 1910 census within the sixteen counties and four municipalities of the Kingdom of Hungary which in whole or part became Slovakia. Two-thirds of them were likely to be ethnic Slovaks, he concluded. Counting them as Slovaks, instead of as Magyars with Slovak language knowledge, would raise the ethnic Slovak number from 1,708,592 to 1,900,000.54 The likelihood that a Slovak would be proficient in the Magyar language in an environment where Magyar was the official language - the language of instruction in schools, the language used in government offices and the court system - was incomparably greater than a Magyar proficient in Slovak. Mother tongue was not a perfect indicator of nationality, but what could be offered in its stead to collect national data? Mraz, in his Zilina report, strikingly concluded that "nationality" alone be used. Rather than employ language proxy, the census should ask the people directly for their nationality. This was a controversial method due its high level of subjectivity. Nationality declaration would not be linked to language as an external marker. Considering the ways in which Czechoslovak demographers regarded mother tongue to have been manipulated on the censuses of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mraz wrote: 52 Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?"; Mraz,"Dva dukazy o falesnosti mad'arskych dat o feci matefske na zaklade dat o znalosti feci," ; and Hora.eek, "Narodnostni statistika," all in CSV II (1921). 53 Jan Auerhan (1880-1942) worked as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom from 1906, and became the undersecretary to the president of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office at its founding in January 1919. He is most noted for his work in the demographic and anthro-geographic fields, the study of Czech and Slovak minorities abroad, and minority questions more generally. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky, 186. 54 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" CSV II ( 1921 ): 51 . �26 SLOV AKIA-2015 In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept "nationality" means confession to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambiguous way, similar to religious conviction . That confession to a certain nationality is the only correct one for ascertaining national ratios. "Mother tongue" has for this reason been eliminated from the demographic markers and as a surrogate question for "nationality." In connection with this is the question at hand, whether a separate "Jewish nationality" should be accepted without regard to religious affiliation. It follows from the concept of nationality described that it is not possible to force someone to declare a separate Jewish nationality, if [that declaration] is to express their internal conviction; because the Jews indeed form a separate race, there will, however, be no recommendation in the instructions for this procedure, except that Jewish nationality shall be left to the rubric of "Other nationality." The Jews should be left the option of declaring themselves either for their own separate nationality or for the nationality of others, which with the influence of environment and education or the like they have accepted as their own. For the stating of the Jewish race the remaining rules of the statement of affiliation to the Jewish confession shall suffice.55 Mraz's interpretation of nationality as an "internal conviction" was most closely related to the definition advanced by Karoly Keleti at the International Statistical Congress meeting in St. Petersburg in 1872. Keleti was the first director of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau founded one year earlier. He helped create the 1867 and the 1880 censuses for the Kingdom of Hungary. 56 The 1872 St. Petersburg Congress not only debated nationality enumeration on the census, but the meaning of nationality itself. Three conceptions of nationality emerged from the deliberations : I) political, in which nationality is equivalent to state belonging; 2) physical, in which nationality is defined racially; and 3) psychical, in which nationality is understood as a psychological community penetrating individual feeling and collective endeavors. 57 Keleti took the 55 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. 76. Italics added. Karoly Keleti (born 1833, Pozsony [Pressburg, Bratislava] - died 1892, Budapest) Eletrajzi lexikon. www.kereso.hu-yrk-Ryrgenwm/7502 accessed June 17, 2005 . 57 Bohac, "Narodnost ci jazyk?" CSV II (1921 ): 50. 56 �SLOV AKIA-2015 27 position that nationality cannot be equivalent to state belonging, as that is so-called political nationality, common in Western Europe, but not in the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nor does ethnic (Stamm) belonging answer to nationality, even if its main marker is language. Nationality was best defined, according to Keleti, as a "subjective state internal to the individual, a feeling analogous to religion that depends on origin and the environment in which a person lives and grows ."58 Keleti's definition was based on social-psychological criteria for which it is difficult to secure an objective external marker. It moved away from language as a definite indicator of nationality, leav ing room for belonging to a nationality whose language one may not use daily or that is not considered a viable national language (like Hebrew or Yiddish in the view of the Czechoslovak state). This was a big plus for Mraz and hi s colleagues, but also ambiguous enough to allow for pressures and fal sifications, like those they presumed embedded in the last Hungarian census before the war. Yet Keleti 's definition was attractive to the Czechoslovak demographers preparing the 1919 Slovak census. This definition would enable the indivi dual to confess nationality as directly as religion, as an expression of his/her internal conviction and self-understanding. Czechoslovak demographers hoped it would un cover the numbers of ethnic Slovaks who had previously been hidden from view because they were counted as Magyar-speakers. They would now be recorded under the banner of their "real" nationality, free to directly profess their "true" group belonging. Jews, too, would be able to declare their "true" group belonging for the first time; not only as a religion, but also as a distinct nationality . Antonin Bohac 59 found Keleti's definition to coincide with concepts of ethno-racial group belonging. "Since the means for express58 Ibid. , 49. Keleti publ is hed his views on nationality in 1880 in the Stalistische Monatschrift under the title "Zur Frage der Volksziihlung." [Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV I ( 1920): 187.] 59 Antonin Bohac ( 1882-1 950) is regarded as the fo under of Czechoslovak demographics, especially with regard to questi ons of nationality. He was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 19 19, and worked fo r the Czechos lovak State Statistical Office upon his return. Bohac was the deputy chairman of the Society for the Study of Nationality Questi ons. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Prague, 1989), 195. Bohac was also associate professor of demography at the Charles Uni versity Faculty of Science where he lee- �28 SLOV AKIA-2015 ing psychological states is language," Bohac wrote, "as Keleti [elsewhere] has stated, the concept of nationality in this sense is quite close to the concept of nationality as ethnic/racial belonging (kmenova prislusnost), for which language is the main connecting bond and main external marker."60 Bohac was correct to observe that Keleti's definition bore a strong resemblance to a physical understanding of nationality, which gave race and/or ethnicity an expanded role. Language remained the main outward indicator of nationality, but was no longer considered identical to nationality itself. Espousing this conception moved nationality closer to ethnicity. It elevated ethnic understandings of the self and the group . The final formulation of the 1919 census shows that the Czechoslovak administration and its demographers accepted Mraz's definition of nationality, based on Keleti's: "an individual national-political conviction according to ethnic belonging to a certain national unit or nation ."61 Five sub-headings were placed under Nationality on the form: Slovaks and Czechs, Rusyns, Magyars, Germans, and Others .62 Czechoslovak demographers understood Jewish nationality to be included under the subheading "Others." While "Jewish nationality" was an available option, though not a requirement, for the Jewish population, the category remained invisible on the actual census form in 1919. The 1919 census asked directly for nationality without the intermediary of language. *** In the late August heat of 1919, census takers dispersed across the territory of Slovakia to ask the people about their nationality. Many complained that the whole endeavor was disorganized and insufficiently thought through. Census takers expressed frustration that they had not received the census forms with time enough to look tured on the "Basics of Population Science." He introduced the usage of punch card technology for processing Czechoslovak census data."Historie statistiky v Cechach po roce 1918," The Czech Statistical Office http ://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.ns£'i/historie_statistiky_ v_cechach_po_roce_ l 918 (accessed January 9, 2012). 60 Federalni statisticky urad, 50. 61 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77* (cast textova). 62 SNA, f. MPS, box 277 . This carton contains the original hand-written forms used for collecting the raw data for the 1919 census. �SLOV AKIA-2015 29 them over, nor so that they could fill one out to use as an example. Due to lack of funds and inadequate organization, many found themselves forced to sleep in train stations and on park benches during the census period, which surely affected their ability to fulfill their duties. One census taker reported that his census materials were stolen from him while he slept! The population, and oftentimes even local community officials, had not been informed about the purpose of the census, nor when it would take place.63 If these complaints are accurate, they undermine the seriousness with which the Czechoslovak administrators prepared the foundation of the 1919 census, as well as the importance they placed upon it as a means of accurately proving national ratios in Slovakia. Yet last minute pre-census agitation to prepare the Slovak population did take place. The prominent Slovak national newspaper Narodnie noviny called on Slovaks " ... to consciously and openly confess their Slovak stock ... to let the beautiful words: 'I am Slovak' 64 consciously and boldly sound from the mouths of loyal citizens. " This example is atypical, however, as the agitation took place in the central Slovak town of Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and home to the Matica slovenska, the Slovak cultural society. Narodnie noviny explained that the purpose of the census was to prove that Slovakia was Slovak, and that it was essential for building its own independent country. Every citizen could participate in building that independent state through the census, the article stressed, an idea meant to reinforce the democratic spirit of the new era.65 "You have no reason to be ashamed of [declaring Slovak nationality]," counseled the leading newspaper in Saris county, a region of eastern Slovakia where national consciousness remained weak, "the Czechoslovak name has the best reputation not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia." The paper ran boldface announcements at the foot of its pages urging all Slovaks to proudly declare to the census taker that they were Slovaks. 66 These reassurances did little to assuage prevalent Slovak fears about the real purpose of the census. This terribly urgent appeal itself 63 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. nos. 7, 8-9. Scitani lidu na Slovensku 1919. Anketa mezi popisujicimi povei'niky. 64 "Scitanie l'udu," Nizrodnie noviny (Turciansky Svaty Martin), August 22, 1919. 65 Ibid. 66 "Slovaci!" Sari.fake hlasy (Presov), August 24, 1919. �30 SLOVAKIA-2015 may have caused anxiety for a population with a low-level of national consciousness. Suspicions ranged from the belief that the goal was to raise or introduce new taxes, undertake military recruitment, or to carry out a plebiscite to divide the territory . The military rumor was the most widespread. Many Slovaks worried that a war would soon break out between the Poles and Magyars, and the job of the census takers was to find able-bodied men to fight. Whoever declared Slovak nationality would be conscripted to fight once again, while other nationalities would be freed from that duty. While it was later revealed that the rumor began in Magyar circles, many people in the border counties still held back from declaring themselves Slovak. Others believed the census to be connected to imminent requisitioning of cattle and grain. Some, more optimistically, believed more satisfactory food and fuel distribution would follow, and possibly a more advantageous land distribution. Still others imagined the census to be an exercise in identifying foreigners (especially Magyars, Poles, and Magyarone Slovaks) and expelling them from Czechoslovakia.67 Widespread fears and suspicions about the real intentions of the 1919 census underscored the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in Slovakia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak state building project, as well as contributed to a certain level of inaccuracy in the results. Of the four national groups which were the most interesting to the state: Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and Jews, the greatest difficulties arose in recording the nationality of the Slovaks and the Jews. Magyars and Germans were by-and-large ready for the census and decisive in their national declarations. Within the ethnic Magyar population, only state and municipal employees exhibited uncertainty in their national declarations. 68 Magyar language use, national uncertainty, fear and mistrust accounted for the greatest difficulties in recording the highest possible number of Slovaks on the 1919 census. Magyar or Magyarone Slovak census takers were known to record entire ethnic Slovak or mixed nationality villages as Magyar, or count individuals as Magyar because they were able to communicate with Magyar-speaking cen67 Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921 ): 133134. 68 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "O Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech" �SLOV AKIA-2015 31 sus takers without the help of an interpreter. 69 The latter illustrates precisely what Mraz and his colleagues had hoped to avoid in bypassing language as identical with or as a surrogate for nationality . They did not want ethnic Slovaks counted as Magyars based on their Magyar language proficiency. Other problems stemmed from uncertainty surrounding the meaning of nationality (primarily in eastern Slovakia). Many Slovaks feared what might happen to them if they did not declare themselves as Magyars. They distrusted the "godless Czechs" and "false prophets from Prague" who came to their doors. 70 The Slovak population tended to be more religious than the highly secularized Czech one, and Slovak national leaders expressed wari71 ness about the "agnostic progressivism" of the Czech intelligentsia. Common answers among Slovaks when asked about their nationality included: Slovak and Magyar ("aji Slovak, aji Mad'ar"), it doesn't matter ("to vsetko jedno"), and Hungarian Slovak ("Uhorsky Slovak"). 72 In eastern Slovakia, other answers included : I speak Slovak and Magyar ("hutorim 73 po slovensky i po mad'arsky"), I pray in Slovak ("modlim sa po slovensky"), and Catholic ("katolik") . Mraz noted in his analysis of the results that Slovaks often confused religion with nationality. 74 Interestingly, this observation recalls the proximity of religious and national feeling within Czechoslovakia's re-conceptualization of nationality, as well as the fine distinction made between them in rec69 Ibid., 7. "O opravnych navrzich pro pfisti scitani. Ibid., 5. "O nepfistojnostech pfi scitani," and Josef Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921): 135 . 71 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 23. 72 All the Slavic languages differentiate the word "Hungarian" from ,,Magyar." The former refers to citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas the latter refers to the predominant ethnic group in that Kingdom. In Slovak, these terms are "Mad'ar" (ethnic Hungarian), Uhorsko (the Kingdom of Hungary), and uhorsky (deriving from the Kingdom of Hungary) . In the early 19 th century, Magyar nationalists followed the lead of Count Istvan Szechenyi in equating "Magyar" and "Hungarian" in foreign languages as part of their drive to assimilate all the non-Magyar nationalities into Magyar language and culture. The non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary rejected the equating of "Magyar" with "Hungarian" and still do. For more on Szechyni ' s activities see Dejiny S/ovenska II ( 1526-1848), ed. Samuel Cambel (Bratislava: VEDA, 1987), 488-90. 73 "Hutorit'" is the Saris form of "hovorit'," to speak. 74 JosefMraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II ( 192 1): 135. II 70 �32 SLOV AKIA-2015 ognizing "Jewish nationality." Nationality was something to be understood and felt as an "internal conviction, similar to religious confession," but consciously separated, and given a higher position than religion in the hierarchy of self and group values of definition. One's nationality, not one's religion, was of the greatest interest to the state. One's nationality, not one's religion, was the primary indicator of one's most strongly held inner values and loyalties. For the Jewish population, answers to the question of nationality were most striking for their variety. Census takers disparaged the eclecticism of the Jewish response, attributing it to opportunism . In some cases, they remarked, national declarations among Jews reached comical proportions: the head of one household declared as a Slovak, his wife as a German, and the children as Hungarians . They noted, however, that often Jews stuck to Jewish nationality so that they would not have to affiliate with any of the other nationality choices.75 The majority of Jews in Slovakia chose the Jewish nationality option on the 1919 census, officially recorded as "Other." Census takers recommended that a separate column be made available on the next census for Jewish nationality because so many Jews had expressly asked for it. 76 In the uncertain environment which prevailed in Slovakia in August 1919, shortly after the rollback of Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army forces but before the de jure securing of the Czechoslovak borders, Jews in Slovakia wished to avoid a difficult and possibly treacherous national affiliation decision through declaring Jewish nationality. Many Jews viewed Jewish nationality as an escape from the nationality conflict. Choosing Jewish nationality appeared to be a good way to opt out, to take a neutral position, to make the safest bet on an unpredictable future. Basing the decision to declare for Jewish nationality on these criteria made it more a strategic and less a heart-felt choice. For the time being, at least, it had less to do with deep-seated feelings of belonging to a Jewish national group, and more to do with trying to make the best possible choice in 75 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech." JosefMniz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (192 1): 129. Unfortunately, the demographic breakdown of those who chose "Other" on the 1919 Slovak census is unavailable, so the conclusion that the majority of Jews declared for Jewish nationality comes from census taker reports and their insistence that it be included as a separate column on the next census. See footnote : Statni ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77*. 76 �SLOV AKIA-2015 33 a high-stakes gamble. The Jewish population in Slovakia overall, counted by religion and nationality, numbered 135,918 according to the 1921 statewide Czechoslovak census, and 354,342 in the state as a whole. 77 Slovaks, counted only under the nationality rubric "Czechoslovak" on the interwar censuses, numbered 1,954,446 in 1919 and 2,025,003 in 1921, a positive change of 3.61 percent. 78 The popularity of the Jewish nationality declaration on the 1919 Slovak census (as "Other"), combined with a majority of ethnic Slovaks declaring as "Slovak" 79 led to a significant decrease in the number of Magyars recorded in Slovakia compared with the last prewar census. This decline heightened the Czechoslovak administration's awareness of further potential benefits rendered to the state by Jewish nationality . If the Jews, who traditionally affiliated with Germanspeakers in Bohemia and Moravia, and Magyar-speakers in Slovakia, declared for Jewish nationality, then the statistical legitimacy of the Czechoslovak nation-state would rise as the numbers of Germans and Hungarians fell. "Jewish nationality" would work to the advantage of the dominant "Czechoslovak" nationality and national state. If, as this argument goes, Jewish nationality favored the Czechoslovak nationality in solving the state's nationalities problems, then declaring Jewish nationality was not really a way of opting out. It was not a neutral position. It could not be an escape from the nationality conflict if it meant - once again - casting one's lot with the dominant state nationality. Jewish nationality may have seemed like an exit, but this was an illusion. One could not avoid taking sides in the interwar nationality conflicts . *** It is a valid and important point that the Czechoslovak government would favor Jewish nationality for its ability to statistically reduce the number of Germans and Magyars in the state. But that con77 Antonin Bohac, Narodnostni mapa republiky ceskoslovenske. Podrobny popis narodnostnich hranic, ostrovu a mensin (Prague, 1926), pp. 148-155 . 78 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora I 92 / Prague, 19240, Table 74: Narodnosti na Slovensku podle scitani lidu z roku 1919 a 1921 . 79 Slovaks who declared as Slovak, according to the options presented on the 1919 Slovak census, were recorded as "Czechoslovak." Slovaks were not recorded as "Slovak" until the 1930 statewide census. �34 SLOV AKIA-2015 clusion neglects the deeper meaning of its inclusion beyond the statistical benefits it could render. Creating a Jewish nationality category manifested the ways in which the meaning of national affiliation had transformed through the cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment of East Central European successor states based on the national principle. Josef Mraz elegantly and succinctly summed up these changes when he stated that declaring for a certain nationality was an expression of internal conviction . Because the very meaning of national affiliation had changed, "Jewish nationality" emerged as a recognized nationality category . Nationality had taken on the problematic role of the manifestation of one's personal convictions, inner values, and ultimate loyalty . Nationality moved ever closer to an essential ethnic or racial understandings of "true" group belonging. The methods and results of the 1919 special census in Slovakia were useful in providing a tested model of nationality investigation based on subjective, internal, ethnic/racial criteria, already approved before an international body (the Paris Peace Conference). The 1919 census had been an experiment in bringing methods of counting and recording the population into line with the new postwar vision of the national state. The 1921 census would build on 1919 methods in circumstances which required more than securing the new borders; they required filling the demarcated territory with meaning, as well as answering the dual questions of what Czechoslovakia was and how nationality and nationhood would function in this state. Examining the 1919 Slovak census offers insight into how Czechoslovakia understood itself as the manifestation of Czechoslovak: self-determination, and the place of the rights of the other nationalities to their own self-determination within this framework. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA-2015 7 THE 1919 CENSUS ON THE TERRITORY OF SLOV AKIA 1 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova When the First World War ended in 1918, the four empires that had determined the shape of state and social relations within and beyond their borders - the Habsburg, the German, the Russian, and the Ottoman - had dissolved. A state system based on the principle of national self-determination took their place in East Central Europe, in which citizenship and state belonging were seen through a national lens. Unrest and anarchy were characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere in many regions of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the fall of 1918. In Slovakia, that instability was part of the larger struggle for the future of the newly bounded territory . Unlike other regions of former Hungary being incorporated into the new or transformed successor states, like Croatia (Yugoslavia) or Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia had never been administratively defined on its own, but solely as sixteen counties and four municipalities of northern Hungary. By the end of the war, the collapse of the old order without replacement by the new left Slovakia in a chaotic condition. Amid the upheaval, looting, and anti-Jewish excesses that typified the period, local National Councils had formed with the goal of consolidating the new state. But they were too weak to decisively resist regional Hungarian opposition and Budapest's efforts to maintain the territory. 2 While Czechoslovakia's birth was announced in Prague on October 28, 1918, the view from Slovakia was far less definitive. It was not a foregone conclusion that Slovakia would indeed be incorporated into the new state. Slovakia was in a precarious position, loosened from defeated Hungary, but not yet officially joined with Bohemia and Moravia. 1 This article is a version of a chapter originally published in my book Mapping Jewish Loyalties in !nterwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 I 5). This material appears courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. 2 Cubomir Liptak, "Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Elena Mannova, ed ., A Concise History of Slovakia. Studia Historica Slovaca XXI (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2000), 239 . 8 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovak historians characterize the unstable "Prevrat " era as the "Struggle for Slovakia," a view that highlights Slovakia's contested status between the Magyars and the Czechs. Save for a handful of Slovak national leaders, the Slovaks themselves moved through this picture as a frustrated underclass, taking advantage of the volatile, chaotic climate to set upon state administrators, notaries, policemen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the propertied . Slovaks found themselves in a moment of great release. It offered them a chance to vent their anger and frustration at the war and the Hungarian system . The newly-formed local National Councils sought to mitigate these widespread outbreaks of violence. Yet these local organs had little control, or the ability to quell Hungarian resistance to the power transfer, which was further impeded by the power structure of the old state, still in place . A Hungarian demand for a referendum on the changes surfaced, relying on the fragmentation of the population along regional and social lines, degrees of national consciousness, and lack of information about the political transformation . It was the first time Budapest asked Slovaks for their opinions . The views of ordinary people, "varied from enthusiastic welcoming of the new state and the 'liberation' of Slovakia, through apathy and desire for peace, to fear of a new unknown situation, of uncertain permanence and threaten3 ing new bloodshed and military solutions. " The Hungarian National Council in Budapest came into being only on October 25, 1918, somewhat later than those of the national minorities. It was established by Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was widely believed to be the emperor-king's obvious choice for the new Prime Minister. Oszkar Jaszi, the progressive Hungarian social scientist, historian, and politician, drafted the Hungarian National Council's twelve-point program. It called for Hungarian independence, an immediate and separate peace treaty with the Allies, universal suffrage with a secret ballot, land reform, and recognition of the 4 rights of the national minorities within a federalized Hungary . When Emperor-King Charles appointed Count Janos Hadik instead, massive anti-government demonstrations broke out, demanding Karolyi. 5 3 Ibid. Peter Hanak, ed. , The Corvina History of Hungary: From Earliest Times Until lhe Present Day (Budapest: Corvina Books, 1991 ), 164. 5 Laszl6 Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 328. 4 SLOV AKIA-2015 9 It was October 28, the same day as the declaration of the new Czechoslovak Republic in Prague. By the night of October 30 through 31, crowds of soldiers and civilians demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. They later occupied public buildings, prevented troops loyal to Karolyi from moving out of the city, captured Budapest's military governor, and freed political prisoners as in 1848. Soldiers tore off the emblems on their uniforms and replaced them with asters and rosettes. Emperor-King Charles retreated and Karolyi formed a new independent Hungarian government. Vanquished Hungary appeared to be on the path to democratization. 6 Meanwhile, Slovak national leaders, mostly from central Slovakia converged in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and established the Slovak National Council. They had little news of what was happening in Prague, Budapest, or Europe more broadly . The Council wished, however, to take a stand on the dramatically unfolding events . The Slovak politician Milan Hodza had been negotiating with Karolyi in Budapest. He arrived in Martin on October 30 just as the Council was about to issue the Martin Declaration, announcing the secession of Slovakia from Hungary, Slovak self-determination and a desire for inclusion in the Czechoslovak state, which fulfilled Prague's wishes .7 The Slovak National Council had no army, so it could not enforce its program or maintain order. Individual militias sprang up in towns and cities across Slovakia, engaging in a power struggle with the newly-formed Hungarian National Councils. It was a highly unstable environment. Demobilized Slovak soldiers (from the Hungarian army) formed the mainstay of active Slovak participation in the evolving power struggle. They created paramilitary groups in the forests, especially in western Slovakia, with about four thousand soldiers active around Bratislava. To dispel the threat of anarchy and establish control over the territory, the Czechoslovak National Council brought Slovak representatives into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in early November of 1918. 8 Slovakia's first provisional "Slovak Government" was set up in Western Slovakia near the Moravia-Slovak border by the Czechoslo6 Hanak, ed ., Corvino History of Hungary , 164-5. Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1 987 (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1988), 40-41 . 8 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in th e 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 239 . 7 10 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak government in Prague, and began to function on November 6. It was led by Vavro Srobar, Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. On Decemberl2, it was replaced by a Ministry for Slovakia, which Srobar established in Zilina in the midst of a combined Czech, French and Italian effort to drive Hungarian troops out of Slovak territory. 9 Less than two weeks later, on December 21, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Benes successfully negotiated French 10 recognition of a demarcation line of the Slovak territory . Entente forces would drive Hungarian troops past the demarcation line on January 20, 1919. That line more or less became the country's official border with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. 11 When Srobar's administration grew too large for Zilina, he deliberated with Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman from Modra near Pressburg (later Bratislava) who was the principal author of the Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, on where Slovakia's central government should be moved . They decided in early January of 1919 to move the capital to Pressburg on February 4, 1919. Zoch was placed in charge of the Pressburg district administration (zupan), and orchestrated the Czechoslovak takeover of the city from January 1, 1919. "Bratislava" became the city's standard official name in March of 1919. 12 Hungary would make one more sustained military effort toward maintaining its prewar borders. Under Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, lasting for 133 days beginning March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Red Army made significant inroads into Slovakia. It was driven out following an ultimatum by the Entente powers at the end of June 1919. The Hungarian Red Army finally retreated from Slovakia on June 30, 1919, and by July 24 the Czechoslovak government held the entire territory. 13 9 Peter Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of Pressburg/Pozsony/Presporok, I 918-19," Austrian History Yearbook 35 (2004 ): 221. IOibid ., 213. 11 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 243. 12 Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City," 221 . 13 For a detailed discussion of the series of revolutions in Hungary see: Laszlo Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) chapter VII "In Search of an Identity" , 324-344; Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919. Nine Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971 ); Andras Sikl6s, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 1918 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1988); Rudolf I. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian SLOV AKIA-2015 11 On the Czechoslovak state level, the Struggle for Slovakia entailed not only the physical, geographic aspect of territorial incorporation, but also the more slippery aspect of drawing the multinational population of Slovakia into the mental landscape of the new state. Coming to terms with the World War I Czech argument that the Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation, and so should together form the dominant national group within the Czechoslovak nation-state, required a shift in direction . The events of the "Prevrat" underscore the tense relations between, first and foremost, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Jews and Slovaks, but also, increasingly between Czechs and Slovaks. These relationships would influence shifts in overall understandings of nationhood and nationality, as well as national political programs within the new state. Czechoslovakia was a nation-state in formation. Successful Czechoslovak state building required incorporating the territory and peoples of Slovakia. This was not to be accomplished by gradually building popular consensus, but through military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering. 14 Drawing the borders in this way would have significant implications for Czechoslovakia's domestic and international nationalities problems. Prague needed the Slovaks, a "state forming nation," 15 or there would be no independent Czechoslovakia. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs could not form a majority in the parliament and legitimately create a viable state. The Slovaks likewise needed the Czechs to help them leave Hungary. They needed the Czechs to help them establish a functioning civil and governmental infrastructure in Slovakia, and to create an educational system for producing Slovak national elites ready to take control of the developing infrastructure. The help the Slovaks desired was temporary_ 16 Soviet Republic (published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University by New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 14 Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires (Lo ndon, NY: Routledge, 200 I), I 62. 15 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. Czechs alone formed only 49 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population without the Slovaks. Whereas, accordin g to the 1921 Czechoslovak census, "Czechoslovaks" formed 65 .51 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population, and "Germans" 23.36 percent. 16 Liptak, "Vll. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. 12 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the introduction to hi s memoir on the formative years 1918 through 1920, Osvobodene Slovensko (Liberated Slovakia), Vavro Srobar recounted hi s first meeting with R.W. Seton-Watson, the influential British historian and political activist who brought nationality questions in Austria-Hungary to the world's attention. In 1907 Seton-Watson came to R6zsahegy (Ruzomberok) in the central Slovak Low Tatra region, where Srobar was then working, while researching the national question for what would be his first major work, Racial Problems in Hungary. 17 Due to the objectivity and calm with which Seton-Watson di scussed Magyarization, Srobar found himself unable to discern where his visitor stood on the issue. Before they parted, Seton-Watson surprised Srobar with a question : "And what is your state program?" he asked. After a moment's hesitation, Srobar replied, "Great Moravia, 18 with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Pannonia," which Seton-Watson "accepted without commentary." "That [conversation] took place seven years before the outbreak of the world war," continued Srobar, "and eleven years afterward 'Great Moravia' received the name the 'Czechoslovak State."' 19 Language was the connection between the "Czechoslovak tribes" that Srobar professed in his memoir, from their ancient roots to the present. Even the establishment of a new literary language in Slovakia, thanks to I:udovit Stur's nineteenth century codification of the central Slovak dialect, "did not for a moment disturb the consciousness of Czechoslovak tribal unity," he asserted. "The longing for close cultural, economic, and political unity increased yearly in proportion to the growing pressure of brutal Magyarization," he added. 20 Srobar underscored a romantic one-thousand year story of the unitary Czechoslovak nation/tribe - focusing on shared language, history, 17 London : Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908 . "Great Moravia," a large Slavic state that existed between 833 and 906, was an important component of the Czechoslovak romantic national idea as well as the development of Slovak nationalism. Considered to have bridged the western Slavs with the Slavonic tribes in the Balkans and with Byzantium, the weakening state collapsed under attack by the Magyar tribes who settled in the Danube Basin in approximately 896. The Czech and Slovak tribes then underwent separate development. For more on Great Moravia see Jan Dekan, Vel'ka Morava: Doba a umenie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1976). 19 Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko. Pamdti z rokov 191 8-1920, Svazok Prvy (Prague, 1928), 7-8. 20 Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko, 11. 18 SLOV AKIA-2015 13 interests, and ancestral ties - that had been so successful in garnering international support for the Czechoslovak state building project during the war in his celebratory and didactic jubilee year volume. While the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation prevailed internationally, the most compelling connection between the Czechs and Slovaks for the prospects of independent statehood was demographic. Though Czechs constituted a majority in Bohemia and Moravia, they feared that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would spell their incorporation into a Greater Germany, due to the existence of a substantial German minority in these lands . At the beginning of the war, Czech leaders first sought a reorganization of the Monarchy along federal lines with a large degree of autonomy for the Czechs, though soon discarded the plan as unfeasib!e.21 In working toward the ultimate goal of independence, the idea of incorporating the estimated three million strong Slovak population became an increasingly attractive solution to counterbalancing the significant German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. 22 By the end of the war T.G. Masaryk and Benes had the commitment of the Entente powers to an independent Czechoslovakia. The Slovak population became the key to the Czechoslovak nation's demographic legitimacy in its new multinational national state. The Paris Peace Conference called upon the Czechoslovak delegation to statistically demonstrate the dominance of the Slovaks in the multinational territory of Slovakia. The viability of the Czechoslovak state depended upon it. In order to collect the necessary data, the Czechoslovak government organized a provisional census for Slovakia. Such a census could not be carried out until the borders of the territory were defined and secured, and military upheavals had ceased . This meant waiting until the ultimatum given by the Entente powers had driven Bela Kun's Red Army troops out of Slovakia at the end of June 1919, and until the Czechoslovak government had control over the territory at the end of July. While the change of regimes was not officially over, and the borders were not fixed by law until Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, I 920, Czechoslovakia held the de facto borders securely enough by August 1919 that it was feasible to set the census in motion. The primary goal of the census was : 21 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. A History o[. East Central Europe, vol. 9 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 76. 2 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 35. 14 SLOV AKIA-2015 [To gather] the necessary information for the Peace Conference concerning how many Slovaks there [were] in the occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary, so that it would be possible to correct and prove false the Hungarian census of 1910, as well as to ascertain other general national proportions in Slovak communities, namely the [extent of] the Magyarization of these communities, the Magyarization of schools and churches. "23 The 1919 census was the first attempt by the Czechoslovak government to map the territory of Slovakia for state building purposes. Mapping Slovakia meant reframing the national ratios of multinational/ethnic/linguistic Slovakia in terms of Slovak, and thus Czechoslovak, dominance. The Czechoslovak government had to prove that the former government sought to create Magyar demographic superiority in the same lands through forced assimilation and manipulation of statistics. The aim of the census was, in other words, to find the ethnic Slovaks whose numbers would prove that a "falsification," or deliberate Magyarization of the nationalities had taken place in the decades before the war. Josef Mraz of the newly-created Czechoslovak State Statistical Office24 set out from Prague to Zilina, 25 the provisional capital of Slovakia, in mid-January 1919 to propose his ideas for the upcoming Slovak census to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia.26 His talks with Srobar lasted an exhausting four days, during which time they debated how the structure, method, and concept of the census could best meet its chief goal: to find out how many Slovaks there were in Slovakia. Upon his arrival in Prague, he wrote up a report of the Zilina proceedings and the census instructions up23 Slovensky narodny archiv (hereafter SNA), file : Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, hereafter MPS, box 277, inv. no. 74. "Prozatimni scitani lidu na Slovensku." In this transitional period before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, Slovakia was often denoted as the "occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary." 24 Josef Mraz (1882-1934) was one of the co-founders of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, who had begun his work as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom. He is noted for his work on the first census in Slovakia ( I 9 I 9), as well as on statistical theory and agricultural statistics. Federalni statisticky ui'ad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Praha, 1989), 194. 25 :Z:ilina was the provisional capital of Slovakia from December 12, 1918 through February 4, 1919, when Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) became the capital. 26 Vavro Srobar was the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (Ministers plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, MPS). SLOV AKIA-2015 15 on which they had agreed. He sent the instructions to be translated into Slovak, Magyar, and German. 27 Mraz included in hi s report a new, subjective definition of nationality that would challenge prewar methods of counting and classifyi ng th e population based on language. This definition would be th e point of departure for fresh debates and reevaluations of nationhood in the evolving circumstances of the interwar Czechoslovak state. He argued that, "In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept 'nationality' means adherence to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambi guous way, similar to reli gious conviction," and that it follows from this conclusion that Jews should have the option of declaring either for their own Jewish nationality, or for the nationality of others, without regard for religious affiliation.28 Debates over "Jewish nationali ty" formed the centerpiece of the overall reevaluation of nationality and nationhood in Czechoslovakia. Jewi sh nationality came to be used as an exceptional example in formulating opposing positions on the meaning, classification, and function of nationality in the new state. Through it, Czechoslovakia shifted the concept of nationality closer to an ethnic or racial understanding of the term, rather than a linguistic or cultural one. The Czechoslovak government, together with the multinational population of the state, initiated th e process of actualizing theoretical concepts of nationality and nationhood through the 1919 census in Slovakia. Responses to the 1919 census gave nationality meaning in the postwar environment, in the context of new states created on the principle of national self-determination . In the process of creating the 1919 Slovak census, Czechoslovak demographers also came to a preliminary decision regarding how 29 Czechoslovakia would "see" and count Jewish nationality . The Jewish case was especially problematic because Czechoslovakia did not consider the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia to possess its own national language, even in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia where Yiddish language usage was more widespread, but never27 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. IOI. From the report by Josef Mraz, "Prozatfmnf scftanf lidu na Slovensku," February 8, 1919 . 28 SNA, f. MPS , box 277, inv. No. 76 . "Prozatfmnf scitani lidu na Slovensku" 29 See: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), for thinking about ways the state "sees" the populat ion and makes it "legible." 16 SLOV AKIA-2015 theless did not dispute Jewish national status within the state. An influential work on national questions published in Prague in early 1919 declared: "Language forms the distinguishing characteristic of the nation : a nation must have its own language, otherwise it is not a nation." 30 How would the Czechoslovak state square its recognition of Jewish national status with the alleged lack of a distinctive national language among the Jews of Czechoslovakia? Debates surrounding Jewish nationality and its codification for census purposes lay at the core of a Czechoslovak reevaluation of the overall meaning of nationality in the postwar period . Decisions regarding the meaning and function of Jewish nationality within the Czechoslovak context went hand in hand with the process of integrating Slovakia into the Czechoslovak state. The Jewish case illuminates the way the process of Czechoslovak state building - including the interrelated efforts to arrive at the true number of Slovaks and Czechs, and to reconcile the dissonant linguistic-national circumstances of the Jewish population so as to codify Jewish nationality within Czechoslovakia - led to an increased unbundling of language from nationality as an absolute indicator of national belonging, and movement toward a definition of nationality as an internal conviction. To begin, it is helpful to take a step back to look at the relationship between language, nationalism, and nationhood; and then to consider their relationship as applied to the institutionalized collection of data for census purposes. First of all, for the peoples of East Central Europe, including the Jews, the nation building process was a fundamental component of modem politics. Nation building required raising the national consciousness of the members of the group, as well as making a convincing case to the world that the group was indeed a real nationality. The most important proof of national existence was language: a special, unique language belonging to the national group alone.31 Nineteenth century nationalism deemed language the most important characteristic marking one nation from another. Language 30 Bohdan Klineberger, Ncirod a ncirodnost (Praha, 1919), 53 . Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 31 SLOV AKIA-2015 17 was the primary determinant of nationhood .32 Nationalism assumes that people naturally group themselves into nations, that these nations have identifiable characteristics, and that their only legitimate form of government is self-government. 33 Making language central to nationalism, argues Elie Kedourie, erases the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism, because then the conception of nationalism itself contains all linguistic, racial, religious and other features. The connection between language and ethnicity is also heightened. 34 Nation - "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" 35 - has been variously defined as dependent more on "objective" factors including language, religion and customs, territory and institutions; and alternatively as coalescing from "subjective" factors like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. 36 The features deemed "objective" have been conceived to mark the boundaries of nations, and features deemed "subjective" to give it internal cohesion and solidarity. "Objective" criteria like language are not enough in and of themselves to establish whether a group is a nation or not. Rather, suggests Walker Connor, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." 37 His conception closely agrees with Ernest Gellner's, where a common language does not bind a group into a nation without mutual recognition of each other. "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to 32 "Let us fo llow our own path ... let all men speak we ll or ill of our nati on, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough," 8 . Suphan, ed. , Johann Gottfried Herder, Sdmmtliche Werke (Berlin: Weidmann), in Smith, Nationalism, 27. 33 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London : Hutchinson, 1961 ), 68. 34 1bid. 35 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975 ), 6. 36 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001 ), I I. 37 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994 ), 197. 18 SLOV AKIA-2015 each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. "38 A people must feel its nationhood. That feeling of nationhood, the condition of being a nation, has been theorized in two main ways in its European context. The first is considered to derive more from a sense of mutual belonging to a political community in which equal citizens participate in a common culture; while the second is regarded as more related to a sense of mutual belonging to an ethnocultural community of descent with political ambitions.39 Neither is exclusive, nor analogous to the state. States can be defined by their autonomous institutional activity, and by their "legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory," but the state itself is not the national political community. 40 Anthony Smith's paired conceptions of nation and ethnie highlight the group's internal cohesion, solidarity, and mutual loyalty. Smith defines nation as "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members;" as distinguished from ethnie "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites."41 Smith's concept of the ethnie is especially important in the Jewish case for understanding the coherence of the group without territory and without a special, unique, shared vernacular. Late nineteenth century Jewish nationalism relied on "subjective" characteristics for modem Jewish nation building; above all a common heritage and shared historical experience. Language was conspicuously absent from the short list. "Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language?" Theodor Herzl famously asked in 1896.42 38 Ernest Geitner, Nations and Natio nalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7. 39 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 40 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 41 Ibid ., 13 . 42 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), 145. SLOV AKIA-2015 19 How then do you count "nationality" on the census? What, in fact, is being counted? Census-creating demographers differ from theorists in their need to count and quantify, classify and categorize state populations. Definitions of nation push and pull against the institutional demands of the state. The real question here is how the complex and fluctuating "nation" is tagged and boxed and bureaucratized for use by the state. What does it mean and how is it used ? Nation indeed becomes, as Rogers Brubaker explains, a "practical category, institutionalized form, contingent event, and category of prac43 tice." "We should not ask 'what is a nation,"' he writes, "but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?" 44 The crystallization of Jewish nationality in Czechoslovakia exemplifies the process by which nation is bureaucratized and given institutional form in interwar East Central Europe. Jewish nationality became an exceptional category of practice within the borders of interwar Czechoslovakia; it was the only nationality in East Central Europe not bound by language . Demographers began to answer the question of how to count nationality on the census at the meeting of the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg in 1872. There, they agreed that language was the primary marker of nationality, and that counting nationality according to language was the most effective means of capturing and recording nationality for the interests of the state. The question of how to codify nationality in a state census had first been debated at the 1857 Congress in Vienna, but without conclusive results. The St. Petersburg Congress decided that language was the best objective indicator of nationality, the most reliable one, and the least confusing, as "each perfectly knows the language used since childhood to think and express oneself." 45 But how should the census ask about language? The conclusions of the St. Petersburg conference point to 43 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 44 1bid, 16. 45 Dominique Arel , "Language categories in censuses : backward- or forward-looking?" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel , eds. , Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2002), 95. 20 SLOV AKIA-2015 an acceptance of mother tongue as the most valid language situation type to use in codifying nationality for the census. Other language situation types include, but are not limited to: language most commonly used, language of daily use, family language, language in which one prays, and the language that one speaks with one's children. 46 Language was first counted on the Austrian and the Hungarian census in 1880. In Austria, language was counted according to "language of daily use" (Umgangssprache); while in the Kingdom of Hungary, language was counted according to "mother tongue" (anyanyelv). When Czechoslovakia came into existence after the First World War, it brought together two traditions of national codification through language proxy.In discussing the relationship of language to nationality for the development of the census, Czechoslovak demographers favored "mother tongue," as nationality was counted in the Kingdom of Hungary, over "language of daily use," as it was done in Austria. They argued that counting according to language of daily use had led to an under representation of Czechs on the Austrian census, and inherently underestimated the numbers of minority national groups where the official language was that of the dominant national group . The dependent position of the Czechs had resulted in more Czechs declaring themselves as Germans when counted this way, they asserted, because a Czech in a German language environment would indeed have used that language on a daily basis. Counting according to mother tongue had led to even greater statistical manipulations in the Kingdom of Hungary. Czechoslovak demographers contended that corruption of the census process in Hungary for the purpose of statistically increasing the number of Magyars had resulted in a gross underestimation of the number of ethnic Slovaks. Consequently, Slovaks as a people suffered more in Hungary than the Czechs in Austria. Yet they agreed that if the census were carried out properly, counting nationality by mother tongue would yield the most accurate and objective picture of 46 David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, Identity formation and the struggle for political power," in Kertzer and Arel, eds., 26, and Dominique Arel, "Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?" in Kertzer and Arel, eds. , 97. SLOVAKIA-2015 21 47 the demographic composition of the state. Czechoslovak demographers accepted the definition of mother tongue as "the language which is most familiar to a person since childhood and with which they think, or simply the language which their parents taught them in their earliest youth. "48 Josef Mraz worked with the definition of mother tongue as well as its caveat, used on the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary to make the mother tongue category as broad as possible, in reformulating the conception of nationality for the 1919 Slovak census. He did not dispute the Hungarian definition's core: mother tongue is the language "to which one confesses as one's own and with which one best and most gladly speaks. "49 It was the caveat that troubled him: Although mother tongue is identical with the language which everyone learned in their childhood in the majority of cases, usually from their mother, it can nevertheless happen that a child has another mother tongue than the mother, especially when the child acquired it in child-care (!), in school (!), or as a result of circumstances by which the parents have different mother tongues, another language than the language of the child's mother. 50 By broadening the definition of mother tongue so that it became disengaged from the language one's mother actually spoke, Hungarian demographers allowed for a greater number of people to declare for the Magyar mother tongue than would have otherwise been possible. While this definition may have obtained in a number of cases due to widespread linguistic assimilation in the Kingdom of Hungary, it left the door open for abuses . ... (Co ntinuation: Next page with Statistical Tables) 47 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" Ceskoslovensky statisticky vestnik (CSV) II ( 1921 ): 49, and Antonin Bohac, "Slovensko ve svetle statistiky -kniha Josefa Mraza," CSV II (1921): 225-6. 48 Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV II ( 1921 ): 187. 49 JosefMraz, Slovensko ve svetle statistiky (Praze, 1920), 33 . 50 Jbid. Exclamation marks in the original. SLOV AKIA-2015 22 Table 2.1: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population According to Religion in 1910 According to Absolute Number Hungarian Total 10,888,138 5,924,665 Roman Catholic 304,570 2,025,508 Greek Catholic 2,573,683 2,621,329 Calvinist 418,449 1,340,143 Lutheran 2,987, 163 40,851 Greek Orthodox 74,296 73,267 Unitarian 932,458 705,488 Jewish 9,602 17,452 Other 20,886,487 10,050,5 75 Total Rusvn Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total German Slovak Romanian 1,372,103 1,406,207 8,531 1,785 79,338 1,133,671 26,964 429,687 2,494 10,645 463,912 706 1,412 1,592 1,799,255 168 203,230 1,004 2,037,435 64 5,830 1,268 1,967,9 70 559 991 3,021 2,949,032 Croatian Other Serbian 5,109 1,810,302 3,892 357,329 463,604 9,511 1,908 31,121 57 56 1,03 1 1,028 791 860 49 128 1,099,386 7,491 25,528 42,580 4 2,702 24 472,587 7 10,387 276 1,833,162 21 91 996 1,106,471 206 3,739 3,739 469,255 According to Absolute Percentage Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total Total 52.1 Hungarian 54.4 German 12.6 9.7 15.0 0.1 3.9 56.0 12.6 6.4 14.3 98.2 31.2 1.4 1.0 32.1 0.1 0.4 34.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 60.3 0.3 4.5 0.1 100 98.6 75.7 55.0 0.2 21.8 5.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 0.8 0.1 17.3 Slovak Romanian 12.9 0.1 SLOV AKIA-2015 Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other 23 0.1 16.6 0.0 3.3 22.9 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 0.3 1.9 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.3 0.4 7.2 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXIII. I 9 I 5 (Budapest, 1918), 20, chart 13, "A nepesseg anyanyelve vallasok szerint 1910-ben." Table 2.2: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population in 1900 and 1910 Total Population Mother Tongue of the Population Hungary Magyar Geman Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other Total non Magyar Total 1900 absolute number 1910 percentage 8,651,520 1,999,060 2,002,165 2,798,559 424,774 191,432 437,737 333,008 8,186,735 16,838,255 absolute number 51.4 11.9 11.9 16.6 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.0 48.6 100 Percentage 9,944,627 1,903,357 1,946,357 2,948,186 464,270 194,808 461,516 401,412 8,319,906 18,264,533 54.4 10.4 10.7 16.1 2.5 1.1 2.5 2.9 45.5 100 CroatiaSlavonia Magyar German Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other 90,781 136,121 17,476 920 4,673 1,490,672 610,908 64,753 3.8 5.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 61.7 25.3 2.7 105,948 134,078 21,613 846 8,317 1,638,354 644,955 67,843 4.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 62.5 24.6 2.6 24 Total non-Magyar Total SLOV AKIA-2015 2,325,523 96.2 2,516,006 95.9 2,416,304 100 2,621,954 100 Hungarian Kingdom Magyar 8,742,301 45.4 10,050,575 48.1 German 2,135,181 2,037,435 11.1 9.8 Slovak 2,019.641 10.5 1,967,970 9.4 Romanian 2,799,479 2,949,032 14.5 14.1 Rusyn 429,447 2.2 472,587 2.3 Croatian 1,682,104 8.7 1,833,162 8.8 Serbian 1,048,645 1,106,471 5.5 5.3 Other 397,761 469,255 2.1 2.2 Total 10,512,258 54.6 10,835,912 51.9 non-Magyar Total 19,254,559 100 20,886,487 100 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXl/l. 1915 (Budapest, 1918), 15, chart 11 , "A nepesseg anyanyelve es magyarul tudasa 1900-ban es 19 I 0-ben." In their analysis, and in their own efforts to bolster Slovak mnnbers, Czechoslovak demographers were uninterested in linguistic assimilation, seeking instead to strip the inhabitants of Slovakia down to their national skins . Their efforts illustrate what Dominique Arel has explained as a backward looking orientation toward language categories in censuses. Arel argues that, even though nationalists portray linguistic assimilation as "forced, unnatural, and fundamentally illegitimate, the result of destructive policies by an 'imperialist' state," it is in reality a normal and expected occurrence. Among speakers of a less prestigious language, there are individuals who will choose to linguistically assimilate for social advancement. 51 In those cases declaration of mother tongue as the "language one best and most gladly speaks" may well differ from the language of one's mother. According to this reasoning, Czechoslovak demographers were backwards-looking because they sought to discover the "real" nationality of the inhabitants of Slovakia, their "true group belong- 51 Arel, "Language categories in censuses," in Census and Identity, Kertzer and Arel, eds., 93 . SLOV AKIA-2015 25 ing" based on their ancestral origins, rather than linguistic assimilation: whether coerced, statistically falsified, or voluntary. Czechoslovak demographers sought to demonstrate the unreliability of the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary through critical comparative examination of the data collected within the language categories of "mother tongue" and "language knowledge. "52 In a typical example, Jan Auerhan 53 pointed to the 301,694 Magyars with knowledge of Slovak counted on the 1910 census within the sixteen counties and four municipalities of the Kingdom of Hungary which in whole or part became Slovakia. Two-thirds of them were likely to be ethnic Slovaks, he concluded. Counting them as Slovaks, instead of as Magyars with Slovak language knowledge, would raise the ethnic Slovak number from 1,708,592 to 1,900,000.54 The likelihood that a Slovak would be proficient in the Magyar language in an environment where Magyar was the official language - the language of instruction in schools, the language used in government offices and the court system - was incomparably greater than a Magyar proficient in Slovak. Mother tongue was not a perfect indicator of nationality, but what could be offered in its stead to collect national data? Mraz, in his Zilina report, strikingly concluded that "nationality" alone be used. Rather than employ language proxy, the census should ask the people directly for their nationality. This was a controversial method due its high level of subjectivity. Nationality declaration would not be linked to language as an external marker. Considering the ways in which Czechoslovak demographers regarded mother tongue to have been manipulated on the censuses of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mraz wrote: 52 Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?"; Mraz,"Dva dukazy o falesnosti mad'arskych dat o feci matefske na zaklade dat o znalosti feci," ; and Hora.eek, "Narodnostni statistika," all in CSV II (1921). 53 Jan Auerhan (1880-1942) worked as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom from 1906, and became the undersecretary to the president of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office at its founding in January 1919. He is most noted for his work in the demographic and anthro-geographic fields, the study of Czech and Slovak minorities abroad, and minority questions more generally. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky, 186. 54 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" CSV II ( 1921 ): 51 . 26 SLOV AKIA-2015 In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept "nationality" means confession to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambiguous way, similar to religious conviction . That confession to a certain nationality is the only correct one for ascertaining national ratios. "Mother tongue" has for this reason been eliminated from the demographic markers and as a surrogate question for "nationality." In connection with this is the question at hand, whether a separate "Jewish nationality" should be accepted without regard to religious affiliation. It follows from the concept of nationality described that it is not possible to force someone to declare a separate Jewish nationality, if [that declaration] is to express their internal conviction; because the Jews indeed form a separate race, there will, however, be no recommendation in the instructions for this procedure, except that Jewish nationality shall be left to the rubric of "Other nationality." The Jews should be left the option of declaring themselves either for their own separate nationality or for the nationality of others, which with the influence of environment and education or the like they have accepted as their own. For the stating of the Jewish race the remaining rules of the statement of affiliation to the Jewish confession shall suffice.55 Mraz's interpretation of nationality as an "internal conviction" was most closely related to the definition advanced by Karoly Keleti at the International Statistical Congress meeting in St. Petersburg in 1872. Keleti was the first director of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau founded one year earlier. He helped create the 1867 and the 1880 censuses for the Kingdom of Hungary. 56 The 1872 St. Petersburg Congress not only debated nationality enumeration on the census, but the meaning of nationality itself. Three conceptions of nationality emerged from the deliberations : I) political, in which nationality is equivalent to state belonging; 2) physical, in which nationality is defined racially; and 3) psychical, in which nationality is understood as a psychological community penetrating individual feeling and collective endeavors. 57 Keleti took the 55 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. 76. Italics added. Karoly Keleti (born 1833, Pozsony [Pressburg, Bratislava] - died 1892, Budapest) Eletrajzi lexikon. www.kereso.hu-yrk-Ryrgenwm/7502 accessed June 17, 2005 . 57 Bohac, "Narodnost ci jazyk?" CSV II (1921 ): 50. 56 SLOV AKIA-2015 27 position that nationality cannot be equivalent to state belonging, as that is so-called political nationality, common in Western Europe, but not in the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nor does ethnic (Stamm) belonging answer to nationality, even if its main marker is language. Nationality was best defined, according to Keleti, as a "subjective state internal to the individual, a feeling analogous to religion that depends on origin and the environment in which a person lives and grows ."58 Keleti's definition was based on social-psychological criteria for which it is difficult to secure an objective external marker. It moved away from language as a definite indicator of nationality, leav ing room for belonging to a nationality whose language one may not use daily or that is not considered a viable national language (like Hebrew or Yiddish in the view of the Czechoslovak state). This was a big plus for Mraz and hi s colleagues, but also ambiguous enough to allow for pressures and fal sifications, like those they presumed embedded in the last Hungarian census before the war. Yet Keleti 's definition was attractive to the Czechoslovak demographers preparing the 1919 Slovak census. This definition would enable the indivi dual to confess nationality as directly as religion, as an expression of his/her internal conviction and self-understanding. Czechoslovak demographers hoped it would un cover the numbers of ethnic Slovaks who had previously been hidden from view because they were counted as Magyar-speakers. They would now be recorded under the banner of their "real" nationality, free to directly profess their "true" group belonging. Jews, too, would be able to declare their "true" group belonging for the first time; not only as a religion, but also as a distinct nationality . Antonin Bohac 59 found Keleti's definition to coincide with concepts of ethno-racial group belonging. "Since the means for express58 Ibid. , 49. Keleti publ is hed his views on nationality in 1880 in the Stalistische Monatschrift under the title "Zur Frage der Volksziihlung." [Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV I ( 1920): 187.] 59 Antonin Bohac ( 1882-1 950) is regarded as the fo under of Czechoslovak demographics, especially with regard to questi ons of nationality. He was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 19 19, and worked fo r the Czechos lovak State Statistical Office upon his return. Bohac was the deputy chairman of the Society for the Study of Nationality Questi ons. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Prague, 1989), 195. Bohac was also associate professor of demography at the Charles Uni versity Faculty of Science where he lee- 28 SLOV AKIA-2015 ing psychological states is language," Bohac wrote, "as Keleti [elsewhere] has stated, the concept of nationality in this sense is quite close to the concept of nationality as ethnic/racial belonging (kmenova prislusnost), for which language is the main connecting bond and main external marker."60 Bohac was correct to observe that Keleti's definition bore a strong resemblance to a physical understanding of nationality, which gave race and/or ethnicity an expanded role. Language remained the main outward indicator of nationality, but was no longer considered identical to nationality itself. Espousing this conception moved nationality closer to ethnicity. It elevated ethnic understandings of the self and the group . The final formulation of the 1919 census shows that the Czechoslovak administration and its demographers accepted Mraz's definition of nationality, based on Keleti's: "an individual national-political conviction according to ethnic belonging to a certain national unit or nation ."61 Five sub-headings were placed under Nationality on the form: Slovaks and Czechs, Rusyns, Magyars, Germans, and Others .62 Czechoslovak demographers understood Jewish nationality to be included under the subheading "Others." While "Jewish nationality" was an available option, though not a requirement, for the Jewish population, the category remained invisible on the actual census form in 1919. The 1919 census asked directly for nationality without the intermediary of language. *** In the late August heat of 1919, census takers dispersed across the territory of Slovakia to ask the people about their nationality. Many complained that the whole endeavor was disorganized and insufficiently thought through. Census takers expressed frustration that they had not received the census forms with time enough to look tured on the "Basics of Population Science." He introduced the usage of punch card technology for processing Czechoslovak census data."Historie statistiky v Cechach po roce 1918," The Czech Statistical Office http ://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.ns£'i/historie_statistiky_ v_cechach_po_roce_ l 918 (accessed January 9, 2012). 60 Federalni statisticky urad, 50. 61 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77* (cast textova). 62 SNA, f. MPS, box 277 . This carton contains the original hand-written forms used for collecting the raw data for the 1919 census. SLOV AKIA-2015 29 them over, nor so that they could fill one out to use as an example. Due to lack of funds and inadequate organization, many found themselves forced to sleep in train stations and on park benches during the census period, which surely affected their ability to fulfill their duties. One census taker reported that his census materials were stolen from him while he slept! The population, and oftentimes even local community officials, had not been informed about the purpose of the census, nor when it would take place.63 If these complaints are accurate, they undermine the seriousness with which the Czechoslovak administrators prepared the foundation of the 1919 census, as well as the importance they placed upon it as a means of accurately proving national ratios in Slovakia. Yet last minute pre-census agitation to prepare the Slovak population did take place. The prominent Slovak national newspaper Narodnie noviny called on Slovaks " ... to consciously and openly confess their Slovak stock ... to let the beautiful words: 'I am Slovak' 64 consciously and boldly sound from the mouths of loyal citizens. " This example is atypical, however, as the agitation took place in the central Slovak town of Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and home to the Matica slovenska, the Slovak cultural society. Narodnie noviny explained that the purpose of the census was to prove that Slovakia was Slovak, and that it was essential for building its own independent country. Every citizen could participate in building that independent state through the census, the article stressed, an idea meant to reinforce the democratic spirit of the new era.65 "You have no reason to be ashamed of [declaring Slovak nationality]," counseled the leading newspaper in Saris county, a region of eastern Slovakia where national consciousness remained weak, "the Czechoslovak name has the best reputation not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia." The paper ran boldface announcements at the foot of its pages urging all Slovaks to proudly declare to the census taker that they were Slovaks. 66 These reassurances did little to assuage prevalent Slovak fears about the real purpose of the census. This terribly urgent appeal itself 63 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. nos. 7, 8-9. Scitani lidu na Slovensku 1919. Anketa mezi popisujicimi povei'niky. 64 "Scitanie l'udu," Nizrodnie noviny (Turciansky Svaty Martin), August 22, 1919. 65 Ibid. 66 "Slovaci!" Sari.fake hlasy (Presov), August 24, 1919. 30 SLOVAKIA-2015 may have caused anxiety for a population with a low-level of national consciousness. Suspicions ranged from the belief that the goal was to raise or introduce new taxes, undertake military recruitment, or to carry out a plebiscite to divide the territory . The military rumor was the most widespread. Many Slovaks worried that a war would soon break out between the Poles and Magyars, and the job of the census takers was to find able-bodied men to fight. Whoever declared Slovak nationality would be conscripted to fight once again, while other nationalities would be freed from that duty. While it was later revealed that the rumor began in Magyar circles, many people in the border counties still held back from declaring themselves Slovak. Others believed the census to be connected to imminent requisitioning of cattle and grain. Some, more optimistically, believed more satisfactory food and fuel distribution would follow, and possibly a more advantageous land distribution. Still others imagined the census to be an exercise in identifying foreigners (especially Magyars, Poles, and Magyarone Slovaks) and expelling them from Czechoslovakia.67 Widespread fears and suspicions about the real intentions of the 1919 census underscored the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in Slovakia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak state building project, as well as contributed to a certain level of inaccuracy in the results. Of the four national groups which were the most interesting to the state: Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and Jews, the greatest difficulties arose in recording the nationality of the Slovaks and the Jews. Magyars and Germans were by-and-large ready for the census and decisive in their national declarations. Within the ethnic Magyar population, only state and municipal employees exhibited uncertainty in their national declarations. 68 Magyar language use, national uncertainty, fear and mistrust accounted for the greatest difficulties in recording the highest possible number of Slovaks on the 1919 census. Magyar or Magyarone Slovak census takers were known to record entire ethnic Slovak or mixed nationality villages as Magyar, or count individuals as Magyar because they were able to communicate with Magyar-speaking cen67 Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921 ): 133134. 68 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "O Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech" SLOV AKIA-2015 31 sus takers without the help of an interpreter. 69 The latter illustrates precisely what Mraz and his colleagues had hoped to avoid in bypassing language as identical with or as a surrogate for nationality . They did not want ethnic Slovaks counted as Magyars based on their Magyar language proficiency. Other problems stemmed from uncertainty surrounding the meaning of nationality (primarily in eastern Slovakia). Many Slovaks feared what might happen to them if they did not declare themselves as Magyars. They distrusted the "godless Czechs" and "false prophets from Prague" who came to their doors. 70 The Slovak population tended to be more religious than the highly secularized Czech one, and Slovak national leaders expressed wari71 ness about the "agnostic progressivism" of the Czech intelligentsia. Common answers among Slovaks when asked about their nationality included: Slovak and Magyar ("aji Slovak, aji Mad'ar"), it doesn't matter ("to vsetko jedno"), and Hungarian Slovak ("Uhorsky Slovak"). 72 In eastern Slovakia, other answers included : I speak Slovak and Magyar ("hutorim 73 po slovensky i po mad'arsky"), I pray in Slovak ("modlim sa po slovensky"), and Catholic ("katolik") . Mraz noted in his analysis of the results that Slovaks often confused religion with nationality. 74 Interestingly, this observation recalls the proximity of religious and national feeling within Czechoslovakia's re-conceptualization of nationality, as well as the fine distinction made between them in rec69 Ibid., 7. "O opravnych navrzich pro pfisti scitani. Ibid., 5. "O nepfistojnostech pfi scitani," and Josef Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921): 135 . 71 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 23. 72 All the Slavic languages differentiate the word "Hungarian" from ,,Magyar." The former refers to citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas the latter refers to the predominant ethnic group in that Kingdom. In Slovak, these terms are "Mad'ar" (ethnic Hungarian), Uhorsko (the Kingdom of Hungary), and uhorsky (deriving from the Kingdom of Hungary) . In the early 19 th century, Magyar nationalists followed the lead of Count Istvan Szechenyi in equating "Magyar" and "Hungarian" in foreign languages as part of their drive to assimilate all the non-Magyar nationalities into Magyar language and culture. The non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary rejected the equating of "Magyar" with "Hungarian" and still do. For more on Szechyni ' s activities see Dejiny S/ovenska II ( 1526-1848), ed. Samuel Cambel (Bratislava: VEDA, 1987), 488-90. 73 "Hutorit'" is the Saris form of "hovorit'," to speak. 74 JosefMraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II ( 192 1): 135. II 70 32 SLOV AKIA-2015 ognizing "Jewish nationality." Nationality was something to be understood and felt as an "internal conviction, similar to religious confession," but consciously separated, and given a higher position than religion in the hierarchy of self and group values of definition. One's nationality, not one's religion, was of the greatest interest to the state. One's nationality, not one's religion, was the primary indicator of one's most strongly held inner values and loyalties. For the Jewish population, answers to the question of nationality were most striking for their variety. Census takers disparaged the eclecticism of the Jewish response, attributing it to opportunism . In some cases, they remarked, national declarations among Jews reached comical proportions: the head of one household declared as a Slovak, his wife as a German, and the children as Hungarians . They noted, however, that often Jews stuck to Jewish nationality so that they would not have to affiliate with any of the other nationality choices.75 The majority of Jews in Slovakia chose the Jewish nationality option on the 1919 census, officially recorded as "Other." Census takers recommended that a separate column be made available on the next census for Jewish nationality because so many Jews had expressly asked for it. 76 In the uncertain environment which prevailed in Slovakia in August 1919, shortly after the rollback of Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army forces but before the de jure securing of the Czechoslovak borders, Jews in Slovakia wished to avoid a difficult and possibly treacherous national affiliation decision through declaring Jewish nationality. Many Jews viewed Jewish nationality as an escape from the nationality conflict. Choosing Jewish nationality appeared to be a good way to opt out, to take a neutral position, to make the safest bet on an unpredictable future. Basing the decision to declare for Jewish nationality on these criteria made it more a strategic and less a heart-felt choice. For the time being, at least, it had less to do with deep-seated feelings of belonging to a Jewish national group, and more to do with trying to make the best possible choice in 75 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech." JosefMniz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (192 1): 129. Unfortunately, the demographic breakdown of those who chose "Other" on the 1919 Slovak census is unavailable, so the conclusion that the majority of Jews declared for Jewish nationality comes from census taker reports and their insistence that it be included as a separate column on the next census. See footnote : Statni ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77*. 76 SLOV AKIA-2015 33 a high-stakes gamble. The Jewish population in Slovakia overall, counted by religion and nationality, numbered 135,918 according to the 1921 statewide Czechoslovak census, and 354,342 in the state as a whole. 77 Slovaks, counted only under the nationality rubric "Czechoslovak" on the interwar censuses, numbered 1,954,446 in 1919 and 2,025,003 in 1921, a positive change of 3.61 percent. 78 The popularity of the Jewish nationality declaration on the 1919 Slovak census (as "Other"), combined with a majority of ethnic Slovaks declaring as "Slovak" 79 led to a significant decrease in the number of Magyars recorded in Slovakia compared with the last prewar census. This decline heightened the Czechoslovak administration's awareness of further potential benefits rendered to the state by Jewish nationality . If the Jews, who traditionally affiliated with Germanspeakers in Bohemia and Moravia, and Magyar-speakers in Slovakia, declared for Jewish nationality, then the statistical legitimacy of the Czechoslovak nation-state would rise as the numbers of Germans and Hungarians fell. "Jewish nationality" would work to the advantage of the dominant "Czechoslovak" nationality and national state. If, as this argument goes, Jewish nationality favored the Czechoslovak nationality in solving the state's nationalities problems, then declaring Jewish nationality was not really a way of opting out. It was not a neutral position. It could not be an escape from the nationality conflict if it meant - once again - casting one's lot with the dominant state nationality. Jewish nationality may have seemed like an exit, but this was an illusion. One could not avoid taking sides in the interwar nationality conflicts . *** It is a valid and important point that the Czechoslovak government would favor Jewish nationality for its ability to statistically reduce the number of Germans and Magyars in the state. But that con77 Antonin Bohac, Narodnostni mapa republiky ceskoslovenske. Podrobny popis narodnostnich hranic, ostrovu a mensin (Prague, 1926), pp. 148-155 . 78 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora I 92 / Prague, 19240, Table 74: Narodnosti na Slovensku podle scitani lidu z roku 1919 a 1921 . 79 Slovaks who declared as Slovak, according to the options presented on the 1919 Slovak census, were recorded as "Czechoslovak." Slovaks were not recorded as "Slovak" until the 1930 statewide census. 34 SLOV AKIA-2015 clusion neglects the deeper meaning of its inclusion beyond the statistical benefits it could render. Creating a Jewish nationality category manifested the ways in which the meaning of national affiliation had transformed through the cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment of East Central European successor states based on the national principle. Josef Mraz elegantly and succinctly summed up these changes when he stated that declaring for a certain nationality was an expression of internal conviction . Because the very meaning of national affiliation had changed, "Jewish nationality" emerged as a recognized nationality category . Nationality had taken on the problematic role of the manifestation of one's personal convictions, inner values, and ultimate loyalty . Nationality moved ever closer to an essential ethnic or racial understandings of "true" group belonging. The methods and results of the 1919 special census in Slovakia were useful in providing a tested model of nationality investigation based on subjective, internal, ethnic/racial criteria, already approved before an international body (the Paris Peace Conference). The 1919 census had been an experiment in bringing methods of counting and recording the population into line with the new postwar vision of the national state. The 1921 census would build on 1919 methods in circumstances which required more than securing the new borders; they required filling the demarcated territory with meaning, as well as answering the dual questions of what Czechoslovakia was and how nationality and nationhood would function in this state. Examining the 1919 Slovak census offers insight into how Czechoslovakia understood itself as the manifestation of Czechoslovak: self-determination, and the place of the rights of the other nationalities to their own self-determination within this framework.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 1919 Census on the Territory of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Rebekah Klein-Pejšová Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 7-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Klein-Pejšová, Rebekah, 1972- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/dc0fc6e45cde3bca2d25a2352cd8abb1.pdf 1649cde7255967a3e2cd0c12f0aac9af PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA THE 1944 COMMUNISTIC REBELLION IN SLOVAKIA In late August, 1944, a rebellion to overthrow the government of the free Slovak Republic was set in motion by Communist partisan forces that were parachuted into the country by Moscow. Although the predominant element among the invaders was Czech, there were also Russians and Frenchmen among them. Conspicuous as one of the leaders promoting this putsch was Dr. Joseph Lettrich who is now an official of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and resides in the United States. The objective of this offensive strategy was not only the ruthless subjugation of the Slovak government, but also the occupation of Slovakia and the integration of the crushed republic into the politically hybridized Czecho-Slovak Republic. With the help of Soviet troops this goal was achieved in the spring of 1945 . Some of the tactics and activities of these Red invaders are reliably described by Dr. Joseph Pauco in his latest book SLOVACI A KOMUNIZMUS (THE SLOVAKS AND COMMUNISM; Middletown, Pa.; 1957). We quote here in part from the chapter "Dielo pomsty" ("An Act of Revenge" - Ed.) The depravity of the partisans literally knew no bounds: They looted and plundered at will and murdered wantonly. Consequently the toll of the struggle was tragic even though the encounters did not last exceptionally long. Co,Ionel Otto Klement reports that "official statistics, released early in 1945, indicate that the so-called national uprising in 1944 cost the Slova:k nation close to 80,000 lives sacrificed on Slovak territrory." The partisans and their henchmen terrorized Slovak villages. They categorically seized all citizens of noite who had shown opposition to Cornmuni,s m. "They robbed their rupartments, homes, castles, factories, places of business, warehouses; they indulged in drunken orgies and began to annoy innocent victims, torturing and !killing them," states Colonel Otto Klement who was fully informed on all that happened. Thousands of Sloivruks were su!bjected to unspeakable tortures and inhuman torments. Among the first victims in this wave of terror was the Slo:v.a:k lalbor leader and mem1b ers o.f iParliament, Francis S1amen, who met his cruel fate in the town of Brezno nad Hronom .. He was a typical Slovruk laborer, one of thousands of diligent and honest Slava:k worikingmen, providing for his family by the toil of his hands. He was interested in the welfare of Slovak workers, �29 SLOVAKIA but his "crime" was that he based his interest on the principles of fundamental Christian equity. He organized a Christian-social wonkers' association and, as president of the group, he was shown a certain degree of deference by his co-iworkers who came to realize that the problems of the l8iboring class can be resolved without recourse to revolutionary methods, without violence, bloodshed, and the confiscation o.f private property. When Francis Slamen noticed thaJt there was a concentration of questionable elements in rthe neighborhood of Brezno, he decided to go to Bratislava in order to inform the state authorities. His planned to leave in the evening of August 27, 1944, but an informer foiled his plans. A few hours before train time, he was forced into a partisan truck The partisans then rounded up other influential loyal patriots in this town, driving them out of their homes at the point of leveled automatics. They ,padked them into the fore section of the truck while heavily armed guards took up the rear. At a;bout eleven o'clock at night, the truck started on its way, but it halted every fifty meters or so, in order to take on mo:re unfortunate capti'Ves. Shortly before midnight, the truck loaded with captives left the heart of town. When the trngic company reached the town limits, two oif the partisans, wh 0 were sta.ltio.ned as guards in the truck, opened fire on the victims. Several of them died on the spot; others lived a few hours longer. The sole survivor in this instance was Judge Denk. His face and head were spattered with the brain fragments o.f Slamen and Dolnan and both his hands, as well as his head and nedk, were torn with shot. But he did not lose consciousness and was able to save himself. When the partisams came to carry a,way the corpses, Denk let himself be taken as a dead man with the dead. They left him in the cemetery for !burial with the rest, and it was there that he spoke to the gendarme who was left to take over, begging him to take him to a hospital from where his wife later smuggled him out to safety and survival. The heartless partisans who carried out this coldblood1 �30 SLOVAKIA ed task of political vengeance appropriated all the valuables on the pevsons of their victims right where they fell. They even stripped the dead of their shoes and before lea ving the scene, they 1kicked the bodies about with violent brutality. Another notable victim of the partisans was a Catholic priest and Parliamentary deputy, Rev. Anthony Salat, who died in the first weeik of the rebellion. He was a man of noble character and his was the stature of an earnest SlovaJk patriot, a brilliant popular writer, a matchless public speaker, and one of the most out-spoken and determined opponents of Communism. Through the years, dating baok as far as 1929, Father Salat serwed as a Parliamentary representative of the Slovak Populist Party. In public life he merited distinction not only as a gifted amd objecti;ve speaker, a defender of Slovak rights in the forum of Prague's hall of Parliament, but also as a journalist. Because of all this, the partisans marked as one of their earlist targets, a figure to be cut down mercilessly, this Father Anthony Salat, a distinguished national leader and an intrepid fighter for justice. They dragged him out of the quiet orf his parish to the bridge that spans the Hron River. He begged to be allowed to make his confession but the rabble refused him this spiritual consolation. fu answer to his request they sounded off rounds of satanic la,ughter and piercing ridicule which alternated with sal:vos from their automatics, felling the good priest to the cold pa,vement of the bridge that he had built for the community. But even this did not satisfy the savage "liberators." They ,b eset the cor;pse of the murdered Father Salat and robbed it. Out of his vest poc!ket they removed his gold watch; out of his coat pocket they took his wallet. They even knoc:ked out several of his teeth and claimed the gold caps from his dental work. Then they hurled the brutally albused a.111d rifled body in.to the Bron. Father Anthony Salat was not the only Slovak Catholic priest done to cruel death iby the partisans. Among others who perished under the violent hand of the oppres1 �SLOVAKIA 31 sons were Fathers J ohn Nemec, Martinka of Liptovsk y Svaty Michal, and the seminaria n Milan of Povazska Bystrica. A frightful death befell Father Seda, the pastor in L1ptovsky Svaty Jan. In his report at a hearing of the U. S. Congress ional Committe e, the Catholic priest, Dr. Stephen Nahalka, related the suffering s inflicted on Father Seda: "They t::ut strips of slkin and flesh from his back and in the end even amputate d his genitals." Father Nicholas Sprinc, a priest of the same diocese as Father Seda, reported the following: "Father Seda was killed. The Reds first flayed him and then subjected him to tortures which it is not proper to describe in the press. His skin was stripped in thick layers. His tormento rs then kept cutting off parts of his body and forcing them into his mouth to the accompan iment of blasphenm ous exdamati ons about 'Holy Communion'." Another witness before the Congress ional Committe e was the Rev. Joseph Poess of Slorvakia whom the partisans had severely wounded in the mass grarve near Sklenne where he sewed as pastor. Ninety men perished in this mass grave, but Father Poess saved himself despite the fact that he had been buried alive. He made his escaipe out of the shallow grave and, after untold suffering s and imprisonm ent, made his way to freedom. The indictmen t which the Partisans fabricate d against him was that he had a secret sending station operating from the church and that he cached weapons in the church sacristy and under the altar in his church. Colonel Otto Klement had informati on on many individual instances of brutality wreaiked upon helple ss and innocent citizens by the partisans . In Turiec the ailing Mary R. fell into their hands; they struck her unconscio us with a heavy millk can. They tortured her by wedging pins under her nails and, after she was completel y spent, she had to kiss the feet of a common prostitute . F1inally the partisan band bound her in chains and bore her off to their headquarters, Sklabina in Turiec, where they shot her and threw her body into a mass burial pit. Her father, John R., was an old man of 78. The parti- �32 SLOVAKIA sans trussed him up and left him, barefoot and half na!ked, exiposed outdoors all night. When he accepted a pair of shoes offered hi.Im by a lady, the gypsy who was guarding him beat him brutally. Then the partisan horde took the old man to Siklabina, aimed a ,shat at the naJPe of his necik, just as they had dispatched his d:mghter, and threw him into the mass grave too. AH these people had no connection whatever with political activities of any kind. Their "offense" was that they were, to some extent, propertied people. Singled out for ,s,rucrifiice were also a number of valiant o:£ficers who chnse to accept no command in the uprising. For this service to their country, Colonels Kruna'k and Zverin, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Kfucik and First Lieutenants Frecer and SindJer, were shot to death. The distinguished General Turanec was put under house arrest in Bans:ka Bystrica right at the outset of the putsch. Once they let .Joose the full strength of their partisan activities, they had General Turanec flown to Moscow, where they tortured him for his uncompromising stand against communism. One of the major stigmas of the putsch is the concentration camp which the partisans arranged in the castle fortress Sl()IVenska L'wpca. Here they tormented and persecuted aver a th'Ousand viictims - not only men, but women and children, too. The sUJperintendent of this concentratiorn camp was the sa,v age Communist Staudinger. One of the prisoners, R. Rudohorsiky, recalls some of the sufferings experienced in Slovenska L'wpca: "The housing of the 1prisoners was horrible. The overseer packed over 150 ,people into a single room. Other sections were croweded with as many persons as eoouJd possibly be forced into them. Househo1d furnishings were remover. From the !beginning, the prisonern were bedded on the bare floor; later the authorities allowed them to bring in some straw. Spies, informers, and instigators of trouble were planted among the prisoners. Hygienic requirements in this concentration camp became a thing of the past. The iplace was a real hell. "Inmates tooik sick ,a s a result of the undernourishment, starvation, filth and foulness that prevailed. Instead �SLOVAKIA 33 of iprorviding medical help or relief for them, the vindictive jailer turned on them with aJbuse and emibittered their lives still further with inhuman treatment. Even when the doctor did come into the camp, he was allowed to examine a sick unfortunate only in the presence of the commandant of the guard of National Security . . . The physician prescribed medication for which the prisoner paid but never received . . . Fare: potatoes and caJbbage. Anything by wa,y of shorttening or grease that may have been allotted to the kitchen wa:s either appropriated by a woman-coolk o.f ill-repute or the suiperintendent o.f the institution and the commandant of National ,S ecurity, or it was sold. But conditions worsened to, such an extent that later not even potatoes or caJbbage ,w ere to be had. There was actual starvation. Red pa:rtiisans, armed to the teeth, visited the castle fortress daily to conduct investigations among the inmates. They heard the grievances orf the prisoners and freely dealt them resounding sla.ps and blows; they 1b eat the:n and tortured them unmercifuUy. "Many of the wretches were taken away under cover of night never to return again. Conditions became such that no prisoner' felt that his life wais safe. Everyone lived in dread expectation, wondering just when the partisans woU!ld come to claim this oo.e or that one who would vanish fureve,r in the abyss of death ... The barbaric superintendent, a former shooma'ker, on visiting the confining quarters abused the miseraible inmates by kic<king them a,bout like dogs while he cursed them fiendishly and threatened every one of them with the gall01Ws. If any of them ha,ppened to have a covering of any ,k ind, he ripped it -away, spewing insults upon them and calling them Nazis and Fascist swine.. "Little children begged their mothers for bread or m.i1'k but what were the un.ha,ppy mothers to do when the p-2rfidious scum that jaHed them had no mercy or feeling in its heart to allow at least to the children some substantial food. Wives were isolated from their husbands; they were :permitted to have no contact whatever, not even a brief .exchange from one to the other as they went for their daily rations. Husbands were the unwilling and helpless witnesses of the appalling sufferings of their wives and children." �34 SLOVAKIA Only prayer and hymns sustained balance and some ,semlblance of morale among the tortured prisoners whose .sufferings defied description. An evil reputation came to be associated with Kunerad, one of the headquarters of the partisan band located near the city 2ilina. V. 2ingor testified that the Czech Karel Bacilek was "the political commissar in the fortress Kunerad." Brutal in the extreme was the punishment meted out to anti-Communistic fighters and quick sentences were readily executed. It was comparable to SkJa;bina. To date it has not been ascertained precisely how many victims met maximum penalties in these two ,plaic-es. Colonel Klement reports that in Slklaib:itna O'Ver a thousand citirens were murdered from Turiec region aJone. In. the mass gra,ve in Podsucha, as the Rev. Stephen Naha1ka testified, there were found eighty victims of parti:sa,n ferocity. Father Poess revealed that in the mass graves near Sklenne rubout two hundred of his parishioners met their deaths. An American citizen, Mr. Smr~ov,s ky, declared before .U. S. Congressional Committee that in the Slovaik community where he had lived in the days of the Slovak Republic, ,the partisans on one occasion destroyed an entire family of five ipersons among whom were a two year old and a four year old child. All were then consigned to a mass grave. Other mass graves were also found at Kovacova, in Pusty Hrad, in the Prievidza valley, at Humenne, Lucivna, Bosany, L'wbietova, Nemeoka L'upca Mld Kremnioka. During this Communist putsch, material -losses in SlovaJkia were extremely great. The state statistical and planning office in Bratislava 1published in its "Statistical Hand1book of Slo:vaikia 1947" an evalution of damage inflicted on -buildings, projects and their equipment, art objects, communications, livestock, and other ravaged properties as in excess of 114,461,000,000 crowns or two and a half billion dollars. The arrival of the Soviet in Slovakia in the bloody August putsch of 1944 was a clear foreclast of what would befall the Slovak people in the event of the downfall of their independent State. � 28 SLOVAKIA THE 1944 COMMUNISTIC REBELLION IN SLOVAKIA In late August, 1944, a rebellion to overthrow the government of the free Slovak Republic was set in motion by Communist partisan forces that were parachuted into the country by Moscow. Although the predominant element among the invaders was Czech, there were also Russians and Frenchmen among them. Conspicuous as one of the leaders promoting this putsch was Dr. Joseph Lettrich who is now an official of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and resides in the United States. The objective of this offensive strategy was not only the ruthless subjugation of the Slovak government, but also the occupation of Slovakia and the integration of the crushed republic into the politically hybridized Czecho-Slovak Republic. With the help of Soviet troops this goal was achieved in the spring of 1945 . Some of the tactics and activities of these Red invaders are reliably described by Dr. Joseph Pauco in his latest book SLOVACI A KOMUNIZMUS (THE SLOVAKS AND COMMUNISM; Middletown, Pa.; 1957). We quote here in part from the chapter "Dielo pomsty" ("An Act of Revenge" - Ed.) The depravity of the partisans literally knew no bounds: They looted and plundered at will and murdered wantonly. Consequently the toll of the struggle was tragic even though the encounters did not last exceptionally long. Co,Ionel Otto Klement reports that "official statistics, released early in 1945, indicate that the so-called national uprising in 1944 cost the Slova:k nation close to 80,000 lives sacrificed on Slovak territrory." The partisans and their henchmen terrorized Slovak villages. They categorically seized all citizens of noite who had shown opposition to Cornmuni,s m. "They robbed their rupartments, homes, castles, factories, places of business, warehouses; they indulged in drunken orgies and began to annoy innocent victims, torturing and !killing them," states Colonel Otto Klement who was fully informed on all that happened. Thousands of Sloivruks were su!bjected to unspeakable tortures and inhuman torments. Among the first victims in this wave of terror was the Slo:v.a:k lalbor leader and mem1b ers o.f iParliament, Francis S1amen, who met his cruel fate in the town of Brezno nad Hronom .. He was a typical Slovruk laborer, one of thousands of diligent and honest Slava:k worikingmen, providing for his family by the toil of his hands. He was interested in the welfare of Slovak workers, �29 SLOVAKIA but his "crime" was that he based his interest on the principles of fundamental Christian equity. He organized a Christian-social wonkers' association and, as president of the group, he was shown a certain degree of deference by his co-iworkers who came to realize that the problems of the l8iboring class can be resolved without recourse to revolutionary methods, without violence, bloodshed, and the confiscation o.f private property. When Francis Slamen noticed thaJt there was a concentration of questionable elements in rthe neighborhood of Brezno, he decided to go to Bratislava in order to inform the state authorities. His planned to leave in the evening of August 27, 1944, but an informer foiled his plans. A few hours before train time, he was forced into a partisan truck The partisans then rounded up other influential loyal patriots in this town, driving them out of their homes at the point of leveled automatics. They ,padked them into the fore section of the truck while heavily armed guards took up the rear. At a;bout eleven o'clock at night, the truck started on its way, but it halted every fifty meters or so, in order to take on mo:re unfortunate capti'Ves. Shortly before midnight, the truck loaded with captives left the heart of town. When the trngic company reached the town limits, two oif the partisans, wh 0 were sta.ltio.ned as guards in the truck, opened fire on the victims. Several of them died on the spot; others lived a few hours longer. The sole survivor in this instance was Judge Denk. His face and head were spattered with the brain fragments o.f Slamen and Dolnan and both his hands, as well as his head and nedk, were torn with shot. But he did not lose consciousness and was able to save himself. When the partisams came to carry a,way the corpses, Denk let himself be taken as a dead man with the dead. They left him in the cemetery for !burial with the rest, and it was there that he spoke to the gendarme who was left to take over, begging him to take him to a hospital from where his wife later smuggled him out to safety and survival. The heartless partisans who carried out this coldblood1 �30 SLOVAKIA ed task of political vengeance appropriated all the valuables on the pevsons of their victims right where they fell. They even stripped the dead of their shoes and before lea ving the scene, they 1kicked the bodies about with violent brutality. Another notable victim of the partisans was a Catholic priest and Parliamentary deputy, Rev. Anthony Salat, who died in the first weeik of the rebellion. He was a man of noble character and his was the stature of an earnest SlovaJk patriot, a brilliant popular writer, a matchless public speaker, and one of the most out-spoken and determined opponents of Communism. Through the years, dating baok as far as 1929, Father Salat serwed as a Parliamentary representative of the Slovak Populist Party. In public life he merited distinction not only as a gifted amd objecti;ve speaker, a defender of Slovak rights in the forum of Prague's hall of Parliament, but also as a journalist. Because of all this, the partisans marked as one of their earlist targets, a figure to be cut down mercilessly, this Father Anthony Salat, a distinguished national leader and an intrepid fighter for justice. They dragged him out of the quiet orf his parish to the bridge that spans the Hron River. He begged to be allowed to make his confession but the rabble refused him this spiritual consolation. fu answer to his request they sounded off rounds of satanic la,ughter and piercing ridicule which alternated with sal:vos from their automatics, felling the good priest to the cold pa,vement of the bridge that he had built for the community. But even this did not satisfy the savage "liberators." They ,b eset the cor;pse of the murdered Father Salat and robbed it. Out of his vest poc!ket they removed his gold watch; out of his coat pocket they took his wallet. They even knoc:ked out several of his teeth and claimed the gold caps from his dental work. Then they hurled the brutally albused a.111d rifled body in.to the Bron. Father Anthony Salat was not the only Slovak Catholic priest done to cruel death iby the partisans. Among others who perished under the violent hand of the oppres1 �SLOVAKIA 31 sons were Fathers J ohn Nemec, Martinka of Liptovsk y Svaty Michal, and the seminaria n Milan of Povazska Bystrica. A frightful death befell Father Seda, the pastor in L1ptovsky Svaty Jan. In his report at a hearing of the U. S. Congress ional Committe e, the Catholic priest, Dr. Stephen Nahalka, related the suffering s inflicted on Father Seda: "They t::ut strips of slkin and flesh from his back and in the end even amputate d his genitals." Father Nicholas Sprinc, a priest of the same diocese as Father Seda, reported the following: "Father Seda was killed. The Reds first flayed him and then subjected him to tortures which it is not proper to describe in the press. His skin was stripped in thick layers. His tormento rs then kept cutting off parts of his body and forcing them into his mouth to the accompan iment of blasphenm ous exdamati ons about 'Holy Communion'." Another witness before the Congress ional Committe e was the Rev. Joseph Poess of Slorvakia whom the partisans had severely wounded in the mass grarve near Sklenne where he sewed as pastor. Ninety men perished in this mass grave, but Father Poess saved himself despite the fact that he had been buried alive. He made his escaipe out of the shallow grave and, after untold suffering s and imprisonm ent, made his way to freedom. The indictmen t which the Partisans fabricate d against him was that he had a secret sending station operating from the church and that he cached weapons in the church sacristy and under the altar in his church. Colonel Otto Klement had informati on on many individual instances of brutality wreaiked upon helple ss and innocent citizens by the partisans . In Turiec the ailing Mary R. fell into their hands; they struck her unconscio us with a heavy millk can. They tortured her by wedging pins under her nails and, after she was completel y spent, she had to kiss the feet of a common prostitute . F1inally the partisan band bound her in chains and bore her off to their headquarters, Sklabina in Turiec, where they shot her and threw her body into a mass burial pit. Her father, John R., was an old man of 78. The parti- �32 SLOVAKIA sans trussed him up and left him, barefoot and half na!ked, exiposed outdoors all night. When he accepted a pair of shoes offered hi.Im by a lady, the gypsy who was guarding him beat him brutally. Then the partisan horde took the old man to Siklabina, aimed a ,shat at the naJPe of his necik, just as they had dispatched his d:mghter, and threw him into the mass grave too. AH these people had no connection whatever with political activities of any kind. Their "offense" was that they were, to some extent, propertied people. Singled out for ,s,rucrifiice were also a number of valiant o:£ficers who chnse to accept no command in the uprising. For this service to their country, Colonels Kruna'k and Zverin, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Kfucik and First Lieutenants Frecer and SindJer, were shot to death. The distinguished General Turanec was put under house arrest in Bans:ka Bystrica right at the outset of the putsch. Once they let .Joose the full strength of their partisan activities, they had General Turanec flown to Moscow, where they tortured him for his uncompromising stand against communism. One of the major stigmas of the putsch is the concentration camp which the partisans arranged in the castle fortress Sl()IVenska L'wpca. Here they tormented and persecuted aver a th'Ousand viictims - not only men, but women and children, too. The sUJperintendent of this concentratiorn camp was the sa,v age Communist Staudinger. One of the prisoners, R. Rudohorsiky, recalls some of the sufferings experienced in Slovenska L'wpca: "The housing of the 1prisoners was horrible. The overseer packed over 150 ,people into a single room. Other sections were croweded with as many persons as eoouJd possibly be forced into them. Househo1d furnishings were remover. From the !beginning, the prisonern were bedded on the bare floor; later the authorities allowed them to bring in some straw. Spies, informers, and instigators of trouble were planted among the prisoners. Hygienic requirements in this concentration camp became a thing of the past. The iplace was a real hell. "Inmates tooik sick ,a s a result of the undernourishment, starvation, filth and foulness that prevailed. Instead �SLOVAKIA 33 of iprorviding medical help or relief for them, the vindictive jailer turned on them with aJbuse and emibittered their lives still further with inhuman treatment. Even when the doctor did come into the camp, he was allowed to examine a sick unfortunate only in the presence of the commandant of the guard of National Security . . . The physician prescribed medication for which the prisoner paid but never received . . . Fare: potatoes and caJbbage. Anything by wa,y of shorttening or grease that may have been allotted to the kitchen wa:s either appropriated by a woman-coolk o.f ill-repute or the suiperintendent o.f the institution and the commandant of National ,S ecurity, or it was sold. But conditions worsened to, such an extent that later not even potatoes or caJbbage ,w ere to be had. There was actual starvation. Red pa:rtiisans, armed to the teeth, visited the castle fortress daily to conduct investigations among the inmates. They heard the grievances orf the prisoners and freely dealt them resounding sla.ps and blows; they 1b eat the:n and tortured them unmercifuUy. "Many of the wretches were taken away under cover of night never to return again. Conditions became such that no prisoner' felt that his life wais safe. Everyone lived in dread expectation, wondering just when the partisans woU!ld come to claim this oo.e or that one who would vanish fureve,r in the abyss of death ... The barbaric superintendent, a former shooma'ker, on visiting the confining quarters abused the miseraible inmates by kic<king them a,bout like dogs while he cursed them fiendishly and threatened every one of them with the gall01Ws. If any of them ha,ppened to have a covering of any ,k ind, he ripped it -away, spewing insults upon them and calling them Nazis and Fascist swine.. "Little children begged their mothers for bread or m.i1'k but what were the un.ha,ppy mothers to do when the p-2rfidious scum that jaHed them had no mercy or feeling in its heart to allow at least to the children some substantial food. Wives were isolated from their husbands; they were :permitted to have no contact whatever, not even a brief .exchange from one to the other as they went for their daily rations. Husbands were the unwilling and helpless witnesses of the appalling sufferings of their wives and children." �34 SLOVAKIA Only prayer and hymns sustained balance and some ,semlblance of morale among the tortured prisoners whose .sufferings defied description. An evil reputation came to be associated with Kunerad, one of the headquarters of the partisan band located near the city 2ilina. V. 2ingor testified that the Czech Karel Bacilek was "the political commissar in the fortress Kunerad." Brutal in the extreme was the punishment meted out to anti-Communistic fighters and quick sentences were readily executed. It was comparable to SkJa;bina. To date it has not been ascertained precisely how many victims met maximum penalties in these two ,plaic-es. Colonel Klement reports that in Slklaib:itna O'Ver a thousand citirens were murdered from Turiec region aJone. In. the mass gra,ve in Podsucha, as the Rev. Stephen Naha1ka testified, there were found eighty victims of parti:sa,n ferocity. Father Poess revealed that in the mass graves near Sklenne rubout two hundred of his parishioners met their deaths. An American citizen, Mr. Smr~ov,s ky, declared before .U. S. Congressional Committee that in the Slovaik community where he had lived in the days of the Slovak Republic, ,the partisans on one occasion destroyed an entire family of five ipersons among whom were a two year old and a four year old child. All were then consigned to a mass grave. Other mass graves were also found at Kovacova, in Pusty Hrad, in the Prievidza valley, at Humenne, Lucivna, Bosany, L'wbietova, Nemeoka L'upca Mld Kremnioka. During this Communist putsch, material -losses in SlovaJkia were extremely great. The state statistical and planning office in Bratislava 1published in its "Statistical Hand1book of Slo:vaikia 1947" an evalution of damage inflicted on -buildings, projects and their equipment, art objects, communications, livestock, and other ravaged properties as in excess of 114,461,000,000 crowns or two and a half billion dollars. The arrival of the Soviet in Slovakia in the bloody August putsch of 1944 was a clear foreclast of what would befall the Slovak people in the event of the downfall of their independent State. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1957, Vol. 7 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 22), March 1957.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 23), June 1957.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 24-25), September-December 1957.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA THE 1944 COMMUNISTIC REBELLION IN SLOVAKIA In late August, 1944, a rebellion to overthrow the government of the free Slovak Republic was set in motion by Communist partisan forces that were parachuted into the country by Moscow. Although the predominant element among the invaders was Czech, there were also Russians and Frenchmen among them. Conspicuous as one of the leaders promoting this putsch was Dr. Joseph Lettrich who is now an official of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and resides in the United States. The objective of this offensive strategy was not only the ruthless subjugation of the Slovak government, but also the occupation of Slovakia and the integration of the crushed republic into the politically hybridized Czecho-Slovak Republic. With the help of Soviet troops this goal was achieved in the spring of 1945 . Some of the tactics and activities of these Red invaders are reliably described by Dr. Joseph Pauco in his latest book SLOVACI A KOMUNIZMUS (THE SLOVAKS AND COMMUNISM; Middletown, Pa.; 1957). We quote here in part from the chapter "Dielo pomsty" ("An Act of Revenge" - Ed.) The depravity of the partisans literally knew no bounds: They looted and plundered at will and murdered wantonly. Consequently the toll of the struggle was tragic even though the encounters did not last exceptionally long. Co,Ionel Otto Klement reports that "official statistics, released early in 1945, indicate that the so-called national uprising in 1944 cost the Slova:k nation close to 80,000 lives sacrificed on Slovak territrory." The partisans and their henchmen terrorized Slovak villages. They categorically seized all citizens of noite who had shown opposition to Cornmuni,s m. "They robbed their rupartments, homes, castles, factories, places of business, warehouses; they indulged in drunken orgies and began to annoy innocent victims, torturing and !killing them," states Colonel Otto Klement who was fully informed on all that happened. Thousands of Sloivruks were su!bjected to unspeakable tortures and inhuman torments. Among the first victims in this wave of terror was the Slo:v.a:k lalbor leader and mem1b ers o.f iParliament, Francis S1amen, who met his cruel fate in the town of Brezno nad Hronom .. He was a typical Slovruk laborer, one of thousands of diligent and honest Slava:k worikingmen, providing for his family by the toil of his hands. He was interested in the welfare of Slovak workers, 29 SLOVAKIA but his "crime" was that he based his interest on the principles of fundamental Christian equity. He organized a Christian-social wonkers' association and, as president of the group, he was shown a certain degree of deference by his co-iworkers who came to realize that the problems of the l8iboring class can be resolved without recourse to revolutionary methods, without violence, bloodshed, and the confiscation o.f private property. When Francis Slamen noticed thaJt there was a concentration of questionable elements in rthe neighborhood of Brezno, he decided to go to Bratislava in order to inform the state authorities. His planned to leave in the evening of August 27, 1944, but an informer foiled his plans. A few hours before train time, he was forced into a partisan truck The partisans then rounded up other influential loyal patriots in this town, driving them out of their homes at the point of leveled automatics. They ,padked them into the fore section of the truck while heavily armed guards took up the rear. At a;bout eleven o'clock at night, the truck started on its way, but it halted every fifty meters or so, in order to take on mo:re unfortunate capti'Ves. Shortly before midnight, the truck loaded with captives left the heart of town. When the trngic company reached the town limits, two oif the partisans, wh 0 were sta.ltio.ned as guards in the truck, opened fire on the victims. Several of them died on the spot; others lived a few hours longer. The sole survivor in this instance was Judge Denk. His face and head were spattered with the brain fragments o.f Slamen and Dolnan and both his hands, as well as his head and nedk, were torn with shot. But he did not lose consciousness and was able to save himself. When the partisams came to carry a,way the corpses, Denk let himself be taken as a dead man with the dead. They left him in the cemetery for !burial with the rest, and it was there that he spoke to the gendarme who was left to take over, begging him to take him to a hospital from where his wife later smuggled him out to safety and survival. The heartless partisans who carried out this coldblood1 30 SLOVAKIA ed task of political vengeance appropriated all the valuables on the pevsons of their victims right where they fell. They even stripped the dead of their shoes and before lea ving the scene, they 1kicked the bodies about with violent brutality. Another notable victim of the partisans was a Catholic priest and Parliamentary deputy, Rev. Anthony Salat, who died in the first weeik of the rebellion. He was a man of noble character and his was the stature of an earnest SlovaJk patriot, a brilliant popular writer, a matchless public speaker, and one of the most out-spoken and determined opponents of Communism. Through the years, dating baok as far as 1929, Father Salat serwed as a Parliamentary representative of the Slovak Populist Party. In public life he merited distinction not only as a gifted amd objecti;ve speaker, a defender of Slovak rights in the forum of Prague's hall of Parliament, but also as a journalist. Because of all this, the partisans marked as one of their earlist targets, a figure to be cut down mercilessly, this Father Anthony Salat, a distinguished national leader and an intrepid fighter for justice. They dragged him out of the quiet orf his parish to the bridge that spans the Hron River. He begged to be allowed to make his confession but the rabble refused him this spiritual consolation. fu answer to his request they sounded off rounds of satanic la,ughter and piercing ridicule which alternated with sal:vos from their automatics, felling the good priest to the cold pa,vement of the bridge that he had built for the community. But even this did not satisfy the savage "liberators." They ,b eset the cor;pse of the murdered Father Salat and robbed it. Out of his vest poc!ket they removed his gold watch; out of his coat pocket they took his wallet. They even knoc:ked out several of his teeth and claimed the gold caps from his dental work. Then they hurled the brutally albused a.111d rifled body in.to the Bron. Father Anthony Salat was not the only Slovak Catholic priest done to cruel death iby the partisans. Among others who perished under the violent hand of the oppres1 SLOVAKIA 31 sons were Fathers J ohn Nemec, Martinka of Liptovsk y Svaty Michal, and the seminaria n Milan of Povazska Bystrica. A frightful death befell Father Seda, the pastor in L1ptovsky Svaty Jan. In his report at a hearing of the U. S. Congress ional Committe e, the Catholic priest, Dr. Stephen Nahalka, related the suffering s inflicted on Father Seda: "They t::ut strips of slkin and flesh from his back and in the end even amputate d his genitals." Father Nicholas Sprinc, a priest of the same diocese as Father Seda, reported the following: "Father Seda was killed. The Reds first flayed him and then subjected him to tortures which it is not proper to describe in the press. His skin was stripped in thick layers. His tormento rs then kept cutting off parts of his body and forcing them into his mouth to the accompan iment of blasphenm ous exdamati ons about 'Holy Communion'." Another witness before the Congress ional Committe e was the Rev. Joseph Poess of Slorvakia whom the partisans had severely wounded in the mass grarve near Sklenne where he sewed as pastor. Ninety men perished in this mass grave, but Father Poess saved himself despite the fact that he had been buried alive. He made his escaipe out of the shallow grave and, after untold suffering s and imprisonm ent, made his way to freedom. The indictmen t which the Partisans fabricate d against him was that he had a secret sending station operating from the church and that he cached weapons in the church sacristy and under the altar in his church. Colonel Otto Klement had informati on on many individual instances of brutality wreaiked upon helple ss and innocent citizens by the partisans . In Turiec the ailing Mary R. fell into their hands; they struck her unconscio us with a heavy millk can. They tortured her by wedging pins under her nails and, after she was completel y spent, she had to kiss the feet of a common prostitute . F1inally the partisan band bound her in chains and bore her off to their headquarters, Sklabina in Turiec, where they shot her and threw her body into a mass burial pit. Her father, John R., was an old man of 78. The parti- 32 SLOVAKIA sans trussed him up and left him, barefoot and half na!ked, exiposed outdoors all night. When he accepted a pair of shoes offered hi.Im by a lady, the gypsy who was guarding him beat him brutally. Then the partisan horde took the old man to Siklabina, aimed a ,shat at the naJPe of his necik, just as they had dispatched his d:mghter, and threw him into the mass grave too. AH these people had no connection whatever with political activities of any kind. Their "offense" was that they were, to some extent, propertied people. Singled out for ,s,rucrifiice were also a number of valiant o:£ficers who chnse to accept no command in the uprising. For this service to their country, Colonels Kruna'k and Zverin, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Kfucik and First Lieutenants Frecer and SindJer, were shot to death. The distinguished General Turanec was put under house arrest in Bans:ka Bystrica right at the outset of the putsch. Once they let .Joose the full strength of their partisan activities, they had General Turanec flown to Moscow, where they tortured him for his uncompromising stand against communism. One of the major stigmas of the putsch is the concentration camp which the partisans arranged in the castle fortress Sl()IVenska L'wpca. Here they tormented and persecuted aver a th'Ousand viictims - not only men, but women and children, too. The sUJperintendent of this concentratiorn camp was the sa,v age Communist Staudinger. One of the prisoners, R. Rudohorsiky, recalls some of the sufferings experienced in Slovenska L'wpca: "The housing of the 1prisoners was horrible. The overseer packed over 150 ,people into a single room. Other sections were croweded with as many persons as eoouJd possibly be forced into them. Househo1d furnishings were remover. From the !beginning, the prisonern were bedded on the bare floor; later the authorities allowed them to bring in some straw. Spies, informers, and instigators of trouble were planted among the prisoners. Hygienic requirements in this concentration camp became a thing of the past. The iplace was a real hell. "Inmates tooik sick ,a s a result of the undernourishment, starvation, filth and foulness that prevailed. Instead SLOVAKIA 33 of iprorviding medical help or relief for them, the vindictive jailer turned on them with aJbuse and emibittered their lives still further with inhuman treatment. Even when the doctor did come into the camp, he was allowed to examine a sick unfortunate only in the presence of the commandant of the guard of National Security . . . The physician prescribed medication for which the prisoner paid but never received . . . Fare: potatoes and caJbbage. Anything by wa,y of shorttening or grease that may have been allotted to the kitchen wa:s either appropriated by a woman-coolk o.f ill-repute or the suiperintendent o.f the institution and the commandant of National ,S ecurity, or it was sold. But conditions worsened to, such an extent that later not even potatoes or caJbbage ,w ere to be had. There was actual starvation. Red pa:rtiisans, armed to the teeth, visited the castle fortress daily to conduct investigations among the inmates. They heard the grievances orf the prisoners and freely dealt them resounding sla.ps and blows; they 1b eat the:n and tortured them unmercifuUy. "Many of the wretches were taken away under cover of night never to return again. Conditions became such that no prisoner' felt that his life wais safe. Everyone lived in dread expectation, wondering just when the partisans woU!ld come to claim this oo.e or that one who would vanish fureve,r in the abyss of death ... The barbaric superintendent, a former shooma'ker, on visiting the confining quarters abused the miseraible inmates by kic<king them a,bout like dogs while he cursed them fiendishly and threatened every one of them with the gall01Ws. If any of them ha,ppened to have a covering of any ,k ind, he ripped it -away, spewing insults upon them and calling them Nazis and Fascist swine.. "Little children begged their mothers for bread or m.i1'k but what were the un.ha,ppy mothers to do when the p-2rfidious scum that jaHed them had no mercy or feeling in its heart to allow at least to the children some substantial food. Wives were isolated from their husbands; they were :permitted to have no contact whatever, not even a brief .exchange from one to the other as they went for their daily rations. Husbands were the unwilling and helpless witnesses of the appalling sufferings of their wives and children." 34 SLOVAKIA Only prayer and hymns sustained balance and some ,semlblance of morale among the tortured prisoners whose .sufferings defied description. An evil reputation came to be associated with Kunerad, one of the headquarters of the partisan band located near the city 2ilina. V. 2ingor testified that the Czech Karel Bacilek was "the political commissar in the fortress Kunerad." Brutal in the extreme was the punishment meted out to anti-Communistic fighters and quick sentences were readily executed. It was comparable to SkJa;bina. To date it has not been ascertained precisely how many victims met maximum penalties in these two ,plaic-es. Colonel Klement reports that in Slklaib:itna O'Ver a thousand citirens were murdered from Turiec region aJone. In. the mass gra,ve in Podsucha, as the Rev. Stephen Naha1ka testified, there were found eighty victims of parti:sa,n ferocity. Father Poess revealed that in the mass graves near Sklenne rubout two hundred of his parishioners met their deaths. An American citizen, Mr. Smr~ov,s ky, declared before .U. S. Congressional Committee that in the Slovaik community where he had lived in the days of the Slovak Republic, ,the partisans on one occasion destroyed an entire family of five ipersons among whom were a two year old and a four year old child. All were then consigned to a mass grave. Other mass graves were also found at Kovacova, in Pusty Hrad, in the Prievidza valley, at Humenne, Lucivna, Bosany, L'wbietova, Nemeoka L'upca Mld Kremnioka. During this Communist putsch, material -losses in SlovaJkia were extremely great. The state statistical and planning office in Bratislava 1published in its "Statistical Hand1book of Slo:vaikia 1947" an evalution of damage inflicted on -buildings, projects and their equipment, art objects, communications, livestock, and other ravaged properties as in excess of 114,461,000,000 crowns or two and a half billion dollars. The arrival of the Soviet in Slovakia in the bloody August putsch of 1944 was a clear foreclast of what would befall the Slovak people in the event of the downfall of their independent State.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 1944 Communistic Rebellion in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (24-25), September-December 1957 pp. 28-34 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1957 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/77ae7728cbfaed1948b983254b1b7916.pdf 63d60bb63d722e7fef72b40f1cb8a349 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 99 THE 1985 PILGRIMAGE AT VELEHRAD: SLOVAK CATHOLICS AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPACE David Doellinger An analysis of the 1985 pilgrimage at Velehrad reveals many of the ways that the nature of pilgrimages (and thus Catholicism's role in Communist Czechoslovakia) had begun to change during the 1980s. At this event, Catholic activists and pilgrims surprised church leaders by voicing their opposition to state policy in front of Party officials, thereby transforming a religious tradition into a public space where Slovak Catholics could meet free from state interference to assert their religious and political beliefs. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage offers an interesting window into the increas ingly contentious relationship between church and state in Czec hoslovakia. It illustrates the mobilizing influence of Pope John Paul II and reveals that restive Catholics, who had been practicing their faith secretly in the underground, helped empower some leaders in the Czechoslovakia's official hierarchy - particularly Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague - to be more critical of the state's religious policies. Man y scholars have recognized the ability of pilgrimages to serve as barometers of soc ial and political change. In their analysis of Christian pilgrimage traditi ons, anthropologists Victor and Edith Turner conclude: Pilgrimage should be regarded ... as an institution with a history. Each pilgrimage, of any length, is vulnerable to the history of its period and must come to terms with shifts of political geography. Pilgrimage is more responsive to social change and popular moods than liturgical ritual, fixed by rubric. 1 1 Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives (New York : Columbia Un ivers ity Press, 1978), 23 1. �SLOVAKIA The character of Slovak pilgrimages had certainly reflected the changing social and political landscape in Slovakia after the Second World War. Pilgrimages had been an important part of Slovak reli gious life since the middle ages. Over thirty pilgrimage sites exist throughout Slovakia and Slovak pilgrim s also visited several religious sites in the Czech lands. Until 1949, when state permission to hold public gatherings such as pilgrimages became mandatory, local church officials had organized the annu al pilgrimages and services at these sites. Thereafter, there had been little acti vity at these sites on pilgrimage days, with the exception of the moments of political liberalization, such as in 1956 (following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin) and 1968 (during the Prague Spring). 2 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage has received much attention by Western political analysts and scholars. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Keston News Service fo llowed this event closely and released extensive reports about thi s pilgrimage (and the pilgrimages that followed). 3 Although Velehrad is located in Moravi a, this pilgrimage was of particular importance to Slovak Catholi cs, who attended in relatively high numbers. Several schol ars writing in the latter half of the 1980s referred to thi s pilgrimage as evidence of a reli gious revival and the resilience of Catholicism in Slovakia. 4 Scholars writing after 1989 have referred to thi s pilgrimage and those that followed, not only in the context of a religious revival, but 2 Karel Kaplan notes that not onl y pilgrimages, but also attendance at reli gious services and the forma tion of new youth groups occurred during the upheaval s in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Karel Kaplan, " Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956 - Part III ," Religion in Comm unist Lands, 14, no. 3 (fall 1986): 280. Milan J. Reban reports a sim ilar resurgence of pilgrimages during the Prague Spring in 1968 . Milan J. Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed . Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke Uni versity Press, I 990), 15 I. 3 The Keston News Service was based at Keston College, England and provided reports and analys is of the religious situation in East Europe. 4 See Janice Brou n, Conscience and Capti vity: Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), 67- 101. Also see Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar (Bloom ington and Indianapo lis: Ind iana Universi ty Press, 1987), 78. �SLOVAKIA 101 also as an example of one of the few expressions of independent or non-state activity in Slovakia. 5 Pilgrimages and their increasing popularity throughout the 1980s became one of the most visible markers of a religious revival in Slovakia. This religious revival had begun almost a decade earlier and was closely related to the election of a Pole, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II in 1978. Pope John Paul II took a new aggressive and uncompromising stand when dealing with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe. Under Pope Paul Vi's (1963-1978) eastern policy (Ostpolitik), the Vatican had made preserving the church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia a primary goal, even at the expense of making important concessions to the Communist government. In 1973, Cardinal Casaroli, responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik, had negotiated the regime's approval of four new bishops, even though all four remained members of Pacem in Terris, a state sponsored organization that coordinated the work of priests in Czechoslovakia. Although this agreement brought the total number of bishops to five (out of thirteen dioceses), many Czech and Slovak Catholics criticized the Vatican's tolerance of Pacem in Terris. Breaking with his predecessor, Pope John Paul II refused to compromise with these governments, particularly with regards to spiritual matters. In 1982, he formally condemned Pacem in Terris. 6 As Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla had secretly ordained many Czech and Slovak priests in the 1970s. Silvester Krcmery, a leader of Slovakia's secret church and a friend of Wojtyla since 1973, described him as a protector of the Slovaks. Emphasizing the importance of their shared experiences under Communism, Krcmery pointed to a 5 Stokes refers to the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage not only in terms of attendance, but also as evidence of Cardinal Tomasek's increasing willingness to act independently of the state. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152. See also Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London : Duke University Press , 1991), 109 and Padraic Kenney , A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 36. 6 Alexander Tomsky, "Pacem in Terris," Religion in Communist Lands lO (1982): 278-279. For a discussion of bishop vacancies, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 125. �102 SLOVAKIA bond that undoubted ly other Catholics in Czechoslovakia shared by saying: "He has lived all thi s persec ution of Catholics." 7 While the election of a Polish pope in 1978 helps explain the increased popularity of Catholicism and religious traditions in Slovakia, the events at Yelehrad in 1985 indicate th at the nature of the pilgrimage experience was transformed by activists in the secret (underground) Catholic church. Such a church existed in the Czech lands and Slovakia from the late 1940s to 1989. It was organized by Catholics in response to the persec ution they faced by the Communist authorities. Members of the secret church met in private apartments for bible study , fellowship and even choir practice. Bishops and priests who had been clandestinely trained and ordained provided pastoral serv ices to these believers. By the 1980s, activists in the secret church published and distributed a wide variety of books and newsletters as samizdat. 8 The undergro und church used its samizdat network to publicize this and later pilgrimages by printing announcements of upcoming pilgrimages and it published accounts of each year's pilgrimages. A rich written record of the 1985 Velehrad pil gri mage can be found in thi s body of sa mizdat literature. 9 7 Silvester Krcmery , interview by author, 3 July I996 , Bratislava, Slovakia. For a brief description of Krcmery's first meeting with Wojtyta, see Frantisek Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct' roz vratit: z osudov katolickej cfrkvi na Slovensku v rokoch I 943-89 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 125. 8 David Doellinger, " Prayers, Pilgrims , and Petitions: The Secret Church and the Growth of Civ il Society in Slovakia," Nationalities Papers 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 215-240. 9 Samizdat (self-published) refers to newspapers, articles, essays, books , etc. that were printed with mimeograph machines or typed carbon copy, and often distributed illegall y, usuall y throu gh personal contacts and info rm al networks. Archi ves with the most extensive holdings on Slovak religious samizdat include: Listy z podzemia samizdat arch ive at the Christian Democratic Movement headq uarters, Bratislava, Slovakia ; Libri Prohibiti Samizdat Archive, Prag ue, Czech Republic; Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Dobrichovice (Prague), Czech Republic. Slovak samizda t can also be found in the Keston Institute's arc hi ve, Oxford , England and th e arc hives of Radi o Free Europe/Radio Liberty in th e Open Society Archives , Budapest, Hungary. For a comprehensive catalog of Slovak religious sam izdat, see Rudolf Lessak, Listy z podzemia: suboma dokumentacia krestanskej samizdatovej publicistiky na S/ovensku v rokoch I 945- I989 (Bratislava: US PO, 1998). �SLOVAKIA 103 The 1985 Velehrad Pilgrimage An increasing number of Catholics attended pilgrimages in Slovakia in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, samizdat reports only carried information for the pilgrimages to Sastfn and Levoca, the two most popular Slovak pilgrimages. An estimated 15 ,000 people attended the pilgrimage at Sastfn in 1983 ; attendance jumped to 50,000 in 1984. 10 About 100,000 pilgrims attended the pilgrimages at Levoca in both 1982 and 1983. 11 The new role and importance of the pilgrimage tradition became firmly established at the 1985 pilgrimage at Yelehrad. An important pil grimage site in Moravia, Velehrad had already hosted an estim ated 40,000 pilgrims in 1984. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage, however, commemorated the 1, 100th anni versary of the death of St. Methodius, who along with St. Cyril , had introduced eastern Christianity (and the Slavic liturgy) to the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. The work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius is particulai:.ly important to Slovak Catholics, who trace their political, cultural and religious history to thi s early empire and the arrival of these monks. 12 Several months prior to the pilgrimage, Czechoslovak Catholics and the Communist authorities began to contest the direction of the Yelehrad commemoration. At the center of the dispute was the question of whether Pope John Paul II would be permitted to attend the event. The Pope had made his first visit to Poland as early as 1979, and Czechoslovakia 's Catholics hoped this anniversary would bring a papal visit. An August 1984 letter to President Gustav Husak, signed simpl y the " Youth of CSSR," demanded that the Pope be 10 "Sastfnska put' I983 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'(sami zdat) 4 (1983): 2; "Sastfnsky prihovor otca Biskupa Gabrisa," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'5 ( 1984): 8; " Sastfn '84," Vy ber (sami zdat) 4 ( 1984): 38. 11 "Annual Pilgrimage to Levoca," Keston News Service (KNS), no. 156 (August I6, I982): 3-4. Also, see Vy ber, 3 (1984 ): 7. 12 See lmrich Kruzliak, "The Heritage of Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Works of Slovak Writers and Artists," in SS. Cy ril and M ethodius Among the Slovaks: Observing the 1, JOd" Anniversary of Saint Methodius' Death, eds. lmrich Kru zliak and Frances L. Mi zenko (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1985), 134-143. The territori al extent of thi s empire is unclear, but it probably included large porti ons of present day Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. �104 SLOVAKIA permitted to attend the 1, l 00 th anniversary event. The authors indicated that they were Catholics from Banska Bystrica (in central Slovakia) and argued that there was popular support for a papal visit: We are in the jubilee year of St. Methodius. Thousands of young hearts put their signature on the request that the Holy Father John Paul II come to our country for thi s jubilee celebration. We join with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, who personally invited the Holy Father to this celebration. Esteemed Mr. President, if these thousands of signatures are [too] few, we are willing to collect additional thousands from young people to agai n document for you the desire of the absolute majority of inhabitants of the CSSR, so that the Holy Father comes to our republic for this precious jubilee occasion. 13 In February 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had formally invited the Pope to Velehrad, and over 17,000 Catholic youth in Czechoslovakia 14 signed a statement demonstrating their support for thi s visit. Cardinal Tomasek also cited this petition action in a letter to the CSSR government requesting permission for the visit. 15 A samizdat author analyzing the importance of the Velehrad celebration for Slovaks and the meaning of the petition wrote: "It is a new first in the public life of our church." 16 The Slovak secret church helped publicize several of these appeals for the Pope' s attendance. Despite the authorities' refusal, public support for the Papal visit continued. On New Years Day 1985 , Cardinal Tomasek sent a letter to the Pope with an additional 500 signatures that had been collected over Christmas. The letter reaffirmed the desire of Czechoslovak Catholics for the Pope to come to Velehrad on September 14 for the Methodius commemoration. It also invited the Pope to visit Sastfn, a Slovak pilgrimage site, afterwards 17 The authorities continued to refuse permission for the visit. 18 13 Letter to President Husak from the Youth of CSS R, 29 August 1984, I, Keston st Institute Fi le (hereafter KJ): CZ ROM 7/4 1 Methodius Celebrations 1985. 14 "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1984): 17. 15 Una Sane ta Catholica (samizdat) Tu rice ( 1984 ): 35. 16 • "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," 17-1 8. 17 Naboienstvo a sucasnost'2 (1985): 19. 18 Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Do wn, 152. Though the authori ties prevented Pope John Paul II from attending the commemoration, his encyc lical Slavorum �SLOVAKIA 105 As the Velehrad pilgrimage approached, members of the secret church in both the Czech lands and Slovakia began making plans to alter the length and nature of the commemoration by organizing a special night program. Catholic activists wanted to invite youth to the site on Saturday, July 6, 1985, for a special program of song and prayer during the night preceding the official commemoration, which had been scheduled for Sunday, July 7. Night programs had already become a popular component of pilgrimages in Slovakia. Over 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at the Levoca pilgrimage in 1983. 19 At Sastfn in 1984, a night program organized by Vladimir Jukl, one of the leaders of the Slovak secret church, had also preceded the regular pilgrimage celebration.20 The plan for a night program at Velehrad appears to have originated with both Moravian and Slovak sources. Catholic youth in Moravia invited their counterparts in Slovakia and Bohemia to the Saturday program that would include prayers for the unity of the church, the Pope, bishops and others in the Church. The Slovak reli gious samizdat Vy ber helped distribute this invitation by prominently publishing it on the back of the front cover of a spring 1985 issue.2' Frantisek Miklosko, another activist in the Slovak secret church , refers to the Moravian Catholics' pl an in a history of the post-war Catholi c Church in Slovakia that he published in 1991 . He credits Vladimir Jukl with the idea of introducing the night program at Velehrad. Miklosko personally presented Jukl 's plan for a night program to Cardinal Tomasek, who supported the idea. Though the local priest and bishop responsible for Velehrad refused to officially approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in Velehrad's basilica, the plan for the night program went ahead. 22 On Saturday afternoon , Ju ly 6, the Velehrad celebration made its informal start with the arri val of an estimated 5,000 young Apostoli - which praised the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was published on the day of the event. Alexander Tomsky, "St Methodius Return s to Czechos lovakia," KNS, no. 235 (October 3, 1985): 18- 19. 19 " Vfce nez sto ti sfc poutn fku na Levocske hofe 3.7. 1983," ln fo rmace o cfrk vi (sami zdat) 9 (1983): 13. 20 "Sastfn ' 84," Vfber 4 ( 1984): 38. Miklosko writes that Ju kl developed the idea for the night program for Sastfn that year. Miklosko, Nebudete ich moct'rozvratit, 136. 21 Vfber4 (1985). 22 Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct'rozvratit;128- l 30. �106 SLOVAKIA Catholics. Accounts of their activities filled subseq uent samizdat periodicals and painted a vivid picture of their activities prior to the formal opening of the celebration at 10:00 AM on Sunday morning. As they arrived on Saturday, the young pilgrims sat in small groups in front of the basilica, some talking with friends and others singing songs, sometimes with the accompaniment of a guitar. Bishop Jan Korec , who had been secretly consecrated in 1951, visited with the young pilgrims in the afternoon and remained with them throughout the night. 23 After an evening mass inside the basilica, the pilgrims spent the night outside with one group in front of the basilica and the other in a nearby field. Each group stayed awake the entire night and observed a program of prayer, meditation and si nging. During the night, both groups chanted slogans such as "We want cloisters," "Long live Tomasek," and "Long live the Pope." One report indicated that the pilgrims also chanted "Let the Pope Come" for about twenty-five minutes. 24 One member of the Slovak secret church apparently spent Saturday afternoon and night with a tape recorder recording the songs, chants and conversations with the pilgrims. A Slovak samiz dat periodical published excerpts from this recording, capturing some of the different hopes and concerns of those in attendance, including the di sappointment of one young pilgrim that the state authorities viewed the pilgrimage and anniversary celebration as a "peace event." The pilgrim, speaking sometime late Saturday evening, described his mixed response to the weekend: I assumed that many believers would participate in this pilgrimage, but I am very surprised by the multitude of people who are already here today. I am very enthusiastic about it, because I expect rich spiritual fruits from this pilgrimage. I regret, of course - and I also think everyone else does - that we may not have the Holy Father here among us. But on the other hand, we are glad that he is represented here by Cardinal Casaro li [responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik]. 25 23 " Velehrad ' 85 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1985): 17. The largest Czech religious samizdat periodical republished this report. "Velehrad I985 , videny zo Slovenska," Jnformace o cirkvi IO (1985), 6-7. 24 "Boli sme na Velehrade," Rodinne spolocenstvo (samizdat) 5 ( 1985): 5-6. 25 "Velehrad ' 85 z magnetofonoveho zaznamu," Vyber9 (1985): 12. �SLOVAKIA 107 Early in the morning a fifty-year old priest, asked for his reaction to thi s " uncommon" event, replied: We spent this night at Velehrad together with Sai nts Cyril and Methodius. And it was very beautiful. There are groups of young believers here from all over Slovakia and also from the Czech lands, but a preponderance here are Slovaks. 26 Though located in Moravia, the night program at Velehrad was of particul ar interest to Slovak Catholics, and other observers also noted the large presence of Slovaks at Velehrad.27 . The enthusiasm of the young Catholics who had arri ved early to spend the night at Velehrad carried over to the official celebrations on Sunday. Despite the state's efforts to curtail attendance by canceling public transportation to Velehrad, pilgrims from all over Czechoslovakia arrived , many on foot, to join those who had spent the night singing, praying and chanting. 28 One samizdat periodical reported that at a 7:00 AM mass outside the Basilica, the pilgrims who had arrived only that morning were surprised that the young people, fo llowing the singing of the papal hymn, broke into chants of "Long li ve John Paul II! " and " Let us have the Hol y Father! " 29 The youth had been chanting these slogans throughout the night, and like a team coming out of a hi gh-school pep rally, they were ready for the celebration to begin. By 10:00 AM, when the official celebration began, an estimated 100,000-250,000 pilgrims had gathered outside the Basilica in the center of Velehrad. 30 A local Party official opened the celebration by welcoming everyone to what he called the St. Methodiu s " Peace Celebration ." In response to this designation, the 26 Ibid., 19. Another Slovak priest, Father Martinec, explai ned that he had he lped wi th the organization of the pilgrimage and the arriva l of Slovak Catholics at Yelehrad . Karel Martinec, interview by author, 4 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. 28 "Yelehrad 1985 ," Vzkffsenf(samizdat) 2 ( 1985): 15. 29 " Boli sme na Yelehrade," 5. 30 Religious samizdat peri odical s re ported this wide range estimate of pilgrims in attendance. See "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 8; "Yelehrad ' 85," 18; " Yelehrad 1985," Vzkifsenf2 ( 1985): 15; and " Yelehrad nas," Informace o cfrk vi 10 ( 1985): 6. Photographs of the pilgrims gathered around the Bas ilica at Yelehrad on Jul y 7 - taken from different angles - indicate that the pilgrims filled every inch of the square and support the magnitude of the size of the crowd as reported by religious samizdat. Kl: photo collection, photos# 1793 and # 1876. 27 �108 SLOVAKIA pilgrims responded negatively with whistles and shouts of "We want Holy Mass!" 3 1 Following the singi ng of the state anthem, the Minister of Culture, Dr. Milan Klu sak, spoke. Again, the pilgrims expressed their dissatisfaction with the official spin he gave to the importance of the anniversary. Several samizdat periodicals reported the following exchange between Klusak and the pilgrims: [Minister Klusak] grasped the situation and therefore improvised as he spoke. In order to stress that he did not consider the celebration to be a peace celebration, he said that he came to the pilgrimage to celebrate Methodius' memory. The crowd corrected him by chanting "Saint, Saint." When he said that Cyril and Methodius brought us a language and alphabet, the people supplemented it with "Faith , Faith!" The surpri sed minister then began a discussion with the people by saying "The Bi shop will speak about Faith to you. We have divided up the work." ... the young people replied to him: "Freedom, Religious Freedom." The minister argued back to the youth and everyone else: "If you did not have [religious freedom], you would not be here." 32 The pilgrims responded to the remainder of Klusak's speech with chants: "We Want the Holy Father!" "We Want Religious Freedom," and "We Want Bishops!" In contrast to the pilgrims' dissatisfaction with the state authorities' remarks, the pilgrims enthusiastically supported the words of the church officials. During the heckling of Minister Klu sak, the pilgrims had also chanted "Long Live Cardinal Tomasek! and "Casaroli!" 33 Cardinal Tomasek read a letter from the Pope that reportedly energized the pilgrims despite their disappointment that the Pope was not there to deliver his words personally . During the Mass, Cardinal Casaroli switched between Czech and Slovak while delivering his sermon.34 Accounts indicate that Cardinal Tomasek and Cardinal Casaroli clearly were surprised by the hi gh attendance and the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. After- 31 "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 7. fbid ., 7. A similar account of this exchange, written by a Slovak pilgrim , appeared in Czech samizdat. " Velehrad 1985 ," Vzkfisenf2 ( 1985): 16. See also Jan Korec, Od barbarskej noci na slobode (Bratislava: Luc, 1993), 342. 33 "Velehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sucasnost; 18. 34 "Boli sme na Velehrade," 7-8. 32 �SLOVAKIA 109 wards, Cardinal Tomasek reportedly told a group of young people, "This is not reality, this is a dream. " 35 The Significance of Velehrad The relatively large number of Catholic youth from Slovakia that chose to come earl y to this pilgrimage indicates both the strength of Catholicism in Slovakia and the failure of the state 's restricti ve policies against the church. Vaclav Benda, a Catholic Czech activist, afterwards commented on the significance of this pilgrimage: Yelehrad was an effective demonstration that the experiment of splitting the church was condemned to failure and ridiculous from the beginning. It must presently be clear from this pilgrimage ... that the prohibitions or radical restriction on the church drove several million active believers into the underground. 36 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage was critical turning point in a revival of the pilgrimage tradition in Slovakia. After Yelehrad, pilgrimage attendance and the number of sites hosting pilgrimages in Slovakia increased significantly. 37 Levoca, in eastern Slovakia, received the largest number of pilgrims with an estimated 150,000 in 1986,38 200,000-230,000 in 1987,39 and possibly as high as 280,000 300,000 in 1988.40 The number of pilgrims to Sastfn, a small village located north of Bratislava near the Moravian border, grew steadily from estimates of 40,000-50,000 in 1986,4 1 and 60,000 in 1987 ,42 to 35 " Yelehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sricasnost; 18. Vaclav Benda, "Ako d'alej po Yelehrade?" Naboienstvo a sricasnost'2 (I 986): 4. 37 Attendance at Slo vak pil grimages in 1989 was also high, but there is less information in samizdat about that year's pilgrimages than for earlier years. This is probably due to the fac t that reports of the summer pilgrimages usually appeared in late fa ll samizdat issues, by which time the Velvet Revolution had already begun. 38 "Levoca 1986," Voice of A merica (VOA) 12 July 1986. 39 "Record Numbers Attend Slovak Pilgrimages," Keston News Service, 280 (23 Jul y 87): 19; "Message from Jan Carnogursky to Keston College," KI: CZ ROM 7 /4 Pilgrimages; "Levoca put' 1987," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'4 ( 1987): 7. 40 " Mariansky rok na Slovensku," Katolfcky mesacnik (sami zdat) 4 (1 988): I ; Peter Marti n, "The Pilgrimage to Levoca," R FE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19. Another sami zdat periodical estimated the attendance in 1988 at " more than 200,000 ." See "Mys lienky z Levocskej pute," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'3 (I 988): 3. 41 " Putne slav nosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," Naboienstvo a sricasnost' I ( I 987): I 719. 36 �110 SLOVAKIA 60,000-70,000 in 1988. 43 The number of pilgrims to Gaboltov, estimated at 20,000-25,000 in 1985 ,44 increased more dramatically from estimates of 30,000-50,000 in 198645 to as high as l 00,000 in 1987 and 1988. 46 Large numbers of pilgrims also visited traditionally less popular pilgrimage sites in Slovakia during this period. Lutina, an important Greek Catholic pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia, received 40,000 pilgrims in 198647 and 50,000 in 1987 .48 Topolcany received 25,000 pilgrims in 1988.49 Due to the nature of a pilgrimage, usually an outdoor event with people sitting or standing in a town square or in a nearby field, only estimates, probably made by members of the secret church present at the pilgrimage, are available. Jan Camogursky , a prominent activist in the Slovak secret church, reported that as he became aware of the political significance of the pilgrimages in 1987, he began making estimates of the number of pilgrims attending the events throughout Slovakia.50 Although not an exact count, these estimates are significant as a measure of the increase in the multitude of pilgrim s attending a particular pilgrimage, an increase that the authors of samizdat reports on pilgrimages were certainly observing. The increase in attendance after 1985 suggests that pilgrimages can be more than barometers of social change; the Velehrad pilgrimage promoted a change in the function of pilgrimages and their appeal to Catholics. The active force that promoted this transformation was the secret church. Members of this community helped transform the pilgrimage tradition into a space where Catholics could meet publicly and in large numbers to worship. Velehrad 's night program allowed young people active in the underground to meet 42 "Sastfn - September 1987," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'5 (1987): l 1. "Sastfn - '88," K ato/fcky mesacnik 5 ( 1988): I. 44 "Gaboltov ' 85 ," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 (I 985): 20. 45 " Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r 1986," 17- 19. 46 " Message from Jan Camogursky to Keston College"; "Put' v Gaboltove," VOA , 24 Jul y 1988. 47 "Pout' reckokatoliku v Lu tine 1986," lnformace o cfrkvi 10 (1986): I0. 48 "Message from Jan Camogursky." 49 "Pilgrimage at Topol'cany," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 13 September 1988. 50 Jan Camogursky, interview by author, 16 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. Documents in the Keston Institute archive indicate that he sent reports of these estimates to Western news organizations. See for example, "Message from Jan Camogursky." 43 �SLOVAKIA 111 with other Catholics and express their faith publicly. Velehrad had demonstrated the secret church 's ability to mobilize its members to participate in a public event, and it continued to do so during the remainder of the decade. Slovak Catholic activists contributed to the popularity of pilgrimages and their night programs in the later half of the 1980s. The used the secret church 's samizdat network to inform its members about previous pilgrimages and to promote attendance at upcoming ones. From 1986 to 1989, the issues of Naboi enstvo a sucasnost; Rodinne spolocenstvo and later Katolfcky mesacnfk published extensive articles and reports about Slovak pilgrimages. This coverage included first hand reports of pilgrims' experiences, often including descriptions of their walk to the site and the activities of the night program. These samizdat periodicals also frequently published transcripts of prayers and sermons spoken during Mass at a pilgrimage, as well as historical information about different pilgrimage sites. 5 1 They also published schedules and information about upcoming pilgrimages in Slovakia. 52 As a result of this coverage, a written record of the experiences, worship service, activities, and even the chants at pilgrimages has been preserved. Catholics unable to attend a particular pilgrimage could learn about what had been said and done by reading these accounts. Since most samizdat reports on pilgrimages were usuall y publi shed several months after the pilgrimage, this coverage reminded Slovak Catholics of what had happened during the summer. Its reports and descriptions of previous pilgrimages promoted the events, and its schedule information certainly helped coordinate attendance at a pilgrimage. In addition to its samiz dat network, information about pilgrimages was shared through the communities of the secret church. Carnogursky reported that many of its communities "visited these pilgrimages collectively as groups." 53 The Slovak secret church also continued to promote the night program for pilgrimages after 1985, and attendance at night prog- 51 For the text of a prayer read by a local priest at the I 988 Sastfn pilgrimage, see "Modlitba na zaver marianskeho Rok u," Kato/icky mesacnfk 6 ( 1988): 5-7 . Another arti cle recounts the history of th e Sastfn pilgrim age site fro m 9 16 A.O. to 1987. "Sastfn," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'4 ( 1987): 8-10. 52 " Letna - putnicka - aktivita 1989," Kato/icky mesacmk 5 ( I 989): 6. 53 Camogursky, interview. �112 SLOVAKIA rams increased. A samizdat article describing the pilgrimage celebrations that had taken place throughout Slovakia in 1986 announced that in 1987 night programs were scheduled in Gaboltov and Uhorna in addition to Levoca and Sastin. 54 In 1988, an estimated 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at Gaboltov,55 and 100,000 attended the night program during the Marian year pilgrimage in Levoca. 56 The following year, 5,000-10,000 people attended the night pro57 gram at the smaller pilgrimage site of Lutina. At the pilgrimage, the members of the secret church could do openly and publicly what they had done since their foundation: gather for prayer, meditation, and worship. Rather than finding safety in small numbers by meeting in private apartments, the pilgrimage tradition allowed the secret church members to practice their faith publicly, on a larger scale, and in fellowship with Catholics not active in the secret church. Jan Camogursky, reporting on the significance of pilgrimages in Slovakia, writes: [While] they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society - the problem of being outnumbered by the police ... The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers ... [This] feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling - that of freedom . On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. 58 Although the secret church had traditionally distanced itself from the political opposition to avoid additional persecution by the state, the pilgrimage tradition facilitated a shift towards a new engagement in the public sphere. For members of the secret church, this issue of religious freedom could always be discussed among fellow members through its communities and samizdat press. Chants for religious freedom and in support of certain church officials had been voiced publicly to a significantly large gathering at Velehrad in 1985. The 54 "Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," 19. " Put' v Gaboltove," VOA, 24 July 1988. 56 "Mariansky rok na Slovensku," l. 57 "0 puti V Lutine," Rodinne spolocenstvo 5 (1989): 14. 58 Jan Carnogursky, "The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia," The Salisbury Review (Ju ne 1989): 36. 55 �SLOVAKIA 113 pilgrimage tradition provided a public space and forum where political demands arti culated by the secret church could be discussed, debated, and shared with the broader public in relative safety. The contest between church and state exhibited at the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage is one of the most striking feature s of this event. 59 The contest over the orientation of the commemoration could be said to have begun in 1984 as Cardinal Tomasek and Czechoslovak Catholics began demanding that Pope John Paul II be given permi ssion to attend. While the state argued that the commemoration should celebrate the cultural significance of St. Methodius, the church argued that the anniversary was a religious event. This conflict between church and state, so publicly exhibited at Velehrad in 1985, suggests that a term such as "church" fail s to capture the complexity of relations between church and state. Rather than a monolith, the "church" was represented by at least three distinct groups in this contest: the official church hierarchy , pilgrims active in the secret church, and pilgrims not active in the secret church. Of the three, it was the pilgrims (both within and without the secret church) listening to the Party officials' presentations who openly challenged the state's authority over the pilgrimage. Through their efforts, the pilgrimage became a public space where Catholics could challenge the status quo and the state 's right to define the meaning of St. Methodius and the l ,lO0 th anni versary . The pilgrimage created a forum where these three representations of the church ' s position could interact and influence one another. Even more interesting is the fact that the challenge to the status quo did not end in 1985 . Leaders of the Slovak underground church increasingly crossed into more politically-oriented public activities, most notably its collection of signatures to a 31-point petition for greater religious freedom in 1987 and 1988 and its organization of a public demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 , 1988 whi ch was violently 59 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, in the introduction to an edited vo lume of research on pilgrimages, assert that the new agenda in pilgrimage stud ies recogni zes that pilgrimage " is above all an arena for competing re ligious and secular discourses, for both the offi cial co-optation and the non-official recovery of rel igious meanings, fo r conflict between orthodoxies, sects and confess ional groups, fo r dri ves towards consensus and communities, and for counter movements towards separateness and division." John Eade and Michae l J. Sallnow , eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. �114 SLOVAKIA broken up by the police. Altogether, 600,000 Czechs and Slovaks signed the petition and a reported 300,000-400,000 of the signatures were collected in Slovakia. Samizdat reports indicate that this petition was often read aloud at pilgrimages in Slovakia during night programs in the late 1980s.60 Divisions also existed within the official hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church regarding the direction the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage should take. Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, since the election of Pope John Paul II, had become increasingly willing to criticize the state's interference in church affairs. In a 1981 letter to the editors of Katolfcke noviny, the state-approved and supported news organ of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomasek had criticized this periodical's focus on Pacem in Terris, disarmament and international relations, rather than Papal speeches and material that responded to the spiritual needs of the country ' s believers.61 In 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had not only formally invited Pope John Paul II to attend the Velehrad commemoration, but had also supported unofficial initiatives that demonstrated popular support for a papal visit. Cardinal Tomasek had also supported the secret church's plan to organize a night program at Velehrad, thus demonstrating that the lines between the secret church's activities and the official church sometimes became quite blurred. The unwillingness of the local bishop and priest responsible for Velehrad to approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in the basilica stands in stark contrast to Cardinal Tomasek's interest in it. All reports indicate that the police and other authorities in Slovakia were fairly ineffective in their efforts to clamp down on pilgrimages. Samizdat articles indicate that the pilgrims were quite aware of secret police agents dressed in civilian clothes and using cameras and video-recorders to document the event, but their presence apparently did little to deter their activities. As early as the 1984 pilgrimage to Levoca, police put several obstacles in the way of 60 For more about the 31-point petition and the March 25, 1988 demonstration, see David Doellinger, "From Prayers to Protests: The Impact of Religio us-Based Dissent on the Emergence of Civil Society in Slovakia and the GDR," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), chapter 4. 61 This letter appeared in lnformace o cirkvi, no. 4 ( 198 1): 24-25. �SLOVAKIA 115 pilgrims, such as running road checks to back up traffic to the site, canceling train and bus service to Levoca, and even cutting down trees to block the road to the basilica. More subtle efforts focused on keeping young people away from Levoca by scheduling a concert by a Slovak pop star in a nearby town . Some schools scheduled special activities on the day of pilgrimages, and others even posted notices banning participation in the pilgrimage.62 Police efforts took a more violent turn in 1986, when militia used dogs to break up groups of pilgrims making their way to Gaboltov.63 Also in 1986, the police interrogated Jozef Halko, a priest who had been sec retly ordained, and Anton Selecky, a Catholic activist, for their activities earlier in the year at the Sastin and Levoca pilgrimages. Holk.o 's interrogation focused on the fact that he had heard confessions at Levoca and Selecky ' s interrogators were concerned that he had written accounts of the pilgrimages for publication in samizdat. 64 In addition to signaling the pilgrimage' s transformation into a public space for Catholics, Velehrad also reflected the increasingly political potential of religion itself in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The political significance of religion and religious activities in the Soviet bloc had become quite apparent during the Pope 's first visit to Poland in 1979. In Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, John Paul II spoke freely about the historically close rel ationship between Christianity and the Polish nation. He also spoke about the failed Warsaw uprising in 1944 (when Soviet troops allowed the Polish Home Army to be defeated by the Nazis), Polish independence, and human dignity. 65 In his analysis of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Jan Kubik notes that Pope John Paul II 's speech and visit brought an end to the " Party-state's monopoly over public di scourse in 62 " Levoca - the Slovak National Shrine," K NS 2 14 (6 December I 984) . For references to the presence of the secret police at Velehrad in 1985, see " Velehrad 85 - spomienka studentov," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1986): 17 and " Boli sme na Velehrade," 5. 63 "Militia Set Dogs on Pilgrims (Czechoslovakia)," KNS 257 (2 1 August 1986). 64 "Slovak Cathol ics interrogated," KNS 264 (27 November 1986). 65 Pope John Paul II , "Pope John Paul IL Speaks in Victory Square, Warsaw," in ed., Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York and Oxford : Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), 200-203. �116 SLOVAKIA Poland."66 Though Solidarity was not a religious movement, Kubik argues that its close association with the Catholic Church and the use of religious symbols strengthened its ability to mobilize the Polish population and to construct a sphere of activity separate from and in defiance to the state. Among its achievements was the construction of public spaces not reserved for the state, including the Gdansk Monument and the Poznan Monument. Both incorporated crosses into their design, and, as Kubik explains, both monuments had been unveiled in religious ceremonies that emphasized the participation of society, rather than society 's subservience to the state. 67 Jan Kubik's analysis of these public events in Poland that preceded the formation of Solidarity offers insight into the political significance of religion in East Central Europe. Just as religion and religious traditions offered an alternative to the state's monopoly of power in Poland, the pilgrimage at Velehrad demonstrated that religion and religious traditions could offer a similar alternative in Czechoslovakia. Pope John Paul II had emphasized the historical significance of Christianity in Poland during his visit in 1979 and the commemoration of St. Methodius at Velehrad had allowed Catholic pilgrims the unique opportunity to confront state officials regarding Czechoslovakia's historical relationship with Christianity. The pilgrims at Velehrad, by vocally opposing the state's emphasis on the cultural contribution of Methodius, expressed their defiance of and unwillingness to be subservient to the state's religious policies. In doing so, the pilgrims transformed the traditional religious pilgrimage into an event of political significance. 66 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, I 994 ), 144. 67 For description and analysis of the Gdansk and the Poznan Monuments, see Kubik, The Power of Symbols, I 96-206, 2 14-216. � SLOVAKIA 99 THE 1985 PILGRIMAGE AT VELEHRAD: SLOVAK CATHOLICS AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPACE David Doellinger An analysis of the 1985 pilgrimage at Velehrad reveals many of the ways that the nature of pilgrimages (and thus Catholicism's role in Communist Czechoslovakia) had begun to change during the 1980s. At this event, Catholic activists and pilgrims surprised church leaders by voicing their opposition to state policy in front of Party officials, thereby transforming a religious tradition into a public space where Slovak Catholics could meet free from state interference to assert their religious and political beliefs. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage offers an interesting window into the increas ingly contentious relationship between church and state in Czec hoslovakia. It illustrates the mobilizing influence of Pope John Paul II and reveals that restive Catholics, who had been practicing their faith secretly in the underground, helped empower some leaders in the Czechoslovakia's official hierarchy - particularly Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague - to be more critical of the state's religious policies. Man y scholars have recognized the ability of pilgrimages to serve as barometers of soc ial and political change. In their analysis of Christian pilgrimage traditi ons, anthropologists Victor and Edith Turner conclude: Pilgrimage should be regarded ... as an institution with a history. Each pilgrimage, of any length, is vulnerable to the history of its period and must come to terms with shifts of political geography. Pilgrimage is more responsive to social change and popular moods than liturgical ritual, fixed by rubric. 1 1 Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives (New York : Columbia Un ivers ity Press, 1978), 23 1. �SLOVAKIA The character of Slovak pilgrimages had certainly reflected the changing social and political landscape in Slovakia after the Second World War. Pilgrimages had been an important part of Slovak reli gious life since the middle ages. Over thirty pilgrimage sites exist throughout Slovakia and Slovak pilgrim s also visited several religious sites in the Czech lands. Until 1949, when state permission to hold public gatherings such as pilgrimages became mandatory, local church officials had organized the annu al pilgrimages and services at these sites. Thereafter, there had been little acti vity at these sites on pilgrimage days, with the exception of the moments of political liberalization, such as in 1956 (following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin) and 1968 (during the Prague Spring). 2 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage has received much attention by Western political analysts and scholars. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Keston News Service fo llowed this event closely and released extensive reports about thi s pilgrimage (and the pilgrimages that followed). 3 Although Velehrad is located in Moravi a, this pilgrimage was of particular importance to Slovak Catholi cs, who attended in relatively high numbers. Several schol ars writing in the latter half of the 1980s referred to thi s pilgrimage as evidence of a reli gious revival and the resilience of Catholicism in Slovakia. 4 Scholars writing after 1989 have referred to thi s pilgrimage and those that followed, not only in the context of a religious revival, but 2 Karel Kaplan notes that not onl y pilgrimages, but also attendance at reli gious services and the forma tion of new youth groups occurred during the upheaval s in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Karel Kaplan, " Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956 - Part III ," Religion in Comm unist Lands, 14, no. 3 (fall 1986): 280. Milan J. Reban reports a sim ilar resurgence of pilgrimages during the Prague Spring in 1968 . Milan J. Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed . Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke Uni versity Press, I 990), 15 I. 3 The Keston News Service was based at Keston College, England and provided reports and analys is of the religious situation in East Europe. 4 See Janice Brou n, Conscience and Capti vity: Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), 67- 101. Also see Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar (Bloom ington and Indianapo lis: Ind iana Universi ty Press, 1987), 78. �SLOVAKIA 101 also as an example of one of the few expressions of independent or non-state activity in Slovakia. 5 Pilgrimages and their increasing popularity throughout the 1980s became one of the most visible markers of a religious revival in Slovakia. This religious revival had begun almost a decade earlier and was closely related to the election of a Pole, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II in 1978. Pope John Paul II took a new aggressive and uncompromising stand when dealing with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe. Under Pope Paul Vi's (1963-1978) eastern policy (Ostpolitik), the Vatican had made preserving the church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia a primary goal, even at the expense of making important concessions to the Communist government. In 1973, Cardinal Casaroli, responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik, had negotiated the regime's approval of four new bishops, even though all four remained members of Pacem in Terris, a state sponsored organization that coordinated the work of priests in Czechoslovakia. Although this agreement brought the total number of bishops to five (out of thirteen dioceses), many Czech and Slovak Catholics criticized the Vatican's tolerance of Pacem in Terris. Breaking with his predecessor, Pope John Paul II refused to compromise with these governments, particularly with regards to spiritual matters. In 1982, he formally condemned Pacem in Terris. 6 As Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla had secretly ordained many Czech and Slovak priests in the 1970s. Silvester Krcmery, a leader of Slovakia's secret church and a friend of Wojtyla since 1973, described him as a protector of the Slovaks. Emphasizing the importance of their shared experiences under Communism, Krcmery pointed to a 5 Stokes refers to the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage not only in terms of attendance, but also as evidence of Cardinal Tomasek's increasing willingness to act independently of the state. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152. See also Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London : Duke University Press , 1991), 109 and Padraic Kenney , A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 36. 6 Alexander Tomsky, "Pacem in Terris," Religion in Communist Lands lO (1982): 278-279. For a discussion of bishop vacancies, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 125. �102 SLOVAKIA bond that undoubted ly other Catholics in Czechoslovakia shared by saying: "He has lived all thi s persec ution of Catholics." 7 While the election of a Polish pope in 1978 helps explain the increased popularity of Catholicism and religious traditions in Slovakia, the events at Yelehrad in 1985 indicate th at the nature of the pilgrimage experience was transformed by activists in the secret (underground) Catholic church. Such a church existed in the Czech lands and Slovakia from the late 1940s to 1989. It was organized by Catholics in response to the persec ution they faced by the Communist authorities. Members of the secret church met in private apartments for bible study , fellowship and even choir practice. Bishops and priests who had been clandestinely trained and ordained provided pastoral serv ices to these believers. By the 1980s, activists in the secret church published and distributed a wide variety of books and newsletters as samizdat. 8 The undergro und church used its samizdat network to publicize this and later pilgrimages by printing announcements of upcoming pilgrimages and it published accounts of each year's pilgrimages. A rich written record of the 1985 Velehrad pil gri mage can be found in thi s body of sa mizdat literature. 9 7 Silvester Krcmery , interview by author, 3 July I996 , Bratislava, Slovakia. For a brief description of Krcmery's first meeting with Wojtyta, see Frantisek Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct' roz vratit: z osudov katolickej cfrkvi na Slovensku v rokoch I 943-89 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 125. 8 David Doellinger, " Prayers, Pilgrims , and Petitions: The Secret Church and the Growth of Civ il Society in Slovakia," Nationalities Papers 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 215-240. 9 Samizdat (self-published) refers to newspapers, articles, essays, books , etc. that were printed with mimeograph machines or typed carbon copy, and often distributed illegall y, usuall y throu gh personal contacts and info rm al networks. Archi ves with the most extensive holdings on Slovak religious samizdat include: Listy z podzemia samizdat arch ive at the Christian Democratic Movement headq uarters, Bratislava, Slovakia ; Libri Prohibiti Samizdat Archive, Prag ue, Czech Republic; Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Dobrichovice (Prague), Czech Republic. Slovak samizda t can also be found in the Keston Institute's arc hi ve, Oxford , England and th e arc hives of Radi o Free Europe/Radio Liberty in th e Open Society Archives , Budapest, Hungary. For a comprehensive catalog of Slovak religious sam izdat, see Rudolf Lessak, Listy z podzemia: suboma dokumentacia krestanskej samizdatovej publicistiky na S/ovensku v rokoch I 945- I989 (Bratislava: US PO, 1998). �SLOVAKIA 103 The 1985 Velehrad Pilgrimage An increasing number of Catholics attended pilgrimages in Slovakia in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, samizdat reports only carried information for the pilgrimages to Sastfn and Levoca, the two most popular Slovak pilgrimages. An estimated 15 ,000 people attended the pilgrimage at Sastfn in 1983 ; attendance jumped to 50,000 in 1984. 10 About 100,000 pilgrims attended the pilgrimages at Levoca in both 1982 and 1983. 11 The new role and importance of the pilgrimage tradition became firmly established at the 1985 pilgrimage at Yelehrad. An important pil grimage site in Moravia, Velehrad had already hosted an estim ated 40,000 pilgrims in 1984. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage, however, commemorated the 1, 100th anni versary of the death of St. Methodius, who along with St. Cyril , had introduced eastern Christianity (and the Slavic liturgy) to the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. The work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius is particulai:.ly important to Slovak Catholics, who trace their political, cultural and religious history to thi s early empire and the arrival of these monks. 12 Several months prior to the pilgrimage, Czechoslovak Catholics and the Communist authorities began to contest the direction of the Yelehrad commemoration. At the center of the dispute was the question of whether Pope John Paul II would be permitted to attend the event. The Pope had made his first visit to Poland as early as 1979, and Czechoslovakia 's Catholics hoped this anniversary would bring a papal visit. An August 1984 letter to President Gustav Husak, signed simpl y the " Youth of CSSR," demanded that the Pope be 10 "Sastfnska put' I983 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'(sami zdat) 4 (1983): 2; "Sastfnsky prihovor otca Biskupa Gabrisa," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'5 ( 1984): 8; " Sastfn '84," Vy ber (sami zdat) 4 ( 1984): 38. 11 "Annual Pilgrimage to Levoca," Keston News Service (KNS), no. 156 (August I6, I982): 3-4. Also, see Vy ber, 3 (1984 ): 7. 12 See lmrich Kruzliak, "The Heritage of Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Works of Slovak Writers and Artists," in SS. Cy ril and M ethodius Among the Slovaks: Observing the 1, JOd" Anniversary of Saint Methodius' Death, eds. lmrich Kru zliak and Frances L. Mi zenko (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1985), 134-143. The territori al extent of thi s empire is unclear, but it probably included large porti ons of present day Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. �104 SLOVAKIA permitted to attend the 1, l 00 th anniversary event. The authors indicated that they were Catholics from Banska Bystrica (in central Slovakia) and argued that there was popular support for a papal visit: We are in the jubilee year of St. Methodius. Thousands of young hearts put their signature on the request that the Holy Father John Paul II come to our country for thi s jubilee celebration. We join with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, who personally invited the Holy Father to this celebration. Esteemed Mr. President, if these thousands of signatures are [too] few, we are willing to collect additional thousands from young people to agai n document for you the desire of the absolute majority of inhabitants of the CSSR, so that the Holy Father comes to our republic for this precious jubilee occasion. 13 In February 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had formally invited the Pope to Velehrad, and over 17,000 Catholic youth in Czechoslovakia 14 signed a statement demonstrating their support for thi s visit. Cardinal Tomasek also cited this petition action in a letter to the CSSR government requesting permission for the visit. 15 A samizdat author analyzing the importance of the Velehrad celebration for Slovaks and the meaning of the petition wrote: "It is a new first in the public life of our church." 16 The Slovak secret church helped publicize several of these appeals for the Pope' s attendance. Despite the authorities' refusal, public support for the Papal visit continued. On New Years Day 1985 , Cardinal Tomasek sent a letter to the Pope with an additional 500 signatures that had been collected over Christmas. The letter reaffirmed the desire of Czechoslovak Catholics for the Pope to come to Velehrad on September 14 for the Methodius commemoration. It also invited the Pope to visit Sastfn, a Slovak pilgrimage site, afterwards 17 The authorities continued to refuse permission for the visit. 18 13 Letter to President Husak from the Youth of CSS R, 29 August 1984, I, Keston st Institute Fi le (hereafter KJ): CZ ROM 7/4 1 Methodius Celebrations 1985. 14 "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1984): 17. 15 Una Sane ta Catholica (samizdat) Tu rice ( 1984 ): 35. 16 • "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," 17-1 8. 17 Naboienstvo a sucasnost'2 (1985): 19. 18 Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Do wn, 152. Though the authori ties prevented Pope John Paul II from attending the commemoration, his encyc lical Slavorum �SLOVAKIA 105 As the Velehrad pilgrimage approached, members of the secret church in both the Czech lands and Slovakia began making plans to alter the length and nature of the commemoration by organizing a special night program. Catholic activists wanted to invite youth to the site on Saturday, July 6, 1985, for a special program of song and prayer during the night preceding the official commemoration, which had been scheduled for Sunday, July 7. Night programs had already become a popular component of pilgrimages in Slovakia. Over 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at the Levoca pilgrimage in 1983. 19 At Sastfn in 1984, a night program organized by Vladimir Jukl, one of the leaders of the Slovak secret church, had also preceded the regular pilgrimage celebration.20 The plan for a night program at Velehrad appears to have originated with both Moravian and Slovak sources. Catholic youth in Moravia invited their counterparts in Slovakia and Bohemia to the Saturday program that would include prayers for the unity of the church, the Pope, bishops and others in the Church. The Slovak reli gious samizdat Vy ber helped distribute this invitation by prominently publishing it on the back of the front cover of a spring 1985 issue.2' Frantisek Miklosko, another activist in the Slovak secret church , refers to the Moravian Catholics' pl an in a history of the post-war Catholi c Church in Slovakia that he published in 1991 . He credits Vladimir Jukl with the idea of introducing the night program at Velehrad. Miklosko personally presented Jukl 's plan for a night program to Cardinal Tomasek, who supported the idea. Though the local priest and bishop responsible for Velehrad refused to officially approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in Velehrad's basilica, the plan for the night program went ahead. 22 On Saturday afternoon , Ju ly 6, the Velehrad celebration made its informal start with the arri val of an estimated 5,000 young Apostoli - which praised the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was published on the day of the event. Alexander Tomsky, "St Methodius Return s to Czechos lovakia," KNS, no. 235 (October 3, 1985): 18- 19. 19 " Vfce nez sto ti sfc poutn fku na Levocske hofe 3.7. 1983," ln fo rmace o cfrk vi (sami zdat) 9 (1983): 13. 20 "Sastfn ' 84," Vfber 4 ( 1984): 38. Miklosko writes that Ju kl developed the idea for the night program for Sastfn that year. Miklosko, Nebudete ich moct'rozvratit, 136. 21 Vfber4 (1985). 22 Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct'rozvratit;128- l 30. �106 SLOVAKIA Catholics. Accounts of their activities filled subseq uent samizdat periodicals and painted a vivid picture of their activities prior to the formal opening of the celebration at 10:00 AM on Sunday morning. As they arrived on Saturday, the young pilgrims sat in small groups in front of the basilica, some talking with friends and others singing songs, sometimes with the accompaniment of a guitar. Bishop Jan Korec , who had been secretly consecrated in 1951, visited with the young pilgrims in the afternoon and remained with them throughout the night. 23 After an evening mass inside the basilica, the pilgrims spent the night outside with one group in front of the basilica and the other in a nearby field. Each group stayed awake the entire night and observed a program of prayer, meditation and si nging. During the night, both groups chanted slogans such as "We want cloisters," "Long live Tomasek," and "Long live the Pope." One report indicated that the pilgrims also chanted "Let the Pope Come" for about twenty-five minutes. 24 One member of the Slovak secret church apparently spent Saturday afternoon and night with a tape recorder recording the songs, chants and conversations with the pilgrims. A Slovak samiz dat periodical published excerpts from this recording, capturing some of the different hopes and concerns of those in attendance, including the di sappointment of one young pilgrim that the state authorities viewed the pilgrimage and anniversary celebration as a "peace event." The pilgrim, speaking sometime late Saturday evening, described his mixed response to the weekend: I assumed that many believers would participate in this pilgrimage, but I am very surprised by the multitude of people who are already here today. I am very enthusiastic about it, because I expect rich spiritual fruits from this pilgrimage. I regret, of course - and I also think everyone else does - that we may not have the Holy Father here among us. But on the other hand, we are glad that he is represented here by Cardinal Casaro li [responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik]. 25 23 " Velehrad ' 85 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1985): 17. The largest Czech religious samizdat periodical republished this report. "Velehrad I985 , videny zo Slovenska," Jnformace o cirkvi IO (1985), 6-7. 24 "Boli sme na Velehrade," Rodinne spolocenstvo (samizdat) 5 ( 1985): 5-6. 25 "Velehrad ' 85 z magnetofonoveho zaznamu," Vyber9 (1985): 12. �SLOVAKIA 107 Early in the morning a fifty-year old priest, asked for his reaction to thi s " uncommon" event, replied: We spent this night at Velehrad together with Sai nts Cyril and Methodius. And it was very beautiful. There are groups of young believers here from all over Slovakia and also from the Czech lands, but a preponderance here are Slovaks. 26 Though located in Moravia, the night program at Velehrad was of particul ar interest to Slovak Catholics, and other observers also noted the large presence of Slovaks at Velehrad.27 . The enthusiasm of the young Catholics who had arri ved early to spend the night at Velehrad carried over to the official celebrations on Sunday. Despite the state's efforts to curtail attendance by canceling public transportation to Velehrad, pilgrims from all over Czechoslovakia arrived , many on foot, to join those who had spent the night singing, praying and chanting. 28 One samizdat periodical reported that at a 7:00 AM mass outside the Basilica, the pilgrims who had arrived only that morning were surprised that the young people, fo llowing the singing of the papal hymn, broke into chants of "Long li ve John Paul II! " and " Let us have the Hol y Father! " 29 The youth had been chanting these slogans throughout the night, and like a team coming out of a hi gh-school pep rally, they were ready for the celebration to begin. By 10:00 AM, when the official celebration began, an estimated 100,000-250,000 pilgrims had gathered outside the Basilica in the center of Velehrad. 30 A local Party official opened the celebration by welcoming everyone to what he called the St. Methodiu s " Peace Celebration ." In response to this designation, the 26 Ibid., 19. Another Slovak priest, Father Martinec, explai ned that he had he lped wi th the organization of the pilgrimage and the arriva l of Slovak Catholics at Yelehrad . Karel Martinec, interview by author, 4 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. 28 "Yelehrad 1985 ," Vzkffsenf(samizdat) 2 ( 1985): 15. 29 " Boli sme na Yelehrade," 5. 30 Religious samizdat peri odical s re ported this wide range estimate of pilgrims in attendance. See "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 8; "Yelehrad ' 85," 18; " Yelehrad 1985," Vzkifsenf2 ( 1985): 15; and " Yelehrad nas," Informace o cfrk vi 10 ( 1985): 6. Photographs of the pilgrims gathered around the Bas ilica at Yelehrad on Jul y 7 - taken from different angles - indicate that the pilgrims filled every inch of the square and support the magnitude of the size of the crowd as reported by religious samizdat. Kl: photo collection, photos# 1793 and # 1876. 27 �108 SLOVAKIA pilgrims responded negatively with whistles and shouts of "We want Holy Mass!" 3 1 Following the singi ng of the state anthem, the Minister of Culture, Dr. Milan Klu sak, spoke. Again, the pilgrims expressed their dissatisfaction with the official spin he gave to the importance of the anniversary. Several samizdat periodicals reported the following exchange between Klusak and the pilgrims: [Minister Klusak] grasped the situation and therefore improvised as he spoke. In order to stress that he did not consider the celebration to be a peace celebration, he said that he came to the pilgrimage to celebrate Methodius' memory. The crowd corrected him by chanting "Saint, Saint." When he said that Cyril and Methodius brought us a language and alphabet, the people supplemented it with "Faith , Faith!" The surpri sed minister then began a discussion with the people by saying "The Bi shop will speak about Faith to you. We have divided up the work." ... the young people replied to him: "Freedom, Religious Freedom." The minister argued back to the youth and everyone else: "If you did not have [religious freedom], you would not be here." 32 The pilgrims responded to the remainder of Klusak's speech with chants: "We Want the Holy Father!" "We Want Religious Freedom," and "We Want Bishops!" In contrast to the pilgrims' dissatisfaction with the state authorities' remarks, the pilgrims enthusiastically supported the words of the church officials. During the heckling of Minister Klu sak, the pilgrims had also chanted "Long Live Cardinal Tomasek! and "Casaroli!" 33 Cardinal Tomasek read a letter from the Pope that reportedly energized the pilgrims despite their disappointment that the Pope was not there to deliver his words personally . During the Mass, Cardinal Casaroli switched between Czech and Slovak while delivering his sermon.34 Accounts indicate that Cardinal Tomasek and Cardinal Casaroli clearly were surprised by the hi gh attendance and the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. After- 31 "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 7. fbid ., 7. A similar account of this exchange, written by a Slovak pilgrim , appeared in Czech samizdat. " Velehrad 1985 ," Vzkfisenf2 ( 1985): 16. See also Jan Korec, Od barbarskej noci na slobode (Bratislava: Luc, 1993), 342. 33 "Velehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sucasnost; 18. 34 "Boli sme na Velehrade," 7-8. 32 �SLOVAKIA 109 wards, Cardinal Tomasek reportedly told a group of young people, "This is not reality, this is a dream. " 35 The Significance of Velehrad The relatively large number of Catholic youth from Slovakia that chose to come earl y to this pilgrimage indicates both the strength of Catholicism in Slovakia and the failure of the state 's restricti ve policies against the church. Vaclav Benda, a Catholic Czech activist, afterwards commented on the significance of this pilgrimage: Yelehrad was an effective demonstration that the experiment of splitting the church was condemned to failure and ridiculous from the beginning. It must presently be clear from this pilgrimage ... that the prohibitions or radical restriction on the church drove several million active believers into the underground. 36 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage was critical turning point in a revival of the pilgrimage tradition in Slovakia. After Yelehrad, pilgrimage attendance and the number of sites hosting pilgrimages in Slovakia increased significantly. 37 Levoca, in eastern Slovakia, received the largest number of pilgrims with an estimated 150,000 in 1986,38 200,000-230,000 in 1987,39 and possibly as high as 280,000 300,000 in 1988.40 The number of pilgrims to Sastfn, a small village located north of Bratislava near the Moravian border, grew steadily from estimates of 40,000-50,000 in 1986,4 1 and 60,000 in 1987 ,42 to 35 " Yelehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sricasnost; 18. Vaclav Benda, "Ako d'alej po Yelehrade?" Naboienstvo a sricasnost'2 (I 986): 4. 37 Attendance at Slo vak pil grimages in 1989 was also high, but there is less information in samizdat about that year's pilgrimages than for earlier years. This is probably due to the fac t that reports of the summer pilgrimages usually appeared in late fa ll samizdat issues, by which time the Velvet Revolution had already begun. 38 "Levoca 1986," Voice of A merica (VOA) 12 July 1986. 39 "Record Numbers Attend Slovak Pilgrimages," Keston News Service, 280 (23 Jul y 87): 19; "Message from Jan Carnogursky to Keston College," KI: CZ ROM 7 /4 Pilgrimages; "Levoca put' 1987," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'4 ( 1987): 7. 40 " Mariansky rok na Slovensku," Katolfcky mesacnik (sami zdat) 4 (1 988): I ; Peter Marti n, "The Pilgrimage to Levoca," R FE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19. Another sami zdat periodical estimated the attendance in 1988 at " more than 200,000 ." See "Mys lienky z Levocskej pute," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'3 (I 988): 3. 41 " Putne slav nosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," Naboienstvo a sricasnost' I ( I 987): I 719. 36 �110 SLOVAKIA 60,000-70,000 in 1988. 43 The number of pilgrims to Gaboltov, estimated at 20,000-25,000 in 1985 ,44 increased more dramatically from estimates of 30,000-50,000 in 198645 to as high as l 00,000 in 1987 and 1988. 46 Large numbers of pilgrims also visited traditionally less popular pilgrimage sites in Slovakia during this period. Lutina, an important Greek Catholic pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia, received 40,000 pilgrims in 198647 and 50,000 in 1987 .48 Topolcany received 25,000 pilgrims in 1988.49 Due to the nature of a pilgrimage, usually an outdoor event with people sitting or standing in a town square or in a nearby field, only estimates, probably made by members of the secret church present at the pilgrimage, are available. Jan Camogursky , a prominent activist in the Slovak secret church, reported that as he became aware of the political significance of the pilgrimages in 1987, he began making estimates of the number of pilgrims attending the events throughout Slovakia.50 Although not an exact count, these estimates are significant as a measure of the increase in the multitude of pilgrim s attending a particular pilgrimage, an increase that the authors of samizdat reports on pilgrimages were certainly observing. The increase in attendance after 1985 suggests that pilgrimages can be more than barometers of social change; the Velehrad pilgrimage promoted a change in the function of pilgrimages and their appeal to Catholics. The active force that promoted this transformation was the secret church. Members of this community helped transform the pilgrimage tradition into a space where Catholics could meet publicly and in large numbers to worship. Velehrad 's night program allowed young people active in the underground to meet 42 "Sastfn - September 1987," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'5 (1987): l 1. "Sastfn - '88," K ato/fcky mesacnik 5 ( 1988): I. 44 "Gaboltov ' 85 ," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 (I 985): 20. 45 " Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r 1986," 17- 19. 46 " Message from Jan Camogursky to Keston College"; "Put' v Gaboltove," VOA , 24 Jul y 1988. 47 "Pout' reckokatoliku v Lu tine 1986," lnformace o cfrkvi 10 (1986): I0. 48 "Message from Jan Camogursky." 49 "Pilgrimage at Topol'cany," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 13 September 1988. 50 Jan Camogursky, interview by author, 16 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. Documents in the Keston Institute archive indicate that he sent reports of these estimates to Western news organizations. See for example, "Message from Jan Camogursky." 43 �SLOVAKIA 111 with other Catholics and express their faith publicly. Velehrad had demonstrated the secret church 's ability to mobilize its members to participate in a public event, and it continued to do so during the remainder of the decade. Slovak Catholic activists contributed to the popularity of pilgrimages and their night programs in the later half of the 1980s. The used the secret church 's samizdat network to inform its members about previous pilgrimages and to promote attendance at upcoming ones. From 1986 to 1989, the issues of Naboi enstvo a sucasnost; Rodinne spolocenstvo and later Katolfcky mesacnfk published extensive articles and reports about Slovak pilgrimages. This coverage included first hand reports of pilgrims' experiences, often including descriptions of their walk to the site and the activities of the night program. These samizdat periodicals also frequently published transcripts of prayers and sermons spoken during Mass at a pilgrimage, as well as historical information about different pilgrimage sites. 5 1 They also published schedules and information about upcoming pilgrimages in Slovakia. 52 As a result of this coverage, a written record of the experiences, worship service, activities, and even the chants at pilgrimages has been preserved. Catholics unable to attend a particular pilgrimage could learn about what had been said and done by reading these accounts. Since most samizdat reports on pilgrimages were usuall y publi shed several months after the pilgrimage, this coverage reminded Slovak Catholics of what had happened during the summer. Its reports and descriptions of previous pilgrimages promoted the events, and its schedule information certainly helped coordinate attendance at a pilgrimage. In addition to its samiz dat network, information about pilgrimages was shared through the communities of the secret church. Carnogursky reported that many of its communities "visited these pilgrimages collectively as groups." 53 The Slovak secret church also continued to promote the night program for pilgrimages after 1985, and attendance at night prog- 51 For the text of a prayer read by a local priest at the I 988 Sastfn pilgrimage, see "Modlitba na zaver marianskeho Rok u," Kato/icky mesacnfk 6 ( 1988): 5-7 . Another arti cle recounts the history of th e Sastfn pilgrim age site fro m 9 16 A.O. to 1987. "Sastfn," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'4 ( 1987): 8-10. 52 " Letna - putnicka - aktivita 1989," Kato/icky mesacmk 5 ( I 989): 6. 53 Camogursky, interview. �112 SLOVAKIA rams increased. A samizdat article describing the pilgrimage celebrations that had taken place throughout Slovakia in 1986 announced that in 1987 night programs were scheduled in Gaboltov and Uhorna in addition to Levoca and Sastin. 54 In 1988, an estimated 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at Gaboltov,55 and 100,000 attended the night program during the Marian year pilgrimage in Levoca. 56 The following year, 5,000-10,000 people attended the night pro57 gram at the smaller pilgrimage site of Lutina. At the pilgrimage, the members of the secret church could do openly and publicly what they had done since their foundation: gather for prayer, meditation, and worship. Rather than finding safety in small numbers by meeting in private apartments, the pilgrimage tradition allowed the secret church members to practice their faith publicly, on a larger scale, and in fellowship with Catholics not active in the secret church. Jan Camogursky, reporting on the significance of pilgrimages in Slovakia, writes: [While] they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society - the problem of being outnumbered by the police ... The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers ... [This] feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling - that of freedom . On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. 58 Although the secret church had traditionally distanced itself from the political opposition to avoid additional persecution by the state, the pilgrimage tradition facilitated a shift towards a new engagement in the public sphere. For members of the secret church, this issue of religious freedom could always be discussed among fellow members through its communities and samizdat press. Chants for religious freedom and in support of certain church officials had been voiced publicly to a significantly large gathering at Velehrad in 1985. The 54 "Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," 19. " Put' v Gaboltove," VOA, 24 July 1988. 56 "Mariansky rok na Slovensku," l. 57 "0 puti V Lutine," Rodinne spolocenstvo 5 (1989): 14. 58 Jan Carnogursky, "The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia," The Salisbury Review (Ju ne 1989): 36. 55 �SLOVAKIA 113 pilgrimage tradition provided a public space and forum where political demands arti culated by the secret church could be discussed, debated, and shared with the broader public in relative safety. The contest between church and state exhibited at the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage is one of the most striking feature s of this event. 59 The contest over the orientation of the commemoration could be said to have begun in 1984 as Cardinal Tomasek and Czechoslovak Catholics began demanding that Pope John Paul II be given permi ssion to attend. While the state argued that the commemoration should celebrate the cultural significance of St. Methodius, the church argued that the anniversary was a religious event. This conflict between church and state, so publicly exhibited at Velehrad in 1985, suggests that a term such as "church" fail s to capture the complexity of relations between church and state. Rather than a monolith, the "church" was represented by at least three distinct groups in this contest: the official church hierarchy , pilgrims active in the secret church, and pilgrims not active in the secret church. Of the three, it was the pilgrims (both within and without the secret church) listening to the Party officials' presentations who openly challenged the state's authority over the pilgrimage. Through their efforts, the pilgrimage became a public space where Catholics could challenge the status quo and the state 's right to define the meaning of St. Methodius and the l ,lO0 th anni versary . The pilgrimage created a forum where these three representations of the church ' s position could interact and influence one another. Even more interesting is the fact that the challenge to the status quo did not end in 1985 . Leaders of the Slovak underground church increasingly crossed into more politically-oriented public activities, most notably its collection of signatures to a 31-point petition for greater religious freedom in 1987 and 1988 and its organization of a public demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 , 1988 whi ch was violently 59 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, in the introduction to an edited vo lume of research on pilgrimages, assert that the new agenda in pilgrimage stud ies recogni zes that pilgrimage " is above all an arena for competing re ligious and secular discourses, for both the offi cial co-optation and the non-official recovery of rel igious meanings, fo r conflict between orthodoxies, sects and confess ional groups, fo r dri ves towards consensus and communities, and for counter movements towards separateness and division." John Eade and Michae l J. Sallnow , eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. �114 SLOVAKIA broken up by the police. Altogether, 600,000 Czechs and Slovaks signed the petition and a reported 300,000-400,000 of the signatures were collected in Slovakia. Samizdat reports indicate that this petition was often read aloud at pilgrimages in Slovakia during night programs in the late 1980s.60 Divisions also existed within the official hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church regarding the direction the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage should take. Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, since the election of Pope John Paul II, had become increasingly willing to criticize the state's interference in church affairs. In a 1981 letter to the editors of Katolfcke noviny, the state-approved and supported news organ of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomasek had criticized this periodical's focus on Pacem in Terris, disarmament and international relations, rather than Papal speeches and material that responded to the spiritual needs of the country ' s believers.61 In 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had not only formally invited Pope John Paul II to attend the Velehrad commemoration, but had also supported unofficial initiatives that demonstrated popular support for a papal visit. Cardinal Tomasek had also supported the secret church's plan to organize a night program at Velehrad, thus demonstrating that the lines between the secret church's activities and the official church sometimes became quite blurred. The unwillingness of the local bishop and priest responsible for Velehrad to approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in the basilica stands in stark contrast to Cardinal Tomasek's interest in it. All reports indicate that the police and other authorities in Slovakia were fairly ineffective in their efforts to clamp down on pilgrimages. Samizdat articles indicate that the pilgrims were quite aware of secret police agents dressed in civilian clothes and using cameras and video-recorders to document the event, but their presence apparently did little to deter their activities. As early as the 1984 pilgrimage to Levoca, police put several obstacles in the way of 60 For more about the 31-point petition and the March 25, 1988 demonstration, see David Doellinger, "From Prayers to Protests: The Impact of Religio us-Based Dissent on the Emergence of Civil Society in Slovakia and the GDR," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), chapter 4. 61 This letter appeared in lnformace o cirkvi, no. 4 ( 198 1): 24-25. �SLOVAKIA 115 pilgrims, such as running road checks to back up traffic to the site, canceling train and bus service to Levoca, and even cutting down trees to block the road to the basilica. More subtle efforts focused on keeping young people away from Levoca by scheduling a concert by a Slovak pop star in a nearby town . Some schools scheduled special activities on the day of pilgrimages, and others even posted notices banning participation in the pilgrimage.62 Police efforts took a more violent turn in 1986, when militia used dogs to break up groups of pilgrims making their way to Gaboltov.63 Also in 1986, the police interrogated Jozef Halko, a priest who had been sec retly ordained, and Anton Selecky, a Catholic activist, for their activities earlier in the year at the Sastin and Levoca pilgrimages. Holk.o 's interrogation focused on the fact that he had heard confessions at Levoca and Selecky ' s interrogators were concerned that he had written accounts of the pilgrimages for publication in samizdat. 64 In addition to signaling the pilgrimage' s transformation into a public space for Catholics, Velehrad also reflected the increasingly political potential of religion itself in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The political significance of religion and religious activities in the Soviet bloc had become quite apparent during the Pope 's first visit to Poland in 1979. In Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, John Paul II spoke freely about the historically close rel ationship between Christianity and the Polish nation. He also spoke about the failed Warsaw uprising in 1944 (when Soviet troops allowed the Polish Home Army to be defeated by the Nazis), Polish independence, and human dignity. 65 In his analysis of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Jan Kubik notes that Pope John Paul II 's speech and visit brought an end to the " Party-state's monopoly over public di scourse in 62 " Levoca - the Slovak National Shrine," K NS 2 14 (6 December I 984) . For references to the presence of the secret police at Velehrad in 1985, see " Velehrad 85 - spomienka studentov," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1986): 17 and " Boli sme na Velehrade," 5. 63 "Militia Set Dogs on Pilgrims (Czechoslovakia)," KNS 257 (2 1 August 1986). 64 "Slovak Cathol ics interrogated," KNS 264 (27 November 1986). 65 Pope John Paul II , "Pope John Paul IL Speaks in Victory Square, Warsaw," in ed., Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York and Oxford : Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), 200-203. �116 SLOVAKIA Poland."66 Though Solidarity was not a religious movement, Kubik argues that its close association with the Catholic Church and the use of religious symbols strengthened its ability to mobilize the Polish population and to construct a sphere of activity separate from and in defiance to the state. Among its achievements was the construction of public spaces not reserved for the state, including the Gdansk Monument and the Poznan Monument. Both incorporated crosses into their design, and, as Kubik explains, both monuments had been unveiled in religious ceremonies that emphasized the participation of society, rather than society 's subservience to the state. 67 Jan Kubik's analysis of these public events in Poland that preceded the formation of Solidarity offers insight into the political significance of religion in East Central Europe. Just as religion and religious traditions offered an alternative to the state's monopoly of power in Poland, the pilgrimage at Velehrad demonstrated that religion and religious traditions could offer a similar alternative in Czechoslovakia. Pope John Paul II had emphasized the historical significance of Christianity in Poland during his visit in 1979 and the commemoration of St. Methodius at Velehrad had allowed Catholic pilgrims the unique opportunity to confront state officials regarding Czechoslovakia's historical relationship with Christianity. The pilgrims at Velehrad, by vocally opposing the state's emphasis on the cultural contribution of Methodius, expressed their defiance of and unwillingness to be subservient to the state's religious policies. In doing so, the pilgrims transformed the traditional religious pilgrimage into an event of political significance. 66 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, I 994 ), 144. 67 For description and analysis of the Gdansk and the Poznan Monuments, see Kubik, The Power of Symbols, I 96-206, 2 14-216. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2007, Vol. 39 Description An account of the resource Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 99 THE 1985 PILGRIMAGE AT VELEHRAD: SLOVAK CATHOLICS AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPACE David Doellinger An analysis of the 1985 pilgrimage at Velehrad reveals many of the ways that the nature of pilgrimages (and thus Catholicism's role in Communist Czechoslovakia) had begun to change during the 1980s. At this event, Catholic activists and pilgrims surprised church leaders by voicing their opposition to state policy in front of Party officials, thereby transforming a religious tradition into a public space where Slovak Catholics could meet free from state interference to assert their religious and political beliefs. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage offers an interesting window into the increas ingly contentious relationship between church and state in Czec hoslovakia. It illustrates the mobilizing influence of Pope John Paul II and reveals that restive Catholics, who had been practicing their faith secretly in the underground, helped empower some leaders in the Czechoslovakia's official hierarchy - particularly Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague - to be more critical of the state's religious policies. Man y scholars have recognized the ability of pilgrimages to serve as barometers of soc ial and political change. In their analysis of Christian pilgrimage traditi ons, anthropologists Victor and Edith Turner conclude: Pilgrimage should be regarded ... as an institution with a history. Each pilgrimage, of any length, is vulnerable to the history of its period and must come to terms with shifts of political geography. Pilgrimage is more responsive to social change and popular moods than liturgical ritual, fixed by rubric. 1 1 Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives (New York : Columbia Un ivers ity Press, 1978), 23 1. SLOVAKIA The character of Slovak pilgrimages had certainly reflected the changing social and political landscape in Slovakia after the Second World War. Pilgrimages had been an important part of Slovak reli gious life since the middle ages. Over thirty pilgrimage sites exist throughout Slovakia and Slovak pilgrim s also visited several religious sites in the Czech lands. Until 1949, when state permission to hold public gatherings such as pilgrimages became mandatory, local church officials had organized the annu al pilgrimages and services at these sites. Thereafter, there had been little acti vity at these sites on pilgrimage days, with the exception of the moments of political liberalization, such as in 1956 (following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin) and 1968 (during the Prague Spring). 2 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage has received much attention by Western political analysts and scholars. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Keston News Service fo llowed this event closely and released extensive reports about thi s pilgrimage (and the pilgrimages that followed). 3 Although Velehrad is located in Moravi a, this pilgrimage was of particular importance to Slovak Catholi cs, who attended in relatively high numbers. Several schol ars writing in the latter half of the 1980s referred to thi s pilgrimage as evidence of a reli gious revival and the resilience of Catholicism in Slovakia. 4 Scholars writing after 1989 have referred to thi s pilgrimage and those that followed, not only in the context of a religious revival, but 2 Karel Kaplan notes that not onl y pilgrimages, but also attendance at reli gious services and the forma tion of new youth groups occurred during the upheaval s in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Karel Kaplan, " Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956 - Part III ," Religion in Comm unist Lands, 14, no. 3 (fall 1986): 280. Milan J. Reban reports a sim ilar resurgence of pilgrimages during the Prague Spring in 1968 . Milan J. Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed . Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke Uni versity Press, I 990), 15 I. 3 The Keston News Service was based at Keston College, England and provided reports and analys is of the religious situation in East Europe. 4 See Janice Brou n, Conscience and Capti vity: Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), 67- 101. Also see Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar (Bloom ington and Indianapo lis: Ind iana Universi ty Press, 1987), 78. SLOVAKIA 101 also as an example of one of the few expressions of independent or non-state activity in Slovakia. 5 Pilgrimages and their increasing popularity throughout the 1980s became one of the most visible markers of a religious revival in Slovakia. This religious revival had begun almost a decade earlier and was closely related to the election of a Pole, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II in 1978. Pope John Paul II took a new aggressive and uncompromising stand when dealing with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe. Under Pope Paul Vi's (1963-1978) eastern policy (Ostpolitik), the Vatican had made preserving the church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia a primary goal, even at the expense of making important concessions to the Communist government. In 1973, Cardinal Casaroli, responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik, had negotiated the regime's approval of four new bishops, even though all four remained members of Pacem in Terris, a state sponsored organization that coordinated the work of priests in Czechoslovakia. Although this agreement brought the total number of bishops to five (out of thirteen dioceses), many Czech and Slovak Catholics criticized the Vatican's tolerance of Pacem in Terris. Breaking with his predecessor, Pope John Paul II refused to compromise with these governments, particularly with regards to spiritual matters. In 1982, he formally condemned Pacem in Terris. 6 As Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla had secretly ordained many Czech and Slovak priests in the 1970s. Silvester Krcmery, a leader of Slovakia's secret church and a friend of Wojtyla since 1973, described him as a protector of the Slovaks. Emphasizing the importance of their shared experiences under Communism, Krcmery pointed to a 5 Stokes refers to the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage not only in terms of attendance, but also as evidence of Cardinal Tomasek's increasing willingness to act independently of the state. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152. See also Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London : Duke University Press , 1991), 109 and Padraic Kenney , A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 36. 6 Alexander Tomsky, "Pacem in Terris," Religion in Communist Lands lO (1982): 278-279. For a discussion of bishop vacancies, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 125. 102 SLOVAKIA bond that undoubted ly other Catholics in Czechoslovakia shared by saying: "He has lived all thi s persec ution of Catholics." 7 While the election of a Polish pope in 1978 helps explain the increased popularity of Catholicism and religious traditions in Slovakia, the events at Yelehrad in 1985 indicate th at the nature of the pilgrimage experience was transformed by activists in the secret (underground) Catholic church. Such a church existed in the Czech lands and Slovakia from the late 1940s to 1989. It was organized by Catholics in response to the persec ution they faced by the Communist authorities. Members of the secret church met in private apartments for bible study , fellowship and even choir practice. Bishops and priests who had been clandestinely trained and ordained provided pastoral serv ices to these believers. By the 1980s, activists in the secret church published and distributed a wide variety of books and newsletters as samizdat. 8 The undergro und church used its samizdat network to publicize this and later pilgrimages by printing announcements of upcoming pilgrimages and it published accounts of each year's pilgrimages. A rich written record of the 1985 Velehrad pil gri mage can be found in thi s body of sa mizdat literature. 9 7 Silvester Krcmery , interview by author, 3 July I996 , Bratislava, Slovakia. For a brief description of Krcmery's first meeting with Wojtyta, see Frantisek Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct' roz vratit: z osudov katolickej cfrkvi na Slovensku v rokoch I 943-89 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 125. 8 David Doellinger, " Prayers, Pilgrims , and Petitions: The Secret Church and the Growth of Civ il Society in Slovakia," Nationalities Papers 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 215-240. 9 Samizdat (self-published) refers to newspapers, articles, essays, books , etc. that were printed with mimeograph machines or typed carbon copy, and often distributed illegall y, usuall y throu gh personal contacts and info rm al networks. Archi ves with the most extensive holdings on Slovak religious samizdat include: Listy z podzemia samizdat arch ive at the Christian Democratic Movement headq uarters, Bratislava, Slovakia ; Libri Prohibiti Samizdat Archive, Prag ue, Czech Republic; Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Dobrichovice (Prague), Czech Republic. Slovak samizda t can also be found in the Keston Institute's arc hi ve, Oxford , England and th e arc hives of Radi o Free Europe/Radio Liberty in th e Open Society Archives , Budapest, Hungary. For a comprehensive catalog of Slovak religious sam izdat, see Rudolf Lessak, Listy z podzemia: suboma dokumentacia krestanskej samizdatovej publicistiky na S/ovensku v rokoch I 945- I989 (Bratislava: US PO, 1998). SLOVAKIA 103 The 1985 Velehrad Pilgrimage An increasing number of Catholics attended pilgrimages in Slovakia in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, samizdat reports only carried information for the pilgrimages to Sastfn and Levoca, the two most popular Slovak pilgrimages. An estimated 15 ,000 people attended the pilgrimage at Sastfn in 1983 ; attendance jumped to 50,000 in 1984. 10 About 100,000 pilgrims attended the pilgrimages at Levoca in both 1982 and 1983. 11 The new role and importance of the pilgrimage tradition became firmly established at the 1985 pilgrimage at Yelehrad. An important pil grimage site in Moravia, Velehrad had already hosted an estim ated 40,000 pilgrims in 1984. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage, however, commemorated the 1, 100th anni versary of the death of St. Methodius, who along with St. Cyril , had introduced eastern Christianity (and the Slavic liturgy) to the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. The work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius is particulai:.ly important to Slovak Catholics, who trace their political, cultural and religious history to thi s early empire and the arrival of these monks. 12 Several months prior to the pilgrimage, Czechoslovak Catholics and the Communist authorities began to contest the direction of the Yelehrad commemoration. At the center of the dispute was the question of whether Pope John Paul II would be permitted to attend the event. The Pope had made his first visit to Poland as early as 1979, and Czechoslovakia 's Catholics hoped this anniversary would bring a papal visit. An August 1984 letter to President Gustav Husak, signed simpl y the " Youth of CSSR," demanded that the Pope be 10 "Sastfnska put' I983 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'(sami zdat) 4 (1983): 2; "Sastfnsky prihovor otca Biskupa Gabrisa," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'5 ( 1984): 8; " Sastfn '84," Vy ber (sami zdat) 4 ( 1984): 38. 11 "Annual Pilgrimage to Levoca," Keston News Service (KNS), no. 156 (August I6, I982): 3-4. Also, see Vy ber, 3 (1984 ): 7. 12 See lmrich Kruzliak, "The Heritage of Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Works of Slovak Writers and Artists," in SS. Cy ril and M ethodius Among the Slovaks: Observing the 1, JOd" Anniversary of Saint Methodius' Death, eds. lmrich Kru zliak and Frances L. Mi zenko (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1985), 134-143. The territori al extent of thi s empire is unclear, but it probably included large porti ons of present day Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 104 SLOVAKIA permitted to attend the 1, l 00 th anniversary event. The authors indicated that they were Catholics from Banska Bystrica (in central Slovakia) and argued that there was popular support for a papal visit: We are in the jubilee year of St. Methodius. Thousands of young hearts put their signature on the request that the Holy Father John Paul II come to our country for thi s jubilee celebration. We join with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, who personally invited the Holy Father to this celebration. Esteemed Mr. President, if these thousands of signatures are [too] few, we are willing to collect additional thousands from young people to agai n document for you the desire of the absolute majority of inhabitants of the CSSR, so that the Holy Father comes to our republic for this precious jubilee occasion. 13 In February 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had formally invited the Pope to Velehrad, and over 17,000 Catholic youth in Czechoslovakia 14 signed a statement demonstrating their support for thi s visit. Cardinal Tomasek also cited this petition action in a letter to the CSSR government requesting permission for the visit. 15 A samizdat author analyzing the importance of the Velehrad celebration for Slovaks and the meaning of the petition wrote: "It is a new first in the public life of our church." 16 The Slovak secret church helped publicize several of these appeals for the Pope' s attendance. Despite the authorities' refusal, public support for the Papal visit continued. On New Years Day 1985 , Cardinal Tomasek sent a letter to the Pope with an additional 500 signatures that had been collected over Christmas. The letter reaffirmed the desire of Czechoslovak Catholics for the Pope to come to Velehrad on September 14 for the Methodius commemoration. It also invited the Pope to visit Sastfn, a Slovak pilgrimage site, afterwards 17 The authorities continued to refuse permission for the visit. 18 13 Letter to President Husak from the Youth of CSS R, 29 August 1984, I, Keston st Institute Fi le (hereafter KJ): CZ ROM 7/4 1 Methodius Celebrations 1985. 14 "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1984): 17. 15 Una Sane ta Catholica (samizdat) Tu rice ( 1984 ): 35. 16 • "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," 17-1 8. 17 Naboienstvo a sucasnost'2 (1985): 19. 18 Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Do wn, 152. Though the authori ties prevented Pope John Paul II from attending the commemoration, his encyc lical Slavorum SLOVAKIA 105 As the Velehrad pilgrimage approached, members of the secret church in both the Czech lands and Slovakia began making plans to alter the length and nature of the commemoration by organizing a special night program. Catholic activists wanted to invite youth to the site on Saturday, July 6, 1985, for a special program of song and prayer during the night preceding the official commemoration, which had been scheduled for Sunday, July 7. Night programs had already become a popular component of pilgrimages in Slovakia. Over 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at the Levoca pilgrimage in 1983. 19 At Sastfn in 1984, a night program organized by Vladimir Jukl, one of the leaders of the Slovak secret church, had also preceded the regular pilgrimage celebration.20 The plan for a night program at Velehrad appears to have originated with both Moravian and Slovak sources. Catholic youth in Moravia invited their counterparts in Slovakia and Bohemia to the Saturday program that would include prayers for the unity of the church, the Pope, bishops and others in the Church. The Slovak reli gious samizdat Vy ber helped distribute this invitation by prominently publishing it on the back of the front cover of a spring 1985 issue.2' Frantisek Miklosko, another activist in the Slovak secret church , refers to the Moravian Catholics' pl an in a history of the post-war Catholi c Church in Slovakia that he published in 1991 . He credits Vladimir Jukl with the idea of introducing the night program at Velehrad. Miklosko personally presented Jukl 's plan for a night program to Cardinal Tomasek, who supported the idea. Though the local priest and bishop responsible for Velehrad refused to officially approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in Velehrad's basilica, the plan for the night program went ahead. 22 On Saturday afternoon , Ju ly 6, the Velehrad celebration made its informal start with the arri val of an estimated 5,000 young Apostoli - which praised the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was published on the day of the event. Alexander Tomsky, "St Methodius Return s to Czechos lovakia," KNS, no. 235 (October 3, 1985): 18- 19. 19 " Vfce nez sto ti sfc poutn fku na Levocske hofe 3.7. 1983," ln fo rmace o cfrk vi (sami zdat) 9 (1983): 13. 20 "Sastfn ' 84," Vfber 4 ( 1984): 38. Miklosko writes that Ju kl developed the idea for the night program for Sastfn that year. Miklosko, Nebudete ich moct'rozvratit, 136. 21 Vfber4 (1985). 22 Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct'rozvratit;128- l 30. 106 SLOVAKIA Catholics. Accounts of their activities filled subseq uent samizdat periodicals and painted a vivid picture of their activities prior to the formal opening of the celebration at 10:00 AM on Sunday morning. As they arrived on Saturday, the young pilgrims sat in small groups in front of the basilica, some talking with friends and others singing songs, sometimes with the accompaniment of a guitar. Bishop Jan Korec , who had been secretly consecrated in 1951, visited with the young pilgrims in the afternoon and remained with them throughout the night. 23 After an evening mass inside the basilica, the pilgrims spent the night outside with one group in front of the basilica and the other in a nearby field. Each group stayed awake the entire night and observed a program of prayer, meditation and si nging. During the night, both groups chanted slogans such as "We want cloisters," "Long live Tomasek," and "Long live the Pope." One report indicated that the pilgrims also chanted "Let the Pope Come" for about twenty-five minutes. 24 One member of the Slovak secret church apparently spent Saturday afternoon and night with a tape recorder recording the songs, chants and conversations with the pilgrims. A Slovak samiz dat periodical published excerpts from this recording, capturing some of the different hopes and concerns of those in attendance, including the di sappointment of one young pilgrim that the state authorities viewed the pilgrimage and anniversary celebration as a "peace event." The pilgrim, speaking sometime late Saturday evening, described his mixed response to the weekend: I assumed that many believers would participate in this pilgrimage, but I am very surprised by the multitude of people who are already here today. I am very enthusiastic about it, because I expect rich spiritual fruits from this pilgrimage. I regret, of course - and I also think everyone else does - that we may not have the Holy Father here among us. But on the other hand, we are glad that he is represented here by Cardinal Casaro li [responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik]. 25 23 " Velehrad ' 85 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1985): 17. The largest Czech religious samizdat periodical republished this report. "Velehrad I985 , videny zo Slovenska," Jnformace o cirkvi IO (1985), 6-7. 24 "Boli sme na Velehrade," Rodinne spolocenstvo (samizdat) 5 ( 1985): 5-6. 25 "Velehrad ' 85 z magnetofonoveho zaznamu," Vyber9 (1985): 12. SLOVAKIA 107 Early in the morning a fifty-year old priest, asked for his reaction to thi s " uncommon" event, replied: We spent this night at Velehrad together with Sai nts Cyril and Methodius. And it was very beautiful. There are groups of young believers here from all over Slovakia and also from the Czech lands, but a preponderance here are Slovaks. 26 Though located in Moravia, the night program at Velehrad was of particul ar interest to Slovak Catholics, and other observers also noted the large presence of Slovaks at Velehrad.27 . The enthusiasm of the young Catholics who had arri ved early to spend the night at Velehrad carried over to the official celebrations on Sunday. Despite the state's efforts to curtail attendance by canceling public transportation to Velehrad, pilgrims from all over Czechoslovakia arrived , many on foot, to join those who had spent the night singing, praying and chanting. 28 One samizdat periodical reported that at a 7:00 AM mass outside the Basilica, the pilgrims who had arrived only that morning were surprised that the young people, fo llowing the singing of the papal hymn, broke into chants of "Long li ve John Paul II! " and " Let us have the Hol y Father! " 29 The youth had been chanting these slogans throughout the night, and like a team coming out of a hi gh-school pep rally, they were ready for the celebration to begin. By 10:00 AM, when the official celebration began, an estimated 100,000-250,000 pilgrims had gathered outside the Basilica in the center of Velehrad. 30 A local Party official opened the celebration by welcoming everyone to what he called the St. Methodiu s " Peace Celebration ." In response to this designation, the 26 Ibid., 19. Another Slovak priest, Father Martinec, explai ned that he had he lped wi th the organization of the pilgrimage and the arriva l of Slovak Catholics at Yelehrad . Karel Martinec, interview by author, 4 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. 28 "Yelehrad 1985 ," Vzkffsenf(samizdat) 2 ( 1985): 15. 29 " Boli sme na Yelehrade," 5. 30 Religious samizdat peri odical s re ported this wide range estimate of pilgrims in attendance. See "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 8; "Yelehrad ' 85," 18; " Yelehrad 1985," Vzkifsenf2 ( 1985): 15; and " Yelehrad nas," Informace o cfrk vi 10 ( 1985): 6. Photographs of the pilgrims gathered around the Bas ilica at Yelehrad on Jul y 7 - taken from different angles - indicate that the pilgrims filled every inch of the square and support the magnitude of the size of the crowd as reported by religious samizdat. Kl: photo collection, photos# 1793 and # 1876. 27 108 SLOVAKIA pilgrims responded negatively with whistles and shouts of "We want Holy Mass!" 3 1 Following the singi ng of the state anthem, the Minister of Culture, Dr. Milan Klu sak, spoke. Again, the pilgrims expressed their dissatisfaction with the official spin he gave to the importance of the anniversary. Several samizdat periodicals reported the following exchange between Klusak and the pilgrims: [Minister Klusak] grasped the situation and therefore improvised as he spoke. In order to stress that he did not consider the celebration to be a peace celebration, he said that he came to the pilgrimage to celebrate Methodius' memory. The crowd corrected him by chanting "Saint, Saint." When he said that Cyril and Methodius brought us a language and alphabet, the people supplemented it with "Faith , Faith!" The surpri sed minister then began a discussion with the people by saying "The Bi shop will speak about Faith to you. We have divided up the work." ... the young people replied to him: "Freedom, Religious Freedom." The minister argued back to the youth and everyone else: "If you did not have [religious freedom], you would not be here." 32 The pilgrims responded to the remainder of Klusak's speech with chants: "We Want the Holy Father!" "We Want Religious Freedom," and "We Want Bishops!" In contrast to the pilgrims' dissatisfaction with the state authorities' remarks, the pilgrims enthusiastically supported the words of the church officials. During the heckling of Minister Klu sak, the pilgrims had also chanted "Long Live Cardinal Tomasek! and "Casaroli!" 33 Cardinal Tomasek read a letter from the Pope that reportedly energized the pilgrims despite their disappointment that the Pope was not there to deliver his words personally . During the Mass, Cardinal Casaroli switched between Czech and Slovak while delivering his sermon.34 Accounts indicate that Cardinal Tomasek and Cardinal Casaroli clearly were surprised by the hi gh attendance and the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. After- 31 "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 7. fbid ., 7. A similar account of this exchange, written by a Slovak pilgrim , appeared in Czech samizdat. " Velehrad 1985 ," Vzkfisenf2 ( 1985): 16. See also Jan Korec, Od barbarskej noci na slobode (Bratislava: Luc, 1993), 342. 33 "Velehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sucasnost; 18. 34 "Boli sme na Velehrade," 7-8. 32 SLOVAKIA 109 wards, Cardinal Tomasek reportedly told a group of young people, "This is not reality, this is a dream. " 35 The Significance of Velehrad The relatively large number of Catholic youth from Slovakia that chose to come earl y to this pilgrimage indicates both the strength of Catholicism in Slovakia and the failure of the state 's restricti ve policies against the church. Vaclav Benda, a Catholic Czech activist, afterwards commented on the significance of this pilgrimage: Yelehrad was an effective demonstration that the experiment of splitting the church was condemned to failure and ridiculous from the beginning. It must presently be clear from this pilgrimage ... that the prohibitions or radical restriction on the church drove several million active believers into the underground. 36 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage was critical turning point in a revival of the pilgrimage tradition in Slovakia. After Yelehrad, pilgrimage attendance and the number of sites hosting pilgrimages in Slovakia increased significantly. 37 Levoca, in eastern Slovakia, received the largest number of pilgrims with an estimated 150,000 in 1986,38 200,000-230,000 in 1987,39 and possibly as high as 280,000 300,000 in 1988.40 The number of pilgrims to Sastfn, a small village located north of Bratislava near the Moravian border, grew steadily from estimates of 40,000-50,000 in 1986,4 1 and 60,000 in 1987 ,42 to 35 " Yelehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sricasnost; 18. Vaclav Benda, "Ako d'alej po Yelehrade?" Naboienstvo a sricasnost'2 (I 986): 4. 37 Attendance at Slo vak pil grimages in 1989 was also high, but there is less information in samizdat about that year's pilgrimages than for earlier years. This is probably due to the fac t that reports of the summer pilgrimages usually appeared in late fa ll samizdat issues, by which time the Velvet Revolution had already begun. 38 "Levoca 1986," Voice of A merica (VOA) 12 July 1986. 39 "Record Numbers Attend Slovak Pilgrimages," Keston News Service, 280 (23 Jul y 87): 19; "Message from Jan Carnogursky to Keston College," KI: CZ ROM 7 /4 Pilgrimages; "Levoca put' 1987," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'4 ( 1987): 7. 40 " Mariansky rok na Slovensku," Katolfcky mesacnik (sami zdat) 4 (1 988): I ; Peter Marti n, "The Pilgrimage to Levoca," R FE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19. Another sami zdat periodical estimated the attendance in 1988 at " more than 200,000 ." See "Mys lienky z Levocskej pute," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'3 (I 988): 3. 41 " Putne slav nosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," Naboienstvo a sricasnost' I ( I 987): I 719. 36 110 SLOVAKIA 60,000-70,000 in 1988. 43 The number of pilgrims to Gaboltov, estimated at 20,000-25,000 in 1985 ,44 increased more dramatically from estimates of 30,000-50,000 in 198645 to as high as l 00,000 in 1987 and 1988. 46 Large numbers of pilgrims also visited traditionally less popular pilgrimage sites in Slovakia during this period. Lutina, an important Greek Catholic pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia, received 40,000 pilgrims in 198647 and 50,000 in 1987 .48 Topolcany received 25,000 pilgrims in 1988.49 Due to the nature of a pilgrimage, usually an outdoor event with people sitting or standing in a town square or in a nearby field, only estimates, probably made by members of the secret church present at the pilgrimage, are available. Jan Camogursky , a prominent activist in the Slovak secret church, reported that as he became aware of the political significance of the pilgrimages in 1987, he began making estimates of the number of pilgrims attending the events throughout Slovakia.50 Although not an exact count, these estimates are significant as a measure of the increase in the multitude of pilgrim s attending a particular pilgrimage, an increase that the authors of samizdat reports on pilgrimages were certainly observing. The increase in attendance after 1985 suggests that pilgrimages can be more than barometers of social change; the Velehrad pilgrimage promoted a change in the function of pilgrimages and their appeal to Catholics. The active force that promoted this transformation was the secret church. Members of this community helped transform the pilgrimage tradition into a space where Catholics could meet publicly and in large numbers to worship. Velehrad 's night program allowed young people active in the underground to meet 42 "Sastfn - September 1987," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'5 (1987): l 1. "Sastfn - '88," K ato/fcky mesacnik 5 ( 1988): I. 44 "Gaboltov ' 85 ," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 (I 985): 20. 45 " Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r 1986," 17- 19. 46 " Message from Jan Camogursky to Keston College"; "Put' v Gaboltove," VOA , 24 Jul y 1988. 47 "Pout' reckokatoliku v Lu tine 1986," lnformace o cfrkvi 10 (1986): I0. 48 "Message from Jan Camogursky." 49 "Pilgrimage at Topol'cany," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 13 September 1988. 50 Jan Camogursky, interview by author, 16 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. Documents in the Keston Institute archive indicate that he sent reports of these estimates to Western news organizations. See for example, "Message from Jan Camogursky." 43 SLOVAKIA 111 with other Catholics and express their faith publicly. Velehrad had demonstrated the secret church 's ability to mobilize its members to participate in a public event, and it continued to do so during the remainder of the decade. Slovak Catholic activists contributed to the popularity of pilgrimages and their night programs in the later half of the 1980s. The used the secret church 's samizdat network to inform its members about previous pilgrimages and to promote attendance at upcoming ones. From 1986 to 1989, the issues of Naboi enstvo a sucasnost; Rodinne spolocenstvo and later Katolfcky mesacnfk published extensive articles and reports about Slovak pilgrimages. This coverage included first hand reports of pilgrims' experiences, often including descriptions of their walk to the site and the activities of the night program. These samizdat periodicals also frequently published transcripts of prayers and sermons spoken during Mass at a pilgrimage, as well as historical information about different pilgrimage sites. 5 1 They also published schedules and information about upcoming pilgrimages in Slovakia. 52 As a result of this coverage, a written record of the experiences, worship service, activities, and even the chants at pilgrimages has been preserved. Catholics unable to attend a particular pilgrimage could learn about what had been said and done by reading these accounts. Since most samizdat reports on pilgrimages were usuall y publi shed several months after the pilgrimage, this coverage reminded Slovak Catholics of what had happened during the summer. Its reports and descriptions of previous pilgrimages promoted the events, and its schedule information certainly helped coordinate attendance at a pilgrimage. In addition to its samiz dat network, information about pilgrimages was shared through the communities of the secret church. Carnogursky reported that many of its communities "visited these pilgrimages collectively as groups." 53 The Slovak secret church also continued to promote the night program for pilgrimages after 1985, and attendance at night prog- 51 For the text of a prayer read by a local priest at the I 988 Sastfn pilgrimage, see "Modlitba na zaver marianskeho Rok u," Kato/icky mesacnfk 6 ( 1988): 5-7 . Another arti cle recounts the history of th e Sastfn pilgrim age site fro m 9 16 A.O. to 1987. "Sastfn," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'4 ( 1987): 8-10. 52 " Letna - putnicka - aktivita 1989," Kato/icky mesacmk 5 ( I 989): 6. 53 Camogursky, interview. 112 SLOVAKIA rams increased. A samizdat article describing the pilgrimage celebrations that had taken place throughout Slovakia in 1986 announced that in 1987 night programs were scheduled in Gaboltov and Uhorna in addition to Levoca and Sastin. 54 In 1988, an estimated 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at Gaboltov,55 and 100,000 attended the night program during the Marian year pilgrimage in Levoca. 56 The following year, 5,000-10,000 people attended the night pro57 gram at the smaller pilgrimage site of Lutina. At the pilgrimage, the members of the secret church could do openly and publicly what they had done since their foundation: gather for prayer, meditation, and worship. Rather than finding safety in small numbers by meeting in private apartments, the pilgrimage tradition allowed the secret church members to practice their faith publicly, on a larger scale, and in fellowship with Catholics not active in the secret church. Jan Camogursky, reporting on the significance of pilgrimages in Slovakia, writes: [While] they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society - the problem of being outnumbered by the police ... The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers ... [This] feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling - that of freedom . On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. 58 Although the secret church had traditionally distanced itself from the political opposition to avoid additional persecution by the state, the pilgrimage tradition facilitated a shift towards a new engagement in the public sphere. For members of the secret church, this issue of religious freedom could always be discussed among fellow members through its communities and samizdat press. Chants for religious freedom and in support of certain church officials had been voiced publicly to a significantly large gathering at Velehrad in 1985. The 54 "Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," 19. " Put' v Gaboltove," VOA, 24 July 1988. 56 "Mariansky rok na Slovensku," l. 57 "0 puti V Lutine," Rodinne spolocenstvo 5 (1989): 14. 58 Jan Carnogursky, "The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia," The Salisbury Review (Ju ne 1989): 36. 55 SLOVAKIA 113 pilgrimage tradition provided a public space and forum where political demands arti culated by the secret church could be discussed, debated, and shared with the broader public in relative safety. The contest between church and state exhibited at the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage is one of the most striking feature s of this event. 59 The contest over the orientation of the commemoration could be said to have begun in 1984 as Cardinal Tomasek and Czechoslovak Catholics began demanding that Pope John Paul II be given permi ssion to attend. While the state argued that the commemoration should celebrate the cultural significance of St. Methodius, the church argued that the anniversary was a religious event. This conflict between church and state, so publicly exhibited at Velehrad in 1985, suggests that a term such as "church" fail s to capture the complexity of relations between church and state. Rather than a monolith, the "church" was represented by at least three distinct groups in this contest: the official church hierarchy , pilgrims active in the secret church, and pilgrims not active in the secret church. Of the three, it was the pilgrims (both within and without the secret church) listening to the Party officials' presentations who openly challenged the state's authority over the pilgrimage. Through their efforts, the pilgrimage became a public space where Catholics could challenge the status quo and the state 's right to define the meaning of St. Methodius and the l ,lO0 th anni versary . The pilgrimage created a forum where these three representations of the church ' s position could interact and influence one another. Even more interesting is the fact that the challenge to the status quo did not end in 1985 . Leaders of the Slovak underground church increasingly crossed into more politically-oriented public activities, most notably its collection of signatures to a 31-point petition for greater religious freedom in 1987 and 1988 and its organization of a public demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 , 1988 whi ch was violently 59 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, in the introduction to an edited vo lume of research on pilgrimages, assert that the new agenda in pilgrimage stud ies recogni zes that pilgrimage " is above all an arena for competing re ligious and secular discourses, for both the offi cial co-optation and the non-official recovery of rel igious meanings, fo r conflict between orthodoxies, sects and confess ional groups, fo r dri ves towards consensus and communities, and for counter movements towards separateness and division." John Eade and Michae l J. Sallnow , eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. 114 SLOVAKIA broken up by the police. Altogether, 600,000 Czechs and Slovaks signed the petition and a reported 300,000-400,000 of the signatures were collected in Slovakia. Samizdat reports indicate that this petition was often read aloud at pilgrimages in Slovakia during night programs in the late 1980s.60 Divisions also existed within the official hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church regarding the direction the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage should take. Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, since the election of Pope John Paul II, had become increasingly willing to criticize the state's interference in church affairs. In a 1981 letter to the editors of Katolfcke noviny, the state-approved and supported news organ of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomasek had criticized this periodical's focus on Pacem in Terris, disarmament and international relations, rather than Papal speeches and material that responded to the spiritual needs of the country ' s believers.61 In 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had not only formally invited Pope John Paul II to attend the Velehrad commemoration, but had also supported unofficial initiatives that demonstrated popular support for a papal visit. Cardinal Tomasek had also supported the secret church's plan to organize a night program at Velehrad, thus demonstrating that the lines between the secret church's activities and the official church sometimes became quite blurred. The unwillingness of the local bishop and priest responsible for Velehrad to approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in the basilica stands in stark contrast to Cardinal Tomasek's interest in it. All reports indicate that the police and other authorities in Slovakia were fairly ineffective in their efforts to clamp down on pilgrimages. Samizdat articles indicate that the pilgrims were quite aware of secret police agents dressed in civilian clothes and using cameras and video-recorders to document the event, but their presence apparently did little to deter their activities. As early as the 1984 pilgrimage to Levoca, police put several obstacles in the way of 60 For more about the 31-point petition and the March 25, 1988 demonstration, see David Doellinger, "From Prayers to Protests: The Impact of Religio us-Based Dissent on the Emergence of Civil Society in Slovakia and the GDR," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), chapter 4. 61 This letter appeared in lnformace o cirkvi, no. 4 ( 198 1): 24-25. SLOVAKIA 115 pilgrims, such as running road checks to back up traffic to the site, canceling train and bus service to Levoca, and even cutting down trees to block the road to the basilica. More subtle efforts focused on keeping young people away from Levoca by scheduling a concert by a Slovak pop star in a nearby town . Some schools scheduled special activities on the day of pilgrimages, and others even posted notices banning participation in the pilgrimage.62 Police efforts took a more violent turn in 1986, when militia used dogs to break up groups of pilgrims making their way to Gaboltov.63 Also in 1986, the police interrogated Jozef Halko, a priest who had been sec retly ordained, and Anton Selecky, a Catholic activist, for their activities earlier in the year at the Sastin and Levoca pilgrimages. Holk.o 's interrogation focused on the fact that he had heard confessions at Levoca and Selecky ' s interrogators were concerned that he had written accounts of the pilgrimages for publication in samizdat. 64 In addition to signaling the pilgrimage' s transformation into a public space for Catholics, Velehrad also reflected the increasingly political potential of religion itself in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The political significance of religion and religious activities in the Soviet bloc had become quite apparent during the Pope 's first visit to Poland in 1979. In Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, John Paul II spoke freely about the historically close rel ationship between Christianity and the Polish nation. He also spoke about the failed Warsaw uprising in 1944 (when Soviet troops allowed the Polish Home Army to be defeated by the Nazis), Polish independence, and human dignity. 65 In his analysis of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Jan Kubik notes that Pope John Paul II 's speech and visit brought an end to the " Party-state's monopoly over public di scourse in 62 " Levoca - the Slovak National Shrine," K NS 2 14 (6 December I 984) . For references to the presence of the secret police at Velehrad in 1985, see " Velehrad 85 - spomienka studentov," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1986): 17 and " Boli sme na Velehrade," 5. 63 "Militia Set Dogs on Pilgrims (Czechoslovakia)," KNS 257 (2 1 August 1986). 64 "Slovak Cathol ics interrogated," KNS 264 (27 November 1986). 65 Pope John Paul II , "Pope John Paul IL Speaks in Victory Square, Warsaw," in ed., Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York and Oxford : Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), 200-203. 116 SLOVAKIA Poland."66 Though Solidarity was not a religious movement, Kubik argues that its close association with the Catholic Church and the use of religious symbols strengthened its ability to mobilize the Polish population and to construct a sphere of activity separate from and in defiance to the state. Among its achievements was the construction of public spaces not reserved for the state, including the Gdansk Monument and the Poznan Monument. Both incorporated crosses into their design, and, as Kubik explains, both monuments had been unveiled in religious ceremonies that emphasized the participation of society, rather than society 's subservience to the state. 67 Jan Kubik's analysis of these public events in Poland that preceded the formation of Solidarity offers insight into the political significance of religion in East Central Europe. Just as religion and religious traditions offered an alternative to the state's monopoly of power in Poland, the pilgrimage at Velehrad demonstrated that religion and religious traditions could offer a similar alternative in Czechoslovakia. Pope John Paul II had emphasized the historical significance of Christianity in Poland during his visit in 1979 and the commemoration of St. Methodius at Velehrad had allowed Catholic pilgrims the unique opportunity to confront state officials regarding Czechoslovakia's historical relationship with Christianity. The pilgrims at Velehrad, by vocally opposing the state's emphasis on the cultural contribution of Methodius, expressed their defiance of and unwillingness to be subservient to the state's religious policies. In doing so, the pilgrims transformed the traditional religious pilgrimage into an event of political significance. 66 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, I 994 ), 144. 67 For description and analysis of the Gdansk and the Poznan Monuments, see Kubik, The Power of Symbols, I 96-206, 2 14-216.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 1985 Pilgrimage at Velehrad: Slovak Catholics and the Creation of a Public Space Description An account of the resource David Doellinger Slovakia, Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007 pp. 99-116 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Doellinger, David Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1490e3af0ce4f4bf4e4f464ec8e3e75a.pdf 131c2b78141c60a2a6af799da0952b80 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 51 MARCH 14, 1974: The 35th Anniversary of Slovak Independence Day By Andrew Pie r, O.S.B. Personal liberty is a God-given natural right to all men because the Creator bestowed intelligence and a conscience upon every man to whom he gave the power to make his own decisions freely. Every infringement on human freedom, therefore, is contrary to the will of God and a violation of God's natural law. When individuals are deprived of their freedom the inevitable result is oppression, and when the rights of any nation to free development are denied the consequence is tyranny. In 1976 the second centennial of American independence will be commemorated in celebration of the overthrow of British imperial tyranny two hundred years ago. The War of Independence was waged by the thirteen American colonies to establish political freedom in the new world. Their successful revolt marked a historic milestone in the struggle of modern man for human freedom, and the founding of the American republic served as a precedent and pattern for countries around the world. Aspiration to national freedom, democracy, self-government and statehood in regions inhabited by people speaking the same language, having the same or a similar culture, sharing the same religion, having developed a literature of its own, and cherishing a common tradition, are a natural outgrowth of the inner most desires of a kindred people to be free . The path to national sovereignity is not always a rosy one, for it is often bathed with the blood, sweat and tears �52 SLOVAEIA of men forced to wage a constant struggle to win freedom, and having won it, they must be eternally vigilant to maintain it. Untold sacrifices are the price of freedom in every age. At the end of World War I the Slovaks, after a thousand years of virtual serfdom, emerged victoriously on the brink of national freedom that was denied them until they declared their independence on March 14, 1939. For a brief span of six years they enjoyed national freedom in their own free Slovak Republic only to fall victims of the Yalta agreement by which freedom was wrested from them by force and they were incorporated once again in the CzechoSlovak state that was destined to become a satellite in the Soviet sphere of influence in central Europe. Self-appointe d champions of Czecho-Slovakia in which the Slovaks have invariably been treated as colonials, or at best as second-rate citizens, by the Czech politicians in Prague at first hailed the "liberation" of the country in World War II by the Russians, but they were disillusioned quickly when a communist regime was imposed upon what was marked at Teheran and Yalta as a Soviet satellite state in the heart of Europe. More than that, under unrelenting pressure from Moscow postwar Czecho-Slovakia became a communist country in which the citizen as a subject of the state lost his freedom . Six years ago in mid-August the Soviet invasion by five armies (forces of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary) of an allied state reduced CzechoSlovakia virtually to a conquered country in which enemy military forces of occupation continue to enforce the will of Moscow. Liberation, so called, in 1945 led to a communist take over in 1948; and twenty years later (1968) the enslavement of a freedom-lovin g peoples, the Slovaks and Czechs, was completed by the unprovoked invasion of their lands by the self-styled champions of "a people's democracy" from the steppes of Eurasia. Despite the loss of their national freedom to the victorious conquerors of World War II, the Slovaks in their homeland have not ceased to aspire to their God-given �SLOVAKIA 53 right to freedom. Although their passive resistance to the communist system appears futile at the moment, they continue to hope for true liberation from the godless forces of communist tyranny, while their fellow countrymen in the free world keep alive their hope of ultimate liberation from the yoke of tyranny. Probably the most abused and misunderstood word in the English language is the simple word, "independence." And perhaps the least understood by many. All of us are interdependent ... we depend upon each other in so many ways: from infancy, through youth, adulthood and old age ... from the cradle to the grave. That's reality! How can we, therefore, speak of independence at all? In the sense that we have freedom of action, provided it does not encroach upon the freedom of others. Independence rules out subservience to an alien power, and it is exercised by free people who live in a prescribed area within which they rule themselves according to the principles of justice, freedom, truth and self-preservation, as well as under the inspiration of a spirit of esprit-decorps and the ideals of a well-ordered society under the authority of the law. Although in this form of society it is majority rule that dominates, there are provisions for the minority to voice their will-which on occasion has been known to predominate, for better or worse. Nevertheless, independence works in this way, too ... as we know it. Control of their national destiny was long denied the Slovaks, but for a brief period in their history of more than a dozen centuries in central Europe in their own free, Slovak Republic (1939-1945) they proved to themselves and to the whole world they are capable of self-rule if given the opportunity ... which they seized before the outbreak of the second World War and managed rather well in their self-governing state despite the handicaps imposed upon them, namely, the pressure of a powerful neighbor at war, as well as the hardship of a wartime economy since Slovakia was surrounded by nations engaged in a titanic struggle. While there are those who continue to downgrade the aspirations of the freedom-loving Slovaks and their desire for a self-governing state of their own, no true champion of liberty will deny them the right to be free. � SLOVAKIA 51 MARCH 14, 1974: The 35th Anniversary of Slovak Independence Day By Andrew Pie r, O.S.B. Personal liberty is a God-given natural right to all men because the Creator bestowed intelligence and a conscience upon every man to whom he gave the power to make his own decisions freely. Every infringement on human freedom, therefore, is contrary to the will of God and a violation of God's natural law. When individuals are deprived of their freedom the inevitable result is oppression, and when the rights of any nation to free development are denied the consequence is tyranny. In 1976 the second centennial of American independence will be commemorated in celebration of the overthrow of British imperial tyranny two hundred years ago. The War of Independence was waged by the thirteen American colonies to establish political freedom in the new world. Their successful revolt marked a historic milestone in the struggle of modern man for human freedom, and the founding of the American republic served as a precedent and pattern for countries around the world. Aspiration to national freedom, democracy, self-government and statehood in regions inhabited by people speaking the same language, having the same or a similar culture, sharing the same religion, having developed a literature of its own, and cherishing a common tradition, are a natural outgrowth of the inner most desires of a kindred people to be free . The path to national sovereignity is not always a rosy one, for it is often bathed with the blood, sweat and tears �52 SLOVAEIA of men forced to wage a constant struggle to win freedom, and having won it, they must be eternally vigilant to maintain it. Untold sacrifices are the price of freedom in every age. At the end of World War I the Slovaks, after a thousand years of virtual serfdom, emerged victoriously on the brink of national freedom that was denied them until they declared their independence on March 14, 1939. For a brief span of six years they enjoyed national freedom in their own free Slovak Republic only to fall victims of the Yalta agreement by which freedom was wrested from them by force and they were incorporated once again in the CzechoSlovak state that was destined to become a satellite in the Soviet sphere of influence in central Europe. Self-appointe d champions of Czecho-Slovakia in which the Slovaks have invariably been treated as colonials, or at best as second-rate citizens, by the Czech politicians in Prague at first hailed the "liberation" of the country in World War II by the Russians, but they were disillusioned quickly when a communist regime was imposed upon what was marked at Teheran and Yalta as a Soviet satellite state in the heart of Europe. More than that, under unrelenting pressure from Moscow postwar Czecho-Slovakia became a communist country in which the citizen as a subject of the state lost his freedom . Six years ago in mid-August the Soviet invasion by five armies (forces of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary) of an allied state reduced CzechoSlovakia virtually to a conquered country in which enemy military forces of occupation continue to enforce the will of Moscow. Liberation, so called, in 1945 led to a communist take over in 1948; and twenty years later (1968) the enslavement of a freedom-lovin g peoples, the Slovaks and Czechs, was completed by the unprovoked invasion of their lands by the self-styled champions of "a people's democracy" from the steppes of Eurasia. Despite the loss of their national freedom to the victorious conquerors of World War II, the Slovaks in their homeland have not ceased to aspire to their God-given �SLOVAKIA 53 right to freedom. Although their passive resistance to the communist system appears futile at the moment, they continue to hope for true liberation from the godless forces of communist tyranny, while their fellow countrymen in the free world keep alive their hope of ultimate liberation from the yoke of tyranny. Probably the most abused and misunderstood word in the English language is the simple word, "independence." And perhaps the least understood by many. All of us are interdependent ... we depend upon each other in so many ways: from infancy, through youth, adulthood and old age ... from the cradle to the grave. That's reality! How can we, therefore, speak of independence at all? In the sense that we have freedom of action, provided it does not encroach upon the freedom of others. Independence rules out subservience to an alien power, and it is exercised by free people who live in a prescribed area within which they rule themselves according to the principles of justice, freedom, truth and self-preservation, as well as under the inspiration of a spirit of esprit-decorps and the ideals of a well-ordered society under the authority of the law. Although in this form of society it is majority rule that dominates, there are provisions for the minority to voice their will-which on occasion has been known to predominate, for better or worse. Nevertheless, independence works in this way, too ... as we know it. Control of their national destiny was long denied the Slovaks, but for a brief period in their history of more than a dozen centuries in central Europe in their own free, Slovak Republic (1939-1945) they proved to themselves and to the whole world they are capable of self-rule if given the opportunity ... which they seized before the outbreak of the second World War and managed rather well in their self-governing state despite the handicaps imposed upon them, namely, the pressure of a powerful neighbor at war, as well as the hardship of a wartime economy since Slovakia was surrounded by nations engaged in a titanic struggle. While there are those who continue to downgrade the aspirations of the freedom-loving Slovaks and their desire for a self-governing state of their own, no true champion of liberty will deny them the right to be free. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 51 MARCH 14, 1974: The 35th Anniversary of Slovak Independence Day By Andrew Pie r, O.S.B. Personal liberty is a God-given natural right to all men because the Creator bestowed intelligence and a conscience upon every man to whom he gave the power to make his own decisions freely. Every infringement on human freedom, therefore, is contrary to the will of God and a violation of God's natural law. When individuals are deprived of their freedom the inevitable result is oppression, and when the rights of any nation to free development are denied the consequence is tyranny. In 1976 the second centennial of American independence will be commemorated in celebration of the overthrow of British imperial tyranny two hundred years ago. The War of Independence was waged by the thirteen American colonies to establish political freedom in the new world. Their successful revolt marked a historic milestone in the struggle of modern man for human freedom, and the founding of the American republic served as a precedent and pattern for countries around the world. Aspiration to national freedom, democracy, self-government and statehood in regions inhabited by people speaking the same language, having the same or a similar culture, sharing the same religion, having developed a literature of its own, and cherishing a common tradition, are a natural outgrowth of the inner most desires of a kindred people to be free . The path to national sovereignity is not always a rosy one, for it is often bathed with the blood, sweat and tears 52 SLOVAEIA of men forced to wage a constant struggle to win freedom, and having won it, they must be eternally vigilant to maintain it. Untold sacrifices are the price of freedom in every age. At the end of World War I the Slovaks, after a thousand years of virtual serfdom, emerged victoriously on the brink of national freedom that was denied them until they declared their independence on March 14, 1939. For a brief span of six years they enjoyed national freedom in their own free Slovak Republic only to fall victims of the Yalta agreement by which freedom was wrested from them by force and they were incorporated once again in the CzechoSlovak state that was destined to become a satellite in the Soviet sphere of influence in central Europe. Self-appointe d champions of Czecho-Slovakia in which the Slovaks have invariably been treated as colonials, or at best as second-rate citizens, by the Czech politicians in Prague at first hailed the "liberation" of the country in World War II by the Russians, but they were disillusioned quickly when a communist regime was imposed upon what was marked at Teheran and Yalta as a Soviet satellite state in the heart of Europe. More than that, under unrelenting pressure from Moscow postwar Czecho-Slovakia became a communist country in which the citizen as a subject of the state lost his freedom . Six years ago in mid-August the Soviet invasion by five armies (forces of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary) of an allied state reduced CzechoSlovakia virtually to a conquered country in which enemy military forces of occupation continue to enforce the will of Moscow. Liberation, so called, in 1945 led to a communist take over in 1948; and twenty years later (1968) the enslavement of a freedom-lovin g peoples, the Slovaks and Czechs, was completed by the unprovoked invasion of their lands by the self-styled champions of "a people's democracy" from the steppes of Eurasia. Despite the loss of their national freedom to the victorious conquerors of World War II, the Slovaks in their homeland have not ceased to aspire to their God-given SLOVAKIA 53 right to freedom. Although their passive resistance to the communist system appears futile at the moment, they continue to hope for true liberation from the godless forces of communist tyranny, while their fellow countrymen in the free world keep alive their hope of ultimate liberation from the yoke of tyranny. Probably the most abused and misunderstood word in the English language is the simple word, "independence." And perhaps the least understood by many. All of us are interdependent ... we depend upon each other in so many ways: from infancy, through youth, adulthood and old age ... from the cradle to the grave. That's reality! How can we, therefore, speak of independence at all? In the sense that we have freedom of action, provided it does not encroach upon the freedom of others. Independence rules out subservience to an alien power, and it is exercised by free people who live in a prescribed area within which they rule themselves according to the principles of justice, freedom, truth and self-preservation, as well as under the inspiration of a spirit of esprit-decorps and the ideals of a well-ordered society under the authority of the law. Although in this form of society it is majority rule that dominates, there are provisions for the minority to voice their will-which on occasion has been known to predominate, for better or worse. Nevertheless, independence works in this way, too ... as we know it. Control of their national destiny was long denied the Slovaks, but for a brief period in their history of more than a dozen centuries in central Europe in their own free, Slovak Republic (1939-1945) they proved to themselves and to the whole world they are capable of self-rule if given the opportunity ... which they seized before the outbreak of the second World War and managed rather well in their self-governing state despite the handicaps imposed upon them, namely, the pressure of a powerful neighbor at war, as well as the hardship of a wartime economy since Slovakia was surrounded by nations engaged in a titanic struggle. While there are those who continue to downgrade the aspirations of the freedom-loving Slovaks and their desire for a self-governing state of their own, no true champion of liberty will deny them the right to be free.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 35th Anniversary of Slovak Independence Day Description An account of the resource Andrew Pier, O.S.B. Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 51-53 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pier, Andrew W., 1910-2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/75b0d395160903025a155a55faab5aac.pdf 7b8f354a00a8669aaf5911cbeb2b518f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. �156 SLOVAKIA The secondar y goal consisted of involving even further the young American-Slovaks in first the Slovak causes and logically political activities at the same time. Both goals are ideally sound and require much more than parental urging to get the young out. It has been stated that the youth of today are more aware of the affairs of the world, of the ills and injustices , and that is debatable . However , acting on the assumpti on of that being true, Slovaks should renew in 1972 all previousl y intensifie d efforts at achieving a balance in both the political field and the youth movemen t. 1972 ended with the reelectio n of Richard M. Nixon, a Republic an, as Presiden t of the United States. Whether one can say that Richard Nixon represen ts the beliefs of the American-Slovaks as an entity is debatable , yet his reelectio n signifies a coalition of numerou s groups analogous to many of the ideal Slovak causes. Yet that presents a sort of predicam ent, because the labor-ori ented Slovak in the urban American cities typically congrega tes and identifies with the Democra tic Party. The scattered Slovak commun ities througho ut the United States do not present definite figures to examine the voting pattern this past year by, yet, realizing the loyalty the Slovak holds to God, America and the Slovak nationali ty, one can assume that the Slovaks who were Democra ts voted Democra tic and the Republic an Slovaks voted Republic an. Presiden t Nixon used the slogan: "Four more years" to lead his reelectio n campaign , and it is the advice from that campaign chant that the young American Slovaks in particula r can take either a hint or begin to worry. We have less than four years now to once again enact the machiner y to bring about the changes we desire in our country. My own particula r involvem ent in partisan politics has been with the Democra tic Party. In 1972 I was elected to a position of precinct delegate from the city of Lincoln Park. That particula r election, the May 16 Presiden tial Primary, was significa nt to the Slovaks of Michigan, because three Slovaks were elected as precinct delegates from Lincoln Park, and two were youths. In June I was selected as a delegate to the Democra tic National Conventi on in Miami Beach, committe d to Governo r George Wallace, �SLOVAKIA 157 representing the 15th Congressional district of Michigan. The Democratic National Convention was perhaps the most representative body of all the facets of America, a feat that the Republicans failed to attain at their own a month later. The significance of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines employed by the Democratic Party offers more than a fair opportunity for all minority groups to seek representation in a political system, and particularly the young Slovaks. The youthful idealists ensured the nomiruv tion of George S. McGovern last July and a coalition of equally-interested young Slovaks and other ethnic-oriented youths can conceivably achieve the same goal. Thus I stress the need for young Slovaks to take part in our political structure, working for their beliefs and goals, not forgetting the goals of America and their Slovak elders. We cannot sit back and allow either of the two parties to become stagnant or indifferent to our needs. But one does not gain in politics by sitting at home. I have chosen to work within the Democratic Party, by my own selection. The basic principles of that party best correlate with the people I associate and my personal viewpoints. From the young McGovern supporters in Miami Beach I have taken notice. A Republican is president, yet the young Democratic organization behind George McGovern succeeded in nominating him as the Democratic candidate for president, a task pronounced as impossible only four months prior to the convention. By their movement we can learn and profit, and the same goes for the young Slovaks adhering to the principles of the Republican Party. Gone are the days of the great ethnic machinery in political wards ( or so is evident in Detroit), yet machinery does not die, needing only replacement and oiling. The Slovaks can rejuvenate life in the political system, for it is from politics whence all good comes. In Michigan, one Slovak from Lincoln Park has been elected to the governing board of the state Democratic Party, and she is a woman. That in itself is significant. The Slovaks in Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh have been equally successful. The youth, in seeking to lead America to a time of peace and prosperity, must regard the example of the elders. But it will be by their youth and their Slovak heritage that they succeed. � SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. �156 SLOVAKIA The secondar y goal consisted of involving even further the young American-Slovaks in first the Slovak causes and logically political activities at the same time. Both goals are ideally sound and require much more than parental urging to get the young out. It has been stated that the youth of today are more aware of the affairs of the world, of the ills and injustices , and that is debatable . However , acting on the assumpti on of that being true, Slovaks should renew in 1972 all previousl y intensifie d efforts at achieving a balance in both the political field and the youth movemen t. 1972 ended with the reelectio n of Richard M. Nixon, a Republic an, as Presiden t of the United States. Whether one can say that Richard Nixon represen ts the beliefs of the American-Slovaks as an entity is debatable , yet his reelectio n signifies a coalition of numerou s groups analogous to many of the ideal Slovak causes. Yet that presents a sort of predicam ent, because the labor-ori ented Slovak in the urban American cities typically congrega tes and identifies with the Democra tic Party. The scattered Slovak commun ities througho ut the United States do not present definite figures to examine the voting pattern this past year by, yet, realizing the loyalty the Slovak holds to God, America and the Slovak nationali ty, one can assume that the Slovaks who were Democra ts voted Democra tic and the Republic an Slovaks voted Republic an. Presiden t Nixon used the slogan: "Four more years" to lead his reelectio n campaign , and it is the advice from that campaign chant that the young American Slovaks in particula r can take either a hint or begin to worry. We have less than four years now to once again enact the machiner y to bring about the changes we desire in our country. My own particula r involvem ent in partisan politics has been with the Democra tic Party. In 1972 I was elected to a position of precinct delegate from the city of Lincoln Park. That particula r election, the May 16 Presiden tial Primary, was significa nt to the Slovaks of Michigan, because three Slovaks were elected as precinct delegates from Lincoln Park, and two were youths. In June I was selected as a delegate to the Democra tic National Conventi on in Miami Beach, committe d to Governo r George Wallace, �SLOVAKIA 157 representing the 15th Congressional district of Michigan. The Democratic National Convention was perhaps the most representative body of all the facets of America, a feat that the Republicans failed to attain at their own a month later. The significance of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines employed by the Democratic Party offers more than a fair opportunity for all minority groups to seek representation in a political system, and particularly the young Slovaks. The youthful idealists ensured the nomiruv tion of George S. McGovern last July and a coalition of equally-interested young Slovaks and other ethnic-oriented youths can conceivably achieve the same goal. Thus I stress the need for young Slovaks to take part in our political structure, working for their beliefs and goals, not forgetting the goals of America and their Slovak elders. We cannot sit back and allow either of the two parties to become stagnant or indifferent to our needs. But one does not gain in politics by sitting at home. I have chosen to work within the Democratic Party, by my own selection. The basic principles of that party best correlate with the people I associate and my personal viewpoints. From the young McGovern supporters in Miami Beach I have taken notice. A Republican is president, yet the young Democratic organization behind George McGovern succeeded in nominating him as the Democratic candidate for president, a task pronounced as impossible only four months prior to the convention. By their movement we can learn and profit, and the same goes for the young Slovaks adhering to the principles of the Republican Party. Gone are the days of the great ethnic machinery in political wards ( or so is evident in Detroit), yet machinery does not die, needing only replacement and oiling. The Slovaks can rejuvenate life in the political system, for it is from politics whence all good comes. In Michigan, one Slovak from Lincoln Park has been elected to the governing board of the state Democratic Party, and she is a woman. That in itself is significant. The Slovaks in Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh have been equally successful. The youth, in seeking to lead America to a time of peace and prosperity, must regard the example of the elders. But it will be by their youth and their Slovak heritage that they succeed. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. 156 SLOVAKIA The secondar y goal consisted of involving even further the young American-Slovaks in first the Slovak causes and logically political activities at the same time. Both goals are ideally sound and require much more than parental urging to get the young out. It has been stated that the youth of today are more aware of the affairs of the world, of the ills and injustices , and that is debatable . However , acting on the assumpti on of that being true, Slovaks should renew in 1972 all previousl y intensifie d efforts at achieving a balance in both the political field and the youth movemen t. 1972 ended with the reelectio n of Richard M. Nixon, a Republic an, as Presiden t of the United States. Whether one can say that Richard Nixon represen ts the beliefs of the American-Slovaks as an entity is debatable , yet his reelectio n signifies a coalition of numerou s groups analogous to many of the ideal Slovak causes. Yet that presents a sort of predicam ent, because the labor-ori ented Slovak in the urban American cities typically congrega tes and identifies with the Democra tic Party. The scattered Slovak commun ities througho ut the United States do not present definite figures to examine the voting pattern this past year by, yet, realizing the loyalty the Slovak holds to God, America and the Slovak nationali ty, one can assume that the Slovaks who were Democra ts voted Democra tic and the Republic an Slovaks voted Republic an. Presiden t Nixon used the slogan: "Four more years" to lead his reelectio n campaign , and it is the advice from that campaign chant that the young American Slovaks in particula r can take either a hint or begin to worry. We have less than four years now to once again enact the machiner y to bring about the changes we desire in our country. My own particula r involvem ent in partisan politics has been with the Democra tic Party. In 1972 I was elected to a position of precinct delegate from the city of Lincoln Park. That particula r election, the May 16 Presiden tial Primary, was significa nt to the Slovaks of Michigan, because three Slovaks were elected as precinct delegates from Lincoln Park, and two were youths. In June I was selected as a delegate to the Democra tic National Conventi on in Miami Beach, committe d to Governo r George Wallace, SLOVAKIA 157 representing the 15th Congressional district of Michigan. The Democratic National Convention was perhaps the most representative body of all the facets of America, a feat that the Republicans failed to attain at their own a month later. The significance of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines employed by the Democratic Party offers more than a fair opportunity for all minority groups to seek representation in a political system, and particularly the young Slovaks. The youthful idealists ensured the nomiruv tion of George S. McGovern last July and a coalition of equally-interested young Slovaks and other ethnic-oriented youths can conceivably achieve the same goal. Thus I stress the need for young Slovaks to take part in our political structure, working for their beliefs and goals, not forgetting the goals of America and their Slovak elders. We cannot sit back and allow either of the two parties to become stagnant or indifferent to our needs. But one does not gain in politics by sitting at home. I have chosen to work within the Democratic Party, by my own selection. The basic principles of that party best correlate with the people I associate and my personal viewpoints. From the young McGovern supporters in Miami Beach I have taken notice. A Republican is president, yet the young Democratic organization behind George McGovern succeeded in nominating him as the Democratic candidate for president, a task pronounced as impossible only four months prior to the convention. By their movement we can learn and profit, and the same goes for the young Slovaks adhering to the principles of the Republican Party. Gone are the days of the great ethnic machinery in political wards ( or so is evident in Detroit), yet machinery does not die, needing only replacement and oiling. The Slovaks can rejuvenate life in the political system, for it is from politics whence all good comes. In Michigan, one Slovak from Lincoln Park has been elected to the governing board of the state Democratic Party, and she is a woman. That in itself is significant. The Slovaks in Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh have been equally successful. The youth, in seeking to lead America to a time of peace and prosperity, must regard the example of the elders. But it will be by their youth and their Slovak heritage that they succeed.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The American Political Question Description An account of the resource Edward M. Zelenak Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 155-157 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zelenak, Edward M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/10f86e64ee5e33e05bc32faa367825f8.pdf 6baea0402c78cc817142a1621e060ef9 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 THE AroSTLES OF BOGUS FEDERALISM By Dr. George W. Cesarich "There are o thers, however, who, under the guise of a federation, are hid ing their ou tworn conce pts whi ch would satisfy tbeir own selfis h as-pirations to powe r." - Matus Zvon. I. Zvon and Federalism There is common agreement that the present Political structure of Europe has ibecome obsolete. Nruzi,sm and fascism had contr1buted a great deal to the general disintegration of EUTopean society, but communism and its collaborators in Croatia, Slo,vakia, Bohemia, Hungary, Ser1bia, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, etc., ha;ve almost comp1e~ly destroyed the old political, social, and economic struoture in Central and Eastern Europe, substituting a centralistic police state for the old institutions. AmO'l1'g the exiles from that area new ,principles of order are being sought and the general trend is definitely toward federalism. This fact has not escaped the attention of those exiles, who are ,partly responsible for the present plight of the enslawed Central and Eastern European nations; so they are often too ready to pay liip service to the "great principle of federalism," however, at the same time clwerly scheming to restore their old power positioos and privileges. They have learned nothing from history, and with great ,v igor ,propagate again their old, discredited political ideas, this time using, however, a new but more deC'eptive phraseology since the old one has positively lost its former respectability For instance, in the Monthly Bulletin of the International Peasant Union (No. 4, 1953) we lfind an article under the title "Separatism or Unification" by Mr. Matus Zvon who, allegedly, is "a newspaperman of Slavaik origin." However, by his ideas he is evidently an advocate of outworn concep_ts of Ozech and Seribiam coJonialism and hegemony which he very skilfully disguises as "federal1 �62 SLOVAKIA ism." At the same time he conducts a vigorous crusade against "separatism," which is the usual abusive name frequein,tly used lby Czech and ,S eribian chauvinists to designate SlovaJk and Croatian movements for national independence. In short, Mr. Zvon attempts to spread an antiquated "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" 1pro,paganda coveTed with the cloak of a respectable federalism, so that his own motto aJbourt those who "are hiding their outworn concepts under the guise of federnlism" undJO'Uibtedly applies to him and his il'k. His concepts are basically undemocratic and imperialist in nature because they implicitly deny the right to self-determinatio,n for the Slovak and Croatian nations and, thus, are cointra:ry to the idea of a tTuly democratic federalism. His "federalist" pro,posals ha'Ve been made in the spirit of the infamous Little Entente which, among other things, was an alliance of hegemonists orgamzed with the purpose to slllppress ,by force the national liberaticm movements of Croats and 1Slovaiks. Genuine fedeTalism should extend the idea of se1f-determination of nations and not restrict it, as Mr. 7-Jvon desi'I'es. Thus Mr. Zvon's case is certainly the case orf a t)'1pical bogus federalism which is used to perpetuate, 1b y using new propaganda slogans, the oppressor states known as "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugoslavia." We agree with Mr. Zvon in his aHeged objecti,ve of a future that would be free of 1both "Soviet terro;r and expfoitation and of the national jealousies, conflicts and bitterness of the prerwar past." We, too, want ",peace and voluntary cooperation among countries, without dictators and secret pol.ice." We kno,w, howeiver, that his objective is unattainable if "Oze~hoslovaJkia" and "Yugoslaivia" continue to exist. We equally despise the communist or fascist form of totalitarianism. We wholeheartedly accept th~ idea of a federation of free nations, as a synthesis of an enlightened nationalism and a democratic internationalism, which would mean a better future for Central and Eastern Europe. But we coIDIPletely and aJbsolutely disagree with Mr. Zvon's concepts of "seiparatfrm" a,nd "nationalist separatist movements" which he unjustly condemns as a "c,hild of extreme nationalism," asserting that "if left unchooked, �SLOVAKIA 63 they (the separatist movements) could bring aJbout 'the ba1kamzation of Europe'." As a matter of fact, the term "separatism," used as a "smear" term by the Oz,e,ch and Ser,bian h e.gemonists, has been extensively used as a weapon in their political and economic exiploitation of oppressed nationalities, particularly of Slovaks and Car,patho-Ukraini ans in "Czechoslovakia," and of Croatians, tSlovenes, Macedonians, Mbanians, and Montenegrins in "Yugoshwia." What is more, this term has been 1ntentionally girven an omnious connotation by some hegemonists, and Mr. Zvon is only continu·ng this smearing "activity" when painting "separatism" in the darkest possilble colors. He attacks, in effect, those "bad," "separatist" Croats and 1Slovaks who want to free themselives from SeI1bian and Cwclh ,p atronage resp. and thereby intend to destroy such nice, "democratic" states like "CzechoslorvaJkia" and "Y,ugoslaJVia," i.e., make an end to Czech and Se11bian domination. Mr. Zrvon and the International Peasant Un.ion's Bulletin evidently lbelierve that those prisons of nations, "Yugoslavia" and "Ozec'hoslov8Jk-ia," are so.me •k ind of sacred COIWS that sh01Uld not lb e touched by any;body else, in order to be milked, but only lby their ·Se11bian and Orech masters. The first and second "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovakia" have passed very strict lruws "for the protection of state" directed against "separatism," and patterned after the similar codes, thus maJking separatism a serious "crime." Some Ozech and Seiibian agitators in exile are evidently unhappy that they are not in a position to apply those laws, i.e., to 'liquidate' freedOIIn-kwing Croats, Slovaks, Macedonians, etc., rSO they engage in a deceptive propaganda against Slovak and Croat "seiparatiSlm." with arguments that could equally a,pply to those American "separatists" who fought for their inde.pendence against EJngland, or to the French resistance moJVement fighting the Germans during World War II. Mr. Zvon's description of "separatism" has as its primary purpose to create a totalitarian scarecrow to be feared and condemned in this democratic world of ours. He contends that "separatism sees the maximum fulfill- �64 SLOVAKIA ment of national life only in a sovereign, independent, &lb preme and ethnically uniform state," and that "the separatism is a dogma which says that the mooit pevfe<!t and supreme !fomn of social life lies in an ethnically uniform state." It is relatively easy to criticize separatism if defined in this manner. But why did Mr. ~on omit to say what he really had in mind when he spoke aibout "separatism"? What he actually fights are the m01Vements of an enslaved nation for liberation from two ev;i1,s: communism and foreign yoke. He aippears to fear t'he struggle of Croats and Slovaks against Se:vb and Czech co1oruzation which is exactly identical with the s.truggle of American colonists a:gainSit English colonialism. For the so-called "separatists" of Mr. ~on, i.e., the Croats and the Slova!ks, "separatism" is no,t "a faith in a dogma in an ethnica.Ny unifomn state" as he misr~esents it, because they all know well that a complete ethnical uniformity is out of the question in Central and Eastern Europe because of many mixed territories. They haJVe never advocated the idea, as he asserts, that the national state is the "supreme form of social life." However, they have become increasingly more aware of the fact, confi11med by their historical exiperience in "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovakia," that they can fully develop their spiritual, cultura:l and economic resources only if they are free of foJ"eign hegemony, i.e., h:we their OIWil independent state. For them, this state is not an absolute ivalue, or a "supreme form of social life," but a practical necessity of their free and prosperous existence. Czech and Se11bian propagandists h:we .b een desperately trying to create the impression that there is something wrong witlh Croat and SlovaJk struggle for national independence. 'Dhereifore, they speaJk of it as a form of "extreme nationalism - chauvinist nationalism - extreme and uncooperative na,tionalism" - and even "totalitarian nationalism." ThLs is ~aotl.y what Mr. Zvon, too, is doing. Of coUTse, he does not have a single word of conde:mnation for Czech and Seooian imperiruliSIIIl, sneering only at the nation aliSIIIl of the oppressed ibut not the imperialism of their oppressors. �SLOVAKIA 65 ENidently, in Mr. Zivon's, opinion, nationalism of small and enslaJVed nations who fight for their freedom and independence is "chauvinistic, e~reme," and "intolerant separatism.." But nationalism of those who have ruled in "CzechoslovaJkia" and "Yugoslavia" - of the Czechs, the Seribs, and theiir helpers - is "geilluine parioti:s m" and "creative nationalism." '.Dhis is the inescaipruble implication of Mr. Zvon's, article that attacks only nationalism of oppressed n8Jtions lalbeled as ",s eparatism" and, at the same time, keeps completely silent albout the chauvinistic nationalism of some O!f the Czechs and iSe:rlbs, and their e~loitation of other Il!ations. Such a "federalism" - as propagated by Mr. Zwon which denies to small nations their right to se1f-deter,mination, aind also attempts to pe:r,petuate their oppression in artifically created states - is undisputably a fraudulent and untrue federalism. It rwould reestalblish the old regimes which, in national respect, were not muoh better than the communist systems with their ,p hony, centralistic "federalisan." There is, indeed, an unlbridgeaible gu1f between such bogus federalism and a truly democratic federalism. Freedom and federalism are two terun.s that are inseparruble. "Yugoslavi:a" and "OzechoslO'VaJ~ia" cannot exist in freedom, because the Croats and the Slovruk•s are almost unanimously opposed to the continued existence of these states. So "Yugoslruvia" and "Czechosl01Vrukia" can be kept aliive only by force and terror. However, a genuine federation cannot ibe created from albOIVe and maintained lb y force and terror, as some "OzechoslOIVruks" and "Yugoslavs" would like to do. This fact is clearly recogruzed by Mr. George M. DimitroJV, Secretary Generrul of the futernational Peasant Union, when he writes: "The attempts to impose federations from above for the purpose of accomodatlng the int.erests of governing oligarchies and cliques - have not been productive of positive results for the nations themselves. Past governments haive spoken od', and speculaited with such sohemes only when faced with unsunmountable difficulties or as a matter of unscrupuloos opportunism." (LiJberation and Union, Washington, 1952, p. 13.). �66 SLOVAKIA As an example f.o r his viewpoint, Mr. Dimitrov descriJbes "the unifi,c ation of Selfus, Croats and Slo,venes manipulated after world War I," stressmg that "it attained no durable results because it was im_po5ed from above, ignO'ring the ideas and needs of the .peoiples involived as weLl as truiy democratic procedures." Thus, any federation should lbe a free union of national states, or as Mr. Dimitrov puts it, "a true federation of free nations, and not an artificial and from above imposed creation." Therefore, the future European Union, and equally any eventJUal future regionail federations, should be built up from ,below and rest on free indiividual nations, and not on artificial oppressor states like "Ozechos.loivakia" and "Yugoslavia." This i:s a!lso the oipinion of the President of the Croatian Peasant Party, Dr. Valdko Macelk, who, in the same pUlblication (ip. 115), inivited the exiles "to prepare plans for a future Union of Free National States in Central and Southeastern Europe." In addition, it is imiportant that such plans ,be realized throwgh truly d~ocratic procedures and in ~ccordan.ce rwith the wishes of the respective peoples which could 1b e easily ascertained lby f~ee ple!biscites. !Having in mind that these ideas are basi~ for a democratic and federalist setup in Central and Eastern Eiurope, we must draw the conclusion that Mr. Zvon's ,b ogus federalism is intenti:onailly directed against the sulbjrugated tions · of "Czechosloivakia" and "Yugoslruvia." And we, therefore, consider it very unfortunate that his article WaJS pulblished in the Bulletin of the International Peasant Union which, as a democratic o,rgani~ti:on, .should be an. instrument. of freedom and 1progress and _not a S'Uipporter of the old regimes. Mr. Zivon must certainly have known that the Croatian Peasa;nt iParty, which is a memlber of the Union, defends the right of the Croatian ,p eople to. national independence and, in this sense, is Olbviously against any "Yugoslavia," therefore "separatist' in the eyes of Mr. Zvon and his kind. This olbjective of the Croa..tian Peasant Party has been proclaimed on many occasions. Consequently, the article attacking "separatism" of the Croats and the Slova!ks, and implicitly defending "Yugoslavia" and "Ozecho- -na- �67 SIJOVAKIA slovaJkia," is entirely orut of place in the Bulletin of the I. P. U. H we were not acquainted with the ideas expressed by Dr. Maic~k and Dr. Do:rmtrov, we could easil,y .get the wrong impression that the whole International Peasant Uniolll has become ain instrument for the restoration of the old regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The ,participation in the I. P. U. of "OzeclJ.OSilovaJk" and "Yugoslav-1Seribian" politica.'l .parties · (which are exdusively Czech and Serbian creaitions), may only strengthen this impression sin~e it is a weN-;kn01WI1 ·fact that the nam.es "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" hruve always lb~en a cover..;up for Czech and Serbian hegemony. fu addition, the real representa:tive.s of the Slova!k peasant people, the leaders of the Hlinka Party in exile, are not members of tlle I. P. U. I.n our Olpiniorn, thorough reorganiization of the I. P. U. would ibe necessary if it would convince the exiles orf all nations that this organi'zation is not a hodge-ipodge assemJblage of old politi'cians imbued with old -hegemonist caru:!epts, ibut an or,g arrization with new, progressive ideas, advocating a truly democratic federalism !based on free iniliividual nations, and in no wary identified with the oippressor-states. We siil!cereily believe that a ibetter and morn equitalble international order in Europe can never ib e founded on the bogus federalism propagated by Mr. Zvon and his so-called "Czechoslo;vaks." In a •s imilar manner, some ChetniJk prorpagandists orf a Greater Seroia speaJk also of a third, "federalist" Yugosil.1aNia. All this is not a solution of national prolblems. On the contrary, the necessary prerequisit.e for a democratic fed,eralized structure in Europe lies, in our opinion, in the liberation of all subjugated nations from the oppression exerted by Moscow, Prague, and Belgrade, and the creation of independent national states, including the Croat and thre Slovak states, which would then freely unite in a higher federal union. The representatives of those nations are progressiive and democratic men who are actirve partisans of a genuine federalism, aind reject a nairrowminded. and intolera.rnt nationalism. But they resolutely orppose tJhe bogus federalism of Mr. Zvon, some "Ozechoslovaks•," and some "Yugoslavs," since it would only prolong a 1 �68 SLOVAKIA the sufferings of subjugated nations in the artificial states which the Croats aind the Slovruks definitely and finalily do accept as their own. II. Ripka and Federalism Another Ciharaicteristic example of such a bogus federalism may 1b e found in the mimeograip:he d -book by Mr. Hubert Riiplcia (A Federation of Central Europe, New York, 1953), published at aJbout the same time as Mr. Zlvon's article, and pvolbaJbly insipired by the same crOIWd of political exiles. Mr. Ripka pleads for a "federation of existing states," not of nations. He is against any "dismemberm ent of Yugoslwvia and ~hoslOJVaki a." He asserts that the "dismemberment of one or the other state would cause destructive repercussions in t.lhe Danulbian region and also in the Balkans." In his opinion, "angry disputes among small, weak states would multiply," and "all efforts to integrate politically or economicailly the quarel1ing nations would collapse in the initial staige." Mr. Ripka says that "Yugoslavia, like OzechoslovaJkia, is esential to Europe, especially to East and Centra!l Eumpe." He thus disregards the wellknown facts that the, Croats do, not want to li,ve in any "Yugoslavia," and that the Slovaks do not want "Czechoslovakia." Though he recognizes the right of the Ukraine to secede from the Russian empire, he nevertheless denies the same right •o f secession to Croatia and !Slovaikia, thus rffillaining loyal to tile old hegemonist alliance of the Czech a.n d Serb ruling circles whicli, for over twenty years, had prevented any sulbstantial reforms in "OzechoslQIVrukia" and "Yugoslavia," and so, are greatly responsible for the present plight of enslaved nations therein. As coUild haive b een expected, Mr. Riplcia, who, togerthe~ with otlier Benes Ozechs, collwlborated with the Communists before, during and after Wovld War lI, and participated in the destruction oif Slovak national independence, rejects the conception of organizing Central and ])astern Europe on the basis of nations in contradiction to existing states. Like Mr. Zlvon, he too contends that "its rea:lization �69 SDOVAKIA would result in the balkanization of the wihole East Central Europe," and for f.ull measure he adds some shallow phrases aJbout ",graive and sometimes insolwble conflicts" which would allegedly preivent "higher integration." MT. Ripka transcends, however, into the world of Aesop's fables when he attempts to put over the idea that "Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were not artificial creations of Versailles diplomacy, but were, on the contrary, organic results of the historical evolution." Of course, he forgets to mention the Pittsburgh Agreement between the Slovaks and the Ozechs which was s·o shamefully violated by the Czech ruling drcles, and he disregards the undenia:ble fact that the Croats haive never accepted "Yrugoslavia" in a free election or a free plebiscite! Mr. Ripka even ventures to make the statement that "a positive ,policy, intended to create a better organization of Central Euro:pe in the future, after the fall of Soviet domination, must be !based therefore upon the existing states which correspond to national needs and aspirations of the nations concerned" ; tJhus he regards the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and those between Se-z,bs and Croats, as "a matter of internal politics." May be that "Czechoslova;kia" and "Yugoslavia" co,r respond to "national needs and aspirations" (to exploitation) of the •B enes Czechs and Serbian "Yugosla:vs," but it is not true that these states have never corresponded to the national needs and aspirations of the Croat and Slovak nations. On the contrary, these nations will do everything possiible to dismember the states which tJhey intensely despise, and create their own states in order to be masters of their OIWil destiny. AJS to the '~bal!kanization oif Burope," this term can only mean the use of pretense and deceit in relations between the nations It is an indisput~ble fact that these were and still are the methods used b,y some Czech and Serbian hegemonists a:gainst the enslaved natiorns. 'I'herefore, only these hegemonists are the ones who are responsilble for this strange, new ,phenomenon cahled the "lba1kanilza:tion of Europe" which came into exist.ence only after the creation of "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovarkia." 1 �70 SLOVAKIA EJvidently, the ideoloigy cYf Mr. Ripka and the Benes Ozechs, as eXiplained in their ipublica:tions, conclusively proves that they ,woU!ld like to continue t:he e~loitat.ion of the small ,b ut courageous Slovruk nation in a third "Czedhoslovrukia," and, since the case of "Yugoslavia" is a very similar one, tihey have 'been contiir:ruously inrventing flimsy arguments to effect the sulbjugation of borth the Croats and the 1Slovaik&. There is nothing peculiar aJbout it when a memlber of the Benes im!I)erialist ruling clique dn,es not recognize the right to freedom and independence to other natiOI1Js, and when he arrogantly attaoks Sloivruk and Croat "separatists" (again that disparaging word) and their national moivemenrts, since it would be swa.nge if it were othel1W'ise.. There already are, however, many progressiJve Czechs who, like t:he Czech Lt. Colonel F. 0. Mikscilie, in the spirit of a true federalism and genuine mutua;l cooperation s,a.y that only bad Ozechs and bad Slovaks can be "Ozechoslovruks." (And we saiy accordingly that only bad Croats and ba.tl Selibs can 'be "Yugoslavs"). The iprincilples of a truly democratic federalism, based on independent and free nations, has been gaining more a:nd more ground. Politics ma!kes for strange 'bedfellows, however, and the propaga:nd.i·s ts oif the old regime and political status quo find a supporter in an unexpected quarter. A former Htmgaria.n Minister to Paris, iMr Paul Auer (Liiooraition a:nd Union, p 20), has a nightmare that "the efforts oif certain nationa.il groups (as, the Slorva:ks and Croaits) to achieve greater independence than they have en!joyed up to now, also slhow the need for a federal system in Southeastern EurOipe, because if these people were to a'C'hieve their aims, we would 1b e fa.iced by a still greater numlber of small states in this a.rea with eiven less power to resist outside pressure." iMay be this is another form of bogus federalism that fears freedom and independence of en:shINed natfon and does not comprehend that this is an albsolutely necessary prerequisite for a free federal union. Mr. Ripka boldly asserts, without amy proof, that a dismemberment of "Yugoslavfa" wo•u ld make impossible any organization of the DanU!bia.n area and the iBaJl.kans. This sounds in our ea.rs Hke a:n argument for fee!ble-minded per- �SLOVAKIA 71 sons, since a solid and la.sting politicaJ orga.nimtion must be ,b ased on freedom, ,a nd freedom cannot 'be coupled, as experience teaches, Mth tJhe e~ence of the artificial creations, o!f Versailles. In fact, the first "YugoslaJvia" was kept together only by force and terror, and consequently easily disintegrated in the fi'.rst storm. The same was the case with "Czechoslova kia" which fell without any resistance. "Yugoslavia" was creat.ed against the will of the Croatian people; the Croats always regarded it as a prison of nations and gave a helping hand to destroy that prison. They will do it agam witJh Tito's "Yugoslavia," or any other "YUJgoslaivia," when the occasion arises. In "Czechoslovru kia," the Slovaks wanted first their aJUtonomy, and when this was denied to them, their independence. 'Dhey were n:ot interested in defending a state which was a clevwly disguised hegemony over them and the Carpatho-Ukr ainians, despite the fact tllat millions were spent a'broiad to propagandir7.e that state as a "bastion of democracy." "Yugoslavia" and ''Czechoslovakia" did not solve national problems. If anything, they for a time only succeeded to suppress them. But, in addition, they have created many new iprdblems that did not exist earlier; among other things, they have certainly increased the amount of mutuaJ intolerance and hatred among their component parts. 'I'he organ:iization o!f that a;rea on the basis of independent nations in a true federal union is the only alternative to the "Czechoslovak " and "Yugoslav" failures. This union would, in accordance with the wishes of the people, bring about a democraJti~ political structure, and simultaneously increase cooperation and tolerance among the respective nations. Let us make olear that the opposition to "Ozechoslovakia" and "YugosilaJvia" iby the Slovaks and Croats and Macedonians, is llJOt the opposition of a small gro111p of "separ.aJtists," as some colonialists would like the public to beliesve, but the opposition of the overwhehning majority of the respective nations. In our recently ,pulblished bOOlk ( Croatia and Serbia, why is their peaceful separation a European necessity?, Croatia Cultural PUJblishing Center, �72 SLOVAKIA 4.851 Drexel Blvd., Chicrugo 15, llinois), we have proven beyond any reasonaJble doulbt that today all the Croan, unanimously advocate the separation of Croatia and Serbia, i.e., the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, and that this solution is in the interesit of a lasting Euroipean settlement and peruce in that area. As to the SlovaJks, it is a iwell-<lmown fact that a great mrujority of tihem is today for an independent Slova,k state, and that only some of their renegades are in the camp of the so-icalled "Czechosloivruks." In fa,ce of such energetic opposition to Czech and Senb schemes, of which Mr. Ripka is certainly aware, a third "Czechoslovakia," and a third "YugoslaJVia," could be established and maintained only by undemocratic and dictatorial proce3ses, i.e., iby deceit, terror, and vi,olence. Left momentarily without po,wer to do anything else, the exiled Benes "Ozechoslova,ks" and the Serbian "Ywgoslavs" use deceit as their most potent weapon in 1:!he effort to affect their Greater Czech and Greater Ser.bian plans, engaging in a fals e and deceitful propaganda against the Croat and Slo1Vak "separatists." Freedom first, then Federalization There is no doubt in our mind that the organization of Central and Eastern Europe on the ibasis of existing states, as propagated by Mr. Ripka, Mr. Zvon and Company, is contrary to the democratic principle of self-determination of nations. Its realization would clearly meatn the restoration of the old, discTedited regimes, but the fight for national freedom on the part of enslaved nations would continue inside the states. A third "Czechosl'ovaJda" and a third "Yugoslaivia" oould lbe established only in the spirit of balkanization; deception, terror and suppression would be even more emiphasized because, in the meantime, the enslaved nations have increased their determination to find an exit from those oppressor-states. In contrast to this hegemonist spirit, we propose the national questions to lbe solved on the generally acceptable democratic principle of self-determination of nations. The S1ova'ks, Croats, Macedonians, and Sloivenes have ,t he right to choose freely their own fo,rnn of government, and to �SIJOVAKIA 73 live in their own independent states like any other nation. "Czechoslovakia" and "YugoslaJvia," therefore, cannot exist as free and democratic states since the nat1ons fordbly included in them do not want them. So they necessarily must be either Olpen dictatorSlhips, or at least pseudodemocracies based on a bogtll.Si federalism. A truly d,emocratic "Yugoslavia" and a truly democratic "Czechoslovakia" are today as unconceivable as a square circle or a round square; true democracy must inevitably lead to the dissolution of these oppressor-states. Thus an orderly, democratic and ,equitalble reorganization orf Central and Eastern Europe presupposes that its nations are first liberated, forming their own independent states and, then, as a second step, estaiblish federal unions among themselves. This means of course that further independent units must be created, i.e., a free Slovenia, a free Croatia, a free S1ova;kia, a free Macedonia, a free Montenegro, which may then freely select the fo!1lll and direction of their participation in a federal union. 'Dhese states thoug:h sma1,l are capaible of an independent existence, de-s pite the perlidio,u,s propaganda slogans of some of the "eX)perts" who, deny the right of small nations to a free existence with the flimsy arguments ab,o ut their "smallness," evidently forgetting that Denmark, Holland, Luxemiburg, Belgium, Finland, Albania, etc., are also small but, nevertheless, have ;proven their ability to live an independent life. For a tyipical hegemonist lilke Mr. Ripka the idea that Slovaks and Croats maiy acquire their freedom appears to be a horrilble nigihtmare, but for all freedom.Jlo1ving individuals, this is the ,o nly equitable solution of national problems in thait part of Europe. This is not atomization of Europe, or its lbalikanization; this is mutual coopJra.tion on the basis of freedom and a genuine democratic fed eralism. Therefore, the existing states, "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugoslavia," which evidently do not correspond to national needs and aispira,tions of their inha,bitants, must be dissolved in the interest of a just national settlement and general peace. After the existence of independent Slovak 1 �74 SLOV.AKIA. and Croatian states, irrespective of the conditions surrounding their coming into existence and their forms of government, tlhe relations between Cre<!hs and SlovaJks, and between Serl}s and Croats, are not '_'internal questions" any more, though Mr. Ripka would prefer such a formula in order that Benes Orechs could continue to dominate the Sl01Vaks without any foreign interference as they did in the past. Hence these questions are today internatiiOnal questions; they are concerned with the relations between nations with their own state ideas. The right to selrf-determination is not a ruse, as Mr. Ripka alleges, but a democrati'c right which should not be reserved onil¥ for the Ozechs and the Serbs, 'b ut sho.uld aipply also for other cultured and freedom~loving nrations. The Oild comlb,ination of Oz.ecih and Serbian ruling circles has for a long time succeeded in suppressing the will of sUlbjugated na,tionalities and nations for their independence. These ruling circles are now desperately tcying to continue this practice under the caver of a bogus federalism. They have not changed a 1b it, they have remained struble in .their insane crarvings to rule other nations. This may lbe clear.ly recognired in various international and exile OTga:ruJzaJtions where the same old hegemonist crowd iD!Sists on its old "Ozechoslo.vaik" and "'Y ugoslaJV" deceptions, maintaining the fiotions of a "CzeohJOslOIVa!k" and a "Yugoslav" unity, which is not accepta.lble to Slovaks and Croats. For instance, the Ben.es Ozechs have created a "Czechorslovak" Comrmittee, without any representation of the national Sl·o.vaJks (•i ncluding, howeiver, some dubious Slovalks who re.present only themselives and not the wishes of their ipeople). The well-ilmown fact js, however, that the Slovaik nation desires its national independence, and, therefore, a "Czeohoslovaik" Committee is an obvio.us deception ( and so are all "Czechoslovak" political parties), est:a!blished ,for the purpose to sooure the hegemo1t1y of the Ozec!h "master race" over the SlavaJks. The "Voice of America," "Ratlio Free Europe," and similar organizations, are under the influence of the same old politicians who cherish hegemon:ism. For ins,tance, the "Bulletin" (IPregled) in Croatian, published by the Na- �SLOVAKIA 75 tional Committee for a Free Europe, has been edited by a Slovenian "Yugoslav," a former mem/ber of the semi.fascist and dictatoriral iBelrg rade governments which systematica.olly persecuted the Croatian peoiple. All this despite the fact that there are many a.Ible Croatian journalists in this country. This is a deliJberate insult to all Croatians, but numerous Croatian representations that were made to end this scandal remained without any success. The old hegemonist crowd is seemingly much stronger than all the appeals to reason and .p olitical decency In the "Voice of America," the Croatian language has not ,b een recognized, and some Se11bian chauvinists broadcast to Croatia in a tongue which sounds impossible for Croatian ear:s. In this case, also, numerous Croatian protests produced no results. In the Christian-iDemocratic Union, some .Sl01Venian "Yugoslavs" speak in the name of "Yugos:lwvia," haiving no authorization whatsoever from the Croats to do so. The Slovaks, too, have had the same e:x1periences with all these and similar or.ganizations. · In this sense, an those individuals who spea,k in the name of the "OzechoslolV'all{s" and "Yugoslavs" show practically every day just what is their rea,I concept of freedom and equa,lity, and wihat they understand under "federalism." They have ibeen continually using 1!he old methods of domination, and derception, whieih they so successfully employed in the first "YugOSllavia" a,nd "Ozechoslcwa,kia," .paying liip service to "freedom, democracy and equality," but having in mind only the restoration of their old power positions. As a matter of fact, they do not fight for a free IDuro,pe, but only for a :IDu:rope without freedom for enslaved nations. Lt is only unfortunate that some American organ.IBati'ons and ind1;vidua,l s nairvely support such basically undemocratic and imperialist politicians. Mr. Ripka, IMr. 'Zenikl; and their il'k, had a wonderful opportunity to show the woriking of fueir federalism. when they were in power in first and second "Czechoslovakia." However, at that time their "federalism" consisted of an extreme centralism, of the oppression orf the SlovaJk nation, of persecutions and terror. Who could be so naive to �76 SLOVAKIA believe that their "federalism" would be any different in the future, particularly if we consider that they e1Ven now, in exile, belieive the same way as they did before, de~ nying the right of SIIIlali enslaved nations to their freedom. The same aipplies to the Serbian and Slo1Venian "Yugoslavs" wiho possess the sa:rne arrogant menrtality asthe "Ozeic:hos1ova!ks." There can be no do'U!bt that the hegemonist crowd has accepted the slogan orf federalism only to deceive· the world about their real intentions. Burt we do not see that they can ever return to po,w er. They have missed the boat. They have had their chances to create democratic federal structures in "Creclloslo1Va!kia" and "Yugoslavia." Instead they ruled dictatorially, dis;regarding completely the wishes. of the oppressed, and thus increasing the .power of centrifugal forces. Ripka and the Benes Czechs missed the boat even twice. Their prindples of political order have failed miseraJbly and, therefore, new ones are necessary. In a shameful collaJboration with the Communists, the Benes Ozechs have destroyed Slovak independence and put to death many SlovaJk patriots, among them the great Slova,k president, Monsignor 'Diso. Slovaks will never forget that. So we are sure that the Slo:va!k nation wrn sei'r e the first opportunity to, diSllllemiber Ozecho-lSlwrukia and reestrublish its own state The same will be done b,y the Croats in the Communist Greater Senbian Yugo,s lavia. These are the realities of contemporary Europe, while the hegemonist ,plans of Mr. Zvon, Mr. Ripka, and similair hegemonists, also their bogus federalism, must inelVita:bly end in the disposal containers of history. 'l"he time of colonialism, as in Africa so. in Eump~ has definitely passed. Czech and Serlb coloniailis;,;,1, under the claaik of a bogus federalism, must end in defeat. After the ineivitaJble disintegration of Communism, the enslaved nations of Eastern and Central Euroipe will sha:ke off the yokes of Moscow, Belgrade and Prague, and esitalblish their own independent states which will freel,y coorperate in a spirit of a truly democratic federalism, entering into federal unions as free, independent, democratic and equal na,tions. �SLOVAKIA 77 We Croats will certainly destroy any attempt to create a third "Yugoslavia," and we firmly believe that our old friends, the Slo,vaks, ,will do the same with respect to "OzechoslO'Vakia." The Croats and the Slovaks would not be worthy to exist as free nations,, if they permitted again the hy,pocritical hegeanonist scihemera and apostles of a bogus federalism t,o .S'l.llbdue them in the arhlficial appressor--states. There can be no free Europe without free E)uropean nations. There can ibe no equitalble settlemenit in Europe and no free Euro;pean or regional union, without an independent Sl01Vruk state, without an independent Croatian state, without a free Macedonia, without a free Slovenia. The dissolution of "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugo.sla";a" is, therefore, an absolut-ely indispensable cond.iition for a true and genuine federalist structure of the European continent. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czeoho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of Dr. Hubert Ripka, FIGARO, Paris, national politics." April 4, 1949. • • • "Novem1ber 7, 1917, is the day thaJt is marlrnd in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new method of equalling differences among people and thus achieving contentment on earth. Today it is still too ealI'ly from thaJt epochal occasion to judge objootiveily the consequences of that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the beginning of an enormous process full of ideas born of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vice-Cha.irnian of the Executive Committee of the "Counc,il of Free ~echoslo!V'a:kia," NOYE PRUDY, November 18, 194'5). � SLOVAKIA 61 THE AroSTLES OF BOGUS FEDERALISM By Dr. George W. Cesarich "There are o thers, however, who, under the guise of a federation, are hid ing their ou tworn conce pts whi ch would satisfy tbeir own selfis h as-pirations to powe r." - Matus Zvon. I. Zvon and Federalism There is common agreement that the present Political structure of Europe has ibecome obsolete. Nruzi,sm and fascism had contr1buted a great deal to the general disintegration of EUTopean society, but communism and its collaborators in Croatia, Slo,vakia, Bohemia, Hungary, Ser1bia, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, etc., ha;ve almost comp1e~ly destroyed the old political, social, and economic struoture in Central and Eastern Europe, substituting a centralistic police state for the old institutions. AmO'l1'g the exiles from that area new ,principles of order are being sought and the general trend is definitely toward federalism. This fact has not escaped the attention of those exiles, who are ,partly responsible for the present plight of the enslawed Central and Eastern European nations; so they are often too ready to pay liip service to the "great principle of federalism," however, at the same time clwerly scheming to restore their old power positioos and privileges. They have learned nothing from history, and with great ,v igor ,propagate again their old, discredited political ideas, this time using, however, a new but more deC'eptive phraseology since the old one has positively lost its former respectability For instance, in the Monthly Bulletin of the International Peasant Union (No. 4, 1953) we lfind an article under the title "Separatism or Unification" by Mr. Matus Zvon who, allegedly, is "a newspaperman of Slavaik origin." However, by his ideas he is evidently an advocate of outworn concep_ts of Ozech and Seribiam coJonialism and hegemony which he very skilfully disguises as "federal1 �62 SLOVAKIA ism." At the same time he conducts a vigorous crusade against "separatism," which is the usual abusive name frequein,tly used lby Czech and ,S eribian chauvinists to designate SlovaJk and Croatian movements for national independence. In short, Mr. Zvon attempts to spread an antiquated "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" 1pro,paganda coveTed with the cloak of a respectable federalism, so that his own motto aJbourt those who "are hiding their outworn concepts under the guise of federnlism" undJO'Uibtedly applies to him and his il'k. His concepts are basically undemocratic and imperialist in nature because they implicitly deny the right to self-determinatio,n for the Slovak and Croatian nations and, thus, are cointra:ry to the idea of a tTuly democratic federalism. His "federalist" pro,posals ha'Ve been made in the spirit of the infamous Little Entente which, among other things, was an alliance of hegemonists orgamzed with the purpose to slllppress ,by force the national liberaticm movements of Croats and 1Slovaiks. Genuine fedeTalism should extend the idea of se1f-determination of nations and not restrict it, as Mr. 7-Jvon desi'I'es. Thus Mr. Zvon's case is certainly the case orf a t)'1pical bogus federalism which is used to perpetuate, 1b y using new propaganda slogans, the oppressor states known as "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugoslavia." We agree with Mr. Zvon in his aHeged objecti,ve of a future that would be free of 1both "Soviet terro;r and expfoitation and of the national jealousies, conflicts and bitterness of the prerwar past." We, too, want ",peace and voluntary cooperation among countries, without dictators and secret pol.ice." We kno,w, howeiver, that his objective is unattainable if "Oze~hoslovaJkia" and "Yugoslaivia" continue to exist. We equally despise the communist or fascist form of totalitarianism. We wholeheartedly accept th~ idea of a federation of free nations, as a synthesis of an enlightened nationalism and a democratic internationalism, which would mean a better future for Central and Eastern Europe. But we coIDIPletely and aJbsolutely disagree with Mr. Zvon's concepts of "seiparatfrm" a,nd "nationalist separatist movements" which he unjustly condemns as a "c,hild of extreme nationalism," asserting that "if left unchooked, �SLOVAKIA 63 they (the separatist movements) could bring aJbout 'the ba1kamzation of Europe'." As a matter of fact, the term "separatism," used as a "smear" term by the Oz,e,ch and Ser,bian h e.gemonists, has been extensively used as a weapon in their political and economic exiploitation of oppressed nationalities, particularly of Slovaks and Car,patho-Ukraini ans in "Czechoslovakia," and of Croatians, tSlovenes, Macedonians, Mbanians, and Montenegrins in "Yugoshwia." What is more, this term has been 1ntentionally girven an omnious connotation by some hegemonists, and Mr. Zvon is only continu·ng this smearing "activity" when painting "separatism" in the darkest possilble colors. He attacks, in effect, those "bad," "separatist" Croats and 1Slovaks who want to free themselives from SeI1bian and Cwclh ,p atronage resp. and thereby intend to destroy such nice, "democratic" states like "CzechoslorvaJkia" and "Y,ugoslaJVia," i.e., make an end to Czech and Se11bian domination. Mr. Zrvon and the International Peasant Un.ion's Bulletin evidently lbelierve that those prisons of nations, "Yugoslavia" and "Ozec'hoslov8Jk-ia," are so.me •k ind of sacred COIWS that sh01Uld not lb e touched by any;body else, in order to be milked, but only lby their ·Se11bian and Orech masters. The first and second "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovakia" have passed very strict lruws "for the protection of state" directed against "separatism," and patterned after the similar codes, thus maJking separatism a serious "crime." Some Ozech and Seiibian agitators in exile are evidently unhappy that they are not in a position to apply those laws, i.e., to 'liquidate' freedOIIn-kwing Croats, Slovaks, Macedonians, etc., rSO they engage in a deceptive propaganda against Slovak and Croat "seiparatiSlm." with arguments that could equally a,pply to those American "separatists" who fought for their inde.pendence against EJngland, or to the French resistance moJVement fighting the Germans during World War II. Mr. Zvon's description of "separatism" has as its primary purpose to create a totalitarian scarecrow to be feared and condemned in this democratic world of ours. He contends that "separatism sees the maximum fulfill- �64 SLOVAKIA ment of national life only in a sovereign, independent, &lb preme and ethnically uniform state," and that "the separatism is a dogma which says that the mooit pevfe<!t and supreme !fomn of social life lies in an ethnically uniform state." It is relatively easy to criticize separatism if defined in this manner. But why did Mr. ~on omit to say what he really had in mind when he spoke aibout "separatism"? What he actually fights are the m01Vements of an enslaved nation for liberation from two ev;i1,s: communism and foreign yoke. He aippears to fear t'he struggle of Croats and Slovaks against Se:vb and Czech co1oruzation which is exactly identical with the s.truggle of American colonists a:gainSit English colonialism. For the so-called "separatists" of Mr. ~on, i.e., the Croats and the Slova!ks, "separatism" is no,t "a faith in a dogma in an ethnica.Ny unifomn state" as he misr~esents it, because they all know well that a complete ethnical uniformity is out of the question in Central and Eastern Europe because of many mixed territories. They haJVe never advocated the idea, as he asserts, that the national state is the "supreme form of social life." However, they have become increasingly more aware of the fact, confi11med by their historical exiperience in "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovakia," that they can fully develop their spiritual, cultura:l and economic resources only if they are free of foJ"eign hegemony, i.e., h:we their OIWil independent state. For them, this state is not an absolute ivalue, or a "supreme form of social life," but a practical necessity of their free and prosperous existence. Czech and Se11bian propagandists h:we .b een desperately trying to create the impression that there is something wrong witlh Croat and SlovaJk struggle for national independence. 'Dhereifore, they speaJk of it as a form of "extreme nationalism - chauvinist nationalism - extreme and uncooperative na,tionalism" - and even "totalitarian nationalism." ThLs is ~aotl.y what Mr. Zvon, too, is doing. Of coUTse, he does not have a single word of conde:mnation for Czech and Seooian imperiruliSIIIl, sneering only at the nation aliSIIIl of the oppressed ibut not the imperialism of their oppressors. �SLOVAKIA 65 ENidently, in Mr. Zivon's, opinion, nationalism of small and enslaJVed nations who fight for their freedom and independence is "chauvinistic, e~reme," and "intolerant separatism.." But nationalism of those who have ruled in "CzechoslovaJkia" and "Yugoslavia" - of the Czechs, the Seribs, and theiir helpers - is "geilluine parioti:s m" and "creative nationalism." '.Dhis is the inescaipruble implication of Mr. Zvon's, article that attacks only nationalism of oppressed n8Jtions lalbeled as ",s eparatism" and, at the same time, keeps completely silent albout the chauvinistic nationalism of some O!f the Czechs and iSe:rlbs, and their e~loitation of other Il!ations. Such a "federalism" - as propagated by Mr. Zwon which denies to small nations their right to se1f-deter,mination, aind also attempts to pe:r,petuate their oppression in artifically created states - is undisputably a fraudulent and untrue federalism. It rwould reestalblish the old regimes which, in national respect, were not muoh better than the communist systems with their ,p hony, centralistic "federalisan." There is, indeed, an unlbridgeaible gu1f between such bogus federalism and a truly democratic federalism. Freedom and federalism are two terun.s that are inseparruble. "Yugoslavi:a" and "OzechoslO'VaJ~ia" cannot exist in freedom, because the Croats and the Slovruk•s are almost unanimously opposed to the continued existence of these states. So "Yugoslruvia" and "Czechosl01Vrukia" can be kept aliive only by force and terror. However, a genuine federation cannot ibe created from albOIVe and maintained lb y force and terror, as some "OzechoslOIVruks" and "Yugoslavs" would like to do. This fact is clearly recogruzed by Mr. George M. DimitroJV, Secretary Generrul of the futernational Peasant Union, when he writes: "The attempts to impose federations from above for the purpose of accomodatlng the int.erests of governing oligarchies and cliques - have not been productive of positive results for the nations themselves. Past governments haive spoken od', and speculaited with such sohemes only when faced with unsunmountable difficulties or as a matter of unscrupuloos opportunism." (LiJberation and Union, Washington, 1952, p. 13.). �66 SLOVAKIA As an example f.o r his viewpoint, Mr. Dimitrov descriJbes "the unifi,c ation of Selfus, Croats and Slo,venes manipulated after world War I," stressmg that "it attained no durable results because it was im_po5ed from above, ignO'ring the ideas and needs of the .peoiples involived as weLl as truiy democratic procedures." Thus, any federation should lbe a free union of national states, or as Mr. Dimitrov puts it, "a true federation of free nations, and not an artificial and from above imposed creation." Therefore, the future European Union, and equally any eventJUal future regionail federations, should be built up from ,below and rest on free indiividual nations, and not on artificial oppressor states like "Ozechos.loivakia" and "Yugoslavia." This i:s a!lso the oipinion of the President of the Croatian Peasant Party, Dr. Valdko Macelk, who, in the same pUlblication (ip. 115), inivited the exiles "to prepare plans for a future Union of Free National States in Central and Southeastern Europe." In addition, it is imiportant that such plans ,be realized throwgh truly d~ocratic procedures and in ~ccordan.ce rwith the wishes of the respective peoples which could 1b e easily ascertained lby f~ee ple!biscites. !Having in mind that these ideas are basi~ for a democratic and federalist setup in Central and Eastern Eiurope, we must draw the conclusion that Mr. Zvon's ,b ogus federalism is intenti:onailly directed against the sulbjrugated tions · of "Czechosloivakia" and "Yugoslruvia." And we, therefore, consider it very unfortunate that his article WaJS pulblished in the Bulletin of the International Peasant Union which, as a democratic o,rgani~ti:on, .should be an. instrument. of freedom and 1progress and _not a S'Uipporter of the old regimes. Mr. Zivon must certainly have known that the Croatian Peasa;nt iParty, which is a memlber of the Union, defends the right of the Croatian ,p eople to. national independence and, in this sense, is Olbviously against any "Yugoslavia," therefore "separatist' in the eyes of Mr. Zvon and his kind. This olbjective of the Croa..tian Peasant Party has been proclaimed on many occasions. Consequently, the article attacking "separatism" of the Croats and the Slova!ks, and implicitly defending "Yugoslavia" and "Ozecho- -na- �67 SIJOVAKIA slovaJkia," is entirely orut of place in the Bulletin of the I. P. U. H we were not acquainted with the ideas expressed by Dr. Maic~k and Dr. Do:rmtrov, we could easil,y .get the wrong impression that the whole International Peasant Uniolll has become ain instrument for the restoration of the old regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The ,participation in the I. P. U. of "OzeclJ.OSilovaJk" and "Yugoslav-1Seribian" politica.'l .parties · (which are exdusively Czech and Serbian creaitions), may only strengthen this impression sin~e it is a weN-;kn01WI1 ·fact that the nam.es "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" hruve always lb~en a cover..;up for Czech and Serbian hegemony. fu addition, the real representa:tive.s of the Slova!k peasant people, the leaders of the Hlinka Party in exile, are not members of tlle I. P. U. I.n our Olpiniorn, thorough reorganiization of the I. P. U. would ibe necessary if it would convince the exiles orf all nations that this organi'zation is not a hodge-ipodge assemJblage of old politi'cians imbued with old -hegemonist caru:!epts, ibut an or,g arrization with new, progressive ideas, advocating a truly democratic federalism !based on free iniliividual nations, and in no wary identified with the oippressor-states. We siil!cereily believe that a ibetter and morn equitalble international order in Europe can never ib e founded on the bogus federalism propagated by Mr. Zvon and his so-called "Czechoslo;vaks." In a •s imilar manner, some ChetniJk prorpagandists orf a Greater Seroia speaJk also of a third, "federalist" Yugosil.1aNia. All this is not a solution of national prolblems. On the contrary, the necessary prerequisit.e for a democratic fed,eralized structure in Europe lies, in our opinion, in the liberation of all subjugated nations from the oppression exerted by Moscow, Prague, and Belgrade, and the creation of independent national states, including the Croat and thre Slovak states, which would then freely unite in a higher federal union. The representatives of those nations are progressiive and democratic men who are actirve partisans of a genuine federalism, aind reject a nairrowminded. and intolera.rnt nationalism. But they resolutely orppose tJhe bogus federalism of Mr. Zvon, some "Ozechoslovaks•," and some "Yugoslavs," since it would only prolong a 1 �68 SLOVAKIA the sufferings of subjugated nations in the artificial states which the Croats aind the Slovruks definitely and finalily do accept as their own. II. Ripka and Federalism Another Ciharaicteristic example of such a bogus federalism may 1b e found in the mimeograip:he d -book by Mr. Hubert Riiplcia (A Federation of Central Europe, New York, 1953), published at aJbout the same time as Mr. Zlvon's article, and pvolbaJbly insipired by the same crOIWd of political exiles. Mr. Ripka pleads for a "federation of existing states," not of nations. He is against any "dismemberm ent of Yugoslwvia and ~hoslOJVaki a." He asserts that the "dismemberment of one or the other state would cause destructive repercussions in t.lhe Danulbian region and also in the Balkans." In his opinion, "angry disputes among small, weak states would multiply," and "all efforts to integrate politically or economicailly the quarel1ing nations would collapse in the initial staige." Mr. Ripka says that "Yugoslavia, like OzechoslovaJkia, is esential to Europe, especially to East and Centra!l Eumpe." He thus disregards the wellknown facts that the, Croats do, not want to li,ve in any "Yugoslavia," and that the Slovaks do not want "Czechoslovakia." Though he recognizes the right of the Ukraine to secede from the Russian empire, he nevertheless denies the same right •o f secession to Croatia and !Slovaikia, thus rffillaining loyal to tile old hegemonist alliance of the Czech a.n d Serb ruling circles whicli, for over twenty years, had prevented any sulbstantial reforms in "OzechoslQIVrukia" and "Yugoslavia," and so, are greatly responsible for the present plight of enslaved nations therein. As coUild haive b een expected, Mr. Riplcia, who, togerthe~ with otlier Benes Ozechs, collwlborated with the Communists before, during and after Wovld War lI, and participated in the destruction oif Slovak national independence, rejects the conception of organizing Central and ])astern Europe on the basis of nations in contradiction to existing states. Like Mr. Zlvon, he too contends that "its rea:lization �69 SDOVAKIA would result in the balkanization of the wihole East Central Europe," and for f.ull measure he adds some shallow phrases aJbout ",graive and sometimes insolwble conflicts" which would allegedly preivent "higher integration." MT. Ripka transcends, however, into the world of Aesop's fables when he attempts to put over the idea that "Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were not artificial creations of Versailles diplomacy, but were, on the contrary, organic results of the historical evolution." Of course, he forgets to mention the Pittsburgh Agreement between the Slovaks and the Ozechs which was s·o shamefully violated by the Czech ruling drcles, and he disregards the undenia:ble fact that the Croats haive never accepted "Yrugoslavia" in a free election or a free plebiscite! Mr. Ripka even ventures to make the statement that "a positive ,policy, intended to create a better organization of Central Euro:pe in the future, after the fall of Soviet domination, must be !based therefore upon the existing states which correspond to national needs and aspirations of the nations concerned" ; tJhus he regards the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and those between Se-z,bs and Croats, as "a matter of internal politics." May be that "Czechoslova;kia" and "Yugoslavia" co,r respond to "national needs and aspirations" (to exploitation) of the •B enes Czechs and Serbian "Yugosla:vs," but it is not true that these states have never corresponded to the national needs and aspirations of the Croat and Slovak nations. On the contrary, these nations will do everything possiible to dismember the states which tJhey intensely despise, and create their own states in order to be masters of their OIWil destiny. AJS to the '~bal!kanization oif Burope," this term can only mean the use of pretense and deceit in relations between the nations It is an indisput~ble fact that these were and still are the methods used b,y some Czech and Serbian hegemonists a:gainst the enslaved natiorns. 'I'herefore, only these hegemonists are the ones who are responsilble for this strange, new ,phenomenon cahled the "lba1kanilza:tion of Europe" which came into exist.ence only after the creation of "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovarkia." 1 �70 SLOVAKIA EJvidently, the ideoloigy cYf Mr. Ripka and the Benes Ozechs, as eXiplained in their ipublica:tions, conclusively proves that they ,woU!ld like to continue t:he e~loitat.ion of the small ,b ut courageous Slovruk nation in a third "Czedhoslovrukia," and, since the case of "Yugoslavia" is a very similar one, tihey have 'been contiir:ruously inrventing flimsy arguments to effect the sulbjugation of borth the Croats and the 1Slovaik&. There is nothing peculiar aJbout it when a memlber of the Benes im!I)erialist ruling clique dn,es not recognize the right to freedom and independence to other natiOI1Js, and when he arrogantly attaoks Sloivruk and Croat "separatists" (again that disparaging word) and their national moivemenrts, since it would be swa.nge if it were othel1W'ise.. There already are, however, many progressiJve Czechs who, like t:he Czech Lt. Colonel F. 0. Mikscilie, in the spirit of a true federalism and genuine mutua;l cooperation s,a.y that only bad Ozechs and bad Slovaks can be "Ozechoslovruks." (And we saiy accordingly that only bad Croats and ba.tl Selibs can 'be "Yugoslavs"). The iprincilples of a truly democratic federalism, based on independent and free nations, has been gaining more a:nd more ground. Politics ma!kes for strange 'bedfellows, however, and the propaga:nd.i·s ts oif the old regime and political status quo find a supporter in an unexpected quarter. A former Htmgaria.n Minister to Paris, iMr Paul Auer (Liiooraition a:nd Union, p 20), has a nightmare that "the efforts oif certain nationa.il groups (as, the Slorva:ks and Croaits) to achieve greater independence than they have en!joyed up to now, also slhow the need for a federal system in Southeastern EurOipe, because if these people were to a'C'hieve their aims, we would 1b e fa.iced by a still greater numlber of small states in this a.rea with eiven less power to resist outside pressure." iMay be this is another form of bogus federalism that fears freedom and independence of en:shINed natfon and does not comprehend that this is an albsolutely necessary prerequisite for a free federal union. Mr. Ripka boldly asserts, without amy proof, that a dismemberment of "Yugoslavfa" wo•u ld make impossible any organization of the DanU!bia.n area and the iBaJl.kans. This sounds in our ea.rs Hke a:n argument for fee!ble-minded per- �SLOVAKIA 71 sons, since a solid and la.sting politicaJ orga.nimtion must be ,b ased on freedom, ,a nd freedom cannot 'be coupled, as experience teaches, Mth tJhe e~ence of the artificial creations, o!f Versailles. In fact, the first "YugoslaJvia" was kept together only by force and terror, and consequently easily disintegrated in the fi'.rst storm. The same was the case with "Czechoslova kia" which fell without any resistance. "Yugoslavia" was creat.ed against the will of the Croatian people; the Croats always regarded it as a prison of nations and gave a helping hand to destroy that prison. They will do it agam witJh Tito's "Yugoslavia," or any other "YUJgoslaivia," when the occasion arises. In "Czechoslovru kia," the Slovaks wanted first their aJUtonomy, and when this was denied to them, their independence. 'Dhey were n:ot interested in defending a state which was a clevwly disguised hegemony over them and the Carpatho-Ukr ainians, despite the fact tllat millions were spent a'broiad to propagandir7.e that state as a "bastion of democracy." "Yugoslavia" and ''Czechoslovakia" did not solve national problems. If anything, they for a time only succeeded to suppress them. But, in addition, they have created many new iprdblems that did not exist earlier; among other things, they have certainly increased the amount of mutuaJ intolerance and hatred among their component parts. 'I'he organ:iization o!f that a;rea on the basis of independent nations in a true federal union is the only alternative to the "Czechoslovak " and "Yugoslav" failures. This union would, in accordance with the wishes of the people, bring about a democraJti~ political structure, and simultaneously increase cooperation and tolerance among the respective nations. Let us make olear that the opposition to "Ozechoslovakia" and "YugosilaJvia" iby the Slovaks and Croats and Macedonians, is llJOt the opposition of a small gro111p of "separ.aJtists," as some colonialists would like the public to beliesve, but the opposition of the overwhehning majority of the respective nations. In our recently ,pulblished bOOlk ( Croatia and Serbia, why is their peaceful separation a European necessity?, Croatia Cultural PUJblishing Center, �72 SLOVAKIA 4.851 Drexel Blvd., Chicrugo 15, llinois), we have proven beyond any reasonaJble doulbt that today all the Croan, unanimously advocate the separation of Croatia and Serbia, i.e., the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, and that this solution is in the interesit of a lasting Euroipean settlement and peruce in that area. As to the SlovaJks, it is a iwell-<lmown fact that a great mrujority of tihem is today for an independent Slova,k state, and that only some of their renegades are in the camp of the so-icalled "Czechosloivruks." In fa,ce of such energetic opposition to Czech and Senb schemes, of which Mr. Ripka is certainly aware, a third "Czechoslovakia," and a third "YugoslaJVia," could be established and maintained only by undemocratic and dictatorial proce3ses, i.e., iby deceit, terror, and vi,olence. Left momentarily without po,wer to do anything else, the exiled Benes "Ozechoslova,ks" and the Serbian "Ywgoslavs" use deceit as their most potent weapon in 1:!he effort to affect their Greater Czech and Greater Ser.bian plans, engaging in a fals e and deceitful propaganda against the Croat and Slo1Vak "separatists." Freedom first, then Federalization There is no doubt in our mind that the organization of Central and Eastern Europe on the ibasis of existing states, as propagated by Mr. Ripka, Mr. Zvon and Company, is contrary to the democratic principle of self-determination of nations. Its realization would clearly meatn the restoration of the old, discTedited regimes, but the fight for national freedom on the part of enslaved nations would continue inside the states. A third "Czechosl'ovaJda" and a third "Yugoslaivia" oould lbe established only in the spirit of balkanization; deception, terror and suppression would be even more emiphasized because, in the meantime, the enslaved nations have increased their determination to find an exit from those oppressor-states. In contrast to this hegemonist spirit, we propose the national questions to lbe solved on the generally acceptable democratic principle of self-determination of nations. The S1ova'ks, Croats, Macedonians, and Sloivenes have ,t he right to choose freely their own fo,rnn of government, and to �SIJOVAKIA 73 live in their own independent states like any other nation. "Czechoslovakia" and "YugoslaJvia," therefore, cannot exist as free and democratic states since the nat1ons fordbly included in them do not want them. So they necessarily must be either Olpen dictatorSlhips, or at least pseudodemocracies based on a bogtll.Si federalism. A truly d,emocratic "Yugoslavia" and a truly democratic "Czechoslovakia" are today as unconceivable as a square circle or a round square; true democracy must inevitably lead to the dissolution of these oppressor-states. Thus an orderly, democratic and ,equitalble reorganization orf Central and Eastern Europe presupposes that its nations are first liberated, forming their own independent states and, then, as a second step, estaiblish federal unions among themselves. This means of course that further independent units must be created, i.e., a free Slovenia, a free Croatia, a free S1ova;kia, a free Macedonia, a free Montenegro, which may then freely select the fo!1lll and direction of their participation in a federal union. 'Dhese states thoug:h sma1,l are capaible of an independent existence, de-s pite the perlidio,u,s propaganda slogans of some of the "eX)perts" who, deny the right of small nations to a free existence with the flimsy arguments ab,o ut their "smallness," evidently forgetting that Denmark, Holland, Luxemiburg, Belgium, Finland, Albania, etc., are also small but, nevertheless, have ;proven their ability to live an independent life. For a tyipical hegemonist lilke Mr. Ripka the idea that Slovaks and Croats maiy acquire their freedom appears to be a horrilble nigihtmare, but for all freedom.Jlo1ving individuals, this is the ,o nly equitable solution of national problems in thait part of Europe. This is not atomization of Europe, or its lbalikanization; this is mutual coopJra.tion on the basis of freedom and a genuine democratic fed eralism. Therefore, the existing states, "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugoslavia," which evidently do not correspond to national needs and aispira,tions of their inha,bitants, must be dissolved in the interest of a just national settlement and general peace. After the existence of independent Slovak 1 �74 SLOV.AKIA. and Croatian states, irrespective of the conditions surrounding their coming into existence and their forms of government, tlhe relations between Cre<!hs and SlovaJks, and between Serl}s and Croats, are not '_'internal questions" any more, though Mr. Ripka would prefer such a formula in order that Benes Orechs could continue to dominate the Sl01Vaks without any foreign interference as they did in the past. Hence these questions are today internatiiOnal questions; they are concerned with the relations between nations with their own state ideas. The right to selrf-determination is not a ruse, as Mr. Ripka alleges, but a democrati'c right which should not be reserved onil¥ for the Ozechs and the Serbs, 'b ut sho.uld aipply also for other cultured and freedom~loving nrations. The Oild comlb,ination of Oz.ecih and Serbian ruling circles has for a long time succeeded in suppressing the will of sUlbjugated na,tionalities and nations for their independence. These ruling circles are now desperately tcying to continue this practice under the caver of a bogus federalism. They have not changed a 1b it, they have remained struble in .their insane crarvings to rule other nations. This may lbe clear.ly recognired in various international and exile OTga:ruJzaJtions where the same old hegemonist crowd iD!Sists on its old "Ozechoslo.vaik" and "'Y ugoslaJV" deceptions, maintaining the fiotions of a "CzeohJOslOIVa!k" and a "Yugoslav" unity, which is not accepta.lble to Slovaks and Croats. For instance, the Ben.es Ozechs have created a "Czechorslovak" Comrmittee, without any representation of the national Sl·o.vaJks (•i ncluding, howeiver, some dubious Slovalks who re.present only themselives and not the wishes of their ipeople). The well-ilmown fact js, however, that the Slovaik nation desires its national independence, and, therefore, a "Czeohoslovaik" Committee is an obvio.us deception ( and so are all "Czechoslovak" political parties), est:a!blished ,for the purpose to sooure the hegemo1t1y of the Ozec!h "master race" over the SlavaJks. The "Voice of America," "Ratlio Free Europe," and similar organizations, are under the influence of the same old politicians who cherish hegemon:ism. For ins,tance, the "Bulletin" (IPregled) in Croatian, published by the Na- �SLOVAKIA 75 tional Committee for a Free Europe, has been edited by a Slovenian "Yugoslav," a former mem/ber of the semi.fascist and dictatoriral iBelrg rade governments which systematica.olly persecuted the Croatian peoiple. All this despite the fact that there are many a.Ible Croatian journalists in this country. This is a deliJberate insult to all Croatians, but numerous Croatian representations that were made to end this scandal remained without any success. The old hegemonist crowd is seemingly much stronger than all the appeals to reason and .p olitical decency In the "Voice of America," the Croatian language has not ,b een recognized, and some Se11bian chauvinists broadcast to Croatia in a tongue which sounds impossible for Croatian ear:s. In this case, also, numerous Croatian protests produced no results. In the Christian-iDemocratic Union, some .Sl01Venian "Yugoslavs" speak in the name of "Yugos:lwvia," haiving no authorization whatsoever from the Croats to do so. The Slovaks, too, have had the same e:x1periences with all these and similar or.ganizations. · In this sense, an those individuals who spea,k in the name of the "OzechoslolV'all{s" and "Yugoslavs" show practically every day just what is their rea,I concept of freedom and equa,lity, and wihat they understand under "federalism." They have ibeen continually using 1!he old methods of domination, and derception, whieih they so successfully employed in the first "YugOSllavia" a,nd "Ozechoslcwa,kia," .paying liip service to "freedom, democracy and equality," but having in mind only the restoration of their old power positions. As a matter of fact, they do not fight for a free IDuro,pe, but only for a :IDu:rope without freedom for enslaved nations. Lt is only unfortunate that some American organ.IBati'ons and ind1;vidua,l s nairvely support such basically undemocratic and imperialist politicians. Mr. Ripka, IMr. 'Zenikl; and their il'k, had a wonderful opportunity to show the woriking of fueir federalism. when they were in power in first and second "Czechoslovakia." However, at that time their "federalism" consisted of an extreme centralism, of the oppression orf the SlovaJk nation, of persecutions and terror. Who could be so naive to �76 SLOVAKIA believe that their "federalism" would be any different in the future, particularly if we consider that they e1Ven now, in exile, belieive the same way as they did before, de~ nying the right of SIIIlali enslaved nations to their freedom. The same aipplies to the Serbian and Slo1Venian "Yugoslavs" wiho possess the sa:rne arrogant menrtality asthe "Ozeic:hos1ova!ks." There can be no do'U!bt that the hegemonist crowd has accepted the slogan orf federalism only to deceive· the world about their real intentions. Burt we do not see that they can ever return to po,w er. They have missed the boat. They have had their chances to create democratic federal structures in "Creclloslo1Va!kia" and "Yugoslavia." Instead they ruled dictatorially, dis;regarding completely the wishes. of the oppressed, and thus increasing the .power of centrifugal forces. Ripka and the Benes Czechs missed the boat even twice. Their prindples of political order have failed miseraJbly and, therefore, new ones are necessary. In a shameful collaJboration with the Communists, the Benes Ozechs have destroyed Slovak independence and put to death many SlovaJk patriots, among them the great Slova,k president, Monsignor 'Diso. Slovaks will never forget that. So we are sure that the Slo:va!k nation wrn sei'r e the first opportunity to, diSllllemiber Ozecho-lSlwrukia and reestrublish its own state The same will be done b,y the Croats in the Communist Greater Senbian Yugo,s lavia. These are the realities of contemporary Europe, while the hegemonist ,plans of Mr. Zvon, Mr. Ripka, and similair hegemonists, also their bogus federalism, must inelVita:bly end in the disposal containers of history. 'l"he time of colonialism, as in Africa so. in Eump~ has definitely passed. Czech and Serlb coloniailis;,;,1, under the claaik of a bogus federalism, must end in defeat. After the ineivitaJble disintegration of Communism, the enslaved nations of Eastern and Central Euroipe will sha:ke off the yokes of Moscow, Belgrade and Prague, and esitalblish their own independent states which will freel,y coorperate in a spirit of a truly democratic federalism, entering into federal unions as free, independent, democratic and equal na,tions. �SLOVAKIA 77 We Croats will certainly destroy any attempt to create a third "Yugoslavia," and we firmly believe that our old friends, the Slo,vaks, ,will do the same with respect to "OzechoslO'Vakia." The Croats and the Slovaks would not be worthy to exist as free nations,, if they permitted again the hy,pocritical hegeanonist scihemera and apostles of a bogus federalism t,o .S'l.llbdue them in the arhlficial appressor--states. There can be no free Europe without free E)uropean nations. There can ibe no equitalble settlemenit in Europe and no free Euro;pean or regional union, without an independent Sl01Vruk state, without an independent Croatian state, without a free Macedonia, without a free Slovenia. The dissolution of "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugo.sla";a" is, therefore, an absolut-ely indispensable cond.iition for a true and genuine federalist structure of the European continent. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czeoho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of Dr. Hubert Ripka, FIGARO, Paris, national politics." April 4, 1949. • • • "Novem1ber 7, 1917, is the day thaJt is marlrnd in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new method of equalling differences among people and thus achieving contentment on earth. Today it is still too ealI'ly from thaJt epochal occasion to judge objootiveily the consequences of that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the beginning of an enormous process full of ideas born of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vice-Cha.irnian of the Executive Committee of the "Counc,il of Free ~echoslo!V'a:kia," NOYE PRUDY, November 18, 194'5). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 THE AroSTLES OF BOGUS FEDERALISM By Dr. George W. Cesarich "There are o thers, however, who, under the guise of a federation, are hid ing their ou tworn conce pts whi ch would satisfy tbeir own selfis h as-pirations to powe r." - Matus Zvon. I. Zvon and Federalism There is common agreement that the present Political structure of Europe has ibecome obsolete. Nruzi,sm and fascism had contr1buted a great deal to the general disintegration of EUTopean society, but communism and its collaborators in Croatia, Slo,vakia, Bohemia, Hungary, Ser1bia, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, etc., ha;ve almost comp1e~ly destroyed the old political, social, and economic struoture in Central and Eastern Europe, substituting a centralistic police state for the old institutions. AmO'l1'g the exiles from that area new ,principles of order are being sought and the general trend is definitely toward federalism. This fact has not escaped the attention of those exiles, who are ,partly responsible for the present plight of the enslawed Central and Eastern European nations; so they are often too ready to pay liip service to the "great principle of federalism," however, at the same time clwerly scheming to restore their old power positioos and privileges. They have learned nothing from history, and with great ,v igor ,propagate again their old, discredited political ideas, this time using, however, a new but more deC'eptive phraseology since the old one has positively lost its former respectability For instance, in the Monthly Bulletin of the International Peasant Union (No. 4, 1953) we lfind an article under the title "Separatism or Unification" by Mr. Matus Zvon who, allegedly, is "a newspaperman of Slavaik origin." However, by his ideas he is evidently an advocate of outworn concep_ts of Ozech and Seribiam coJonialism and hegemony which he very skilfully disguises as "federal1 62 SLOVAKIA ism." At the same time he conducts a vigorous crusade against "separatism," which is the usual abusive name frequein,tly used lby Czech and ,S eribian chauvinists to designate SlovaJk and Croatian movements for national independence. In short, Mr. Zvon attempts to spread an antiquated "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" 1pro,paganda coveTed with the cloak of a respectable federalism, so that his own motto aJbourt those who "are hiding their outworn concepts under the guise of federnlism" undJO'Uibtedly applies to him and his il'k. His concepts are basically undemocratic and imperialist in nature because they implicitly deny the right to self-determinatio,n for the Slovak and Croatian nations and, thus, are cointra:ry to the idea of a tTuly democratic federalism. His "federalist" pro,posals ha'Ve been made in the spirit of the infamous Little Entente which, among other things, was an alliance of hegemonists orgamzed with the purpose to slllppress ,by force the national liberaticm movements of Croats and 1Slovaiks. Genuine fedeTalism should extend the idea of se1f-determination of nations and not restrict it, as Mr. 7-Jvon desi'I'es. Thus Mr. Zvon's case is certainly the case orf a t)'1pical bogus federalism which is used to perpetuate, 1b y using new propaganda slogans, the oppressor states known as "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugoslavia." We agree with Mr. Zvon in his aHeged objecti,ve of a future that would be free of 1both "Soviet terro;r and expfoitation and of the national jealousies, conflicts and bitterness of the prerwar past." We, too, want ",peace and voluntary cooperation among countries, without dictators and secret pol.ice." We kno,w, howeiver, that his objective is unattainable if "Oze~hoslovaJkia" and "Yugoslaivia" continue to exist. We equally despise the communist or fascist form of totalitarianism. We wholeheartedly accept th~ idea of a federation of free nations, as a synthesis of an enlightened nationalism and a democratic internationalism, which would mean a better future for Central and Eastern Europe. But we coIDIPletely and aJbsolutely disagree with Mr. Zvon's concepts of "seiparatfrm" a,nd "nationalist separatist movements" which he unjustly condemns as a "c,hild of extreme nationalism," asserting that "if left unchooked, SLOVAKIA 63 they (the separatist movements) could bring aJbout 'the ba1kamzation of Europe'." As a matter of fact, the term "separatism," used as a "smear" term by the Oz,e,ch and Ser,bian h e.gemonists, has been extensively used as a weapon in their political and economic exiploitation of oppressed nationalities, particularly of Slovaks and Car,patho-Ukraini ans in "Czechoslovakia," and of Croatians, tSlovenes, Macedonians, Mbanians, and Montenegrins in "Yugoshwia." What is more, this term has been 1ntentionally girven an omnious connotation by some hegemonists, and Mr. Zvon is only continu·ng this smearing "activity" when painting "separatism" in the darkest possilble colors. He attacks, in effect, those "bad," "separatist" Croats and 1Slovaks who want to free themselives from SeI1bian and Cwclh ,p atronage resp. and thereby intend to destroy such nice, "democratic" states like "CzechoslorvaJkia" and "Y,ugoslaJVia," i.e., make an end to Czech and Se11bian domination. Mr. Zrvon and the International Peasant Un.ion's Bulletin evidently lbelierve that those prisons of nations, "Yugoslavia" and "Ozec'hoslov8Jk-ia," are so.me •k ind of sacred COIWS that sh01Uld not lb e touched by any;body else, in order to be milked, but only lby their ·Se11bian and Orech masters. The first and second "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovakia" have passed very strict lruws "for the protection of state" directed against "separatism," and patterned after the similar codes, thus maJking separatism a serious "crime." Some Ozech and Seiibian agitators in exile are evidently unhappy that they are not in a position to apply those laws, i.e., to 'liquidate' freedOIIn-kwing Croats, Slovaks, Macedonians, etc., rSO they engage in a deceptive propaganda against Slovak and Croat "seiparatiSlm." with arguments that could equally a,pply to those American "separatists" who fought for their inde.pendence against EJngland, or to the French resistance moJVement fighting the Germans during World War II. Mr. Zvon's description of "separatism" has as its primary purpose to create a totalitarian scarecrow to be feared and condemned in this democratic world of ours. He contends that "separatism sees the maximum fulfill- 64 SLOVAKIA ment of national life only in a sovereign, independent, &lb preme and ethnically uniform state," and that "the separatism is a dogma which says that the mooit pevfe<!t and supreme !fomn of social life lies in an ethnically uniform state." It is relatively easy to criticize separatism if defined in this manner. But why did Mr. ~on omit to say what he really had in mind when he spoke aibout "separatism"? What he actually fights are the m01Vements of an enslaved nation for liberation from two ev;i1,s: communism and foreign yoke. He aippears to fear t'he struggle of Croats and Slovaks against Se:vb and Czech co1oruzation which is exactly identical with the s.truggle of American colonists a:gainSit English colonialism. For the so-called "separatists" of Mr. ~on, i.e., the Croats and the Slova!ks, "separatism" is no,t "a faith in a dogma in an ethnica.Ny unifomn state" as he misr~esents it, because they all know well that a complete ethnical uniformity is out of the question in Central and Eastern Europe because of many mixed territories. They haJVe never advocated the idea, as he asserts, that the national state is the "supreme form of social life." However, they have become increasingly more aware of the fact, confi11med by their historical exiperience in "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovakia," that they can fully develop their spiritual, cultura:l and economic resources only if they are free of foJ"eign hegemony, i.e., h:we their OIWil independent state. For them, this state is not an absolute ivalue, or a "supreme form of social life," but a practical necessity of their free and prosperous existence. Czech and Se11bian propagandists h:we .b een desperately trying to create the impression that there is something wrong witlh Croat and SlovaJk struggle for national independence. 'Dhereifore, they speaJk of it as a form of "extreme nationalism - chauvinist nationalism - extreme and uncooperative na,tionalism" - and even "totalitarian nationalism." ThLs is ~aotl.y what Mr. Zvon, too, is doing. Of coUTse, he does not have a single word of conde:mnation for Czech and Seooian imperiruliSIIIl, sneering only at the nation aliSIIIl of the oppressed ibut not the imperialism of their oppressors. SLOVAKIA 65 ENidently, in Mr. Zivon's, opinion, nationalism of small and enslaJVed nations who fight for their freedom and independence is "chauvinistic, e~reme," and "intolerant separatism.." But nationalism of those who have ruled in "CzechoslovaJkia" and "Yugoslavia" - of the Czechs, the Seribs, and theiir helpers - is "geilluine parioti:s m" and "creative nationalism." '.Dhis is the inescaipruble implication of Mr. Zvon's, article that attacks only nationalism of oppressed n8Jtions lalbeled as ",s eparatism" and, at the same time, keeps completely silent albout the chauvinistic nationalism of some O!f the Czechs and iSe:rlbs, and their e~loitation of other Il!ations. Such a "federalism" - as propagated by Mr. Zwon which denies to small nations their right to se1f-deter,mination, aind also attempts to pe:r,petuate their oppression in artifically created states - is undisputably a fraudulent and untrue federalism. It rwould reestalblish the old regimes which, in national respect, were not muoh better than the communist systems with their ,p hony, centralistic "federalisan." There is, indeed, an unlbridgeaible gu1f between such bogus federalism and a truly democratic federalism. Freedom and federalism are two terun.s that are inseparruble. "Yugoslavi:a" and "OzechoslO'VaJ~ia" cannot exist in freedom, because the Croats and the Slovruk•s are almost unanimously opposed to the continued existence of these states. So "Yugoslruvia" and "Czechosl01Vrukia" can be kept aliive only by force and terror. However, a genuine federation cannot ibe created from albOIVe and maintained lb y force and terror, as some "OzechoslOIVruks" and "Yugoslavs" would like to do. This fact is clearly recogruzed by Mr. George M. DimitroJV, Secretary Generrul of the futernational Peasant Union, when he writes: "The attempts to impose federations from above for the purpose of accomodatlng the int.erests of governing oligarchies and cliques - have not been productive of positive results for the nations themselves. Past governments haive spoken od', and speculaited with such sohemes only when faced with unsunmountable difficulties or as a matter of unscrupuloos opportunism." (LiJberation and Union, Washington, 1952, p. 13.). 66 SLOVAKIA As an example f.o r his viewpoint, Mr. Dimitrov descriJbes "the unifi,c ation of Selfus, Croats and Slo,venes manipulated after world War I," stressmg that "it attained no durable results because it was im_po5ed from above, ignO'ring the ideas and needs of the .peoiples involived as weLl as truiy democratic procedures." Thus, any federation should lbe a free union of national states, or as Mr. Dimitrov puts it, "a true federation of free nations, and not an artificial and from above imposed creation." Therefore, the future European Union, and equally any eventJUal future regionail federations, should be built up from ,below and rest on free indiividual nations, and not on artificial oppressor states like "Ozechos.loivakia" and "Yugoslavia." This i:s a!lso the oipinion of the President of the Croatian Peasant Party, Dr. Valdko Macelk, who, in the same pUlblication (ip. 115), inivited the exiles "to prepare plans for a future Union of Free National States in Central and Southeastern Europe." In addition, it is imiportant that such plans ,be realized throwgh truly d~ocratic procedures and in ~ccordan.ce rwith the wishes of the respective peoples which could 1b e easily ascertained lby f~ee ple!biscites. !Having in mind that these ideas are basi~ for a democratic and federalist setup in Central and Eastern Eiurope, we must draw the conclusion that Mr. Zvon's ,b ogus federalism is intenti:onailly directed against the sulbjrugated tions · of "Czechosloivakia" and "Yugoslruvia." And we, therefore, consider it very unfortunate that his article WaJS pulblished in the Bulletin of the International Peasant Union which, as a democratic o,rgani~ti:on, .should be an. instrument. of freedom and 1progress and _not a S'Uipporter of the old regimes. Mr. Zivon must certainly have known that the Croatian Peasa;nt iParty, which is a memlber of the Union, defends the right of the Croatian ,p eople to. national independence and, in this sense, is Olbviously against any "Yugoslavia," therefore "separatist' in the eyes of Mr. Zvon and his kind. This olbjective of the Croa..tian Peasant Party has been proclaimed on many occasions. Consequently, the article attacking "separatism" of the Croats and the Slova!ks, and implicitly defending "Yugoslavia" and "Ozecho- -na- 67 SIJOVAKIA slovaJkia," is entirely orut of place in the Bulletin of the I. P. U. H we were not acquainted with the ideas expressed by Dr. Maic~k and Dr. Do:rmtrov, we could easil,y .get the wrong impression that the whole International Peasant Uniolll has become ain instrument for the restoration of the old regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The ,participation in the I. P. U. of "OzeclJ.OSilovaJk" and "Yugoslav-1Seribian" politica.'l .parties · (which are exdusively Czech and Serbian creaitions), may only strengthen this impression sin~e it is a weN-;kn01WI1 ·fact that the nam.es "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" hruve always lb~en a cover..;up for Czech and Serbian hegemony. fu addition, the real representa:tive.s of the Slova!k peasant people, the leaders of the Hlinka Party in exile, are not members of tlle I. P. U. I.n our Olpiniorn, thorough reorganiization of the I. P. U. would ibe necessary if it would convince the exiles orf all nations that this organi'zation is not a hodge-ipodge assemJblage of old politi'cians imbued with old -hegemonist caru:!epts, ibut an or,g arrization with new, progressive ideas, advocating a truly democratic federalism !based on free iniliividual nations, and in no wary identified with the oippressor-states. We siil!cereily believe that a ibetter and morn equitalble international order in Europe can never ib e founded on the bogus federalism propagated by Mr. Zvon and his so-called "Czechoslo;vaks." In a •s imilar manner, some ChetniJk prorpagandists orf a Greater Seroia speaJk also of a third, "federalist" Yugosil.1aNia. All this is not a solution of national prolblems. On the contrary, the necessary prerequisit.e for a democratic fed,eralized structure in Europe lies, in our opinion, in the liberation of all subjugated nations from the oppression exerted by Moscow, Prague, and Belgrade, and the creation of independent national states, including the Croat and thre Slovak states, which would then freely unite in a higher federal union. The representatives of those nations are progressiive and democratic men who are actirve partisans of a genuine federalism, aind reject a nairrowminded. and intolera.rnt nationalism. But they resolutely orppose tJhe bogus federalism of Mr. Zvon, some "Ozechoslovaks•," and some "Yugoslavs," since it would only prolong a 1 68 SLOVAKIA the sufferings of subjugated nations in the artificial states which the Croats aind the Slovruks definitely and finalily do accept as their own. II. Ripka and Federalism Another Ciharaicteristic example of such a bogus federalism may 1b e found in the mimeograip:he d -book by Mr. Hubert Riiplcia (A Federation of Central Europe, New York, 1953), published at aJbout the same time as Mr. Zlvon's article, and pvolbaJbly insipired by the same crOIWd of political exiles. Mr. Ripka pleads for a "federation of existing states," not of nations. He is against any "dismemberm ent of Yugoslwvia and ~hoslOJVaki a." He asserts that the "dismemberment of one or the other state would cause destructive repercussions in t.lhe Danulbian region and also in the Balkans." In his opinion, "angry disputes among small, weak states would multiply," and "all efforts to integrate politically or economicailly the quarel1ing nations would collapse in the initial staige." Mr. Ripka says that "Yugoslavia, like OzechoslovaJkia, is esential to Europe, especially to East and Centra!l Eumpe." He thus disregards the wellknown facts that the, Croats do, not want to li,ve in any "Yugoslavia," and that the Slovaks do not want "Czechoslovakia." Though he recognizes the right of the Ukraine to secede from the Russian empire, he nevertheless denies the same right •o f secession to Croatia and !Slovaikia, thus rffillaining loyal to tile old hegemonist alliance of the Czech a.n d Serb ruling circles whicli, for over twenty years, had prevented any sulbstantial reforms in "OzechoslQIVrukia" and "Yugoslavia," and so, are greatly responsible for the present plight of enslaved nations therein. As coUild haive b een expected, Mr. Riplcia, who, togerthe~ with otlier Benes Ozechs, collwlborated with the Communists before, during and after Wovld War lI, and participated in the destruction oif Slovak national independence, rejects the conception of organizing Central and ])astern Europe on the basis of nations in contradiction to existing states. Like Mr. Zlvon, he too contends that "its rea:lization 69 SDOVAKIA would result in the balkanization of the wihole East Central Europe," and for f.ull measure he adds some shallow phrases aJbout ",graive and sometimes insolwble conflicts" which would allegedly preivent "higher integration." MT. Ripka transcends, however, into the world of Aesop's fables when he attempts to put over the idea that "Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were not artificial creations of Versailles diplomacy, but were, on the contrary, organic results of the historical evolution." Of course, he forgets to mention the Pittsburgh Agreement between the Slovaks and the Ozechs which was s·o shamefully violated by the Czech ruling drcles, and he disregards the undenia:ble fact that the Croats haive never accepted "Yrugoslavia" in a free election or a free plebiscite! Mr. Ripka even ventures to make the statement that "a positive ,policy, intended to create a better organization of Central Euro:pe in the future, after the fall of Soviet domination, must be !based therefore upon the existing states which correspond to national needs and aspirations of the nations concerned" ; tJhus he regards the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and those between Se-z,bs and Croats, as "a matter of internal politics." May be that "Czechoslova;kia" and "Yugoslavia" co,r respond to "national needs and aspirations" (to exploitation) of the •B enes Czechs and Serbian "Yugosla:vs," but it is not true that these states have never corresponded to the national needs and aspirations of the Croat and Slovak nations. On the contrary, these nations will do everything possiible to dismember the states which tJhey intensely despise, and create their own states in order to be masters of their OIWil destiny. AJS to the '~bal!kanization oif Burope," this term can only mean the use of pretense and deceit in relations between the nations It is an indisput~ble fact that these were and still are the methods used b,y some Czech and Serbian hegemonists a:gainst the enslaved natiorns. 'I'herefore, only these hegemonists are the ones who are responsilble for this strange, new ,phenomenon cahled the "lba1kanilza:tion of Europe" which came into exist.ence only after the creation of "Yugoslavia" and "Czechoslovarkia." 1 70 SLOVAKIA EJvidently, the ideoloigy cYf Mr. Ripka and the Benes Ozechs, as eXiplained in their ipublica:tions, conclusively proves that they ,woU!ld like to continue t:he e~loitat.ion of the small ,b ut courageous Slovruk nation in a third "Czedhoslovrukia," and, since the case of "Yugoslavia" is a very similar one, tihey have 'been contiir:ruously inrventing flimsy arguments to effect the sulbjugation of borth the Croats and the 1Slovaik&. There is nothing peculiar aJbout it when a memlber of the Benes im!I)erialist ruling clique dn,es not recognize the right to freedom and independence to other natiOI1Js, and when he arrogantly attaoks Sloivruk and Croat "separatists" (again that disparaging word) and their national moivemenrts, since it would be swa.nge if it were othel1W'ise.. There already are, however, many progressiJve Czechs who, like t:he Czech Lt. Colonel F. 0. Mikscilie, in the spirit of a true federalism and genuine mutua;l cooperation s,a.y that only bad Ozechs and bad Slovaks can be "Ozechoslovruks." (And we saiy accordingly that only bad Croats and ba.tl Selibs can 'be "Yugoslavs"). The iprincilples of a truly democratic federalism, based on independent and free nations, has been gaining more a:nd more ground. Politics ma!kes for strange 'bedfellows, however, and the propaga:nd.i·s ts oif the old regime and political status quo find a supporter in an unexpected quarter. A former Htmgaria.n Minister to Paris, iMr Paul Auer (Liiooraition a:nd Union, p 20), has a nightmare that "the efforts oif certain nationa.il groups (as, the Slorva:ks and Croaits) to achieve greater independence than they have en!joyed up to now, also slhow the need for a federal system in Southeastern EurOipe, because if these people were to a'C'hieve their aims, we would 1b e fa.iced by a still greater numlber of small states in this a.rea with eiven less power to resist outside pressure." iMay be this is another form of bogus federalism that fears freedom and independence of en:shINed natfon and does not comprehend that this is an albsolutely necessary prerequisite for a free federal union. Mr. Ripka boldly asserts, without amy proof, that a dismemberment of "Yugoslavfa" wo•u ld make impossible any organization of the DanU!bia.n area and the iBaJl.kans. This sounds in our ea.rs Hke a:n argument for fee!ble-minded per- SLOVAKIA 71 sons, since a solid and la.sting politicaJ orga.nimtion must be ,b ased on freedom, ,a nd freedom cannot 'be coupled, as experience teaches, Mth tJhe e~ence of the artificial creations, o!f Versailles. In fact, the first "YugoslaJvia" was kept together only by force and terror, and consequently easily disintegrated in the fi'.rst storm. The same was the case with "Czechoslova kia" which fell without any resistance. "Yugoslavia" was creat.ed against the will of the Croatian people; the Croats always regarded it as a prison of nations and gave a helping hand to destroy that prison. They will do it agam witJh Tito's "Yugoslavia," or any other "YUJgoslaivia," when the occasion arises. In "Czechoslovru kia," the Slovaks wanted first their aJUtonomy, and when this was denied to them, their independence. 'Dhey were n:ot interested in defending a state which was a clevwly disguised hegemony over them and the Carpatho-Ukr ainians, despite the fact tllat millions were spent a'broiad to propagandir7.e that state as a "bastion of democracy." "Yugoslavia" and ''Czechoslovakia" did not solve national problems. If anything, they for a time only succeeded to suppress them. But, in addition, they have created many new iprdblems that did not exist earlier; among other things, they have certainly increased the amount of mutuaJ intolerance and hatred among their component parts. 'I'he organ:iization o!f that a;rea on the basis of independent nations in a true federal union is the only alternative to the "Czechoslovak " and "Yugoslav" failures. This union would, in accordance with the wishes of the people, bring about a democraJti~ political structure, and simultaneously increase cooperation and tolerance among the respective nations. Let us make olear that the opposition to "Ozechoslovakia" and "YugosilaJvia" iby the Slovaks and Croats and Macedonians, is llJOt the opposition of a small gro111p of "separ.aJtists," as some colonialists would like the public to beliesve, but the opposition of the overwhehning majority of the respective nations. In our recently ,pulblished bOOlk ( Croatia and Serbia, why is their peaceful separation a European necessity?, Croatia Cultural PUJblishing Center, 72 SLOVAKIA 4.851 Drexel Blvd., Chicrugo 15, llinois), we have proven beyond any reasonaJble doulbt that today all the Croan, unanimously advocate the separation of Croatia and Serbia, i.e., the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, and that this solution is in the interesit of a lasting Euroipean settlement and peruce in that area. As to the SlovaJks, it is a iwell-<lmown fact that a great mrujority of tihem is today for an independent Slova,k state, and that only some of their renegades are in the camp of the so-icalled "Czechosloivruks." In fa,ce of such energetic opposition to Czech and Senb schemes, of which Mr. Ripka is certainly aware, a third "Czechoslovakia," and a third "YugoslaJVia," could be established and maintained only by undemocratic and dictatorial proce3ses, i.e., iby deceit, terror, and vi,olence. Left momentarily without po,wer to do anything else, the exiled Benes "Ozechoslova,ks" and the Serbian "Ywgoslavs" use deceit as their most potent weapon in 1:!he effort to affect their Greater Czech and Greater Ser.bian plans, engaging in a fals e and deceitful propaganda against the Croat and Slo1Vak "separatists." Freedom first, then Federalization There is no doubt in our mind that the organization of Central and Eastern Europe on the ibasis of existing states, as propagated by Mr. Ripka, Mr. Zvon and Company, is contrary to the democratic principle of self-determination of nations. Its realization would clearly meatn the restoration of the old, discTedited regimes, but the fight for national freedom on the part of enslaved nations would continue inside the states. A third "Czechosl'ovaJda" and a third "Yugoslaivia" oould lbe established only in the spirit of balkanization; deception, terror and suppression would be even more emiphasized because, in the meantime, the enslaved nations have increased their determination to find an exit from those oppressor-states. In contrast to this hegemonist spirit, we propose the national questions to lbe solved on the generally acceptable democratic principle of self-determination of nations. The S1ova'ks, Croats, Macedonians, and Sloivenes have ,t he right to choose freely their own fo,rnn of government, and to SIJOVAKIA 73 live in their own independent states like any other nation. "Czechoslovakia" and "YugoslaJvia," therefore, cannot exist as free and democratic states since the nat1ons fordbly included in them do not want them. So they necessarily must be either Olpen dictatorSlhips, or at least pseudodemocracies based on a bogtll.Si federalism. A truly d,emocratic "Yugoslavia" and a truly democratic "Czechoslovakia" are today as unconceivable as a square circle or a round square; true democracy must inevitably lead to the dissolution of these oppressor-states. Thus an orderly, democratic and ,equitalble reorganization orf Central and Eastern Europe presupposes that its nations are first liberated, forming their own independent states and, then, as a second step, estaiblish federal unions among themselves. This means of course that further independent units must be created, i.e., a free Slovenia, a free Croatia, a free S1ova;kia, a free Macedonia, a free Montenegro, which may then freely select the fo!1lll and direction of their participation in a federal union. 'Dhese states thoug:h sma1,l are capaible of an independent existence, de-s pite the perlidio,u,s propaganda slogans of some of the "eX)perts" who, deny the right of small nations to a free existence with the flimsy arguments ab,o ut their "smallness," evidently forgetting that Denmark, Holland, Luxemiburg, Belgium, Finland, Albania, etc., are also small but, nevertheless, have ;proven their ability to live an independent life. For a tyipical hegemonist lilke Mr. Ripka the idea that Slovaks and Croats maiy acquire their freedom appears to be a horrilble nigihtmare, but for all freedom.Jlo1ving individuals, this is the ,o nly equitable solution of national problems in thait part of Europe. This is not atomization of Europe, or its lbalikanization; this is mutual coopJra.tion on the basis of freedom and a genuine democratic fed eralism. Therefore, the existing states, "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugoslavia," which evidently do not correspond to national needs and aispira,tions of their inha,bitants, must be dissolved in the interest of a just national settlement and general peace. After the existence of independent Slovak 1 74 SLOV.AKIA. and Croatian states, irrespective of the conditions surrounding their coming into existence and their forms of government, tlhe relations between Cre<!hs and SlovaJks, and between Serl}s and Croats, are not '_'internal questions" any more, though Mr. Ripka would prefer such a formula in order that Benes Orechs could continue to dominate the Sl01Vaks without any foreign interference as they did in the past. Hence these questions are today internatiiOnal questions; they are concerned with the relations between nations with their own state ideas. The right to selrf-determination is not a ruse, as Mr. Ripka alleges, but a democrati'c right which should not be reserved onil¥ for the Ozechs and the Serbs, 'b ut sho.uld aipply also for other cultured and freedom~loving nrations. The Oild comlb,ination of Oz.ecih and Serbian ruling circles has for a long time succeeded in suppressing the will of sUlbjugated na,tionalities and nations for their independence. These ruling circles are now desperately tcying to continue this practice under the caver of a bogus federalism. They have not changed a 1b it, they have remained struble in .their insane crarvings to rule other nations. This may lbe clear.ly recognired in various international and exile OTga:ruJzaJtions where the same old hegemonist crowd iD!Sists on its old "Ozechoslo.vaik" and "'Y ugoslaJV" deceptions, maintaining the fiotions of a "CzeohJOslOIVa!k" and a "Yugoslav" unity, which is not accepta.lble to Slovaks and Croats. For instance, the Ben.es Ozechs have created a "Czechorslovak" Comrmittee, without any representation of the national Sl·o.vaJks (•i ncluding, howeiver, some dubious Slovalks who re.present only themselives and not the wishes of their ipeople). The well-ilmown fact js, however, that the Slovaik nation desires its national independence, and, therefore, a "Czeohoslovaik" Committee is an obvio.us deception ( and so are all "Czechoslovak" political parties), est:a!blished ,for the purpose to sooure the hegemo1t1y of the Ozec!h "master race" over the SlavaJks. The "Voice of America," "Ratlio Free Europe," and similar organizations, are under the influence of the same old politicians who cherish hegemon:ism. For ins,tance, the "Bulletin" (IPregled) in Croatian, published by the Na- SLOVAKIA 75 tional Committee for a Free Europe, has been edited by a Slovenian "Yugoslav," a former mem/ber of the semi.fascist and dictatoriral iBelrg rade governments which systematica.olly persecuted the Croatian peoiple. All this despite the fact that there are many a.Ible Croatian journalists in this country. This is a deliJberate insult to all Croatians, but numerous Croatian representations that were made to end this scandal remained without any success. The old hegemonist crowd is seemingly much stronger than all the appeals to reason and .p olitical decency In the "Voice of America," the Croatian language has not ,b een recognized, and some Se11bian chauvinists broadcast to Croatia in a tongue which sounds impossible for Croatian ear:s. In this case, also, numerous Croatian protests produced no results. In the Christian-iDemocratic Union, some .Sl01Venian "Yugoslavs" speak in the name of "Yugos:lwvia," haiving no authorization whatsoever from the Croats to do so. The Slovaks, too, have had the same e:x1periences with all these and similar or.ganizations. · In this sense, an those individuals who spea,k in the name of the "OzechoslolV'all{s" and "Yugoslavs" show practically every day just what is their rea,I concept of freedom and equa,lity, and wihat they understand under "federalism." They have ibeen continually using 1!he old methods of domination, and derception, whieih they so successfully employed in the first "YugOSllavia" a,nd "Ozechoslcwa,kia," .paying liip service to "freedom, democracy and equality," but having in mind only the restoration of their old power positions. As a matter of fact, they do not fight for a free IDuro,pe, but only for a :IDu:rope without freedom for enslaved nations. Lt is only unfortunate that some American organ.IBati'ons and ind1;vidua,l s nairvely support such basically undemocratic and imperialist politicians. Mr. Ripka, IMr. 'Zenikl; and their il'k, had a wonderful opportunity to show the woriking of fueir federalism. when they were in power in first and second "Czechoslovakia." However, at that time their "federalism" consisted of an extreme centralism, of the oppression orf the SlovaJk nation, of persecutions and terror. Who could be so naive to 76 SLOVAKIA believe that their "federalism" would be any different in the future, particularly if we consider that they e1Ven now, in exile, belieive the same way as they did before, de~ nying the right of SIIIlali enslaved nations to their freedom. The same aipplies to the Serbian and Slo1Venian "Yugoslavs" wiho possess the sa:rne arrogant menrtality asthe "Ozeic:hos1ova!ks." There can be no do'U!bt that the hegemonist crowd has accepted the slogan orf federalism only to deceive· the world about their real intentions. Burt we do not see that they can ever return to po,w er. They have missed the boat. They have had their chances to create democratic federal structures in "Creclloslo1Va!kia" and "Yugoslavia." Instead they ruled dictatorially, dis;regarding completely the wishes. of the oppressed, and thus increasing the .power of centrifugal forces. Ripka and the Benes Czechs missed the boat even twice. Their prindples of political order have failed miseraJbly and, therefore, new ones are necessary. In a shameful collaJboration with the Communists, the Benes Ozechs have destroyed Slovak independence and put to death many SlovaJk patriots, among them the great Slova,k president, Monsignor 'Diso. Slovaks will never forget that. So we are sure that the Slo:va!k nation wrn sei'r e the first opportunity to, diSllllemiber Ozecho-lSlwrukia and reestrublish its own state The same will be done b,y the Croats in the Communist Greater Senbian Yugo,s lavia. These are the realities of contemporary Europe, while the hegemonist ,plans of Mr. Zvon, Mr. Ripka, and similair hegemonists, also their bogus federalism, must inelVita:bly end in the disposal containers of history. 'l"he time of colonialism, as in Africa so. in Eump~ has definitely passed. Czech and Serlb coloniailis;,;,1, under the claaik of a bogus federalism, must end in defeat. After the ineivitaJble disintegration of Communism, the enslaved nations of Eastern and Central Euroipe will sha:ke off the yokes of Moscow, Belgrade and Prague, and esitalblish their own independent states which will freel,y coorperate in a spirit of a truly democratic federalism, entering into federal unions as free, independent, democratic and equal na,tions. SLOVAKIA 77 We Croats will certainly destroy any attempt to create a third "Yugoslavia," and we firmly believe that our old friends, the Slo,vaks, ,will do the same with respect to "OzechoslO'Vakia." The Croats and the Slovaks would not be worthy to exist as free nations,, if they permitted again the hy,pocritical hegeanonist scihemera and apostles of a bogus federalism t,o .S'l.llbdue them in the arhlficial appressor--states. There can be no free Europe without free E)uropean nations. There can ibe no equitalble settlemenit in Europe and no free Euro;pean or regional union, without an independent Sl01Vruk state, without an independent Croatian state, without a free Macedonia, without a free Slovenia. The dissolution of "Czechoslovakia" and "Yugo.sla";a" is, therefore, an absolut-ely indispensable cond.iition for a true and genuine federalist structure of the European continent. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czeoho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of Dr. Hubert Ripka, FIGARO, Paris, national politics." April 4, 1949. • • • "Novem1ber 7, 1917, is the day thaJt is marlrnd in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new method of equalling differences among people and thus achieving contentment on earth. Today it is still too ealI'ly from thaJt epochal occasion to judge objootiveily the consequences of that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the beginning of an enormous process full of ideas born of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vice-Cha.irnian of the Executive Committee of the "Counc,il of Free ~echoslo!V'a:kia," NOYE PRUDY, November 18, 194'5).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Apostles of Bogus Federalism Description An account of the resource Dr. George W. Cesarich Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 61-77 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cesarich, George W. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2665a947275bb254be9e3a566380943b.pdf 735a3280b60052bd52944c0d480379ca PDF Text Text 112 SLOVAKIA The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs By Paul F e n c h a k In Dickens' novel Oliver Twist, Jack Dawkins, called the Artful Dodger, is a teacher - albeit one who taught the art of pickpocketing to innocent youngsters such as Oliver Twist. His motive: personal gain. The writer of this article is convinced that the counterparts of the Artful Dodger are today directing ethnic studies programs in the public schools of the United States. Seemingly they are no more altruistic towards needful ethnic groups in America than the Artful Dodger was toward the welfare of Oliver Twist. Formulators of ethnic studies programs dodge no small number of ethnic groups as they label "minority groups" to the Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and Orientals. Frequently space is also given to Jews, Germans, Italians, and Poles. Scholars who would talk of Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Rumanians, among others, are judged to be divining in some dark, mysterious regions, presided over by pagan gods who, midst Gog and Magog, are all agog in exotic studies about areas considered to be "powder kegs" and "tinderboxes" - "balkanized" beyond comprehension to sensible people. The powerful National Education Association boasts of having a "strong program to improve the lot of minority groups, including Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and other bi-lingual groups." Often Croatians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Finns, et al., are more bi-lingual than some groups cited by the NEA, yet the amount of coverage given East European-Americ ans is usually nil. In 1972 the writer wrote the State Superintendents of Schools of the fifty state education departments requesting copies of curriculum guides, brochures, bulletins, etc., �SLOVAKIA 113 dealing with racial, cultural, multi-cultural, inter-cultural, disadvantaged, etc., matters of ethnics in America. For sundry reasons the responses were not rapid in arriving. To date 24 of 50 state education departments have either forwarded materials or have indicated that materials will be forthcoming. In summary of the vast amount of ethnic studies promoted by state education departments, one conclusion can easily be made: East European ethnics do not exist in the United States. Even Pennsylvania, the most Slavic of the fifty states, with fraternal, religious, and educational institutions located throughout the commonwealth in large numbers, is guilty of producing ethnic materials that are absolutely ignominous to the mass of citizens of East European ancestry living within the state. In Pennsylvania one need just travel from town to town, stopping to examine the names of those who served and those who died for the United States in both World Wars, as registered on community Honor Rolls. Seemingly then, the non-sense of excluding East Europeans would end - and even the very productive efforts of these peoples in the mines, mills, and farms, in athletics, in scholarship, and in good citizenship would then be recognized. The map of Pennsylvania already recognizes these peoples: Mazeppa, Kossuth, Pulaski, Po1and Mines, Dalmatia, Zelienople, Gallitzin, Livonia, St. Petersburg, and Slovan, among others. The bulk of the state curriculum guides, with Texas being a noteworthy exception, on ethnic and racial/cultural studies focus on the groups cited by the National Education Association: Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-Americans. Orientals and Jews are reasonably well-covered as are Italians, Irish, English, Germans, and French. It is always interesting to observe how state and local education experts use the term "minority group." One county in Maryland that contains thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, et al., admits having "5,603 black students and another 706 pupils from various other minority groups." The thruth is that in most states the term "minority groups" as presented in curriculum guides excludes Americans of East European ancestry and consequently millions of Americans are being denied the �114 SLOVAKIA opportunity of studying their heritages. Likewise, they are being denied opportunity in employment quests and, worst of all, some Americans are being deprived of the opportunity of attaining optimum psychological and emotional growth. Whereas the successful guidance counselor can help students to correctly answer the important question, "Whom am I?," counselors rarely talk about, or know anything about, Slavic languages, Finno-Ugric languages, Baltic languages, etc. But it is ever so fashionable in American schools to talk about the pleasantries of French, Spanish, German, and Latin. Evidently one of the major problems in education re ethnics is that the artful dodgers are not honest enough to admit that they need re-trained in order to be able to properly assemble the American mosaic. How many Slavic-Americans live in Peoria, Illinois? Frankly, the writer doesn't know, yet he assumes that in an industrial area of ca. 150,000 some Croatians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Poles, et al., do live and work. (All cities always have Russans!) Given the resources of the Peoria educational system the writer could develop reasonably accurate projections of the ethnic composition for Peoria; the same could be done for Paducah, Kentucky, or Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Why then the mystique about the manifold ethnic groups that comprise America? It appears that our ethnic directors are hiding and confusing issues. They are run by a system that relegated East Europeans. How negatively runs the cross-examination when an East European scholar seeks to get more considerations from librarians, curriculum directors, supervisors, administrators, editors, and other educators. Sooner or later the question emerges: How many Ukrainians (Czechs, Finns, et. al.) are then in Peoria? Yet these same specialists are able to calculate that there are certain numbers of Blacks and Spanish~speaking in their areas. How strange! The writer has heard this tactic so many times that he refuses to dignify such questions, presenting instead a general response that there are many Slavs, Finno-Ugrics, Baltics, etc., in a political sub-division, if such is the case. If the specialist is persistent in wanting to know the exact number of Czechs in Peoria, the writer usually asks .the specialist to secure �SLOVAKIA 115 that data for him, using the resources of people who should know. It is patently obvious that ethnic analysts do not want t o know how many East European-Americans live in various communities, as there is absolutely nothing stopping them from researching such data for East Europeans. The Texas Education Agency is to be commended for having produced an interesting curriculum guide: Czecho-Slovakia: Information Minimum. This booklet (71 pages) contains important facts about Czecho-Slovakia, especially as they relate to the history and culture of the United States. With its excellent maps, drawings, alphabets, data summaries, etc., it is the type of guide needed by more groups in more states. Unfortunately, of the 24 states that responded with materials, only Texas submitted any recognizable booklet doing justice to East Europeans. The catty Polish jokes seem to have nine lives. In years gone by the same tripe was slurred against Jews, Italians, and Irish. Yet the time length of the ethnic joke being in vogue was never so long. The Polish joke has been in circulation so long now that it is possible that a student my have entered kindergarten, completed grade school and junior high school, and have been graduated from high school while hearing no ethnic jokes other than the Polish variety. The tragedy of this attitude is supported by the extremely weak collection of literature available about East European peoples in American schools. This despite the fact that there are in America today some 35,000,000 Americans of East European ancestry. A stigma of the Polish joke is that some Americans who are not Poles also are labelled as Poles for purposes of jibing, e.g., the writer's daughter who as a third grade student was continually chided by her WASP classmates as being "Polish." "No need to explain that you are a Ukrainian-Slovak-American, Marcia! You're Polish! Ha! Ha! Ha!" (Marcia learned how to counter such diatribes by asking, "How many of you know Polish?" Response: "None of us." "How does it feel to be dumber than a Pole?") This is cited as the last Polish joke. That "Russian" studies receive top billing in American �116 SLOVAKIA schools goes without saying. Soviet Life is the most popular periodical in school libraries, so from such "reliable" sources students learn how the Germans killed 10,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, as an article early in 1971 indicated. After reading the Soviet account of how the Germans killed the Polish officers, the author wrote a letter to Soviet Life asking how accusations against the Russians can be disproved. Nicholai Zhiltsov, managing editor of Soviet Life, submitted the following reply on June 1, 1971: "Please excuse the delay in answering your letter which we have forwarded to our Moscow Editorial Board for their comments." Needless to say, by late 1973 a reply has not yet arrived. Barbara Mikulski, Polish-American and member of the City Council of Baltimore, spoke clearly and honestly about many situations when she stated, "When we ask for something, we are either put off, put out, or put down." Ask for books for the library and the librarian will write off your requests as "Not in Books in Print." Ask that East European specialists be invited to participate in social studies workshops, and your letter goes unanswered. Suggest that an Ethnic Library be started, with coverage for all ethnics, and again your letter is unanswered. Apply for a position in human relations and you are told that the emphasis is on black studies. Period. A frequently used dodge by curriculum formulators is the statement that they do not desire to approach East European studies, as, if they do, then it will be necessary to analyze all other ethnic groups in the United States. In a sense this attitude translates as "East Europeans don't burn, don't riot, don't act like rowdies ... so nobody pays any attention to them." That deceit shows through current ethnic analyses is obvious enough as in legal provisions for the teaching about ethnic studies in most states, no groups are expressly excluded. When prices in America continue to skyrocket as a result of expanded trade with East European nations, a need for better understanding about East Europeans is more imperative than ever. The current campaign by Jews in America to identify the lack of liberties accorded their brethre.n in the Soviet Union could in some ways be made �SLOVAKIA 117 to appear rather miniscule if injustices perpetrated against Slovaks, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, et. al., were similarly examined. Freedom still remains undebatable despite the economic strategems of government and big business. At home, one of principal educational problems may be that big business is too much in the saddle in influencing ethnic studies programs. No champions from business arose to exhort the cause of ethnics when the Schweiker ethnic studies bill was not approved for funding by tlie White House, yet industrial support was hardly lacking for both parties. Michael Novak in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics speaks of the possibility of Blacks and ethnics forming a coalition for mutual gain. It cannot be assumed that because Blacks have been afforded study programs and given some economic assistance, that power groups in America are genuinely interested in their welfare. Nobody volunteered any help to the Blacks and it can be reasonably assumed that nothing will be given East Europeans unless they demand considerations. One of the greatest problems confronting East Europeans is that textbook purchasers know too little about non-Russian-oriented publications; they buy primarily from the big, conventional publishing houses. East European publishers need to wage a campaign to bring their publications to the school systems throughout the country. The fact is that numerous administrators know as much about East Europeans as a dog knows about mathematics. An example: The late Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki, when at Marquette University, used to begin his classes with an anonymous quiz, one of the questions of which was: List the Slavic nationalities or peoples in Europe. The usual answer ran like this: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Turkey, Austria, Russians, Bavarians, Bolsheviks, "Lower Slobovia" (Li'l Abner's contribution) and "Carpathia" (Marilyn Monroe's contribution from the movie, "The Prince and the Showgirl"). On July 11, 1954, the New York Times altered geography of Europe with the following headline: Rising Danube Flood Hits Prague. The Baltimore Sun had an interesting article (some �118 SLOVAKIA reporters are more discerning than many of our educators) on December 4, 1935, written by R. P. Harriss, "All Others." Harriss states, "The official census for Baltimore is a curious intensely interesting document, both for what it reveals and for what it leaves out. It lists some 14,000 nonexistent Russians and contains vague hints of a polygenous percentage which it does not bother to define." True enough. In an article in the Baltimore Sun on February 13, 1967, a native of Kazan, Russia, is quoted: "There are probably not more than five or six families of true Russians in Baltimore." Yet the article speaks of Russians from Galicia, Byelorussia, Carpatho-Ukraine. Seems that census officials and educators have in America done a magician's job of creating 'Russians.' How some of the mysteries regarding census data will be clarified remains a monumental task for the artful dodgers who have compiled the data thus far. Quoting again the Harriss article of 1935: "Officially there are 1,637 Hungarians in Baltimore, 1,441 Ruman.ians, and no Ukrainians, no Serbs." Harriss was candid enough to realize that by 1935 there were three Ukrainian churches, plus other institutions, in the Baltimore area and he was smart enough to see that the census data was akin to ethnic studies programs of today. Surely nobody would suspect that the Russians built the Ukrainian churches! The situation in literary studies is not much better than in the social sciences. To be sure "Russian Literature" units are taught in many schools, yet in "World Literature" courses very little is presented to develop the genius of Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, et. al., writers. Likewise the study of art and music suffer from non-coverage and from misconceptions. Now is the time to clear the muddied waters. East Europeans must declare themselves. They need to write more, question more, educate P.T.A. groups, civic organizations, education councils (on which they are rarely represented), etc. The "education crisis" should be recognized immediately. Forget about token appointments and honorary ethnic banquets (which cost you $100) in Washington where ethnic foods and cultural items are displayed. Begin a program called "Operation Hometown." Organize East European �SLOVAKIA 119 festivals as was done at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York. Show films. Present books and audio-visual aids to libraries. Request relevant books at your public libraries. Have cultural groups perform at YMCA's, schools, colleges, charity events, etc. It is important that school book lists be examined and that books by and about East Europeans be added. Music departments should be exhorted to sound to the tunes of rhapsodies, mazurkas, kolomajykas, polkas. Home economic departments would win adherents by presenting samplings of pirohy, halusky, makovnik, etc. Courses of study need to be expanded to include information about the great contributions of East Europeans to America, as, in the words of Michael Novak, "America is becoming America." The name of the game for East Europeans is "catch-up." Don't wait for the artful dodgers to structure your ethnic studies as you are excluded from their terminology. In the words of Dickens " ... You must get up very early in the morning, to win against the Dodger." "Morning!" said Charley Bates; "you must put your boots on over-night, and have a telescope at each eye, and a opera-glass between your shoulders, if you want to come over him." The U.S. flight crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project visited Russia for two weeks in November 1973 to familiarize themselves with the Soyuz spacecraft system that will link up with their Apollo in 1975. Most of their activities were conducted in the J . A. Gagarin Center of Cosmonaut Training at Zvezdny Goroduk, or Star City, near Moscow. Making the trip were the three Apollo crewmen, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand and Donald K. Slayton; backup crewmen, Capt. Alan L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans and Maj. Jack R. Lousma; support crewmen, Lt. Col. Robert F. Overmyer and Lt. Col. Karol J. Bobko; and Capt. Eugene A. Ceman, Special Assistant to the U.S. ASTP Technical Director. Bobko and Cer:nan are Slovaks. � 112 SLOVAKIA The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs By Paul F e n c h a k In Dickens' novel Oliver Twist, Jack Dawkins, called the Artful Dodger, is a teacher - albeit one who taught the art of pickpocketing to innocent youngsters such as Oliver Twist. His motive: personal gain. The writer of this article is convinced that the counterparts of the Artful Dodger are today directing ethnic studies programs in the public schools of the United States. Seemingly they are no more altruistic towards needful ethnic groups in America than the Artful Dodger was toward the welfare of Oliver Twist. Formulators of ethnic studies programs dodge no small number of ethnic groups as they label "minority groups" to the Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and Orientals. Frequently space is also given to Jews, Germans, Italians, and Poles. Scholars who would talk of Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Rumanians, among others, are judged to be divining in some dark, mysterious regions, presided over by pagan gods who, midst Gog and Magog, are all agog in exotic studies about areas considered to be "powder kegs" and "tinderboxes" - "balkanized" beyond comprehension to sensible people. The powerful National Education Association boasts of having a "strong program to improve the lot of minority groups, including Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and other bi-lingual groups." Often Croatians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Finns, et al., are more bi-lingual than some groups cited by the NEA, yet the amount of coverage given East European-Americ ans is usually nil. In 1972 the writer wrote the State Superintendents of Schools of the fifty state education departments requesting copies of curriculum guides, brochures, bulletins, etc., �SLOVAKIA 113 dealing with racial, cultural, multi-cultural, inter-cultural, disadvantaged, etc., matters of ethnics in America. For sundry reasons the responses were not rapid in arriving. To date 24 of 50 state education departments have either forwarded materials or have indicated that materials will be forthcoming. In summary of the vast amount of ethnic studies promoted by state education departments, one conclusion can easily be made: East European ethnics do not exist in the United States. Even Pennsylvania, the most Slavic of the fifty states, with fraternal, religious, and educational institutions located throughout the commonwealth in large numbers, is guilty of producing ethnic materials that are absolutely ignominous to the mass of citizens of East European ancestry living within the state. In Pennsylvania one need just travel from town to town, stopping to examine the names of those who served and those who died for the United States in both World Wars, as registered on community Honor Rolls. Seemingly then, the non-sense of excluding East Europeans would end - and even the very productive efforts of these peoples in the mines, mills, and farms, in athletics, in scholarship, and in good citizenship would then be recognized. The map of Pennsylvania already recognizes these peoples: Mazeppa, Kossuth, Pulaski, Po1and Mines, Dalmatia, Zelienople, Gallitzin, Livonia, St. Petersburg, and Slovan, among others. The bulk of the state curriculum guides, with Texas being a noteworthy exception, on ethnic and racial/cultural studies focus on the groups cited by the National Education Association: Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-Americans. Orientals and Jews are reasonably well-covered as are Italians, Irish, English, Germans, and French. It is always interesting to observe how state and local education experts use the term "minority group." One county in Maryland that contains thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, et al., admits having "5,603 black students and another 706 pupils from various other minority groups." The thruth is that in most states the term "minority groups" as presented in curriculum guides excludes Americans of East European ancestry and consequently millions of Americans are being denied the �114 SLOVAKIA opportunity of studying their heritages. Likewise, they are being denied opportunity in employment quests and, worst of all, some Americans are being deprived of the opportunity of attaining optimum psychological and emotional growth. Whereas the successful guidance counselor can help students to correctly answer the important question, "Whom am I?," counselors rarely talk about, or know anything about, Slavic languages, Finno-Ugric languages, Baltic languages, etc. But it is ever so fashionable in American schools to talk about the pleasantries of French, Spanish, German, and Latin. Evidently one of the major problems in education re ethnics is that the artful dodgers are not honest enough to admit that they need re-trained in order to be able to properly assemble the American mosaic. How many Slavic-Americans live in Peoria, Illinois? Frankly, the writer doesn't know, yet he assumes that in an industrial area of ca. 150,000 some Croatians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Poles, et al., do live and work. (All cities always have Russans!) Given the resources of the Peoria educational system the writer could develop reasonably accurate projections of the ethnic composition for Peoria; the same could be done for Paducah, Kentucky, or Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Why then the mystique about the manifold ethnic groups that comprise America? It appears that our ethnic directors are hiding and confusing issues. They are run by a system that relegated East Europeans. How negatively runs the cross-examination when an East European scholar seeks to get more considerations from librarians, curriculum directors, supervisors, administrators, editors, and other educators. Sooner or later the question emerges: How many Ukrainians (Czechs, Finns, et. al.) are then in Peoria? Yet these same specialists are able to calculate that there are certain numbers of Blacks and Spanish~speaking in their areas. How strange! The writer has heard this tactic so many times that he refuses to dignify such questions, presenting instead a general response that there are many Slavs, Finno-Ugrics, Baltics, etc., in a political sub-division, if such is the case. If the specialist is persistent in wanting to know the exact number of Czechs in Peoria, the writer usually asks .the specialist to secure �SLOVAKIA 115 that data for him, using the resources of people who should know. It is patently obvious that ethnic analysts do not want t o know how many East European-Americans live in various communities, as there is absolutely nothing stopping them from researching such data for East Europeans. The Texas Education Agency is to be commended for having produced an interesting curriculum guide: Czecho-Slovakia: Information Minimum. This booklet (71 pages) contains important facts about Czecho-Slovakia, especially as they relate to the history and culture of the United States. With its excellent maps, drawings, alphabets, data summaries, etc., it is the type of guide needed by more groups in more states. Unfortunately, of the 24 states that responded with materials, only Texas submitted any recognizable booklet doing justice to East Europeans. The catty Polish jokes seem to have nine lives. In years gone by the same tripe was slurred against Jews, Italians, and Irish. Yet the time length of the ethnic joke being in vogue was never so long. The Polish joke has been in circulation so long now that it is possible that a student my have entered kindergarten, completed grade school and junior high school, and have been graduated from high school while hearing no ethnic jokes other than the Polish variety. The tragedy of this attitude is supported by the extremely weak collection of literature available about East European peoples in American schools. This despite the fact that there are in America today some 35,000,000 Americans of East European ancestry. A stigma of the Polish joke is that some Americans who are not Poles also are labelled as Poles for purposes of jibing, e.g., the writer's daughter who as a third grade student was continually chided by her WASP classmates as being "Polish." "No need to explain that you are a Ukrainian-Slovak-American, Marcia! You're Polish! Ha! Ha! Ha!" (Marcia learned how to counter such diatribes by asking, "How many of you know Polish?" Response: "None of us." "How does it feel to be dumber than a Pole?") This is cited as the last Polish joke. That "Russian" studies receive top billing in American �116 SLOVAKIA schools goes without saying. Soviet Life is the most popular periodical in school libraries, so from such "reliable" sources students learn how the Germans killed 10,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, as an article early in 1971 indicated. After reading the Soviet account of how the Germans killed the Polish officers, the author wrote a letter to Soviet Life asking how accusations against the Russians can be disproved. Nicholai Zhiltsov, managing editor of Soviet Life, submitted the following reply on June 1, 1971: "Please excuse the delay in answering your letter which we have forwarded to our Moscow Editorial Board for their comments." Needless to say, by late 1973 a reply has not yet arrived. Barbara Mikulski, Polish-American and member of the City Council of Baltimore, spoke clearly and honestly about many situations when she stated, "When we ask for something, we are either put off, put out, or put down." Ask for books for the library and the librarian will write off your requests as "Not in Books in Print." Ask that East European specialists be invited to participate in social studies workshops, and your letter goes unanswered. Suggest that an Ethnic Library be started, with coverage for all ethnics, and again your letter is unanswered. Apply for a position in human relations and you are told that the emphasis is on black studies. Period. A frequently used dodge by curriculum formulators is the statement that they do not desire to approach East European studies, as, if they do, then it will be necessary to analyze all other ethnic groups in the United States. In a sense this attitude translates as "East Europeans don't burn, don't riot, don't act like rowdies ... so nobody pays any attention to them." That deceit shows through current ethnic analyses is obvious enough as in legal provisions for the teaching about ethnic studies in most states, no groups are expressly excluded. When prices in America continue to skyrocket as a result of expanded trade with East European nations, a need for better understanding about East Europeans is more imperative than ever. The current campaign by Jews in America to identify the lack of liberties accorded their brethre.n in the Soviet Union could in some ways be made �SLOVAKIA 117 to appear rather miniscule if injustices perpetrated against Slovaks, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, et. al., were similarly examined. Freedom still remains undebatable despite the economic strategems of government and big business. At home, one of principal educational problems may be that big business is too much in the saddle in influencing ethnic studies programs. No champions from business arose to exhort the cause of ethnics when the Schweiker ethnic studies bill was not approved for funding by tlie White House, yet industrial support was hardly lacking for both parties. Michael Novak in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics speaks of the possibility of Blacks and ethnics forming a coalition for mutual gain. It cannot be assumed that because Blacks have been afforded study programs and given some economic assistance, that power groups in America are genuinely interested in their welfare. Nobody volunteered any help to the Blacks and it can be reasonably assumed that nothing will be given East Europeans unless they demand considerations. One of the greatest problems confronting East Europeans is that textbook purchasers know too little about non-Russian-oriented publications; they buy primarily from the big, conventional publishing houses. East European publishers need to wage a campaign to bring their publications to the school systems throughout the country. The fact is that numerous administrators know as much about East Europeans as a dog knows about mathematics. An example: The late Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki, when at Marquette University, used to begin his classes with an anonymous quiz, one of the questions of which was: List the Slavic nationalities or peoples in Europe. The usual answer ran like this: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Turkey, Austria, Russians, Bavarians, Bolsheviks, "Lower Slobovia" (Li'l Abner's contribution) and "Carpathia" (Marilyn Monroe's contribution from the movie, "The Prince and the Showgirl"). On July 11, 1954, the New York Times altered geography of Europe with the following headline: Rising Danube Flood Hits Prague. The Baltimore Sun had an interesting article (some �118 SLOVAKIA reporters are more discerning than many of our educators) on December 4, 1935, written by R. P. Harriss, "All Others." Harriss states, "The official census for Baltimore is a curious intensely interesting document, both for what it reveals and for what it leaves out. It lists some 14,000 nonexistent Russians and contains vague hints of a polygenous percentage which it does not bother to define." True enough. In an article in the Baltimore Sun on February 13, 1967, a native of Kazan, Russia, is quoted: "There are probably not more than five or six families of true Russians in Baltimore." Yet the article speaks of Russians from Galicia, Byelorussia, Carpatho-Ukraine. Seems that census officials and educators have in America done a magician's job of creating 'Russians.' How some of the mysteries regarding census data will be clarified remains a monumental task for the artful dodgers who have compiled the data thus far. Quoting again the Harriss article of 1935: "Officially there are 1,637 Hungarians in Baltimore, 1,441 Ruman.ians, and no Ukrainians, no Serbs." Harriss was candid enough to realize that by 1935 there were three Ukrainian churches, plus other institutions, in the Baltimore area and he was smart enough to see that the census data was akin to ethnic studies programs of today. Surely nobody would suspect that the Russians built the Ukrainian churches! The situation in literary studies is not much better than in the social sciences. To be sure "Russian Literature" units are taught in many schools, yet in "World Literature" courses very little is presented to develop the genius of Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, et. al., writers. Likewise the study of art and music suffer from non-coverage and from misconceptions. Now is the time to clear the muddied waters. East Europeans must declare themselves. They need to write more, question more, educate P.T.A. groups, civic organizations, education councils (on which they are rarely represented), etc. The "education crisis" should be recognized immediately. Forget about token appointments and honorary ethnic banquets (which cost you $100) in Washington where ethnic foods and cultural items are displayed. Begin a program called "Operation Hometown." Organize East European �SLOVAKIA 119 festivals as was done at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York. Show films. Present books and audio-visual aids to libraries. Request relevant books at your public libraries. Have cultural groups perform at YMCA's, schools, colleges, charity events, etc. It is important that school book lists be examined and that books by and about East Europeans be added. Music departments should be exhorted to sound to the tunes of rhapsodies, mazurkas, kolomajykas, polkas. Home economic departments would win adherents by presenting samplings of pirohy, halusky, makovnik, etc. Courses of study need to be expanded to include information about the great contributions of East Europeans to America, as, in the words of Michael Novak, "America is becoming America." The name of the game for East Europeans is "catch-up." Don't wait for the artful dodgers to structure your ethnic studies as you are excluded from their terminology. In the words of Dickens " ... You must get up very early in the morning, to win against the Dodger." "Morning!" said Charley Bates; "you must put your boots on over-night, and have a telescope at each eye, and a opera-glass between your shoulders, if you want to come over him." The U.S. flight crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project visited Russia for two weeks in November 1973 to familiarize themselves with the Soyuz spacecraft system that will link up with their Apollo in 1975. Most of their activities were conducted in the J . A. Gagarin Center of Cosmonaut Training at Zvezdny Goroduk, or Star City, near Moscow. Making the trip were the three Apollo crewmen, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand and Donald K. Slayton; backup crewmen, Capt. Alan L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans and Maj. Jack R. Lousma; support crewmen, Lt. Col. Robert F. Overmyer and Lt. Col. Karol J. Bobko; and Capt. Eugene A. Ceman, Special Assistant to the U.S. ASTP Technical Director. Bobko and Cer:nan are Slovaks. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 112 SLOVAKIA The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs By Paul F e n c h a k In Dickens' novel Oliver Twist, Jack Dawkins, called the Artful Dodger, is a teacher - albeit one who taught the art of pickpocketing to innocent youngsters such as Oliver Twist. His motive: personal gain. The writer of this article is convinced that the counterparts of the Artful Dodger are today directing ethnic studies programs in the public schools of the United States. Seemingly they are no more altruistic towards needful ethnic groups in America than the Artful Dodger was toward the welfare of Oliver Twist. Formulators of ethnic studies programs dodge no small number of ethnic groups as they label "minority groups" to the Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and Orientals. Frequently space is also given to Jews, Germans, Italians, and Poles. Scholars who would talk of Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Rumanians, among others, are judged to be divining in some dark, mysterious regions, presided over by pagan gods who, midst Gog and Magog, are all agog in exotic studies about areas considered to be "powder kegs" and "tinderboxes" - "balkanized" beyond comprehension to sensible people. The powerful National Education Association boasts of having a "strong program to improve the lot of minority groups, including Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and other bi-lingual groups." Often Croatians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Finns, et al., are more bi-lingual than some groups cited by the NEA, yet the amount of coverage given East European-Americ ans is usually nil. In 1972 the writer wrote the State Superintendents of Schools of the fifty state education departments requesting copies of curriculum guides, brochures, bulletins, etc., SLOVAKIA 113 dealing with racial, cultural, multi-cultural, inter-cultural, disadvantaged, etc., matters of ethnics in America. For sundry reasons the responses were not rapid in arriving. To date 24 of 50 state education departments have either forwarded materials or have indicated that materials will be forthcoming. In summary of the vast amount of ethnic studies promoted by state education departments, one conclusion can easily be made: East European ethnics do not exist in the United States. Even Pennsylvania, the most Slavic of the fifty states, with fraternal, religious, and educational institutions located throughout the commonwealth in large numbers, is guilty of producing ethnic materials that are absolutely ignominous to the mass of citizens of East European ancestry living within the state. In Pennsylvania one need just travel from town to town, stopping to examine the names of those who served and those who died for the United States in both World Wars, as registered on community Honor Rolls. Seemingly then, the non-sense of excluding East Europeans would end - and even the very productive efforts of these peoples in the mines, mills, and farms, in athletics, in scholarship, and in good citizenship would then be recognized. The map of Pennsylvania already recognizes these peoples: Mazeppa, Kossuth, Pulaski, Po1and Mines, Dalmatia, Zelienople, Gallitzin, Livonia, St. Petersburg, and Slovan, among others. The bulk of the state curriculum guides, with Texas being a noteworthy exception, on ethnic and racial/cultural studies focus on the groups cited by the National Education Association: Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-Americans. Orientals and Jews are reasonably well-covered as are Italians, Irish, English, Germans, and French. It is always interesting to observe how state and local education experts use the term "minority group." One county in Maryland that contains thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, et al., admits having "5,603 black students and another 706 pupils from various other minority groups." The thruth is that in most states the term "minority groups" as presented in curriculum guides excludes Americans of East European ancestry and consequently millions of Americans are being denied the 114 SLOVAKIA opportunity of studying their heritages. Likewise, they are being denied opportunity in employment quests and, worst of all, some Americans are being deprived of the opportunity of attaining optimum psychological and emotional growth. Whereas the successful guidance counselor can help students to correctly answer the important question, "Whom am I?," counselors rarely talk about, or know anything about, Slavic languages, Finno-Ugric languages, Baltic languages, etc. But it is ever so fashionable in American schools to talk about the pleasantries of French, Spanish, German, and Latin. Evidently one of the major problems in education re ethnics is that the artful dodgers are not honest enough to admit that they need re-trained in order to be able to properly assemble the American mosaic. How many Slavic-Americans live in Peoria, Illinois? Frankly, the writer doesn't know, yet he assumes that in an industrial area of ca. 150,000 some Croatians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Poles, et al., do live and work. (All cities always have Russans!) Given the resources of the Peoria educational system the writer could develop reasonably accurate projections of the ethnic composition for Peoria; the same could be done for Paducah, Kentucky, or Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Why then the mystique about the manifold ethnic groups that comprise America? It appears that our ethnic directors are hiding and confusing issues. They are run by a system that relegated East Europeans. How negatively runs the cross-examination when an East European scholar seeks to get more considerations from librarians, curriculum directors, supervisors, administrators, editors, and other educators. Sooner or later the question emerges: How many Ukrainians (Czechs, Finns, et. al.) are then in Peoria? Yet these same specialists are able to calculate that there are certain numbers of Blacks and Spanish~speaking in their areas. How strange! The writer has heard this tactic so many times that he refuses to dignify such questions, presenting instead a general response that there are many Slavs, Finno-Ugrics, Baltics, etc., in a political sub-division, if such is the case. If the specialist is persistent in wanting to know the exact number of Czechs in Peoria, the writer usually asks .the specialist to secure SLOVAKIA 115 that data for him, using the resources of people who should know. It is patently obvious that ethnic analysts do not want t o know how many East European-Americans live in various communities, as there is absolutely nothing stopping them from researching such data for East Europeans. The Texas Education Agency is to be commended for having produced an interesting curriculum guide: Czecho-Slovakia: Information Minimum. This booklet (71 pages) contains important facts about Czecho-Slovakia, especially as they relate to the history and culture of the United States. With its excellent maps, drawings, alphabets, data summaries, etc., it is the type of guide needed by more groups in more states. Unfortunately, of the 24 states that responded with materials, only Texas submitted any recognizable booklet doing justice to East Europeans. The catty Polish jokes seem to have nine lives. In years gone by the same tripe was slurred against Jews, Italians, and Irish. Yet the time length of the ethnic joke being in vogue was never so long. The Polish joke has been in circulation so long now that it is possible that a student my have entered kindergarten, completed grade school and junior high school, and have been graduated from high school while hearing no ethnic jokes other than the Polish variety. The tragedy of this attitude is supported by the extremely weak collection of literature available about East European peoples in American schools. This despite the fact that there are in America today some 35,000,000 Americans of East European ancestry. A stigma of the Polish joke is that some Americans who are not Poles also are labelled as Poles for purposes of jibing, e.g., the writer's daughter who as a third grade student was continually chided by her WASP classmates as being "Polish." "No need to explain that you are a Ukrainian-Slovak-American, Marcia! You're Polish! Ha! Ha! Ha!" (Marcia learned how to counter such diatribes by asking, "How many of you know Polish?" Response: "None of us." "How does it feel to be dumber than a Pole?") This is cited as the last Polish joke. That "Russian" studies receive top billing in American 116 SLOVAKIA schools goes without saying. Soviet Life is the most popular periodical in school libraries, so from such "reliable" sources students learn how the Germans killed 10,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, as an article early in 1971 indicated. After reading the Soviet account of how the Germans killed the Polish officers, the author wrote a letter to Soviet Life asking how accusations against the Russians can be disproved. Nicholai Zhiltsov, managing editor of Soviet Life, submitted the following reply on June 1, 1971: "Please excuse the delay in answering your letter which we have forwarded to our Moscow Editorial Board for their comments." Needless to say, by late 1973 a reply has not yet arrived. Barbara Mikulski, Polish-American and member of the City Council of Baltimore, spoke clearly and honestly about many situations when she stated, "When we ask for something, we are either put off, put out, or put down." Ask for books for the library and the librarian will write off your requests as "Not in Books in Print." Ask that East European specialists be invited to participate in social studies workshops, and your letter goes unanswered. Suggest that an Ethnic Library be started, with coverage for all ethnics, and again your letter is unanswered. Apply for a position in human relations and you are told that the emphasis is on black studies. Period. A frequently used dodge by curriculum formulators is the statement that they do not desire to approach East European studies, as, if they do, then it will be necessary to analyze all other ethnic groups in the United States. In a sense this attitude translates as "East Europeans don't burn, don't riot, don't act like rowdies ... so nobody pays any attention to them." That deceit shows through current ethnic analyses is obvious enough as in legal provisions for the teaching about ethnic studies in most states, no groups are expressly excluded. When prices in America continue to skyrocket as a result of expanded trade with East European nations, a need for better understanding about East Europeans is more imperative than ever. The current campaign by Jews in America to identify the lack of liberties accorded their brethre.n in the Soviet Union could in some ways be made SLOVAKIA 117 to appear rather miniscule if injustices perpetrated against Slovaks, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, et. al., were similarly examined. Freedom still remains undebatable despite the economic strategems of government and big business. At home, one of principal educational problems may be that big business is too much in the saddle in influencing ethnic studies programs. No champions from business arose to exhort the cause of ethnics when the Schweiker ethnic studies bill was not approved for funding by tlie White House, yet industrial support was hardly lacking for both parties. Michael Novak in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics speaks of the possibility of Blacks and ethnics forming a coalition for mutual gain. It cannot be assumed that because Blacks have been afforded study programs and given some economic assistance, that power groups in America are genuinely interested in their welfare. Nobody volunteered any help to the Blacks and it can be reasonably assumed that nothing will be given East Europeans unless they demand considerations. One of the greatest problems confronting East Europeans is that textbook purchasers know too little about non-Russian-oriented publications; they buy primarily from the big, conventional publishing houses. East European publishers need to wage a campaign to bring their publications to the school systems throughout the country. The fact is that numerous administrators know as much about East Europeans as a dog knows about mathematics. An example: The late Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki, when at Marquette University, used to begin his classes with an anonymous quiz, one of the questions of which was: List the Slavic nationalities or peoples in Europe. The usual answer ran like this: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Turkey, Austria, Russians, Bavarians, Bolsheviks, "Lower Slobovia" (Li'l Abner's contribution) and "Carpathia" (Marilyn Monroe's contribution from the movie, "The Prince and the Showgirl"). On July 11, 1954, the New York Times altered geography of Europe with the following headline: Rising Danube Flood Hits Prague. The Baltimore Sun had an interesting article (some 118 SLOVAKIA reporters are more discerning than many of our educators) on December 4, 1935, written by R. P. Harriss, "All Others." Harriss states, "The official census for Baltimore is a curious intensely interesting document, both for what it reveals and for what it leaves out. It lists some 14,000 nonexistent Russians and contains vague hints of a polygenous percentage which it does not bother to define." True enough. In an article in the Baltimore Sun on February 13, 1967, a native of Kazan, Russia, is quoted: "There are probably not more than five or six families of true Russians in Baltimore." Yet the article speaks of Russians from Galicia, Byelorussia, Carpatho-Ukraine. Seems that census officials and educators have in America done a magician's job of creating 'Russians.' How some of the mysteries regarding census data will be clarified remains a monumental task for the artful dodgers who have compiled the data thus far. Quoting again the Harriss article of 1935: "Officially there are 1,637 Hungarians in Baltimore, 1,441 Ruman.ians, and no Ukrainians, no Serbs." Harriss was candid enough to realize that by 1935 there were three Ukrainian churches, plus other institutions, in the Baltimore area and he was smart enough to see that the census data was akin to ethnic studies programs of today. Surely nobody would suspect that the Russians built the Ukrainian churches! The situation in literary studies is not much better than in the social sciences. To be sure "Russian Literature" units are taught in many schools, yet in "World Literature" courses very little is presented to develop the genius of Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, et. al., writers. Likewise the study of art and music suffer from non-coverage and from misconceptions. Now is the time to clear the muddied waters. East Europeans must declare themselves. They need to write more, question more, educate P.T.A. groups, civic organizations, education councils (on which they are rarely represented), etc. The "education crisis" should be recognized immediately. Forget about token appointments and honorary ethnic banquets (which cost you $100) in Washington where ethnic foods and cultural items are displayed. Begin a program called "Operation Hometown." Organize East European SLOVAKIA 119 festivals as was done at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York. Show films. Present books and audio-visual aids to libraries. Request relevant books at your public libraries. Have cultural groups perform at YMCA's, schools, colleges, charity events, etc. It is important that school book lists be examined and that books by and about East Europeans be added. Music departments should be exhorted to sound to the tunes of rhapsodies, mazurkas, kolomajykas, polkas. Home economic departments would win adherents by presenting samplings of pirohy, halusky, makovnik, etc. Courses of study need to be expanded to include information about the great contributions of East Europeans to America, as, in the words of Michael Novak, "America is becoming America." The name of the game for East Europeans is "catch-up." Don't wait for the artful dodgers to structure your ethnic studies as you are excluded from their terminology. In the words of Dickens " ... You must get up very early in the morning, to win against the Dodger." "Morning!" said Charley Bates; "you must put your boots on over-night, and have a telescope at each eye, and a opera-glass between your shoulders, if you want to come over him." The U.S. flight crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project visited Russia for two weeks in November 1973 to familiarize themselves with the Soyuz spacecraft system that will link up with their Apollo in 1975. Most of their activities were conducted in the J . A. Gagarin Center of Cosmonaut Training at Zvezdny Goroduk, or Star City, near Moscow. Making the trip were the three Apollo crewmen, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand and Donald K. Slayton; backup crewmen, Capt. Alan L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans and Maj. Jack R. Lousma; support crewmen, Lt. Col. Robert F. Overmyer and Lt. Col. Karol J. Bobko; and Capt. Eugene A. Ceman, Special Assistant to the U.S. ASTP Technical Director. Bobko and Cer:nan are Slovaks.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs Description An account of the resource Paul Fenchak Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 112-119 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fenchak, Paul Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fb40bfffdceeb97a931b9b25f09f126a.pdf 911fa8cfb7edca5158a25708177d2d32 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 79 The Assin1ilation Process of An1e rican Slovaks J . M . Ki rs c h b au m, Ph. D . Historians and sociologists have presented the United States during the past 200 years as a vast melting pot in which immigrants from many nations and continents were supposed to become Americans and lose their identity. This belief became a part of the national consciousness of the majority of Americans and foreign scholars have accepted uncritically the idea that successive waves of immigrants have been "digested" and have become an integral part of the American nation. During the past few year s, this hypothesis has been put in doubt by scholars and especially by sociologists dealing with today's America. Some of them assert that the melting pot was a romantic idea about something which happened only in the writings of historians who dealt with national ambitions and dreams and not with reality. Even 200 years after the enunciation of the melting pot idea, the ethnic groups continue to behave differently from the Anglo-Saxon element. According to recent studies, the melting pot concept extended chiefly to the political and economic spheres. In other areas, what sociologists call "structual separation," persists. In religion and in social relations, the ethnic groups resist amalgamation. In view of this situation, the Organization of American Historians dedicated a session during its annual meeting in 1969 to the topic : "Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History." At this meeting, some scholars challenged the traditional ways of interpreting American history and came to the conclusions which brought renewed academic interest in the problems of the ethnic groups .1 The historians were joined by sociologists and linguists and the results of their research contradicts to a great degree the idea of a melting pot and monolithic structure of the American nation. They found out that even Americans of western European origin (German, Norwegian, �80 SLOVAKIA Swedish, Irish, etc.) continue to this very day t.o recognize their ancestry and t.o partially define themselves in accordance with it. "For reasons that are not really well understood, these groups have not lost themselves entirely within their American surroundings even after three, four, or more generations, although they have had every opportunity to do so." 2 The ethnic groups preserved, however, not only the awareness of their European ancestry and cultural heritage, but many of them maintained the languages spoken by their fathers and fore-fathers. As a result, the idea of ethnicity and of language maintenance in America is becoming of interest not only to scholars but also to other Americans. "That third and subsequent generations frequently continue to think of themselves in partially ethnic terms and frequently maintain positive attitudes and interests with respect to the heritage of their grandparents, became a significant fact in American life." 3 Prof. Fishman in the recent book Language Loyalty in the United States which he edited together with several American scholars, deals especially with the maintenance and perpetuation of non-English mother tongues of American ethnic and religious groups. Through thorough research, Fishman and a group of American scholars came to startling results about present-day America. They also mention Slovaks and in view of the possibility that the statistics confused again Czechs and Slovaks, the new generation of Slovaks educated at American universities should carry out genuine research into the problems of the Slovak ethnic group in the United States. According to Fishman, the assimilation process of the Slovaks proceeds much faster than that of many other ethnic groups. They have assimilated much faster than, for instance, Poles, Magyars, Ukrainians, or Germans. According to the census data, there were 274,948 Slovaks in 1920 who were not born in the United States, whereas in 1940 only 171,580 and 125,000 in 1960. As for Slovaks born in the United States, the 1920 statistics show 344,918 as against 283,520 in 1940 and 125,000 in 1960, which means a considerable decrease from decade to decade. The number of Slovaks born in America who gave their mother tongue �SLOVAKIA 81 as Slovaks, according to the censuses of 1920 and 1940 is again percentagewise much smaller than in the case of other Slavs or even Magyars. The maintenance of mother tongues or the admission of Slovak parentage declines among the children of Slovak parents from generation to generation, according to American statistics. Thus the process of assimilation seems to be much stronger among Slovaks than among Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Magyars or Germans. For instance, in 1960, 125,000 first generation Slovaks claimed their mother tongue as Slovak. The same number of second generation Slovaks appear in the statistics, but in the third generation, only 10,000 Americans born to Slovak parents claimed Slovak as their mother tongue. As a result, only 260,000 persons born in the United States claimed in 1960 to be of Slovak origin or admitted that their mother tongue was Slovak. The total number of foreign and native born persons who claimed Slovak as their mother tongue was 484,360 in 1940 and only 260,0000 in 1960.4 The decrease or assimilation process among Slovaks in the United States is best shown by the following comparison with other central European immigrants: Slovaks decreased by 46.3 % Poles decreased by 9 .6 % Serbs and Croats decreased by 10.8 % Ukrainians increased by 202.6 % Prof. Fishman carefully mentions that mother tongue data on natives of foreign or mixed parentage does not necessarily reflect the real number of people born in the individual ethnic groups. Some demographic and some non-demographic factors account for the fact that some Americans of non Anglo-Saxon origin did not reveal their ethnic origin and mother tongue. Among the factors were a) "the varying prestige of the mother tongue both among its own speakers and among Americans in general," and b) tlile social mobility experienced by the second generation. Where the prestige of a particular mother tongue was low, and where the social mobility of its prospective claimants was high, it is likely the language less frequently �82 SLOVAKIA became the mother of American-born (second generation) offspring and was even less frequently claimed as such. "Unfortunately," concludes Fishman, "no census-type data are available on either of these variables and it has been necessary to study them by other means." 5 Generally, the immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe preserved their language and cultural heritage much better than immigrants from other parts of the European Continent. In the case of Slovaks, the statistics show that in spite of the greater number of parishes, organizations and newspapers compared to some other ethnic groups from Central Europe had in the past decades, the assimilation process was much stronger. As far as the mother tongue maintenance is concerned, American Slovaks are in twelfth place among the 23 ethnic groups in 1969, but for the period 1940-1960 in the 15th place. They are far ahead of Magyars, Russians, Poles, Croats, or Serbians in their integration into the AngloSaxon language group. There are no statistics about the number of Slovak newspapers and periodicals since these were shown under "other Slavic Groups" which includes Slovenes, Croatians, and Serbians. The statistics also show that the number of Slovaks is inferior during some decades to the number of Czechs and this could lead to the conclusion that the census takers may have confused the Czechs with Slovaks and vice-versa, as it happened according to the official admission in the Canadian census of 1961. The statistics quoted above and used in Fishman's book have been derived from U.S. Census of Population 1960: General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, Final Report PC ( 1 )-lC.6 The statistics do not add, however, correctly and they seem to be at odds with unofficial statistics and numbers of Slovaks who are at the present time organized in Slovak organizations in the United States. Although generally only 15 to 20 % of Americans or Canadians of East European origin are members of their fraternal or socio-cultural associations, the number of Slovaks organized in the United States amounted in 1969 to well over 450,000 according to the �SLOVAKIA 83 Secretary of the Slovak League of America, Joseph Pauco, Ph.D. In addition 'to this membership, we have to take into consideration social clubs and church organizations, as well as cultural centres which have been organized within Slovak Catholic and Protestant parishes or in larger American cities, and whose members are only partly organized in the fraternal Slovak organizations. According to Dr. Pauco, there is almost at each parish such a club or church organization and half of its membership does not belong to any Slovak fraternal organization. Since there are over 400 parishes in the United States, and taking into account that Slovak families are usually very large, counting five members as a f!1inimum, Dr. Pauco, as a long time Secretary of the Federation of Slovak Organizations in the United States, the Slovak League of America, assumes that the number of Americans of Slovak origin who to a great degree are still conscious of their ethnic background, amount to approximately two million. 7 However, if the official statistics are correct, then we cannot but come to the conclusion that the assimilation process of Slovaks is much stronger than we are willing to admit. On the other hand, if the statistics can be doubted, then there is only one remedy; the educated Slovaks whose numbers are not negligible, should begin a thorough research into the problems of American Slovaks. Their task will be now much easier than a few years ago since a joint commission cif the Organization of American Historians and the American Historical Association issued a statement on the writing and teaching of American history in the text books, stressing the fact that American ethnlc difference must be "faithfully portrayed." Also many other things reveal that a new tide of ethnic studies is at hand. The first sign is the growing interest of publishers and, second, new scholarship efforts are growing in American universities. The renewed interest in ethnic Americans was underscored by the Ford Foundation which announced in Ne,v York a new program of fellowships to encourage scholarships in the field of ethnic studies. A. national award of $288,052.00 will go to 87 doctoral candidacies at 58 graduate �SLOVAKIA 84 schools for the writing of dissertations on subjects dealing with the experience and culture of ethnic minorities in the United States. "The new program is designed to help stimulate the development of a body of knowledge on the history and culture of the nation's ethnic minorities, which is already becoming a subject of intense interest to a new generation of American students," according to F. Champion Ward, the Foundation's Vice-President for Higher Education and Research. 8 1) International Migration Rev.iew, an article by Dean Cincl, p. 58-63. 2) See Fishman et al, Language Loyalty in the United States (Mouton & Co., The Hague) , 1966. 3) Fishman, op. c. p. 31. 4 ) Fishman, ibid. p. 44. This figure shou}jd read 415,000 because Fishman shows 125,000 for foreign born (,p. 36) and 260,000 for native born ( p. 42) . 5 ) Ibid. , p. 40. 6 ) Published in Washington, D. C., by U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. 7 ) Personal letter by Dr. Pauco /dated December 8, 1970. Dr. Pauco's estimate of the number of Slovaks in the United States is corroborated also by the figures on the emigration from Slovakia to the United States published recently by the Slovak Academy of Sciences. In the years 1880-1890, 122,479 persons left Slovakia for the United States; in the years 1901-1910, 215,292 persons, and in the years 1850-1921 529,949 persons; althogether 867,720 persons left for the United States. Even if i,t is true that many of these persons returned after two or three years spent in the United States, the statistics justify the estimate that about two million Americans are of Slovak origin. 8 ) The New York Times, November 27, 1970, page L. 41. " THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA heartily commends all efforts of our governmental and other organs to ferret out and unmask all Communists and fellow travellers, as well as all persons and organizations who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism promoted by the Soviet Union. � SLOVAKIA 79 The Assin1ilation Process of An1e rican Slovaks J . M . Ki rs c h b au m, Ph. D . Historians and sociologists have presented the United States during the past 200 years as a vast melting pot in which immigrants from many nations and continents were supposed to become Americans and lose their identity. This belief became a part of the national consciousness of the majority of Americans and foreign scholars have accepted uncritically the idea that successive waves of immigrants have been "digested" and have become an integral part of the American nation. During the past few year s, this hypothesis has been put in doubt by scholars and especially by sociologists dealing with today's America. Some of them assert that the melting pot was a romantic idea about something which happened only in the writings of historians who dealt with national ambitions and dreams and not with reality. Even 200 years after the enunciation of the melting pot idea, the ethnic groups continue to behave differently from the Anglo-Saxon element. According to recent studies, the melting pot concept extended chiefly to the political and economic spheres. In other areas, what sociologists call "structual separation," persists. In religion and in social relations, the ethnic groups resist amalgamation. In view of this situation, the Organization of American Historians dedicated a session during its annual meeting in 1969 to the topic : "Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History." At this meeting, some scholars challenged the traditional ways of interpreting American history and came to the conclusions which brought renewed academic interest in the problems of the ethnic groups .1 The historians were joined by sociologists and linguists and the results of their research contradicts to a great degree the idea of a melting pot and monolithic structure of the American nation. They found out that even Americans of western European origin (German, Norwegian, �80 SLOVAKIA Swedish, Irish, etc.) continue to this very day t.o recognize their ancestry and t.o partially define themselves in accordance with it. "For reasons that are not really well understood, these groups have not lost themselves entirely within their American surroundings even after three, four, or more generations, although they have had every opportunity to do so." 2 The ethnic groups preserved, however, not only the awareness of their European ancestry and cultural heritage, but many of them maintained the languages spoken by their fathers and fore-fathers. As a result, the idea of ethnicity and of language maintenance in America is becoming of interest not only to scholars but also to other Americans. "That third and subsequent generations frequently continue to think of themselves in partially ethnic terms and frequently maintain positive attitudes and interests with respect to the heritage of their grandparents, became a significant fact in American life." 3 Prof. Fishman in the recent book Language Loyalty in the United States which he edited together with several American scholars, deals especially with the maintenance and perpetuation of non-English mother tongues of American ethnic and religious groups. Through thorough research, Fishman and a group of American scholars came to startling results about present-day America. They also mention Slovaks and in view of the possibility that the statistics confused again Czechs and Slovaks, the new generation of Slovaks educated at American universities should carry out genuine research into the problems of the Slovak ethnic group in the United States. According to Fishman, the assimilation process of the Slovaks proceeds much faster than that of many other ethnic groups. They have assimilated much faster than, for instance, Poles, Magyars, Ukrainians, or Germans. According to the census data, there were 274,948 Slovaks in 1920 who were not born in the United States, whereas in 1940 only 171,580 and 125,000 in 1960. As for Slovaks born in the United States, the 1920 statistics show 344,918 as against 283,520 in 1940 and 125,000 in 1960, which means a considerable decrease from decade to decade. The number of Slovaks born in America who gave their mother tongue �SLOVAKIA 81 as Slovaks, according to the censuses of 1920 and 1940 is again percentagewise much smaller than in the case of other Slavs or even Magyars. The maintenance of mother tongues or the admission of Slovak parentage declines among the children of Slovak parents from generation to generation, according to American statistics. Thus the process of assimilation seems to be much stronger among Slovaks than among Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Magyars or Germans. For instance, in 1960, 125,000 first generation Slovaks claimed their mother tongue as Slovak. The same number of second generation Slovaks appear in the statistics, but in the third generation, only 10,000 Americans born to Slovak parents claimed Slovak as their mother tongue. As a result, only 260,000 persons born in the United States claimed in 1960 to be of Slovak origin or admitted that their mother tongue was Slovak. The total number of foreign and native born persons who claimed Slovak as their mother tongue was 484,360 in 1940 and only 260,0000 in 1960.4 The decrease or assimilation process among Slovaks in the United States is best shown by the following comparison with other central European immigrants: Slovaks decreased by 46.3 % Poles decreased by 9 .6 % Serbs and Croats decreased by 10.8 % Ukrainians increased by 202.6 % Prof. Fishman carefully mentions that mother tongue data on natives of foreign or mixed parentage does not necessarily reflect the real number of people born in the individual ethnic groups. Some demographic and some non-demographic factors account for the fact that some Americans of non Anglo-Saxon origin did not reveal their ethnic origin and mother tongue. Among the factors were a) "the varying prestige of the mother tongue both among its own speakers and among Americans in general," and b) tlile social mobility experienced by the second generation. Where the prestige of a particular mother tongue was low, and where the social mobility of its prospective claimants was high, it is likely the language less frequently �82 SLOVAKIA became the mother of American-born (second generation) offspring and was even less frequently claimed as such. "Unfortunately," concludes Fishman, "no census-type data are available on either of these variables and it has been necessary to study them by other means." 5 Generally, the immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe preserved their language and cultural heritage much better than immigrants from other parts of the European Continent. In the case of Slovaks, the statistics show that in spite of the greater number of parishes, organizations and newspapers compared to some other ethnic groups from Central Europe had in the past decades, the assimilation process was much stronger. As far as the mother tongue maintenance is concerned, American Slovaks are in twelfth place among the 23 ethnic groups in 1969, but for the period 1940-1960 in the 15th place. They are far ahead of Magyars, Russians, Poles, Croats, or Serbians in their integration into the AngloSaxon language group. There are no statistics about the number of Slovak newspapers and periodicals since these were shown under "other Slavic Groups" which includes Slovenes, Croatians, and Serbians. The statistics also show that the number of Slovaks is inferior during some decades to the number of Czechs and this could lead to the conclusion that the census takers may have confused the Czechs with Slovaks and vice-versa, as it happened according to the official admission in the Canadian census of 1961. The statistics quoted above and used in Fishman's book have been derived from U.S. Census of Population 1960: General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, Final Report PC ( 1 )-lC.6 The statistics do not add, however, correctly and they seem to be at odds with unofficial statistics and numbers of Slovaks who are at the present time organized in Slovak organizations in the United States. Although generally only 15 to 20 % of Americans or Canadians of East European origin are members of their fraternal or socio-cultural associations, the number of Slovaks organized in the United States amounted in 1969 to well over 450,000 according to the �SLOVAKIA 83 Secretary of the Slovak League of America, Joseph Pauco, Ph.D. In addition 'to this membership, we have to take into consideration social clubs and church organizations, as well as cultural centres which have been organized within Slovak Catholic and Protestant parishes or in larger American cities, and whose members are only partly organized in the fraternal Slovak organizations. According to Dr. Pauco, there is almost at each parish such a club or church organization and half of its membership does not belong to any Slovak fraternal organization. Since there are over 400 parishes in the United States, and taking into account that Slovak families are usually very large, counting five members as a f!1inimum, Dr. Pauco, as a long time Secretary of the Federation of Slovak Organizations in the United States, the Slovak League of America, assumes that the number of Americans of Slovak origin who to a great degree are still conscious of their ethnic background, amount to approximately two million. 7 However, if the official statistics are correct, then we cannot but come to the conclusion that the assimilation process of Slovaks is much stronger than we are willing to admit. On the other hand, if the statistics can be doubted, then there is only one remedy; the educated Slovaks whose numbers are not negligible, should begin a thorough research into the problems of American Slovaks. Their task will be now much easier than a few years ago since a joint commission cif the Organization of American Historians and the American Historical Association issued a statement on the writing and teaching of American history in the text books, stressing the fact that American ethnlc difference must be "faithfully portrayed." Also many other things reveal that a new tide of ethnic studies is at hand. The first sign is the growing interest of publishers and, second, new scholarship efforts are growing in American universities. The renewed interest in ethnic Americans was underscored by the Ford Foundation which announced in Ne,v York a new program of fellowships to encourage scholarships in the field of ethnic studies. A. national award of $288,052.00 will go to 87 doctoral candidacies at 58 graduate �SLOVAKIA 84 schools for the writing of dissertations on subjects dealing with the experience and culture of ethnic minorities in the United States. "The new program is designed to help stimulate the development of a body of knowledge on the history and culture of the nation's ethnic minorities, which is already becoming a subject of intense interest to a new generation of American students," according to F. Champion Ward, the Foundation's Vice-President for Higher Education and Research. 8 1) International Migration Rev.iew, an article by Dean Cincl, p. 58-63. 2) See Fishman et al, Language Loyalty in the United States (Mouton & Co., The Hague) , 1966. 3) Fishman, op. c. p. 31. 4 ) Fishman, ibid. p. 44. This figure shou}jd read 415,000 because Fishman shows 125,000 for foreign born (,p. 36) and 260,000 for native born ( p. 42) . 5 ) Ibid. , p. 40. 6 ) Published in Washington, D. C., by U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. 7 ) Personal letter by Dr. Pauco /dated December 8, 1970. Dr. Pauco's estimate of the number of Slovaks in the United States is corroborated also by the figures on the emigration from Slovakia to the United States published recently by the Slovak Academy of Sciences. In the years 1880-1890, 122,479 persons left Slovakia for the United States; in the years 1901-1910, 215,292 persons, and in the years 1850-1921 529,949 persons; althogether 867,720 persons left for the United States. Even if i,t is true that many of these persons returned after two or three years spent in the United States, the statistics justify the estimate that about two million Americans are of Slovak origin. 8 ) The New York Times, November 27, 1970, page L. 41. " THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA heartily commends all efforts of our governmental and other organs to ferret out and unmask all Communists and fellow travellers, as well as all persons and organizations who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism promoted by the Soviet Union. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1971, Vol. 21 Description An account of the resource Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 79 The Assin1ilation Process of An1e rican Slovaks J . M . Ki rs c h b au m, Ph. D . Historians and sociologists have presented the United States during the past 200 years as a vast melting pot in which immigrants from many nations and continents were supposed to become Americans and lose their identity. This belief became a part of the national consciousness of the majority of Americans and foreign scholars have accepted uncritically the idea that successive waves of immigrants have been "digested" and have become an integral part of the American nation. During the past few year s, this hypothesis has been put in doubt by scholars and especially by sociologists dealing with today's America. Some of them assert that the melting pot was a romantic idea about something which happened only in the writings of historians who dealt with national ambitions and dreams and not with reality. Even 200 years after the enunciation of the melting pot idea, the ethnic groups continue to behave differently from the Anglo-Saxon element. According to recent studies, the melting pot concept extended chiefly to the political and economic spheres. In other areas, what sociologists call "structual separation," persists. In religion and in social relations, the ethnic groups resist amalgamation. In view of this situation, the Organization of American Historians dedicated a session during its annual meeting in 1969 to the topic : "Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History." At this meeting, some scholars challenged the traditional ways of interpreting American history and came to the conclusions which brought renewed academic interest in the problems of the ethnic groups .1 The historians were joined by sociologists and linguists and the results of their research contradicts to a great degree the idea of a melting pot and monolithic structure of the American nation. They found out that even Americans of western European origin (German, Norwegian, 80 SLOVAKIA Swedish, Irish, etc.) continue to this very day t.o recognize their ancestry and t.o partially define themselves in accordance with it. "For reasons that are not really well understood, these groups have not lost themselves entirely within their American surroundings even after three, four, or more generations, although they have had every opportunity to do so." 2 The ethnic groups preserved, however, not only the awareness of their European ancestry and cultural heritage, but many of them maintained the languages spoken by their fathers and fore-fathers. As a result, the idea of ethnicity and of language maintenance in America is becoming of interest not only to scholars but also to other Americans. "That third and subsequent generations frequently continue to think of themselves in partially ethnic terms and frequently maintain positive attitudes and interests with respect to the heritage of their grandparents, became a significant fact in American life." 3 Prof. Fishman in the recent book Language Loyalty in the United States which he edited together with several American scholars, deals especially with the maintenance and perpetuation of non-English mother tongues of American ethnic and religious groups. Through thorough research, Fishman and a group of American scholars came to startling results about present-day America. They also mention Slovaks and in view of the possibility that the statistics confused again Czechs and Slovaks, the new generation of Slovaks educated at American universities should carry out genuine research into the problems of the Slovak ethnic group in the United States. According to Fishman, the assimilation process of the Slovaks proceeds much faster than that of many other ethnic groups. They have assimilated much faster than, for instance, Poles, Magyars, Ukrainians, or Germans. According to the census data, there were 274,948 Slovaks in 1920 who were not born in the United States, whereas in 1940 only 171,580 and 125,000 in 1960. As for Slovaks born in the United States, the 1920 statistics show 344,918 as against 283,520 in 1940 and 125,000 in 1960, which means a considerable decrease from decade to decade. The number of Slovaks born in America who gave their mother tongue SLOVAKIA 81 as Slovaks, according to the censuses of 1920 and 1940 is again percentagewise much smaller than in the case of other Slavs or even Magyars. The maintenance of mother tongues or the admission of Slovak parentage declines among the children of Slovak parents from generation to generation, according to American statistics. Thus the process of assimilation seems to be much stronger among Slovaks than among Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Magyars or Germans. For instance, in 1960, 125,000 first generation Slovaks claimed their mother tongue as Slovak. The same number of second generation Slovaks appear in the statistics, but in the third generation, only 10,000 Americans born to Slovak parents claimed Slovak as their mother tongue. As a result, only 260,000 persons born in the United States claimed in 1960 to be of Slovak origin or admitted that their mother tongue was Slovak. The total number of foreign and native born persons who claimed Slovak as their mother tongue was 484,360 in 1940 and only 260,0000 in 1960.4 The decrease or assimilation process among Slovaks in the United States is best shown by the following comparison with other central European immigrants: Slovaks decreased by 46.3 % Poles decreased by 9 .6 % Serbs and Croats decreased by 10.8 % Ukrainians increased by 202.6 % Prof. Fishman carefully mentions that mother tongue data on natives of foreign or mixed parentage does not necessarily reflect the real number of people born in the individual ethnic groups. Some demographic and some non-demographic factors account for the fact that some Americans of non Anglo-Saxon origin did not reveal their ethnic origin and mother tongue. Among the factors were a) "the varying prestige of the mother tongue both among its own speakers and among Americans in general," and b) tlile social mobility experienced by the second generation. Where the prestige of a particular mother tongue was low, and where the social mobility of its prospective claimants was high, it is likely the language less frequently 82 SLOVAKIA became the mother of American-born (second generation) offspring and was even less frequently claimed as such. "Unfortunately," concludes Fishman, "no census-type data are available on either of these variables and it has been necessary to study them by other means." 5 Generally, the immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe preserved their language and cultural heritage much better than immigrants from other parts of the European Continent. In the case of Slovaks, the statistics show that in spite of the greater number of parishes, organizations and newspapers compared to some other ethnic groups from Central Europe had in the past decades, the assimilation process was much stronger. As far as the mother tongue maintenance is concerned, American Slovaks are in twelfth place among the 23 ethnic groups in 1969, but for the period 1940-1960 in the 15th place. They are far ahead of Magyars, Russians, Poles, Croats, or Serbians in their integration into the AngloSaxon language group. There are no statistics about the number of Slovak newspapers and periodicals since these were shown under "other Slavic Groups" which includes Slovenes, Croatians, and Serbians. The statistics also show that the number of Slovaks is inferior during some decades to the number of Czechs and this could lead to the conclusion that the census takers may have confused the Czechs with Slovaks and vice-versa, as it happened according to the official admission in the Canadian census of 1961. The statistics quoted above and used in Fishman's book have been derived from U.S. Census of Population 1960: General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, Final Report PC ( 1 )-lC.6 The statistics do not add, however, correctly and they seem to be at odds with unofficial statistics and numbers of Slovaks who are at the present time organized in Slovak organizations in the United States. Although generally only 15 to 20 % of Americans or Canadians of East European origin are members of their fraternal or socio-cultural associations, the number of Slovaks organized in the United States amounted in 1969 to well over 450,000 according to the SLOVAKIA 83 Secretary of the Slovak League of America, Joseph Pauco, Ph.D. In addition 'to this membership, we have to take into consideration social clubs and church organizations, as well as cultural centres which have been organized within Slovak Catholic and Protestant parishes or in larger American cities, and whose members are only partly organized in the fraternal Slovak organizations. According to Dr. Pauco, there is almost at each parish such a club or church organization and half of its membership does not belong to any Slovak fraternal organization. Since there are over 400 parishes in the United States, and taking into account that Slovak families are usually very large, counting five members as a f!1inimum, Dr. Pauco, as a long time Secretary of the Federation of Slovak Organizations in the United States, the Slovak League of America, assumes that the number of Americans of Slovak origin who to a great degree are still conscious of their ethnic background, amount to approximately two million. 7 However, if the official statistics are correct, then we cannot but come to the conclusion that the assimilation process of Slovaks is much stronger than we are willing to admit. On the other hand, if the statistics can be doubted, then there is only one remedy; the educated Slovaks whose numbers are not negligible, should begin a thorough research into the problems of American Slovaks. Their task will be now much easier than a few years ago since a joint commission cif the Organization of American Historians and the American Historical Association issued a statement on the writing and teaching of American history in the text books, stressing the fact that American ethnlc difference must be "faithfully portrayed." Also many other things reveal that a new tide of ethnic studies is at hand. The first sign is the growing interest of publishers and, second, new scholarship efforts are growing in American universities. The renewed interest in ethnic Americans was underscored by the Ford Foundation which announced in Ne,v York a new program of fellowships to encourage scholarships in the field of ethnic studies. A. national award of $288,052.00 will go to 87 doctoral candidacies at 58 graduate SLOVAKIA 84 schools for the writing of dissertations on subjects dealing with the experience and culture of ethnic minorities in the United States. "The new program is designed to help stimulate the development of a body of knowledge on the history and culture of the nation's ethnic minorities, which is already becoming a subject of intense interest to a new generation of American students," according to F. Champion Ward, the Foundation's Vice-President for Higher Education and Research. 8 1) International Migration Rev.iew, an article by Dean Cincl, p. 58-63. 2) See Fishman et al, Language Loyalty in the United States (Mouton & Co., The Hague) , 1966. 3) Fishman, op. c. p. 31. 4 ) Fishman, ibid. p. 44. This figure shou}jd read 415,000 because Fishman shows 125,000 for foreign born (,p. 36) and 260,000 for native born ( p. 42) . 5 ) Ibid. , p. 40. 6 ) Published in Washington, D. C., by U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. 7 ) Personal letter by Dr. Pauco /dated December 8, 1970. Dr. Pauco's estimate of the number of Slovaks in the United States is corroborated also by the figures on the emigration from Slovakia to the United States published recently by the Slovak Academy of Sciences. In the years 1880-1890, 122,479 persons left Slovakia for the United States; in the years 1901-1910, 215,292 persons, and in the years 1850-1921 529,949 persons; althogether 867,720 persons left for the United States. Even if i,t is true that many of these persons returned after two or three years spent in the United States, the statistics justify the estimate that about two million Americans are of Slovak origin. 8 ) The New York Times, November 27, 1970, page L. 41. " THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA heartily commends all efforts of our governmental and other organs to ferret out and unmask all Communists and fellow travellers, as well as all persons and organizations who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism promoted by the Soviet Union.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Assimilation Process of American Slovaks Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum, Ph.D Slovakia, Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971 pp. 79-84 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ec550c677d62ab56f7bdecb75deac4df.pdf 5b42a7eefdb03b512ec55b30ecbbf712 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution 1 E li sabeth Bakke " We approve the political progra m, w hi ch e ndeavors to unite the Czec hs a nd Slovaks in[to] an indepe nd e nt state of the Czech la nd s and Slovakia. Slovakia sha ll ha ve its own ad mini strati o n, its ow n parli ament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the officia l language in the sc hoo l[s], in office[sl and in public li fe in genera l. The Czecho-Slovak state sha ll be a republic , its constitution sha ll be democratic. [ ...] The detail ed reg ulati o ns for the estab lishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the li berated Czechs and Slovaks and the ir lega l representati ves." The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918 2 ' An earli er version of thi s art icle was presented at the 34th National Conven ti on of the AAASS in Pittsburgh. 2 1- 24 November. 2002. 2 Thi s Agreeme nt was signed by the Slovak League of America . th e Czech National A lli ance. th e Al li ance of Czec h Ca th oli cs. representing Czech and Slovak emigrc organi zations in the USA. and T omas G. M asaryk. President of the Czechos lovak ati ona l Council in Pari s. I have quoted th e Engli sh version from The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (Chicago: Th e Slova k Cath ol ic Federati on of America. 1934). 27. The Slovak ori gin al is reprinted in Edvard Benes. Svetov,i valka a nase revoluce. Vol. Ill (Dokumenty). (Prague: C in-Orbis . 1929) . 365. See also M. Mark Stolarik. 'The Role of Amer ican Slova ks in th e C rea tion of Czecho-S lovak ia. 19 14- 19 18"'. �SLOVAKIA 53 Slovak autonomy was on the agenda throughout Czechoslovakia 's 74 years of existence, from the beginning to the bitter end. Although it may be argued that inexperienced politicians, short deadlines , rigid constitutional amendment procedures and conflicting economic priorities also played a role in the breakup, the long-term conflict that drove Czechoslovakia apart were the closely-related matters of political autonomy and recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation. 3 What was at stake was not only the institutional set-up and division of power; for the Slovaks, separate political institutions were also important symbols of national individuality and ownership to the shared Czecho-Slovak state. The roots of the conflict go back to the founding of Czechoslovakia in October of 19 I 8. The Czechs and Slovaks had no prior shared statehood tradition s (save perhaps Great Moravia in the ninth century), and independence was not even on the agenda before World War I. Starting in 1915, the independence movement abroad, with Tomas G. Masaryk at the helm, tried to convince the Allies that a Czechoslovak Republic should be established, invoking the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation. " In the First Czechoslovak Republic the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation (albeit with two tribes) became official state ideology , and it went hand-in-hand with political centralism. 4 Slovak Studies VIII (Rome, 1968) for a very interesting acco unt of the circumsta nces that led to its signin g and the subseq uent course of even ts in th e new lyfounded Repub lic. 3 For a discussion of the breakup see Eric Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure. Negotiated Breakup (A nn Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jirf Musil , ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995 ); Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska . Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989- 1992 (Bratis lava : AEP, 2002); Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics. Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 4 For details see Elisabeth Bakke, Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 19/9- 1938 (Oslo: Series of Dissertations submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Un iversity of Oslo, no. 11 /1999). �SLOVAKIA 54 Howeve r, a sub sta nti al pa rt of th e Sl ova k po liti ca l e lite opposed both , de ma ndir.g recog nition of the Slovak nati on and autonomy fo r Slovaki a. The Pittsburgh Agreeme nt became important both beca use it defin ed the contents of Slovak a utonomy and because Masaryk had signed it. Afte r World War II , Czec hos lovaki sm was abandoned, but poli ti ca l centra li sm was not, and th e federali zati on of Czech os lov aki a aft er the Sov iet in vas ion in 1968 did not give Slovak po liti ca l insti tution s any rea l dec ision-m aking power. Afte r the Ve lvet Revo lution in 1989, political autonomy for Slovaki a reappeared on the agenda, and became a major iss ue in the di spute over C zechos lovaki a's new constitution . The main purpose of the present article is to co mpare the autonomy de bates durin g the First Republic and after the Ve lve t Re volu ti o n, in orde r to establi sh continuity and change. The research ques ti o ns are: I . How were the de mands fo r autonomy substa nti ated, and what were the main argume nts aga inst it? 2. Wh at role did the princ ipl e of nation al se lf-de te rmin ati on pl ay in the debates in the two peri ods? The First Re public was a unitary state , and autonom y as such was ne ver on the age nda of the Parliame nt in the interwar pe ri od. Of th e three a utonom y proposa ls th at made it to th e Parli a me nt, two were bl oc ked in committees, whil e the third was adopted without any de bate after th e fa teful Muni c h agree me nt in 1938. My analys is of the inte rwar di sco urse is th e refore based o n a se lec ti o n of govern me nt in a ugurati on de bates and budgetary debates, as we ll as c lippings from Slovak, the main autono mi st ne wspaper. 5 After 1989 seve ral de bates were re levant to the autono my di scourse: In the Federal Parliament I have analyzed the 1990 " hyphen de bate," the de bate on the compete ncy law , a nd the two de bates about the break-up of Czechos lovaki a in the fa ll of 1992. In the res- ' T he analys is of the debate in the interwar period is a condensed version of a part of Chapter 13 of my PhD di ssertat ion. For detai ls see Bakke (ibid. 1999). �SLOVAKIA 55 pec ti ve Czech and Sl ovak Nati onal Council s (Republi c Asse mblies), I have analyzed the 1992 debates on the Sl ovak D ecl aration of Sovereignty, the Slovak Con stitution, and the Czech Constituti on. I will structure the arti cle around the foll owin g three points: I . Th e in stituti onal set-up and th e contents of the autonomy demands. 2. The co mpos iti on and stability of the elite constellations on either side of the conflict. 3. The main arg uments a) in favor of autonomy and b) against autonomy. wi th spec ial emphas is on how they relate to the principle of nati onal sel f-determinati on. 1. The Institutional Set-up and the Contents of the Autonomy Demandi Czec hos lovakia was from the outset presented as the nati on-state of the Czechos lovak nation. 6 Thi s was codified in the 1920 Constituti on, which al so gave the First Czechos lovak Republic a unitary, centrali zed state form and a bi ca meral leg islature. Czec hos lovaki a was at first di vided into 22 co unties, but the county sys tem was implemented onl y in Sl ovaki a and fro m 1928 , four prov inces repl aced the counties (see tabl e I ). In the interw ar peri od, the demands for autonomy were defined in term s of separate Sl ovak instituti ons with dec ision-making powers in matters of vital importance for th e Slovaks as a nati on. The core demands were that Sl ovaki a should have " its own admini strati on, its own parli ament and its ow n co urts," cf. the Pittsburgh Ag reement. M ost of the autonomy proposa ls also included a separate Sl ovak government, but none of the three autonomy proposals that made it into the Parli ament went beyond an asymmetric federati on.7 " In reality. th e Czec hs and Slovaks togeth er comprised 65.5 percent of the populati on. Germans 23.4 percent. Magyars 5.6 percent. Ruthenians 3.5 percen t. Jews 1.4 perce nt. and Po les 0.6 percen t in the 1921 cens us. See Scftanr lidu v repub lice ceskosloven.~ke ze dne 15. unora I 921. Dfl I. (Prague: Statnf ufad statistick y. I 924 ). 7 See Bakke (ibid .. 1999). 465- 77 for a more detailed overv iew of the autonomy proposa ls. See also James Ramon Fe lak. '·A t the Price of the Republic ··. Hlinka ·s �SLOVAKIA 56 The 1938 Constitutional a me ndm ent that inaugurated the shortli ved Second Republi c was based on the third a utonomy proposal of the Slovak People 's Party, which had been submitted in August 1938. The Second Re public co mbined a federa l state form with separate Slovak institutions : a leg islat ive asse mbl y (D iet), a se parate administration and separate co urts. The Slovak gove rnme nt was acco untabl e to the Die t, and received exec uti ve power in all matters under its juri sdi ction , as we ll as many matters unde r central jurisdiction. Slovak became the officia l lang uage in S lovakia, and separate c iti zenship was introduced. After World War II , the Czechos lovak govern me nt recognized the S lovaks as a separate nati on a nd the Slovak National Co un ci l (w hi c h de fac to controlled the liberated parts of Slovakia) as its representative. An exec utive Board of Commissioners was also establi shed. However, through the three Prague agreements and the two first postwar constituti ons, Slovak institution s were gradua ll y stripped of their power and co mpete nce, and Czechoslovakia return ed to a centrali st, unitary state fo rm , with a unicamera l leg is lature. 8 Part of the reaso n for the c la mpdow n o n the Slovak organs was the victory of the De mocratic Party in the 1946 e lectio ns, w hi c h convinced the Communists th at Slovakia could not be tru sted. 9 Slovak People ·s Party. 1929-J 938 (Pi tt sburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, I 994). especially pp. 30, 80- 1, 19 1- 92. ij The 1960 Constitution aboli shed the Board of Commissioners. See Program prve dom;Jcf v/ady repub liky vlady narodnf fronty Cechu a Slovaku, (Prag ue: Mini sterstvo l nformacf. 1945). I 6-17: Jaros lav Chovanec & Peter Mozolfk, Historicke a statopravne korene sa mostatn ost i slovenskej republiky , (Yydavatel's tvo Procom , Brati slava, 1994), 38, 11 4- 122; Michal Barn ovsky. " Tri prazske dohody", in Cesko- slovenske vztahy - Slovensko-ceske vzthhy (Liberec: Technick a Un i verzi ta, 1998). 119 ff.: Elisabeth Bakke, "The Principle of National Self-de termination in Czechoslovak Consti tuti ons 1920- 1992" . CEPSR. no. I O (2002), 173- 98 . 9 The Democratic Party received 62 .0 percent of th e votes in Slovakia. See Michal Barnovsky & Edita l vanickova, eds, Prve povojnove volby v strednej a j uhovychod- nej Eur6pe (Bratislava: VEDA, 1998). 2 15- 18. �57 SLOVAKIA Table 1: State Form, Administrative Structure and Institutional Set-up in Czechoslovak Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments Year 1920 State-forming State form Administrative nation Czechoslovak Un itary 22 co unties : Centra lized, from 1928 four bicameral legislature nation Institutional set-up structure provinces 1938 Czech and Federal Slovak nations 1948 Czech and Unitary Slovak nations Four provi nces : Asymmetric: Bohem ia. M ora- bicamera l via, Slovak ia. & separate Slovak Sub-Carpathian instituti ons with Ruthenia extensi ve powers Two prov inces , Asy mmetric; The Czech lands unicamera l & separate and Slovak ia Slovak inst itutions with lim ited powers 1960 Czech and Uni ta ry Slovak nati ons Two prov inces, Asymme tric: unicame- the Czech lands ra l & separate Slovak and Slovak ia institut ions with more l imited powers 1968 Czech and Federal Slovak nations Two repub lics, Symmetric: bicameral, T he Czech Re- federa l & separate publ ic and the Czech and Slovak Slovak Republ ic institut ions Source: A ll cons titutions can be found in Sbfrka zakonii a naHzenf stalU ceskoslovenskeho. During the Prag ue Spring of 1968, the questi on of Slovak autonomy reappeared on the agenda. The initi ati ve to amend the constituti on ca me from the Slovak Nati onal Council , and thi s time a sy mmetri c so luti on was pro posed, sy mboli zing the equality of the two state-forming nati ons. 10 Accordin g to the 1968 Constitution, Czecho- ' 0 T he process towards federa li za ti on is doc umented in Jozef Za tk uli ak, Fede- ra lizacia Ceskoslovenskeho Staw 1968- 1970. Vznik Cesko-sl ovenskej fede racie �SLOVAKIA 58 slovakia became a federation of two republics, the Czech and th e Slovak Republic s, each with their ow n assemblies (National Councils), and their own govern ments. The bicameral federal legis lature consisted of the proporti onall y elected Chamber of the Peop le, and the Chamber of Nations where the two Republics were represented on equal terms. For important dec isions, a majority was req uired in the Peop le's chamber, as we ll as in the separate Czech and Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations, in effect giving the Slovaks veto powers. The 1968 Constitution provided the in stitutional foundations for Slovak autonomy, but in practice the political system remained centralized. The original division of power in the 1968 Constitution changed in favor of the federal level during the "Normali zation " of th e early 1970s, and fo rmal decision-making rul es and divi sion of powers did not matter much during Communism . As Carol Skalnik Leff has pointed out, however, federation plu s democra ti zation was a power eq uation. 11 After the Velvet Revo lution in 1989, th e 1968 Constitution acquired new importance; first , it determined the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution (a three-fifths majority in all parts of the federal parliament), and second, it became the point of departure for the negoti ati ons about the contents of a new constitutional settl ement. Under th e new, democratic co nditi ons, the Slovak minorit y had an excell ent bargaining position , since any cons ti tutional settlement required Slovak co nsent. After 1989 the questi on was, therefore, not whether Slovakia should have autonomy, but the ex tent of that autonomy. Separate Slovak institutions were taken for roku 1968 (B rn o: Nak ladatelstvi Doplnek, 1996). See also Jaros lav Krejci & Pave l Machonin , Czechos lovakia 19/8- 92. A U1bora to1y for Social Change (London: Macmill an, I 996), 45-7: Chovanec & Mozolik, (op.cit. , I 994). 48-52: Ales Gerloch . Jiri Hrebej & Vladimir Zoubek. Us tavnf sys tem Ceske republiky ( Prague: Prospektrum, 1999). 51-4 : Carol Skalni k Leff, National Conf7ict in Czechoslo vakia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 988), 243 ff. 11 Leff, 132-33. �SLOVAKIA 59 granted, and autonomy now became a matter of allocating more decision-making power to the Republics. The " hyphen delJate" in the sprin g of 1990 was a foreboding of the problems that lay ahead. It was Pres ide nt Vaclav Havel who inadvertently started it. In Janu ary of 1990, without prior consultations, he submitted a constitutional amendment to the federal Parliament, proposing to drop the word "Soc iali st" from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic . Much to hi s and many others' surpri se, thi s trigged a bitter di spute about whether the name of the Republic should be spelled with or without a hyphe n. The main alternatives were the "Czec ho-S lovak Republic ," favored by a majority of the Slovaks, and the "Czechoslovak Federal Republic ," favored by a majority of the Czechs. Stalemate in the federal Parliament at first resulted in the absurd dec ision to spe ll the word "Czechoslovak" in one word in the Czech Republic and with a hyphen in Slovakia. Thi s was presented as a concession to "S lovak grammar. " This deci sion caused demonstration s in Slovakia, after which the Parliament made a hasty retreat and settled for the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ." 12 Negotiations about a new Czechoslovak Constitution started after the elections in June of 1990, but soon ran into trouble. As before, the Czech political elite was generally in favor of more centralized solutions than the Slovaks. The difference was that the Czech majority , rea li zing that a unitary state was not an option , now favored a " function al federation," while the majority of the Slovak political elite increas ing ly leaned toward s confederal rather than federal so lutions. 13 A temporary settl e me nt was reached in the Competency Law 12 Milan Sutovec. Semi6za aka politikum alebo ·'pomlckova vojna." (Bra ti slava: Kalli gram , I 999). 299 ff. 13 Opinion polls cons istently showed th at th e public in the Czech Republic preferred a unitary state. with a federation as the second most popular option. while a confederation never exceeded 6 percent support. By con trast, a confedera ti on or a federation was th e preferred state form in Slovakia. See table 12.3. in Sharon L. Wolchik, ''The Politi cs of Transition and the Break-up of Czechos lovakia," in Jiff Musil. ed. , op.cit.. 235. �SLOVAKIA 60 of December 1990, whi c h more-or-less reestabli shed the co mpetency di vision of the 1968 Constitutio n. However, whil e thi s was abo ut as fa r as the Czechs we re w illing to go , the S lova ks looked at the Co mpete ncy Law merely as a po int of departure fo r further negoti ati ons. The core of the confli ct was the all ocati on of compe te nce and power in two specific areas: Eco nomi c po li cy a nd intern ati ona l re lations. The majority of the S lovak elite pressed fo r S lovak " visibility" in intern ati ona l rel ati ons, and wanted to all ocate more power in economi c matte rs to the Republics . The Czec h side wanted the federa l leve l to be stron g e nough to carry o ut the econo mi c reform s necessar y fo r th e tra ns iti o n to a market econo my, and wanted th e state internati onall y to speak with one vo ice . The negoti atio ns fa il ed to produce an acceptabl e co mpromi se befo re the 1992 elections, 14 and since the vic torious Czec h and Sl ovak parti es di sag reed fund ame nta ll y o n the iss ues of econo mic reform and state fo rm , they dec ided to di vide the state. It turn ed out th at both sides prefe rred a break-up rathe r than accepting the favo red state form of the othe r party, des pite the fac t that before the e lec ti ons, the future ex iste nce of Czec hos lovak ia was still ta ke n fo r granted . The onl y party th at advocated secess io n w as the Sl ova k Nationa l Party. 2. The Composition and Stability of the Elite Constellations In the inter- war peri od, the e lite conste ll atio ns fac in g eac h other were c lear-cut and quite stable. A clear majority of the Czec hos lovak parties was ce ntra li st a nd in fa vor of Czechoslo vaki sm. Thi s camp co mpri sed the e ntire Czech political e lite and a substanti al pa rt of the Slovak political e lite. Inte restingly, the major ce ntrali st pl ayers in the interw ar clashes about autonomy in the Parli ame nt were Slovak s, not Czec hs, a nd like th e ir adversaries, they were posin g as the c ha mpi ons of Slovak inte rests/the Slovak nati on. The two most influe nti al 14 T he negoti ators did reach a co mpromi se in the spring of 1992, but th is was turned down by th e pres idium of th e Slovak Nati onal Counci l. See Rychl fk , Roz pad. 2 18- 20. �SLOVAKIA 61 Slovak centrali sts were the Agrarian Mi Ian Hodza ( 1878- I 944) and the Social Democrat I van Derer ( 1884- 1973). They represented their parties in the Parli ament during the entire First Republi c and betwee n th em, the two men served as mini sters for 23 yea rs. Milan Hodza even became the first Slovak Prime Mini ster in 1935. Apart from these two, the A grarian Anton Stefanek ( I 877-1964) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Igor Hrusovsky ( 1872- 1937), both seasoned parli amentari ans, played an espec iall y acti ve role in th e debates. By co ntrast, two Slovak parti es represented th e autonomist ca mp. arguing that the Slovaks were a nation of their own and, therefore, entitl ed to autonomy. 15 The larges t autonomi st party was the Slovak Peopl e's Party . Its co-founder and chairman Andrej Hlinka ( 1864- 1938), whose name was added to the party's title in 1925, was a dominatin g fi gure in the stru gg le for Slovak autonomy until hi s death in August of 1938. 16 Ferdinand (Ferdi s) Juriga ( 1878-1950) had been the onl y Slovak deputy in th e Hungari an Parli ament of 19 14 and he continued to defend Slovak autonomy in the Parliament also of the First Republi c. Jozef Ti so ( 1887- 1947) played an important role in the 1930s, as did editor-in-chief of Slovak, Karol Sidor ( 1901 - 53). The Slovak Nati onal Party never had more than one deputy - its chairman M artin Razus ( 1888- 1937) - and pl ayed a more peripheral role. After the Velvet Revolution, elite constellations were more vo latile. The Slovak political elite was from the outset divided on the quest ion of state form, the preferred so lution s ranging from mildl y federa li st to a loose confederat ion. From 1991 the Slovak National Party started to advocate independence, but already in 1990 th e chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Jan Carnogursky, argued th at Slovakia should enter the European Community as an in- " In addition. some of th e national minority parties and the Communists su pported autonomy. but for other reasons. '" See Felak. Ac Che Price of Che Republic. 1994: A lena Bartl ova. A ndrej Hlinka. ( Bratislava: Obzor. 1991 ). �SLOVAKIA 62 de pende nt state. Hi s party was earl y in favo r of a confederal so luti on, but o nl y as a te mporary so luti on, until both Re publi cs joined the European Community. 17 Public Aga inst Vi o le nce was be ing pulled in o ppos ite direc ti o ns, and whe n the c irc le around Vl adimfr Mec ia r broke o ut and fo rmed the Moveme nt fo r a De mocrati c Slovaki a in 1991 , the liberal , federa li st oriented w in g re ma ined , whil e the national populi sts w ith confedera l lea nings fo ll owed Mec iar. In the 1992 e lecti on Mec iar' s Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a appeared as the main champion of Slovak interests. The Czec h politica l e lite was fro m the o utset more indiffe rent to the nati onal questi on. Wh ile Public Aga inst Vi o le nce had the nati onal questi o n as o ne of its top pri o riti es , it was co mpl ete ly absent fro m the agenda of C ivic Forum in the first e lecti o n. In stead , " bac k to Eu ro pe" and e limination of communi sm we re the top pri oriti es. 18 Espec iall y after the " ma nagers" aro und Vac lav Kl aus won over the di ss ide nt w in g of C ivic Forum in 199 1, the leadin g Czec h po liti ca l e lite united in favo r of a stro ng fe derati o n. In th e 1992 e lec ti o n Kl aus' C ivic De mocratic Party ca me o ut as the main c hampi on of a federa l so luti on. The Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a and the C ivi c De mocrati c Party won the e lecti ons in th e ir respective Re publics, whil e parti es th at took a more mode rate stand on the questi on of state fo rm lost. Once the victors w ith Vac lav Kl aus and Vl adimfr Mec iar at the he lm had dec ided to di vide the state, fo rmer ene mi es beca me alli es, and the e lite conste ll ati ons changed according ly. The fo rme r oppone nts in the negoti ati o ns on state fo rm now united in favo r of a break-up , aga inst a motl ey c rew of oppos ition parti es, co mpri sing Czec h and Slovak Communi st and Soc ial De mocrati c parties, as we ll as Miros lav Slade k 's ultra- nati ona li st Republican Party of C zec hoslo vaki a. 17 Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. 67 . 93-4. '~Oskar Krejci. Kniha o volbich. (Prag ue: Victori a Pu bli sh ing. 1994). 2 10- 11. �SLOVAKIA 63 3. The Arguments in Favor of Autonomy If we turn to the actual arg ume nts, the main impress ion is that there were e lements of continuity as well as c ha nge when we go from the interwar period to the post-Communist period. On the one hand, the argume nts in favor of autonomy were located within the sa me nat io nalist di sco urse in both periods . On the other hand , the composition of the arg uments in favor of autonomy changed, and so did the contents of the autonomy demands, as we have seen. In the interwar period, the principle of national se lf-determination was used as an arg ument in favor of an asymmetric federation; after 1989 it was first used as an argument in favor of confederal so lutions, and then in favor of an independent Slovak state. Arguments in Favor of Autonomy During the First Republic In the inter-war period , the cornerstone of the a utonomists was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation , and the core message was that this Slovak nation was entitl ed to auto nomy. The premi se linkin g national identity to the matter of state form was the principle of national se lf-determination, understood as the ri ght of cu ltu ra ll y distinct nation s to se lf-governance. 19 In the a utonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used thi s right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czec hs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state. Moreove r, as a free a nd equa l nation , the S lovaks were entit led to manage the ir own affairs and, therefore , to autonomo us political institutions. In practice, autonomy demands were always made on be half of Slovakia, yet for the a utonomists this amo unted to the same , s ince they regarded Slovakia as the homeland of the Slovaks, despite its substantial national minoriti es. 19 The principle of national self-determination can be interpreted in at least two other ways: as the right of the people to choose their government without coercion , i.e. popular sovereig nty - or as th e right of independent states to manage their affa irs without foreign intervention. See e.g. 0yvind 0sterud, Nasjonenes selvbestemmel- sesrett. (Oslo: Un iversitetsforlaget. 1984). 150 ff. �64 SLOVAKIA The Slovak a uto nomi sts argued a lon g three ma in lin es. First, they argued that Slovakia was discriminated aga in st in vario us ways, and that autono my was necessary to a ll eviate S lovakia's ill s. Second , they arg ued that Slovakia was entit led to auto no my by virtu e of various " co ntrac ts" (e.g. th e Pittsburgh Agreement). Finally, they argued that the Slovaks had the right to auto nom y s impl y because they were a natio n (the classical nation ali st arg umen t). The point of departure for the deprivation mguments was that the Slovaks were an indi vid ua l nati o n wit h separate nationa l interests, and that these national interests were not properly loo ked after under th e present centrali zed state form. Here S lovak grievances were turned into reasons for autonomy, and autonomy was the so lution to everythin g. Most of the gr ieva nce arguments for auton o my were associated with the use of Slovak as the offic ial lang uage in Slovakia and w ith (w hite-co llar) jobs fo r the Slovak inte lli gentsia. The sig na l words were " Slovak bread" . For in sta nce, before th e 1929 e lec ti on, the a utonomi st news paper Slovak argued that " a uto nomy does no t only mean political ri g hts, but a lso bread. When we get our own administration , our ow n asse mbly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be e mpl oyed there. [ ... ] The auton o mo us adm ini strati o n of the Slova k home land will compel the e mployers first a nd foremost to gran t the Slovaks work and bread." 20 Accord in g to the contract oriented lin e of arg um e nts , Slovakia had the right to autonomy by virtue of certai n (a ll eged ly) binding doc um e nts or "co ntracts". The point of departure was again that the Slovaks were an indi vidu a l and sovere ig n natio n, and th at S lovakia was the ho me la nd of the Slovaks. The argume nt was that Slovakia had been promised autono my, a nd th at thi s promise was lega ll y bindin g. However, fo r a co ntract to be va lid , it must be stipul ated th at the sig natori es had the right to s ig n agreements on behalf of those they were said to represent - in this case th e Czec h and Slovak nati o ns. 20 Slovak no. 240, 22 October I929. p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 65 Several of the many declarations and agreements that were formulated during World War I were used as arguments for (or against) autonomy . However, two documents stand out: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th , 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th , 1918. The former was a clear asset, while the latter soon became a liability (see next subsection). The Martin Declaration had been adopted at an as sembly of all Slovak political parties in Turciansky Svaty Martin. For the autonomists , the significance of the Martin Declaration was that through this act, the Slovaks had voluntarily joined the Czechs as equal s in one state, and they had therefore an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs. Moreover, as an equal nation which had entered the state voluntarily, the Slovaks had the right to autonomy. In effect, the autonomi sts gave the Martin declaration state-forming significance. This was also reflected in repeated attempts to turn October 30th into a national holiday. Compared to the other wartime declarations , however, the Pittsburgh Agreement had some obvious advantages. First and foremost , it had greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government, because Czechoslovakia's first president and co-founder Tomas G. Masaryk had signed it, along with Czech and Slovak emigre leaders in the United States. 2 1 Second, the Agreement contained the most important autonomy demands. From the moment the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, it was invoked in every single debate where autonomy was " M asaryk was not Pres ident at th e tim e, of course, but on the initi ati ve of th e Slov ak L eague he signed a calliographed version of the Ag ree ment on November 14th. 19 I 8, the very same day he was elected Pres ident of the Republic. Besides. on October 3 1st. 19 18, th e Czec hoslov ak Nation al Committee had declared as bindin g all ac ti ons by members of the pro visional government abroad (including M asaryk). It may be argued that if the decl arati on of the establi shment of th e Czechos lovak state was valid. then the authori zation of Masaryk 's ac ti ons was valid as we ll. In practice, th e va lidity of th e Pittsburgh Agreement was a political , not a lega l matter. For the tex t of the statement , see Benes (op. cit. . 1929). 490. See also M. M ark Stolarik (op. cit. , 1968), 49. �SLOVAKIA 66 mentioned. At first glance, this Agreement would seem to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, the usage varied. Early in the period, the autonomists would present the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta granting the Slovaks the right to autonomy. Later, it became more common to present it as a binding contract. The concept of a Magna Charta brings to mind a sovereign granting hi s subjects certain rights and privileges, and it was Masaryk who (implicitly) had this role. When the Pittsburgh Agreement was presented as a contract, the contracting partners were at first the Czech and Slovak nation s. However, especially after it became public knowledge in 1922 that President Masaryk had actually drafted it, he was increasingly presented as a contracting partner. This shift can also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the leg itimate representatives of their co-nationals at home. However, the third and most common use, especially in the 1930s, was the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" or as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation (not just a small faction, but of all Slovaks). The point of departure was that the Slovaks were an individual nation with a natural right to self-determination, and therefore to autonomy if it so wishes. This usage was associated with the third , classical nationalist line of argument, which rested on three premises: I. that the Slovaks were an individual nation ; 2. that nation s had the right to self-determination; and 3. that the Slovak autonomists represented the true will of the Slovak nation - which was autonomy. The second premise was often implicit, while a lot of effort was put into defending Slovak individuality and the right to speak on the Slovaks ' behalf. The autonomists employed two main strategies to substantiate their claim. One strategy was to argue from the majority, which meant resorting to "advanced math". Election results here came in handy. In a parliamentary debate in 1933, Jozef Tiso argued that as a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the �SLOVAKIA 67 Slovak nation. Upon subtracting the stipulated Czech and Magyar votes from the votes cast for the centralist parties in Slovakia, he ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the Slovak People ' s Party and the Slovak National Party put together. 22 A second strategy was personal attacks (argumentum ad homi- nem), which were often used to defend the existence of a Slovak nation as well as the claim for autonomy. The autonomists would then accuse Slovak deputies belonging to the Czechoslovak parties of being " renegades," " Phari sees," "sodomites" and "careerists ," and, therefore, not worthy of representing the Slovak nation. In his rather biblical language, the chairman of the Slovak People ' s Party, Andrej Hlinka, argued in 1927 that "S lovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago. " 23 Continuity and change after 1989 After 1989, the core message was still that the Slovaks were entitled to national se lf-determination "q ua nation," although the contents of this self-determination had changed from an asymmetric federation to confederate so lutions or even independence. The most important changes compared to the interwar period were, first , that there was no longer any need to defend the existence of an individual Slovak nation , since that was taken for granted, and second, a change in th e composition of the arguments. Deprivation arguments and contract oriented arguments were nearly absent, while classical nationalist arguments now dominated , and the principle of national se lf-determination was invoked more explicitly. 22 30 I. schuze poslanecke snemov ny N.S .R.C. dne 29 . li stopadu 1933. in Tesnopi- secke zpravy o scht1zfch poslanecke snemovny Narodnfho shromaidenf republiky ceskoslovenske. Ill. volebnf obdobf. (Prague. 1929- 35), 47- 50. 23 Hlinka, Slovak no. 86, 16 April , I 927 , p. I. "Sodomi tes•· referred to Social Demo- crats. as a play on wo rd s. �SLOVAKIA 68 There are, of co urse, some differe nces between the various debates, which is perha ps not surpri sin g, sin ce the topics of the debates a lso differed. The principle of nati ona l se lf-determi nati o n was most ex plicitly vo iced in the 1992 debates in the federa l parliament (th e two debates on the break- up of Czec hos lovak ia), a nd in the Slovak National Council (the de bates on the S lovak Declaration of Sovere ig nty and the Slovak Constitution ). Conve rse ly. thi s principle was more impli c it in the 1990 " hyphen debate". The " hyphe n debate" is perhaps the most atyp ica l, in terms of topic ("Czecho-Slo vak Republic" with a hyphen versus "Czechos lovak Federal Republic") as we ll as types of arg ume nt. First, thi s is rea ll y the o nl y debate where identity pl ayed any major part. Ide ntity arg uments appeared in two forms: On the one hand , it was arg ued that for the S lovaks, to spe ll the word Czecho-Slovak w ithout a hyphe n was tantamo unt to accepting the abe rrati o n of Czec hos lova ki sm. On the o ther hand , it was arg ued that th e hyphe n ex pressed Slovak nati o na l indi vidu a lity and the equa l standing of the Czech and Slovak nati o ns in the federati o n. Second, the hyphe n debate is the only debate where the Pittsburg h Agreement was me ntion ed more than o nce. However, of th e six speake rs referrin g to it, o ne appea led to the Agreement to substantiate the c laim for a hyph e n in the "Czecho-Slovak" Rep ubli c. (thi s is how the word was spelled in the orig ina l), while the rest bas ically referred to it as an express io n of the eq ual status of the two natio ns e ntering the state , or as a part of the hi storical narrative lead ing up to the federalization. Nobody referred to it as a contrac t, and the Czech National Socialist Bi anka Hykova even quoted Masaryk to the effect that it was o nl y a n agreement between American Czechs and Slovaks. 2-1 Contract oriented arguments thus disappeared a ltogeth er, and refere nces to the Pittsburg h Agreeme nt and/or the Martin Dec lara20 See Zprava o 26. spolecne sc hi'1zi snemovny lidu a snemovny narodu. 29.3. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky V. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1986-90), 25 1. 253 , 256, 270, 304. �SLOVAKIA 69 tion were rare. A utonomy was ex plicitly mentioned in the contex t of the Pittsburgh Ag reement onl y once, in the second debate abou t th e brea k-up of th e state. According to I va n Simko from the Chri stian Democratic Movement, Slovak organization s in the U nited States had made an agreement wi th Masaryk "as a leading personality of Czech po litica l li fe" to fo rm a shared state where Sl ovaki a was to have an autonomous position. Thi s agreement was unfortun ately not honored , he argued. 25 Depri vation arg uments were al so rare . The phrase " Slovak bread" occurred onl y once: In the first debate on the break -up of the state in September 1992, Michal Ko vac from the Mo ve ment for a Democratic Slovaki a ( later to beco me Slovaki a's first pres ident) argued that in a normally functioning federation , it wo uld not be possible for the standard of li ving in Slovaki a to drop as much as it had in onl y two yea rs. In another four years , he argued, " Would we not be in the hi storica l situation w here we have already been, that the Slovak nation would have to go abroad for bread, because there would not be bread for people in Slovakia? And we wou ld be as weakened as we once were under dear father Masaryk." 26 However, in the interw ar period " Slovak bread" was usuall y tantamount to w hite-collar jobs for the yo ung Slovak intelli gentsia in Slovaki a, whi le here th e lack of " bread " obvious ly refers to general unemployment. The probl em was real enough - in the earl y 1990s the unemployment ra te in Slovak ia was three or four times the Czech average. 27 25 Zprava o 5. spo lecne schu zi snemovny lidu a snemo vny narodu. 18.11 . 1992 . 25 .1 1.1 992. in Federi ln f shromiidenf Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V il. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 7 17. 2 '' Zprava o 4. spo lec ne sc huzi snemo vny lidu a snemov ny narodu 29.9. 1992. in Fe- denilni shro m;ii deni Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V II. vo lebnf obdobf, ( 1992). 60 I. 27 11. 8 percent in Slovaki a vers us 4. 1 percent in the Czec h Republic in 199 1: 10.3 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992. Transition reporc I 996. (L ondon. The European Bank fo r Reconstructi on and Deve lopment. I 996). However. th e difference was even larger in 1993. the first yea r of independence. �SLOVAKIA 70 Finall y, compared to the interwar period , classica l nationalist ar g uments were much more co mmon , and the principle of nation al self-determination was invoked more ex plicitly. In the debate about the allocation of competence between the Republics and the Federation it was used as an argument in favor of returnin g to the original 1968 Constitution. 28 Y et, the most co mmon use of th e principle of national self-determination was as an argument in favor of establi shing an independent Slovak state or dividin g Czechoslovakia. There are, however, some interestin g nation al differences between actors in how they used it. Slovak deputies speaking in favor of Slovak independence invoked the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Slovak nation . They regarded it as an inalienable, natural ri ght, and in one instance, even as a God-given ri ght. 29 An independent Slovak state was presented as the fulfillment of IO00 years of strugg le for Slovak individuality and sovereignty , and as the result of a natural , hi storical process of national emancipation . In the words of HZDS deputy chairman Au gustfn Marian Huska , " the Constitution is the fulfillm ent and lega l enac tment of th e ri ght to se lf-determination . ( ... )To the Slovak s, whose consciousness was molded by more than a thou sand years under foreign rule , the feeling of dependence had become second nature. Slowly, but persistently they formed an awareness of the need for self-determination , the need to search for, find , 28 Zprava o 9. spolecne schi°1zi snemovny lidu a snernovn y narodu. 11 .- 12. 12. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf CSFR. ( 1990-1992) . < ww,~ .p,p.c:dckni h/ I 990fs/sbn/-stcn -prot/009,c: hu t./s009077. html/ d> [2 Febru ary, 2004]. See also the debate on th e Slovak declaration of so vereignty. Stenograficka sprava o 3. sch6dzi Slovenskej narodnej rndy konanej 17. j ul a 1992. < www .nr,r.sk/i ndexarch.a,p> ]4 Febru ary. 2004 J. 29 Sedovic (S lovak National Part y), Zprava o 5. spol ec ne schu zi SL a SN , 18. 11 . 1992. in Federalnf shro,mii denf Ceske a Slovenske Federati vnf republiky. VII. volebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 788. �71 SLOVAKIA ex press. a nd at las t rea li ze sovere ig nty." 30 S lova ki a was in o th e r word s pi ctured as a nati on-state a nd the S lova ks as the state-forming nati o n. Howeve r, in the de bates in the Sl ovak Nation a l Counc il , Slovak deputi es, inc ludin g Prime Mini ster Vl adim fr Mec iar, at the same tim e pro mi sed to res pec t the eq ua l rig hts of a ll c iti ze ns, nati o na l minorities and ethni c groups. De puti es re presentin g th e Magyar mino rity in the S lovak Nationa l Counc il recog ni zed o r eve n s uppo rted the S lovak ri g ht to selfde te rmin ati o n, but argued that the princ ipl e sho uld a lso appl y to the nati o na l mino riti es. Thi s was a n arg ume nt in favo r of auto no my. At the same time, Magyar deputi es arg ued th at S lovaki a sho uld not be presented as a nati o n- state in the Co nstituti o n, bec au se it was not nation all y ho moge neous. Founding the state o n the nati o na l princ ipl e meant turnin g the minoriti es into second-c lass c iti zens, they argued . Czec h de puti es co nsiste ntly presented the break-up of Czec hoslovaki a as a matte r of se lf- determinati o n fo r the Slovak nati o n. The 1992 e lecti o n. the Slovak Dec larati o n of Sovere ig nty, and the Slovak Constituti o n were take n as proof th at the S lovak natio n did wa nt inde pende nce. In the words of Prime Mini ste r Vacl av Kl aus of the Czec h Re publi c: "The S lova k nati o n used the o ppo rtunity to co mpl e te its nati o na l e manc ipati o n by fo undin g its own state. Thi s is a rea lity we mu st res pect. " 3 1 T he arg ume nt th at the Czec hs had no ri ght to deny th e S lovak natio n its rig ht to se lf-de termin ati o n was a lso used aga in st ho ld in g a referend um in the Czech Republi c; Czec h c itizens could no t dec ide whet her the S lovaks sho uld beco me a statefo rming natio n o r no t. Interestin g ly, the princi pl e of nati o na l se lf-determin ati o n was not even o nce in voked o n be ha lf of the Czec h na- -'" For Huska ·s statement and the debate on the Const itut ion. see Stenograficka sprava o 5. sch6dzi S lovenskej mirodnej rady kona nej 31. augusta a I . septembra 1992. <www.nr,r. ., k/indexarch.a,p> 14 February . 20041. -' 1 K laus in th e debate on th e Czech Constitution . Ceskii narodnf rada I 992- 1992. Stenoprotokoly. I 0. schuze. 16.- 17. 12. 1992. <www.psp.cz/cknih/ I 992cnr/,tenprot/O I 0schuzi> 13 February. 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 72 tion .32 The reason is obvious: The Czechs did not regard the establi shme nt of the Czec h Republic as a state-formin g process, but as a restoration of Czech statehood , which expl icitly included Czechoslovak state tradition s. But the n the Czechs a lways rega rded Czechoslovakia as their state. Apart from the princ ipl e of national se lf-determination , the main lin e of argument in favor of di ssolution may be termed reali st. It was argued that the federation did not work or that it was a lread y dead, that it was too late to save the state, and now the important thing was to e nd the state in a peaceful , orderly, cultivated , adult and leg itimate fashion , and to ensure good ne ighborl y relation s be twee n the future inde pe nde nt states. 4. The Centralist Arguments Against Autonomy If we turn to the centra li st side, di sco ntinuity 1s th e word that first co mes to mind. In the inte rwar period , the centrali st arg ume nts against a utonomy were located within a nation a li st di sco urse, and mirrored the autonomist arguments to a large ex tent , the difference be ing th at the centralists based the ir arg uments on an a lte rn ative national id eo logy - Czec hos lovakism . After 1989 , the "ce ntra li st" arg um e nts changed profoundly . Czechos lov akism had been abandoned already in 1945 , and the unitary state form in 1968. The "centrali sts" afte r 1989 were , the refore, centra li sts on ly re lative to those advocating confederate so luti ons, a nd in the las t instance, inde pe ndence for Slovakia. " The principle of national se l f-de term ination was invoked on behalf of the .. Moravian nati on" ( 1.5 million . accord ing to the 199 1 census). but then as an argument in favor of Moravi an autonomy in a Czecho-Morav ian federation . See espec ially the speec hes of deputies Jan Jeg la and Jiff Bfl y (both from the Moravi an movement H SD-SMS) . Ceska narodnf rada 1992- 1992 . Stenoprotokoly. 10. sc huze , 16.17. 12. 1992. < www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1992<.:nr/~tenprot/0 I 0schuz/> 13 Febru ary , 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 73 Centralist Arguments during the First Republic ln the inter-war period, the co rnerstone of the ce ntra li st argumentati on was that the Czechs and Slovak s were one Czechoslovak nati on (a lbe it w ith two tri bes), and the core message was th at a ce ntra li zed state form was necessary to preserve nati onal unity and th e integrity of th e state. T he premi se linking nati onal identity to state fo rm was the principl e of nati onal se l f-determin ati on. According to the centrali sts, the Czechos lovak nati on had used its ri ght to self-determ ination to re uni te in a Czechos lovak nati on-state, and thi s unity had to be preserved.·13 A uto nomy for Slovak ia was seen as a th reat to Czechos lovak nationa l unity as we ll as state in tegrity , first because it wo uld dri ve th e two tribes of the Czechos lovak nati on apart, and second , beca use granting Slovaki a autonomy wo ul d be tantamoun t to recogni zing th e Slovak s as a separate nati on, w hich would j eopardi ze the state's ra ison d'etre. Th e centra lists co untered the depri vati on arguments of the autonomi sts in two ways . On the one hand, they denied that the Slovak s were d iscrimin ated agai nst, and on the other hand , they rejec ted autonomy as a suitabl e remedy to Slovaki a's alleged ill s. What was needed to help Slovak ia was not autonomy, but more unity, especiall y economica ll y, the ce ntra li sts argued. Thi s was entirely in line w ith thei r overall "strength th ro ugh unity" message. However, their main artill ery was aimed at the contract-oriented arguments, and espec iall y the Pi tts burgh Agreement. T he main ar guments were: I . T he A meri ca n Czechs and Slovaks were not leg itimate represe ntati ves of th eir co-n ati onals at home, and had no ri ght to dec ide on their behal f; 2. The Pittsburg h Agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain hi stori ca l va lue; but in order to be va lid, it wo uld need the co nse nt of Czechs and Slovak s at home; and 3. Leg itimate Slovak represe ntati ves had conse nted to Czec hos lovak ·'-' There was no big difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovak cen tralists in terms of the co ntents of national identity. In both cases . national identi ty was defined in terms of culture. language and ancestry. See Bakke (op.c it. , 1999). especia ll y Chapter I 0. fo r documentati on. �SLOVAKIA 74 national and state unity in the Constitu ti on of 1920, as we ll as at assem bli es before and after Pittsburg h. The first arg ume nt was especia ll y damag in g, since it went to the core of a ll the auto no mi st argument s assoc iated w ith the Pittsburg h Agreement , in va lid atin g the Agreement as a Magna C harta, as a binding contract, a nd as an express io n of the will of the Slovak natio n. It was more difficult for the ce ntra li sts to de nou nce the leg iti macy of Masaryk as a represe ntati ve of the Czec hos lovak state, but the Pres ident did his best to free him se lf and the government of any obligation. Masaryk c la imed that he had sig ned the Pittsburg h Agreement in order to "appease a sma ll Slovak fact io n that dreamed of God know s what sort of independence for Slovakia ," and di smi ssed it as "a loca l pac t between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." 34 There is littl e doubt that Masaryk drafted the Agreement in order to ap pease a part of the Slovak League, but o ne may wo nder why this was important to him if he rega rded the m mere ly as American citizens. I think Mark Stol arik has a va lid point when he arg ues that th e American Slovaks he lped legiti mi ze th e creation of Czechoslovakia in the abse nce of a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary (caused by war censorship).·15 Masaryk a lso tried , un successfu ll y, to di sc redit the Pittsburg h Agreement through quasi- lega li sti c arguments. In a le tte r to Andrej Hlinka on October 12th, 1929, Masaryk c laimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was "a forge ry," because at the time, the em ig re organization of the Slovaks present in Pitts burgh , "the [Slovak l Leag ue lega ll y did no t ex ist, and it was recognized by th e Government o nl y in 191 9." Hlinka evide ntl y wrote the Slovak Leag ue , w hi ch retorted th at the re was " no doubt a bout th e a uthe nti c ity of th e Pittsburg h Agreement," and A merica n lega l experts confirmed th at there was no " Tomas G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce. (Prague: Orbis a Ci n. 1925). 262-263. 35 M . Mark Stolarik (op.c it.. 1968). 54. �SLOVAKIA 75 difference between chartered a nd unc hartered orga ni zatio ns w ith respect to entering such ag ree me nts. 36 T o prop up the claim that leg itim ate Slovak representatives had co nsented to Czec hos lovak nat io na l and state unity after Pitts burg h, the ce ntrali sts preferred to use the Martin Dec lara ti o n of October 30th , 19 18, since thi s Dec laration had been unanimou sly accepted at a n asse mbl y of a ll Slovak po liti ca l part ies. In the beg innin g, they also used the 1920 Constitution for th e same purpose, but the trouble was th at th e Slovak Club in the Constitutional Assembly was coo pted , and arguably not representative of Slovak opinion. The ma in reason why the Martin Dec larati on was s uc h a n asset for the centrali sts, was the sente nce statin g th at the "S lovak nati o n is lingui sti ca ll y as we ll as culturally-historically pa rt of th e unitary Czec ho-Sl ovak nation ." Moreover, the asse mbl y at M artin had demanded nat io na l se lf-dete rmin ation on behalf of this "Czecho-S lovak nat io n," w hil e at the sa me time it was s il e nt on auton omy. The ce ntrali sts thu s used it as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity, and as proof of the will of the Slovaks to e nter s uc h a unity. (Rumor in Slovakia had it th at the passage o n Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was , however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samue l Zoch, who had dra fted it).:17 Finally , the centrali sts counte red the c lass ic a l nati o na li st arg ume nt by rejecting the first premi se, that the Slovaks were an indi vidual nation, a nd the third premise. that the autonomi sts represented the tru e w ill of the Slovak nati o n. They presented the Slovaks as a tribe of th e Czechoslovak nati o n, and the Slovak me mbe rs o f the ce nt ral ist parties as the leg itim ate Slovak rep rese ntat ives. At the sa me time, they accepted the seco nd premi se, th at nati o ns had th e -' 6 The letter is pub lished as Document No. 30 in Joseph A. Mikus. Slova kia. A Poli- tica l and Constitutional Histo1y . (Brati slava: SAP. I 995) 209-2 10. The answer of th e Slovak League was published in Slo vak no. 194. 27 August. 1930. p. I. See also M. Mark Stolarik (op. cit.. 1968). 48-49. 52. -' 7 V ac lav Chaloupecky: Martinshi deklilrace 19- 20. II jejf politicke osudy (Prague. I 928). �SLOVAKIA 76 right to sel f-determin ati on, but as we have seen, th ey in vo ked thi s prin ciple on behalf of th e Czec hos lovak nati on. A n I va n Derer specialty was the argument th at i f the Slovak s had been an indi vidual nati on, then they w ould have th e ri ght to secess ion, not onl y to autonomy. 38 B oth sides had their share of argumentati on errors. T he ce ntrali sts argued from maj ority (a rg umentum ad populum ) in the earl y 1920s, w hen they recei ved the maj ority of the Slovak votes, and personal attacks (arg umentum ad hominem) were ac tu all y mos t co mmon on th e centrali st side. probabl y because they fi tted so we ll into their genera l strength-th ro ugh-unity argument. T he Slovak autonomi sts were accused of being " M agyarones" or " new Slovaks," thereby impl y ing th at they had other loya lties or identities,'9 and of being paid by the Hungari an government. In both cases, the M agyars had the ro le of ·'bogeyman" . T hi s M agyarone ca rd was used to expl ain w hy the Slovaks had turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present , and to co unter th e autonomi st c laim th at they we re the so le leg itimate representati ves of the Slovak nati on. I f the ce ntra li sts believed th at Sl ovak autonomy would j eopardi ze Czechos lovak nati onal unity and th e integrit y of th e state, it w as quite log ica l to acc use th e autonomi sts of being renegades (though probabl y not very smart). Profound Changes after 1989 After 1989 there was not much left of the former ce ntra list arguments, which is not surpri sing considering that Czec hos lovaki srn had 18 • I van Derer. Ceskos/ovensk;i otizkil. (Prague : Orbis. 1935). 88- 90. 39 Both labels we re commonly used about people of Slovak origi n who had become more or less ass imil ated during Hungari an rul e. but who turned back after 19 18. There we re some known M agyarones among the autonomists (chiefl y Franti sek Jehlicka and Yoj tech/ Bela Tuka). but the lead ing figures (Hlin ka. Juri ga) had defended Slovak interests also under Hungary. T he total number of people who ac tu ally switched nati onal affi l iatio n from Magyar to Slovak i n the firs t ten years of Czec hos lovaki a cannot be ascertained prec ise ly, but an educated guess is th at it was betwee n 250.000 and half a million. See Bak ke (op.cit. . 1999). 305- 307. �SLOVAKIA 77 been abandoned and a unitary state form was no longer an option. Th e "centralists" still accepted the principle of nati onal self- determinati on; however, they now recogni zed the Czec hs and Slovaks as equal , state-forming nation s and Czechoslovakia as a Czech and Slova k nati on-state. As long as state form was sti 11 on the agenda, the players on the "centrali st" side were mostly Czechs, and the task was to defend a " function al federation ," which meant to preserve the powers of the federation v is-a-vi s the Republics. Once the break-up of the state appeared on the agenda after the 1992 electi ons, however , th e "centra li st" pl ayers were Czech and Slovak opposition parti es and the task was now to preserve a common Czechoslovak state. In the hy ph en debate, as we ll as in the co mpetenc y debate, Czech deputi es explicitly presented th e federal state form as an express ion of the equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. The main Czech arguments against th e hy phen were that it was divi sive, and that it was unacceptable to the Czech publi c. This probabl y had something to do with the fact that the Second Czecho-Slovak Republi c ( 1938-- 39) was spelled with a hyphen. It was also argued that it was grammati ca ll y probl emati c, th at the original spelling had been without a hyphen (an hi stori ca l argument), and th at the Morav ians would feel offended (an identity argument). The main arguments in favor of a strong federation were that it was necessary in order to carry out the economic reform s and to fulfill Czechos lovakia 's internati onal obligati ons. For the Czech elite, the power and competency of the Czech Republic was irrelevant. In fact, I have onl y found one example of a Czec h deputy in vok ing nat ional interests, and he arg ued th at a confederate solution would be contrary to Czech interests.-lO The Czech and Slovak opposition parties that defended Czec hoslovaki a's ex istence in the debates in the fall of 1992 were mostly Socialists and Communists, but also included the ultra-nati onali st ' 0 M andl er (Libera l Democra ti c Part y). Zprava o 9. spol ecne schuzi SL a S . 11.- 12.1 2. 1990, in Fedenilnf shromaf.difof Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky V I . vo lebnf obdobf ( 1990), <www.psp.c z/ci,.nih/ 19901\h,bnf!.,tcnprot/009,c:hud ,009()77. htrn ll d> [4 February 2004 1. �78 SLOVAKIA Republican s. Even thoug h this opposition accepted th e principle of national se lf-determination , they mostly interpreted it in the origina l meanin g - as popular sovereignty . The totally dominating line of argument was that the only leg itimate way of dividin g Czechoslovakia according to the principle of se lf-determination was to let the citizens decide by popular vote, a nd that it was unacceptable to divide the state against the will of the peopl e. In the first debate on dissolution , thi s was supported by a hi storical a nalogy. By accident, the debate was held 54 years after the fateful Munich agreement, and the opposition argued that a new Munich was about to happen: Again the fate of the Czechoslovak state wou ld be dec ided without asking the peop le. In the first debate the oppos ition parties advocated a refere ndum before the decision was made; in the second debate a ratifying pl ebisc ite. The motive was obvious ly to save the state, since all opin ion poll s showed that a clear majority was in favor. However, very few deputies ac tually defended the me rits of Czechoslovakia, although a handful of Czechs professed their love for the shared homeland , or invoked the legacy of the founding fathers , mostly T.G. Masary k and Milan Rasti slav Stefanik. Finally, a weak echo of the inte rwar debate could be heard in claims that separation would be a threat to the future existence of the Czech and Slovak nation s (reminiscent of the strength-through-unity argument), and in charges of treason (personal attac ks). Ne ither line of argument was very common. The claim that voting in favor of disso luti on was an act of treason was a preserve of the ultra-nationalist Republican Party of Czec hos lovakia. The debates a lso had their amusing sides, for in stance in the use of metaphors. The federation was alternately see n as a leaking ship, a train being pulled in opposite directions , and an old patient with a severe heart condit ion , whi le the establishment of the new states was compared to giving birth to twins! �SLOVAKIA 79 5. Summary and Conclusion [n the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was a unitary , centralized state, and autonomy was a matter of separate Slovak institutions. After 1989, Czechoslovakia was a sy mm etric federation of two nationa l Republic s. Separate Slovak inst itutions were, therefore, no longer an iss ue, and autonomy became a matter of allocating more deci s ion-makin g power to the Republic s. However, in both cases, there was a conflict over state form, and in both cases the content of that conflict was how centralized the state should be. As for the actors , the e lite constellations were most stable in the inte rw ar pe riod . However, as lon g as the conflict was about state form, the Czech political elite was in favor of the most centralized so lution , while the Slovak elite was divided . Once the break-up of Czechoslovakia was on the agenda, the re were Czech and Slovak parties on both si des. If we focus on the main arguments on either side, we can obse rve continuity as well as change. Durin g the First Republic , the arguments of both sides were located within a nationali st discourse, but they founded their argume ntation on alternative nation al ideologies. The centralists invoked the principle of national se lf-dete rmination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation", the autonomists on behalf of the Slovak nation . After the Velvet Revolution , the autonomist argume nts were still located within a nationali st di scourse, and when the victorious part ies in the 1992 elections dec ided to divide the state, the Czech si de simply adopted the Slovak arg uments. By contrast, the "centrali st" arguments in the debate on state form were mainly economic, while the arguments in the debate on the break-up of Czechoslovakia were procedural. The most strik in g feature of the autonomy di sco urse after 1989 is therefore the asy mmetry of the arguments on both sides. Let us now address th e question of how the arguments related to the principle of national se lf-determination : On the autonomist side, the core message was the sa me in both periods; that the Slovaks were e ntitl ed to autonomy or se lf-determination "qu a nation ." Howeve r, �80 SLOVAKIA the principle of natio na l se lf-d etermin a ti o n was in voked more ex plicitl y after the Velvet Revo lution . On the centra li st side, the principle was used as an argument against a utono my in the interwar period , and w ith a certain twist, against the break-up of Czechos lovakia in 1992 . In the latter case, se lf-de te rmin ation was understood as popul ar sovere ignty - i.e . as a democratic principle. It is also inte res tin g that after 1989, the principl e of nation a l se lfdetermination was consistently invoked on behalf of the Slovaks, not on behalf of the Czechs, other than in the context of Czechoslovakia as the nation- state of two individual , sovere ign nations. In conclusion , the continuity was strongest on the autonomist side , alth ough th e conte nts of nation al se lf-determination c hanged from autonom y to independence. On the "centrali st" side, most of the a mmunition aga inst Slovak autonomy was gone once the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was abandoned. � 52 SLOVAKIA The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution 1 E li sabeth Bakke " We approve the political progra m, w hi ch e ndeavors to unite the Czec hs a nd Slovaks in[to] an indepe nd e nt state of the Czech la nd s and Slovakia. Slovakia sha ll ha ve its own ad mini strati o n, its ow n parli ament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the officia l language in the sc hoo l[s], in office[sl and in public li fe in genera l. The Czecho-Slovak state sha ll be a republic , its constitution sha ll be democratic. [ ...] The detail ed reg ulati o ns for the estab lishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the li berated Czechs and Slovaks and the ir lega l representati ves." The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918 2 ' An earli er version of thi s art icle was presented at the 34th National Conven ti on of the AAASS in Pittsburgh. 2 1- 24 November. 2002. 2 Thi s Agreeme nt was signed by the Slovak League of America . th e Czech National A lli ance. th e Al li ance of Czec h Ca th oli cs. representing Czech and Slovak emigrc organi zations in the USA. and T omas G. M asaryk. President of the Czechos lovak ati ona l Council in Pari s. I have quoted th e Engli sh version from The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (Chicago: Th e Slova k Cath ol ic Federati on of America. 1934). 27. The Slovak ori gin al is reprinted in Edvard Benes. Svetov,i valka a nase revoluce. Vol. Ill (Dokumenty). (Prague: C in-Orbis . 1929) . 365. See also M. Mark Stolarik. 'The Role of Amer ican Slova ks in th e C rea tion of Czecho-S lovak ia. 19 14- 19 18"'. �SLOVAKIA 53 Slovak autonomy was on the agenda throughout Czechoslovakia 's 74 years of existence, from the beginning to the bitter end. Although it may be argued that inexperienced politicians, short deadlines , rigid constitutional amendment procedures and conflicting economic priorities also played a role in the breakup, the long-term conflict that drove Czechoslovakia apart were the closely-related matters of political autonomy and recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation. 3 What was at stake was not only the institutional set-up and division of power; for the Slovaks, separate political institutions were also important symbols of national individuality and ownership to the shared Czecho-Slovak state. The roots of the conflict go back to the founding of Czechoslovakia in October of 19 I 8. The Czechs and Slovaks had no prior shared statehood tradition s (save perhaps Great Moravia in the ninth century), and independence was not even on the agenda before World War I. Starting in 1915, the independence movement abroad, with Tomas G. Masaryk at the helm, tried to convince the Allies that a Czechoslovak Republic should be established, invoking the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation. " In the First Czechoslovak Republic the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation (albeit with two tribes) became official state ideology , and it went hand-in-hand with political centralism. 4 Slovak Studies VIII (Rome, 1968) for a very interesting acco unt of the circumsta nces that led to its signin g and the subseq uent course of even ts in th e new lyfounded Repub lic. 3 For a discussion of the breakup see Eric Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure. Negotiated Breakup (A nn Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jirf Musil , ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995 ); Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska . Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989- 1992 (Bratis lava : AEP, 2002); Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics. Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 4 For details see Elisabeth Bakke, Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 19/9- 1938 (Oslo: Series of Dissertations submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Un iversity of Oslo, no. 11 /1999). �SLOVAKIA 54 Howeve r, a sub sta nti al pa rt of th e Sl ova k po liti ca l e lite opposed both , de ma ndir.g recog nition of the Slovak nati on and autonomy fo r Slovaki a. The Pittsburgh Agreeme nt became important both beca use it defin ed the contents of Slovak a utonomy and because Masaryk had signed it. Afte r World War II , Czec hos lovaki sm was abandoned, but poli ti ca l centra li sm was not, and th e federali zati on of Czech os lov aki a aft er the Sov iet in vas ion in 1968 did not give Slovak po liti ca l insti tution s any rea l dec ision-m aking power. Afte r the Ve lvet Revo lution in 1989, political autonomy for Slovaki a reappeared on the agenda, and became a major iss ue in the di spute over C zechos lovaki a's new constitution . The main purpose of the present article is to co mpare the autonomy de bates durin g the First Republic and after the Ve lve t Re volu ti o n, in orde r to establi sh continuity and change. The research ques ti o ns are: I . How were the de mands fo r autonomy substa nti ated, and what were the main argume nts aga inst it? 2. Wh at role did the princ ipl e of nation al se lf-de te rmin ati on pl ay in the debates in the two peri ods? The First Re public was a unitary state , and autonom y as such was ne ver on the age nda of the Parliame nt in the interwar pe ri od. Of th e three a utonom y proposa ls th at made it to th e Parli a me nt, two were bl oc ked in committees, whil e the third was adopted without any de bate after th e fa teful Muni c h agree me nt in 1938. My analys is of the inte rwar di sco urse is th e refore based o n a se lec ti o n of govern me nt in a ugurati on de bates and budgetary debates, as we ll as c lippings from Slovak, the main autono mi st ne wspaper. 5 After 1989 seve ral de bates were re levant to the autono my di scourse: In the Federal Parliament I have analyzed the 1990 " hyphen de bate," the de bate on the compete ncy law , a nd the two de bates about the break-up of Czechos lovaki a in the fa ll of 1992. In the res- ' T he analys is of the debate in the interwar period is a condensed version of a part of Chapter 13 of my PhD di ssertat ion. For detai ls see Bakke (ibid. 1999). �SLOVAKIA 55 pec ti ve Czech and Sl ovak Nati onal Council s (Republi c Asse mblies), I have analyzed the 1992 debates on the Sl ovak D ecl aration of Sovereignty, the Slovak Con stitution, and the Czech Constituti on. I will structure the arti cle around the foll owin g three points: I . Th e in stituti onal set-up and th e contents of the autonomy demands. 2. The co mpos iti on and stability of the elite constellations on either side of the conflict. 3. The main arg uments a) in favor of autonomy and b) against autonomy. wi th spec ial emphas is on how they relate to the principle of nati onal sel f-determinati on. 1. The Institutional Set-up and the Contents of the Autonomy Demandi Czec hos lovakia was from the outset presented as the nati on-state of the Czechos lovak nation. 6 Thi s was codified in the 1920 Constituti on, which al so gave the First Czechos lovak Republic a unitary, centrali zed state form and a bi ca meral leg islature. Czec hos lovaki a was at first di vided into 22 co unties, but the county sys tem was implemented onl y in Sl ovaki a and fro m 1928 , four prov inces repl aced the counties (see tabl e I ). In the interw ar peri od, the demands for autonomy were defined in term s of separate Sl ovak instituti ons with dec ision-making powers in matters of vital importance for th e Slovaks as a nati on. The core demands were that Sl ovaki a should have " its own admini strati on, its own parli ament and its ow n co urts," cf. the Pittsburgh Ag reement. M ost of the autonomy proposa ls also included a separate Sl ovak government, but none of the three autonomy proposals that made it into the Parli ament went beyond an asymmetric federati on.7 " In reality. th e Czec hs and Slovaks togeth er comprised 65.5 percent of the populati on. Germans 23.4 percent. Magyars 5.6 percent. Ruthenians 3.5 percen t. Jews 1.4 perce nt. and Po les 0.6 percen t in the 1921 cens us. See Scftanr lidu v repub lice ceskosloven.~ke ze dne 15. unora I 921. Dfl I. (Prague: Statnf ufad statistick y. I 924 ). 7 See Bakke (ibid .. 1999). 465- 77 for a more detailed overv iew of the autonomy proposa ls. See also James Ramon Fe lak. '·A t the Price of the Republic ··. Hlinka ·s �SLOVAKIA 56 The 1938 Constitutional a me ndm ent that inaugurated the shortli ved Second Republi c was based on the third a utonomy proposal of the Slovak People 's Party, which had been submitted in August 1938. The Second Re public co mbined a federa l state form with separate Slovak institutions : a leg islat ive asse mbl y (D iet), a se parate administration and separate co urts. The Slovak gove rnme nt was acco untabl e to the Die t, and received exec uti ve power in all matters under its juri sdi ction , as we ll as many matters unde r central jurisdiction. Slovak became the officia l lang uage in S lovakia, and separate c iti zenship was introduced. After World War II , the Czechos lovak govern me nt recognized the S lovaks as a separate nati on a nd the Slovak National Co un ci l (w hi c h de fac to controlled the liberated parts of Slovakia) as its representative. An exec utive Board of Commissioners was also establi shed. However, through the three Prague agreements and the two first postwar constituti ons, Slovak institution s were gradua ll y stripped of their power and co mpete nce, and Czechoslovakia return ed to a centrali st, unitary state fo rm , with a unicamera l leg is lature. 8 Part of the reaso n for the c la mpdow n o n the Slovak organs was the victory of the De mocratic Party in the 1946 e lectio ns, w hi c h convinced the Communists th at Slovakia could not be tru sted. 9 Slovak People ·s Party. 1929-J 938 (Pi tt sburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, I 994). especially pp. 30, 80- 1, 19 1- 92. ij The 1960 Constitution aboli shed the Board of Commissioners. See Program prve dom;Jcf v/ady repub liky vlady narodnf fronty Cechu a Slovaku, (Prag ue: Mini sterstvo l nformacf. 1945). I 6-17: Jaros lav Chovanec & Peter Mozolfk, Historicke a statopravne korene sa mostatn ost i slovenskej republiky , (Yydavatel's tvo Procom , Brati slava, 1994), 38, 11 4- 122; Michal Barn ovsky. " Tri prazske dohody", in Cesko- slovenske vztahy - Slovensko-ceske vzthhy (Liberec: Technick a Un i verzi ta, 1998). 119 ff.: Elisabeth Bakke, "The Principle of National Self-de termination in Czechoslovak Consti tuti ons 1920- 1992" . CEPSR. no. I O (2002), 173- 98 . 9 The Democratic Party received 62 .0 percent of th e votes in Slovakia. See Michal Barnovsky & Edita l vanickova, eds, Prve povojnove volby v strednej a j uhovychod- nej Eur6pe (Bratislava: VEDA, 1998). 2 15- 18. �57 SLOVAKIA Table 1: State Form, Administrative Structure and Institutional Set-up in Czechoslovak Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments Year 1920 State-forming State form Administrative nation Czechoslovak Un itary 22 co unties : Centra lized, from 1928 four bicameral legislature nation Institutional set-up structure provinces 1938 Czech and Federal Slovak nations 1948 Czech and Unitary Slovak nations Four provi nces : Asymmetric: Bohem ia. M ora- bicamera l via, Slovak ia. & separate Slovak Sub-Carpathian instituti ons with Ruthenia extensi ve powers Two prov inces , Asy mmetric; The Czech lands unicamera l & separate and Slovak ia Slovak inst itutions with lim ited powers 1960 Czech and Uni ta ry Slovak nati ons Two prov inces, Asymme tric: unicame- the Czech lands ra l & separate Slovak and Slovak ia institut ions with more l imited powers 1968 Czech and Federal Slovak nations Two repub lics, Symmetric: bicameral, T he Czech Re- federa l & separate publ ic and the Czech and Slovak Slovak Republ ic institut ions Source: A ll cons titutions can be found in Sbfrka zakonii a naHzenf stalU ceskoslovenskeho. During the Prag ue Spring of 1968, the questi on of Slovak autonomy reappeared on the agenda. The initi ati ve to amend the constituti on ca me from the Slovak Nati onal Council , and thi s time a sy mmetri c so luti on was pro posed, sy mboli zing the equality of the two state-forming nati ons. 10 Accordin g to the 1968 Constitution, Czecho- ' 0 T he process towards federa li za ti on is doc umented in Jozef Za tk uli ak, Fede- ra lizacia Ceskoslovenskeho Staw 1968- 1970. Vznik Cesko-sl ovenskej fede racie �SLOVAKIA 58 slovakia became a federation of two republics, the Czech and th e Slovak Republic s, each with their ow n assemblies (National Councils), and their own govern ments. The bicameral federal legis lature consisted of the proporti onall y elected Chamber of the Peop le, and the Chamber of Nations where the two Republics were represented on equal terms. For important dec isions, a majority was req uired in the Peop le's chamber, as we ll as in the separate Czech and Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations, in effect giving the Slovaks veto powers. The 1968 Constitution provided the in stitutional foundations for Slovak autonomy, but in practice the political system remained centralized. The original division of power in the 1968 Constitution changed in favor of the federal level during the "Normali zation " of th e early 1970s, and fo rmal decision-making rul es and divi sion of powers did not matter much during Communism . As Carol Skalnik Leff has pointed out, however, federation plu s democra ti zation was a power eq uation. 11 After the Velvet Revo lution in 1989, th e 1968 Constitution acquired new importance; first , it determined the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution (a three-fifths majority in all parts of the federal parliament), and second, it became the point of departure for the negoti ati ons about the contents of a new constitutional settl ement. Under th e new, democratic co nditi ons, the Slovak minorit y had an excell ent bargaining position , since any cons ti tutional settlement required Slovak co nsent. After 1989 the questi on was, therefore, not whether Slovakia should have autonomy, but the ex tent of that autonomy. Separate Slovak institutions were taken for roku 1968 (B rn o: Nak ladatelstvi Doplnek, 1996). See also Jaros lav Krejci & Pave l Machonin , Czechos lovakia 19/8- 92. A U1bora to1y for Social Change (London: Macmill an, I 996), 45-7: Chovanec & Mozolik, (op.cit. , I 994). 48-52: Ales Gerloch . Jiri Hrebej & Vladimir Zoubek. Us tavnf sys tem Ceske republiky ( Prague: Prospektrum, 1999). 51-4 : Carol Skalni k Leff, National Conf7ict in Czechoslo vakia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 988), 243 ff. 11 Leff, 132-33. �SLOVAKIA 59 granted, and autonomy now became a matter of allocating more decision-making power to the Republics. The " hyphen delJate" in the sprin g of 1990 was a foreboding of the problems that lay ahead. It was Pres ide nt Vaclav Havel who inadvertently started it. In Janu ary of 1990, without prior consultations, he submitted a constitutional amendment to the federal Parliament, proposing to drop the word "Soc iali st" from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic . Much to hi s and many others' surpri se, thi s trigged a bitter di spute about whether the name of the Republic should be spelled with or without a hyphe n. The main alternatives were the "Czec ho-S lovak Republic ," favored by a majority of the Slovaks, and the "Czechoslovak Federal Republic ," favored by a majority of the Czechs. Stalemate in the federal Parliament at first resulted in the absurd dec ision to spe ll the word "Czechoslovak" in one word in the Czech Republic and with a hyphen in Slovakia. Thi s was presented as a concession to "S lovak grammar. " This deci sion caused demonstration s in Slovakia, after which the Parliament made a hasty retreat and settled for the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ." 12 Negotiations about a new Czechoslovak Constitution started after the elections in June of 1990, but soon ran into trouble. As before, the Czech political elite was generally in favor of more centralized solutions than the Slovaks. The difference was that the Czech majority , rea li zing that a unitary state was not an option , now favored a " function al federation," while the majority of the Slovak political elite increas ing ly leaned toward s confederal rather than federal so lutions. 13 A temporary settl e me nt was reached in the Competency Law 12 Milan Sutovec. Semi6za aka politikum alebo ·'pomlckova vojna." (Bra ti slava: Kalli gram , I 999). 299 ff. 13 Opinion polls cons istently showed th at th e public in the Czech Republic preferred a unitary state. with a federation as the second most popular option. while a confederation never exceeded 6 percent support. By con trast, a confedera ti on or a federation was th e preferred state form in Slovakia. See table 12.3. in Sharon L. Wolchik, ''The Politi cs of Transition and the Break-up of Czechos lovakia," in Jiff Musil. ed. , op.cit.. 235. �SLOVAKIA 60 of December 1990, whi c h more-or-less reestabli shed the co mpetency di vision of the 1968 Constitutio n. However, whil e thi s was abo ut as fa r as the Czechs we re w illing to go , the S lova ks looked at the Co mpete ncy Law merely as a po int of departure fo r further negoti ati ons. The core of the confli ct was the all ocati on of compe te nce and power in two specific areas: Eco nomi c po li cy a nd intern ati ona l re lations. The majority of the S lovak elite pressed fo r S lovak " visibility" in intern ati ona l rel ati ons, and wanted to all ocate more power in economi c matte rs to the Republics . The Czec h side wanted the federa l leve l to be stron g e nough to carry o ut the econo mi c reform s necessar y fo r th e tra ns iti o n to a market econo my, and wanted th e state internati onall y to speak with one vo ice . The negoti atio ns fa il ed to produce an acceptabl e co mpromi se befo re the 1992 elections, 14 and since the vic torious Czec h and Sl ovak parti es di sag reed fund ame nta ll y o n the iss ues of econo mic reform and state fo rm , they dec ided to di vide the state. It turn ed out th at both sides prefe rred a break-up rathe r than accepting the favo red state form of the othe r party, des pite the fac t that before the e lec ti ons, the future ex iste nce of Czec hos lovak ia was still ta ke n fo r granted . The onl y party th at advocated secess io n w as the Sl ova k Nationa l Party. 2. The Composition and Stability of the Elite Constellations In the inter- war peri od, the e lite conste ll atio ns fac in g eac h other were c lear-cut and quite stable. A clear majority of the Czec hos lovak parties was ce ntra li st a nd in fa vor of Czechoslo vaki sm. Thi s camp co mpri sed the e ntire Czech political e lite and a substanti al pa rt of the Slovak political e lite. Inte restingly, the major ce ntrali st pl ayers in the interw ar clashes about autonomy in the Parli ame nt were Slovak s, not Czec hs, a nd like th e ir adversaries, they were posin g as the c ha mpi ons of Slovak inte rests/the Slovak nati on. The two most influe nti al 14 T he negoti ators did reach a co mpromi se in the spring of 1992, but th is was turned down by th e pres idium of th e Slovak Nati onal Counci l. See Rychl fk , Roz pad. 2 18- 20. �SLOVAKIA 61 Slovak centrali sts were the Agrarian Mi Ian Hodza ( 1878- I 944) and the Social Democrat I van Derer ( 1884- 1973). They represented their parties in the Parli ament during the entire First Republi c and betwee n th em, the two men served as mini sters for 23 yea rs. Milan Hodza even became the first Slovak Prime Mini ster in 1935. Apart from these two, the A grarian Anton Stefanek ( I 877-1964) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Igor Hrusovsky ( 1872- 1937), both seasoned parli amentari ans, played an espec iall y acti ve role in th e debates. By co ntrast, two Slovak parti es represented th e autonomist ca mp. arguing that the Slovaks were a nation of their own and, therefore, entitl ed to autonomy. 15 The larges t autonomi st party was the Slovak Peopl e's Party . Its co-founder and chairman Andrej Hlinka ( 1864- 1938), whose name was added to the party's title in 1925, was a dominatin g fi gure in the stru gg le for Slovak autonomy until hi s death in August of 1938. 16 Ferdinand (Ferdi s) Juriga ( 1878-1950) had been the onl y Slovak deputy in th e Hungari an Parli ament of 19 14 and he continued to defend Slovak autonomy in the Parliament also of the First Republi c. Jozef Ti so ( 1887- 1947) played an important role in the 1930s, as did editor-in-chief of Slovak, Karol Sidor ( 1901 - 53). The Slovak Nati onal Party never had more than one deputy - its chairman M artin Razus ( 1888- 1937) - and pl ayed a more peripheral role. After the Velvet Revolution, elite constellations were more vo latile. The Slovak political elite was from the outset divided on the quest ion of state form, the preferred so lution s ranging from mildl y federa li st to a loose confederat ion. From 1991 the Slovak National Party started to advocate independence, but already in 1990 th e chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Jan Carnogursky, argued th at Slovakia should enter the European Community as an in- " In addition. some of th e national minority parties and the Communists su pported autonomy. but for other reasons. '" See Felak. Ac Che Price of Che Republic. 1994: A lena Bartl ova. A ndrej Hlinka. ( Bratislava: Obzor. 1991 ). �SLOVAKIA 62 de pende nt state. Hi s party was earl y in favo r of a confederal so luti on, but o nl y as a te mporary so luti on, until both Re publi cs joined the European Community. 17 Public Aga inst Vi o le nce was be ing pulled in o ppos ite direc ti o ns, and whe n the c irc le around Vl adimfr Mec ia r broke o ut and fo rmed the Moveme nt fo r a De mocrati c Slovaki a in 1991 , the liberal , federa li st oriented w in g re ma ined , whil e the national populi sts w ith confedera l lea nings fo ll owed Mec iar. In the 1992 e lecti on Mec iar' s Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a appeared as the main champion of Slovak interests. The Czec h politica l e lite was fro m the o utset more indiffe rent to the nati onal questi on. Wh ile Public Aga inst Vi o le nce had the nati onal questi o n as o ne of its top pri o riti es , it was co mpl ete ly absent fro m the agenda of C ivic Forum in the first e lecti o n. In stead , " bac k to Eu ro pe" and e limination of communi sm we re the top pri oriti es. 18 Espec iall y after the " ma nagers" aro und Vac lav Kl aus won over the di ss ide nt w in g of C ivic Forum in 199 1, the leadin g Czec h po liti ca l e lite united in favo r of a stro ng fe derati o n. In th e 1992 e lec ti o n Kl aus' C ivic De mocratic Party ca me o ut as the main c hampi on of a federa l so luti on. The Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a and the C ivi c De mocrati c Party won the e lecti ons in th e ir respective Re publics, whil e parti es th at took a more mode rate stand on the questi on of state fo rm lost. Once the victors w ith Vac lav Kl aus and Vl adimfr Mec iar at the he lm had dec ided to di vide the state, fo rmer ene mi es beca me alli es, and the e lite conste ll ati ons changed according ly. The fo rme r oppone nts in the negoti ati o ns on state fo rm now united in favo r of a break-up , aga inst a motl ey c rew of oppos ition parti es, co mpri sing Czec h and Slovak Communi st and Soc ial De mocrati c parties, as we ll as Miros lav Slade k 's ultra- nati ona li st Republican Party of C zec hoslo vaki a. 17 Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. 67 . 93-4. '~Oskar Krejci. Kniha o volbich. (Prag ue: Victori a Pu bli sh ing. 1994). 2 10- 11. �SLOVAKIA 63 3. The Arguments in Favor of Autonomy If we turn to the actual arg ume nts, the main impress ion is that there were e lements of continuity as well as c ha nge when we go from the interwar period to the post-Communist period. On the one hand, the argume nts in favor of autonomy were located within the sa me nat io nalist di sco urse in both periods . On the other hand , the composition of the arg uments in favor of autonomy changed, and so did the contents of the autonomy demands, as we have seen. In the interwar period, the principle of national se lf-determination was used as an arg ument in favor of an asymmetric federation; after 1989 it was first used as an argument in favor of confederal so lutions, and then in favor of an independent Slovak state. Arguments in Favor of Autonomy During the First Republic In the inter-war period , the cornerstone of the a utonomists was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation , and the core message was that this Slovak nation was entitl ed to auto nomy. The premi se linkin g national identity to the matter of state form was the principle of national se lf-determination, understood as the ri ght of cu ltu ra ll y distinct nation s to se lf-governance. 19 In the a utonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used thi s right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czec hs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state. Moreove r, as a free a nd equa l nation , the S lovaks were entit led to manage the ir own affairs and, therefore , to autonomo us political institutions. In practice, autonomy demands were always made on be half of Slovakia, yet for the a utonomists this amo unted to the same , s ince they regarded Slovakia as the homeland of the Slovaks, despite its substantial national minoriti es. 19 The principle of national self-determination can be interpreted in at least two other ways: as the right of the people to choose their government without coercion , i.e. popular sovereig nty - or as th e right of independent states to manage their affa irs without foreign intervention. See e.g. 0yvind 0sterud, Nasjonenes selvbestemmel- sesrett. (Oslo: Un iversitetsforlaget. 1984). 150 ff. �64 SLOVAKIA The Slovak a uto nomi sts argued a lon g three ma in lin es. First, they argued that Slovakia was discriminated aga in st in vario us ways, and that autono my was necessary to a ll eviate S lovakia's ill s. Second , they arg ued that Slovakia was entit led to auto no my by virtu e of various " co ntrac ts" (e.g. th e Pittsburgh Agreement). Finally, they argued that the Slovaks had the right to auto nom y s impl y because they were a natio n (the classical nation ali st arg umen t). The point of departure for the deprivation mguments was that the Slovaks were an indi vid ua l nati o n wit h separate nationa l interests, and that these national interests were not properly loo ked after under th e present centrali zed state form. Here S lovak grievances were turned into reasons for autonomy, and autonomy was the so lution to everythin g. Most of the gr ieva nce arguments for auton o my were associated with the use of Slovak as the offic ial lang uage in Slovakia and w ith (w hite-co llar) jobs fo r the Slovak inte lli gentsia. The sig na l words were " Slovak bread" . For in sta nce, before th e 1929 e lec ti on, the a utonomi st news paper Slovak argued that " a uto nomy does no t only mean political ri g hts, but a lso bread. When we get our own administration , our ow n asse mbly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be e mpl oyed there. [ ... ] The auton o mo us adm ini strati o n of the Slova k home land will compel the e mployers first a nd foremost to gran t the Slovaks work and bread." 20 Accord in g to the contract oriented lin e of arg um e nts , Slovakia had the right to autonomy by virtue of certai n (a ll eged ly) binding doc um e nts or "co ntracts". The point of departure was again that the Slovaks were an indi vidu a l and sovere ig n natio n, and th at S lovakia was the ho me la nd of the Slovaks. The argume nt was that Slovakia had been promised autono my, a nd th at thi s promise was lega ll y bindin g. However, fo r a co ntract to be va lid , it must be stipul ated th at the sig natori es had the right to s ig n agreements on behalf of those they were said to represent - in this case th e Czec h and Slovak nati o ns. 20 Slovak no. 240, 22 October I929. p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 65 Several of the many declarations and agreements that were formulated during World War I were used as arguments for (or against) autonomy . However, two documents stand out: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th , 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th , 1918. The former was a clear asset, while the latter soon became a liability (see next subsection). The Martin Declaration had been adopted at an as sembly of all Slovak political parties in Turciansky Svaty Martin. For the autonomists , the significance of the Martin Declaration was that through this act, the Slovaks had voluntarily joined the Czechs as equal s in one state, and they had therefore an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs. Moreover, as an equal nation which had entered the state voluntarily, the Slovaks had the right to autonomy. In effect, the autonomi sts gave the Martin declaration state-forming significance. This was also reflected in repeated attempts to turn October 30th into a national holiday. Compared to the other wartime declarations , however, the Pittsburgh Agreement had some obvious advantages. First and foremost , it had greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government, because Czechoslovakia's first president and co-founder Tomas G. Masaryk had signed it, along with Czech and Slovak emigre leaders in the United States. 2 1 Second, the Agreement contained the most important autonomy demands. From the moment the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, it was invoked in every single debate where autonomy was " M asaryk was not Pres ident at th e tim e, of course, but on the initi ati ve of th e Slov ak L eague he signed a calliographed version of the Ag ree ment on November 14th. 19 I 8, the very same day he was elected Pres ident of the Republic. Besides. on October 3 1st. 19 18, th e Czec hoslov ak Nation al Committee had declared as bindin g all ac ti ons by members of the pro visional government abroad (including M asaryk). It may be argued that if the decl arati on of the establi shment of th e Czechos lovak state was valid. then the authori zation of Masaryk 's ac ti ons was valid as we ll. In practice, th e va lidity of th e Pittsburgh Agreement was a political , not a lega l matter. For the tex t of the statement , see Benes (op. cit. . 1929). 490. See also M. M ark Stolarik (op. cit. , 1968), 49. �SLOVAKIA 66 mentioned. At first glance, this Agreement would seem to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, the usage varied. Early in the period, the autonomists would present the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta granting the Slovaks the right to autonomy. Later, it became more common to present it as a binding contract. The concept of a Magna Charta brings to mind a sovereign granting hi s subjects certain rights and privileges, and it was Masaryk who (implicitly) had this role. When the Pittsburgh Agreement was presented as a contract, the contracting partners were at first the Czech and Slovak nation s. However, especially after it became public knowledge in 1922 that President Masaryk had actually drafted it, he was increasingly presented as a contracting partner. This shift can also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the leg itimate representatives of their co-nationals at home. However, the third and most common use, especially in the 1930s, was the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" or as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation (not just a small faction, but of all Slovaks). The point of departure was that the Slovaks were an individual nation with a natural right to self-determination, and therefore to autonomy if it so wishes. This usage was associated with the third , classical nationalist line of argument, which rested on three premises: I. that the Slovaks were an individual nation ; 2. that nation s had the right to self-determination; and 3. that the Slovak autonomists represented the true will of the Slovak nation - which was autonomy. The second premise was often implicit, while a lot of effort was put into defending Slovak individuality and the right to speak on the Slovaks ' behalf. The autonomists employed two main strategies to substantiate their claim. One strategy was to argue from the majority, which meant resorting to "advanced math". Election results here came in handy. In a parliamentary debate in 1933, Jozef Tiso argued that as a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the �SLOVAKIA 67 Slovak nation. Upon subtracting the stipulated Czech and Magyar votes from the votes cast for the centralist parties in Slovakia, he ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the Slovak People ' s Party and the Slovak National Party put together. 22 A second strategy was personal attacks (argumentum ad homi- nem), which were often used to defend the existence of a Slovak nation as well as the claim for autonomy. The autonomists would then accuse Slovak deputies belonging to the Czechoslovak parties of being " renegades," " Phari sees," "sodomites" and "careerists ," and, therefore, not worthy of representing the Slovak nation. In his rather biblical language, the chairman of the Slovak People ' s Party, Andrej Hlinka, argued in 1927 that "S lovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago. " 23 Continuity and change after 1989 After 1989, the core message was still that the Slovaks were entitled to national se lf-determination "q ua nation," although the contents of this self-determination had changed from an asymmetric federation to confederate so lutions or even independence. The most important changes compared to the interwar period were, first , that there was no longer any need to defend the existence of an individual Slovak nation , since that was taken for granted, and second, a change in th e composition of the arguments. Deprivation arguments and contract oriented arguments were nearly absent, while classical nationalist arguments now dominated , and the principle of national se lf-determination was invoked more explicitly. 22 30 I. schuze poslanecke snemov ny N.S .R.C. dne 29 . li stopadu 1933. in Tesnopi- secke zpravy o scht1zfch poslanecke snemovny Narodnfho shromaidenf republiky ceskoslovenske. Ill. volebnf obdobf. (Prague. 1929- 35), 47- 50. 23 Hlinka, Slovak no. 86, 16 April , I 927 , p. I. "Sodomi tes•· referred to Social Demo- crats. as a play on wo rd s. �SLOVAKIA 68 There are, of co urse, some differe nces between the various debates, which is perha ps not surpri sin g, sin ce the topics of the debates a lso differed. The principle of nati ona l se lf-determi nati o n was most ex plicitly vo iced in the 1992 debates in the federa l parliament (th e two debates on the break- up of Czec hos lovak ia), a nd in the Slovak National Council (the de bates on the S lovak Declaration of Sovere ig nty and the Slovak Constitution ). Conve rse ly. thi s principle was more impli c it in the 1990 " hyphen debate". The " hyphe n debate" is perhaps the most atyp ica l, in terms of topic ("Czecho-Slo vak Republic" with a hyphen versus "Czechos lovak Federal Republic") as we ll as types of arg ume nt. First, thi s is rea ll y the o nl y debate where identity pl ayed any major part. Ide ntity arg uments appeared in two forms: On the one hand , it was arg ued that for the S lovaks, to spe ll the word Czecho-Slovak w ithout a hyphe n was tantamo unt to accepting the abe rrati o n of Czec hos lova ki sm. On the o ther hand , it was arg ued that th e hyphe n ex pressed Slovak nati o na l indi vidu a lity and the equa l standing of the Czech and Slovak nati o ns in the federati o n. Second, the hyphe n debate is the only debate where the Pittsburg h Agreement was me ntion ed more than o nce. However, of th e six speake rs referrin g to it, o ne appea led to the Agreement to substantiate the c laim for a hyph e n in the "Czecho-Slovak" Rep ubli c. (thi s is how the word was spelled in the orig ina l), while the rest bas ically referred to it as an express io n of the eq ual status of the two natio ns e ntering the state , or as a part of the hi storical narrative lead ing up to the federalization. Nobody referred to it as a contrac t, and the Czech National Socialist Bi anka Hykova even quoted Masaryk to the effect that it was o nl y a n agreement between American Czechs and Slovaks. 2-1 Contract oriented arguments thus disappeared a ltogeth er, and refere nces to the Pittsburg h Agreeme nt and/or the Martin Dec lara20 See Zprava o 26. spolecne sc hi'1zi snemovny lidu a snemovny narodu. 29.3. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky V. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1986-90), 25 1. 253 , 256, 270, 304. �SLOVAKIA 69 tion were rare. A utonomy was ex plicitly mentioned in the contex t of the Pittsburgh Ag reement onl y once, in the second debate abou t th e brea k-up of th e state. According to I va n Simko from the Chri stian Democratic Movement, Slovak organization s in the U nited States had made an agreement wi th Masaryk "as a leading personality of Czech po litica l li fe" to fo rm a shared state where Sl ovaki a was to have an autonomous position. Thi s agreement was unfortun ately not honored , he argued. 25 Depri vation arg uments were al so rare . The phrase " Slovak bread" occurred onl y once: In the first debate on the break -up of the state in September 1992, Michal Ko vac from the Mo ve ment for a Democratic Slovaki a ( later to beco me Slovaki a's first pres ident) argued that in a normally functioning federation , it wo uld not be possible for the standard of li ving in Slovaki a to drop as much as it had in onl y two yea rs. In another four years , he argued, " Would we not be in the hi storica l situation w here we have already been, that the Slovak nation would have to go abroad for bread, because there would not be bread for people in Slovakia? And we wou ld be as weakened as we once were under dear father Masaryk." 26 However, in the interw ar period " Slovak bread" was usuall y tantamount to w hite-collar jobs for the yo ung Slovak intelli gentsia in Slovaki a, whi le here th e lack of " bread " obvious ly refers to general unemployment. The probl em was real enough - in the earl y 1990s the unemployment ra te in Slovak ia was three or four times the Czech average. 27 25 Zprava o 5. spo lecne schu zi snemovny lidu a snemo vny narodu. 18.11 . 1992 . 25 .1 1.1 992. in Federi ln f shromiidenf Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V il. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 7 17. 2 '' Zprava o 4. spo lec ne sc huzi snemo vny lidu a snemov ny narodu 29.9. 1992. in Fe- denilni shro m;ii deni Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V II. vo lebnf obdobf, ( 1992). 60 I. 27 11. 8 percent in Slovaki a vers us 4. 1 percent in the Czec h Republic in 199 1: 10.3 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992. Transition reporc I 996. (L ondon. The European Bank fo r Reconstructi on and Deve lopment. I 996). However. th e difference was even larger in 1993. the first yea r of independence. �SLOVAKIA 70 Finall y, compared to the interwar period , classica l nationalist ar g uments were much more co mmon , and the principle of nation al self-determination was invoked more ex plicitly. In the debate about the allocation of competence between the Republics and the Federation it was used as an argument in favor of returnin g to the original 1968 Constitution. 28 Y et, the most co mmon use of th e principle of national self-determination was as an argument in favor of establi shing an independent Slovak state or dividin g Czechoslovakia. There are, however, some interestin g nation al differences between actors in how they used it. Slovak deputies speaking in favor of Slovak independence invoked the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Slovak nation . They regarded it as an inalienable, natural ri ght, and in one instance, even as a God-given ri ght. 29 An independent Slovak state was presented as the fulfillment of IO00 years of strugg le for Slovak individuality and sovereignty , and as the result of a natural , hi storical process of national emancipation . In the words of HZDS deputy chairman Au gustfn Marian Huska , " the Constitution is the fulfillm ent and lega l enac tment of th e ri ght to se lf-determination . ( ... )To the Slovak s, whose consciousness was molded by more than a thou sand years under foreign rule , the feeling of dependence had become second nature. Slowly, but persistently they formed an awareness of the need for self-determination , the need to search for, find , 28 Zprava o 9. spolecne schi°1zi snemovny lidu a snernovn y narodu. 11 .- 12. 12. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf CSFR. ( 1990-1992) . < ww,~ .p,p.c:dckni h/ I 990fs/sbn/-stcn -prot/009,c: hu t./s009077. html/ d> [2 Febru ary, 2004]. See also the debate on th e Slovak declaration of so vereignty. Stenograficka sprava o 3. sch6dzi Slovenskej narodnej rndy konanej 17. j ul a 1992. < www .nr,r.sk/i ndexarch.a,p> ]4 Febru ary. 2004 J. 29 Sedovic (S lovak National Part y), Zprava o 5. spol ec ne schu zi SL a SN , 18. 11 . 1992. in Federalnf shro,mii denf Ceske a Slovenske Federati vnf republiky. VII. volebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 788. �71 SLOVAKIA ex press. a nd at las t rea li ze sovere ig nty." 30 S lova ki a was in o th e r word s pi ctured as a nati on-state a nd the S lova ks as the state-forming nati o n. Howeve r, in the de bates in the Sl ovak Nation a l Counc il , Slovak deputi es, inc ludin g Prime Mini ster Vl adim fr Mec iar, at the same tim e pro mi sed to res pec t the eq ua l rig hts of a ll c iti ze ns, nati o na l minorities and ethni c groups. De puti es re presentin g th e Magyar mino rity in the S lovak Nationa l Counc il recog ni zed o r eve n s uppo rted the S lovak ri g ht to selfde te rmin ati o n, but argued that the princ ipl e sho uld a lso appl y to the nati o na l mino riti es. Thi s was a n arg ume nt in favo r of auto no my. At the same time, Magyar deputi es arg ued th at S lovaki a sho uld not be presented as a nati o n- state in the Co nstituti o n, bec au se it was not nation all y ho moge neous. Founding the state o n the nati o na l princ ipl e meant turnin g the minoriti es into second-c lass c iti zens, they argued . Czec h de puti es co nsiste ntly presented the break-up of Czec hoslovaki a as a matte r of se lf- determinati o n fo r the Slovak nati o n. The 1992 e lecti o n. the Slovak Dec larati o n of Sovere ig nty, and the Slovak Constituti o n were take n as proof th at the S lovak natio n did wa nt inde pende nce. In the words of Prime Mini ste r Vacl av Kl aus of the Czec h Re publi c: "The S lova k nati o n used the o ppo rtunity to co mpl e te its nati o na l e manc ipati o n by fo undin g its own state. Thi s is a rea lity we mu st res pect. " 3 1 T he arg ume nt th at the Czec hs had no ri ght to deny th e S lovak natio n its rig ht to se lf-de termin ati o n was a lso used aga in st ho ld in g a referend um in the Czech Republi c; Czec h c itizens could no t dec ide whet her the S lovaks sho uld beco me a statefo rming natio n o r no t. Interestin g ly, the princi pl e of nati o na l se lf-determin ati o n was not even o nce in voked o n be ha lf of the Czec h na- -'" For Huska ·s statement and the debate on the Const itut ion. see Stenograficka sprava o 5. sch6dzi S lovenskej mirodnej rady kona nej 31. augusta a I . septembra 1992. <www.nr,r. ., k/indexarch.a,p> 14 February . 20041. -' 1 K laus in th e debate on th e Czech Constitution . Ceskii narodnf rada I 992- 1992. Stenoprotokoly. I 0. schuze. 16.- 17. 12. 1992. <www.psp.cz/cknih/ I 992cnr/,tenprot/O I 0schuzi> 13 February. 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 72 tion .32 The reason is obvious: The Czechs did not regard the establi shme nt of the Czec h Republic as a state-formin g process, but as a restoration of Czech statehood , which expl icitly included Czechoslovak state tradition s. But the n the Czechs a lways rega rded Czechoslovakia as their state. Apart from the princ ipl e of national se lf-determination , the main lin e of argument in favor of di ssolution may be termed reali st. It was argued that the federation did not work or that it was a lread y dead, that it was too late to save the state, and now the important thing was to e nd the state in a peaceful , orderly, cultivated , adult and leg itimate fashion , and to ensure good ne ighborl y relation s be twee n the future inde pe nde nt states. 4. The Centralist Arguments Against Autonomy If we turn to the centra li st side, di sco ntinuity 1s th e word that first co mes to mind. In the inte rwar period , the centrali st arg ume nts against a utonomy were located within a nation a li st di sco urse, and mirrored the autonomist arguments to a large ex tent , the difference be ing th at the centralists based the ir arg uments on an a lte rn ative national id eo logy - Czec hos lovakism . After 1989 , the "ce ntra li st" arg um e nts changed profoundly . Czechos lov akism had been abandoned already in 1945 , and the unitary state form in 1968. The "centrali sts" afte r 1989 were , the refore, centra li sts on ly re lative to those advocating confederate so luti ons, a nd in the las t instance, inde pe ndence for Slovakia. " The principle of national se l f-de term ination was invoked on behalf of the .. Moravian nati on" ( 1.5 million . accord ing to the 199 1 census). but then as an argument in favor of Moravi an autonomy in a Czecho-Morav ian federation . See espec ially the speec hes of deputies Jan Jeg la and Jiff Bfl y (both from the Moravi an movement H SD-SMS) . Ceska narodnf rada 1992- 1992 . Stenoprotokoly. 10. sc huze , 16.17. 12. 1992. < www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1992<.:nr/~tenprot/0 I 0schuz/> 13 Febru ary , 2004J. �SLOVAKIA 73 Centralist Arguments during the First Republic ln the inter-war period, the co rnerstone of the ce ntra li st argumentati on was that the Czechs and Slovak s were one Czechoslovak nati on (a lbe it w ith two tri bes), and the core message was th at a ce ntra li zed state form was necessary to preserve nati onal unity and th e integrity of th e state. T he premi se linking nati onal identity to state fo rm was the principl e of nati onal se l f-determin ati on. According to the centrali sts, the Czechos lovak nati on had used its ri ght to self-determ ination to re uni te in a Czechos lovak nati on-state, and thi s unity had to be preserved.·13 A uto nomy for Slovak ia was seen as a th reat to Czechos lovak nationa l unity as we ll as state in tegrity , first because it wo uld dri ve th e two tribes of the Czechos lovak nati on apart, and second , beca use granting Slovaki a autonomy wo ul d be tantamoun t to recogni zing th e Slovak s as a separate nati on, w hich would j eopardi ze the state's ra ison d'etre. Th e centra lists co untered the depri vati on arguments of the autonomi sts in two ways . On the one hand, they denied that the Slovak s were d iscrimin ated agai nst, and on the other hand , they rejec ted autonomy as a suitabl e remedy to Slovaki a's alleged ill s. What was needed to help Slovak ia was not autonomy, but more unity, especiall y economica ll y, the ce ntra li sts argued. Thi s was entirely in line w ith thei r overall "strength th ro ugh unity" message. However, their main artill ery was aimed at the contract-oriented arguments, and espec iall y the Pi tts burgh Agreement. T he main ar guments were: I . T he A meri ca n Czechs and Slovaks were not leg itimate represe ntati ves of th eir co-n ati onals at home, and had no ri ght to dec ide on their behal f; 2. The Pittsburg h Agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain hi stori ca l va lue; but in order to be va lid, it wo uld need the co nse nt of Czechs and Slovak s at home; and 3. Leg itimate Slovak represe ntati ves had conse nted to Czec hos lovak ·'-' There was no big difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovak cen tralists in terms of the co ntents of national identity. In both cases . national identi ty was defined in terms of culture. language and ancestry. See Bakke (op.c it. , 1999). especia ll y Chapter I 0. fo r documentati on. �SLOVAKIA 74 national and state unity in the Constitu ti on of 1920, as we ll as at assem bli es before and after Pittsburg h. The first arg ume nt was especia ll y damag in g, since it went to the core of a ll the auto no mi st argument s assoc iated w ith the Pittsburg h Agreement , in va lid atin g the Agreement as a Magna C harta, as a binding contract, a nd as an express io n of the will of the Slovak natio n. It was more difficult for the ce ntra li sts to de nou nce the leg iti macy of Masaryk as a represe ntati ve of the Czec hos lovak state, but the Pres ident did his best to free him se lf and the government of any obligation. Masaryk c la imed that he had sig ned the Pittsburg h Agreement in order to "appease a sma ll Slovak fact io n that dreamed of God know s what sort of independence for Slovakia ," and di smi ssed it as "a loca l pac t between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." 34 There is littl e doubt that Masaryk drafted the Agreement in order to ap pease a part of the Slovak League, but o ne may wo nder why this was important to him if he rega rded the m mere ly as American citizens. I think Mark Stol arik has a va lid point when he arg ues that th e American Slovaks he lped legiti mi ze th e creation of Czechoslovakia in the abse nce of a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary (caused by war censorship).·15 Masaryk a lso tried , un successfu ll y, to di sc redit the Pittsburg h Agreement through quasi- lega li sti c arguments. In a le tte r to Andrej Hlinka on October 12th, 1929, Masaryk c laimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was "a forge ry," because at the time, the em ig re organization of the Slovaks present in Pitts burgh , "the [Slovak l Leag ue lega ll y did no t ex ist, and it was recognized by th e Government o nl y in 191 9." Hlinka evide ntl y wrote the Slovak Leag ue , w hi ch retorted th at the re was " no doubt a bout th e a uthe nti c ity of th e Pittsburg h Agreement," and A merica n lega l experts confirmed th at there was no " Tomas G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce. (Prague: Orbis a Ci n. 1925). 262-263. 35 M . Mark Stolarik (op.c it.. 1968). 54. �SLOVAKIA 75 difference between chartered a nd unc hartered orga ni zatio ns w ith respect to entering such ag ree me nts. 36 T o prop up the claim that leg itim ate Slovak representatives had co nsented to Czec hos lovak nat io na l and state unity after Pitts burg h, the ce ntrali sts preferred to use the Martin Dec lara ti o n of October 30th , 19 18, since thi s Dec laration had been unanimou sly accepted at a n asse mbl y of a ll Slovak po liti ca l part ies. In the beg innin g, they also used the 1920 Constitution for th e same purpose, but the trouble was th at th e Slovak Club in the Constitutional Assembly was coo pted , and arguably not representative of Slovak opinion. The ma in reason why the Martin Dec larati on was s uc h a n asset for the centrali sts, was the sente nce statin g th at the "S lovak nati o n is lingui sti ca ll y as we ll as culturally-historically pa rt of th e unitary Czec ho-Sl ovak nation ." Moreover, the asse mbl y at M artin had demanded nat io na l se lf-dete rmin ation on behalf of this "Czecho-S lovak nat io n," w hil e at the sa me time it was s il e nt on auton omy. The ce ntrali sts thu s used it as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity, and as proof of the will of the Slovaks to e nter s uc h a unity. (Rumor in Slovakia had it th at the passage o n Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was , however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samue l Zoch, who had dra fted it).:17 Finally , the centrali sts counte red the c lass ic a l nati o na li st arg ume nt by rejecting the first premi se, that the Slovaks were an indi vidual nation, a nd the third premise. that the autonomi sts represented the tru e w ill of the Slovak nati o n. They presented the Slovaks as a tribe of th e Czechoslovak nati o n, and the Slovak me mbe rs o f the ce nt ral ist parties as the leg itim ate Slovak rep rese ntat ives. At the sa me time, they accepted the seco nd premi se, th at nati o ns had th e -' 6 The letter is pub lished as Document No. 30 in Joseph A. Mikus. Slova kia. A Poli- tica l and Constitutional Histo1y . (Brati slava: SAP. I 995) 209-2 10. The answer of th e Slovak League was published in Slo vak no. 194. 27 August. 1930. p. I. See also M. Mark Stolarik (op. cit.. 1968). 48-49. 52. -' 7 V ac lav Chaloupecky: Martinshi deklilrace 19- 20. II jejf politicke osudy (Prague. I 928). �SLOVAKIA 76 right to sel f-determin ati on, but as we have seen, th ey in vo ked thi s prin ciple on behalf of th e Czec hos lovak nati on. A n I va n Derer specialty was the argument th at i f the Slovak s had been an indi vidual nati on, then they w ould have th e ri ght to secess ion, not onl y to autonomy. 38 B oth sides had their share of argumentati on errors. T he ce ntrali sts argued from maj ority (a rg umentum ad populum ) in the earl y 1920s, w hen they recei ved the maj ority of the Slovak votes, and personal attacks (arg umentum ad hominem) were ac tu all y mos t co mmon on th e centrali st side. probabl y because they fi tted so we ll into their genera l strength-th ro ugh-unity argument. T he Slovak autonomi sts were accused of being " M agyarones" or " new Slovaks," thereby impl y ing th at they had other loya lties or identities,'9 and of being paid by the Hungari an government. In both cases, the M agyars had the ro le of ·'bogeyman" . T hi s M agyarone ca rd was used to expl ain w hy the Slovaks had turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present , and to co unter th e autonomi st c laim th at they we re the so le leg itimate representati ves of the Slovak nati on. I f the ce ntra li sts believed th at Sl ovak autonomy would j eopardi ze Czechos lovak nati onal unity and th e integrit y of th e state, it w as quite log ica l to acc use th e autonomi sts of being renegades (though probabl y not very smart). Profound Changes after 1989 After 1989 there was not much left of the former ce ntra list arguments, which is not surpri sing considering that Czec hos lovaki srn had 18 • I van Derer. Ceskos/ovensk;i otizkil. (Prague : Orbis. 1935). 88- 90. 39 Both labels we re commonly used about people of Slovak origi n who had become more or less ass imil ated during Hungari an rul e. but who turned back after 19 18. There we re some known M agyarones among the autonomists (chiefl y Franti sek Jehlicka and Yoj tech/ Bela Tuka). but the lead ing figures (Hlin ka. Juri ga) had defended Slovak interests also under Hungary. T he total number of people who ac tu ally switched nati onal affi l iatio n from Magyar to Slovak i n the firs t ten years of Czec hos lovaki a cannot be ascertained prec ise ly, but an educated guess is th at it was betwee n 250.000 and half a million. See Bak ke (op.cit. . 1999). 305- 307. �SLOVAKIA 77 been abandoned and a unitary state form was no longer an option. Th e "centralists" still accepted the principle of nati onal self- determinati on; however, they now recogni zed the Czec hs and Slovaks as equal , state-forming nation s and Czechoslovakia as a Czech and Slova k nati on-state. As long as state form was sti 11 on the agenda, the players on the "centrali st" side were mostly Czechs, and the task was to defend a " function al federation ," which meant to preserve the powers of the federation v is-a-vi s the Republics. Once the break-up of the state appeared on the agenda after the 1992 electi ons, however , th e "centra li st" pl ayers were Czech and Slovak opposition parti es and the task was now to preserve a common Czechoslovak state. In the hy ph en debate, as we ll as in the co mpetenc y debate, Czech deputi es explicitly presented th e federal state form as an express ion of the equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. The main Czech arguments against th e hy phen were that it was divi sive, and that it was unacceptable to the Czech publi c. This probabl y had something to do with the fact that the Second Czecho-Slovak Republi c ( 1938-- 39) was spelled with a hyphen. It was also argued that it was grammati ca ll y probl emati c, th at the original spelling had been without a hyphen (an hi stori ca l argument), and th at the Morav ians would feel offended (an identity argument). The main arguments in favor of a strong federation were that it was necessary in order to carry out the economic reform s and to fulfill Czechos lovakia 's internati onal obligati ons. For the Czech elite, the power and competency of the Czech Republic was irrelevant. In fact, I have onl y found one example of a Czec h deputy in vok ing nat ional interests, and he arg ued th at a confederate solution would be contrary to Czech interests.-lO The Czech and Slovak opposition parties that defended Czec hoslovaki a's ex istence in the debates in the fall of 1992 were mostly Socialists and Communists, but also included the ultra-nati onali st ' 0 M andl er (Libera l Democra ti c Part y). Zprava o 9. spol ecne schuzi SL a S . 11.- 12.1 2. 1990, in Fedenilnf shromaf.difof Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky V I . vo lebnf obdobf ( 1990), <www.psp.c z/ci,.nih/ 19901\h,bnf!.,tcnprot/009,c:hud ,009()77. htrn ll d> [4 February 2004 1. �78 SLOVAKIA Republican s. Even thoug h this opposition accepted th e principle of national se lf-determination , they mostly interpreted it in the origina l meanin g - as popular sovereignty . The totally dominating line of argument was that the only leg itimate way of dividin g Czechoslovakia according to the principle of se lf-determination was to let the citizens decide by popular vote, a nd that it was unacceptable to divide the state against the will of the peopl e. In the first debate on dissolution , thi s was supported by a hi storical a nalogy. By accident, the debate was held 54 years after the fateful Munich agreement, and the opposition argued that a new Munich was about to happen: Again the fate of the Czechoslovak state wou ld be dec ided without asking the peop le. In the first debate the oppos ition parties advocated a refere ndum before the decision was made; in the second debate a ratifying pl ebisc ite. The motive was obvious ly to save the state, since all opin ion poll s showed that a clear majority was in favor. However, very few deputies ac tually defended the me rits of Czechoslovakia, although a handful of Czechs professed their love for the shared homeland , or invoked the legacy of the founding fathers , mostly T.G. Masary k and Milan Rasti slav Stefanik. Finally, a weak echo of the inte rwar debate could be heard in claims that separation would be a threat to the future existence of the Czech and Slovak nation s (reminiscent of the strength-through-unity argument), and in charges of treason (personal attac ks). Ne ither line of argument was very common. The claim that voting in favor of disso luti on was an act of treason was a preserve of the ultra-nationalist Republican Party of Czec hos lovakia. The debates a lso had their amusing sides, for in stance in the use of metaphors. The federation was alternately see n as a leaking ship, a train being pulled in opposite directions , and an old patient with a severe heart condit ion , whi le the establishment of the new states was compared to giving birth to twins! �SLOVAKIA 79 5. Summary and Conclusion [n the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was a unitary , centralized state, and autonomy was a matter of separate Slovak institutions. After 1989, Czechoslovakia was a sy mm etric federation of two nationa l Republic s. Separate Slovak inst itutions were, therefore, no longer an iss ue, and autonomy became a matter of allocating more deci s ion-makin g power to the Republic s. However, in both cases, there was a conflict over state form, and in both cases the content of that conflict was how centralized the state should be. As for the actors , the e lite constellations were most stable in the inte rw ar pe riod . However, as lon g as the conflict was about state form, the Czech political elite was in favor of the most centralized so lution , while the Slovak elite was divided . Once the break-up of Czechoslovakia was on the agenda, the re were Czech and Slovak parties on both si des. If we focus on the main arguments on either side, we can obse rve continuity as well as change. Durin g the First Republic , the arguments of both sides were located within a nationali st discourse, but they founded their argume ntation on alternative nation al ideologies. The centralists invoked the principle of national se lf-dete rmination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation", the autonomists on behalf of the Slovak nation . After the Velvet Revolution , the autonomist argume nts were still located within a nationali st di scourse, and when the victorious part ies in the 1992 elections dec ided to divide the state, the Czech si de simply adopted the Slovak arg uments. By contrast, the "centrali st" arguments in the debate on state form were mainly economic, while the arguments in the debate on the break-up of Czechoslovakia were procedural. The most strik in g feature of the autonomy di sco urse after 1989 is therefore the asy mmetry of the arguments on both sides. Let us now address th e question of how the arguments related to the principle of national se lf-determination : On the autonomist side, the core message was the sa me in both periods; that the Slovaks were e ntitl ed to autonomy or se lf-determination "qu a nation ." Howeve r, �80 SLOVAKIA the principle of natio na l se lf-d etermin a ti o n was in voked more ex plicitl y after the Velvet Revo lution . On the centra li st side, the principle was used as an argument against a utono my in the interwar period , and w ith a certain twist, against the break-up of Czechos lovakia in 1992 . In the latter case, se lf-de te rmin ation was understood as popul ar sovere ignty - i.e . as a democratic principle. It is also inte res tin g that after 1989, the principl e of nation a l se lfdetermination was consistently invoked on behalf of the Slovaks, not on behalf of the Czechs, other than in the context of Czechoslovakia as the nation- state of two individual , sovere ign nations. In conclusion , the continuity was strongest on the autonomist side , alth ough th e conte nts of nation al se lf-determination c hanged from autonom y to independence. On the "centrali st" side, most of the a mmunition aga inst Slovak autonomy was gone once the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was abandoned. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution 1 E li sabeth Bakke " We approve the political progra m, w hi ch e ndeavors to unite the Czec hs a nd Slovaks in[to] an indepe nd e nt state of the Czech la nd s and Slovakia. Slovakia sha ll ha ve its own ad mini strati o n, its ow n parli ament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the officia l language in the sc hoo l[s], in office[sl and in public li fe in genera l. The Czecho-Slovak state sha ll be a republic , its constitution sha ll be democratic. [ ...] The detail ed reg ulati o ns for the estab lishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the li berated Czechs and Slovaks and the ir lega l representati ves." The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918 2 ' An earli er version of thi s art icle was presented at the 34th National Conven ti on of the AAASS in Pittsburgh. 2 1- 24 November. 2002. 2 Thi s Agreeme nt was signed by the Slovak League of America . th e Czech National A lli ance. th e Al li ance of Czec h Ca th oli cs. representing Czech and Slovak emigrc organi zations in the USA. and T omas G. M asaryk. President of the Czechos lovak ati ona l Council in Pari s. I have quoted th e Engli sh version from The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (Chicago: Th e Slova k Cath ol ic Federati on of America. 1934). 27. The Slovak ori gin al is reprinted in Edvard Benes. Svetov,i valka a nase revoluce. Vol. Ill (Dokumenty). (Prague: C in-Orbis . 1929) . 365. See also M. Mark Stolarik. 'The Role of Amer ican Slova ks in th e C rea tion of Czecho-S lovak ia. 19 14- 19 18"'. SLOVAKIA 53 Slovak autonomy was on the agenda throughout Czechoslovakia 's 74 years of existence, from the beginning to the bitter end. Although it may be argued that inexperienced politicians, short deadlines , rigid constitutional amendment procedures and conflicting economic priorities also played a role in the breakup, the long-term conflict that drove Czechoslovakia apart were the closely-related matters of political autonomy and recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation. 3 What was at stake was not only the institutional set-up and division of power; for the Slovaks, separate political institutions were also important symbols of national individuality and ownership to the shared Czecho-Slovak state. The roots of the conflict go back to the founding of Czechoslovakia in October of 19 I 8. The Czechs and Slovaks had no prior shared statehood tradition s (save perhaps Great Moravia in the ninth century), and independence was not even on the agenda before World War I. Starting in 1915, the independence movement abroad, with Tomas G. Masaryk at the helm, tried to convince the Allies that a Czechoslovak Republic should be established, invoking the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation. " In the First Czechoslovak Republic the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation (albeit with two tribes) became official state ideology , and it went hand-in-hand with political centralism. 4 Slovak Studies VIII (Rome, 1968) for a very interesting acco unt of the circumsta nces that led to its signin g and the subseq uent course of even ts in th e new lyfounded Repub lic. 3 For a discussion of the breakup see Eric Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure. Negotiated Breakup (A nn Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jirf Musil , ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995 ); Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska . Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989- 1992 (Bratis lava : AEP, 2002); Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics. Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 4 For details see Elisabeth Bakke, Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 19/9- 1938 (Oslo: Series of Dissertations submitted to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Un iversity of Oslo, no. 11 /1999). SLOVAKIA 54 Howeve r, a sub sta nti al pa rt of th e Sl ova k po liti ca l e lite opposed both , de ma ndir.g recog nition of the Slovak nati on and autonomy fo r Slovaki a. The Pittsburgh Agreeme nt became important both beca use it defin ed the contents of Slovak a utonomy and because Masaryk had signed it. Afte r World War II , Czec hos lovaki sm was abandoned, but poli ti ca l centra li sm was not, and th e federali zati on of Czech os lov aki a aft er the Sov iet in vas ion in 1968 did not give Slovak po liti ca l insti tution s any rea l dec ision-m aking power. Afte r the Ve lvet Revo lution in 1989, political autonomy for Slovaki a reappeared on the agenda, and became a major iss ue in the di spute over C zechos lovaki a's new constitution . The main purpose of the present article is to co mpare the autonomy de bates durin g the First Republic and after the Ve lve t Re volu ti o n, in orde r to establi sh continuity and change. The research ques ti o ns are: I . How were the de mands fo r autonomy substa nti ated, and what were the main argume nts aga inst it? 2. Wh at role did the princ ipl e of nation al se lf-de te rmin ati on pl ay in the debates in the two peri ods? The First Re public was a unitary state , and autonom y as such was ne ver on the age nda of the Parliame nt in the interwar pe ri od. Of th e three a utonom y proposa ls th at made it to th e Parli a me nt, two were bl oc ked in committees, whil e the third was adopted without any de bate after th e fa teful Muni c h agree me nt in 1938. My analys is of the inte rwar di sco urse is th e refore based o n a se lec ti o n of govern me nt in a ugurati on de bates and budgetary debates, as we ll as c lippings from Slovak, the main autono mi st ne wspaper. 5 After 1989 seve ral de bates were re levant to the autono my di scourse: In the Federal Parliament I have analyzed the 1990 " hyphen de bate," the de bate on the compete ncy law , a nd the two de bates about the break-up of Czechos lovaki a in the fa ll of 1992. In the res- ' T he analys is of the debate in the interwar period is a condensed version of a part of Chapter 13 of my PhD di ssertat ion. For detai ls see Bakke (ibid. 1999). SLOVAKIA 55 pec ti ve Czech and Sl ovak Nati onal Council s (Republi c Asse mblies), I have analyzed the 1992 debates on the Sl ovak D ecl aration of Sovereignty, the Slovak Con stitution, and the Czech Constituti on. I will structure the arti cle around the foll owin g three points: I . Th e in stituti onal set-up and th e contents of the autonomy demands. 2. The co mpos iti on and stability of the elite constellations on either side of the conflict. 3. The main arg uments a) in favor of autonomy and b) against autonomy. wi th spec ial emphas is on how they relate to the principle of nati onal sel f-determinati on. 1. The Institutional Set-up and the Contents of the Autonomy Demandi Czec hos lovakia was from the outset presented as the nati on-state of the Czechos lovak nation. 6 Thi s was codified in the 1920 Constituti on, which al so gave the First Czechos lovak Republic a unitary, centrali zed state form and a bi ca meral leg islature. Czec hos lovaki a was at first di vided into 22 co unties, but the county sys tem was implemented onl y in Sl ovaki a and fro m 1928 , four prov inces repl aced the counties (see tabl e I ). In the interw ar peri od, the demands for autonomy were defined in term s of separate Sl ovak instituti ons with dec ision-making powers in matters of vital importance for th e Slovaks as a nati on. The core demands were that Sl ovaki a should have " its own admini strati on, its own parli ament and its ow n co urts," cf. the Pittsburgh Ag reement. M ost of the autonomy proposa ls also included a separate Sl ovak government, but none of the three autonomy proposals that made it into the Parli ament went beyond an asymmetric federati on.7 " In reality. th e Czec hs and Slovaks togeth er comprised 65.5 percent of the populati on. Germans 23.4 percent. Magyars 5.6 percent. Ruthenians 3.5 percen t. Jews 1.4 perce nt. and Po les 0.6 percen t in the 1921 cens us. See Scftanr lidu v repub lice ceskosloven.~ke ze dne 15. unora I 921. Dfl I. (Prague: Statnf ufad statistick y. I 924 ). 7 See Bakke (ibid .. 1999). 465- 77 for a more detailed overv iew of the autonomy proposa ls. See also James Ramon Fe lak. '·A t the Price of the Republic ··. Hlinka ·s SLOVAKIA 56 The 1938 Constitutional a me ndm ent that inaugurated the shortli ved Second Republi c was based on the third a utonomy proposal of the Slovak People 's Party, which had been submitted in August 1938. The Second Re public co mbined a federa l state form with separate Slovak institutions : a leg islat ive asse mbl y (D iet), a se parate administration and separate co urts. The Slovak gove rnme nt was acco untabl e to the Die t, and received exec uti ve power in all matters under its juri sdi ction , as we ll as many matters unde r central jurisdiction. Slovak became the officia l lang uage in S lovakia, and separate c iti zenship was introduced. After World War II , the Czechos lovak govern me nt recognized the S lovaks as a separate nati on a nd the Slovak National Co un ci l (w hi c h de fac to controlled the liberated parts of Slovakia) as its representative. An exec utive Board of Commissioners was also establi shed. However, through the three Prague agreements and the two first postwar constituti ons, Slovak institution s were gradua ll y stripped of their power and co mpete nce, and Czechoslovakia return ed to a centrali st, unitary state fo rm , with a unicamera l leg is lature. 8 Part of the reaso n for the c la mpdow n o n the Slovak organs was the victory of the De mocratic Party in the 1946 e lectio ns, w hi c h convinced the Communists th at Slovakia could not be tru sted. 9 Slovak People ·s Party. 1929-J 938 (Pi tt sburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, I 994). especially pp. 30, 80- 1, 19 1- 92. ij The 1960 Constitution aboli shed the Board of Commissioners. See Program prve dom;Jcf v/ady repub liky vlady narodnf fronty Cechu a Slovaku, (Prag ue: Mini sterstvo l nformacf. 1945). I 6-17: Jaros lav Chovanec & Peter Mozolfk, Historicke a statopravne korene sa mostatn ost i slovenskej republiky , (Yydavatel's tvo Procom , Brati slava, 1994), 38, 11 4- 122; Michal Barn ovsky. " Tri prazske dohody", in Cesko- slovenske vztahy - Slovensko-ceske vzthhy (Liberec: Technick a Un i verzi ta, 1998). 119 ff.: Elisabeth Bakke, "The Principle of National Self-de termination in Czechoslovak Consti tuti ons 1920- 1992" . CEPSR. no. I O (2002), 173- 98 . 9 The Democratic Party received 62 .0 percent of th e votes in Slovakia. See Michal Barnovsky & Edita l vanickova, eds, Prve povojnove volby v strednej a j uhovychod- nej Eur6pe (Bratislava: VEDA, 1998). 2 15- 18. 57 SLOVAKIA Table 1: State Form, Administrative Structure and Institutional Set-up in Czechoslovak Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments Year 1920 State-forming State form Administrative nation Czechoslovak Un itary 22 co unties : Centra lized, from 1928 four bicameral legislature nation Institutional set-up structure provinces 1938 Czech and Federal Slovak nations 1948 Czech and Unitary Slovak nations Four provi nces : Asymmetric: Bohem ia. M ora- bicamera l via, Slovak ia. & separate Slovak Sub-Carpathian instituti ons with Ruthenia extensi ve powers Two prov inces , Asy mmetric; The Czech lands unicamera l & separate and Slovak ia Slovak inst itutions with lim ited powers 1960 Czech and Uni ta ry Slovak nati ons Two prov inces, Asymme tric: unicame- the Czech lands ra l & separate Slovak and Slovak ia institut ions with more l imited powers 1968 Czech and Federal Slovak nations Two repub lics, Symmetric: bicameral, T he Czech Re- federa l & separate publ ic and the Czech and Slovak Slovak Republ ic institut ions Source: A ll cons titutions can be found in Sbfrka zakonii a naHzenf stalU ceskoslovenskeho. During the Prag ue Spring of 1968, the questi on of Slovak autonomy reappeared on the agenda. The initi ati ve to amend the constituti on ca me from the Slovak Nati onal Council , and thi s time a sy mmetri c so luti on was pro posed, sy mboli zing the equality of the two state-forming nati ons. 10 Accordin g to the 1968 Constitution, Czecho- ' 0 T he process towards federa li za ti on is doc umented in Jozef Za tk uli ak, Fede- ra lizacia Ceskoslovenskeho Staw 1968- 1970. Vznik Cesko-sl ovenskej fede racie SLOVAKIA 58 slovakia became a federation of two republics, the Czech and th e Slovak Republic s, each with their ow n assemblies (National Councils), and their own govern ments. The bicameral federal legis lature consisted of the proporti onall y elected Chamber of the Peop le, and the Chamber of Nations where the two Republics were represented on equal terms. For important dec isions, a majority was req uired in the Peop le's chamber, as we ll as in the separate Czech and Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations, in effect giving the Slovaks veto powers. The 1968 Constitution provided the in stitutional foundations for Slovak autonomy, but in practice the political system remained centralized. The original division of power in the 1968 Constitution changed in favor of the federal level during the "Normali zation " of th e early 1970s, and fo rmal decision-making rul es and divi sion of powers did not matter much during Communism . As Carol Skalnik Leff has pointed out, however, federation plu s democra ti zation was a power eq uation. 11 After the Velvet Revo lution in 1989, th e 1968 Constitution acquired new importance; first , it determined the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution (a three-fifths majority in all parts of the federal parliament), and second, it became the point of departure for the negoti ati ons about the contents of a new constitutional settl ement. Under th e new, democratic co nditi ons, the Slovak minorit y had an excell ent bargaining position , since any cons ti tutional settlement required Slovak co nsent. After 1989 the questi on was, therefore, not whether Slovakia should have autonomy, but the ex tent of that autonomy. Separate Slovak institutions were taken for roku 1968 (B rn o: Nak ladatelstvi Doplnek, 1996). See also Jaros lav Krejci & Pave l Machonin , Czechos lovakia 19/8- 92. A U1bora to1y for Social Change (London: Macmill an, I 996), 45-7: Chovanec & Mozolik, (op.cit. , I 994). 48-52: Ales Gerloch . Jiri Hrebej & Vladimir Zoubek. Us tavnf sys tem Ceske republiky ( Prague: Prospektrum, 1999). 51-4 : Carol Skalni k Leff, National Conf7ict in Czechoslo vakia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 988), 243 ff. 11 Leff, 132-33. SLOVAKIA 59 granted, and autonomy now became a matter of allocating more decision-making power to the Republics. The " hyphen delJate" in the sprin g of 1990 was a foreboding of the problems that lay ahead. It was Pres ide nt Vaclav Havel who inadvertently started it. In Janu ary of 1990, without prior consultations, he submitted a constitutional amendment to the federal Parliament, proposing to drop the word "Soc iali st" from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic . Much to hi s and many others' surpri se, thi s trigged a bitter di spute about whether the name of the Republic should be spelled with or without a hyphe n. The main alternatives were the "Czec ho-S lovak Republic ," favored by a majority of the Slovaks, and the "Czechoslovak Federal Republic ," favored by a majority of the Czechs. Stalemate in the federal Parliament at first resulted in the absurd dec ision to spe ll the word "Czechoslovak" in one word in the Czech Republic and with a hyphen in Slovakia. Thi s was presented as a concession to "S lovak grammar. " This deci sion caused demonstration s in Slovakia, after which the Parliament made a hasty retreat and settled for the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ." 12 Negotiations about a new Czechoslovak Constitution started after the elections in June of 1990, but soon ran into trouble. As before, the Czech political elite was generally in favor of more centralized solutions than the Slovaks. The difference was that the Czech majority , rea li zing that a unitary state was not an option , now favored a " function al federation," while the majority of the Slovak political elite increas ing ly leaned toward s confederal rather than federal so lutions. 13 A temporary settl e me nt was reached in the Competency Law 12 Milan Sutovec. Semi6za aka politikum alebo ·'pomlckova vojna." (Bra ti slava: Kalli gram , I 999). 299 ff. 13 Opinion polls cons istently showed th at th e public in the Czech Republic preferred a unitary state. with a federation as the second most popular option. while a confederation never exceeded 6 percent support. By con trast, a confedera ti on or a federation was th e preferred state form in Slovakia. See table 12.3. in Sharon L. Wolchik, ''The Politi cs of Transition and the Break-up of Czechos lovakia," in Jiff Musil. ed. , op.cit.. 235. SLOVAKIA 60 of December 1990, whi c h more-or-less reestabli shed the co mpetency di vision of the 1968 Constitutio n. However, whil e thi s was abo ut as fa r as the Czechs we re w illing to go , the S lova ks looked at the Co mpete ncy Law merely as a po int of departure fo r further negoti ati ons. The core of the confli ct was the all ocati on of compe te nce and power in two specific areas: Eco nomi c po li cy a nd intern ati ona l re lations. The majority of the S lovak elite pressed fo r S lovak " visibility" in intern ati ona l rel ati ons, and wanted to all ocate more power in economi c matte rs to the Republics . The Czec h side wanted the federa l leve l to be stron g e nough to carry o ut the econo mi c reform s necessar y fo r th e tra ns iti o n to a market econo my, and wanted th e state internati onall y to speak with one vo ice . The negoti atio ns fa il ed to produce an acceptabl e co mpromi se befo re the 1992 elections, 14 and since the vic torious Czec h and Sl ovak parti es di sag reed fund ame nta ll y o n the iss ues of econo mic reform and state fo rm , they dec ided to di vide the state. It turn ed out th at both sides prefe rred a break-up rathe r than accepting the favo red state form of the othe r party, des pite the fac t that before the e lec ti ons, the future ex iste nce of Czec hos lovak ia was still ta ke n fo r granted . The onl y party th at advocated secess io n w as the Sl ova k Nationa l Party. 2. The Composition and Stability of the Elite Constellations In the inter- war peri od, the e lite conste ll atio ns fac in g eac h other were c lear-cut and quite stable. A clear majority of the Czec hos lovak parties was ce ntra li st a nd in fa vor of Czechoslo vaki sm. Thi s camp co mpri sed the e ntire Czech political e lite and a substanti al pa rt of the Slovak political e lite. Inte restingly, the major ce ntrali st pl ayers in the interw ar clashes about autonomy in the Parli ame nt were Slovak s, not Czec hs, a nd like th e ir adversaries, they were posin g as the c ha mpi ons of Slovak inte rests/the Slovak nati on. The two most influe nti al 14 T he negoti ators did reach a co mpromi se in the spring of 1992, but th is was turned down by th e pres idium of th e Slovak Nati onal Counci l. See Rychl fk , Roz pad. 2 18- 20. SLOVAKIA 61 Slovak centrali sts were the Agrarian Mi Ian Hodza ( 1878- I 944) and the Social Democrat I van Derer ( 1884- 1973). They represented their parties in the Parli ament during the entire First Republi c and betwee n th em, the two men served as mini sters for 23 yea rs. Milan Hodza even became the first Slovak Prime Mini ster in 1935. Apart from these two, the A grarian Anton Stefanek ( I 877-1964) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Igor Hrusovsky ( 1872- 1937), both seasoned parli amentari ans, played an espec iall y acti ve role in th e debates. By co ntrast, two Slovak parti es represented th e autonomist ca mp. arguing that the Slovaks were a nation of their own and, therefore, entitl ed to autonomy. 15 The larges t autonomi st party was the Slovak Peopl e's Party . Its co-founder and chairman Andrej Hlinka ( 1864- 1938), whose name was added to the party's title in 1925, was a dominatin g fi gure in the stru gg le for Slovak autonomy until hi s death in August of 1938. 16 Ferdinand (Ferdi s) Juriga ( 1878-1950) had been the onl y Slovak deputy in th e Hungari an Parli ament of 19 14 and he continued to defend Slovak autonomy in the Parliament also of the First Republi c. Jozef Ti so ( 1887- 1947) played an important role in the 1930s, as did editor-in-chief of Slovak, Karol Sidor ( 1901 - 53). The Slovak Nati onal Party never had more than one deputy - its chairman M artin Razus ( 1888- 1937) - and pl ayed a more peripheral role. After the Velvet Revolution, elite constellations were more vo latile. The Slovak political elite was from the outset divided on the quest ion of state form, the preferred so lution s ranging from mildl y federa li st to a loose confederat ion. From 1991 the Slovak National Party started to advocate independence, but already in 1990 th e chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Jan Carnogursky, argued th at Slovakia should enter the European Community as an in- " In addition. some of th e national minority parties and the Communists su pported autonomy. but for other reasons. '" See Felak. Ac Che Price of Che Republic. 1994: A lena Bartl ova. A ndrej Hlinka. ( Bratislava: Obzor. 1991 ). SLOVAKIA 62 de pende nt state. Hi s party was earl y in favo r of a confederal so luti on, but o nl y as a te mporary so luti on, until both Re publi cs joined the European Community. 17 Public Aga inst Vi o le nce was be ing pulled in o ppos ite direc ti o ns, and whe n the c irc le around Vl adimfr Mec ia r broke o ut and fo rmed the Moveme nt fo r a De mocrati c Slovaki a in 1991 , the liberal , federa li st oriented w in g re ma ined , whil e the national populi sts w ith confedera l lea nings fo ll owed Mec iar. In the 1992 e lecti on Mec iar' s Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a appeared as the main champion of Slovak interests. The Czec h politica l e lite was fro m the o utset more indiffe rent to the nati onal questi on. Wh ile Public Aga inst Vi o le nce had the nati onal questi o n as o ne of its top pri o riti es , it was co mpl ete ly absent fro m the agenda of C ivic Forum in the first e lecti o n. In stead , " bac k to Eu ro pe" and e limination of communi sm we re the top pri oriti es. 18 Espec iall y after the " ma nagers" aro und Vac lav Kl aus won over the di ss ide nt w in g of C ivic Forum in 199 1, the leadin g Czec h po liti ca l e lite united in favo r of a stro ng fe derati o n. In th e 1992 e lec ti o n Kl aus' C ivic De mocratic Party ca me o ut as the main c hampi on of a federa l so luti on. The Move me nt fo r a De mocrati c S lovaki a and the C ivi c De mocrati c Party won the e lecti ons in th e ir respective Re publics, whil e parti es th at took a more mode rate stand on the questi on of state fo rm lost. Once the victors w ith Vac lav Kl aus and Vl adimfr Mec iar at the he lm had dec ided to di vide the state, fo rmer ene mi es beca me alli es, and the e lite conste ll ati ons changed according ly. The fo rme r oppone nts in the negoti ati o ns on state fo rm now united in favo r of a break-up , aga inst a motl ey c rew of oppos ition parti es, co mpri sing Czec h and Slovak Communi st and Soc ial De mocrati c parties, as we ll as Miros lav Slade k 's ultra- nati ona li st Republican Party of C zec hoslo vaki a. 17 Stein , Czecho/Slovakia. 67 . 93-4. '~Oskar Krejci. Kniha o volbich. (Prag ue: Victori a Pu bli sh ing. 1994). 2 10- 11. SLOVAKIA 63 3. The Arguments in Favor of Autonomy If we turn to the actual arg ume nts, the main impress ion is that there were e lements of continuity as well as c ha nge when we go from the interwar period to the post-Communist period. On the one hand, the argume nts in favor of autonomy were located within the sa me nat io nalist di sco urse in both periods . On the other hand , the composition of the arg uments in favor of autonomy changed, and so did the contents of the autonomy demands, as we have seen. In the interwar period, the principle of national se lf-determination was used as an arg ument in favor of an asymmetric federation; after 1989 it was first used as an argument in favor of confederal so lutions, and then in favor of an independent Slovak state. Arguments in Favor of Autonomy During the First Republic In the inter-war period , the cornerstone of the a utonomists was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation , and the core message was that this Slovak nation was entitl ed to auto nomy. The premi se linkin g national identity to the matter of state form was the principle of national se lf-determination, understood as the ri ght of cu ltu ra ll y distinct nation s to se lf-governance. 19 In the a utonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used thi s right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czec hs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state. Moreove r, as a free a nd equa l nation , the S lovaks were entit led to manage the ir own affairs and, therefore , to autonomo us political institutions. In practice, autonomy demands were always made on be half of Slovakia, yet for the a utonomists this amo unted to the same , s ince they regarded Slovakia as the homeland of the Slovaks, despite its substantial national minoriti es. 19 The principle of national self-determination can be interpreted in at least two other ways: as the right of the people to choose their government without coercion , i.e. popular sovereig nty - or as th e right of independent states to manage their affa irs without foreign intervention. See e.g. 0yvind 0sterud, Nasjonenes selvbestemmel- sesrett. (Oslo: Un iversitetsforlaget. 1984). 150 ff. 64 SLOVAKIA The Slovak a uto nomi sts argued a lon g three ma in lin es. First, they argued that Slovakia was discriminated aga in st in vario us ways, and that autono my was necessary to a ll eviate S lovakia's ill s. Second , they arg ued that Slovakia was entit led to auto no my by virtu e of various " co ntrac ts" (e.g. th e Pittsburgh Agreement). Finally, they argued that the Slovaks had the right to auto nom y s impl y because they were a natio n (the classical nation ali st arg umen t). The point of departure for the deprivation mguments was that the Slovaks were an indi vid ua l nati o n wit h separate nationa l interests, and that these national interests were not properly loo ked after under th e present centrali zed state form. Here S lovak grievances were turned into reasons for autonomy, and autonomy was the so lution to everythin g. Most of the gr ieva nce arguments for auton o my were associated with the use of Slovak as the offic ial lang uage in Slovakia and w ith (w hite-co llar) jobs fo r the Slovak inte lli gentsia. The sig na l words were " Slovak bread" . For in sta nce, before th e 1929 e lec ti on, the a utonomi st news paper Slovak argued that " a uto nomy does no t only mean political ri g hts, but a lso bread. When we get our own administration , our ow n asse mbly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be e mpl oyed there. [ ... ] The auton o mo us adm ini strati o n of the Slova k home land will compel the e mployers first a nd foremost to gran t the Slovaks work and bread." 20 Accord in g to the contract oriented lin e of arg um e nts , Slovakia had the right to autonomy by virtue of certai n (a ll eged ly) binding doc um e nts or "co ntracts". The point of departure was again that the Slovaks were an indi vidu a l and sovere ig n natio n, and th at S lovakia was the ho me la nd of the Slovaks. The argume nt was that Slovakia had been promised autono my, a nd th at thi s promise was lega ll y bindin g. However, fo r a co ntract to be va lid , it must be stipul ated th at the sig natori es had the right to s ig n agreements on behalf of those they were said to represent - in this case th e Czec h and Slovak nati o ns. 20 Slovak no. 240, 22 October I929. p. 3. SLOVAKIA 65 Several of the many declarations and agreements that were formulated during World War I were used as arguments for (or against) autonomy . However, two documents stand out: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th , 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th , 1918. The former was a clear asset, while the latter soon became a liability (see next subsection). The Martin Declaration had been adopted at an as sembly of all Slovak political parties in Turciansky Svaty Martin. For the autonomists , the significance of the Martin Declaration was that through this act, the Slovaks had voluntarily joined the Czechs as equal s in one state, and they had therefore an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs. Moreover, as an equal nation which had entered the state voluntarily, the Slovaks had the right to autonomy. In effect, the autonomi sts gave the Martin declaration state-forming significance. This was also reflected in repeated attempts to turn October 30th into a national holiday. Compared to the other wartime declarations , however, the Pittsburgh Agreement had some obvious advantages. First and foremost , it had greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government, because Czechoslovakia's first president and co-founder Tomas G. Masaryk had signed it, along with Czech and Slovak emigre leaders in the United States. 2 1 Second, the Agreement contained the most important autonomy demands. From the moment the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, it was invoked in every single debate where autonomy was " M asaryk was not Pres ident at th e tim e, of course, but on the initi ati ve of th e Slov ak L eague he signed a calliographed version of the Ag ree ment on November 14th. 19 I 8, the very same day he was elected Pres ident of the Republic. Besides. on October 3 1st. 19 18, th e Czec hoslov ak Nation al Committee had declared as bindin g all ac ti ons by members of the pro visional government abroad (including M asaryk). It may be argued that if the decl arati on of the establi shment of th e Czechos lovak state was valid. then the authori zation of Masaryk 's ac ti ons was valid as we ll. In practice, th e va lidity of th e Pittsburgh Agreement was a political , not a lega l matter. For the tex t of the statement , see Benes (op. cit. . 1929). 490. See also M. M ark Stolarik (op. cit. , 1968), 49. SLOVAKIA 66 mentioned. At first glance, this Agreement would seem to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, the usage varied. Early in the period, the autonomists would present the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta granting the Slovaks the right to autonomy. Later, it became more common to present it as a binding contract. The concept of a Magna Charta brings to mind a sovereign granting hi s subjects certain rights and privileges, and it was Masaryk who (implicitly) had this role. When the Pittsburgh Agreement was presented as a contract, the contracting partners were at first the Czech and Slovak nation s. However, especially after it became public knowledge in 1922 that President Masaryk had actually drafted it, he was increasingly presented as a contracting partner. This shift can also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the leg itimate representatives of their co-nationals at home. However, the third and most common use, especially in the 1930s, was the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" or as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation (not just a small faction, but of all Slovaks). The point of departure was that the Slovaks were an individual nation with a natural right to self-determination, and therefore to autonomy if it so wishes. This usage was associated with the third , classical nationalist line of argument, which rested on three premises: I. that the Slovaks were an individual nation ; 2. that nation s had the right to self-determination; and 3. that the Slovak autonomists represented the true will of the Slovak nation - which was autonomy. The second premise was often implicit, while a lot of effort was put into defending Slovak individuality and the right to speak on the Slovaks ' behalf. The autonomists employed two main strategies to substantiate their claim. One strategy was to argue from the majority, which meant resorting to "advanced math". Election results here came in handy. In a parliamentary debate in 1933, Jozef Tiso argued that as a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the SLOVAKIA 67 Slovak nation. Upon subtracting the stipulated Czech and Magyar votes from the votes cast for the centralist parties in Slovakia, he ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the Slovak People ' s Party and the Slovak National Party put together. 22 A second strategy was personal attacks (argumentum ad homi- nem), which were often used to defend the existence of a Slovak nation as well as the claim for autonomy. The autonomists would then accuse Slovak deputies belonging to the Czechoslovak parties of being " renegades," " Phari sees," "sodomites" and "careerists ," and, therefore, not worthy of representing the Slovak nation. In his rather biblical language, the chairman of the Slovak People ' s Party, Andrej Hlinka, argued in 1927 that "S lovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago. " 23 Continuity and change after 1989 After 1989, the core message was still that the Slovaks were entitled to national se lf-determination "q ua nation," although the contents of this self-determination had changed from an asymmetric federation to confederate so lutions or even independence. The most important changes compared to the interwar period were, first , that there was no longer any need to defend the existence of an individual Slovak nation , since that was taken for granted, and second, a change in th e composition of the arguments. Deprivation arguments and contract oriented arguments were nearly absent, while classical nationalist arguments now dominated , and the principle of national se lf-determination was invoked more explicitly. 22 30 I. schuze poslanecke snemov ny N.S .R.C. dne 29 . li stopadu 1933. in Tesnopi- secke zpravy o scht1zfch poslanecke snemovny Narodnfho shromaidenf republiky ceskoslovenske. Ill. volebnf obdobf. (Prague. 1929- 35), 47- 50. 23 Hlinka, Slovak no. 86, 16 April , I 927 , p. I. "Sodomi tes•· referred to Social Demo- crats. as a play on wo rd s. SLOVAKIA 68 There are, of co urse, some differe nces between the various debates, which is perha ps not surpri sin g, sin ce the topics of the debates a lso differed. The principle of nati ona l se lf-determi nati o n was most ex plicitly vo iced in the 1992 debates in the federa l parliament (th e two debates on the break- up of Czec hos lovak ia), a nd in the Slovak National Council (the de bates on the S lovak Declaration of Sovere ig nty and the Slovak Constitution ). Conve rse ly. thi s principle was more impli c it in the 1990 " hyphen debate". The " hyphe n debate" is perhaps the most atyp ica l, in terms of topic ("Czecho-Slo vak Republic" with a hyphen versus "Czechos lovak Federal Republic") as we ll as types of arg ume nt. First, thi s is rea ll y the o nl y debate where identity pl ayed any major part. Ide ntity arg uments appeared in two forms: On the one hand , it was arg ued that for the S lovaks, to spe ll the word Czecho-Slovak w ithout a hyphe n was tantamo unt to accepting the abe rrati o n of Czec hos lova ki sm. On the o ther hand , it was arg ued that th e hyphe n ex pressed Slovak nati o na l indi vidu a lity and the equa l standing of the Czech and Slovak nati o ns in the federati o n. Second, the hyphe n debate is the only debate where the Pittsburg h Agreement was me ntion ed more than o nce. However, of th e six speake rs referrin g to it, o ne appea led to the Agreement to substantiate the c laim for a hyph e n in the "Czecho-Slovak" Rep ubli c. (thi s is how the word was spelled in the orig ina l), while the rest bas ically referred to it as an express io n of the eq ual status of the two natio ns e ntering the state , or as a part of the hi storical narrative lead ing up to the federalization. Nobody referred to it as a contrac t, and the Czech National Socialist Bi anka Hykova even quoted Masaryk to the effect that it was o nl y a n agreement between American Czechs and Slovaks. 2-1 Contract oriented arguments thus disappeared a ltogeth er, and refere nces to the Pittsburg h Agreeme nt and/or the Martin Dec lara20 See Zprava o 26. spolecne sc hi'1zi snemovny lidu a snemovny narodu. 29.3. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky V. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1986-90), 25 1. 253 , 256, 270, 304. SLOVAKIA 69 tion were rare. A utonomy was ex plicitly mentioned in the contex t of the Pittsburgh Ag reement onl y once, in the second debate abou t th e brea k-up of th e state. According to I va n Simko from the Chri stian Democratic Movement, Slovak organization s in the U nited States had made an agreement wi th Masaryk "as a leading personality of Czech po litica l li fe" to fo rm a shared state where Sl ovaki a was to have an autonomous position. Thi s agreement was unfortun ately not honored , he argued. 25 Depri vation arg uments were al so rare . The phrase " Slovak bread" occurred onl y once: In the first debate on the break -up of the state in September 1992, Michal Ko vac from the Mo ve ment for a Democratic Slovaki a ( later to beco me Slovaki a's first pres ident) argued that in a normally functioning federation , it wo uld not be possible for the standard of li ving in Slovaki a to drop as much as it had in onl y two yea rs. In another four years , he argued, " Would we not be in the hi storica l situation w here we have already been, that the Slovak nation would have to go abroad for bread, because there would not be bread for people in Slovakia? And we wou ld be as weakened as we once were under dear father Masaryk." 26 However, in the interw ar period " Slovak bread" was usuall y tantamount to w hite-collar jobs for the yo ung Slovak intelli gentsia in Slovaki a, whi le here th e lack of " bread " obvious ly refers to general unemployment. The probl em was real enough - in the earl y 1990s the unemployment ra te in Slovak ia was three or four times the Czech average. 27 25 Zprava o 5. spo lecne schu zi snemovny lidu a snemo vny narodu. 18.11 . 1992 . 25 .1 1.1 992. in Federi ln f shromiidenf Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V il. vo lebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 7 17. 2 '' Zprava o 4. spo lec ne sc huzi snemo vny lidu a snemov ny narodu 29.9. 1992. in Fe- denilni shro m;ii deni Ceske a S/ovenske Federaci vnf republiky. V II. vo lebnf obdobf, ( 1992). 60 I. 27 11. 8 percent in Slovaki a vers us 4. 1 percent in the Czec h Republic in 199 1: 10.3 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992. Transition reporc I 996. (L ondon. The European Bank fo r Reconstructi on and Deve lopment. I 996). However. th e difference was even larger in 1993. the first yea r of independence. SLOVAKIA 70 Finall y, compared to the interwar period , classica l nationalist ar g uments were much more co mmon , and the principle of nation al self-determination was invoked more ex plicitly. In the debate about the allocation of competence between the Republics and the Federation it was used as an argument in favor of returnin g to the original 1968 Constitution. 28 Y et, the most co mmon use of th e principle of national self-determination was as an argument in favor of establi shing an independent Slovak state or dividin g Czechoslovakia. There are, however, some interestin g nation al differences between actors in how they used it. Slovak deputies speaking in favor of Slovak independence invoked the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Slovak nation . They regarded it as an inalienable, natural ri ght, and in one instance, even as a God-given ri ght. 29 An independent Slovak state was presented as the fulfillment of IO00 years of strugg le for Slovak individuality and sovereignty , and as the result of a natural , hi storical process of national emancipation . In the words of HZDS deputy chairman Au gustfn Marian Huska , " the Constitution is the fulfillm ent and lega l enac tment of th e ri ght to se lf-determination . ( ... )To the Slovak s, whose consciousness was molded by more than a thou sand years under foreign rule , the feeling of dependence had become second nature. Slowly, but persistently they formed an awareness of the need for self-determination , the need to search for, find , 28 Zprava o 9. spolecne schi°1zi snemovny lidu a snernovn y narodu. 11 .- 12. 12. 1990. in Federalnf shromaidenf CSFR. ( 1990-1992) . < ww,~ .p,p.c:dckni h/ I 990fs/sbn/-stcn -prot/009,c: hu t./s009077. html/ d> [2 Febru ary, 2004]. See also the debate on th e Slovak declaration of so vereignty. Stenograficka sprava o 3. sch6dzi Slovenskej narodnej rndy konanej 17. j ul a 1992. < www .nr,r.sk/i ndexarch.a,p> ]4 Febru ary. 2004 J. 29 Sedovic (S lovak National Part y), Zprava o 5. spol ec ne schu zi SL a SN , 18. 11 . 1992. in Federalnf shro,mii denf Ceske a Slovenske Federati vnf republiky. VII. volebnf obdobf. ( 1992). 788. 71 SLOVAKIA ex press. a nd at las t rea li ze sovere ig nty." 30 S lova ki a was in o th e r word s pi ctured as a nati on-state a nd the S lova ks as the state-forming nati o n. Howeve r, in the de bates in the Sl ovak Nation a l Counc il , Slovak deputi es, inc ludin g Prime Mini ster Vl adim fr Mec iar, at the same tim e pro mi sed to res pec t the eq ua l rig hts of a ll c iti ze ns, nati o na l minorities and ethni c groups. De puti es re presentin g th e Magyar mino rity in the S lovak Nationa l Counc il recog ni zed o r eve n s uppo rted the S lovak ri g ht to selfde te rmin ati o n, but argued that the princ ipl e sho uld a lso appl y to the nati o na l mino riti es. Thi s was a n arg ume nt in favo r of auto no my. At the same time, Magyar deputi es arg ued th at S lovaki a sho uld not be presented as a nati o n- state in the Co nstituti o n, bec au se it was not nation all y ho moge neous. Founding the state o n the nati o na l princ ipl e meant turnin g the minoriti es into second-c lass c iti zens, they argued . Czec h de puti es co nsiste ntly presented the break-up of Czec hoslovaki a as a matte r of se lf- determinati o n fo r the Slovak nati o n. The 1992 e lecti o n. the Slovak Dec larati o n of Sovere ig nty, and the Slovak Constituti o n were take n as proof th at the S lovak natio n did wa nt inde pende nce. In the words of Prime Mini ste r Vacl av Kl aus of the Czec h Re publi c: "The S lova k nati o n used the o ppo rtunity to co mpl e te its nati o na l e manc ipati o n by fo undin g its own state. Thi s is a rea lity we mu st res pect. " 3 1 T he arg ume nt th at the Czec hs had no ri ght to deny th e S lovak natio n its rig ht to se lf-de termin ati o n was a lso used aga in st ho ld in g a referend um in the Czech Republi c; Czec h c itizens could no t dec ide whet her the S lovaks sho uld beco me a statefo rming natio n o r no t. Interestin g ly, the princi pl e of nati o na l se lf-determin ati o n was not even o nce in voked o n be ha lf of the Czec h na- -'" For Huska ·s statement and the debate on the Const itut ion. see Stenograficka sprava o 5. sch6dzi S lovenskej mirodnej rady kona nej 31. augusta a I . septembra 1992. <www.nr,r. ., k/indexarch.a,p> 14 February . 20041. -' 1 K laus in th e debate on th e Czech Constitution . Ceskii narodnf rada I 992- 1992. Stenoprotokoly. I 0. schuze. 16.- 17. 12. 1992. <www.psp.cz/cknih/ I 992cnr/,tenprot/O I 0schuzi> 13 February. 2004J. SLOVAKIA 72 tion .32 The reason is obvious: The Czechs did not regard the establi shme nt of the Czec h Republic as a state-formin g process, but as a restoration of Czech statehood , which expl icitly included Czechoslovak state tradition s. But the n the Czechs a lways rega rded Czechoslovakia as their state. Apart from the princ ipl e of national se lf-determination , the main lin e of argument in favor of di ssolution may be termed reali st. It was argued that the federation did not work or that it was a lread y dead, that it was too late to save the state, and now the important thing was to e nd the state in a peaceful , orderly, cultivated , adult and leg itimate fashion , and to ensure good ne ighborl y relation s be twee n the future inde pe nde nt states. 4. The Centralist Arguments Against Autonomy If we turn to the centra li st side, di sco ntinuity 1s th e word that first co mes to mind. In the inte rwar period , the centrali st arg ume nts against a utonomy were located within a nation a li st di sco urse, and mirrored the autonomist arguments to a large ex tent , the difference be ing th at the centralists based the ir arg uments on an a lte rn ative national id eo logy - Czec hos lovakism . After 1989 , the "ce ntra li st" arg um e nts changed profoundly . Czechos lov akism had been abandoned already in 1945 , and the unitary state form in 1968. The "centrali sts" afte r 1989 were , the refore, centra li sts on ly re lative to those advocating confederate so luti ons, a nd in the las t instance, inde pe ndence for Slovakia. " The principle of national se l f-de term ination was invoked on behalf of the .. Moravian nati on" ( 1.5 million . accord ing to the 199 1 census). but then as an argument in favor of Moravi an autonomy in a Czecho-Morav ian federation . See espec ially the speec hes of deputies Jan Jeg la and Jiff Bfl y (both from the Moravi an movement H SD-SMS) . Ceska narodnf rada 1992- 1992 . Stenoprotokoly. 10. sc huze , 16.17. 12. 1992. < www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1992<.:nr/~tenprot/0 I 0schuz/> 13 Febru ary , 2004J. SLOVAKIA 73 Centralist Arguments during the First Republic ln the inter-war period, the co rnerstone of the ce ntra li st argumentati on was that the Czechs and Slovak s were one Czechoslovak nati on (a lbe it w ith two tri bes), and the core message was th at a ce ntra li zed state form was necessary to preserve nati onal unity and th e integrity of th e state. T he premi se linking nati onal identity to state fo rm was the principl e of nati onal se l f-determin ati on. According to the centrali sts, the Czechos lovak nati on had used its ri ght to self-determ ination to re uni te in a Czechos lovak nati on-state, and thi s unity had to be preserved.·13 A uto nomy for Slovak ia was seen as a th reat to Czechos lovak nationa l unity as we ll as state in tegrity , first because it wo uld dri ve th e two tribes of the Czechos lovak nati on apart, and second , beca use granting Slovaki a autonomy wo ul d be tantamoun t to recogni zing th e Slovak s as a separate nati on, w hich would j eopardi ze the state's ra ison d'etre. Th e centra lists co untered the depri vati on arguments of the autonomi sts in two ways . On the one hand, they denied that the Slovak s were d iscrimin ated agai nst, and on the other hand , they rejec ted autonomy as a suitabl e remedy to Slovaki a's alleged ill s. What was needed to help Slovak ia was not autonomy, but more unity, especiall y economica ll y, the ce ntra li sts argued. Thi s was entirely in line w ith thei r overall "strength th ro ugh unity" message. However, their main artill ery was aimed at the contract-oriented arguments, and espec iall y the Pi tts burgh Agreement. T he main ar guments were: I . T he A meri ca n Czechs and Slovaks were not leg itimate represe ntati ves of th eir co-n ati onals at home, and had no ri ght to dec ide on their behal f; 2. The Pittsburg h Agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain hi stori ca l va lue; but in order to be va lid, it wo uld need the co nse nt of Czechs and Slovak s at home; and 3. Leg itimate Slovak represe ntati ves had conse nted to Czec hos lovak ·'-' There was no big difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovak cen tralists in terms of the co ntents of national identity. In both cases . national identi ty was defined in terms of culture. language and ancestry. See Bakke (op.c it. , 1999). especia ll y Chapter I 0. fo r documentati on. SLOVAKIA 74 national and state unity in the Constitu ti on of 1920, as we ll as at assem bli es before and after Pittsburg h. The first arg ume nt was especia ll y damag in g, since it went to the core of a ll the auto no mi st argument s assoc iated w ith the Pittsburg h Agreement , in va lid atin g the Agreement as a Magna C harta, as a binding contract, a nd as an express io n of the will of the Slovak natio n. It was more difficult for the ce ntra li sts to de nou nce the leg iti macy of Masaryk as a represe ntati ve of the Czec hos lovak state, but the Pres ident did his best to free him se lf and the government of any obligation. Masaryk c la imed that he had sig ned the Pittsburg h Agreement in order to "appease a sma ll Slovak fact io n that dreamed of God know s what sort of independence for Slovakia ," and di smi ssed it as "a loca l pac t between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." 34 There is littl e doubt that Masaryk drafted the Agreement in order to ap pease a part of the Slovak League, but o ne may wo nder why this was important to him if he rega rded the m mere ly as American citizens. I think Mark Stol arik has a va lid point when he arg ues that th e American Slovaks he lped legiti mi ze th e creation of Czechoslovakia in the abse nce of a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary (caused by war censorship).·15 Masaryk a lso tried , un successfu ll y, to di sc redit the Pittsburg h Agreement through quasi- lega li sti c arguments. In a le tte r to Andrej Hlinka on October 12th, 1929, Masaryk c laimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was "a forge ry," because at the time, the em ig re organization of the Slovaks present in Pitts burgh , "the [Slovak l Leag ue lega ll y did no t ex ist, and it was recognized by th e Government o nl y in 191 9." Hlinka evide ntl y wrote the Slovak Leag ue , w hi ch retorted th at the re was " no doubt a bout th e a uthe nti c ity of th e Pittsburg h Agreement," and A merica n lega l experts confirmed th at there was no " Tomas G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce. (Prague: Orbis a Ci n. 1925). 262-263. 35 M . Mark Stolarik (op.c it.. 1968). 54. SLOVAKIA 75 difference between chartered a nd unc hartered orga ni zatio ns w ith respect to entering such ag ree me nts. 36 T o prop up the claim that leg itim ate Slovak representatives had co nsented to Czec hos lovak nat io na l and state unity after Pitts burg h, the ce ntrali sts preferred to use the Martin Dec lara ti o n of October 30th , 19 18, since thi s Dec laration had been unanimou sly accepted at a n asse mbl y of a ll Slovak po liti ca l part ies. In the beg innin g, they also used the 1920 Constitution for th e same purpose, but the trouble was th at th e Slovak Club in the Constitutional Assembly was coo pted , and arguably not representative of Slovak opinion. The ma in reason why the Martin Dec larati on was s uc h a n asset for the centrali sts, was the sente nce statin g th at the "S lovak nati o n is lingui sti ca ll y as we ll as culturally-historically pa rt of th e unitary Czec ho-Sl ovak nation ." Moreover, the asse mbl y at M artin had demanded nat io na l se lf-dete rmin ation on behalf of this "Czecho-S lovak nat io n," w hil e at the sa me time it was s il e nt on auton omy. The ce ntrali sts thu s used it as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity, and as proof of the will of the Slovaks to e nter s uc h a unity. (Rumor in Slovakia had it th at the passage o n Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was , however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samue l Zoch, who had dra fted it).:17 Finally , the centrali sts counte red the c lass ic a l nati o na li st arg ume nt by rejecting the first premi se, that the Slovaks were an indi vidual nation, a nd the third premise. that the autonomi sts represented the tru e w ill of the Slovak nati o n. They presented the Slovaks as a tribe of th e Czechoslovak nati o n, and the Slovak me mbe rs o f the ce nt ral ist parties as the leg itim ate Slovak rep rese ntat ives. At the sa me time, they accepted the seco nd premi se, th at nati o ns had th e -' 6 The letter is pub lished as Document No. 30 in Joseph A. Mikus. Slova kia. A Poli- tica l and Constitutional Histo1y . (Brati slava: SAP. I 995) 209-2 10. The answer of th e Slovak League was published in Slo vak no. 194. 27 August. 1930. p. I. See also M. Mark Stolarik (op. cit.. 1968). 48-49. 52. -' 7 V ac lav Chaloupecky: Martinshi deklilrace 19- 20. II jejf politicke osudy (Prague. I 928). SLOVAKIA 76 right to sel f-determin ati on, but as we have seen, th ey in vo ked thi s prin ciple on behalf of th e Czec hos lovak nati on. A n I va n Derer specialty was the argument th at i f the Slovak s had been an indi vidual nati on, then they w ould have th e ri ght to secess ion, not onl y to autonomy. 38 B oth sides had their share of argumentati on errors. T he ce ntrali sts argued from maj ority (a rg umentum ad populum ) in the earl y 1920s, w hen they recei ved the maj ority of the Slovak votes, and personal attacks (arg umentum ad hominem) were ac tu all y mos t co mmon on th e centrali st side. probabl y because they fi tted so we ll into their genera l strength-th ro ugh-unity argument. T he Slovak autonomi sts were accused of being " M agyarones" or " new Slovaks," thereby impl y ing th at they had other loya lties or identities,'9 and of being paid by the Hungari an government. In both cases, the M agyars had the ro le of ·'bogeyman" . T hi s M agyarone ca rd was used to expl ain w hy the Slovaks had turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present , and to co unter th e autonomi st c laim th at they we re the so le leg itimate representati ves of the Slovak nati on. I f the ce ntra li sts believed th at Sl ovak autonomy would j eopardi ze Czechos lovak nati onal unity and th e integrit y of th e state, it w as quite log ica l to acc use th e autonomi sts of being renegades (though probabl y not very smart). Profound Changes after 1989 After 1989 there was not much left of the former ce ntra list arguments, which is not surpri sing considering that Czec hos lovaki srn had 18 • I van Derer. Ceskos/ovensk;i otizkil. (Prague : Orbis. 1935). 88- 90. 39 Both labels we re commonly used about people of Slovak origi n who had become more or less ass imil ated during Hungari an rul e. but who turned back after 19 18. There we re some known M agyarones among the autonomists (chiefl y Franti sek Jehlicka and Yoj tech/ Bela Tuka). but the lead ing figures (Hlin ka. Juri ga) had defended Slovak interests also under Hungary. T he total number of people who ac tu ally switched nati onal affi l iatio n from Magyar to Slovak i n the firs t ten years of Czec hos lovaki a cannot be ascertained prec ise ly, but an educated guess is th at it was betwee n 250.000 and half a million. See Bak ke (op.cit. . 1999). 305- 307. SLOVAKIA 77 been abandoned and a unitary state form was no longer an option. Th e "centralists" still accepted the principle of nati onal self- determinati on; however, they now recogni zed the Czec hs and Slovaks as equal , state-forming nation s and Czechoslovakia as a Czech and Slova k nati on-state. As long as state form was sti 11 on the agenda, the players on the "centrali st" side were mostly Czechs, and the task was to defend a " function al federation ," which meant to preserve the powers of the federation v is-a-vi s the Republics. Once the break-up of the state appeared on the agenda after the 1992 electi ons, however , th e "centra li st" pl ayers were Czech and Slovak opposition parti es and the task was now to preserve a common Czechoslovak state. In the hy ph en debate, as we ll as in the co mpetenc y debate, Czech deputi es explicitly presented th e federal state form as an express ion of the equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. The main Czech arguments against th e hy phen were that it was divi sive, and that it was unacceptable to the Czech publi c. This probabl y had something to do with the fact that the Second Czecho-Slovak Republi c ( 1938-- 39) was spelled with a hyphen. It was also argued that it was grammati ca ll y probl emati c, th at the original spelling had been without a hyphen (an hi stori ca l argument), and th at the Morav ians would feel offended (an identity argument). The main arguments in favor of a strong federation were that it was necessary in order to carry out the economic reform s and to fulfill Czechos lovakia 's internati onal obligati ons. For the Czech elite, the power and competency of the Czech Republic was irrelevant. In fact, I have onl y found one example of a Czec h deputy in vok ing nat ional interests, and he arg ued th at a confederate solution would be contrary to Czech interests.-lO The Czech and Slovak opposition parties that defended Czec hoslovaki a's ex istence in the debates in the fall of 1992 were mostly Socialists and Communists, but also included the ultra-nati onali st ' 0 M andl er (Libera l Democra ti c Part y). Zprava o 9. spol ecne schuzi SL a S . 11.- 12.1 2. 1990, in Fedenilnf shromaf.difof Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky V I . vo lebnf obdobf ( 1990), <www.psp.c z/ci,.nih/ 19901\h,bnf!.,tcnprot/009,c:hud ,009()77. htrn ll d> [4 February 2004 1. 78 SLOVAKIA Republican s. Even thoug h this opposition accepted th e principle of national se lf-determination , they mostly interpreted it in the origina l meanin g - as popular sovereignty . The totally dominating line of argument was that the only leg itimate way of dividin g Czechoslovakia according to the principle of se lf-determination was to let the citizens decide by popular vote, a nd that it was unacceptable to divide the state against the will of the peopl e. In the first debate on dissolution , thi s was supported by a hi storical a nalogy. By accident, the debate was held 54 years after the fateful Munich agreement, and the opposition argued that a new Munich was about to happen: Again the fate of the Czechoslovak state wou ld be dec ided without asking the peop le. In the first debate the oppos ition parties advocated a refere ndum before the decision was made; in the second debate a ratifying pl ebisc ite. The motive was obvious ly to save the state, since all opin ion poll s showed that a clear majority was in favor. However, very few deputies ac tually defended the me rits of Czechoslovakia, although a handful of Czechs professed their love for the shared homeland , or invoked the legacy of the founding fathers , mostly T.G. Masary k and Milan Rasti slav Stefanik. Finally, a weak echo of the inte rwar debate could be heard in claims that separation would be a threat to the future existence of the Czech and Slovak nation s (reminiscent of the strength-through-unity argument), and in charges of treason (personal attac ks). Ne ither line of argument was very common. The claim that voting in favor of disso luti on was an act of treason was a preserve of the ultra-nationalist Republican Party of Czec hos lovakia. The debates a lso had their amusing sides, for in stance in the use of metaphors. The federation was alternately see n as a leaking ship, a train being pulled in opposite directions , and an old patient with a severe heart condit ion , whi le the establishment of the new states was compared to giving birth to twins! SLOVAKIA 79 5. Summary and Conclusion [n the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was a unitary , centralized state, and autonomy was a matter of separate Slovak institutions. After 1989, Czechoslovakia was a sy mm etric federation of two nationa l Republic s. Separate Slovak inst itutions were, therefore, no longer an iss ue, and autonomy became a matter of allocating more deci s ion-makin g power to the Republic s. However, in both cases, there was a conflict over state form, and in both cases the content of that conflict was how centralized the state should be. As for the actors , the e lite constellations were most stable in the inte rw ar pe riod . However, as lon g as the conflict was about state form, the Czech political elite was in favor of the most centralized so lution , while the Slovak elite was divided . Once the break-up of Czechoslovakia was on the agenda, the re were Czech and Slovak parties on both si des. If we focus on the main arguments on either side, we can obse rve continuity as well as change. Durin g the First Republic , the arguments of both sides were located within a nationali st discourse, but they founded their argume ntation on alternative nation al ideologies. The centralists invoked the principle of national se lf-dete rmination on behalf of the "Czechoslovak nation", the autonomists on behalf of the Slovak nation . After the Velvet Revolution , the autonomist argume nts were still located within a nationali st di scourse, and when the victorious part ies in the 1992 elections dec ided to divide the state, the Czech si de simply adopted the Slovak arg uments. By contrast, the "centrali st" arguments in the debate on state form were mainly economic, while the arguments in the debate on the break-up of Czechoslovakia were procedural. The most strik in g feature of the autonomy di sco urse after 1989 is therefore the asy mmetry of the arguments on both sides. Let us now address th e question of how the arguments related to the principle of national se lf-determination : On the autonomist side, the core message was the sa me in both periods; that the Slovaks were e ntitl ed to autonomy or se lf-determination "qu a nation ." Howeve r, 80 SLOVAKIA the principle of natio na l se lf-d etermin a ti o n was in voked more ex plicitl y after the Velvet Revo lution . On the centra li st side, the principle was used as an argument against a utono my in the interwar period , and w ith a certain twist, against the break-up of Czechos lovakia in 1992 . In the latter case, se lf-de te rmin ation was understood as popul ar sovere ignty - i.e . as a democratic principle. It is also inte res tin g that after 1989, the principl e of nation a l se lfdetermination was consistently invoked on behalf of the Slovaks, not on behalf of the Czechs, other than in the context of Czechoslovakia as the nation- state of two individual , sovere ign nations. In conclusion , the continuity was strongest on the autonomist side , alth ough th e conte nts of nation al se lf-determination c hanged from autonom y to independence. On the "centrali st" side, most of the a mmunition aga inst Slovak autonomy was gone once the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was abandoned.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Autonomy Discourse in Parliamentary Debates during the First Czechoslovak Republic and after the Velvet Revolution Description An account of the resource Elisabeth Bakke Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 52-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bakke, Elisabeth Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b39a1656e960f4eb12a2ef6d79601d00.pdf b13ae9748db576ed4e4a1e2d6018043b PDF Text Text 70 SLOVAKIA The Battle Over Presidential Power In Slovakia Spencer Zifcak On the 5th May, 1995 the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the country's parliament, passed a motion of no confidence in the President, Mr. Michal Kovac. This motion was passed 80 votes to 40 with 30 abstentions. It was a clear victory - but Mr. Kovac stayed put. Kovac declared that the parliament's vote was unconstitutional and meaningless, indicating to the press and the public that he would not, under any circumstances, be forced to resign. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, responded by saying that the President had acted contrary to the interest of the state and of the democratically-elected parliament. He renewed his calls for Mr. Kovac to vacate his office. This was a test of strength, he asserted, between the will of the democratically-elected government and a President who had lost both his mandate and authority. The two then traded further insults in bitter personal exchanges that would make most western observers blanch. It was these vitriolic exchanges that captured the attention of the press and the public. It is a sad fact of the recent Slovak political life that invective has tended to replace debate as the "modus vivendi" of political and journalistic discourse. Beneath these exchanges, however, lay more fundamental political and constitutional issues. For the impasse that was reached in May would not have occured had the institutional and constitutional structure of Slovakia been different. Without the �SLOVAKIA 71 clear appreciation of these latter difficulties, therefore, the political brawling that has recently taken place cannot be seen in its proper perspective. In the remainder of this article, I will examine this flawed constitutional framework with a view to casting a clearer light on current political development. The Curious Constitutional Relationship between President, Government and Parliament. The Slovak Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government. 1 That is, it provides that the government is drawn from the parliament which is directly elected by the people. The government is then responsible to the parliament and through the parliament to the people. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is designated as the principal repository of state power. It is the government, therefore, which has stewardship of the affairs of state. The President is the head of state. In this role he/she performs a number of important but essentially residual functions. Unlike the parliament, however, the President is not elected directly. He or she is elected for a five year term by the parliament and requires a three-fifths majority of the parliament in order to assume the position. The President appoints and recalls the Prime Minister, the government and heads of important state authorities. He or she convenes sessions of the parliament and may dissolve it under certain specified conditions. The President signs all laws and may return them to the parliament for comment, thus exercising a limited form of veto. But here the similarities in the well-understood relationship between President, government and parliament end. For the position of the President in Slovakia also possesses some rather 1 See further Shugart M. "Of Presidents and Parliaments" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1993), pp. 30-32. �72 SLOVAKIA unusual features which, for example, set it apart from its counterparts in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unlike the constitutions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Slovak Constitution does not distinguish clearly between the powers its President exercises independently and those which he or she must exercise upon government advice. From a purely textual reading, it would appear that, with the notable exeption of declaring war, the President may exercise each and every one of his or her other powers independently of the recommendation of the government of the day. Potentially, therefore, the Presidency may assume considerable political importance. The strength of the office is also enhanced by a number of other constitutional provisions. For example, the President may submit reports on the state of the nation and other serious political issues to the parliament and may also submit bills and other decrees for its consideration. More extraordinarily, however, the President has the right not only to attend sessions of the parliament but also to attend sessions of the government, to chair them and to demand reports from the government and its members as he or she sees fit. 2 This confuses the position of President and Prime Minister in a parliamentary system and injects an immediate element of conflict between them. Although the President's position in relation to the government is a strong one, his or her position in relation to the parliament is weak. The President may disolve the parliament only if the Government' s programme is rejected by the parliament three times within six months of it assuming office. Once the government's programme is accepted, however, the parliament may not be disolved until the time of the next election. More importantly, the parliament may remove the President from office at any time during his or her term. So, the President may be recalled if he or 2 This latter provision is contained in Article 102(q) of the Constitution and, as far as I am aware, has no other counterpart in the Central European region. �SLOVAKIA 73 she "undertakes activities directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic or if his (or her) activities undermine the democratic order of the Slovak Republic." 3 The votes of three-fifths of the members of parliament are needed to remove the President from office. Again, this provision is inconsistent with traditional understanding of parliamentary democracy. According to these understandings, the Presidency exists to guard the constitution, to act as a counterweight to the abuse of governmental power and provide the means through which governmental and parliamentary crises may be resolved. It is incompatible with each of these roles for the President to be removable on broadly defined grounds at the will of either the government or parliament. It is against this somewhat strange constitutional backround that the present political turmoil is best understood. Presidential and Prime Ministerial Power In 1993 a row erupted between Prime Minister Meciar and his foreign minister Milan Knazko. Meciar accused Knazko of treachery in that he had persuaded some members of the governing coalition to vote against Meciar' s preferred candidate for the Presidency. Knazko denied the charges and counterattacked, saying that Meciar conducted government in an authoritarian manner and ought to consult more widely with the parliament and the public. Meciar then advised the new President, Mr. Kovac, to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial post. At first, Kovac cavilled at this request, preferring instead to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. More specifically, the President petitioned the Court to determine whether he was under a duty to follow the Prime Minister's advice when appointing and 3 Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. �74 SLOVAKIA recalling ministers. Undeterred, Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed. To defuse the situation, Kovac then recalled Knazko from office before the Court had rolled on his petition. The Court's decision appeared in June and favoured the President. After an extensive examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and an exploration of the political and constitutional history of the office of President, the Court decided that the President was not obliged to follow the Prime Minister's recomendations.4 The Court remarked that the Constitution had created a Presidency possessing considerable power. Further, it observed that article 111, which provides that the President appoints and recalls ministers on the Prime Minister's recomendation, was cast in discretionary rather then imperative terms. For these and other reasons it determined that the President exercised his powers of appointment and recall independently. This decission had no impact in the Knazko case but ignited new fires in November, 1993 when Prime Minister Meciar submitted a new cabinet for the President's approval. Meciar submitted seven names as a package, indicating to the President that he must appoint every person nominated or appoint no one at all. Kovac, however, took exception to the appointment of Ivan Lexa as minister for privatisation on the grounds that Lexa was unqualified for the position and that a conflict of interest rendered him unfit to hold the post. He refused to appoint him, calling the Prime Minister's bluff and provoking a hostile governmental response. Three months later, Meciar' s government come to an end. The Prime Minister proposed to amend privatisation laws in a manner that would have concentrated all power over privati- • Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Volume 1, C.5. �SLOVAKIA 75 sation in his own hands and slowed the privatisation program significantly. President Kovac publicly criticised the Prime Minister, warning that his dictatorial style could produce significant problems for Slovak democracy. With Kovac's tacit approval, a number of opposition parties then banded together to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Meciar resigned and Kovac installed the new government led by Jozef Moravcik five days afterwards. New elections were held in September, 1994 and, despite his setback, Meciar' s HZDS emerged with the largest single block of votes. HZDS deputies were infuriated, however, when President Kovac failed immediately to appoint Meciar as Prime Minister, prefering instead to allow the new parliamentary deputies to explore a number of different governmental configurations. A Meciar-led coalition was finally appointed however and parliament reconvened on November 3. After its first formal session, the governing parties reconvened parliament immediately for a second sitting which took place throughout the night. During that evening, the new coalition partners moved a vote of no confidence in two former Moravcfk government ministers and dismissed a swath of senior governmental officials including members of the boards of Slovak Radio and television, members of the National Property Fund and the chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme Auditing Office. 5 The coalition also attempted to introduce retrospective amendments to privatisation laws instituted by the previous government but this initiative met with a Presidential veto a few days later. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President had sunk to an all-time low and it was simply a matter of time before their political and personal animosity would be rekindled. 5 For further details of these disturbing parliamentary developments see "Slovakia" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1995), pp. 30-32. �76 SLOVAKIA The Parliament's Vote of No Confidence in the President On May, 5 1995 and without notice, HZDS deputies in the parliament moved a vote of no confidence in President Kovac. The HZDS statement which accompanied the motion declared that after two years in office, the President "is not capable of carrying out his duties because he is causing a polarisation of society, his actions are not impartial and he has failed to respect the seriousness of the democratic decisions approved by the parliament, and, thus, the will of the majority of Slovak people." The motion of no confidence was based on a confidential report produced by OKO, the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the operation of the state intelligence services (SIS). This committee was headed by Ivan Lexa, whose appointment as privatisation minister the President had rejected one year before. The contents of the report are not known. Nor is the content of the parliamentary discussion about it. This is because the government and some members of the opposition parties voted ' to close the session of parliament at which the report was considered. The Constitution permits the closure of parliament if three-fifths of the deputies vote in favor of doing so. 6 For one day, democracy in Slovakia was suspended. In any event, the parliament voted in favor of the motion of no confidence but failed to achieve the three-fifths majority that was required to remove the President from office. The President was not given a copy of the report and it was not until six days later that he was permitted to enter parliament to deliver his defence. As he stood to address the parliament, every member of the governing coalition rose and left the chamber leaving the parliament in tatters. In his address, the President denied the 6 Article 83(4). �SLOVAKIA 77 rumoured charges against him, which included the allegation that he had requested the SIS to produce confidential security reports on his political opponents. He criticized the Meciar government's propensity to concentrate power in its own hands. He argued that the parliament's resolution conformed neither with parliamentary standing orders nor with the terms of the constitution. He concluded by reaffirming that he would not be driven from his position. The following day, the Prime Minister was on the attack again asserting that the President's mandate had concluded with his own re-election. In the light of the parliament's vote of no confidence, therefore, the only principled position the President could take was to resign. Constitutional Travail It is clear from this account of events that the marriage between former political allies Kovac and Meciar has broken down irretrievably. But to say this is to tell only half the relevant story. The constitutional problematic is just as important and far more interesting. In conclusion, therefore, let me draw out this salient points. 1. The constitution itself established the preconditions for the current political debacle. It juxtaposes a strong government with a strong presidency, leaving it quite unclear, therefore, how the respective roles of President and Prime Minister should properly be reconciled. In certain key respects, the constitutional text is uncertain or indefinite. The problem of whether and when the President should exercise his or her designated constitutional functions independently provides the clearest and most pressing example of this textual ambiguity. The lack of clarity in these two respects is aggravated by the absence of established constitutional conventions governing the relationship between �78 SLOVAKIA the two offices in question. In the absence of either mutual respect or good will between the protagonists, the political traditions that are now being established are likely to create even greater conflict and uncertainty in the future. 2. The stability of the Presidency and hence the effective operation of the separation of powers is undermined completely by the parliament's power to remove the President from office. Such a provision does not exist in other comparable constitutions in the region and this for good reason. Symbolically, the role of the President is to unify the nation and to protect its democratic institutions. In practice, the President can cause a government to think before it acts precipitously, either to misuse or enhance its own power or to deny other institutions and individuals the capacity to exercise theirs. It is in recognition of the fact that the President represents the continuity and certainty of constitutional values, that the office holder is, in most cases, elected for a term which exceeds that of any one government. But the Slovak provision fails entirely to recognize this. Instead it establishes an irreconcilable tension between the President with the power to check the actions of the government, and the parliament which may, at one and the same time, remove the President at the behest of the government. 7 3. Article 106 which gives the parliament this power is itself fundamentally flawed. It casts the grounds for the President's removal in such broad terms that it is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to them. In fact, the form of words used resembles the definition of treason contained in some other Central European constitutions. But article 107 of the Slovak Constitution deals separately with treason, leaving the scope of 7 For an earlier analysis of a similar effect see Hollander, P. "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique", in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1992). �SLOVAKIA 79 Article 106 quite unclear. Further, Article 106 provides no indication as to how the parliament should proceed in determining whether the President meets the grounds for dismissal set down. To prevent the parliament from engaging in a political witchhunt, one might have expected that any charges against the President would have been referred to an independent body, for example the Constitutional Court, for determination. But no such procedure is set down and no such independent body was called upon during the recent fracas. 4. By failing to make it clear which of the President's powers should be exercised independently and which should be exercised upon governmental advice, the constitution provides an avenue for Presidents with pretentions to greater power to interfere significantly in the day-to-day affairs of state. This is bound to be a source of irritation to an elected government and, when combined with personal animosity between leaders and a marked lack of respect for the institutions of government, sets the scene for just the kind of escalating political conflict which Slovakia has witnessed. 5. Article 83(4), which allows the National Council of the Slovak Republic to hold closed sessions in circumstances defined by law or where three-fifths of the deputies agree that sessions be held in secret, is a flat denial of fundamental democratic principle and should never have been countenacted. Its effect, when combined with Article 106, is to permit a President to be removed from office in secret without the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made and to deprive the courts, the media and the public of any opportunity to asses the validity of such allegations and, therefore, to hold the President or parliament responsible for their actions. �80 SLOVAKIA Conclusion Very little that is good has come out of the recent battle over Presidential power. The intensity of the conflict has left the principal protagonists bruised, Slovak politics is more divided than at any time since 1989, and the flaws in the constitution are more clearly and dangerously exposed than ever before. But there has been one hopeful sign. Not long after the President delivered his defence to parliament, two of the major opposition parties called a protest rally. Over 30,000 people attended, making it the biggest since the revolutionary rallies of 1989. In his speach to the rally Jan Carnogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, declared that neither he, nor any of the participants, should let the current government "steal the Slovak nation from its people." The implication of his remark was that the new Slovakia should be identified not only as a national, but also as a democratic and constitutional entity. The many people at the rally took the point. Part of the problem with the entire fabric of Slovak constitutionalism and politics has been that the people themselves have taken so little interest in it. Perhaps this rally might mark the beginning of a new, more active and more democratic awareness. � 70 SLOVAKIA The Battle Over Presidential Power In Slovakia Spencer Zifcak On the 5th May, 1995 the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the country's parliament, passed a motion of no confidence in the President, Mr. Michal Kovac. This motion was passed 80 votes to 40 with 30 abstentions. It was a clear victory - but Mr. Kovac stayed put. Kovac declared that the parliament's vote was unconstitutional and meaningless, indicating to the press and the public that he would not, under any circumstances, be forced to resign. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, responded by saying that the President had acted contrary to the interest of the state and of the democratically-elected parliament. He renewed his calls for Mr. Kovac to vacate his office. This was a test of strength, he asserted, between the will of the democratically-elected government and a President who had lost both his mandate and authority. The two then traded further insults in bitter personal exchanges that would make most western observers blanch. It was these vitriolic exchanges that captured the attention of the press and the public. It is a sad fact of the recent Slovak political life that invective has tended to replace debate as the "modus vivendi" of political and journalistic discourse. Beneath these exchanges, however, lay more fundamental political and constitutional issues. For the impasse that was reached in May would not have occured had the institutional and constitutional structure of Slovakia been different. Without the �SLOVAKIA 71 clear appreciation of these latter difficulties, therefore, the political brawling that has recently taken place cannot be seen in its proper perspective. In the remainder of this article, I will examine this flawed constitutional framework with a view to casting a clearer light on current political development. The Curious Constitutional Relationship between President, Government and Parliament. The Slovak Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government. 1 That is, it provides that the government is drawn from the parliament which is directly elected by the people. The government is then responsible to the parliament and through the parliament to the people. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is designated as the principal repository of state power. It is the government, therefore, which has stewardship of the affairs of state. The President is the head of state. In this role he/she performs a number of important but essentially residual functions. Unlike the parliament, however, the President is not elected directly. He or she is elected for a five year term by the parliament and requires a three-fifths majority of the parliament in order to assume the position. The President appoints and recalls the Prime Minister, the government and heads of important state authorities. He or she convenes sessions of the parliament and may dissolve it under certain specified conditions. The President signs all laws and may return them to the parliament for comment, thus exercising a limited form of veto. But here the similarities in the well-understood relationship between President, government and parliament end. For the position of the President in Slovakia also possesses some rather 1 See further Shugart M. "Of Presidents and Parliaments" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1993), pp. 30-32. �72 SLOVAKIA unusual features which, for example, set it apart from its counterparts in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unlike the constitutions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Slovak Constitution does not distinguish clearly between the powers its President exercises independently and those which he or she must exercise upon government advice. From a purely textual reading, it would appear that, with the notable exeption of declaring war, the President may exercise each and every one of his or her other powers independently of the recommendation of the government of the day. Potentially, therefore, the Presidency may assume considerable political importance. The strength of the office is also enhanced by a number of other constitutional provisions. For example, the President may submit reports on the state of the nation and other serious political issues to the parliament and may also submit bills and other decrees for its consideration. More extraordinarily, however, the President has the right not only to attend sessions of the parliament but also to attend sessions of the government, to chair them and to demand reports from the government and its members as he or she sees fit. 2 This confuses the position of President and Prime Minister in a parliamentary system and injects an immediate element of conflict between them. Although the President's position in relation to the government is a strong one, his or her position in relation to the parliament is weak. The President may disolve the parliament only if the Government' s programme is rejected by the parliament three times within six months of it assuming office. Once the government's programme is accepted, however, the parliament may not be disolved until the time of the next election. More importantly, the parliament may remove the President from office at any time during his or her term. So, the President may be recalled if he or 2 This latter provision is contained in Article 102(q) of the Constitution and, as far as I am aware, has no other counterpart in the Central European region. �SLOVAKIA 73 she "undertakes activities directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic or if his (or her) activities undermine the democratic order of the Slovak Republic." 3 The votes of three-fifths of the members of parliament are needed to remove the President from office. Again, this provision is inconsistent with traditional understanding of parliamentary democracy. According to these understandings, the Presidency exists to guard the constitution, to act as a counterweight to the abuse of governmental power and provide the means through which governmental and parliamentary crises may be resolved. It is incompatible with each of these roles for the President to be removable on broadly defined grounds at the will of either the government or parliament. It is against this somewhat strange constitutional backround that the present political turmoil is best understood. Presidential and Prime Ministerial Power In 1993 a row erupted between Prime Minister Meciar and his foreign minister Milan Knazko. Meciar accused Knazko of treachery in that he had persuaded some members of the governing coalition to vote against Meciar' s preferred candidate for the Presidency. Knazko denied the charges and counterattacked, saying that Meciar conducted government in an authoritarian manner and ought to consult more widely with the parliament and the public. Meciar then advised the new President, Mr. Kovac, to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial post. At first, Kovac cavilled at this request, preferring instead to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. More specifically, the President petitioned the Court to determine whether he was under a duty to follow the Prime Minister's advice when appointing and 3 Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. �74 SLOVAKIA recalling ministers. Undeterred, Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed. To defuse the situation, Kovac then recalled Knazko from office before the Court had rolled on his petition. The Court's decision appeared in June and favoured the President. After an extensive examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and an exploration of the political and constitutional history of the office of President, the Court decided that the President was not obliged to follow the Prime Minister's recomendations.4 The Court remarked that the Constitution had created a Presidency possessing considerable power. Further, it observed that article 111, which provides that the President appoints and recalls ministers on the Prime Minister's recomendation, was cast in discretionary rather then imperative terms. For these and other reasons it determined that the President exercised his powers of appointment and recall independently. This decission had no impact in the Knazko case but ignited new fires in November, 1993 when Prime Minister Meciar submitted a new cabinet for the President's approval. Meciar submitted seven names as a package, indicating to the President that he must appoint every person nominated or appoint no one at all. Kovac, however, took exception to the appointment of Ivan Lexa as minister for privatisation on the grounds that Lexa was unqualified for the position and that a conflict of interest rendered him unfit to hold the post. He refused to appoint him, calling the Prime Minister's bluff and provoking a hostile governmental response. Three months later, Meciar' s government come to an end. The Prime Minister proposed to amend privatisation laws in a manner that would have concentrated all power over privati- • Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Volume 1, C.5. �SLOVAKIA 75 sation in his own hands and slowed the privatisation program significantly. President Kovac publicly criticised the Prime Minister, warning that his dictatorial style could produce significant problems for Slovak democracy. With Kovac's tacit approval, a number of opposition parties then banded together to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Meciar resigned and Kovac installed the new government led by Jozef Moravcik five days afterwards. New elections were held in September, 1994 and, despite his setback, Meciar' s HZDS emerged with the largest single block of votes. HZDS deputies were infuriated, however, when President Kovac failed immediately to appoint Meciar as Prime Minister, prefering instead to allow the new parliamentary deputies to explore a number of different governmental configurations. A Meciar-led coalition was finally appointed however and parliament reconvened on November 3. After its first formal session, the governing parties reconvened parliament immediately for a second sitting which took place throughout the night. During that evening, the new coalition partners moved a vote of no confidence in two former Moravcfk government ministers and dismissed a swath of senior governmental officials including members of the boards of Slovak Radio and television, members of the National Property Fund and the chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme Auditing Office. 5 The coalition also attempted to introduce retrospective amendments to privatisation laws instituted by the previous government but this initiative met with a Presidential veto a few days later. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President had sunk to an all-time low and it was simply a matter of time before their political and personal animosity would be rekindled. 5 For further details of these disturbing parliamentary developments see "Slovakia" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1995), pp. 30-32. �76 SLOVAKIA The Parliament's Vote of No Confidence in the President On May, 5 1995 and without notice, HZDS deputies in the parliament moved a vote of no confidence in President Kovac. The HZDS statement which accompanied the motion declared that after two years in office, the President "is not capable of carrying out his duties because he is causing a polarisation of society, his actions are not impartial and he has failed to respect the seriousness of the democratic decisions approved by the parliament, and, thus, the will of the majority of Slovak people." The motion of no confidence was based on a confidential report produced by OKO, the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the operation of the state intelligence services (SIS). This committee was headed by Ivan Lexa, whose appointment as privatisation minister the President had rejected one year before. The contents of the report are not known. Nor is the content of the parliamentary discussion about it. This is because the government and some members of the opposition parties voted ' to close the session of parliament at which the report was considered. The Constitution permits the closure of parliament if three-fifths of the deputies vote in favor of doing so. 6 For one day, democracy in Slovakia was suspended. In any event, the parliament voted in favor of the motion of no confidence but failed to achieve the three-fifths majority that was required to remove the President from office. The President was not given a copy of the report and it was not until six days later that he was permitted to enter parliament to deliver his defence. As he stood to address the parliament, every member of the governing coalition rose and left the chamber leaving the parliament in tatters. In his address, the President denied the 6 Article 83(4). �SLOVAKIA 77 rumoured charges against him, which included the allegation that he had requested the SIS to produce confidential security reports on his political opponents. He criticized the Meciar government's propensity to concentrate power in its own hands. He argued that the parliament's resolution conformed neither with parliamentary standing orders nor with the terms of the constitution. He concluded by reaffirming that he would not be driven from his position. The following day, the Prime Minister was on the attack again asserting that the President's mandate had concluded with his own re-election. In the light of the parliament's vote of no confidence, therefore, the only principled position the President could take was to resign. Constitutional Travail It is clear from this account of events that the marriage between former political allies Kovac and Meciar has broken down irretrievably. But to say this is to tell only half the relevant story. The constitutional problematic is just as important and far more interesting. In conclusion, therefore, let me draw out this salient points. 1. The constitution itself established the preconditions for the current political debacle. It juxtaposes a strong government with a strong presidency, leaving it quite unclear, therefore, how the respective roles of President and Prime Minister should properly be reconciled. In certain key respects, the constitutional text is uncertain or indefinite. The problem of whether and when the President should exercise his or her designated constitutional functions independently provides the clearest and most pressing example of this textual ambiguity. The lack of clarity in these two respects is aggravated by the absence of established constitutional conventions governing the relationship between �78 SLOVAKIA the two offices in question. In the absence of either mutual respect or good will between the protagonists, the political traditions that are now being established are likely to create even greater conflict and uncertainty in the future. 2. The stability of the Presidency and hence the effective operation of the separation of powers is undermined completely by the parliament's power to remove the President from office. Such a provision does not exist in other comparable constitutions in the region and this for good reason. Symbolically, the role of the President is to unify the nation and to protect its democratic institutions. In practice, the President can cause a government to think before it acts precipitously, either to misuse or enhance its own power or to deny other institutions and individuals the capacity to exercise theirs. It is in recognition of the fact that the President represents the continuity and certainty of constitutional values, that the office holder is, in most cases, elected for a term which exceeds that of any one government. But the Slovak provision fails entirely to recognize this. Instead it establishes an irreconcilable tension between the President with the power to check the actions of the government, and the parliament which may, at one and the same time, remove the President at the behest of the government. 7 3. Article 106 which gives the parliament this power is itself fundamentally flawed. It casts the grounds for the President's removal in such broad terms that it is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to them. In fact, the form of words used resembles the definition of treason contained in some other Central European constitutions. But article 107 of the Slovak Constitution deals separately with treason, leaving the scope of 7 For an earlier analysis of a similar effect see Hollander, P. "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique", in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1992). �SLOVAKIA 79 Article 106 quite unclear. Further, Article 106 provides no indication as to how the parliament should proceed in determining whether the President meets the grounds for dismissal set down. To prevent the parliament from engaging in a political witchhunt, one might have expected that any charges against the President would have been referred to an independent body, for example the Constitutional Court, for determination. But no such procedure is set down and no such independent body was called upon during the recent fracas. 4. By failing to make it clear which of the President's powers should be exercised independently and which should be exercised upon governmental advice, the constitution provides an avenue for Presidents with pretentions to greater power to interfere significantly in the day-to-day affairs of state. This is bound to be a source of irritation to an elected government and, when combined with personal animosity between leaders and a marked lack of respect for the institutions of government, sets the scene for just the kind of escalating political conflict which Slovakia has witnessed. 5. Article 83(4), which allows the National Council of the Slovak Republic to hold closed sessions in circumstances defined by law or where three-fifths of the deputies agree that sessions be held in secret, is a flat denial of fundamental democratic principle and should never have been countenacted. Its effect, when combined with Article 106, is to permit a President to be removed from office in secret without the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made and to deprive the courts, the media and the public of any opportunity to asses the validity of such allegations and, therefore, to hold the President or parliament responsible for their actions. �80 SLOVAKIA Conclusion Very little that is good has come out of the recent battle over Presidential power. The intensity of the conflict has left the principal protagonists bruised, Slovak politics is more divided than at any time since 1989, and the flaws in the constitution are more clearly and dangerously exposed than ever before. But there has been one hopeful sign. Not long after the President delivered his defence to parliament, two of the major opposition parties called a protest rally. Over 30,000 people attended, making it the biggest since the revolutionary rallies of 1989. In his speach to the rally Jan Carnogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, declared that neither he, nor any of the participants, should let the current government "steal the Slovak nation from its people." The implication of his remark was that the new Slovakia should be identified not only as a national, but also as a democratic and constitutional entity. The many people at the rally took the point. Part of the problem with the entire fabric of Slovak constitutionalism and politics has been that the people themselves have taken so little interest in it. Perhaps this rally might mark the beginning of a new, more active and more democratic awareness. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1998, Vol. 36 Description An account of the resource Vol. 36 (No. 66-67), 1998. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 70 SLOVAKIA The Battle Over Presidential Power In Slovakia Spencer Zifcak On the 5th May, 1995 the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the country's parliament, passed a motion of no confidence in the President, Mr. Michal Kovac. This motion was passed 80 votes to 40 with 30 abstentions. It was a clear victory - but Mr. Kovac stayed put. Kovac declared that the parliament's vote was unconstitutional and meaningless, indicating to the press and the public that he would not, under any circumstances, be forced to resign. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, responded by saying that the President had acted contrary to the interest of the state and of the democratically-elected parliament. He renewed his calls for Mr. Kovac to vacate his office. This was a test of strength, he asserted, between the will of the democratically-elected government and a President who had lost both his mandate and authority. The two then traded further insults in bitter personal exchanges that would make most western observers blanch. It was these vitriolic exchanges that captured the attention of the press and the public. It is a sad fact of the recent Slovak political life that invective has tended to replace debate as the "modus vivendi" of political and journalistic discourse. Beneath these exchanges, however, lay more fundamental political and constitutional issues. For the impasse that was reached in May would not have occured had the institutional and constitutional structure of Slovakia been different. Without the SLOVAKIA 71 clear appreciation of these latter difficulties, therefore, the political brawling that has recently taken place cannot be seen in its proper perspective. In the remainder of this article, I will examine this flawed constitutional framework with a view to casting a clearer light on current political development. The Curious Constitutional Relationship between President, Government and Parliament. The Slovak Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government. 1 That is, it provides that the government is drawn from the parliament which is directly elected by the people. The government is then responsible to the parliament and through the parliament to the people. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is designated as the principal repository of state power. It is the government, therefore, which has stewardship of the affairs of state. The President is the head of state. In this role he/she performs a number of important but essentially residual functions. Unlike the parliament, however, the President is not elected directly. He or she is elected for a five year term by the parliament and requires a three-fifths majority of the parliament in order to assume the position. The President appoints and recalls the Prime Minister, the government and heads of important state authorities. He or she convenes sessions of the parliament and may dissolve it under certain specified conditions. The President signs all laws and may return them to the parliament for comment, thus exercising a limited form of veto. But here the similarities in the well-understood relationship between President, government and parliament end. For the position of the President in Slovakia also possesses some rather 1 See further Shugart M. "Of Presidents and Parliaments" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1993), pp. 30-32. 72 SLOVAKIA unusual features which, for example, set it apart from its counterparts in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unlike the constitutions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Slovak Constitution does not distinguish clearly between the powers its President exercises independently and those which he or she must exercise upon government advice. From a purely textual reading, it would appear that, with the notable exeption of declaring war, the President may exercise each and every one of his or her other powers independently of the recommendation of the government of the day. Potentially, therefore, the Presidency may assume considerable political importance. The strength of the office is also enhanced by a number of other constitutional provisions. For example, the President may submit reports on the state of the nation and other serious political issues to the parliament and may also submit bills and other decrees for its consideration. More extraordinarily, however, the President has the right not only to attend sessions of the parliament but also to attend sessions of the government, to chair them and to demand reports from the government and its members as he or she sees fit. 2 This confuses the position of President and Prime Minister in a parliamentary system and injects an immediate element of conflict between them. Although the President's position in relation to the government is a strong one, his or her position in relation to the parliament is weak. The President may disolve the parliament only if the Government' s programme is rejected by the parliament three times within six months of it assuming office. Once the government's programme is accepted, however, the parliament may not be disolved until the time of the next election. More importantly, the parliament may remove the President from office at any time during his or her term. So, the President may be recalled if he or 2 This latter provision is contained in Article 102(q) of the Constitution and, as far as I am aware, has no other counterpart in the Central European region. SLOVAKIA 73 she "undertakes activities directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic or if his (or her) activities undermine the democratic order of the Slovak Republic." 3 The votes of three-fifths of the members of parliament are needed to remove the President from office. Again, this provision is inconsistent with traditional understanding of parliamentary democracy. According to these understandings, the Presidency exists to guard the constitution, to act as a counterweight to the abuse of governmental power and provide the means through which governmental and parliamentary crises may be resolved. It is incompatible with each of these roles for the President to be removable on broadly defined grounds at the will of either the government or parliament. It is against this somewhat strange constitutional backround that the present political turmoil is best understood. Presidential and Prime Ministerial Power In 1993 a row erupted between Prime Minister Meciar and his foreign minister Milan Knazko. Meciar accused Knazko of treachery in that he had persuaded some members of the governing coalition to vote against Meciar' s preferred candidate for the Presidency. Knazko denied the charges and counterattacked, saying that Meciar conducted government in an authoritarian manner and ought to consult more widely with the parliament and the public. Meciar then advised the new President, Mr. Kovac, to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial post. At first, Kovac cavilled at this request, preferring instead to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. More specifically, the President petitioned the Court to determine whether he was under a duty to follow the Prime Minister's advice when appointing and 3 Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. 74 SLOVAKIA recalling ministers. Undeterred, Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed. To defuse the situation, Kovac then recalled Knazko from office before the Court had rolled on his petition. The Court's decision appeared in June and favoured the President. After an extensive examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and an exploration of the political and constitutional history of the office of President, the Court decided that the President was not obliged to follow the Prime Minister's recomendations.4 The Court remarked that the Constitution had created a Presidency possessing considerable power. Further, it observed that article 111, which provides that the President appoints and recalls ministers on the Prime Minister's recomendation, was cast in discretionary rather then imperative terms. For these and other reasons it determined that the President exercised his powers of appointment and recall independently. This decission had no impact in the Knazko case but ignited new fires in November, 1993 when Prime Minister Meciar submitted a new cabinet for the President's approval. Meciar submitted seven names as a package, indicating to the President that he must appoint every person nominated or appoint no one at all. Kovac, however, took exception to the appointment of Ivan Lexa as minister for privatisation on the grounds that Lexa was unqualified for the position and that a conflict of interest rendered him unfit to hold the post. He refused to appoint him, calling the Prime Minister's bluff and provoking a hostile governmental response. Three months later, Meciar' s government come to an end. The Prime Minister proposed to amend privatisation laws in a manner that would have concentrated all power over privati- • Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Volume 1, C.5. SLOVAKIA 75 sation in his own hands and slowed the privatisation program significantly. President Kovac publicly criticised the Prime Minister, warning that his dictatorial style could produce significant problems for Slovak democracy. With Kovac's tacit approval, a number of opposition parties then banded together to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Meciar resigned and Kovac installed the new government led by Jozef Moravcik five days afterwards. New elections were held in September, 1994 and, despite his setback, Meciar' s HZDS emerged with the largest single block of votes. HZDS deputies were infuriated, however, when President Kovac failed immediately to appoint Meciar as Prime Minister, prefering instead to allow the new parliamentary deputies to explore a number of different governmental configurations. A Meciar-led coalition was finally appointed however and parliament reconvened on November 3. After its first formal session, the governing parties reconvened parliament immediately for a second sitting which took place throughout the night. During that evening, the new coalition partners moved a vote of no confidence in two former Moravcfk government ministers and dismissed a swath of senior governmental officials including members of the boards of Slovak Radio and television, members of the National Property Fund and the chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme Auditing Office. 5 The coalition also attempted to introduce retrospective amendments to privatisation laws instituted by the previous government but this initiative met with a Presidential veto a few days later. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President had sunk to an all-time low and it was simply a matter of time before their political and personal animosity would be rekindled. 5 For further details of these disturbing parliamentary developments see "Slovakia" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1995), pp. 30-32. 76 SLOVAKIA The Parliament's Vote of No Confidence in the President On May, 5 1995 and without notice, HZDS deputies in the parliament moved a vote of no confidence in President Kovac. The HZDS statement which accompanied the motion declared that after two years in office, the President "is not capable of carrying out his duties because he is causing a polarisation of society, his actions are not impartial and he has failed to respect the seriousness of the democratic decisions approved by the parliament, and, thus, the will of the majority of Slovak people." The motion of no confidence was based on a confidential report produced by OKO, the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the operation of the state intelligence services (SIS). This committee was headed by Ivan Lexa, whose appointment as privatisation minister the President had rejected one year before. The contents of the report are not known. Nor is the content of the parliamentary discussion about it. This is because the government and some members of the opposition parties voted ' to close the session of parliament at which the report was considered. The Constitution permits the closure of parliament if three-fifths of the deputies vote in favor of doing so. 6 For one day, democracy in Slovakia was suspended. In any event, the parliament voted in favor of the motion of no confidence but failed to achieve the three-fifths majority that was required to remove the President from office. The President was not given a copy of the report and it was not until six days later that he was permitted to enter parliament to deliver his defence. As he stood to address the parliament, every member of the governing coalition rose and left the chamber leaving the parliament in tatters. In his address, the President denied the 6 Article 83(4). SLOVAKIA 77 rumoured charges against him, which included the allegation that he had requested the SIS to produce confidential security reports on his political opponents. He criticized the Meciar government's propensity to concentrate power in its own hands. He argued that the parliament's resolution conformed neither with parliamentary standing orders nor with the terms of the constitution. He concluded by reaffirming that he would not be driven from his position. The following day, the Prime Minister was on the attack again asserting that the President's mandate had concluded with his own re-election. In the light of the parliament's vote of no confidence, therefore, the only principled position the President could take was to resign. Constitutional Travail It is clear from this account of events that the marriage between former political allies Kovac and Meciar has broken down irretrievably. But to say this is to tell only half the relevant story. The constitutional problematic is just as important and far more interesting. In conclusion, therefore, let me draw out this salient points. 1. The constitution itself established the preconditions for the current political debacle. It juxtaposes a strong government with a strong presidency, leaving it quite unclear, therefore, how the respective roles of President and Prime Minister should properly be reconciled. In certain key respects, the constitutional text is uncertain or indefinite. The problem of whether and when the President should exercise his or her designated constitutional functions independently provides the clearest and most pressing example of this textual ambiguity. The lack of clarity in these two respects is aggravated by the absence of established constitutional conventions governing the relationship between 78 SLOVAKIA the two offices in question. In the absence of either mutual respect or good will between the protagonists, the political traditions that are now being established are likely to create even greater conflict and uncertainty in the future. 2. The stability of the Presidency and hence the effective operation of the separation of powers is undermined completely by the parliament's power to remove the President from office. Such a provision does not exist in other comparable constitutions in the region and this for good reason. Symbolically, the role of the President is to unify the nation and to protect its democratic institutions. In practice, the President can cause a government to think before it acts precipitously, either to misuse or enhance its own power or to deny other institutions and individuals the capacity to exercise theirs. It is in recognition of the fact that the President represents the continuity and certainty of constitutional values, that the office holder is, in most cases, elected for a term which exceeds that of any one government. But the Slovak provision fails entirely to recognize this. Instead it establishes an irreconcilable tension between the President with the power to check the actions of the government, and the parliament which may, at one and the same time, remove the President at the behest of the government. 7 3. Article 106 which gives the parliament this power is itself fundamentally flawed. It casts the grounds for the President's removal in such broad terms that it is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to them. In fact, the form of words used resembles the definition of treason contained in some other Central European constitutions. But article 107 of the Slovak Constitution deals separately with treason, leaving the scope of 7 For an earlier analysis of a similar effect see Hollander, P. "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique", in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1992). SLOVAKIA 79 Article 106 quite unclear. Further, Article 106 provides no indication as to how the parliament should proceed in determining whether the President meets the grounds for dismissal set down. To prevent the parliament from engaging in a political witchhunt, one might have expected that any charges against the President would have been referred to an independent body, for example the Constitutional Court, for determination. But no such procedure is set down and no such independent body was called upon during the recent fracas. 4. By failing to make it clear which of the President's powers should be exercised independently and which should be exercised upon governmental advice, the constitution provides an avenue for Presidents with pretentions to greater power to interfere significantly in the day-to-day affairs of state. This is bound to be a source of irritation to an elected government and, when combined with personal animosity between leaders and a marked lack of respect for the institutions of government, sets the scene for just the kind of escalating political conflict which Slovakia has witnessed. 5. Article 83(4), which allows the National Council of the Slovak Republic to hold closed sessions in circumstances defined by law or where three-fifths of the deputies agree that sessions be held in secret, is a flat denial of fundamental democratic principle and should never have been countenacted. Its effect, when combined with Article 106, is to permit a President to be removed from office in secret without the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made and to deprive the courts, the media and the public of any opportunity to asses the validity of such allegations and, therefore, to hold the President or parliament responsible for their actions. 80 SLOVAKIA Conclusion Very little that is good has come out of the recent battle over Presidential power. The intensity of the conflict has left the principal protagonists bruised, Slovak politics is more divided than at any time since 1989, and the flaws in the constitution are more clearly and dangerously exposed than ever before. But there has been one hopeful sign. Not long after the President delivered his defence to parliament, two of the major opposition parties called a protest rally. Over 30,000 people attended, making it the biggest since the revolutionary rallies of 1989. In his speach to the rally Jan Carnogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, declared that neither he, nor any of the participants, should let the current government "steal the Slovak nation from its people." The implication of his remark was that the new Slovakia should be identified not only as a national, but also as a democratic and constitutional entity. The many people at the rally took the point. Part of the problem with the entire fabric of Slovak constitutionalism and politics has been that the people themselves have taken so little interest in it. Perhaps this rally might mark the beginning of a new, more active and more democratic awareness.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Battle Over Presidential Power in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Spencer Žifčák Slovakia, Vol. 36 (No. 66-67), 1998 pp. 70-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zifcak, Spencer, 1950- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/240911e14f80fa5ed63d8c7ff1008704.pdf 7da4603378f53dbfad11508d2b2dba57 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 1 THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA E DWARD L. DELANEY {Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla, Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana, Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln" teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.) T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity. Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an ignominlous endlng thirty years later. On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger· mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri· cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo• hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds. But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed. With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president, Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader• shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1 for an lndeflnite perlod. As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca and was therefore not blndlng. Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts �2 SLOVAKIA who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with 1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt !or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm. There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier, and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities. Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions. I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is ~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo• hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia was regarded as self-determinlng and independent. Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their pledges of military alliance. Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator. He was glven no alternative. He submitted. When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that •·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime. The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus cheatlng the Red gallows. For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two �SLOVAKIA 3 presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a. Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy. The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became a reality to them. Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new• bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles also recognlzed the fact that the state existed. Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage. Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels. Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism, natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots. Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un• dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since. Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre. He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In whatever he was rloing at the moment After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger• many. "No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com• �4 SLOV.AKIA pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy." ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the '·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on which they clashed. Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican. "The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect• ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church." Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the Czechs after the war? There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them. Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country. He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or their people in America than in their horne lands. "Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians, instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty. They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles. I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers? "True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man." That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal , rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted �SLOVAKIA 6 agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla. Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence, as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts. Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11 and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties. One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs. That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day. To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon. When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it. lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it. After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody by the Slovak mllltary authorltles. The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep them safe untll they could be freed after the war. The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene with Himmler. "We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler, "and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.'' The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant. �6 SLOVAKIA Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par• tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark· ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com· mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de• flance to thelr over-lords. The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April 6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague. Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re· volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys. women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague. The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels, the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln. On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned. The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness. But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia. Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph. �SLOVAKI.A. 7 Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre• dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth· les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela· tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing. The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng, Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au• thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon, also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven· year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had been imposed on them. Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding. New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace, we shall never know. In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow• managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals. Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of mine reached the American Legation. Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud. When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a fait accompll three years before. Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds. Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned. Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran. The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that Slovak patriot 1s on our heads. � SLOVAKIA 1 THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA E DWARD L. DELANEY {Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla, Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana, Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln" teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.) T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity. Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an ignominlous endlng thirty years later. On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger· mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri· cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo• hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds. But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed. With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president, Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader• shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1 for an lndeflnite perlod. As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca and was therefore not blndlng. Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts �2 SLOVAKIA who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with 1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt !or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm. There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier, and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities. Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions. I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is ~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo• hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia was regarded as self-determinlng and independent. Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their pledges of military alliance. Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator. He was glven no alternative. He submitted. When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that •·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime. The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus cheatlng the Red gallows. For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two �SLOVAKIA 3 presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a. Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy. The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became a reality to them. Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new• bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles also recognlzed the fact that the state existed. Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage. Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels. Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism, natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots. Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un• dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since. Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre. He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In whatever he was rloing at the moment After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger• many. "No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com• �4 SLOV.AKIA pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy." ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the '·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on which they clashed. Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican. "The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect• ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church." Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the Czechs after the war? There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them. Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country. He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or their people in America than in their horne lands. "Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians, instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty. They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles. I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers? "True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man." That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal , rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted �SLOVAKIA 6 agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla. Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence, as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts. Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11 and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties. One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs. That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day. To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon. When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it. lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it. After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody by the Slovak mllltary authorltles. The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep them safe untll they could be freed after the war. The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene with Himmler. "We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler, "and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.'' The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant. �6 SLOVAKIA Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par• tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark· ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com· mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de• flance to thelr over-lords. The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April 6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague. Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re· volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys. women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague. The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels, the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln. On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned. The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness. But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia. Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph. �SLOVAKI.A. 7 Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre• dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth· les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela· tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing. The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng, Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au• thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon, also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven· year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had been imposed on them. Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding. New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace, we shall never know. In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow• managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals. Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of mine reached the American Legation. Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud. When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a fait accompll three years before. Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds. Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned. Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran. The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that Slovak patriot 1s on our heads. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 1 THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA E DWARD L. DELANEY {Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla, Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana, Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln" teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.) T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity. Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an ignominlous endlng thirty years later. On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger· mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri· cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo• hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds. But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed. With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president, Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader• shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1 for an lndeflnite perlod. As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca and was therefore not blndlng. Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts 2 SLOVAKIA who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with 1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt !or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm. There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier, and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities. Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions. I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is ~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo• hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia was regarded as self-determinlng and independent. Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their pledges of military alliance. Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator. He was glven no alternative. He submitted. When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that •·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime. The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus cheatlng the Red gallows. For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two SLOVAKIA 3 presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a. Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy. The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became a reality to them. Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new• bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles also recognlzed the fact that the state existed. Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage. Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels. Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism, natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots. Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un• dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since. Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre. He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In whatever he was rloing at the moment After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger• many. "No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com• 4 SLOV.AKIA pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy." ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the '·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on which they clashed. Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican. "The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect• ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church." Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the Czechs after the war? There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them. Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country. He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or their people in America than in their horne lands. "Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians, instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty. They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles. I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers? "True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man." That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal , rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted SLOVAKIA 6 agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla. Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence, as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts. Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11 and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties. One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs. That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day. To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon. When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it. lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it. After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody by the Slovak mllltary authorltles. The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep them safe untll they could be freed after the war. The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene with Himmler. "We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler, "and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.'' The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant. 6 SLOVAKIA Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par• tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark· ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com· mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de• flance to thelr over-lords. The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April 6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague. Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re· volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys. women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague. The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels, the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln. On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned. The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness. But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia. Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph. SLOVAKI.A. 7 Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre• dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth· les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela· tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing. The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng, Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au• thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon, also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven· year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had been imposed on them. Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding. New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace, we shall never know. In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow• managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals. Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of mine reached the American Legation. Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud. When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a fait accompll three years before. Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds. Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned. Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran. The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that Slovak patriot 1s on our heads.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Betrayal of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Edward L. Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 1-7 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a969fe086d944834d00d86c394adb7d6.pdf 5a0f99039785ac20100e32fe7783d738 PDF Text Text 12 SLOVAKIA Slovanics" grammar is a real possibility. I believe that it could be drawn up along the lines presented in this article. Of course, it would require the careful, studious efforts of someone well acquainted with the Slovanic languages or at least with one of them. But I feel it can be done. At least the possibility should be explored and an attempt made in .that direction. Perhaps if we Slovaks ignore this project, some one of our kindred Slavs may take it up, using his tongue instead of ours as the basis. The Slav languages certainly should be taught in our schools. But if they are to be, a Slovanic grammar is needed. Slovak can offer itself as the key ingredient in such a book, since it possesses the qualirty of representatives among the Slavic vernaculars. What is requisite, therefore, is a recognition of the needs for and feasibility of a "High School Slovanics" book, and then the efforts of our Slovak-American intelligentsia to prepare it. In this way, the great culture of our tiny nation would make still another contribution to the advancement of world knowledge and culture. - (MOST," Vol. 5, No. 2) . • • • THE BIRTH OF A SATELLITE By Bohdan Chudoba (It is ofiten maintained that Czecho-Slovaikiia became a s·a tellite of Moscow in February, 1948, when the communists gained full power in Prague. In the following article Pr<Yfessor Bohdan Chudio'ba of New York, a noted historian and forimer leading Czech -politician, very clearly -i lluminates the Czecho-Slovaik situation after World War II and the disastrous role that Czecho~ovaikia's foruner President Edward Benes played when, long before '1'94'8, he paved the way for the commun,ist seizure o,f full power in '1948.) When leading statesmen of the Allied Powers met at Teheran in 1943 and President Roosevelt ha,d to decide whether or not to support ChurchiH's plan to invade the Balkans and keep the Red Army out of Central Europe, the conference had the spectacle of Edward Benes journeying solemnly from London to Moscow where, on December 12, he signed a new treaty between Czecho-Slovalda and the Soviet Union, binding himself and his (provisional) government to dissolve all "anti-communist organizations �SLOVAKIA 13 in his country. His voyage to Moscow had been prepared long before by his chief advisor, the late Hubert Ripka. Speaking over the Moscow broadcasting system on December 21, 1943, Dr. Benes declared: "In 1938 we were deserted by the Western Democracies and then subjugated by the Nazis; only the Soviet Union remained faithful to us." That was not true. Benes knew very well that in 1938 the Soviets had refused to give any precise answer to the Czecho-Slovak High Command's request for military aid in the eventuality of war with Hitler Germany. He also accompanied this false strutement by another declaration which can be regarded as the core of his policy. He said: "This journey of mine is the necessary result, the logical conclusion, and the final evolutionary achievement of the Czech policy of the last hundred years, a result made possible by the Russian revolution of the last war." Beware of ideologists who consider their achievements as final. Benes was not satisfied with placing himself in the service of the Krem1lin. Although perfectly aware of the mass graves of Polish officers murdered by the Bolshevists in Katyn in 1944, he persuaded Stanislaus Mikolajczyk to quit the legitimate Polish exile government in London and to join the puppet government set up by the Soviets in Lublin, Eastern Poland. This adventure ended in Mikolajczyk's flight to the West in 1947. Most of Benes' aides were enthusiastic members of the Socialist avant-garde. Hubert Ripka, the most cunning among them, had already developed a far-reaching program which he published in England in 1945 entitled "Czechoslovakia in the New Europe." "Our alliance with the Soviet Union," he declared, "requires a new orientation of our cultural policy; it is necessary that all anti-Soviet elements be eliminated from our schools, educational institutions, and from our literature." Ripka's best disciple, Ivo Duchacek, went even further, saying in his book "Along the Road to Moscow" (London 1944): "This immense conflagration is far more than a flickering flame on which people could warm their soup, people who, until yesterday, had made a career out of criticizing Lenin's interpretation of Marx." �14 SLOVAKIA Benes Moves to Moscow Early in H)45 Benes made his final decision. Accompanied by Jari Sramek and the other ministers of his ca:binet he moved from London to Moscow preferring to reenter his country with the Red Army rather than with the Western liberation troops. In Moscow Benes' star began to decline. He had to nominate a new cabinet in which staunch communists held the key positions. The Soviets were probably not quite sure yet of Czecho-Slovakia. They had freed General Prchala's troops from the concentration camps and sent them, under the command of a man named Svoboda, to the Dukla Pass in the Ca:r,pathians. There most of these young Czech soldiers found their death. But the Soviets still wanted Benes' help. They used the first stop t!he provisional Czecho~lovak Government had to make on Czecho-Slovak soil in the wake of the Red Army, to proclaim a political manifesto that bound Benes and his friends even closer to Moscow than the treaty of 1943. The Kosice Program The Kosice Program, as th:is manifesto is usually called, achieved two things with one stroke: It set the Communist P.arity on its way to final domination of Czecho-Slovakia and it committed the non-Communist members of the Government to help the Communists achieve this aim. It also enacted a decision which had been taken by the Benes group as early as 1943 in London: the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as well as of the Magyarspeaking population of Czecho-Slovakia. Later we were to pay dearly for this blindness. One thing was o·bvious from the very beginning t o any reader of the Kosice program : it was directed against the Czecho-Slovak constitution of 1920. Everyone who had signed it could, according to the laws of the Republic, have been summoned before a court and condemned for high treason. The two parits of the document which were most obviously undemocratic were those concerned with the nationalization of basic industry and the ban of nonCommunist or non-Socialist political parties. �SLOVAKIA 15 The announcemen t of the program caused much anxiety throughout the country. But the note of triumph of Socialist propaganda became louder and louder as the President approached Prague and culminated in his message to the provisional Parliament whose members were all appointed by Dr. Benes, and which had .assembled in Prague on October 28, 1945. "Today," tlhe message read, "we are betaking ourselves along a path which is to lead to the socialization of modern society." The President wholehearted ly endorsed the Kosice program. Secret Police Early Established Immediately after liberation, poiice forces, the SNB, the STB, and the ZOB, organized throughout the country under the auspices of .the Red Army, were to solve thd problems. Any,body arrested by them could have been retained ind~inljtely. Those beaten to death in the prison cells or deported to Siberia have left no traces. Democratic politidans, such as Ivan Micura, a prominent Slovak who had constantly opposed the Nazi domina,tion of Central Europe~ were arrested in their homes, deported to Russia and never heard from a,gain. Gradually the immense police apparatus turned its energies to "prdblems of socialization." Afl persons who possessed some property were put on a list of suspicious persons. The following document gives a good illustration of this process: "Recorded on September 12, 1945, at 1100 hours in the office of the District National Committee in Novy Bydzov. "The Chairman of the District National Committee of Novy Bydzov, in accordance with orders received from the Minister of Food Supply, Mr. Vaclav Majer, and the Provincial National Committee, issues the following order to Ladislav Stulik, milrler in Hradisko: "I order you to revoke, at not later than 4 p. m. of this day, the complaints which you have submitted to the district· court of justice on behalf of the millers' union; if you should not comply with this order I shall have you arrested at 6 p. m. I also order you to refrain from any �16 SLOVAKIA participation in public life. The police measures mentioned above will also be applied to the members of your family, if you do not comply with this order." "Gestapoism" At the same time a wave of cruel hatred travelled from one individual to another. Perhaps the majority of the Czechs were suddenly ready to suspect, to denounce, to arrest, and to torture their neighbors. In a town in eastern Bohemia a group of local intellectuals used to assemble every night at a given hour and to pay a visit to the district jail where hundreds of people, suspected of · collaboration with the Nazis during the war, were imprisoned. There they amused themselves until the small hours by beating the prisoners with sticks and ropes. This willingness to do evil spread as an infectious disease. Someone called it "gestapoism." Its victims were in the first place the Sudeten Germans. Outrages were committed such as the tragic march of death of 60,000 German speaking inhabitants of Brno, the capital of Moravia, from that city to the Austrian border - a march during which about half of the victims miserably perished. But the same cruelties were committed by the Czechs also against other Czechs. In places such as the Pankrac prison in Prague or the Kounicovy Koleje in Brno, people who had been denounced by their neighbors were, without any investigation at all, machinegunned by hundreds every night and buried in common graves. It was on the dirty floor of a Pankrac prison cell that death came to Emil Ha.cha, former President of Czechoslovakia, a great scholar and gentleman whose only concern had been the welfare of his nation. One of the prisoners, who was lucky enough to endure the tortures and to stay alive, relates his memories: "I saw bodies with demolished faces and without eyes, heaps of bodies of men, women, and even children. I have heard jailors reading names from a list of those who were to be set free, but who had already died of starvation days before and whose bodies I myself was forced to remove from our crowded prison cells. Twice a week I had to help load �SLOVAKIA 17 trucks with such corpses, --corpses of those who were investigated but never reached a court of justice. I saw with my own eyes a prisoner who had been prepared for an investigation, have his legs pierced above the heels, a rope placed through the holes, and then suspended on a hook in the wall. This torture, it is true, did not last long, but when, after three years, the prisoner in question was set free, the investigators were still unable to define the charges a!;ainst him." No wonder that, when the weekly paper "0bzory" was started by the Czech People's Party in Prague, one of the first articles submitted to the editors by a young girl, Renata J., was a treatise on fear. "We are a generation of fear," she wrote in her manuscript, "we live in fear, we eat in fear, fear devours our thoughts, our words - words which we do no dare to utter... " Such was the real Czecho-Slovakia of 1945, when Dr. Benes was its President. People were ousted from their jobs, their lodgings. Their properties were confiscated. And they were unable to appeal to the law. Little wonder, then, that the Communists made easy game of Czecho-Slovakia . • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can only repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolba/bly not even Gerunany, nor even the Sfovaks, woulld a•cce,pt in the '.l10ng rlllil tlhe existence of Czechoslovakia. Therefore the grafting of Ozeohoslova!kia on to a Danubian federation is hardly possjlble. In such a framewwk she wou1.d si1mply continue to be what she was in her prevti.ous existence : an internaitiona:l oolamity. The position would ibe di,f. ferent in the case of Bohemia and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The O!ften repeated argument that Czecihoslovakia',s 'breaking up into her natural components would cause an even greaiter dislocation in the Daruufbe Basin, fails to convince, if one realizes ,that such a parution is the essentia1l iprerequisilte of the •o reation of a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miiksche - a Czech - in UNC0NlDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 216-216; Falber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � 12 SLOVAKIA Slovanics" grammar is a real possibility. I believe that it could be drawn up along the lines presented in this article. Of course, it would require the careful, studious efforts of someone well acquainted with the Slovanic languages or at least with one of them. But I feel it can be done. At least the possibility should be explored and an attempt made in .that direction. Perhaps if we Slovaks ignore this project, some one of our kindred Slavs may take it up, using his tongue instead of ours as the basis. The Slav languages certainly should be taught in our schools. But if they are to be, a Slovanic grammar is needed. Slovak can offer itself as the key ingredient in such a book, since it possesses the qualirty of representatives among the Slavic vernaculars. What is requisite, therefore, is a recognition of the needs for and feasibility of a "High School Slovanics" book, and then the efforts of our Slovak-American intelligentsia to prepare it. In this way, the great culture of our tiny nation would make still another contribution to the advancement of world knowledge and culture. - (MOST," Vol. 5, No. 2) . • • • THE BIRTH OF A SATELLITE By Bohdan Chudoba (It is ofiten maintained that Czecho-Slovaikiia became a s·a tellite of Moscow in February, 1948, when the communists gained full power in Prague. In the following article Pr<Yfessor Bohdan Chudio'ba of New York, a noted historian and forimer leading Czech -politician, very clearly -i lluminates the Czecho-Slovaik situation after World War II and the disastrous role that Czecho~ovaikia's foruner President Edward Benes played when, long before '1'94'8, he paved the way for the commun,ist seizure o,f full power in '1948.) When leading statesmen of the Allied Powers met at Teheran in 1943 and President Roosevelt ha,d to decide whether or not to support ChurchiH's plan to invade the Balkans and keep the Red Army out of Central Europe, the conference had the spectacle of Edward Benes journeying solemnly from London to Moscow where, on December 12, he signed a new treaty between Czecho-Slovalda and the Soviet Union, binding himself and his (provisional) government to dissolve all "anti-communist organizations �SLOVAKIA 13 in his country. His voyage to Moscow had been prepared long before by his chief advisor, the late Hubert Ripka. Speaking over the Moscow broadcasting system on December 21, 1943, Dr. Benes declared: "In 1938 we were deserted by the Western Democracies and then subjugated by the Nazis; only the Soviet Union remained faithful to us." That was not true. Benes knew very well that in 1938 the Soviets had refused to give any precise answer to the Czecho-Slovak High Command's request for military aid in the eventuality of war with Hitler Germany. He also accompanied this false strutement by another declaration which can be regarded as the core of his policy. He said: "This journey of mine is the necessary result, the logical conclusion, and the final evolutionary achievement of the Czech policy of the last hundred years, a result made possible by the Russian revolution of the last war." Beware of ideologists who consider their achievements as final. Benes was not satisfied with placing himself in the service of the Krem1lin. Although perfectly aware of the mass graves of Polish officers murdered by the Bolshevists in Katyn in 1944, he persuaded Stanislaus Mikolajczyk to quit the legitimate Polish exile government in London and to join the puppet government set up by the Soviets in Lublin, Eastern Poland. This adventure ended in Mikolajczyk's flight to the West in 1947. Most of Benes' aides were enthusiastic members of the Socialist avant-garde. Hubert Ripka, the most cunning among them, had already developed a far-reaching program which he published in England in 1945 entitled "Czechoslovakia in the New Europe." "Our alliance with the Soviet Union," he declared, "requires a new orientation of our cultural policy; it is necessary that all anti-Soviet elements be eliminated from our schools, educational institutions, and from our literature." Ripka's best disciple, Ivo Duchacek, went even further, saying in his book "Along the Road to Moscow" (London 1944): "This immense conflagration is far more than a flickering flame on which people could warm their soup, people who, until yesterday, had made a career out of criticizing Lenin's interpretation of Marx." �14 SLOVAKIA Benes Moves to Moscow Early in H)45 Benes made his final decision. Accompanied by Jari Sramek and the other ministers of his ca:binet he moved from London to Moscow preferring to reenter his country with the Red Army rather than with the Western liberation troops. In Moscow Benes' star began to decline. He had to nominate a new cabinet in which staunch communists held the key positions. The Soviets were probably not quite sure yet of Czecho-Slovakia. They had freed General Prchala's troops from the concentration camps and sent them, under the command of a man named Svoboda, to the Dukla Pass in the Ca:r,pathians. There most of these young Czech soldiers found their death. But the Soviets still wanted Benes' help. They used the first stop t!he provisional Czecho~lovak Government had to make on Czecho-Slovak soil in the wake of the Red Army, to proclaim a political manifesto that bound Benes and his friends even closer to Moscow than the treaty of 1943. The Kosice Program The Kosice Program, as th:is manifesto is usually called, achieved two things with one stroke: It set the Communist P.arity on its way to final domination of Czecho-Slovakia and it committed the non-Communist members of the Government to help the Communists achieve this aim. It also enacted a decision which had been taken by the Benes group as early as 1943 in London: the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as well as of the Magyarspeaking population of Czecho-Slovakia. Later we were to pay dearly for this blindness. One thing was o·bvious from the very beginning t o any reader of the Kosice program : it was directed against the Czecho-Slovak constitution of 1920. Everyone who had signed it could, according to the laws of the Republic, have been summoned before a court and condemned for high treason. The two parits of the document which were most obviously undemocratic were those concerned with the nationalization of basic industry and the ban of nonCommunist or non-Socialist political parties. �SLOVAKIA 15 The announcemen t of the program caused much anxiety throughout the country. But the note of triumph of Socialist propaganda became louder and louder as the President approached Prague and culminated in his message to the provisional Parliament whose members were all appointed by Dr. Benes, and which had .assembled in Prague on October 28, 1945. "Today," tlhe message read, "we are betaking ourselves along a path which is to lead to the socialization of modern society." The President wholehearted ly endorsed the Kosice program. Secret Police Early Established Immediately after liberation, poiice forces, the SNB, the STB, and the ZOB, organized throughout the country under the auspices of .the Red Army, were to solve thd problems. Any,body arrested by them could have been retained ind~inljtely. Those beaten to death in the prison cells or deported to Siberia have left no traces. Democratic politidans, such as Ivan Micura, a prominent Slovak who had constantly opposed the Nazi domina,tion of Central Europe~ were arrested in their homes, deported to Russia and never heard from a,gain. Gradually the immense police apparatus turned its energies to "prdblems of socialization." Afl persons who possessed some property were put on a list of suspicious persons. The following document gives a good illustration of this process: "Recorded on September 12, 1945, at 1100 hours in the office of the District National Committee in Novy Bydzov. "The Chairman of the District National Committee of Novy Bydzov, in accordance with orders received from the Minister of Food Supply, Mr. Vaclav Majer, and the Provincial National Committee, issues the following order to Ladislav Stulik, milrler in Hradisko: "I order you to revoke, at not later than 4 p. m. of this day, the complaints which you have submitted to the district· court of justice on behalf of the millers' union; if you should not comply with this order I shall have you arrested at 6 p. m. I also order you to refrain from any �16 SLOVAKIA participation in public life. The police measures mentioned above will also be applied to the members of your family, if you do not comply with this order." "Gestapoism" At the same time a wave of cruel hatred travelled from one individual to another. Perhaps the majority of the Czechs were suddenly ready to suspect, to denounce, to arrest, and to torture their neighbors. In a town in eastern Bohemia a group of local intellectuals used to assemble every night at a given hour and to pay a visit to the district jail where hundreds of people, suspected of · collaboration with the Nazis during the war, were imprisoned. There they amused themselves until the small hours by beating the prisoners with sticks and ropes. This willingness to do evil spread as an infectious disease. Someone called it "gestapoism." Its victims were in the first place the Sudeten Germans. Outrages were committed such as the tragic march of death of 60,000 German speaking inhabitants of Brno, the capital of Moravia, from that city to the Austrian border - a march during which about half of the victims miserably perished. But the same cruelties were committed by the Czechs also against other Czechs. In places such as the Pankrac prison in Prague or the Kounicovy Koleje in Brno, people who had been denounced by their neighbors were, without any investigation at all, machinegunned by hundreds every night and buried in common graves. It was on the dirty floor of a Pankrac prison cell that death came to Emil Ha.cha, former President of Czechoslovakia, a great scholar and gentleman whose only concern had been the welfare of his nation. One of the prisoners, who was lucky enough to endure the tortures and to stay alive, relates his memories: "I saw bodies with demolished faces and without eyes, heaps of bodies of men, women, and even children. I have heard jailors reading names from a list of those who were to be set free, but who had already died of starvation days before and whose bodies I myself was forced to remove from our crowded prison cells. Twice a week I had to help load �SLOVAKIA 17 trucks with such corpses, --corpses of those who were investigated but never reached a court of justice. I saw with my own eyes a prisoner who had been prepared for an investigation, have his legs pierced above the heels, a rope placed through the holes, and then suspended on a hook in the wall. This torture, it is true, did not last long, but when, after three years, the prisoner in question was set free, the investigators were still unable to define the charges a!;ainst him." No wonder that, when the weekly paper "0bzory" was started by the Czech People's Party in Prague, one of the first articles submitted to the editors by a young girl, Renata J., was a treatise on fear. "We are a generation of fear," she wrote in her manuscript, "we live in fear, we eat in fear, fear devours our thoughts, our words - words which we do no dare to utter... " Such was the real Czecho-Slovakia of 1945, when Dr. Benes was its President. People were ousted from their jobs, their lodgings. Their properties were confiscated. And they were unable to appeal to the law. Little wonder, then, that the Communists made easy game of Czecho-Slovakia . • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can only repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolba/bly not even Gerunany, nor even the Sfovaks, woulld a•cce,pt in the '.l10ng rlllil tlhe existence of Czechoslovakia. Therefore the grafting of Ozeohoslova!kia on to a Danubian federation is hardly possjlble. In such a framewwk she wou1.d si1mply continue to be what she was in her prevti.ous existence : an internaitiona:l oolamity. The position would ibe di,f. ferent in the case of Bohemia and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The O!ften repeated argument that Czecihoslovakia',s 'breaking up into her natural components would cause an even greaiter dislocation in the Daruufbe Basin, fails to convince, if one realizes ,that such a parution is the essentia1l iprerequisilte of the •o reation of a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miiksche - a Czech - in UNC0NlDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 216-216; Falber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 12 SLOVAKIA Slovanics" grammar is a real possibility. I believe that it could be drawn up along the lines presented in this article. Of course, it would require the careful, studious efforts of someone well acquainted with the Slovanic languages or at least with one of them. But I feel it can be done. At least the possibility should be explored and an attempt made in .that direction. Perhaps if we Slovaks ignore this project, some one of our kindred Slavs may take it up, using his tongue instead of ours as the basis. The Slav languages certainly should be taught in our schools. But if they are to be, a Slovanic grammar is needed. Slovak can offer itself as the key ingredient in such a book, since it possesses the qualirty of representatives among the Slavic vernaculars. What is requisite, therefore, is a recognition of the needs for and feasibility of a "High School Slovanics" book, and then the efforts of our Slovak-American intelligentsia to prepare it. In this way, the great culture of our tiny nation would make still another contribution to the advancement of world knowledge and culture. - (MOST," Vol. 5, No. 2) . • • • THE BIRTH OF A SATELLITE By Bohdan Chudoba (It is ofiten maintained that Czecho-Slovaikiia became a s·a tellite of Moscow in February, 1948, when the communists gained full power in Prague. In the following article Pr<Yfessor Bohdan Chudio'ba of New York, a noted historian and forimer leading Czech -politician, very clearly -i lluminates the Czecho-Slovaik situation after World War II and the disastrous role that Czecho~ovaikia's foruner President Edward Benes played when, long before '1'94'8, he paved the way for the commun,ist seizure o,f full power in '1948.) When leading statesmen of the Allied Powers met at Teheran in 1943 and President Roosevelt ha,d to decide whether or not to support ChurchiH's plan to invade the Balkans and keep the Red Army out of Central Europe, the conference had the spectacle of Edward Benes journeying solemnly from London to Moscow where, on December 12, he signed a new treaty between Czecho-Slovalda and the Soviet Union, binding himself and his (provisional) government to dissolve all "anti-communist organizations SLOVAKIA 13 in his country. His voyage to Moscow had been prepared long before by his chief advisor, the late Hubert Ripka. Speaking over the Moscow broadcasting system on December 21, 1943, Dr. Benes declared: "In 1938 we were deserted by the Western Democracies and then subjugated by the Nazis; only the Soviet Union remained faithful to us." That was not true. Benes knew very well that in 1938 the Soviets had refused to give any precise answer to the Czecho-Slovak High Command's request for military aid in the eventuality of war with Hitler Germany. He also accompanied this false strutement by another declaration which can be regarded as the core of his policy. He said: "This journey of mine is the necessary result, the logical conclusion, and the final evolutionary achievement of the Czech policy of the last hundred years, a result made possible by the Russian revolution of the last war." Beware of ideologists who consider their achievements as final. Benes was not satisfied with placing himself in the service of the Krem1lin. Although perfectly aware of the mass graves of Polish officers murdered by the Bolshevists in Katyn in 1944, he persuaded Stanislaus Mikolajczyk to quit the legitimate Polish exile government in London and to join the puppet government set up by the Soviets in Lublin, Eastern Poland. This adventure ended in Mikolajczyk's flight to the West in 1947. Most of Benes' aides were enthusiastic members of the Socialist avant-garde. Hubert Ripka, the most cunning among them, had already developed a far-reaching program which he published in England in 1945 entitled "Czechoslovakia in the New Europe." "Our alliance with the Soviet Union," he declared, "requires a new orientation of our cultural policy; it is necessary that all anti-Soviet elements be eliminated from our schools, educational institutions, and from our literature." Ripka's best disciple, Ivo Duchacek, went even further, saying in his book "Along the Road to Moscow" (London 1944): "This immense conflagration is far more than a flickering flame on which people could warm their soup, people who, until yesterday, had made a career out of criticizing Lenin's interpretation of Marx." 14 SLOVAKIA Benes Moves to Moscow Early in H)45 Benes made his final decision. Accompanied by Jari Sramek and the other ministers of his ca:binet he moved from London to Moscow preferring to reenter his country with the Red Army rather than with the Western liberation troops. In Moscow Benes' star began to decline. He had to nominate a new cabinet in which staunch communists held the key positions. The Soviets were probably not quite sure yet of Czecho-Slovakia. They had freed General Prchala's troops from the concentration camps and sent them, under the command of a man named Svoboda, to the Dukla Pass in the Ca:r,pathians. There most of these young Czech soldiers found their death. But the Soviets still wanted Benes' help. They used the first stop t!he provisional Czecho~lovak Government had to make on Czecho-Slovak soil in the wake of the Red Army, to proclaim a political manifesto that bound Benes and his friends even closer to Moscow than the treaty of 1943. The Kosice Program The Kosice Program, as th:is manifesto is usually called, achieved two things with one stroke: It set the Communist P.arity on its way to final domination of Czecho-Slovakia and it committed the non-Communist members of the Government to help the Communists achieve this aim. It also enacted a decision which had been taken by the Benes group as early as 1943 in London: the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as well as of the Magyarspeaking population of Czecho-Slovakia. Later we were to pay dearly for this blindness. One thing was o·bvious from the very beginning t o any reader of the Kosice program : it was directed against the Czecho-Slovak constitution of 1920. Everyone who had signed it could, according to the laws of the Republic, have been summoned before a court and condemned for high treason. The two parits of the document which were most obviously undemocratic were those concerned with the nationalization of basic industry and the ban of nonCommunist or non-Socialist political parties. SLOVAKIA 15 The announcemen t of the program caused much anxiety throughout the country. But the note of triumph of Socialist propaganda became louder and louder as the President approached Prague and culminated in his message to the provisional Parliament whose members were all appointed by Dr. Benes, and which had .assembled in Prague on October 28, 1945. "Today," tlhe message read, "we are betaking ourselves along a path which is to lead to the socialization of modern society." The President wholehearted ly endorsed the Kosice program. Secret Police Early Established Immediately after liberation, poiice forces, the SNB, the STB, and the ZOB, organized throughout the country under the auspices of .the Red Army, were to solve thd problems. Any,body arrested by them could have been retained ind~inljtely. Those beaten to death in the prison cells or deported to Siberia have left no traces. Democratic politidans, such as Ivan Micura, a prominent Slovak who had constantly opposed the Nazi domina,tion of Central Europe~ were arrested in their homes, deported to Russia and never heard from a,gain. Gradually the immense police apparatus turned its energies to "prdblems of socialization." Afl persons who possessed some property were put on a list of suspicious persons. The following document gives a good illustration of this process: "Recorded on September 12, 1945, at 1100 hours in the office of the District National Committee in Novy Bydzov. "The Chairman of the District National Committee of Novy Bydzov, in accordance with orders received from the Minister of Food Supply, Mr. Vaclav Majer, and the Provincial National Committee, issues the following order to Ladislav Stulik, milrler in Hradisko: "I order you to revoke, at not later than 4 p. m. of this day, the complaints which you have submitted to the district· court of justice on behalf of the millers' union; if you should not comply with this order I shall have you arrested at 6 p. m. I also order you to refrain from any 16 SLOVAKIA participation in public life. The police measures mentioned above will also be applied to the members of your family, if you do not comply with this order." "Gestapoism" At the same time a wave of cruel hatred travelled from one individual to another. Perhaps the majority of the Czechs were suddenly ready to suspect, to denounce, to arrest, and to torture their neighbors. In a town in eastern Bohemia a group of local intellectuals used to assemble every night at a given hour and to pay a visit to the district jail where hundreds of people, suspected of · collaboration with the Nazis during the war, were imprisoned. There they amused themselves until the small hours by beating the prisoners with sticks and ropes. This willingness to do evil spread as an infectious disease. Someone called it "gestapoism." Its victims were in the first place the Sudeten Germans. Outrages were committed such as the tragic march of death of 60,000 German speaking inhabitants of Brno, the capital of Moravia, from that city to the Austrian border - a march during which about half of the victims miserably perished. But the same cruelties were committed by the Czechs also against other Czechs. In places such as the Pankrac prison in Prague or the Kounicovy Koleje in Brno, people who had been denounced by their neighbors were, without any investigation at all, machinegunned by hundreds every night and buried in common graves. It was on the dirty floor of a Pankrac prison cell that death came to Emil Ha.cha, former President of Czechoslovakia, a great scholar and gentleman whose only concern had been the welfare of his nation. One of the prisoners, who was lucky enough to endure the tortures and to stay alive, relates his memories: "I saw bodies with demolished faces and without eyes, heaps of bodies of men, women, and even children. I have heard jailors reading names from a list of those who were to be set free, but who had already died of starvation days before and whose bodies I myself was forced to remove from our crowded prison cells. Twice a week I had to help load SLOVAKIA 17 trucks with such corpses, --corpses of those who were investigated but never reached a court of justice. I saw with my own eyes a prisoner who had been prepared for an investigation, have his legs pierced above the heels, a rope placed through the holes, and then suspended on a hook in the wall. This torture, it is true, did not last long, but when, after three years, the prisoner in question was set free, the investigators were still unable to define the charges a!;ainst him." No wonder that, when the weekly paper "0bzory" was started by the Czech People's Party in Prague, one of the first articles submitted to the editors by a young girl, Renata J., was a treatise on fear. "We are a generation of fear," she wrote in her manuscript, "we live in fear, we eat in fear, fear devours our thoughts, our words - words which we do no dare to utter... " Such was the real Czecho-Slovakia of 1945, when Dr. Benes was its President. People were ousted from their jobs, their lodgings. Their properties were confiscated. And they were unable to appeal to the law. Little wonder, then, that the Communists made easy game of Czecho-Slovakia . • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can only repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolba/bly not even Gerunany, nor even the Sfovaks, woulld a•cce,pt in the '.l10ng rlllil tlhe existence of Czechoslovakia. Therefore the grafting of Ozeohoslova!kia on to a Danubian federation is hardly possjlble. In such a framewwk she wou1.d si1mply continue to be what she was in her prevti.ous existence : an internaitiona:l oolamity. The position would ibe di,f. ferent in the case of Bohemia and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The O!ften repeated argument that Czecihoslovakia',s 'breaking up into her natural components would cause an even greaiter dislocation in the Daruufbe Basin, fails to convince, if one realizes ,that such a parution is the essentia1l iprerequisilte of the •o reation of a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miiksche - a Czech - in UNC0NlDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 216-216; Falber and Faiber, Ltd., London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Birth of a Satellite Description An account of the resource Bohdan Chudoba Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 6 (31), March-June 1960 pp. 12-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Chudoba, Bohdan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1960 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c9f3421fefc835397e1825fe1d41f08b.pdf e4b7ca934a2cb12d830a6397fb72344d PDF Text Text 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. �SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. �52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. �SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. �54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. �SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 �56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° �SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. �58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. �SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . �60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: �SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. �62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 �SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 �64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. �SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995) � 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. �SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. �52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. �SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. �54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. �SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 �56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° �SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. �58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. �SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . �60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: �SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. �62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 �SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 �64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. �SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. 52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. 54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. 58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . 60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Birth of Lexicographic Works in North America with Special Emphasis on J. J. Konuš Description An account of the resource Dalibor Mikuláš Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 50-65 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuláš, Dalibor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6744e6aad7468419ac2624101a85e953.pdf 37c8e65feb163eb93b316fe90cf05207 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka �60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- � SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka �60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Blind Alley of the Czechoslovaks Description An account of the resource By: The Informer Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 59-60 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d34ef8d9b1e14db214783cae3b9d29e9.pdf 9f5488907155635d54a32238029997c0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY Joseph K~rschbaum, M,A., LL.D. Early in February orf this year. Senator William E. Jenner's Committee !began to investigate se:veraJ Cze<!h politicians and their SlOIVaJk hirelings (br. Ruibert Ripka, Dr. Ferdinand Peroutka, Dr. Peter Zenlkl, Dr. J ose,ph Let.trich, General Nicholas Feriencik) who collatbomted wiitJh Communism and were granted asy1wm ·a nd aid by the administration oif President Hiarry Truman: The iillvesti:gatiion was initiated in the interests of American democracy and the security of .the United States of America. Anglo...Saxon law, however, protects the accused and the suspect until a verd!ict is rendered and, therefore, no one on the Slov,ak side has thus far taJken · a meritorious position, even though the SlovaJk nation ,p aid and is stiU .paying heavily in blood and suffering for the politics of the Czech and so-.called "Czechoslovak" CO'llaJboraitOTs with Communism now being investigated. The investi,gaJtion is not as yet completed, and it can happen that for various reaso1I1s it may not b_e completed in such a m·a nner as would ·be demanded by truth and justice. In the first place, we are here concerned with a .poHtical committee and the evidence of facts after some 10-12 yea·r s is quite 'buvdensome. In the second plaJce, many political circles, new,spa;pers. and or1ganimations in the demooratic world are and wiU 1~ interested in defending the 0zech collalborators, because all fellow-travelers and cry,pto-Communists wiill thereby deifend their own policies and themselves. The following remarks concerning the case of Hulbert Ripka· and Coonpan~ are not a result of the investigation of the Senate SU:b-<Committee, nor do they in any way consider what the eventual result might ib.e. Dr. Hulbert Ripka himself, conscious of his own "mistakes" and not altogether governed by the mofal prindp.le that "the hest deifense is offense," d!id not wait for .the resll!lt of the investigation, as every serious person would do, but attacked his a0cusers, waning: I cOiffiplain, I oigject. Ordinarily we wou,l d not expect this from a 60-year-old politician. The remariks t'hat foHow refer to t:Jhis 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 complaint of Dr. Ripka and his altlies in whose na;me Dr. Rrpka speaks. The Psychological Errors of Ripka's Defense The very fad that Dr. Riipka considered it necessary to complain iaJbout hiis accusers 1publ icly must girve the impression to ervery legally and politica!My minded person that Dr. Riipka is not certain albout his ow11 innocence and, therefore, resorted to hysteri'ca1 spasms before the resul..ts of the investigation were made kno1W11. The manner of his public defense and ang,r y tone, as well as the badly selec,ted vooa1bulary of Dr. Rip:k,a in his series of articles .pU!blished in the NiEW YORKSKY DENN1K f!rom March 12th of this year, necessarily leads us to the conclusion that some/body stepped on the corns of Dr. Ripka and his fsociates.. Dr. Ripka made it quite dbvious that the co·r n huH:s, and he and his associates are afraid of having it operated on. 1 This, however, undoulb,t edl,y wu.H not sur.pTise any decent person, who is acquainted with the actual situation in the Gzecho-Sl{)!Vruk Repulblic after 194.5 and wu.th the politics of the aocused Ozech aifd "Ozechoslovatk" collaJborators with Oommunism, as much as the fa'Ct that heire we hruve a man who so scandra:lously defends himself aigainst accusations of politi'cal collalboration, lbut who voted with both hands to hang ,p oliticians who eiven "might have" collalborated and with far less catastrophic consequences than in the case of Dr. Rtpka and his associates. The Sloivak ,p oliticians, who saived their nation from suffering and possible caitastrophy and cairried out the state rewolution with a song on their lips, were not resiponsi/ble foir a single verdict of death for politi:ca:l reasons while they g01Verned. How did they fare during the reign of DT. Rip!ka and his a;SSociates? They were hung and shot and tortured witho,wt mercy and without regard to rig,ht and justice for "all.eged" collaJbomtion. Nay, the verofoits were already rendered by the Ozech exiles in London without investigation and trial. Yet, this same Dr. Ripka, who sent people to the g•allows, feels highly inswted and thiniks that he is unjustly treated by the very faot th11it somebody had dared to ask him what the conditions were in Ozec'ho-Slova;kia while he �(j SI. OV AKT A and his associates were memibers of the "National Front" Government there and why that country was surrende,r ed to Moscow without a fight. Instead of exiplaining calmly and objectively and, incidentally, uttering "mea oulipa" and pointing out extenuating circUlffis1Jances, 1because only these will be considered, Dr. Hulbert Riplka insolently attacked his accusers and the victims of his politics in the effort to weaken the accusation and diivert attention to events which had little or nothing in common with the investigation of the Senate COIIlllrn.ittee of the United States. PsyohologicaHy - and in politics psychological moments are not without significance - Dr. R•i pka b.egan his defense very amk!war<ily. Lt was "a very wrong approach" to the delicate question of collaJboration in ipolitics. Let us, however, leave the realm of psycholo,g y and see at least cursorily how the case looks from the angle of political and legal argiuments. Political Falsehoods and Half-Truths Dr. Ripka rests his defense on several politicai falsehoods and half--truths, assuming that "Ameri:cans, with the exception of a few experts, cannot knoiw the comp1ex problems of Central EurO!pe," as he himself stated it. The main lies resorted to 'by Ripka are the following: 1. that the whole (Ozechos;Jo1vruk) nation wa:s for an alliance with the USSR during the war; 2. that the treaty of Dr. Benes with Moscow (December 12, 1943) was concluded to save Sl01ViaJkfa; 3. that the A.Hies had wanted a Soviet-Czech treaty in 1943. In the first instance, we are concerned with such an apparent lie that we must seriously question the fact that Dr. Ripka, a learned politician, can so daringly state such an exposed untruth in the face of thousands of Czechs and Sfovaks. The fad is that, for example, in Slovakia - in whose name Ripka presumes to spealk - up to the time of the OzechoJSoviet treaty, both the Communists and those accused with Ripka today (Ur. Lettrich and Gen. Feriencik) were practically inactive in politics. It was only after the treaty of Dr. Benes with Stalin that the so-ealled "Slovak underground" - the Communists and their collabora- �SLOVAKIA i tors from the "Ozechoslova;k" camp - met for the first time and on the basis of the treaty decided in Moscow to undertake political action for the renewal of Ozecho-.Slo ,,akia. It seems that Dr. Ri,pka depends entirely too much on the "ignorance " of Americans when he a1btempts to deny such evident facts. He pretends that he has forgotten that the governmen t, in which he occupied such an eminent position, had jailed and sentenced to death thousands and thousands of ,people in Sloivakia and the Czech lands, that it dispossessed and disfranchis ed them only /because they were against Moscow and CommuniS1In; that the governmen t of which Ripka was a part deported over three million Germans in a ba.zfuaTic manner aJlso beicause they rather looked to Germany than to Russia, and that it deported even the Magyars for collaiborating with the Germans. Now, then, where was this "whole nation" which Ripka spoke of? In this case we can understand "nation" in the political sense oi Anglo.Saxo n terminolog y and, consequent ly, must include the entire population of the Ozecho-Slo.vak Repulblic, because otherwise in the Ozech~lov aJk Repulblic there are and were at least two nations already even at the time the London governmen t of Dr. Benes concluded the Czecho-Sov iet Treaty. 2. The weakest argument of a political nature offered for the co.llalboration of the Czech ,p oliticians with Moscow is the statement that the Czecho-&wieit Treaty of 1943 was concluded "to save Slovailria." '.Dhis is not only a lie, but a political rubsurdity, especially in the veraion of Dr. Hulbert Ri,p ka. At the time when the Czech exiles, headed 'by Dr. Edward Benes, concluded their treaty with Moscow, there were no SlovaJk Communis ts in Moscow who could have had "sepa.ratist ic tendencies, " nay, there were :no significant SloV1ak Communis ts there at aJI. The leader of the Slovak Communist s, Dr. Vladimir Clementis, was Dr. Benes's man in London and the rest of the Slovruk Communist s, outside of one or two exceptions, li'Ved comfortabl y in Slovakia. Dr. Ripka knowingly uses the argument which could be applied cum grano salis to the events of 1944 and later, �SLOVAKIA when Slovaik Communists manifested tendencies for independence, because they saw no reason why the Czechs should rule over S10!Vl8Jk,ia (Dr. Nemec, the governmoot delegate), when Slwruk blood was !being spilled the:re, while in the Czech lands the people, taiking council from the London government of Benes, were even afraid to speak out so that they mi ght not anger the Germa:ris. At this time it is bloody irony to ta1k a'bout "saNing Slovalkia," whkh without the interference orf Dr. Ripka and his associates would have come out of the war either as Finland did, or in the worst case as Hungary did, which would haNe been !better for the Slovak nation from every point oif 'View than the position which ·r esulted from the Ozecho-Soviet Treaty. Slovakia was plundered so thoroughly and Silo1Vak women and girls were brutally ravaged by the Russian hordes as if no treaty had existed at all. And thus it was that amti-Commun ists were hung, shot and jailed in Slo,valkia. To this ibolshevik vengeance and inhumanity was added also the revenge of the Ozechs, ait times, proved wo,r se than the excesses of the bar'baria.n Reds. Then SlovaJkia was also plundered economically by Prague. 1 If Dr. Riipka and his asso.ciates maintain that they rendered the Czechs and the SlOIV'aJks a seirivice by delaying the bolsheivization of Czecho-Slwaik ia with the:i.r treaty (which we seriously doulbt), then it is apparent that Ripka '8Jlld Coonpany would like us to forget how many people perished and are still perishing ~ause they believed the false and n.ruive the sis aJbouit the independeince oif the Ozecho~Slovak Republic and therefore, came out openl;y- agiainst Communism. And how muoh damage did the propaganda of Riipka and his associates do from the international standpoint when it proved, or tried to pmve, that collaJboration witfu Moscow was not only possible, but necessary? The tTuth is that the policy of Dr. Benes, Dr. Ripka and Company could have served only the interests of Moscow and the Czech Communists, lbecaJuse under the veil of Czech propaganda Moscow could play its false role, and the Czech Communists could murrder, deport, violate, ipersecute any one they wanted to with the copartidspaJtion and coresponsibili ty of the glo- �SLOVAKIA 9 rified "democ,r,a,ts" in the western world of Dr. Benes, Masaryik, Dr. Ripka, Zenkl, etc. 3. Rilpka did not state the trwth when he wrote that the western a:11:ies wanted the Czecho-Soviet 'Dreaty in 1943. We know that they were not for it; Churchill aind EJden eS1peciaJl.y were against it; both protested.pulbliicly ag:ainst it and the matter was debated in Parliament. Of course, when the allies did coI11SenJt to it, it was only rufter Dr. Benes had everything cwt and dried amd the allies were faced with .,_ fait accampli; and they did so to aJVoid an airig,ument with Moscow at t:hat time. In his entire "complaint," Dr. Rtpka moves aibout on thin ice; he anticipates, distorts the facts and entangles his argumentation with pettifoggery. He would like to hruve us forget, at the same time, that he himse1f had spoken and written aJbout aH. these matters, that the Loo.don bToadc,a sts .and the press of the Ozeich exiles commented on them, that we ha,ve the memoirs of Dr. Benes, Dr. Olementis, Masaryk and even the great masterpiece of collraJboration by Ripka himself, his boolk IDAST AND WEST, published in London in 1944. U siI1Jg the Polish case as an argument in this connootion is also antici'Pating and distorting the facts. Dr. Ripka intentionally forgets jrust wh~in Dr. Edward Benes began hi:s. Sovietophile politics; and ver,y conrvenienUy prefers not tq mention thait between Moscow and the Poiish London Government there was not only the "Katyn affa.ir," but also an 8JPparent anti-Communist atmosphere, while the goivernment of Dr. Benes wa,s a cami:miflaged bols'hevilk emlbassy a:nd propagation center in the western world, which Moscow not only did not h0JVe to l,iquidaJte, 'but, converaely, used its .services very effectivcly to promote its own interests. Moscow liquidate its own agents only after they harve finished the wo~k asstgrned them. Since this was not the case with Benes'•s . London Go:vernmenrt in 1943, no parallel can ibe drawn between the Ozecli and Polish governments in London without an attempt at deceit. By using the arguments he did, Ripka not only did not produce an adequate defense for the conclusion of the Czecho-Soviet Treaty,. but eiven did not give an aiecepbalble ex- �10 SLOVAKIA ipla.nation for it. On the contrary, by taking recourse to lies, half-truths, anticipation and distortion of the facts , he demonstrated quite clearly that the Cooch and Slovak collaborators with Communism do not know how to defend their politics. Therefore, it remains for us to answer at least briefly the question whether Dr. Ripka and Company did collaJborate with bolshevism at the eX!pense of the Czech and SlOIVak naJtions and at the expense of the interests o.f democracy in general. The Collaboration of Ripka and Co. If we do not taJke into account the legal pa:squinades of the so-.cahled "peoples-democrat ic" courts, we find that there is no established legal definition for the crime of col1.a!boration as we have, for exa:mple, in the case of treason. In general, after the S'e cond World War, colla:boraltion meant aiding the occU1pants in the management of the territories they had oocU!pied -and su,pportirug their aggressions. A whole series of governments - from Petiaiin's to the H'l.l!Ilgarian, Rumanian and Slava:k - ,w as placed on trial and convicted for such colla!boration, even though in some cases collaboration consisted of not resisting German agg·ressiorn and of alliances of these governments with Berlin, which undoubtedly spared the nations concerned from aJctwail oocuipation and its consequences. The defense "of the collaborators with Germany - pointing out that they a'Verted ca:tastTophy f.rcnn other nations - however, was not accepted. Post~war governments, including the one of which Dr. Riipka and his associates were members, a::r\bitrnrily and mercilessly sent hundreds and thousands of such "collaJbora:tors" to the gallows, jails and concentration camps. If it is true that the Czecho.-iSlovruk Repulblic was "occupied" by the Russian Army, as Dr. Ripka himself now claims in his defense, and not "lifberated" - as he claimed eaxlier - then tihere can be no argument that the politics of Dr. Riipka and Co. exhausts the rea.il sUl~ance of the crime of coll.aJboration as it was defined by the "Nation.al Courts" of Ozecho--SlOIV'alkria and by the manifestations of Dr. R:ilpka himself. �SLOVAKIA 11 Dr. Ripka and his associates not only col,laJborated with the occupying power, but a:lso he1ped it sig:n.irficantly to consolidate its aggressions, includJing Ozecho-<Slovaikia itself. Naturally, Dr. Ripka points out that that was not his intention. It is possilble, however, to ,presuppose that it was the intention of Petain, or any other government in Central Euro:pe during the war, to aid the Gernnans at the expense of their own ·nations and countries? Did they a1l not defend themselrve.s - and many of them altogether jlUSbly - that they saved their naitions from great drumacge, from slaughter and plunder? What was the answer given to such questions, or to suoh a defense, by the government of which Benes, Ripka, Zenfkl, Lettrich, etc., were members? The gallows, concentration camps, deportation to Siberia, forced labor camps, and jails! So that there mi:ght not be any misunderstanding, decent ,people in macny cases regarded the continU'atiOlll cxf "peoples-democratic governments" as a travesty of justice and judicial mocder and, therefore, we do not want to girve the impression that our conclusion is to "repay the gaUows with gallows." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim of those remarks is something altogether different: to point out what kind of individuals are seelking cover in the democratic society and are aippealing to its sense of justrl.re, when they themselves never displayed any towat-d persons who were guilty of lesser transgressions than they and whose politics resulted in far less fortunate consequences than theirs. Comparing the collaJboration and politics of Dr. Ripka and Co. with that of, for example, Marshall Petain, Dr. Tiso, Antonescu, etc., we must also taJke into consideration one essential difference: the latter did not request and did not want colialboration with Germa'lllY; they did not initiate it and did not see in the Naizi system a;nd collaiboration with Germany what Dr. Rirpka and Oompany, long before 1945, saw in bolsheviism and in collaboration with Moscow. Marshal Petain and Dr. Tiso were put into the situation of "co'llalboration," when more than half of France was occupied and Slovakia was gi;ven a choice of being ooowpied by Germany or dirvided among its neighbors. Therefore, even if they did accept unpleasant and ungrateful tasks in �12 SLOVAKIA the interest of their nations, they did not 'b ecome international propagandists Of German politics, as w,a,s- the case with the Czech gove:mment-in..exile in its relation to Russia. Dr. RiJpka and Co., therefore, were not only guilty of the type of "collaboration'' for whfoh Pet-ain was coovicted and Dr. Tiso was murdered, but of a ty;pe much wcmse, because they wanted to collalbol'late with Russia and presented bolsheivism, fong before they returned to Prague, in glowing ternns as a form of prog,r essive democrax!y, defending i,t a-g ainst the Naizi bogey and convincing the world that the Soviets love and want peruce and the necessity for cooperating with Russia. Broadcasting over BBC, London, November 7, 1942, on the world s1gmficance of the Soviet Revolution, Dr. Hubert Ripka said that the revolution (which ,b rought bo~shevism or Communism to Russia) "is a super-111ational ideal, an eternal ideal, a h\.llill'an ideal, an ideal which has kindled the minds of t'he nolblest of men from the time of Plato and through t'he Chr:isti,a n era, through the great Fre1mh Revolution and until today." In his hook EA/ST AND WEST (London, l944), Dr. Rlipka wrote (p. 64). "The democvatization of Russia and the whole of Soviet society, which is a permanent resuit of the Soviet revolutionary process, eliJminated from Russian policy the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against the smaUer nations; it also resulted in the ,Soviet Union's becoming a genll'inely pea~e-loving power, sincerely interested in -the maJnteniance of peace,. but at the same time powerful enough to resist aggression and furnish effective help and support to t'he peace..Joving forees of the world." Addressing .himself to the Central...Jilil~apean nations, Dr. Ripka stated categorically: "We repeat: the So'Vli.ets are not anxious to 'Bolshewze' Central and South~Eastern Europe" (East and West, p. 61). And: "Here and there, mi~ givings still exist on the score of Russian or, more ,preciseily, Soviet imlperi,a;lism. We do not share those feavs" (.p. 51) Dr. Fevclinamd Peroutka, a very close fri-end of Dr. Rirpka, even after he had the opportunity to see just what the bolshevi!k ho:rdes ·were c84)alble of and to know just what oommunist politics aimed to achieve, wrote: "The East, there is �SLOVAKIA 13 our liberator, our ally and our protector in the future ... If in England there still can be found factors who evince a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then those persons cannot even be considered as our friends" (DNESEK, June 11, 1946). The remain!ing 0zech aind Slova!k associa.tes of Dr. Ripka spolke, acted and wrote along the same lines, here and there trying to outdo each othm- in their apPeasement of the Communists and in proclaiming their undying loyalty to the Soviet Union. In other words, in the case of Dr. Ripka a.nd Oo. we are not concerned with coUaJborators who were forced to collaborate, 'but with politicians who. even gained otheiis for the Soviet Union (Vd. the books of Dr. Ripka, Dr. Peroutka, Dr. Benes and their manifestations during and aftm- the war; Dr. Stephen Osusky',s booklet "Dr. Bene£ and the Slova!ks"; also quotaitions in the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER and S'LOV A.KIA, as well as HrOlbak's "CZECH0SL0ViA!KliSM Versus A!MERilC.AJN]SM"). Conclusion As I had said at the beginning of these remavks, the investigaition of Dr. Hubm-t Ripka and Co. can be completed without the American authorities undertaking any necessary steps a;gainst this grouip of collalbomtors with bolshevism who are hidiinig behind a democratic laibel an~ are using and abusing the good nature and hospitality of certain American circles. But eiven such an end of the inivestigation will not change the fact in t'he least that Dr. Ripka; Peroutka, Zeillkl, Lettrich, Fm-ienci,k, etc., were tools of communist policy in the 0zecho..Slo:vak Republi:c - Dr. Ripka even in and t'hat their collalbora.tion the international arena resulted in rirvers of blood, suffering and the enslavement of millions of innocent hwman beings. Dr. Rii.pk•a and his associ,a tes are attempting to defend their coHalboration by saying that they intended to 'defend democracy and that they could not foresee that Russia would not honor its treaties. In ,p olitics, where everything is judged b.y results and not according to intentions, this feeble defense will not · rid them of the responsibility. It �14 SLO VAKIA could be, as already stated, the maximum of extenuating circumstances, ,booaruse in poil[tics the definition still. applies : gouverner, c'est prevoir (to govern is to foresee). Dr. Rirpka and Co. either l,araked necessairy f.oresig'ht, or, if they knew what they were doing, collaJborated fully and wiUingly in the full sense of the word. In either case, however, i:t is difficrut to understand why sO!Ill'e American chicles are still supporting these ~ech politicfans, who in the battle a:g·a inst Communism - failed .shamefully and rutterly, maJking it ruppeaT that some one is interested in whitewashing them forcefll!lly of c0Ua1boration - the collaJb oriation which they committed to a very greater measure than did the people they shot and hung for coUaboratirrg with the Na2Jis. · The Czech politicians coli1ruborated with the men of the Kremlin 'because they hated the West after Munich (193:8). Some wanted to avenge themselves on the West. They :knew what they were doing; they turned to Moscow knowingly and willingly. The Ozech •p oliticians a3so hated the SloV'a:ks, because they had dared to lwe their own li,ves and proclaim their independence; th,a t they demonstmted their ability to live without the Czechs and thus frustrated their plan to Ozechize the S1ovaik nation, to destroy it as a nation. Driven by this hatred, the desire for revenge and the ambition to rule, Dr. Ripka and Co. thrust themseJ,ves into the embrace of Moscow and fled to the West only after they sa:w that they played the wrong hoTse and Moscow wanted to liquidate them. We m'll!st, therefore, ask the question, whether in the fight against Communism these persons are, from among the Czech and Slov,a,k exiles, suitaJble intei,preters o;f democratic conceptions with regard to the ~ h and Slovak nations and whether they came to the United States and Cainada through those elements of the past administrations, which saw in Comtmunism "a progressive democracy" - as did Ripka, PerourtJka, Zenkl Le1Jtrich and Co. The <:ry· "cavean:t consules, nequid detrimenti Res PUiblica capiat," it seems, is, therefore, in order, but the investigation of the Czech collalborators is aJso late by several years. � SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY Joseph K~rschbaum, M,A., LL.D. Early in February orf this year. Senator William E. Jenner's Committee !began to investigate se:veraJ Cze<!h politicians and their SlOIVaJk hirelings (br. Ruibert Ripka, Dr. Ferdinand Peroutka, Dr. Peter Zenlkl, Dr. J ose,ph Let.trich, General Nicholas Feriencik) who collatbomted wiitJh Communism and were granted asy1wm ·a nd aid by the administration oif President Hiarry Truman: The iillvesti:gatiion was initiated in the interests of American democracy and the security of .the United States of America. Anglo...Saxon law, however, protects the accused and the suspect until a verd!ict is rendered and, therefore, no one on the Slov,ak side has thus far taJken · a meritorious position, even though the SlovaJk nation ,p aid and is stiU .paying heavily in blood and suffering for the politics of the Czech and so-.called "Czechoslovak" CO'llaJboraitOTs with Communism now being investigated. The investi,gaJtion is not as yet completed, and it can happen that for various reaso1I1s it may not b_e completed in such a m·a nner as would ·be demanded by truth and justice. In the first place, we are here concerned with a .poHtical committee and the evidence of facts after some 10-12 yea·r s is quite 'buvdensome. In the second plaJce, many political circles, new,spa;pers. and or1ganimations in the demooratic world are and wiU 1~ interested in defending the 0zech collalborators, because all fellow-travelers and cry,pto-Communists wiill thereby deifend their own policies and themselves. The following remarks concerning the case of Hulbert Ripka· and Coonpan~ are not a result of the investigation of the Senate SU:b-<Committee, nor do they in any way consider what the eventual result might ib.e. Dr. Hulbert Ripka himself, conscious of his own "mistakes" and not altogether governed by the mofal prindp.le that "the hest deifense is offense," d!id not wait for .the resll!lt of the investigation, as every serious person would do, but attacked his a0cusers, waning: I cOiffiplain, I oigject. Ordinarily we wou,l d not expect this from a 60-year-old politician. The remariks t'hat foHow refer to t:Jhis 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 complaint of Dr. Ripka and his altlies in whose na;me Dr. Rrpka speaks. The Psychological Errors of Ripka's Defense The very fad that Dr. Riipka considered it necessary to complain iaJbout hiis accusers 1publ icly must girve the impression to ervery legally and politica!My minded person that Dr. Riipka is not certain albout his ow11 innocence and, therefore, resorted to hysteri'ca1 spasms before the resul..ts of the investigation were made kno1W11. The manner of his public defense and ang,r y tone, as well as the badly selec,ted vooa1bulary of Dr. Rip:k,a in his series of articles .pU!blished in the NiEW YORKSKY DENN1K f!rom March 12th of this year, necessarily leads us to the conclusion that some/body stepped on the corns of Dr. Ripka and his fsociates.. Dr. Ripka made it quite dbvious that the co·r n huH:s, and he and his associates are afraid of having it operated on. 1 This, however, undoulb,t edl,y wu.H not sur.pTise any decent person, who is acquainted with the actual situation in the Gzecho-Sl{)!Vruk Repulblic after 194.5 and wu.th the politics of the aocused Ozech aifd "Ozechoslovatk" collaJborators with Oommunism, as much as the fa'Ct that heire we hruve a man who so scandra:lously defends himself aigainst accusations of politi'cal collalboration, lbut who voted with both hands to hang ,p oliticians who eiven "might have" collalborated and with far less catastrophic consequences than in the case of Dr. Rtpka and his associates. The Sloivak ,p oliticians, who saived their nation from suffering and possible caitastrophy and cairried out the state rewolution with a song on their lips, were not resiponsi/ble foir a single verdict of death for politi:ca:l reasons while they g01Verned. How did they fare during the reign of DT. Rip!ka and his a;SSociates? They were hung and shot and tortured witho,wt mercy and without regard to rig,ht and justice for "all.eged" collaJbomtion. Nay, the verofoits were already rendered by the Ozech exiles in London without investigation and trial. Yet, this same Dr. Ripka, who sent people to the g•allows, feels highly inswted and thiniks that he is unjustly treated by the very faot th11it somebody had dared to ask him what the conditions were in Ozec'ho-Slova;kia while he �(j SI. OV AKT A and his associates were memibers of the "National Front" Government there and why that country was surrende,r ed to Moscow without a fight. Instead of exiplaining calmly and objectively and, incidentally, uttering "mea oulipa" and pointing out extenuating circUlffis1Jances, 1because only these will be considered, Dr. Hulbert Riplka insolently attacked his accusers and the victims of his politics in the effort to weaken the accusation and diivert attention to events which had little or nothing in common with the investigation of the Senate COIIlllrn.ittee of the United States. PsyohologicaHy - and in politics psychological moments are not without significance - Dr. R•i pka b.egan his defense very amk!war<ily. Lt was "a very wrong approach" to the delicate question of collaJboration in ipolitics. Let us, however, leave the realm of psycholo,g y and see at least cursorily how the case looks from the angle of political and legal argiuments. Political Falsehoods and Half-Truths Dr. Ripka rests his defense on several politicai falsehoods and half--truths, assuming that "Ameri:cans, with the exception of a few experts, cannot knoiw the comp1ex problems of Central EurO!pe," as he himself stated it. The main lies resorted to 'by Ripka are the following: 1. that the whole (Ozechos;Jo1vruk) nation wa:s for an alliance with the USSR during the war; 2. that the treaty of Dr. Benes with Moscow (December 12, 1943) was concluded to save Sl01ViaJkfa; 3. that the A.Hies had wanted a Soviet-Czech treaty in 1943. In the first instance, we are concerned with such an apparent lie that we must seriously question the fact that Dr. Ripka, a learned politician, can so daringly state such an exposed untruth in the face of thousands of Czechs and Sfovaks. The fad is that, for example, in Slovakia - in whose name Ripka presumes to spealk - up to the time of the OzechoJSoviet treaty, both the Communists and those accused with Ripka today (Ur. Lettrich and Gen. Feriencik) were practically inactive in politics. It was only after the treaty of Dr. Benes with Stalin that the so-ealled "Slovak underground" - the Communists and their collabora- �SLOVAKIA i tors from the "Ozechoslova;k" camp - met for the first time and on the basis of the treaty decided in Moscow to undertake political action for the renewal of Ozecho-.Slo ,,akia. It seems that Dr. Ri,pka depends entirely too much on the "ignorance " of Americans when he a1btempts to deny such evident facts. He pretends that he has forgotten that the governmen t, in which he occupied such an eminent position, had jailed and sentenced to death thousands and thousands of ,people in Sloivakia and the Czech lands, that it dispossessed and disfranchis ed them only /because they were against Moscow and CommuniS1In; that the governmen t of which Ripka was a part deported over three million Germans in a ba.zfuaTic manner aJlso beicause they rather looked to Germany than to Russia, and that it deported even the Magyars for collaiborating with the Germans. Now, then, where was this "whole nation" which Ripka spoke of? In this case we can understand "nation" in the political sense oi Anglo.Saxo n terminolog y and, consequent ly, must include the entire population of the Ozecho-Slo.vak Repulblic, because otherwise in the Ozech~lov aJk Repulblic there are and were at least two nations already even at the time the London governmen t of Dr. Benes concluded the Czecho-Sov iet Treaty. 2. The weakest argument of a political nature offered for the co.llalboration of the Czech ,p oliticians with Moscow is the statement that the Czecho-&wieit Treaty of 1943 was concluded "to save Slovailria." '.Dhis is not only a lie, but a political rubsurdity, especially in the veraion of Dr. Hulbert Ri,p ka. At the time when the Czech exiles, headed 'by Dr. Edward Benes, concluded their treaty with Moscow, there were no SlovaJk Communis ts in Moscow who could have had "sepa.ratist ic tendencies, " nay, there were :no significant SloV1ak Communis ts there at aJI. The leader of the Slovak Communist s, Dr. Vladimir Clementis, was Dr. Benes's man in London and the rest of the Slovruk Communist s, outside of one or two exceptions, li'Ved comfortabl y in Slovakia. Dr. Ripka knowingly uses the argument which could be applied cum grano salis to the events of 1944 and later, �SLOVAKIA when Slovaik Communists manifested tendencies for independence, because they saw no reason why the Czechs should rule over S10!Vl8Jk,ia (Dr. Nemec, the governmoot delegate), when Slwruk blood was !being spilled the:re, while in the Czech lands the people, taiking council from the London government of Benes, were even afraid to speak out so that they mi ght not anger the Germa:ris. At this time it is bloody irony to ta1k a'bout "saNing Slovalkia," whkh without the interference orf Dr. Ripka and his associates would have come out of the war either as Finland did, or in the worst case as Hungary did, which would haNe been !better for the Slovak nation from every point oif 'View than the position which ·r esulted from the Ozecho-Soviet Treaty. Slovakia was plundered so thoroughly and Silo1Vak women and girls were brutally ravaged by the Russian hordes as if no treaty had existed at all. And thus it was that amti-Commun ists were hung, shot and jailed in Slo,valkia. To this ibolshevik vengeance and inhumanity was added also the revenge of the Ozechs, ait times, proved wo,r se than the excesses of the bar'baria.n Reds. Then SlovaJkia was also plundered economically by Prague. 1 If Dr. Riipka and his asso.ciates maintain that they rendered the Czechs and the SlOIV'aJks a seirivice by delaying the bolsheivization of Czecho-Slwaik ia with the:i.r treaty (which we seriously doulbt), then it is apparent that Ripka '8Jlld Coonpany would like us to forget how many people perished and are still perishing ~ause they believed the false and n.ruive the sis aJbouit the independeince oif the Ozecho~Slovak Republic and therefore, came out openl;y- agiainst Communism. And how muoh damage did the propaganda of Riipka and his associates do from the international standpoint when it proved, or tried to pmve, that collaJboration witfu Moscow was not only possible, but necessary? The tTuth is that the policy of Dr. Benes, Dr. Ripka and Company could have served only the interests of Moscow and the Czech Communists, lbecaJuse under the veil of Czech propaganda Moscow could play its false role, and the Czech Communists could murrder, deport, violate, ipersecute any one they wanted to with the copartidspaJtion and coresponsibili ty of the glo- �SLOVAKIA 9 rified "democ,r,a,ts" in the western world of Dr. Benes, Masaryik, Dr. Ripka, Zenkl, etc. 3. Rilpka did not state the trwth when he wrote that the western a:11:ies wanted the Czecho-Soviet 'Dreaty in 1943. We know that they were not for it; Churchill aind EJden eS1peciaJl.y were against it; both protested.pulbliicly ag:ainst it and the matter was debated in Parliament. Of course, when the allies did coI11SenJt to it, it was only rufter Dr. Benes had everything cwt and dried amd the allies were faced with .,_ fait accampli; and they did so to aJVoid an airig,ument with Moscow at t:hat time. In his entire "complaint," Dr. Rtpka moves aibout on thin ice; he anticipates, distorts the facts and entangles his argumentation with pettifoggery. He would like to hruve us forget, at the same time, that he himse1f had spoken and written aJbout aH. these matters, that the Loo.don bToadc,a sts .and the press of the Ozeich exiles commented on them, that we ha,ve the memoirs of Dr. Benes, Dr. Olementis, Masaryk and even the great masterpiece of collraJboration by Ripka himself, his boolk IDAST AND WEST, published in London in 1944. U siI1Jg the Polish case as an argument in this connootion is also antici'Pating and distorting the facts. Dr. Ripka intentionally forgets jrust wh~in Dr. Edward Benes began hi:s. Sovietophile politics; and ver,y conrvenienUy prefers not tq mention thait between Moscow and the Poiish London Government there was not only the "Katyn affa.ir," but also an 8JPparent anti-Communist atmosphere, while the goivernment of Dr. Benes wa,s a cami:miflaged bols'hevilk emlbassy a:nd propagation center in the western world, which Moscow not only did not h0JVe to l,iquidaJte, 'but, converaely, used its .services very effectivcly to promote its own interests. Moscow liquidate its own agents only after they harve finished the wo~k asstgrned them. Since this was not the case with Benes'•s . London Go:vernmenrt in 1943, no parallel can ibe drawn between the Ozecli and Polish governments in London without an attempt at deceit. By using the arguments he did, Ripka not only did not produce an adequate defense for the conclusion of the Czecho-Soviet Treaty,. but eiven did not give an aiecepbalble ex- �10 SLOVAKIA ipla.nation for it. On the contrary, by taking recourse to lies, half-truths, anticipation and distortion of the facts , he demonstrated quite clearly that the Cooch and Slovak collaborators with Communism do not know how to defend their politics. Therefore, it remains for us to answer at least briefly the question whether Dr. Ripka and Company did collaJborate with bolshevism at the eX!pense of the Czech and SlOIVak naJtions and at the expense of the interests o.f democracy in general. The Collaboration of Ripka and Co. If we do not taJke into account the legal pa:squinades of the so-.cahled "peoples-democrat ic" courts, we find that there is no established legal definition for the crime of col1.a!boration as we have, for exa:mple, in the case of treason. In general, after the S'e cond World War, colla:boraltion meant aiding the occU1pants in the management of the territories they had oocU!pied -and su,pportirug their aggressions. A whole series of governments - from Petiaiin's to the H'l.l!Ilgarian, Rumanian and Slava:k - ,w as placed on trial and convicted for such colla!boration, even though in some cases collaboration consisted of not resisting German agg·ressiorn and of alliances of these governments with Berlin, which undoubtedly spared the nations concerned from aJctwail oocuipation and its consequences. The defense "of the collaborators with Germany - pointing out that they a'Verted ca:tastTophy f.rcnn other nations - however, was not accepted. Post~war governments, including the one of which Dr. Riipka and his associates were members, a::r\bitrnrily and mercilessly sent hundreds and thousands of such "collaJbora:tors" to the gallows, jails and concentration camps. If it is true that the Czecho.-iSlovruk Repulblic was "occupied" by the Russian Army, as Dr. Ripka himself now claims in his defense, and not "lifberated" - as he claimed eaxlier - then tihere can be no argument that the politics of Dr. Riipka and Co. exhausts the rea.il sUl~ance of the crime of coll.aJboration as it was defined by the "Nation.al Courts" of Ozecho--SlOIV'alkria and by the manifestations of Dr. R:ilpka himself. �SLOVAKIA 11 Dr. Ripka and his associates not only col,laJborated with the occupying power, but a:lso he1ped it sig:n.irficantly to consolidate its aggressions, includJing Ozecho-<Slovaikia itself. Naturally, Dr. Ripka points out that that was not his intention. It is possilble, however, to ,presuppose that it was the intention of Petain, or any other government in Central Euro:pe during the war, to aid the Gernnans at the expense of their own ·nations and countries? Did they a1l not defend themselrve.s - and many of them altogether jlUSbly - that they saved their naitions from great drumacge, from slaughter and plunder? What was the answer given to such questions, or to suoh a defense, by the government of which Benes, Ripka, Zenfkl, Lettrich, etc., were members? The gallows, concentration camps, deportation to Siberia, forced labor camps, and jails! So that there mi:ght not be any misunderstanding, decent ,people in macny cases regarded the continU'atiOlll cxf "peoples-democratic governments" as a travesty of justice and judicial mocder and, therefore, we do not want to girve the impression that our conclusion is to "repay the gaUows with gallows." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim of those remarks is something altogether different: to point out what kind of individuals are seelking cover in the democratic society and are aippealing to its sense of justrl.re, when they themselves never displayed any towat-d persons who were guilty of lesser transgressions than they and whose politics resulted in far less fortunate consequences than theirs. Comparing the collaJboration and politics of Dr. Ripka and Co. with that of, for example, Marshall Petain, Dr. Tiso, Antonescu, etc., we must also taJke into consideration one essential difference: the latter did not request and did not want colialboration with Germa'lllY; they did not initiate it and did not see in the Naizi system a;nd collaiboration with Germany what Dr. Rirpka and Oompany, long before 1945, saw in bolsheviism and in collaboration with Moscow. Marshal Petain and Dr. Tiso were put into the situation of "co'llalboration," when more than half of France was occupied and Slovakia was gi;ven a choice of being ooowpied by Germany or dirvided among its neighbors. Therefore, even if they did accept unpleasant and ungrateful tasks in �12 SLOVAKIA the interest of their nations, they did not 'b ecome international propagandists Of German politics, as w,a,s- the case with the Czech gove:mment-in..exile in its relation to Russia. Dr. RiJpka and Co., therefore, were not only guilty of the type of "collaboration'' for whfoh Pet-ain was coovicted and Dr. Tiso was murdered, but of a ty;pe much wcmse, because they wanted to collalbol'late with Russia and presented bolsheivism, fong before they returned to Prague, in glowing ternns as a form of prog,r essive democrax!y, defending i,t a-g ainst the Naizi bogey and convincing the world that the Soviets love and want peruce and the necessity for cooperating with Russia. Broadcasting over BBC, London, November 7, 1942, on the world s1gmficance of the Soviet Revolution, Dr. Hubert Ripka said that the revolution (which ,b rought bo~shevism or Communism to Russia) "is a super-111ational ideal, an eternal ideal, a h\.llill'an ideal, an ideal which has kindled the minds of t'he nolblest of men from the time of Plato and through t'he Chr:isti,a n era, through the great Fre1mh Revolution and until today." In his hook EA/ST AND WEST (London, l944), Dr. Rlipka wrote (p. 64). "The democvatization of Russia and the whole of Soviet society, which is a permanent resuit of the Soviet revolutionary process, eliJminated from Russian policy the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against the smaUer nations; it also resulted in the ,Soviet Union's becoming a genll'inely pea~e-loving power, sincerely interested in -the maJnteniance of peace,. but at the same time powerful enough to resist aggression and furnish effective help and support to t'he peace..Joving forees of the world." Addressing .himself to the Central...Jilil~apean nations, Dr. Ripka stated categorically: "We repeat: the So'Vli.ets are not anxious to 'Bolshewze' Central and South~Eastern Europe" (East and West, p. 61). And: "Here and there, mi~ givings still exist on the score of Russian or, more ,preciseily, Soviet imlperi,a;lism. We do not share those feavs" (.p. 51) Dr. Fevclinamd Peroutka, a very close fri-end of Dr. Rirpka, even after he had the opportunity to see just what the bolshevi!k ho:rdes ·were c84)alble of and to know just what oommunist politics aimed to achieve, wrote: "The East, there is �SLOVAKIA 13 our liberator, our ally and our protector in the future ... If in England there still can be found factors who evince a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then those persons cannot even be considered as our friends" (DNESEK, June 11, 1946). The remain!ing 0zech aind Slova!k associa.tes of Dr. Ripka spolke, acted and wrote along the same lines, here and there trying to outdo each othm- in their apPeasement of the Communists and in proclaiming their undying loyalty to the Soviet Union. In other words, in the case of Dr. Ripka a.nd Oo. we are not concerned with coUaJborators who were forced to collaborate, 'but with politicians who. even gained otheiis for the Soviet Union (Vd. the books of Dr. Ripka, Dr. Peroutka, Dr. Benes and their manifestations during and aftm- the war; Dr. Stephen Osusky',s booklet "Dr. Bene£ and the Slova!ks"; also quotaitions in the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER and S'LOV A.KIA, as well as HrOlbak's "CZECH0SL0ViA!KliSM Versus A!MERilC.AJN]SM"). Conclusion As I had said at the beginning of these remavks, the investigaition of Dr. Hubm-t Ripka and Co. can be completed without the American authorities undertaking any necessary steps a;gainst this grouip of collalbomtors with bolshevism who are hidiinig behind a democratic laibel an~ are using and abusing the good nature and hospitality of certain American circles. But eiven such an end of the inivestigation will not change the fact in t'he least that Dr. Ripka; Peroutka, Zeillkl, Lettrich, Fm-ienci,k, etc., were tools of communist policy in the 0zecho..Slo:vak Republi:c - Dr. Ripka even in and t'hat their collalbora.tion the international arena resulted in rirvers of blood, suffering and the enslavement of millions of innocent hwman beings. Dr. Rii.pk•a and his associ,a tes are attempting to defend their coHalboration by saying that they intended to 'defend democracy and that they could not foresee that Russia would not honor its treaties. In ,p olitics, where everything is judged b.y results and not according to intentions, this feeble defense will not · rid them of the responsibility. It �14 SLO VAKIA could be, as already stated, the maximum of extenuating circumstances, ,booaruse in poil[tics the definition still. applies : gouverner, c'est prevoir (to govern is to foresee). Dr. Rirpka and Co. either l,araked necessairy f.oresig'ht, or, if they knew what they were doing, collaJborated fully and wiUingly in the full sense of the word. In either case, however, i:t is difficrut to understand why sO!Ill'e American chicles are still supporting these ~ech politicfans, who in the battle a:g·a inst Communism - failed .shamefully and rutterly, maJking it ruppeaT that some one is interested in whitewashing them forcefll!lly of c0Ua1boration - the collaJb oriation which they committed to a very greater measure than did the people they shot and hung for coUaboratirrg with the Na2Jis. · The Czech politicians coli1ruborated with the men of the Kremlin 'because they hated the West after Munich (193:8). Some wanted to avenge themselves on the West. They :knew what they were doing; they turned to Moscow knowingly and willingly. The Ozech •p oliticians a3so hated the SloV'a:ks, because they had dared to lwe their own li,ves and proclaim their independence; th,a t they demonstmted their ability to live without the Czechs and thus frustrated their plan to Ozechize the S1ovaik nation, to destroy it as a nation. Driven by this hatred, the desire for revenge and the ambition to rule, Dr. Ripka and Co. thrust themseJ,ves into the embrace of Moscow and fled to the West only after they sa:w that they played the wrong hoTse and Moscow wanted to liquidate them. We m'll!st, therefore, ask the question, whether in the fight against Communism these persons are, from among the Czech and Slov,a,k exiles, suitaJble intei,preters o;f democratic conceptions with regard to the ~ h and Slovak nations and whether they came to the United States and Cainada through those elements of the past administrations, which saw in Comtmunism "a progressive democracy" - as did Ripka, PerourtJka, Zenkl Le1Jtrich and Co. The <:ry· "cavean:t consules, nequid detrimenti Res PUiblica capiat," it seems, is, therefore, in order, but the investigation of the Czech collalborators is aJso late by several years. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY Joseph K~rschbaum, M,A., LL.D. Early in February orf this year. Senator William E. Jenner's Committee !began to investigate se:veraJ Cze<!h politicians and their SlOIVaJk hirelings (br. Ruibert Ripka, Dr. Ferdinand Peroutka, Dr. Peter Zenlkl, Dr. J ose,ph Let.trich, General Nicholas Feriencik) who collatbomted wiitJh Communism and were granted asy1wm ·a nd aid by the administration oif President Hiarry Truman: The iillvesti:gatiion was initiated in the interests of American democracy and the security of .the United States of America. Anglo...Saxon law, however, protects the accused and the suspect until a verd!ict is rendered and, therefore, no one on the Slov,ak side has thus far taJken · a meritorious position, even though the SlovaJk nation ,p aid and is stiU .paying heavily in blood and suffering for the politics of the Czech and so-.called "Czechoslovak" CO'llaJboraitOTs with Communism now being investigated. The investi,gaJtion is not as yet completed, and it can happen that for various reaso1I1s it may not b_e completed in such a m·a nner as would ·be demanded by truth and justice. In the first place, we are here concerned with a .poHtical committee and the evidence of facts after some 10-12 yea·r s is quite 'buvdensome. In the second plaJce, many political circles, new,spa;pers. and or1ganimations in the demooratic world are and wiU 1~ interested in defending the 0zech collalborators, because all fellow-travelers and cry,pto-Communists wiill thereby deifend their own policies and themselves. The following remarks concerning the case of Hulbert Ripka· and Coonpan~ are not a result of the investigation of the Senate SU:b-<Committee, nor do they in any way consider what the eventual result might ib.e. Dr. Hulbert Ripka himself, conscious of his own "mistakes" and not altogether governed by the mofal prindp.le that "the hest deifense is offense," d!id not wait for .the resll!lt of the investigation, as every serious person would do, but attacked his a0cusers, waning: I cOiffiplain, I oigject. Ordinarily we wou,l d not expect this from a 60-year-old politician. The remariks t'hat foHow refer to t:Jhis 1 SLOVAKIA 5 complaint of Dr. Ripka and his altlies in whose na;me Dr. Rrpka speaks. The Psychological Errors of Ripka's Defense The very fad that Dr. Riipka considered it necessary to complain iaJbout hiis accusers 1publ icly must girve the impression to ervery legally and politica!My minded person that Dr. Riipka is not certain albout his ow11 innocence and, therefore, resorted to hysteri'ca1 spasms before the resul..ts of the investigation were made kno1W11. The manner of his public defense and ang,r y tone, as well as the badly selec,ted vooa1bulary of Dr. Rip:k,a in his series of articles .pU!blished in the NiEW YORKSKY DENN1K f!rom March 12th of this year, necessarily leads us to the conclusion that some/body stepped on the corns of Dr. Ripka and his fsociates.. Dr. Ripka made it quite dbvious that the co·r n huH:s, and he and his associates are afraid of having it operated on. 1 This, however, undoulb,t edl,y wu.H not sur.pTise any decent person, who is acquainted with the actual situation in the Gzecho-Sl{)!Vruk Repulblic after 194.5 and wu.th the politics of the aocused Ozech aifd "Ozechoslovatk" collaJborators with Oommunism, as much as the fa'Ct that heire we hruve a man who so scandra:lously defends himself aigainst accusations of politi'cal collalboration, lbut who voted with both hands to hang ,p oliticians who eiven "might have" collalborated and with far less catastrophic consequences than in the case of Dr. Rtpka and his associates. The Sloivak ,p oliticians, who saived their nation from suffering and possible caitastrophy and cairried out the state rewolution with a song on their lips, were not resiponsi/ble foir a single verdict of death for politi:ca:l reasons while they g01Verned. How did they fare during the reign of DT. Rip!ka and his a;SSociates? They were hung and shot and tortured witho,wt mercy and without regard to rig,ht and justice for "all.eged" collaJbomtion. Nay, the verofoits were already rendered by the Ozech exiles in London without investigation and trial. Yet, this same Dr. Ripka, who sent people to the g•allows, feels highly inswted and thiniks that he is unjustly treated by the very faot th11it somebody had dared to ask him what the conditions were in Ozec'ho-Slova;kia while he (j SI. OV AKT A and his associates were memibers of the "National Front" Government there and why that country was surrende,r ed to Moscow without a fight. Instead of exiplaining calmly and objectively and, incidentally, uttering "mea oulipa" and pointing out extenuating circUlffis1Jances, 1because only these will be considered, Dr. Hulbert Riplka insolently attacked his accusers and the victims of his politics in the effort to weaken the accusation and diivert attention to events which had little or nothing in common with the investigation of the Senate COIIlllrn.ittee of the United States. PsyohologicaHy - and in politics psychological moments are not without significance - Dr. R•i pka b.egan his defense very amk!war<ily. Lt was "a very wrong approach" to the delicate question of collaJboration in ipolitics. Let us, however, leave the realm of psycholo,g y and see at least cursorily how the case looks from the angle of political and legal argiuments. Political Falsehoods and Half-Truths Dr. Ripka rests his defense on several politicai falsehoods and half--truths, assuming that "Ameri:cans, with the exception of a few experts, cannot knoiw the comp1ex problems of Central EurO!pe," as he himself stated it. The main lies resorted to 'by Ripka are the following: 1. that the whole (Ozechos;Jo1vruk) nation wa:s for an alliance with the USSR during the war; 2. that the treaty of Dr. Benes with Moscow (December 12, 1943) was concluded to save Sl01ViaJkfa; 3. that the A.Hies had wanted a Soviet-Czech treaty in 1943. In the first instance, we are concerned with such an apparent lie that we must seriously question the fact that Dr. Ripka, a learned politician, can so daringly state such an exposed untruth in the face of thousands of Czechs and Sfovaks. The fad is that, for example, in Slovakia - in whose name Ripka presumes to spealk - up to the time of the OzechoJSoviet treaty, both the Communists and those accused with Ripka today (Ur. Lettrich and Gen. Feriencik) were practically inactive in politics. It was only after the treaty of Dr. Benes with Stalin that the so-ealled "Slovak underground" - the Communists and their collabora- SLOVAKIA i tors from the "Ozechoslova;k" camp - met for the first time and on the basis of the treaty decided in Moscow to undertake political action for the renewal of Ozecho-.Slo ,,akia. It seems that Dr. Ri,pka depends entirely too much on the "ignorance " of Americans when he a1btempts to deny such evident facts. He pretends that he has forgotten that the governmen t, in which he occupied such an eminent position, had jailed and sentenced to death thousands and thousands of ,people in Sloivakia and the Czech lands, that it dispossessed and disfranchis ed them only /because they were against Moscow and CommuniS1In; that the governmen t of which Ripka was a part deported over three million Germans in a ba.zfuaTic manner aJlso beicause they rather looked to Germany than to Russia, and that it deported even the Magyars for collaiborating with the Germans. Now, then, where was this "whole nation" which Ripka spoke of? In this case we can understand "nation" in the political sense oi Anglo.Saxo n terminolog y and, consequent ly, must include the entire population of the Ozecho-Slo.vak Repulblic, because otherwise in the Ozech~lov aJk Repulblic there are and were at least two nations already even at the time the London governmen t of Dr. Benes concluded the Czecho-Sov iet Treaty. 2. The weakest argument of a political nature offered for the co.llalboration of the Czech ,p oliticians with Moscow is the statement that the Czecho-&wieit Treaty of 1943 was concluded "to save Slovailria." '.Dhis is not only a lie, but a political rubsurdity, especially in the veraion of Dr. Hulbert Ri,p ka. At the time when the Czech exiles, headed 'by Dr. Edward Benes, concluded their treaty with Moscow, there were no SlovaJk Communis ts in Moscow who could have had "sepa.ratist ic tendencies, " nay, there were :no significant SloV1ak Communis ts there at aJI. The leader of the Slovak Communist s, Dr. Vladimir Clementis, was Dr. Benes's man in London and the rest of the Slovruk Communist s, outside of one or two exceptions, li'Ved comfortabl y in Slovakia. Dr. Ripka knowingly uses the argument which could be applied cum grano salis to the events of 1944 and later, SLOVAKIA when Slovaik Communists manifested tendencies for independence, because they saw no reason why the Czechs should rule over S10!Vl8Jk,ia (Dr. Nemec, the governmoot delegate), when Slwruk blood was !being spilled the:re, while in the Czech lands the people, taiking council from the London government of Benes, were even afraid to speak out so that they mi ght not anger the Germa:ris. At this time it is bloody irony to ta1k a'bout "saNing Slovalkia," whkh without the interference orf Dr. Ripka and his associates would have come out of the war either as Finland did, or in the worst case as Hungary did, which would haNe been !better for the Slovak nation from every point oif 'View than the position which ·r esulted from the Ozecho-Soviet Treaty. Slovakia was plundered so thoroughly and Silo1Vak women and girls were brutally ravaged by the Russian hordes as if no treaty had existed at all. And thus it was that amti-Commun ists were hung, shot and jailed in Slo,valkia. To this ibolshevik vengeance and inhumanity was added also the revenge of the Ozechs, ait times, proved wo,r se than the excesses of the bar'baria.n Reds. Then SlovaJkia was also plundered economically by Prague. 1 If Dr. Riipka and his asso.ciates maintain that they rendered the Czechs and the SlOIV'aJks a seirivice by delaying the bolsheivization of Czecho-Slwaik ia with the:i.r treaty (which we seriously doulbt), then it is apparent that Ripka '8Jlld Coonpany would like us to forget how many people perished and are still perishing ~ause they believed the false and n.ruive the sis aJbouit the independeince oif the Ozecho~Slovak Republic and therefore, came out openl;y- agiainst Communism. And how muoh damage did the propaganda of Riipka and his associates do from the international standpoint when it proved, or tried to pmve, that collaJboration witfu Moscow was not only possible, but necessary? The tTuth is that the policy of Dr. Benes, Dr. Ripka and Company could have served only the interests of Moscow and the Czech Communists, lbecaJuse under the veil of Czech propaganda Moscow could play its false role, and the Czech Communists could murrder, deport, violate, ipersecute any one they wanted to with the copartidspaJtion and coresponsibili ty of the glo- SLOVAKIA 9 rified "democ,r,a,ts" in the western world of Dr. Benes, Masaryik, Dr. Ripka, Zenkl, etc. 3. Rilpka did not state the trwth when he wrote that the western a:11:ies wanted the Czecho-Soviet 'Dreaty in 1943. We know that they were not for it; Churchill aind EJden eS1peciaJl.y were against it; both protested.pulbliicly ag:ainst it and the matter was debated in Parliament. Of course, when the allies did coI11SenJt to it, it was only rufter Dr. Benes had everything cwt and dried amd the allies were faced with .,_ fait accampli; and they did so to aJVoid an airig,ument with Moscow at t:hat time. In his entire "complaint," Dr. Rtpka moves aibout on thin ice; he anticipates, distorts the facts and entangles his argumentation with pettifoggery. He would like to hruve us forget, at the same time, that he himse1f had spoken and written aJbout aH. these matters, that the Loo.don bToadc,a sts .and the press of the Ozeich exiles commented on them, that we ha,ve the memoirs of Dr. Benes, Dr. Olementis, Masaryk and even the great masterpiece of collraJboration by Ripka himself, his boolk IDAST AND WEST, published in London in 1944. U siI1Jg the Polish case as an argument in this connootion is also antici'Pating and distorting the facts. Dr. Ripka intentionally forgets jrust wh~in Dr. Edward Benes began hi:s. Sovietophile politics; and ver,y conrvenienUy prefers not tq mention thait between Moscow and the Poiish London Government there was not only the "Katyn affa.ir," but also an 8JPparent anti-Communist atmosphere, while the goivernment of Dr. Benes wa,s a cami:miflaged bols'hevilk emlbassy a:nd propagation center in the western world, which Moscow not only did not h0JVe to l,iquidaJte, 'but, converaely, used its .services very effectivcly to promote its own interests. Moscow liquidate its own agents only after they harve finished the wo~k asstgrned them. Since this was not the case with Benes'•s . London Go:vernmenrt in 1943, no parallel can ibe drawn between the Ozecli and Polish governments in London without an attempt at deceit. By using the arguments he did, Ripka not only did not produce an adequate defense for the conclusion of the Czecho-Soviet Treaty,. but eiven did not give an aiecepbalble ex- 10 SLOVAKIA ipla.nation for it. On the contrary, by taking recourse to lies, half-truths, anticipation and distortion of the facts , he demonstrated quite clearly that the Cooch and Slovak collaborators with Communism do not know how to defend their politics. Therefore, it remains for us to answer at least briefly the question whether Dr. Ripka and Company did collaJborate with bolshevism at the eX!pense of the Czech and SlOIVak naJtions and at the expense of the interests o.f democracy in general. The Collaboration of Ripka and Co. If we do not taJke into account the legal pa:squinades of the so-.cahled "peoples-democrat ic" courts, we find that there is no established legal definition for the crime of col1.a!boration as we have, for exa:mple, in the case of treason. In general, after the S'e cond World War, colla:boraltion meant aiding the occU1pants in the management of the territories they had oocU!pied -and su,pportirug their aggressions. A whole series of governments - from Petiaiin's to the H'l.l!Ilgarian, Rumanian and Slava:k - ,w as placed on trial and convicted for such colla!boration, even though in some cases collaboration consisted of not resisting German agg·ressiorn and of alliances of these governments with Berlin, which undoubtedly spared the nations concerned from aJctwail oocuipation and its consequences. The defense "of the collaborators with Germany - pointing out that they a'Verted ca:tastTophy f.rcnn other nations - however, was not accepted. Post~war governments, including the one of which Dr. Riipka and his associates were members, a::r\bitrnrily and mercilessly sent hundreds and thousands of such "collaJbora:tors" to the gallows, jails and concentration camps. If it is true that the Czecho.-iSlovruk Repulblic was "occupied" by the Russian Army, as Dr. Ripka himself now claims in his defense, and not "lifberated" - as he claimed eaxlier - then tihere can be no argument that the politics of Dr. Riipka and Co. exhausts the rea.il sUl~ance of the crime of coll.aJboration as it was defined by the "Nation.al Courts" of Ozecho--SlOIV'alkria and by the manifestations of Dr. R:ilpka himself. SLOVAKIA 11 Dr. Ripka and his associates not only col,laJborated with the occupying power, but a:lso he1ped it sig:n.irficantly to consolidate its aggressions, includJing Ozecho-<Slovaikia itself. Naturally, Dr. Ripka points out that that was not his intention. It is possilble, however, to ,presuppose that it was the intention of Petain, or any other government in Central Euro:pe during the war, to aid the Gernnans at the expense of their own ·nations and countries? Did they a1l not defend themselrve.s - and many of them altogether jlUSbly - that they saved their naitions from great drumacge, from slaughter and plunder? What was the answer given to such questions, or to suoh a defense, by the government of which Benes, Ripka, Zenfkl, Lettrich, etc., were members? The gallows, concentration camps, deportation to Siberia, forced labor camps, and jails! So that there mi:ght not be any misunderstanding, decent ,people in macny cases regarded the continU'atiOlll cxf "peoples-democratic governments" as a travesty of justice and judicial mocder and, therefore, we do not want to girve the impression that our conclusion is to "repay the gaUows with gallows." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim of those remarks is something altogether different: to point out what kind of individuals are seelking cover in the democratic society and are aippealing to its sense of justrl.re, when they themselves never displayed any towat-d persons who were guilty of lesser transgressions than they and whose politics resulted in far less fortunate consequences than theirs. Comparing the collaJboration and politics of Dr. Ripka and Co. with that of, for example, Marshall Petain, Dr. Tiso, Antonescu, etc., we must also taJke into consideration one essential difference: the latter did not request and did not want colialboration with Germa'lllY; they did not initiate it and did not see in the Naizi system a;nd collaiboration with Germany what Dr. Rirpka and Oompany, long before 1945, saw in bolsheviism and in collaboration with Moscow. Marshal Petain and Dr. Tiso were put into the situation of "co'llalboration," when more than half of France was occupied and Slovakia was gi;ven a choice of being ooowpied by Germany or dirvided among its neighbors. Therefore, even if they did accept unpleasant and ungrateful tasks in 12 SLOVAKIA the interest of their nations, they did not 'b ecome international propagandists Of German politics, as w,a,s- the case with the Czech gove:mment-in..exile in its relation to Russia. Dr. RiJpka and Co., therefore, were not only guilty of the type of "collaboration'' for whfoh Pet-ain was coovicted and Dr. Tiso was murdered, but of a ty;pe much wcmse, because they wanted to collalbol'late with Russia and presented bolsheivism, fong before they returned to Prague, in glowing ternns as a form of prog,r essive democrax!y, defending i,t a-g ainst the Naizi bogey and convincing the world that the Soviets love and want peruce and the necessity for cooperating with Russia. Broadcasting over BBC, London, November 7, 1942, on the world s1gmficance of the Soviet Revolution, Dr. Hubert Ripka said that the revolution (which ,b rought bo~shevism or Communism to Russia) "is a super-111ational ideal, an eternal ideal, a h\.llill'an ideal, an ideal which has kindled the minds of t'he nolblest of men from the time of Plato and through t'he Chr:isti,a n era, through the great Fre1mh Revolution and until today." In his hook EA/ST AND WEST (London, l944), Dr. Rlipka wrote (p. 64). "The democvatization of Russia and the whole of Soviet society, which is a permanent resuit of the Soviet revolutionary process, eliJminated from Russian policy the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against the smaUer nations; it also resulted in the ,Soviet Union's becoming a genll'inely pea~e-loving power, sincerely interested in -the maJnteniance of peace,. but at the same time powerful enough to resist aggression and furnish effective help and support to t'he peace..Joving forees of the world." Addressing .himself to the Central...Jilil~apean nations, Dr. Ripka stated categorically: "We repeat: the So'Vli.ets are not anxious to 'Bolshewze' Central and South~Eastern Europe" (East and West, p. 61). And: "Here and there, mi~ givings still exist on the score of Russian or, more ,preciseily, Soviet imlperi,a;lism. We do not share those feavs" (.p. 51) Dr. Fevclinamd Peroutka, a very close fri-end of Dr. Rirpka, even after he had the opportunity to see just what the bolshevi!k ho:rdes ·were c84)alble of and to know just what oommunist politics aimed to achieve, wrote: "The East, there is SLOVAKIA 13 our liberator, our ally and our protector in the future ... If in England there still can be found factors who evince a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then those persons cannot even be considered as our friends" (DNESEK, June 11, 1946). The remain!ing 0zech aind Slova!k associa.tes of Dr. Ripka spolke, acted and wrote along the same lines, here and there trying to outdo each othm- in their apPeasement of the Communists and in proclaiming their undying loyalty to the Soviet Union. In other words, in the case of Dr. Ripka a.nd Oo. we are not concerned with coUaJborators who were forced to collaborate, 'but with politicians who. even gained otheiis for the Soviet Union (Vd. the books of Dr. Ripka, Dr. Peroutka, Dr. Benes and their manifestations during and aftm- the war; Dr. Stephen Osusky',s booklet "Dr. Bene£ and the Slova!ks"; also quotaitions in the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER and S'LOV A.KIA, as well as HrOlbak's "CZECH0SL0ViA!KliSM Versus A!MERilC.AJN]SM"). Conclusion As I had said at the beginning of these remavks, the investigaition of Dr. Hubm-t Ripka and Co. can be completed without the American authorities undertaking any necessary steps a;gainst this grouip of collalbomtors with bolshevism who are hidiinig behind a democratic laibel an~ are using and abusing the good nature and hospitality of certain American circles. But eiven such an end of the inivestigation will not change the fact in t'he least that Dr. Ripka; Peroutka, Zeillkl, Lettrich, Fm-ienci,k, etc., were tools of communist policy in the 0zecho..Slo:vak Republi:c - Dr. Ripka even in and t'hat their collalbora.tion the international arena resulted in rirvers of blood, suffering and the enslavement of millions of innocent hwman beings. Dr. Rii.pk•a and his associ,a tes are attempting to defend their coHalboration by saying that they intended to 'defend democracy and that they could not foresee that Russia would not honor its treaties. In ,p olitics, where everything is judged b.y results and not according to intentions, this feeble defense will not · rid them of the responsibility. It 14 SLO VAKIA could be, as already stated, the maximum of extenuating circumstances, ,booaruse in poil[tics the definition still. applies : gouverner, c'est prevoir (to govern is to foresee). Dr. Rirpka and Co. either l,araked necessairy f.oresig'ht, or, if they knew what they were doing, collaJborated fully and wiUingly in the full sense of the word. In either case, however, i:t is difficrut to understand why sO!Ill'e American chicles are still supporting these ~ech politicfans, who in the battle a:g·a inst Communism - failed .shamefully and rutterly, maJking it ruppeaT that some one is interested in whitewashing them forcefll!lly of c0Ua1boration - the collaJb oriation which they committed to a very greater measure than did the people they shot and hung for coUaboratirrg with the Na2Jis. · The Czech politicians coli1ruborated with the men of the Kremlin 'because they hated the West after Munich (193:8). Some wanted to avenge themselves on the West. They :knew what they were doing; they turned to Moscow knowingly and willingly. The Ozech •p oliticians a3so hated the SloV'a:ks, because they had dared to lwe their own li,ves and proclaim their independence; th,a t they demonstmted their ability to live without the Czechs and thus frustrated their plan to Ozechize the S1ovaik nation, to destroy it as a nation. Driven by this hatred, the desire for revenge and the ambition to rule, Dr. Ripka and Co. thrust themseJ,ves into the embrace of Moscow and fled to the West only after they sa:w that they played the wrong hoTse and Moscow wanted to liquidate them. We m'll!st, therefore, ask the question, whether in the fight against Communism these persons are, from among the Czech and Slov,a,k exiles, suitaJble intei,preters o;f democratic conceptions with regard to the ~ h and Slovak nations and whether they came to the United States and Cainada through those elements of the past administrations, which saw in Comtmunism "a progressive democracy" - as did Ripka, PerourtJka, Zenkl Le1Jtrich and Co. The <:ry· "cavean:t consules, nequid detrimenti Res PUiblica capiat," it seems, is, therefore, in order, but the investigation of the Czech collalborators is aJso late by several years.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Case of Dr. Hubert Ripka and Company Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D. Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954 pp. 4-14 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1954 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3a30f0930fb14252cce15b5ae15d325c.pdf 67b79a93269b6588ade3875e6c82c94e PDF Text Text AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law 2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. 6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt 8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the 10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. 12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, 14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. 16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng 18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. 20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. 24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 1-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5793659afca5cb0ddbe869ddb332e6da.pdf addf4730244a97b946fc8badbc0bbea4 PDF Text Text THE CAUSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S DISINTEGRATION (k) - "The Slovaks, dissatisfied with autonomy within the framework of a diminished Czechoslovak state, went after independence as their ultimate goal. For that their leaders were accused of treason. I doubt whether that was in place...." (John F. Montgomery, for­mer U. S. Ambassador to Hungary: "Hungary, the Satellite against its own W111.") The disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and her agony in the fall of 1938 will form interesting chapters in the history of the Europe created by treaties from 1919-1920. During that memorable 1938 and the spring that followed the Munich "capitulation" of the western democracies before German expansion, it was not only a state that collapsed, but also the whole European political and strategic system - a legal and moral system. In Slovakia some of the foremost personalities were executed, thousands exiled and other thousands were jailed because they were accused of "causing the collapse of Czechoslovakia." But some of the Slovak leaders were fortunate to escape from their country. They were tried in absentia, sentenced to the gallows or hard labor for many years. Czech propaganda, favoring the followers of the late Dr. Beneš, refers to those Slovaks as traitors, fascists and nazis even today. Will the accusation stand up before the objective judgment of history, or at least before the impartial criticism of factors who are better acquainted with the causes of the European drama of 1938­J939 and followed the whole struggle for peace, or who in some cases had even taken part in it? There is no doubt that Slovak political leaders did not even think of playing so important a role as is ascribed to them. While they had participated in the drama, their action was only a reaction to the phenomenon for which they were not responsible: they simply defended the natural rights and principles that were the foundation of an order that was the subject of a struggle between the great powers. To ascribe to Slovak politicians such great importance. therefore, is unreal, and, as far as Czechoslovakia 1s concerned, 1t would be overestimating the interna] causes of her disintegration if her ruin were ascribed exclusively to internal phenomena and the centrifugal efforts of the discontented nations and nationalities that comprised Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia did not collapse only because of internal troubles. The causes of her ruination rest above all else on the fact that she was a part of the political order that Germany and several Danubian states, who had lost the first World War, were determined to ruin. It was the political order that the western European creators could not defend at the time. The causes of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia must be sought in the European situation, especially In the moral and political crisis of Europe and in the change in the forces and presuppositions on which the European order was being built in 1919-1920. The blunders of Czech political factors in foreign and domestic politics hastened the disintegration and it was these blunders that were responsible even for the internal centrifugal efforts among the majority of inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. An analysis of the European political situation, as well as a closer look at the conditions in Czechoslovakia during its entire existence, leads us to that conclusion. According to Dr. Edward Beneš, "a fatal blow was dealt from the outside" at Munich, where four great powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - decided on September 29, 1938, to annex the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany (See: Dr. E. Beneš, NOVÁ SLOVANSKÁ POLITIKA -The New Slovanic Policy -Prague, 1946, pg. 48). In reality the consequences of the Munich conference, at which of representatives of the Prague government could only listen to the decision of the four great powers and silently yield to their decision or start a war against Germany forsaken by all allies -were the beginning of the end of the state that was the pillar of the political order of central Europe, the state that defended this system even when real political sense demanded that it be changed. Munich forced this system to fall and with it collapsed also Czechoslovakia. The na­tions situated between Germany and Russia had to suffer the conse­quences of this reality. Nobody in the capitals of Europe doubted this in 1938. "All is lost," cried Winston Churchill in his parliamentary speech only six days after Munich. "Let us not try to conceal this reality from ourselves In this regard. We must now assume as certain, that all the states of central and eastern Europe will try to obtain from the triumphant Nazi power the best conditions that they shall be able to get. The system of alliances of central European states, which France thus far regarded as a guarantee of its security, was swept away, and I do not see any possibility of renewing lt." He said that the road along the Danube basin to the Black Sea, the road to Turkey, was open. Militarily and economically the states of Europe will be, in fact if not formally, drawn into the circle of a wide system of the political power of Berlin. He predicted that would happen without much resistance and probably without a shot being fired. "You shall see," said Churchill, "how from day to day, from week to week, these countries shall become hostile to us....." It was just as clear In Paris what Munich meant to France and her Danubian allies. "Germany once again is master of central Europe," André Tardieu wrote in his book "L'année de Munich" (pg. 168). And the last French ambassador in Berlin, M. Coulondre, said in his political report on March 19, 1939: "The Munich Pact, complemented by the German-British and Franco-German declarations, according to the German conception means the right of the Reich to organize Central and Southeastern Europe as it pleases with the unexpressed agreement or at least with the tolerance of the great western powers" That the Germans felt that Munich gave them a free hand in Central Europe was soon demonstrated, when the great powers failed to protest the Magyar and Polish seizure of Czechoslovak territory only a month after Munich. And Munich, according to Chamberlain, had guaranteed no further territorial changes: "I believe that under the present system of guarantees the New Czechoslovakia will find greater security than she has ever enjoyed In the past." Germany actually was absolute master of the Danube basin. The confusion created by Munich In the southeastern states of Europe worked to the advantage of the Reich (G. Gafencu, former Rumanian minister, In bis book "The Last Days of Europe.) The prestige of Geneva fell, and there was no time to organize a new system of collective security. As far as America and the Russians were con­cerned, the former were too far away, and the latter preferred not to intervene. But Munich had far-reaching effects even from another standpoint, especially as far as the politics of Russia was concerned. Russia was isolated by Munich; the Kremlin was not invited to participate at Munich. With the annexation of the Sudetenland, the strategic posi­tion of Czechoslovakia was ruined. According to Walter Lippman's "USA Foreign Policy," England and France sacrificed their alliance with Russia when they surrendered Czechoslovakia to the mercy of Hitler. We mention these things, because Munich did affect what happened later In the Danubian states and the politics of its leading statesmen after 1938. As far as Slovakia ls concerned, the stand of Russia after Munich ls especially interesting. Soviet Russia not only recognized the Independent Slovak Republic and established regular diplomatic contacts with her, but the Russian ambassador G. Pushkin, handing over bis credentials to the president of Slovakia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, said: "Handing over to you the documents that accredit me as special ambassador and minister plenipotentiary to your Republic, nominated by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can tell you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken note of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. As a result of war in Europe, the establishment of these contacts transcends the framework of mutual interests of both our states." II MUNICH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA When the British Prime Minister Chamberlain was confronted with the German demands relative to the Sudetenland at Godesberg, he replied to Hitler by letter on September 26 saying that "the national and economic independence of Czechoslovakia automatically would disappear if the German pian were accepted." On September 29, 1938, this pian was accepted, nevertheless, and not only by the four powers -England, France, Italy and Germany ­who participated in the Munich Conference, but on September 30 also by the Prague Government which was headed by Dr. Edward Beneš. Was Chamberlain right about the destruction of the independence of Czechoslovakia.? If the Czechoslovak Republic formally preserved the character of an Independent state even after Munich, in reality the new situation limited free decisions by the Prague Government In internal as well as in foreign policy. Furthermore, there hung over the rump state, like a dark cloud, the knowledge that even the new situation was only temporary and that it depended entirely on the Germans when new situations would arise. "The population of Czechoslovakia,'' wrote Graham Hutton in a book published in the spring of 1939, "reduced to less than 10 million people, is completely under the political, economic and military control of Germany. The new policy of the State is already working entirely in the Interest of Germany and to the disadvantage of the western powers, Poland, Rumania and other Slovanic states. Its human re­sources are as much at the disposition of Germany as are its economic resources and the production of weapons. . . . The new Czechoslovakia has come under the rule of Germany and her borders cannot be regarded otherwise than as German borders." (Les Nouveaux destine du Danube, pgs. 46, 52). Of course, it was clear to every sober observer of German policy that the Germans did not consider this advantageous situation as a definite solution. The successes of Hitler’s regime after the occupation of the Rhineland In 1936, attained without great difficulties. could only encourage the Germans in their "Drang nach Osten,'' because for such a policy, especially as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, they already had allies In the Magyars, but also in the over-all order of conditions in the Danube basin after 1918. The liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, could be clearly fore­seen In 1938, and the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote In his book "Failure of a Mission" (1939) that the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia was reached on March 12. Winston Churchill, too, knew what Munich meant for Czechoslovakia, because he said in Parliament on October 5, 1938: "AU is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. . . . I venture to think that In the future the Czechoslo­vak state cannot be maintained as an Independent entity. I think you will find that in a period of time which may be measured In years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed In the nazi regime....." Seton-Watson, one of the greatest admirers of the Czech nation and the former Czechoslovak Republic, remarked bluntly: "Churchill was only too true a prophet." He noted, too, that "In this period the process of disintegration was continued from within." Even Seton-Watson regarded Munich as "the surrender of a key position to the Pan-Germans." In his "History of the Czechs and Slovaks," he goes on to say that the borders of Bohemia, one of the oldest boundaries of Europe and never changed even In the darkest days of national decline, suddenly became defenseless and the whole Danube region was surrendered to the mercy of the Germans. In his pro-Czech and anti-Slovak "Czechoslovakia in European History," Prof. S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado wrote: "The n1mp of Czechoslovakia was obviously incapable of independent economic or political existence" (pg. 348) and that "after Munich the only hope for the country's survival lay in complete reorientation toward Nazi Germany'' (pg. 350), while "In the domain of economics the maimed state was completely at the mercy of Germany (pg. 352). We could, thus, continue to quote almost indefinitely the views of statesmen, politicians, history professors and publicists, who saw in the Munich decision the end of Czechoslovakia and giving the Germans a free hand in central and southeastern Europe. After the loss of the Sudetenland, the fertile Slovak valleys, Tešín and the strategic heights on the north and the Slovak border, nay even a few kilometers of land not far from Bratislava (Devin), the territory of Czechoslovakia in reality would have been able to exist independently only if every inhabitant would exert all his strength to hold the state and if maimed and demoralized Czechoslovakia had not been a small island in the German sea, which the Germans wanted to liquidate, since no one - not even the allies and creators of Czechoslovakia in Versailles - wanted to prevent them in doing that. It was the British Prime Minister himself who said only a week after Munich that even with the greatest sympathies toward Czechoslovakia, he could not allow the British Empire to become enveigled in war under any circumstances "because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." We know that France became a second rate military power after the Germans occupied the Saar. And disunited internally, France did not even want to shed blood for Czechoslovakia. It was thus that the Cze­choslovak-Franco-Russian Treaty of 1936 became ineffective. The Soviet Union "regretted," but it could come to the aid of Czechoslovakia only if France first defended the Beneš republic. Czechoslovakia did not get any help from the outside before Munich, and after Munich she definitely could not expect it. The English publisher, Graham Hutton, in the book quoted above (pg. 143), did not hesitate to express the view that Czechoslovakia finds herself So dependent on Germany, economically, that undoubtedly ft would be better for her, from a purely objective standpoint, to establish a complete custom and exchange union with Germany, than to try to hold to the view of nominal and false independence. That no outside help would be forthcoming was quite clear in Prague itself. Dr. Ivan Derer, the greatest Czechoslovak of Slovak origin, in a broadcast from Prague said among other things: "The Munich Pact not only means that France and England will not help us in the event of war, but it also means that we would find our­selves at war with Germany, because we did not want to give up the Sudeten-German territory. In this war France and England would be obligated to help the Germans and not us." The Czechs were the chosen people of Czechoslovakia, even though they formed less than half the population. They always Jived In the historical past, boasting of the glory of their kings and the "historical lands" of the Bohemian Crown. Their minds were on the enterprises, the factories and the lands which Munich gave their three neighbors. Masaryk and Beneš had continued the legend of Libuša and Přemysl, that the Czech people was a ruling nation and the other peoples of Czechoslovakia - the Slovaks. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukrainians and Rusins - existed only to serve the needs of the Czechs.. They really got a build up from 1918 to 1938, not only at home but also abroad by Beneš's propaganda machinery. The sorry part of it for them was that they had begun to believe the "stories." When the first grave crisis appeared and their great Beneš chose to resign and flee, the Czechs even forgot they had a well• equipped army and the Škoda works. They were soon broken even morally. The rapid disintegration within the Republic encouraged the Germans to go ahead with their plans of aggression. Beneš's "Island of Democracy" collapsed without offering the slightest physical resistance to the Nazis. The Czechs were not taught by Masaryk and Beneš to fight for freedom and democracy, but only to be the "rul­ing nation," whereas the other nations of the Republic could not see why they should fight for a system and a state that had ex­ploited and mistreated them. III SLOVAK POLITICS AFTER MUNICH Under such circumstances, there remained for the nations comprising Czecho-Slovakia nothing else to do but accept the conse­quences of that given situation and to work In their own interests to save whatever could be saved. In reality the politics of Prague, and to a certain extent even that of Slovak leaders, changed after Munich. In the foreign field Prague informed Moscow that it no longer regarded the Russo-Czecho-Slovak agreement as valid. The Little Entente finished In the same fashion and great changes took place also in internal politics. Slovakia and her political factors, however, acted in a positive manner toward the state and the Czech nation even after Munich. After a 20-year fight with Prague centralism, after innumerable injustices perpetrated against the Slovak Nation, the existence of which they even denied, the Slovaks did not say "Goodbye! " to Prague, but only demanded the fulfillment of the Pittsburgh Pact, on the basis of which they had entered into the single state with the Czech nation In 1918. The demands -formulated in the Žilina Manifesto, signed by the representatives of all political parties in Slovakia, excepting the Communist and Social Democratic parties - in no way exceeded the framework of the Pittsburgh Pact, nay not even the obligations of Dr. Beneš during the Peace Conference, where he proclaimed: "It is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to organize the state by accepting as the basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a second Switzerland. .. . " -D. H. Miller, MY DIARY, pg. 69). Finally, even the motion for the autonomy of Slovakia -passed November 18, 1988, by the Prague Parliament by a vote of 144-25 ­did not go so far as Dr. Beneš had assured the Peace Conference and noted the adhesion of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In attaining autonomy Slovakia saw the realization of its twenty-year struggle and the removal of the causes that had placed it in opposition not only to Prague, but had also dug a chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks. "The old Czecho-Slovakia," said Dr. Martin Sokol in Parliament on the day Slovak autonomy became law, "in no small measure fell also because there was no agreement and sincere cooperation between the Slovak and Czech nations. if we wish the new, smaller Czecho-Slovakia to be healthy and capable of life, wo must build it not only with new methods, but also with a new spirit of mutual, fraternal understanding." At the session of Parliament on December 14, 1938, Dr. Nicholas Pružinský said among other things: "We have faith in the new Government because of objective reasons, too. We have here before our eyes the fulfillment of the legal demands of Slovakia. To the Government that stands back of the autonomy of Slovakia belongs the trust of the Slovaks and Slovakia." The Slovaks voted unanimously for the successor of Dr. E. Beneš, Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1988, as they had voted for Dr. Beneš In 1935, on the basis of the promises given. From the expressions of their representatives it is plainly evident that the Slovaks wanted a new, healthy Czecho-Slovakia, hoped for a mutual, fraternal understanding with the Czechs and expressed their confidence in the government which backed the autonomy of Slovakia, but only to such a government and as long as it backed that autonomy. But the Czechs, it seems, regretted granting autonomy to Slovakia after they had recovered from the first shock of Munich. They were exceedingly sorry that they had "given" the Slovaks what rightfully was theirs and began to plot against the autonomy of Slo­vakia. They sought legal and illegal means of circumventing the law that gave Slovakia autonomy. Czech political leaders were determined again to prove that Slovakia was not able to live an autonomous life. "At the same Ume they acted systematically to squeeze Slovakia against the wall economically and financially." (Dr. Ďurčanský: POHĽAD na slovenskú politickú minulosť, pg. 218). As a result of this policy of Czech representatives and after considering the international situation, more and more voices began to cry out against such autonomy. The first to protest was Dr. V. Tuka, who, after serving 9 years of a 15-year term given him by a Czech court for "treason," never became reconciled with Prague. Dr. Tuka, a university professor was sentenced without sufficient proof, with the aid of false witnesses and only on indictments. When the verdict was pronounced In 1929, Dr. Tuka said: "On this verdict shall be laid the foundations of the Slovak state for a hundred and hundred future years." It was the same Dr. Tuka who previously (in 1924) had proclaimed that Slovakia was mature for independence. In their contacts with the Third Reich, especially with its economic representatives, Slovak representatives learned early In 1939 that the Germans were preparing for new political deals with their Magyar allies against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in the spring. About the middle of February one of the foremost factors of the Third Reich, Dr. Vehnsenmayer notified several Slovak political representatives that Hungary wants to occupy the territory of Slovakia on March 15, and indicated that an eventual proclamation of the independence of Slovakia could forestall this action. In the meantime, Czech leaders "were unbelievably shortsighted and haughty In their treatment of the Slovaks," as Sir Neville Henderson wrote ("Failure of a Mission," pg. 232). The Prague government went so far as to ask Berlin how German circles would regard military intervention In Slovakia. Berlin answered that such action was entirely an internal affair of Czecho-Slovakia. Encouraged by Berlin, the Czechs prepared to liquidate Slovak autonomy. And on March 10th, writes Henderson, "the Czech president deposed the Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, from his office and occupied Bra­tislava with the Czech army and gendarmery and by force installed a new government there." The story, however, is not complete without stating the fact that Slovak soldiers were disarmed and put under guard in barracks, the military commissioner of the Slovak government was deprived of his function, 300-400 outstanding Slovak men were arrested at night and taken into Moravia and university students also were disarmed and incarcerated, etc. This act of the Prague Government was the coup re grace for the Czecho-Slovak Republic that suffered in agony since Munich. This was too favorable an opportunity to be missed by Hitler's opportunism; disregarding the consequences, he decided to pull the right plan out of bis brief-case and act with lightning speed, Henderson writes and adds: "My warning ambassador Mastný that his Government (that is the Prague Government) was playing into the hands of Hitler and that its foolhardiness would end in catastrophe fell upon deaf ears.... The Czech Government persevered in its stubbornness . ... (Opus cit., pg. 233). If any other nation were confronted with a situation such as the Slovaks were faced with In 1939, how would it have acted? And what did the Slovaks do? This sounds like an irony of fate, but they did only what Dr. Beneš considered as correct in 1936 when he told Count C. Sforza, the Italian statesman: "... I would turn to Berlin and accept any compromise I could to preserve the independence of my country.... (Vd ILLUSIONS ET RÉALITÉS de L'EUROPE, Fribourg, 1944). Nay, while Dr. Beneš wanted to do that willingly, the Czechs forced the Slovaks into the situation and made Hitler call Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso to Berlin on March 13, 1939. - (S. N., 1949). • • • • WHO SAID IT?: - Masaryk on Collaboration With USSR. - Broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, on November 8, Jan Masaryk congratulated the Soviet people on their anniversary. He said that the Russian revolution produced a new type of state. War was necessary to convince the world that there could be no peace without the Soviet Union. Therefore, collaboration with the Soviet Union will be sought The Soviet Union having no imperialistic aims, Stalin has again stressed the independence of other States. Czechoslovakia fears nothing because her traditional characteristics of democracy and pro­gress are respected by Russia, with whom Czechoslovakia will colla­borate on an equal basis. The Soviet Union accepts the friendship of the Slav nations, respects their independence, and seeks the collabo­ration of Britain and the United States for peace. The Soviet-Czecho­slovak Treaty, protecting Czechoslovakia from German aggression, guarantees our internal freedom and State independence, Masaryk concluded." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, III., November 27, 1944). 10 SLOVAKIA THE CAUSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S DISINTEGRATION I (k)- "The Slovaks, dissatlsfied with autonomy within the framework of a diminished Czechoslovak state, went after independence as their ultlmate goal. For that their leaders were accused of treason. I doubht whether that was in place. . . ." (John F. Montgomery, former U. S. Ambassador to Hungary: "Hungary, the Satellite agalnst its own W111.") The disintegratlon of Czechoslovakia In 1939 and her agony in the fall of 1938 will form interesting chapters in the history of the Europe created by treaties from 1919- 1920. Durlng that memorable 1938 and the sprlng that followed the Munich "capltulatlon" of the western democracles before German expansion, it was not only a state that collapsed, but also the whole European political and strategic system - a !ega! and mora! system. In Slovakia some of the foremost personalitles were executed, thousands exiled and other thousands were jailed because they were accused of "causing the collapse of Czechoslovakia." But some of the Slovak Ieaders were fortunate to escape from their country. They were tried in absentia, sentenced to the gallows or hard labor for many years. Czech propaganda, favorlng the followers of the late Dr. Beneš, refers to those Slovaks as traitors, fascists and nazis even today. Will the accusation stand up before the objecttve judgment of history, or at least before the impartial criticism of factors who are better acquainted with the causes of the European drama of 1938J 939 and followed the whole struggle for peace, or who in some cases had even taken part in it? There ls no doubt that Slovak political leaders d!d not even th!nk of playing so !mportant a role as is ascrlbed to them. While they had partlcipated in the drama, their action was only a reaction to the phenomenon for which they were not responsible: they slmply defended the natural r!ghts and pr!nciples that were the foundation of an order that was the subject of a struggle between the great powers. To ascribe to Slovak politicians such great !mportance. therefore, is unreal, and, as far as Czechoslovakia 1s concerned, 1t would be overestlmating the interna] causes of her dlslntegratlon if her ruin were ascribed exclusively to interna! phenomena and the centrifugal efforts of the dlscontented natlons and natlonalitles that comprised Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia did not collapse only because of interna! troubles. The causes of her ruinatlon rest above all else on the fact that she was a part of the political order that Germany and several Danubian states, who had lost the flrst World War, were determined to ruln. It was the political order that the western European creators could not defend at the tlme. The causes of the dlslntegration of Czechoslovakla must be sought in the European sltuatlon, especlally In the mora! and polltlcal crlsls �SLOVAKIA 11 of Europe and in the change in the forces and presuppositlons on whlch the European order was being built in 1919-1920. The blunders of Czech polltlcal factors in foreign and domestic politics hastened the disintegration and it was these blunders that wer responsible even for the interna! centrlfugal efforts among the majority of lnhabltants of Czechoslovakia. An analysls ot the European political situation, as well as a closer look at the conditions in Czecho slovakia during its entlre exlstence, Jeads us to that concluslon. Accordlng to Dr. Edward Beneš, "a fatal blow was dealt from the outside" at Munich, where four great powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - declded on September 29, 1938, to annex the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakla to Germany (See: Dr. E. Beneš, NOVÁ SLOVANSKÁ POLITIKA - The New Slovanlc Policy - Prague, 1946, pg. 48). In reality the consequences of the Munich conference, at whlch of representatives of the Prague government could only listen to the decision of the four great powers and silently yield to thelr declslon or start a war agalnst Germany forsaken by all allies - were the be• glnnlng of the end of the state that was the piliar of the politlcal order of centra! Europe, the state that defended thls system even when real polltlcal sense demanded that 1t be changed. Munlch forced this system to fall and with it collapsed also Czechoslovakla. The nations sltuated between Germany and Russla had to suffer the consequences of thls reality. Nobody In the capitals of Europe doubted thls in 1938. "All is Jost," eried Winston Churchill in bis parllamentary speech only six days after Munlch. "Let us not try to conceal thls reality from ourselves In thls regard. We must now assume as certaln, that all the states of centra! and eastern Europe will try to obtain from the triumphant Nazl power the best conditions that they shall be able to get. The system of alliances of centra! European states, whlch France thus far regarded as a guarantee of its securlty, was swept away, and I do not see any posslbillty of renewlng lt." He sald that the road along the Danube basln to the Black Sea, the road to Turkey, was open. Mllitarily and economically the states of Europe w!Jl be, in fact if not formally, drawn lnto the clrcle of a wide system of the polltlcal power of Berlin. He predlcted that would happen without much reslstance and probably wlthout a shot belng fired. "You shall see," sald Churchlll, "how from day to day, trom week to week, these countrles shall become hostile to us. . . .." It was just as clear In Parls what Munlch meant to France and her Danublan allies. "Germany once again is master of centra! Europe," André Tardleu wrote In hls book "L'année de Munlch" (pg. 168). And the Iast French ambassador In Berlin, M. Coulondre, said in hls poJitical report on March 19, 1939: "The Munich Pact, coroplemented by the Gerroan-Brltlsh and Franco-German declarations, accordlng to the German conception means the right of the Relch to erganlze Centra! and Southeastern Europe as it pleases wlth the unexpressed agreement or at least with the tolerance of the great western powers" That the Germans felt that Munlch gave them a free hand in Centra! Europe was soon demonstrated, when the great powers falled to protest the Magyar and Polish selzure of Czechoslovak territory only a month after Munich. And Munlch, accordlng to Chamberlaln, �12 SLOVAKIA had guaranteed no further terrltorlal changes: "I believe that under the present system of guarantees the New Czchoslovakla will flnd greater security than she has ever enjoyed In the past." Germany actually was absolute master of the Danube basln. The confuslon created by Munlch In the southeastern states of Europe worked to the advantage of the Reich (G. Gafencu, former Rumanlan minister, In bis book "The Last Days of Europe.) The prestlge of Geneva fell, and there was no tlme to organize a new system of colIective security. As far as Amerlca and the Russians were concerned, the former were too far away, and the latter preferred not to lntervene. But Munlch had far-reachlng effects even trom another standpolnt, especlally as far as the polltlcs ot Russla was concerned. Russla was lsolated by Munich; the Kremlln was not lnvlted to partlclpate at Munlch. W!th the annexatlon of the Sudetenland, the strategic position of Czechoslovakia was rulned. Accordlng to Walter Lippman's "USA Fore!gn Policy," England and France sacrlflced the!r alllance with Russla when they surrendered Czechoslovak!a to the mercy ot Hitler. We mention these thlngs, beca.use Mun!ch dld affect what happened later In the Danublan states and the polltlcs of lts leadlng sta.tesmen after 1938. As far as Slovakia ls concerned, the stand of Russla after Munlch ls especlally lnterestlng. Soviet Russla not only recognlzed the Independent Slovak Republlc and establlshed regula.r dlplomatic contacts wlth ber, but the Russian a.mbassador G. Pushkin, handlng over bis credentlals to the presldent of Slovakla, Dr. Joseph Tis o, sald: "Handlng over to you the documents that accredlt me as speclal ambassador and minister plenlpotentiary to your Republlc, nomlna.ted by the Presldency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can tel1 you wlth joy that the natlons ot the Soviet Union ha.ve ta.ken note of the establishment of dlplomatlc contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republlc with deep satlsfactlon. As a result of war in Europe, the establishment of these contacts transcends the framework of mutua.I interests of both our sta.tes." II MUNICH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA When the Brltlsh Prime Minister Chamberlain was confronted wlth the German dema.nds relatlve to the Sudetenland at Godesburg, he replled to Hitler by letter on September 26 saylng that "the natlonal and economlc lndependence ot Czechoslovakia automatlcally would dlsa.ppea.r lf the German pian were accepted." On September 29, 1938, thls pian was accepted, nevertheless, and not only by the four powers - England, France, Italy and Germany who partlclpated in the Munlcb Conference, but on September 30 also by the Prague Government whlch was headed by Dr. Edward Beneš. Was Chamberlaln rlght a.bout the destructlon of tbe lndependence of Czechoslovakla.? Jf the Czechoslovak Republic forma.By preserved the character of an Independent state even after Munlch, In reality the new sltuatlon limited free declslons by the Prague Government In lnternal as well as In foreign policy. Furthermore, tbere hung over the rump state, llke �SLOVAKIA 13 a dark cloud, the knowledge that even the new situation was only temporary and that it depended entlrely on the Germans when new situatlons would arise. "The populatlon of Czechoslovakla,'' wrote Graham Hutton in a book publlshed in the sprlng of 1939, "reduced to less than 10 million people, Js completely under the polltlcal, economlc and military control of Germany. The new pollcy of the State is already worklng entlrely in the Jnterest of Germany and to the disadvantage of the western powers, Poland, Rumanla and other Slovanlc states. Its human resources are as much at the dlsposltlon of Germany as are lts economic resources and the productlon of weapons. . . . The new Czechoslo• vakia has come under the rule of Germany and her borders cannot be regarded otherwlse than as German borders." (Les Nouveaux destlns du Danube, pgs. 46, 52). Of course, it was clear to every sober observer of German pollcy that the Germans dld not consider this advantageous sltuation AS a definite solution. The successes of Hltler's reglme after the occupatlon of the Rhineland In 1936, attained wlthout great dlfflcultles. could only encourage the Germans in their "Drang nach Osten,'' because for such a policy, especially as far as Czechoslovakia was eon cerned, they already had allles In the Magyars, but also in the over-all order of condltlons in the Danube basln after 1918. The llquidatlon of the Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, could be clearly foreseen In 1938, and the Britlsh ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote In hls book "Failure of a Mlssion" (1939) that the declsion to occupy Czechoslovakla was reached on March 12. Wlnston Churchtll, too, knew what Munich meant for Czechoslovakla, because he said in Parllament on October 5, 1938: "AU is over. Sllent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakla recedes lnto the darkness. . . . I venture to thlnk that In the future the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintalned as an Independent entity. I thlnk you will flnd that in a perlod of Ume which may be measured In years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed In the nazl reglme. . . .." Seton-Watson, one of the greatest admirers of the Czech natlon and the former Czechoslovak Republic, remarked bluntly: "Churchlll was only too true a prophet." He noted, too, that "In thls period the process of dislntegration was continued trom wlthin." Even Seton-Watson regarded Munlch as "the surrender of a key posltlon to the Pan-Germans." In hls "History of the Czechs and Slovaks," he goes on to say that the borders of Bohemia, one of the oldest boundaries of Europe and never changed even In the darkest days of national decllne, suddenly became defenseless and the whole Danube reglon was surrendered to the mercy of the Germans. In his pro-Czech and anti-Slovak "Czechoslovakla in European History," Prof. S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado wrote: "The n1mp of Czechoslovakla was obviously incapable of independent economic or polltlcal existence" (pg. 348) and that "after Munlch the only hope for the country's survlval lay in complete reorlentatlon toward Nazl Germany'' (pg. 350), while "In the domain of economlcs the malmed state was completely at the mercy of Germany (pg. 352). We could, thus, contlnue to quote almost !ndeflnltely the views �14 SLOVAKIA of statesmen, pollticians, hlstory professors and publlclsts, who saw In the Munlch decision the end of Czechoslovakia and giving the Germans a free hand in central and southeastern Europe. After the loss of the Sudetenland, the fertile Slovak valleys, Tešin and the strategic heights on the north and the Slovak border, nay even a few kilometers of land not far from Bratislava (Devin), the territory of Czechoslovakia in reality would have been able to cxist independently only lf every inhabitant would exert all his strength to hold the state and if malmed and demoralized Czechoslovakia had not been a small island in the German sea, wh!ch the Germans wanted to llquidate, slnce no one - not even the allles and creators of Czechoslovakia in Versailles - wanted to prevent them in doing that. lt was the British Prime Minister himself who said only a week after Munich that even with the greatest sympathles toward Czecho• slovakia, he could not allow the Brit!sh Empire to become enveigled In war under any c!rcumstances "because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothlng." We know that F rance became a second rate mllitary power after the Germans occupied the Saar. And disunited internally, France did not even want to shed blood for Czechoslovakia. It was thus that the Czechoslovak-Franco-Russian Treaty of 1936 became ineffectlve. The Soviet Union "regretted," but lt could come to the ald of Czecho• slovakia only if France first defended the Beneš republlc. Czechoslovakia did not get any help from the outslde before Munich, and after Munich she deflnitely could not expect it. The Engl!sh publisher, Graham Hutton, in the book quoted above (pg. 143), dld not hesitate to express the view that Czechoslovak!a flnds herself So dependent on Germany, economically, that undoubtedly ft would be better for her, from a purely object!ve standpoint, to establish a complete custom and exchange union with Germany, than to try to hold to the view of nominal and false independence. That no outside help would be forthcoming was quite clear in Prague itself. Dr. Ivan Derer, the greatest Czechoslovak of Slovak origin, in a broadcast trom Prague sald among other things: "The Munich Pact not only means that France and England w!ll not help us in the event of war, but it also means that we would find ourselves at war with Germany, because we did not want to glve up the Sudeten-German territory. In tbls war France and England would be obligated to help the Germans and not us." The Czechs were the chosen people of Czechoslovakia, even though they formed less than half the population. They always Jived In the hlstorical past, boast!ng of the glory of the!r klngs and the "histor!cal lands" of the Bohemian Crown. THeir mlnds were on tbe enterprises, the factorles and the lands which Munich gave tbeir three neighbors. Masaryk and Beneš had continued the legend of Libuša and þÿ P Y e m ythat s l , the Czech people was a rullng natlon and the other peoples of Czechoslovakla - the Slovaks. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Ruslns - exlsted only to serve the needs of the Czechs.. They really got a bu!ld up from 1918 to 1938, not only at home but also abroad by Beneš's propaganda machinery. The sorry part of lt for them was tbat they had begun to belleve the "stories." When the first grave crisis appeared and thelr great Beneš �SLOVAKIA 15 chose to resign and flee, the Czechs even forgot they had a well• equipped army and the Škoda works. They were soon broken even morally. The rapid disintegration wlthln the Republlc encouraged the Germans to go ahead wlth thelr plans of aggresslon. Beneš's "Island of Democracy" collapsed wlthout offerlng the slightest physical reslstance to the Nazis. The Czechs were not taught by Masaryk and Beneš to fight for freedom and democracy, but only to be the "ruling nation," whereas the other natlons of the Republlc could not see why they should fight for a system and a state that had exploited and mistreated them. III SLOVAK POLITICS AFTER MUNICH Under such circumstances, there remalned for the natlons comprlslng Czecho-Slovakia nothing else to do but accept the consequences of that given sltuation and to work In thelr own interests to save whatever could be saved. In reality the politics of Prague, and to a certaln extent even that of Slovak leaders, changed after Munich. In the foreign field Prague lnformed Moscow that it no longer regarded the Russo-Czecho-Slovak agreement as valid. The Little Entente flnlshed In the same fashion and great changes took place also in interna! polltics. Slovakia and ber polltical factors, however, acted in a posltlve manner toward the state and the Czech nation even after Munich. After a 20-year fight wlth Prague centrallsm, after innumerable lnjustices perpetrated against the Slovak Natlon, the exlstence of which they even denied, the Slovaks did not say "Goodbye ! " to Prague, but only demanded the fu lfi llment of the Pittsburgh Pact, on the basis of which they had entered into the single state with the Czech nation In 1918. The demands - formulated in the Žilina Manlfesto, signed by the representatives of all politlcal partles in Slovakla, excepting the Communist and Social Democratic partles - in no way exceeded the framework of the Plttsburgh Pact, nay not even the obllgations of Dr. Beneš during the Peace Conference, where he proclaimed: "lt is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to organize the state by accepting as the basis of national rlghts the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republlc, that is, to make of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a second Switzerland. .. . " - D. H. Miller, MY DlARY, pg. 69). Finally, even the motion for the autonomy of Slovakia - passed November 18, 1988, by the Prague Parliament by a vote of 144-25 did not go so far as Dr. Beneš had assured the Peace Conference and noted the adheslon of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In attaining autonomy Slovakla saw the realizatlon of its twentyyear struggle and the removal of the causes that had placed it in opposltlon not only to Prague, but had also dug a chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks. "The old Czecho-Slovakia," sald Dr. Martin Sokol in Parliament on the day Slovak autonomy became law, "in no small measure fell also because there was no agreement and sincere cooperatlon between the Slovak and Czech natlons. lf we wlsh the �16 SLOVAKIA new, amaller Czecho-Slovakla to be healthy and capable of llfe, wo must bulld lt not only wlth new methoda, but a lao wlth a new spirit of mutual, fraternal understanding." At the sesslon of Parliament on December 14, 1938, Dr. Nlcholas Pružlnský said among other thlngs: "We have falth in the new Government becauae of objectlve reasona, too. We have here before our eyes the fulfillment of the legal demands of Slovakia. To the Government that standa back of the autonomy of Slovakla belongs the trust of the Slovak• and Slovakla." The Slovaks voted unanlmously for the successor of Dr. E. Beneš, Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1988, as they had voted for Dr. Beneš In 1935, on the basls of the promlses glven. From the expresslons of thelr representatlves lt ls plalnly evldent that the Slovaks wanted a new, healthy Czecho-Slovakia, hoped for a mutual, fraternal understandlng wlth the Czechs and expressed thelr confidence in the government whlch backed the autonomy of Slovakia, but only to such a government and as long as lt backed that autonomy. But the Czechs, lt seems, regretted grantlng autonomy to Slovakla after they had recovered from the flrst shock of Munlch. They were exceedlngly sorry that they had "glven" the S lovaks what rightfully was thelrs and began to plot against the autonomy of Slovakia. They sought legal and lllegal means ot clrcumventing the law that gave Slovakla autonomy. Czech political leaders were determlned agaln to prove that Slovakla was not able to live an autonomous llfe. "At the same Ume they acted systematically to squeeze Slova• kla agalnst the wall econom!cally and flnancially." (Dr. Ďurčanský: POHL'AD na slovenskú politickú mlnulose, pg. 218). As a result of thls pollcy of Czech representatlves and after eon• slderlng the lnternatlonal sltuation, more and more voices began to cry out agalnst such autonomy. The flrst to protest was Dr. V. Tuka, who, after serving 9 years of a 15-year term glven bim by a Czech court for "treason," never became reconciled wlth Prague. Dr. Tuka, a unlverslty professor was sentenced wlthout sufficient proof, with the ald of false wltnesses and only on lndlctments. When the verdlct was pronounced In 1929, Dr. Tuka sald: "On thls verdlct shall be lald the foundations of the Slovak state for a hundred and hundred future years." It was the same Dr. Tulca who previously (In 1924) had proclalmed that Slovakla was mature for lndependence. In thelr contacts wlth the Thlrd Relch, especially wlth lts eco• nomlc representatives, Slovak representatives learned early In 1939 that the Germans were preparlng for new politlcal deals wlth thelr Magyar allies agalnst the Czecho-Slovak Republlc In the sprlng. About the mlddle of February one of the foremost factors of the Thlrd Relch, Dr. Vehnsenmayer notlfled several Slovak polltical rep• resentatlves that Hungary wants to occupy the terrltory of Slovakla on March 15, and lndlcated that an eventual proclamation of the lndependence of Slovakla could forestall thls actlon. In the meantlme, Czech leaders "were unbelleva.bly shortslghted and haughty In thelr treatment of the Slovaks," as Sir Neville Henderson wrote ("Fallure of a Mlsslon," pg. 232). The Prague government went so far as to ask Berlin how German clrcles would regard milltary lntervention In Slovak.ia. Berlin answered that such actlon was entirely an lnternal affalr of Czecho•Slovakla. Encouraged �SLOVAKIA 17 by Berlln, the Czechs prepared to llquidate Slovak autonomy. And on March 10th, wrltes Henderson, "the Czech president deposed the Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, from his office and occupied Bratislava with the Czech army and gendarmery and by force installed a new government there." The story, however, is not complete without stating the fact that Slovak soldiers were disarmed and put under guard in barracks, the military commlssioner of the Slovak government was deprived of bis functlon, 300-400 outstanding Slovak men were arrested at night and taken into Moravia and universlty students also were disarmed and lncarcerated, etc. This act of the Prague Government was the coup re grace for the Czecho-Slovak Republic that suffered in agony slnce Munich. Th!s was too favorable an opportunity to be mlssed by Hitler's opportunism; disregarding the consequences, he decided to puli the right pian out of bis brief-case and act wlth lightning speed, Henderson writes and adds: "My warning ambassador Mastný that his Government (that is the Prague Government) was playing into the hands of Hitler and that its foolhardiness would end in catastrophe fell lipon deaf ears. . . . The Czech Government persevered in its stubborness. . . . (Opus cit., pg. 233). If any other nation were confronted with a situation such as the Slovaks were faced with In 1939, how would lt have acted? And what did the Slovaks do? This sounds like an irony of fate, but they dld only what Dr. Beneš considered as correct in 1936 when he told Count C. Sforza, the !talian statesman: " . . . 1 would turn to Berlin and accept any compromise I could to preserve the independence of my country... . (Vd ILLUSIONS ET RÉALITÉS de L'EUROPE, Fribourg, 1944). Nay, while Dr. Beneš wanted to do that willingly, the Czechs forced the Slovaks lnto the situation and made Hitler call Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tlso to Berlin on March 13, 1939. - (S. N., 1949) . • • • • WHO SAID IT?: - Masaryk on Collaboration With USSR. Broadcastlng to Czechoslovakia, on November 8, Jan Masaryk con• gratulated the Soviet people on their anniversary. He said that the Russian revolution produced a new type of state. War was necessary to convince the world that there could be no peace without the Soviet Union. Therefore, collaboration with the Soviet Union will be sought The Soviet Union having no imperialistic aims, Stalin has again stressed the independence of other States. Czechoslovakia fears nothing because her traditional characteristics of democracy and progress are respected by Russia, with whom Czechoslovakia will collaborate on an equal basis. The Soviet Union accepts the frlendshlp of the Slav nations, respects their independence, and seeks the collaboration of Britain and the United States for peace. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, protecting Czechoslovakia from German aggression, guarantees our internal freedom and State independence, Masaryk concluded." (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, III., November 27, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document THE CAUSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S DISINTEGRATION (k) - "The Slovaks, dissatisfied with autonomy within the framework of a diminished Czechoslovak state, went after independence as their ultimate goal. For that their leaders were accused of treason. I doubt whether that was in place...." (John F. Montgomery, for­mer U. S. Ambassador to Hungary: "Hungary, the Satellite against its own W111.") The disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and her agony in the fall of 1938 will form interesting chapters in the history of the Europe created by treaties from 1919-1920. During that memorable 1938 and the spring that followed the Munich "capitulation" of the western democracies before German expansion, it was not only a state that collapsed, but also the whole European political and strategic system - a legal and moral system. In Slovakia some of the foremost personalities were executed, thousands exiled and other thousands were jailed because they were accused of "causing the collapse of Czechoslovakia." But some of the Slovak leaders were fortunate to escape from their country. They were tried in absentia, sentenced to the gallows or hard labor for many years. Czech propaganda, favoring the followers of the late Dr. Beneš, refers to those Slovaks as traitors, fascists and nazis even today. Will the accusation stand up before the objective judgment of history, or at least before the impartial criticism of factors who are better acquainted with the causes of the European drama of 1938­J939 and followed the whole struggle for peace, or who in some cases had even taken part in it? There is no doubt that Slovak political leaders did not even think of playing so important a role as is ascribed to them. While they had participated in the drama, their action was only a reaction to the phenomenon for which they were not responsible: they simply defended the natural rights and principles that were the foundation of an order that was the subject of a struggle between the great powers. To ascribe to Slovak politicians such great importance. therefore, is unreal, and, as far as Czechoslovakia 1s concerned, 1t would be overestimating the interna] causes of her disintegration if her ruin were ascribed exclusively to internal phenomena and the centrifugal efforts of the discontented nations and nationalities that comprised Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia did not collapse only because of internal troubles. The causes of her ruination rest above all else on the fact that she was a part of the political order that Germany and several Danubian states, who had lost the first World War, were determined to ruin. It was the political order that the western European creators could not defend at the time. The causes of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia must be sought in the European situation, especially In the moral and political crisis of Europe and in the change in the forces and presuppositions on which the European order was being built in 1919-1920. The blunders of Czech political factors in foreign and domestic politics hastened the disintegration and it was these blunders that were responsible even for the internal centrifugal efforts among the majority of inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. An analysis of the European political situation, as well as a closer look at the conditions in Czechoslovakia during its entire existence, leads us to that conclusion. According to Dr. Edward Beneš, "a fatal blow was dealt from the outside" at Munich, where four great powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - decided on September 29, 1938, to annex the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany (See: Dr. E. Beneš, NOVÁ SLOVANSKÁ POLITIKA -The New Slovanic Policy -Prague, 1946, pg. 48). In reality the consequences of the Munich conference, at which of representatives of the Prague government could only listen to the decision of the four great powers and silently yield to their decision or start a war against Germany forsaken by all allies -were the beginning of the end of the state that was the pillar of the political order of central Europe, the state that defended this system even when real political sense demanded that it be changed. Munich forced this system to fall and with it collapsed also Czechoslovakia. The na­tions situated between Germany and Russia had to suffer the conse­quences of this reality. Nobody in the capitals of Europe doubted this in 1938. "All is lost," cried Winston Churchill in his parliamentary speech only six days after Munich. "Let us not try to conceal this reality from ourselves In this regard. We must now assume as certain, that all the states of central and eastern Europe will try to obtain from the triumphant Nazi power the best conditions that they shall be able to get. The system of alliances of central European states, which France thus far regarded as a guarantee of its security, was swept away, and I do not see any possibility of renewing lt." He said that the road along the Danube basin to the Black Sea, the road to Turkey, was open. Militarily and economically the states of Europe will be, in fact if not formally, drawn into the circle of a wide system of the political power of Berlin. He predicted that would happen without much resistance and probably without a shot being fired. "You shall see," said Churchill, "how from day to day, from week to week, these countries shall become hostile to us....." It was just as clear In Paris what Munich meant to France and her Danubian allies. "Germany once again is master of central Europe," André Tardieu wrote in his book "L'année de Munich" (pg. 168). And the last French ambassador in Berlin, M. Coulondre, said in his political report on March 19, 1939: "The Munich Pact, complemented by the German-British and Franco-German declarations, according to the German conception means the right of the Reich to organize Central and Southeastern Europe as it pleases with the unexpressed agreement or at least with the tolerance of the great western powers" That the Germans felt that Munich gave them a free hand in Central Europe was soon demonstrated, when the great powers failed to protest the Magyar and Polish seizure of Czechoslovak territory only a month after Munich. And Munich, according to Chamberlain, had guaranteed no further territorial changes: "I believe that under the present system of guarantees the New Czechoslovakia will find greater security than she has ever enjoyed In the past." Germany actually was absolute master of the Danube basin. The confusion created by Munich In the southeastern states of Europe worked to the advantage of the Reich (G. Gafencu, former Rumanian minister, In bis book "The Last Days of Europe.) The prestige of Geneva fell, and there was no time to organize a new system of collective security. As far as America and the Russians were con­cerned, the former were too far away, and the latter preferred not to intervene. But Munich had far-reaching effects even from another standpoint, especially as far as the politics of Russia was concerned. Russia was isolated by Munich; the Kremlin was not invited to participate at Munich. With the annexation of the Sudetenland, the strategic posi­tion of Czechoslovakia was ruined. According to Walter Lippman's "USA Foreign Policy," England and France sacrificed their alliance with Russia when they surrendered Czechoslovakia to the mercy of Hitler. We mention these things, because Munich did affect what happened later In the Danubian states and the politics of its leading statesmen after 1938. As far as Slovakia ls concerned, the stand of Russia after Munich ls especially interesting. Soviet Russia not only recognized the Independent Slovak Republic and established regular diplomatic contacts with her, but the Russian ambassador G. Pushkin, handing over bis credentials to the president of Slovakia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, said: "Handing over to you the documents that accredit me as special ambassador and minister plenipotentiary to your Republic, nominated by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can tell you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken note of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. As a result of war in Europe, the establishment of these contacts transcends the framework of mutual interests of both our states." II MUNICH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA When the British Prime Minister Chamberlain was confronted with the German demands relative to the Sudetenland at Godesberg, he replied to Hitler by letter on September 26 saying that "the national and economic independence of Czechoslovakia automatically would disappear if the German pian were accepted." On September 29, 1938, this pian was accepted, nevertheless, and not only by the four powers -England, France, Italy and Germany ­who participated in the Munich Conference, but on September 30 also by the Prague Government which was headed by Dr. Edward Beneš. Was Chamberlain right about the destruction of the independence of Czechoslovakia.? If the Czechoslovak Republic formally preserved the character of an Independent state even after Munich, in reality the new situation limited free decisions by the Prague Government In internal as well as in foreign policy. Furthermore, there hung over the rump state, like a dark cloud, the knowledge that even the new situation was only temporary and that it depended entirely on the Germans when new situations would arise. "The population of Czechoslovakia,'' wrote Graham Hutton in a book published in the spring of 1939, "reduced to less than 10 million people, is completely under the political, economic and military control of Germany. The new policy of the State is already working entirely in the Interest of Germany and to the disadvantage of the western powers, Poland, Rumania and other Slovanic states. Its human re­sources are as much at the disposition of Germany as are its economic resources and the production of weapons. . . . The new Czechoslovakia has come under the rule of Germany and her borders cannot be regarded otherwise than as German borders." (Les Nouveaux destine du Danube, pgs. 46, 52). Of course, it was clear to every sober observer of German policy that the Germans did not consider this advantageous situation as a definite solution. The successes of Hitler’s regime after the occupation of the Rhineland In 1936, attained without great difficulties. could only encourage the Germans in their "Drang nach Osten,'' because for such a policy, especially as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, they already had allies In the Magyars, but also in the over-all order of conditions in the Danube basin after 1918. The liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, could be clearly fore­seen In 1938, and the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote In his book "Failure of a Mission" (1939) that the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia was reached on March 12. Winston Churchill, too, knew what Munich meant for Czechoslovakia, because he said in Parliament on October 5, 1938: "AU is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. . . . I venture to think that In the future the Czechoslo­vak state cannot be maintained as an Independent entity. I think you will find that in a period of time which may be measured In years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed In the nazi regime....." Seton-Watson, one of the greatest admirers of the Czech nation and the former Czechoslovak Republic, remarked bluntly: "Churchill was only too true a prophet." He noted, too, that "In this period the process of disintegration was continued from within." Even Seton-Watson regarded Munich as "the surrender of a key position to the Pan-Germans." In his "History of the Czechs and Slovaks," he goes on to say that the borders of Bohemia, one of the oldest boundaries of Europe and never changed even In the darkest days of national decline, suddenly became defenseless and the whole Danube region was surrendered to the mercy of the Germans. In his pro-Czech and anti-Slovak "Czechoslovakia in European History," Prof. S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado wrote: "The n1mp of Czechoslovakia was obviously incapable of independent economic or political existence" (pg. 348) and that "after Munich the only hope for the country's survival lay in complete reorientation toward Nazi Germany'' (pg. 350), while "In the domain of economics the maimed state was completely at the mercy of Germany (pg. 352). We could, thus, continue to quote almost indefinitely the views of statesmen, politicians, history professors and publicists, who saw in the Munich decision the end of Czechoslovakia and giving the Germans a free hand in central and southeastern Europe. After the loss of the Sudetenland, the fertile Slovak valleys, Tešín and the strategic heights on the north and the Slovak border, nay even a few kilometers of land not far from Bratislava (Devin), the territory of Czechoslovakia in reality would have been able to exist independently only if every inhabitant would exert all his strength to hold the state and if maimed and demoralized Czechoslovakia had not been a small island in the German sea, which the Germans wanted to liquidate, since no one - not even the allies and creators of Czechoslovakia in Versailles - wanted to prevent them in doing that. It was the British Prime Minister himself who said only a week after Munich that even with the greatest sympathies toward Czechoslovakia, he could not allow the British Empire to become enveigled in war under any circumstances "because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." We know that France became a second rate military power after the Germans occupied the Saar. And disunited internally, France did not even want to shed blood for Czechoslovakia. It was thus that the Cze­choslovak-Franco-Russian Treaty of 1936 became ineffective. The Soviet Union "regretted," but it could come to the aid of Czechoslovakia only if France first defended the Beneš republic. Czechoslovakia did not get any help from the outside before Munich, and after Munich she definitely could not expect it. The English publisher, Graham Hutton, in the book quoted above (pg. 143), did not hesitate to express the view that Czechoslovakia finds herself So dependent on Germany, economically, that undoubtedly ft would be better for her, from a purely objective standpoint, to establish a complete custom and exchange union with Germany, than to try to hold to the view of nominal and false independence. That no outside help would be forthcoming was quite clear in Prague itself. Dr. Ivan Derer, the greatest Czechoslovak of Slovak origin, in a broadcast from Prague said among other things: "The Munich Pact not only means that France and England will not help us in the event of war, but it also means that we would find our­selves at war with Germany, because we did not want to give up the Sudeten-German territory. In this war France and England would be obligated to help the Germans and not us." The Czechs were the chosen people of Czechoslovakia, even though they formed less than half the population. They always Jived In the historical past, boasting of the glory of their kings and the "historical lands" of the Bohemian Crown. Their minds were on the enterprises, the factories and the lands which Munich gave their three neighbors. Masaryk and Beneš had continued the legend of Libuša and Přemysl, that the Czech people was a ruling nation and the other peoples of Czechoslovakia - the Slovaks. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukrainians and Rusins - existed only to serve the needs of the Czechs.. They really got a build up from 1918 to 1938, not only at home but also abroad by Beneš's propaganda machinery. The sorry part of it for them was that they had begun to believe the "stories." When the first grave crisis appeared and their great Beneš chose to resign and flee, the Czechs even forgot they had a well• equipped army and the Škoda works. They were soon broken even morally. The rapid disintegration within the Republic encouraged the Germans to go ahead with their plans of aggression. Beneš's "Island of Democracy" collapsed without offering the slightest physical resistance to the Nazis. The Czechs were not taught by Masaryk and Beneš to fight for freedom and democracy, but only to be the "rul­ing nation," whereas the other nations of the Republic could not see why they should fight for a system and a state that had ex­ploited and mistreated them. III SLOVAK POLITICS AFTER MUNICH Under such circumstances, there remained for the nations comprising Czecho-Slovakia nothing else to do but accept the conse­quences of that given situation and to work In their own interests to save whatever could be saved. In reality the politics of Prague, and to a certain extent even that of Slovak leaders, changed after Munich. In the foreign field Prague informed Moscow that it no longer regarded the Russo-Czecho-Slovak agreement as valid. The Little Entente finished In the same fashion and great changes took place also in internal politics. Slovakia and her political factors, however, acted in a positive manner toward the state and the Czech nation even after Munich. After a 20-year fight with Prague centralism, after innumerable injustices perpetrated against the Slovak Nation, the existence of which they even denied, the Slovaks did not say "Goodbye! " to Prague, but only demanded the fulfillment of the Pittsburgh Pact, on the basis of which they had entered into the single state with the Czech nation In 1918. The demands -formulated in the Žilina Manifesto, signed by the representatives of all political parties in Slovakia, excepting the Communist and Social Democratic parties - in no way exceeded the framework of the Pittsburgh Pact, nay not even the obligations of Dr. Beneš during the Peace Conference, where he proclaimed: "It is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to organize the state by accepting as the basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a second Switzerland. .. . " -D. H. Miller, MY DIARY, pg. 69). Finally, even the motion for the autonomy of Slovakia -passed November 18, 1988, by the Prague Parliament by a vote of 144-25 ­did not go so far as Dr. Beneš had assured the Peace Conference and noted the adhesion of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In attaining autonomy Slovakia saw the realization of its twenty-year struggle and the removal of the causes that had placed it in opposition not only to Prague, but had also dug a chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks. "The old Czecho-Slovakia," said Dr. Martin Sokol in Parliament on the day Slovak autonomy became law, "in no small measure fell also because there was no agreement and sincere cooperation between the Slovak and Czech nations. if we wish the new, smaller Czecho-Slovakia to be healthy and capable of life, wo must build it not only with new methods, but also with a new spirit of mutual, fraternal understanding." At the session of Parliament on December 14, 1938, Dr. Nicholas Pružinský said among other things: "We have faith in the new Government because of objective reasons, too. We have here before our eyes the fulfillment of the legal demands of Slovakia. To the Government that stands back of the autonomy of Slovakia belongs the trust of the Slovaks and Slovakia." The Slovaks voted unanimously for the successor of Dr. E. Beneš, Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1988, as they had voted for Dr. Beneš In 1935, on the basis of the promises given. From the expressions of their representatives it is plainly evident that the Slovaks wanted a new, healthy Czecho-Slovakia, hoped for a mutual, fraternal understanding with the Czechs and expressed their confidence in the government which backed the autonomy of Slovakia, but only to such a government and as long as it backed that autonomy. But the Czechs, it seems, regretted granting autonomy to Slovakia after they had recovered from the first shock of Munich. They were exceedingly sorry that they had "given" the Slovaks what rightfully was theirs and began to plot against the autonomy of Slo­vakia. They sought legal and illegal means of circumventing the law that gave Slovakia autonomy. Czech political leaders were determined again to prove that Slovakia was not able to live an autonomous life. "At the same Ume they acted systematically to squeeze Slovakia against the wall economically and financially." (Dr. Ďurčanský: POHĽAD na slovenskú politickú minulosť, pg. 218). As a result of this policy of Czech representatives and after considering the international situation, more and more voices began to cry out against such autonomy. The first to protest was Dr. V. Tuka, who, after serving 9 years of a 15-year term given him by a Czech court for "treason," never became reconciled with Prague. Dr. Tuka, a university professor was sentenced without sufficient proof, with the aid of false witnesses and only on indictments. When the verdict was pronounced In 1929, Dr. Tuka said: "On this verdict shall be laid the foundations of the Slovak state for a hundred and hundred future years." It was the same Dr. Tuka who previously (in 1924) had proclaimed that Slovakia was mature for independence. In their contacts with the Third Reich, especially with its economic representatives, Slovak representatives learned early In 1939 that the Germans were preparing for new political deals with their Magyar allies against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in the spring. About the middle of February one of the foremost factors of the Third Reich, Dr. Vehnsenmayer notified several Slovak political representatives that Hungary wants to occupy the territory of Slovakia on March 15, and indicated that an eventual proclamation of the independence of Slovakia could forestall this action. In the meantime, Czech leaders "were unbelievably shortsighted and haughty In their treatment of the Slovaks," as Sir Neville Henderson wrote ("Failure of a Mission," pg. 232). The Prague government went so far as to ask Berlin how German circles would regard military intervention In Slovakia. Berlin answered that such action was entirely an internal affair of Czecho-Slovakia. Encouraged by Berlin, the Czechs prepared to liquidate Slovak autonomy. And on March 10th, writes Henderson, "the Czech president deposed the Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, from his office and occupied Bra­tislava with the Czech army and gendarmery and by force installed a new government there." The story, however, is not complete without stating the fact that Slovak soldiers were disarmed and put under guard in barracks, the military commissioner of the Slovak government was deprived of his function, 300-400 outstanding Slovak men were arrested at night and taken into Moravia and university students also were disarmed and incarcerated, etc. This act of the Prague Government was the coup re grace for the Czecho-Slovak Republic that suffered in agony since Munich. This was too favorable an opportunity to be missed by Hitler's opportunism; disregarding the consequences, he decided to pull the right plan out of bis brief-case and act with lightning speed, Henderson writes and adds: "My warning ambassador Mastný that his Government (that is the Prague Government) was playing into the hands of Hitler and that its foolhardiness would end in catastrophe fell upon deaf ears.... The Czech Government persevered in its stubbornness . ... (Opus cit., pg. 233). If any other nation were confronted with a situation such as the Slovaks were faced with In 1939, how would it have acted? And what did the Slovaks do? This sounds like an irony of fate, but they did only what Dr. Beneš considered as correct in 1936 when he told Count C. Sforza, the Italian statesman: "... I would turn to Berlin and accept any compromise I could to preserve the independence of my country.... (Vd ILLUSIONS ET RÉALITÉS de L'EUROPE, Fribourg, 1944). Nay, while Dr. Beneš wanted to do that willingly, the Czechs forced the Slovaks into the situation and made Hitler call Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso to Berlin on March 13, 1939. - (S. N., 1949). • • • • WHO SAID IT?: - Masaryk on Collaboration With USSR. - Broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, on November 8, Jan Masaryk congratulated the Soviet people on their anniversary. He said that the Russian revolution produced a new type of state. War was necessary to convince the world that there could be no peace without the Soviet Union. Therefore, collaboration with the Soviet Union will be sought The Soviet Union having no imperialistic aims, Stalin has again stressed the independence of other States. Czechoslovakia fears nothing because her traditional characteristics of democracy and pro­gress are respected by Russia, with whom Czechoslovakia will colla­borate on an equal basis. The Soviet Union accepts the friendship of the Slav nations, respects their independence, and seeks the collabo­ration of Britain and the United States for peace. The Soviet-Czecho­slovak Treaty, protecting Czechoslovakia from German aggression, guarantees our internal freedom and State independence, Masaryk concluded." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, III., November 27, 1944). Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Causes of Czechoslovakia's Disintegration Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 10-17 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d0ba71173f7bdf164123c28566e4b847.pdf 3ba09f4a3837ff3d89e456901053d0a6 PDF Text Text SLO VA KI A Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XIV 1964 NO. 37 Francis Vnuk: THE CENTENARY OF ANDREJ HLINKA Born: September 27, 1864 Died: August 16, 1938 From the beginning of the 10th century Slovakia was an integral part of the multilingual, multinational kingdom of Hungary. Then at the beginning of the 19th century the Magyars, as the dominant racial group of the kingdom, in sharp contrast to the explicit wishes of the saitly king Stephen - Regnum unius linguae, unius moris imbecile et fragile est (a kingdom where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile) - launched an all-out drive for a unilingual national state. This could, of course, happen only at the expense of the national minorities, of which the Slovaks were affected the most severely. In 1818 the Magyar revolutionary leader, L. Kossuth, wrote in 'Pesti Hirlap': ·" Amen, amen I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Another outstanding Magyar politician, K. Tisza, uttered in a Parliamentary debate on December 15, 1875 his notoriously famous statement: "There is no Slovak nation." The words were followed by actions; the Magyars did all that was humanly possible to deprive the Slovaks of their 111ationality. Into this oppressive and all-prevading era of magyarlzation entered Hlinka, as a young student and young priest. The pastoral duties gave him plenty of opportunities to s ee the abysmal injustice wrought by magyarization on his own peoples as well as the reckless immorality of the perpetrators of this denationalization policy. To free the village people from the economic grip of foreign inn- and shopkeepers - the frontline Magyarizators - he founded Christian temperance societies and cooperative associations. He fought corrupticn and exploitation trough newspaper articles, public speeches and addresses. In or der to carry this struggle on to the flcor of the Parliament he entered t he �2 SLOVAKIA electoral contest in the 1898 election but was defeated by 150 votes. HilS fearless defense of ,p eople's rights and his determined struggle with the state authorities made him soon a national hero and at t'he same time brought him into sharp <!onflict with the oppressors. After many threats and smaller punishmentJs, heavy blows started to fall in 1906. For his support of the Slovak candidate (V. Srobar) in the 1906 election (Srobar lost by 104 votes) he was suspended by his bishop A. Parvy "ab ordine et officio" and then arrested. After five months in prison he was sentenced at a well-publicized trial on November 26th, 1906 to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1500 crowns. Wh....,on he returned from prison he was condemned to a further 18 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 crowns on a charge of "incitement". This charge was based on two farewell articles written before his entry into the Szeged prison. It was obvious that these vindictive sentences, as well rus the unjust suspension by his bishop, were aimed at breaking Hlinka's spirit, to strike terror among the Slovak leaders and to deprive the whole nation of its ablest spokesmen and fighters. But it was just this treatment that transformed Hlinka in the minds of people into a national figure. Very sC'on his name outgrew the local Slovak scene and outside his enslaved •c ountry it became synonymous with the unjust oppression meted out on the hapless Slovaks by the chauvinist Magyar government. In Moravia and Bohemia especially Hlinka found many ·ardent friends and supporters. It was largely due to the Moravia:n Catholic clergy that in the delicate matter of Hlinka's suspension the Vatican decided in Hlinka's favour and against his bishop. But in the meantime there occurred on October 27th, 1907 a bloody incident at Hlinka's birthplace, Cernova. Here the villageris with Hlinka's help built a church. Naturally they wanted Hlinka at its consecration. But since Hlinka was under suspension, t'he bishop ordered that the church be consecrated by another priest. This priest came to Cernova with an armed escort of gendarmes. When the village crowd blocked their entry, the gendarmes fired without warning, killing nine people and wounding some 50 ( of whom six subsequently died). �SLOVAKIA 3 This massacre enraged the whole civilized world. Among the advocates of the Slovak cause were such prominent intellectual personalities of the time as B. BJornson, L. N. Tolstoy, but the most effective was the voice of R. W. Se·trin-Watsan. In his book "Racial problems in Hungary" (1908) - where he placed Hlinka's portrait as the frontiispiece - Seton-Watson meticulously and dispassionately exposed the chauvinist Magyar policies and made a powerful plea for better treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. His admiration for Hlinka was sincere and wellmeri1ted. "I held then - wrote Seton-Watson in 'The new Slovakia' (1924) - and still hold, the Hlinka was at that moment in mainy ways the most characteristic figure in the struggle of the Slovak nation against magyarization. He stood among other things for that devotion to religion as they conceived it, for that outraged moral sense which have characterised the Slovaks in modern times." The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was indeed desperate. Looking for help Hlinka cast his eyes first and foremost at the Moravians and the Czechs who - though under Austrian rule - were enjoying incomparably wider freedom. Union with the Czedhs figured prominently in his thinking. He defiantly declared before the court of Bratislava (on i.fay 4th, 1908): "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, the fact remains eternally true that we Slovaks form with the Czechs a single race, a single culture, a single nation." On the other hand it must be mentioned that Hlinka strongly opposed the influence of the Czech freethinkers, liberals and socialists and made this stand very clear in his vehement attack,s on the Hlasists - Masaryk's followers in Slovakia. Then came the first world war and at its end Slovakia experienced the most revolutionary change in its history. When it came to the vital question as to what was going to happen to the Slovaks, Hlinka knew the answer and was most outspoken about it. With his enthusiasm he converted to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state the hesitant and doub ting. At the meeting of Slovak leaders on October 30th, 1918 he declared: "This i!S the time to act ... Let us state it plainly that �4 SLOVAKIA we stand for the Czecho-Slovak solution. Our thousand year old marriage with the Magyars was a failure and our roads must now part." IIlinka's bold action and the weight of his authority, more than anything else, swayed public opinion in Slovakia towards the general acceptance of a political union with the Czechs in one state. . In the collapse of Magyar domination over Slovakia IIlinka saw the victory of the martyred Slovak truth. As he repeatedly stated, he saw in the political upheaval of 191819 the finger of God who in His eternal justice "depo3uit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles" (hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble). Yet the dawn of the new era did not fulfill IIlinka's expectattons. From the beginning the rule of Slovakia passed into the hands of a close circle of men who enjoyed not so much the confidence of the Slovak people as the confidence of the authorities in Prague. They excluded IIlinka from any share of power and responsibility, though he was without question the best known, most respected and most severely persecuted fighter for the Slovak cause. Equally disappointing were the Czech officials, legionaries and administrato'rs who poured intk> Slovakia in 1918·19 to take over the positions vacated by the Magyar officialdom. In their dealings with the Slovaks the Czech newcomers were very tactless, arrogant and offensive. The British Minister to Prague, Cecil Gosling, visited Slovakia in November 1919 and had this to report to his government : The Czech administration of the Slovaks has been on·e o.f harsh and, in ·s ome cases, ·b rutal domina.tion with a result that thra po,l itical situation is preca,rious and there is a conside.:rable party in favour of complete autonomy •aind .t he -estabLtshment of a Slovakia P:arJiament. Th·e following are .t he main errors of Czech administration: l. Hostility to the Roman Catholic Church •evin~ed by Czech soldiers and offi'Ciials and which includes the desecratiion and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, in.te,r ruption of marria,ges and stmilar offenses :ag.ain:st the principles of culture a,nd d•ecency. 2. The country has been flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if ,employed, they receive kom onre half to two thirds les·s pa,y .than the Czechs. 3. Corruption in t•h e public offices. 4. Attempts to subs•t itute the Czech for .the Slo%k •language. On my return. I s&w Moin:sdeur Bene§, the Foreign Minister (in the abs•en~ of the President who i:s indisposed), and I represented these facts to him. �SLOVAKiA , 5 The Minister replied without equi'Vocation that he was aware that my statements were perfectly correct; ,and that: I. S teps would be ~mmedi,ately taken for the cessation in S ovakia of all religio,us hostility .and intoler,ance and the S!,ovaks should be at once informed ,t hat his Government had opened irelations witih the Vatican, acknowledged the appointme·n t of the new Arehib1shop o.f Prague, and we,r,e sending within the ne,xt few days a repr,esentative to the Holy See. Il. 'l1hat airr,a,ngements would be made to sto,p ,the transmission to Slovakia of fresh Chech officials and that all officials salaries, whether paid to Czec<hs or Slovaks, would be on an equal footing. m. That asS'U:l'anee shoiU.ld be defini,tely ma,d,e ,t hat tihe Government had no inte-nti:o,n of imposing t>h-e Czech language in ,th,e p'ace of the ancient Slov,ak tongue . . . Hlinka recognized these facts much earlier than Gosling natl was genuinely grieved by this unexpected development. He sensed that the Slovaks had only exchanged the Magyar rule for the Czech one. Then in the summer of 1919 he learned that President Masaryk had concluded during the war an agreement with the Slovaks in America in which full autonomy for Slovakia was guaranteed. Edged on by his associates, especially Dr. F. Jehlicka, Hlinka travelled to Paris (on a Polish passport and under an assumed name) and submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference there, protesting against the Cze<!h injustices and seeking to secure autonomy for the Slovak nation. ("Le droit a !'existence nous a ete accorde par le Createur; noUJS esperons que la glorieuse Conference de la Paix nous le garan tira contre !'injustice des hommes" - he pleaded.) But he was not heard, and what is more, he and his companions were expelled from Paris. After his unsuccessful venture Hlinka returned in Oct. 1919 to Slovakia (his associat~s dispersed to Poland, Hungary and the USA) where he was arrested by the Prague authorities. This step met with violent disapproval from the Slovak population and demonstrated (if such a demonstration , was necessary) how high Hlinka's standing and ,p opularity were among the Slovaks. The British Minister reported in his dispatch: PRAGUE, Octoboc 20, 1919 My Laird, Fatihe-r Hlinka, a Slovak P,riest, whose •alll,ti-Czech policy has been referl.'ed to by me in previous despatches, was arrested lby order of the Government on the 13th instant. �6 SLOVAKIA Following this event, <rioting occocred in Slovakia, as well as some ho.stil demonstrations ,a,gainst the French officers on duty there. The situation was regard,ed as serious by the Governme<nt and, at a Cabinet Council it wais decid,ed to invoke the assista,noe ·O,f Dr. Kordac, the Arc-hbisho,p of Pra-gue to cairn the people who a<re incensed by the ,a•nti,cl-erical policy of thie, Czechs and the unsympathetic rule of their authoritiies. The A<rehibisihop ,p romised to give all the assistance in his power and ,i t is hoped that the authority of ,t he Church will haive a good effect in quelling disordier. It is S'igmificant that a Government which .hars coosistently shown itself anti-cleTical, should now invoke the a1ssistance of the body it has hosti:lized a.nd -points, j,ndeed, to gravity of the s-Ltuation. T,h,,e President and his Ministers •h ave asked me to 9l'·oceed to Slovakiia to meet and cornver.s,e with the leading S1oivaks, ,a,n d I am a,ccoI"dingly ,proc-eedhng to B~artislava tomo,r row, a,c companied by Colonel Goulso-n , ·t he Milita~y Atta,che. I have, &,c., OEOliL GOSLING Hlinka stayed in a Czech prison six months. But he was never tried. Upon his election to the Parliament in 1920 the Czech government released him from custody. The first free election in Slovakia, in the spring of 1920, brought sweeping victory to the Social Democrats. On his return from prison Hlinka vowed: "I will not stop work ing till red Slovakia becomes white Slovakia again.'' Into this fight he threw the whole weight of his magnetic personality, his unique gift of eloquence and his crusading zeal. The inept r:ile of the Social Democrats and internal strife within their party (leading in 1921 to a split which subsequently gave birth to the Communist party) made his task so much easier. The Prague government imposed on Slovak,s a harsh rule of rigid centralism. The economic discrimination against the Slovaks resulted in the ruining of Slovak industry, unemployment, mass emigration and the relegation of Slovakia to the status of a colony. It provoked an upsurge of intense nationalism and Hlinka skillfully channelled these feelings into a forceful popular movement. In November 1921 Hlinka dissociated his party from the Sramek's People's Party and under the na1.n e of Hlinka's P eople's Party entered the 1925 election. The party emerged victorious, capturing some 50% of the total votes cast. By this convincing victory Hlinka redeemed his promise "to �SLOVAKIA 7 v;hiten red Slovakia." His party became the strongest Slovak political party and retained this primacy till the end of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic. Hlinka's pensonality loomed large over the Slovak political scene in the interwar period. Few of Hlinka's many adversaries would concede him the status of a mature politician, but none could deny his indisputable leadership of the Slovak masses who followed him with confidence and dedication. Hlinka knew now to appeal to the elementary instincts of the Slovak peasantry and intelligentsia and in his program he embodied their nationalist feelings and jus tified demands. His followers came from all walks of life; it was often said that his organization was not a political pairty but a broad popular movement. By temperament Hlinka was a man of moods and passk ns and his impulsive character was proverbial. His tactics were very often erratic and incomprehensible, but in matters of principle he was uncompromising. He summed up the whole program of his movement in a simple motto: For God and nation. He saw himself as a defender of Slovak Christiam tradition against the flood of modern antireligious curr ents of thought and ,s ocialist materialism - which led one critic to write cf him: He is first and foremost a churchman, and his many high qualities are far better suited to an ecclesiastical than to a political career - and secondly a fighter for Slovak autonomy which was promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the pursuit of these two cornerstones of his progiram Hlinka was most resolute and unyielding. Though he possessed the rare ability of winning the trust and support of a large section of the Slovak population he was not always happy in the selectfon of and in working with his closest comrades-at-arms. U1I1worthy individuals like Jehlicka, Tuka, Machacek rose high in the party ranks and manipulated at times even Hlinka himself. At other times Hlinka authoritatively ca~t out of the party personalities like Juriga, Koza-Matejov, Kolisek who definitely deserved better treatment and a more sympathetic hearing. When all is said and done Hlinka's greatnes did not lie in the field of high politics and diplomacy but in his close and intimate ties with the people. The whole nation was al- �R SLOVAKIA ways ready to follow him through thick and thi!n. There was the strength of Hlinka's movemen t. No political party could have possibly survived unscathe d such blows as the Tuka affair, ,s uch political blunders as the fruitless and fru ~trating entry into a coalition governme nt, such defection -, and expulsion s of its leading members, so many attempts at fragment ation and such a loose and haphaz8JI'd administr ation. Hilnka's People's Party managed to pass through these crises and emerge unbroken , though not unshaken. By the early 1930's Hlinka had become a father-f:g ure of the Slovak people; his popularit y was there for the whole world to see. When in 1933 the Prague governme nt tried to by-pass Hlinka during a national celebratio n at Nitra, a hundred- thousand strong crowd on the verge of revolt successfu lly demande d to be addressed by Hlinka. The struggle for autonomy still continued , but now it was further enhanced and more ably executed by the infusion of new blood from the growing ranks of the young Slovak intelligentsia. In the summer of 1938 the Slovak nation in a spectacular manifesta tion at Bratislav a demanded the realizat!o n of their promised autonomy . The greatest mass of people in Slovak history spontane ously and enthusias tically greeted Hlinka as its leader in grateful recogniti0n of his selfless fight for autonomy . Moved to t ear s Hlinka answered in a short speech which was to be his farewell address. On August 16th, 1938 Hlinka died. Less than two months later, on October 6th, 1938, Slovak autonom y was solemnly proclaime d at Zilina and on March 14th, 1939 an independ ant Slovak state was declared by the Slovak Parliame nt. At an early imposing session of this National Assembly a law was passed (No. 83 of April 25th, 1939) which gratefully acknowle dged Hlinka's meTits in the struggle for the common good of the Slovak people: ANDREJ HLINKA SA ZASLUZ IL O SLOVEN SKY NAROD. � SLO VA KI A Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XIV 1964 NO. 37 Francis Vnuk: THE CENTENARY OF ANDREJ HLINKA Born: September 27, 1864 Died: August 16, 1938 From the beginning of the 10th century Slovakia was an integral part of the multilingual, multinational kingdom of Hungary. Then at the beginning of the 19th century the Magyars, as the dominant racial group of the kingdom, in sharp contrast to the explicit wishes of the saitly king Stephen - Regnum unius linguae, unius moris imbecile et fragile est (a kingdom where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile) - launched an all-out drive for a unilingual national state. This could, of course, happen only at the expense of the national minorities, of which the Slovaks were affected the most severely. In 1818 the Magyar revolutionary leader, L. Kossuth, wrote in 'Pesti Hirlap': ·" Amen, amen I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Another outstanding Magyar politician, K. Tisza, uttered in a Parliamentary debate on December 15, 1875 his notoriously famous statement: "There is no Slovak nation." The words were followed by actions; the Magyars did all that was humanly possible to deprive the Slovaks of their 111ationality. Into this oppressive and all-prevading era of magyarlzation entered Hlinka, as a young student and young priest. The pastoral duties gave him plenty of opportunities to s ee the abysmal injustice wrought by magyarization on his own peoples as well as the reckless immorality of the perpetrators of this denationalization policy. To free the village people from the economic grip of foreign inn- and shopkeepers - the frontline Magyarizators - he founded Christian temperance societies and cooperative associations. He fought corrupticn and exploitation trough newspaper articles, public speeches and addresses. In or der to carry this struggle on to the flcor of the Parliament he entered t he �2 SLOVAKIA electoral contest in the 1898 election but was defeated by 150 votes. HilS fearless defense of ,p eople's rights and his determined struggle with the state authorities made him soon a national hero and at t'he same time brought him into sharp <!onflict with the oppressors. After many threats and smaller punishmentJs, heavy blows started to fall in 1906. For his support of the Slovak candidate (V. Srobar) in the 1906 election (Srobar lost by 104 votes) he was suspended by his bishop A. Parvy "ab ordine et officio" and then arrested. After five months in prison he was sentenced at a well-publicized trial on November 26th, 1906 to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1500 crowns. Wh....,on he returned from prison he was condemned to a further 18 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 crowns on a charge of "incitement". This charge was based on two farewell articles written before his entry into the Szeged prison. It was obvious that these vindictive sentences, as well rus the unjust suspension by his bishop, were aimed at breaking Hlinka's spirit, to strike terror among the Slovak leaders and to deprive the whole nation of its ablest spokesmen and fighters. But it was just this treatment that transformed Hlinka in the minds of people into a national figure. Very sC'on his name outgrew the local Slovak scene and outside his enslaved •c ountry it became synonymous with the unjust oppression meted out on the hapless Slovaks by the chauvinist Magyar government. In Moravia and Bohemia especially Hlinka found many ·ardent friends and supporters. It was largely due to the Moravia:n Catholic clergy that in the delicate matter of Hlinka's suspension the Vatican decided in Hlinka's favour and against his bishop. But in the meantime there occurred on October 27th, 1907 a bloody incident at Hlinka's birthplace, Cernova. Here the villageris with Hlinka's help built a church. Naturally they wanted Hlinka at its consecration. But since Hlinka was under suspension, t'he bishop ordered that the church be consecrated by another priest. This priest came to Cernova with an armed escort of gendarmes. When the village crowd blocked their entry, the gendarmes fired without warning, killing nine people and wounding some 50 ( of whom six subsequently died). �SLOVAKIA 3 This massacre enraged the whole civilized world. Among the advocates of the Slovak cause were such prominent intellectual personalities of the time as B. BJornson, L. N. Tolstoy, but the most effective was the voice of R. W. Se·trin-Watsan. In his book "Racial problems in Hungary" (1908) - where he placed Hlinka's portrait as the frontiispiece - Seton-Watson meticulously and dispassionately exposed the chauvinist Magyar policies and made a powerful plea for better treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. His admiration for Hlinka was sincere and wellmeri1ted. "I held then - wrote Seton-Watson in 'The new Slovakia' (1924) - and still hold, the Hlinka was at that moment in mainy ways the most characteristic figure in the struggle of the Slovak nation against magyarization. He stood among other things for that devotion to religion as they conceived it, for that outraged moral sense which have characterised the Slovaks in modern times." The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was indeed desperate. Looking for help Hlinka cast his eyes first and foremost at the Moravians and the Czechs who - though under Austrian rule - were enjoying incomparably wider freedom. Union with the Czedhs figured prominently in his thinking. He defiantly declared before the court of Bratislava (on i.fay 4th, 1908): "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, the fact remains eternally true that we Slovaks form with the Czechs a single race, a single culture, a single nation." On the other hand it must be mentioned that Hlinka strongly opposed the influence of the Czech freethinkers, liberals and socialists and made this stand very clear in his vehement attack,s on the Hlasists - Masaryk's followers in Slovakia. Then came the first world war and at its end Slovakia experienced the most revolutionary change in its history. When it came to the vital question as to what was going to happen to the Slovaks, Hlinka knew the answer and was most outspoken about it. With his enthusiasm he converted to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state the hesitant and doub ting. At the meeting of Slovak leaders on October 30th, 1918 he declared: "This i!S the time to act ... Let us state it plainly that �4 SLOVAKIA we stand for the Czecho-Slovak solution. Our thousand year old marriage with the Magyars was a failure and our roads must now part." IIlinka's bold action and the weight of his authority, more than anything else, swayed public opinion in Slovakia towards the general acceptance of a political union with the Czechs in one state. . In the collapse of Magyar domination over Slovakia IIlinka saw the victory of the martyred Slovak truth. As he repeatedly stated, he saw in the political upheaval of 191819 the finger of God who in His eternal justice "depo3uit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles" (hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble). Yet the dawn of the new era did not fulfill IIlinka's expectattons. From the beginning the rule of Slovakia passed into the hands of a close circle of men who enjoyed not so much the confidence of the Slovak people as the confidence of the authorities in Prague. They excluded IIlinka from any share of power and responsibility, though he was without question the best known, most respected and most severely persecuted fighter for the Slovak cause. Equally disappointing were the Czech officials, legionaries and administrato'rs who poured intk> Slovakia in 1918·19 to take over the positions vacated by the Magyar officialdom. In their dealings with the Slovaks the Czech newcomers were very tactless, arrogant and offensive. The British Minister to Prague, Cecil Gosling, visited Slovakia in November 1919 and had this to report to his government : The Czech administration of the Slovaks has been on·e o.f harsh and, in ·s ome cases, ·b rutal domina.tion with a result that thra po,l itical situation is preca,rious and there is a conside.:rable party in favour of complete autonomy •aind .t he -estabLtshment of a Slovakia P:arJiament. Th·e following are .t he main errors of Czech administration: l. Hostility to the Roman Catholic Church •evin~ed by Czech soldiers and offi'Ciials and which includes the desecratiion and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, in.te,r ruption of marria,ges and stmilar offenses :ag.ain:st the principles of culture a,nd d•ecency. 2. The country has been flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if ,employed, they receive kom onre half to two thirds les·s pa,y .than the Czechs. 3. Corruption in t•h e public offices. 4. Attempts to subs•t itute the Czech for .the Slo%k •language. On my return. I s&w Moin:sdeur Bene§, the Foreign Minister (in the abs•en~ of the President who i:s indisposed), and I represented these facts to him. �SLOVAKiA , 5 The Minister replied without equi'Vocation that he was aware that my statements were perfectly correct; ,and that: I. S teps would be ~mmedi,ately taken for the cessation in S ovakia of all religio,us hostility .and intoler,ance and the S!,ovaks should be at once informed ,t hat his Government had opened irelations witih the Vatican, acknowledged the appointme·n t of the new Arehib1shop o.f Prague, and we,r,e sending within the ne,xt few days a repr,esentative to the Holy See. Il. 'l1hat airr,a,ngements would be made to sto,p ,the transmission to Slovakia of fresh Chech officials and that all officials salaries, whether paid to Czec<hs or Slovaks, would be on an equal footing. m. That asS'U:l'anee shoiU.ld be defini,tely ma,d,e ,t hat tihe Government had no inte-nti:o,n of imposing t>h-e Czech language in ,th,e p'ace of the ancient Slov,ak tongue . . . Hlinka recognized these facts much earlier than Gosling natl was genuinely grieved by this unexpected development. He sensed that the Slovaks had only exchanged the Magyar rule for the Czech one. Then in the summer of 1919 he learned that President Masaryk had concluded during the war an agreement with the Slovaks in America in which full autonomy for Slovakia was guaranteed. Edged on by his associates, especially Dr. F. Jehlicka, Hlinka travelled to Paris (on a Polish passport and under an assumed name) and submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference there, protesting against the Cze<!h injustices and seeking to secure autonomy for the Slovak nation. ("Le droit a !'existence nous a ete accorde par le Createur; noUJS esperons que la glorieuse Conference de la Paix nous le garan tira contre !'injustice des hommes" - he pleaded.) But he was not heard, and what is more, he and his companions were expelled from Paris. After his unsuccessful venture Hlinka returned in Oct. 1919 to Slovakia (his associat~s dispersed to Poland, Hungary and the USA) where he was arrested by the Prague authorities. This step met with violent disapproval from the Slovak population and demonstrated (if such a demonstration , was necessary) how high Hlinka's standing and ,p opularity were among the Slovaks. The British Minister reported in his dispatch: PRAGUE, Octoboc 20, 1919 My Laird, Fatihe-r Hlinka, a Slovak P,riest, whose •alll,ti-Czech policy has been referl.'ed to by me in previous despatches, was arrested lby order of the Government on the 13th instant. �6 SLOVAKIA Following this event, <rioting occocred in Slovakia, as well as some ho.stil demonstrations ,a,gainst the French officers on duty there. The situation was regard,ed as serious by the Governme<nt and, at a Cabinet Council it wais decid,ed to invoke the assista,noe ·O,f Dr. Kordac, the Arc-hbisho,p of Pra-gue to cairn the people who a<re incensed by the ,a•nti,cl-erical policy of thie, Czechs and the unsympathetic rule of their authoritiies. The A<rehibisihop ,p romised to give all the assistance in his power and ,i t is hoped that the authority of ,t he Church will haive a good effect in quelling disordier. It is S'igmificant that a Government which .hars coosistently shown itself anti-cleTical, should now invoke the a1ssistance of the body it has hosti:lized a.nd -points, j,ndeed, to gravity of the s-Ltuation. T,h,,e President and his Ministers •h ave asked me to 9l'·oceed to Slovakiia to meet and cornver.s,e with the leading S1oivaks, ,a,n d I am a,ccoI"dingly ,proc-eedhng to B~artislava tomo,r row, a,c companied by Colonel Goulso-n , ·t he Milita~y Atta,che. I have, &,c., OEOliL GOSLING Hlinka stayed in a Czech prison six months. But he was never tried. Upon his election to the Parliament in 1920 the Czech government released him from custody. The first free election in Slovakia, in the spring of 1920, brought sweeping victory to the Social Democrats. On his return from prison Hlinka vowed: "I will not stop work ing till red Slovakia becomes white Slovakia again.'' Into this fight he threw the whole weight of his magnetic personality, his unique gift of eloquence and his crusading zeal. The inept r:ile of the Social Democrats and internal strife within their party (leading in 1921 to a split which subsequently gave birth to the Communist party) made his task so much easier. The Prague government imposed on Slovak,s a harsh rule of rigid centralism. The economic discrimination against the Slovaks resulted in the ruining of Slovak industry, unemployment, mass emigration and the relegation of Slovakia to the status of a colony. It provoked an upsurge of intense nationalism and Hlinka skillfully channelled these feelings into a forceful popular movement. In November 1921 Hlinka dissociated his party from the Sramek's People's Party and under the na1.n e of Hlinka's P eople's Party entered the 1925 election. The party emerged victorious, capturing some 50% of the total votes cast. By this convincing victory Hlinka redeemed his promise "to �SLOVAKIA 7 v;hiten red Slovakia." His party became the strongest Slovak political party and retained this primacy till the end of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic. Hlinka's pensonality loomed large over the Slovak political scene in the interwar period. Few of Hlinka's many adversaries would concede him the status of a mature politician, but none could deny his indisputable leadership of the Slovak masses who followed him with confidence and dedication. Hlinka knew now to appeal to the elementary instincts of the Slovak peasantry and intelligentsia and in his program he embodied their nationalist feelings and jus tified demands. His followers came from all walks of life; it was often said that his organization was not a political pairty but a broad popular movement. By temperament Hlinka was a man of moods and passk ns and his impulsive character was proverbial. His tactics were very often erratic and incomprehensible, but in matters of principle he was uncompromising. He summed up the whole program of his movement in a simple motto: For God and nation. He saw himself as a defender of Slovak Christiam tradition against the flood of modern antireligious curr ents of thought and ,s ocialist materialism - which led one critic to write cf him: He is first and foremost a churchman, and his many high qualities are far better suited to an ecclesiastical than to a political career - and secondly a fighter for Slovak autonomy which was promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the pursuit of these two cornerstones of his progiram Hlinka was most resolute and unyielding. Though he possessed the rare ability of winning the trust and support of a large section of the Slovak population he was not always happy in the selectfon of and in working with his closest comrades-at-arms. U1I1worthy individuals like Jehlicka, Tuka, Machacek rose high in the party ranks and manipulated at times even Hlinka himself. At other times Hlinka authoritatively ca~t out of the party personalities like Juriga, Koza-Matejov, Kolisek who definitely deserved better treatment and a more sympathetic hearing. When all is said and done Hlinka's greatnes did not lie in the field of high politics and diplomacy but in his close and intimate ties with the people. The whole nation was al- �R SLOVAKIA ways ready to follow him through thick and thi!n. There was the strength of Hlinka's movemen t. No political party could have possibly survived unscathe d such blows as the Tuka affair, ,s uch political blunders as the fruitless and fru ~trating entry into a coalition governme nt, such defection -, and expulsion s of its leading members, so many attempts at fragment ation and such a loose and haphaz8JI'd administr ation. Hilnka's People's Party managed to pass through these crises and emerge unbroken , though not unshaken. By the early 1930's Hlinka had become a father-f:g ure of the Slovak people; his popularit y was there for the whole world to see. When in 1933 the Prague governme nt tried to by-pass Hlinka during a national celebratio n at Nitra, a hundred- thousand strong crowd on the verge of revolt successfu lly demande d to be addressed by Hlinka. The struggle for autonomy still continued , but now it was further enhanced and more ably executed by the infusion of new blood from the growing ranks of the young Slovak intelligentsia. In the summer of 1938 the Slovak nation in a spectacular manifesta tion at Bratislav a demanded the realizat!o n of their promised autonomy . The greatest mass of people in Slovak history spontane ously and enthusias tically greeted Hlinka as its leader in grateful recogniti0n of his selfless fight for autonomy . Moved to t ear s Hlinka answered in a short speech which was to be his farewell address. On August 16th, 1938 Hlinka died. Less than two months later, on October 6th, 1938, Slovak autonom y was solemnly proclaime d at Zilina and on March 14th, 1939 an independ ant Slovak state was declared by the Slovak Parliame nt. At an early imposing session of this National Assembly a law was passed (No. 83 of April 25th, 1939) which gratefully acknowle dged Hlinka's meTits in the struggle for the common good of the Slovak people: ANDREJ HLINKA SA ZASLUZ IL O SLOVEN SKY NAROD. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1964, Vol. 14 Description An account of the resource Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLO VA KI A Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XIV 1964 NO. 37 Francis Vnuk: THE CENTENARY OF ANDREJ HLINKA Born: September 27, 1864 Died: August 16, 1938 From the beginning of the 10th century Slovakia was an integral part of the multilingual, multinational kingdom of Hungary. Then at the beginning of the 19th century the Magyars, as the dominant racial group of the kingdom, in sharp contrast to the explicit wishes of the saitly king Stephen - Regnum unius linguae, unius moris imbecile et fragile est (a kingdom where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile) - launched an all-out drive for a unilingual national state. This could, of course, happen only at the expense of the national minorities, of which the Slovaks were affected the most severely. In 1818 the Magyar revolutionary leader, L. Kossuth, wrote in 'Pesti Hirlap': ·" Amen, amen I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Another outstanding Magyar politician, K. Tisza, uttered in a Parliamentary debate on December 15, 1875 his notoriously famous statement: "There is no Slovak nation." The words were followed by actions; the Magyars did all that was humanly possible to deprive the Slovaks of their 111ationality. Into this oppressive and all-prevading era of magyarlzation entered Hlinka, as a young student and young priest. The pastoral duties gave him plenty of opportunities to s ee the abysmal injustice wrought by magyarization on his own peoples as well as the reckless immorality of the perpetrators of this denationalization policy. To free the village people from the economic grip of foreign inn- and shopkeepers - the frontline Magyarizators - he founded Christian temperance societies and cooperative associations. He fought corrupticn and exploitation trough newspaper articles, public speeches and addresses. In or der to carry this struggle on to the flcor of the Parliament he entered t he 2 SLOVAKIA electoral contest in the 1898 election but was defeated by 150 votes. HilS fearless defense of ,p eople's rights and his determined struggle with the state authorities made him soon a national hero and at t'he same time brought him into sharp <!onflict with the oppressors. After many threats and smaller punishmentJs, heavy blows started to fall in 1906. For his support of the Slovak candidate (V. Srobar) in the 1906 election (Srobar lost by 104 votes) he was suspended by his bishop A. Parvy "ab ordine et officio" and then arrested. After five months in prison he was sentenced at a well-publicized trial on November 26th, 1906 to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1500 crowns. Wh....,on he returned from prison he was condemned to a further 18 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 crowns on a charge of "incitement". This charge was based on two farewell articles written before his entry into the Szeged prison. It was obvious that these vindictive sentences, as well rus the unjust suspension by his bishop, were aimed at breaking Hlinka's spirit, to strike terror among the Slovak leaders and to deprive the whole nation of its ablest spokesmen and fighters. But it was just this treatment that transformed Hlinka in the minds of people into a national figure. Very sC'on his name outgrew the local Slovak scene and outside his enslaved •c ountry it became synonymous with the unjust oppression meted out on the hapless Slovaks by the chauvinist Magyar government. In Moravia and Bohemia especially Hlinka found many ·ardent friends and supporters. It was largely due to the Moravia:n Catholic clergy that in the delicate matter of Hlinka's suspension the Vatican decided in Hlinka's favour and against his bishop. But in the meantime there occurred on October 27th, 1907 a bloody incident at Hlinka's birthplace, Cernova. Here the villageris with Hlinka's help built a church. Naturally they wanted Hlinka at its consecration. But since Hlinka was under suspension, t'he bishop ordered that the church be consecrated by another priest. This priest came to Cernova with an armed escort of gendarmes. When the village crowd blocked their entry, the gendarmes fired without warning, killing nine people and wounding some 50 ( of whom six subsequently died). SLOVAKIA 3 This massacre enraged the whole civilized world. Among the advocates of the Slovak cause were such prominent intellectual personalities of the time as B. BJornson, L. N. Tolstoy, but the most effective was the voice of R. W. Se·trin-Watsan. In his book "Racial problems in Hungary" (1908) - where he placed Hlinka's portrait as the frontiispiece - Seton-Watson meticulously and dispassionately exposed the chauvinist Magyar policies and made a powerful plea for better treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. His admiration for Hlinka was sincere and wellmeri1ted. "I held then - wrote Seton-Watson in 'The new Slovakia' (1924) - and still hold, the Hlinka was at that moment in mainy ways the most characteristic figure in the struggle of the Slovak nation against magyarization. He stood among other things for that devotion to religion as they conceived it, for that outraged moral sense which have characterised the Slovaks in modern times." The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was indeed desperate. Looking for help Hlinka cast his eyes first and foremost at the Moravians and the Czechs who - though under Austrian rule - were enjoying incomparably wider freedom. Union with the Czedhs figured prominently in his thinking. He defiantly declared before the court of Bratislava (on i.fay 4th, 1908): "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, the fact remains eternally true that we Slovaks form with the Czechs a single race, a single culture, a single nation." On the other hand it must be mentioned that Hlinka strongly opposed the influence of the Czech freethinkers, liberals and socialists and made this stand very clear in his vehement attack,s on the Hlasists - Masaryk's followers in Slovakia. Then came the first world war and at its end Slovakia experienced the most revolutionary change in its history. When it came to the vital question as to what was going to happen to the Slovaks, Hlinka knew the answer and was most outspoken about it. With his enthusiasm he converted to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state the hesitant and doub ting. At the meeting of Slovak leaders on October 30th, 1918 he declared: "This i!S the time to act ... Let us state it plainly that 4 SLOVAKIA we stand for the Czecho-Slovak solution. Our thousand year old marriage with the Magyars was a failure and our roads must now part." IIlinka's bold action and the weight of his authority, more than anything else, swayed public opinion in Slovakia towards the general acceptance of a political union with the Czechs in one state. . In the collapse of Magyar domination over Slovakia IIlinka saw the victory of the martyred Slovak truth. As he repeatedly stated, he saw in the political upheaval of 191819 the finger of God who in His eternal justice "depo3uit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles" (hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble). Yet the dawn of the new era did not fulfill IIlinka's expectattons. From the beginning the rule of Slovakia passed into the hands of a close circle of men who enjoyed not so much the confidence of the Slovak people as the confidence of the authorities in Prague. They excluded IIlinka from any share of power and responsibility, though he was without question the best known, most respected and most severely persecuted fighter for the Slovak cause. Equally disappointing were the Czech officials, legionaries and administrato'rs who poured intk> Slovakia in 1918·19 to take over the positions vacated by the Magyar officialdom. In their dealings with the Slovaks the Czech newcomers were very tactless, arrogant and offensive. The British Minister to Prague, Cecil Gosling, visited Slovakia in November 1919 and had this to report to his government : The Czech administration of the Slovaks has been on·e o.f harsh and, in ·s ome cases, ·b rutal domina.tion with a result that thra po,l itical situation is preca,rious and there is a conside.:rable party in favour of complete autonomy •aind .t he -estabLtshment of a Slovakia P:arJiament. Th·e following are .t he main errors of Czech administration: l. Hostility to the Roman Catholic Church •evin~ed by Czech soldiers and offi'Ciials and which includes the desecratiion and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, in.te,r ruption of marria,ges and stmilar offenses :ag.ain:st the principles of culture a,nd d•ecency. 2. The country has been flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if ,employed, they receive kom onre half to two thirds les·s pa,y .than the Czechs. 3. Corruption in t•h e public offices. 4. Attempts to subs•t itute the Czech for .the Slo%k •language. On my return. I s&w Moin:sdeur Bene§, the Foreign Minister (in the abs•en~ of the President who i:s indisposed), and I represented these facts to him. SLOVAKiA , 5 The Minister replied without equi'Vocation that he was aware that my statements were perfectly correct; ,and that: I. S teps would be ~mmedi,ately taken for the cessation in S ovakia of all religio,us hostility .and intoler,ance and the S!,ovaks should be at once informed ,t hat his Government had opened irelations witih the Vatican, acknowledged the appointme·n t of the new Arehib1shop o.f Prague, and we,r,e sending within the ne,xt few days a repr,esentative to the Holy See. Il. 'l1hat airr,a,ngements would be made to sto,p ,the transmission to Slovakia of fresh Chech officials and that all officials salaries, whether paid to Czec<hs or Slovaks, would be on an equal footing. m. That asS'U:l'anee shoiU.ld be defini,tely ma,d,e ,t hat tihe Government had no inte-nti:o,n of imposing t>h-e Czech language in ,th,e p'ace of the ancient Slov,ak tongue . . . Hlinka recognized these facts much earlier than Gosling natl was genuinely grieved by this unexpected development. He sensed that the Slovaks had only exchanged the Magyar rule for the Czech one. Then in the summer of 1919 he learned that President Masaryk had concluded during the war an agreement with the Slovaks in America in which full autonomy for Slovakia was guaranteed. Edged on by his associates, especially Dr. F. Jehlicka, Hlinka travelled to Paris (on a Polish passport and under an assumed name) and submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference there, protesting against the Cze<!h injustices and seeking to secure autonomy for the Slovak nation. ("Le droit a !'existence nous a ete accorde par le Createur; noUJS esperons que la glorieuse Conference de la Paix nous le garan tira contre !'injustice des hommes" - he pleaded.) But he was not heard, and what is more, he and his companions were expelled from Paris. After his unsuccessful venture Hlinka returned in Oct. 1919 to Slovakia (his associat~s dispersed to Poland, Hungary and the USA) where he was arrested by the Prague authorities. This step met with violent disapproval from the Slovak population and demonstrated (if such a demonstration , was necessary) how high Hlinka's standing and ,p opularity were among the Slovaks. The British Minister reported in his dispatch: PRAGUE, Octoboc 20, 1919 My Laird, Fatihe-r Hlinka, a Slovak P,riest, whose •alll,ti-Czech policy has been referl.'ed to by me in previous despatches, was arrested lby order of the Government on the 13th instant. 6 SLOVAKIA Following this event, <rioting occocred in Slovakia, as well as some ho.stil demonstrations ,a,gainst the French officers on duty there. The situation was regard,ed as serious by the Governme<nt and, at a Cabinet Council it wais decid,ed to invoke the assista,noe ·O,f Dr. Kordac, the Arc-hbisho,p of Pra-gue to cairn the people who a<re incensed by the ,a•nti,cl-erical policy of thie, Czechs and the unsympathetic rule of their authoritiies. The A<rehibisihop ,p romised to give all the assistance in his power and ,i t is hoped that the authority of ,t he Church will haive a good effect in quelling disordier. It is S'igmificant that a Government which .hars coosistently shown itself anti-cleTical, should now invoke the a1ssistance of the body it has hosti:lized a.nd -points, j,ndeed, to gravity of the s-Ltuation. T,h,,e President and his Ministers •h ave asked me to 9l'·oceed to Slovakiia to meet and cornver.s,e with the leading S1oivaks, ,a,n d I am a,ccoI"dingly ,proc-eedhng to B~artislava tomo,r row, a,c companied by Colonel Goulso-n , ·t he Milita~y Atta,che. I have, &,c., OEOliL GOSLING Hlinka stayed in a Czech prison six months. But he was never tried. Upon his election to the Parliament in 1920 the Czech government released him from custody. The first free election in Slovakia, in the spring of 1920, brought sweeping victory to the Social Democrats. On his return from prison Hlinka vowed: "I will not stop work ing till red Slovakia becomes white Slovakia again.'' Into this fight he threw the whole weight of his magnetic personality, his unique gift of eloquence and his crusading zeal. The inept r:ile of the Social Democrats and internal strife within their party (leading in 1921 to a split which subsequently gave birth to the Communist party) made his task so much easier. The Prague government imposed on Slovak,s a harsh rule of rigid centralism. The economic discrimination against the Slovaks resulted in the ruining of Slovak industry, unemployment, mass emigration and the relegation of Slovakia to the status of a colony. It provoked an upsurge of intense nationalism and Hlinka skillfully channelled these feelings into a forceful popular movement. In November 1921 Hlinka dissociated his party from the Sramek's People's Party and under the na1.n e of Hlinka's P eople's Party entered the 1925 election. The party emerged victorious, capturing some 50% of the total votes cast. By this convincing victory Hlinka redeemed his promise "to SLOVAKIA 7 v;hiten red Slovakia." His party became the strongest Slovak political party and retained this primacy till the end of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic. Hlinka's pensonality loomed large over the Slovak political scene in the interwar period. Few of Hlinka's many adversaries would concede him the status of a mature politician, but none could deny his indisputable leadership of the Slovak masses who followed him with confidence and dedication. Hlinka knew now to appeal to the elementary instincts of the Slovak peasantry and intelligentsia and in his program he embodied their nationalist feelings and jus tified demands. His followers came from all walks of life; it was often said that his organization was not a political pairty but a broad popular movement. By temperament Hlinka was a man of moods and passk ns and his impulsive character was proverbial. His tactics were very often erratic and incomprehensible, but in matters of principle he was uncompromising. He summed up the whole program of his movement in a simple motto: For God and nation. He saw himself as a defender of Slovak Christiam tradition against the flood of modern antireligious curr ents of thought and ,s ocialist materialism - which led one critic to write cf him: He is first and foremost a churchman, and his many high qualities are far better suited to an ecclesiastical than to a political career - and secondly a fighter for Slovak autonomy which was promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the pursuit of these two cornerstones of his progiram Hlinka was most resolute and unyielding. Though he possessed the rare ability of winning the trust and support of a large section of the Slovak population he was not always happy in the selectfon of and in working with his closest comrades-at-arms. U1I1worthy individuals like Jehlicka, Tuka, Machacek rose high in the party ranks and manipulated at times even Hlinka himself. At other times Hlinka authoritatively ca~t out of the party personalities like Juriga, Koza-Matejov, Kolisek who definitely deserved better treatment and a more sympathetic hearing. When all is said and done Hlinka's greatnes did not lie in the field of high politics and diplomacy but in his close and intimate ties with the people. The whole nation was al- R SLOVAKIA ways ready to follow him through thick and thi!n. There was the strength of Hlinka's movemen t. No political party could have possibly survived unscathe d such blows as the Tuka affair, ,s uch political blunders as the fruitless and fru ~trating entry into a coalition governme nt, such defection -, and expulsion s of its leading members, so many attempts at fragment ation and such a loose and haphaz8JI'd administr ation. Hilnka's People's Party managed to pass through these crises and emerge unbroken , though not unshaken. By the early 1930's Hlinka had become a father-f:g ure of the Slovak people; his popularit y was there for the whole world to see. When in 1933 the Prague governme nt tried to by-pass Hlinka during a national celebratio n at Nitra, a hundred- thousand strong crowd on the verge of revolt successfu lly demande d to be addressed by Hlinka. The struggle for autonomy still continued , but now it was further enhanced and more ably executed by the infusion of new blood from the growing ranks of the young Slovak intelligentsia. In the summer of 1938 the Slovak nation in a spectacular manifesta tion at Bratislav a demanded the realizat!o n of their promised autonomy . The greatest mass of people in Slovak history spontane ously and enthusias tically greeted Hlinka as its leader in grateful recogniti0n of his selfless fight for autonomy . Moved to t ear s Hlinka answered in a short speech which was to be his farewell address. On August 16th, 1938 Hlinka died. Less than two months later, on October 6th, 1938, Slovak autonom y was solemnly proclaime d at Zilina and on March 14th, 1939 an independ ant Slovak state was declared by the Slovak Parliame nt. At an early imposing session of this National Assembly a law was passed (No. 83 of April 25th, 1939) which gratefully acknowle dged Hlinka's meTits in the struggle for the common good of the Slovak people: ANDREJ HLINKA SA ZASLUZ IL O SLOVEN SKY NAROD.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Centenary of Andrej Hlinka Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964 pp. 1-8 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f8b7d7b39fabe52b38da5be643a5af68.pdf 23b85fe4fa9f0ab3c6b7b736f656811a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 131 The Centenary of Bishop S. J\Ioyses J . M . Ki rs c h b au m Among all the prominent Slovaks of the 19th century, the Catholic Bishop Stephen Moyses seems to be the strongest personality even if the least known. He overI, shadowed Slovak leaders of previous decades not only by his education but also by his experience as a university professor, delegate to the ~ (~~ ) Diet, member of the diplomatic mission to the Impe~ rial Court and last but not least by his courage in the fight against the wave of -Magyarization. The reason for his relegation to obscurity between 1918 and 1938 was the official tendency of the inter-war Czecho-Slovak governments to recognize as good Slovaks and patriots only those who subscribed to the ideology of the "Czechoslovak nation" and belonged to the' Protestant church. Great figures of the Slovak past like Bernolak, Holly or even :Cudovit stlir, who was a Protestant but represented together with Bernolak and Holly the Slovak national aspirations for a distinct cultural, linguistic and political identity of Slovaks, were to be sent into oblivion. Bishop Moyses who waged a fierce struggle against the Hungarian policy of assimilation in the 1860's and was the first and the most successful President of Matica Slovenska, the institution which represented the best Slovak traditions, was not a person to be recognized by Prague and her representatives in Slovakia as a great figure of Slovak history. Even though he was a promoter of the Catholic-Protestant co-operation in Slovakia, his name, his activities and his patriotism were to be belittled or forgotten. ~7\f - �132 SLOVAKIA After the Second World War the atmosphere did not change for the better for the recognition of Slovak leaders who came from and represented the Catholic majority of Slovakia. Slovakia was ruled not only from Prague but for a short time by a coalition from which Catholics were practically excluded, and later by Communists. As a result, only after the 1968 political Spring, Moyses was accepted as one of the prominent figures of Slovak history and his centenary was duly remembered. 1 Before 1918 Moyses had been recognized even by the Slovak Protestant leaders as the most prominent national leader of his time. Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky, a prominent poet, writer and leader of the struggle for Slovak national rights at the turn of the 20th century, wrote about Bishop Moyses that Moyses was "the most outstanding head among Slovaks and possessed such an erudition and experience in life that prominent Slovak leaders had accepted his moderate, but definitive leadership without any resistance ... Not even the most radical Slovaks were more dedicated to the Slovak cause than Moyses ... " Vajansky wrote even more favourable statements about Moyses in the only biography which was until recently published in Slovakia. The recognition of Moyses' great personal qualities and dedication to the Slovak cause by Vajansky was of great importance if we take into consideration the fact that Vajansky was a prominent Protestant and Moyses a Catholic Bishop. However, Moyses fully deserved this recognition. He overlooked the confessional differences in the Slovak national life and forgot the quarrels of the past decades and together with the Lutheran Bishop Karol Kuzmany laid foundation to an exemplary co-operation of Slovak Catholics and Protestants in national offices. Each Slovak generation since the 1860's was reminded of the "Moyses-Kuzmany" tradition. In the 1930's this tradition was renewed for a short period by the prominent Slovak leaders, Andrew Hlinka and Martin Razus. Unfortunately it was abandoned after 1945 by the Protestants. Several other Protestant leaders of the past century also expressed great admiration for Moyses and recognized that he helped the Slovak cause a long time before he returned to Slovakia from Zagreb, Croatia, where he was �SLOVAKIA 133 a university professor and representative of the Croats at the Diet and at the Imperial Court in Vienna. According to Jan Francisci and M. Dohnany, the leaders of the Slovak uprising of 1848 received support from the Croatian "ban" Jelacic only thanks to the intervention of Bishop Moyses. 2 It was, however, during the period of his presidency of Matica Slovenska that Bishop Moyses became the most respected personality in Slovakia. When he was attacked by Magyar newspapers after his successful audience with the Emperor, prominent Slovaks of all walks of life expressed in hundreds of letters their admiration of and gratitude to Bishop Moyses. The role which Bishop Moyses played in Slovak national life at one of the crucial periods of Slovak history, deserved his nation's recognition. He gave an example of a courageous leadership in national, cultural and educational affairs at a time of concentrated efforts of the Hungarian Government to suppress Slovak political and cultural life and assimilate Slovaks. Among the most memorable actions of Bishop Moyses in this period was his protest to the Emperor Francis Joseph I in December 1861. In May of the same year, Slovak leaders adopted a "Memorandum of the Slovak Nation" in which they requested political, indicial and linguistic rights as a distinct national entity. The Budapest government disregarded the Memorandum and Moyses, hurt in his national feelings, decided to lead a delegation to the Emperor. He presented to the Emperor not only the Memorandum, but also his own "Memorial" which was later considered by historians as an example of great diplomatic skill. In spite of Magyar protests, Moyses obtained from Emperor the permission to organize a national cultural institution MATICA SLOVENSKA and even a gift of 1000 crowns for that purpose. 3 Moyses fought against great odds, but never discouraged he helped to organize Slovak schools, supported publications defending Slovak cultural heritage and renewed the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition which gave the Slovak nation moral strength and resistance in their struggle for survival. Honoured and respected until his death on July 6, 1869, Moyses passed in to the gallery of great Slovak figures of the 19th century. Only the anti-Slovak �134 SLOVAKIA and anti-Catholic policy of Prague government could temporarily deny him the place of honour among Slovaks. In 1969 even the Communist regime had to "rehabilitate" and revive this outstanding figure of the Slovak past. Bishop Moyses ' Role in the Views of Non-Slovaks While in the past fifty years the activities of Bishop Moyses on behalf of the Slovak nation were not recognized by the rulers of pre-war Czecho-Slovakia or by the Regime which was imposed on the Slovaks after the Second World War, we find in foreign languages an objective valuation of his work, especially of the period when he was the President of Matica Slovenska. Seton Watson, writing under the pseudonym Scotus Viator, was the first to praise the role which Bishop Moyses played amongst Slovaks in the 1860's. Moreover, Bishop Moyses had received recognition even from the Emperor Francis Joseph who appointed him in 1863 to the Imperial Court Council. In September 1863 Moyses led another delegation to Vienna and was received by the Emperor. The delegation assured the Emperor that the Slovak nation will contribute in the spirit of the "October Diploma" to the "strengthening of the empire internally as well as externally." On the same occasion the delegation was received by the Chancellor for Hungary, Count Forgach, whom Bishop Moyses greeted in Slovak. Seton Watson recorded the recognition given to Bishop Moyses, and as a historian praising Moyses' Memorial to the Emperor 4 as an example of good diplomacy wrote: "Roused by such unwarrantable action ( of the Magyars), Dr. Stephen Moyses, the Bishop of Banska Bystrica, one of the truest of Slovak patriots, decided to appeal to the monarch direct on behalf of his unfortunate countrymen; and on December 12, 1861, a Slovak deputation headed by the Bishop was actually received by Francis Joseph in the Hofburg at Vienna, and presented an address of grievances and requests. This address, and the memorial submitted by Bishop Moyses himself at the same time, mark a decided advance upon the manifestos of May 1848, and June 1861.5 They are at once more lucid and dignified, they avoid the verbosity and provocative tone of the Memorandum, show far more respect for existing institu- �SLOVAKIA 135 tions, and base their case upon law and fact. They lay stress upon the racial equality and concord which had prevailed in Hungary during former centuries, and contrast him with the Magyar hegemony which the legislation of the past seventy years established. The non-Magyars, they assert, are quite content to recognize the Magyar language in the higher administration, but they demand free play for their own tongues in church, school and local affairs, and in their direct contact with the authorities. The Magyars will not allow this, and try to 'cut off from the Slovaks every road to culture, and thus to let them languish in a condition of moral and social atrophy, as the prey of a future Magyarizing policy.' In effect, they put forward. the same claims as the Memorandists--the formation of Slovak Okolie, with a Slovak local assembly: the introduction of Slovak within this district as the official language of administration, justice and education: free control of the schools by 'the Slovak nation'-but at the same time they are careful to define the new territory of their dreams as 'an integral part of Hungary,' which would be subject to the central Parliament and to the supreme authorities. Moreover, they repair the most regrettable omission of the Memorandum: for while claiming Slovak as the official language of the Okolie, they specially exclude all places of other nationality, and express the wish that their communal affairs should be conducted without hindrance in the language of the majority. Bishop Moyses was inundated with addresses of thanks from the Slovak villages and corporations of North Hungary for his courageous advocacy of the Slovak cause." 6 FOOTNOTES 1) See Historicky casopis, No. 4, 1969 and Nove Slov o, June 26, 1969. The regime also allowed a public celebration of the centenary and a conference on the work and life of Moyses. 2) Moyses was born in Slovakia on October 27, 1797 and spent bis young years in his native country, but as a young priest he was sent by bis bishop first to Budapest and later he was appointed professor at the University of Zagreb, Croatia, where he spent 21 years. Both Slovakia and Croatia were parts of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Hahsburg Empire. 3) For more details on the life and activities of Bishop Moyses in Slovakia see J. M. Kirschbaum, "K storocnici biskupa Stefana Moysesa", Ncirodny Americko-slovensky Kalendcir, (Pittsburgh, Pa. 1970) , p. 39-44. �136 SLOVAKIA 4) See the text at the end of this article and commentary by Seton Watson (Scotus Viator) on the following pages. 5) The documents were published in Petitionen der Serben und Slo waken von Jahre 1861. (Vienna, 1862). 6) The Pe~tbudinske Vedomosti published no fewer than sixty-five of these addresses in the early months of 1862. And yet Bela Grunwald calmly asserted (Felvidek, p. 41) that "the majority of the Slovak population showed the greatest antipathy and indignation" toward Slovak national programme. MEMORIAL OF BISHOP STEPHEN MOYSES OF BANSKA BYSTRICA TO HIS MAJESTY EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH I Your Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty! Most gracious sovereign lord: It is an undoubted historic fact that the kingdom of Hungary was not founded by Saint Stephen upon any one special nationality, but rather upon the Christian faith and upon the laws borrowed from pre-Christian peoples. So far as the written records of this kingdom show us, history knows nothing of a special privileged position of the Magyar people. Even the conquerors under Arpad were not Magyars alone, but came in company with Cumanes and Russians, who all spread themselves throughout the country. At the real foundation of the kingdom under Stephen, the predominant--our native history says, the exclusive-influence was exercised by foreigners, Italians, Germans and Slavs. King Stephen expressly declares himself for the equal rights of all the languages in use in the country. The various divisions of the country as well as the highest dignities of the kingdom have preserved even to the present day their Slav names. After the country had been completely Christianized, the various races, inhabiting it lived in brotherly concord, without any trace of a privileged position for the Magyars. Indeed, the Germans and Slavs from time to time gained the upper hand •to such an extent that the Magyars felt it necessary to seek the protection of the Diet against this. Even on such occasions the Diet always proclaimed the most complete equality, without the slightest privilege for the Magyars. This did not, however, prevent the Magyars from being either completely or at least parlially excluded from the magistracy of several municipalities, in accordance with the Royal privileges to the latter. Above all was this the .!ase in the city of Buda. The Latin language, which was employed for over eight hundred years in the legislature, administration and judicature, was specially qualified to arrest the jealousy of the various nationalities. This was, moreover, recognized by the municipalities* of the ~oul)try, .and w&s specially cited in defence of the Latin language against , *) Here used in the legal sense, to include town councils and county assemblies. �SLOVAKIA 137 the Germanizing efforts of the Emperor Joseph II of glorious memory. But it was the very efforts of the Emperor Joseph which awakened the national movements in Hungary: among the Slovaks, it is true, only in the field of literature: among the Magyars politically as well. Naturally the non-Magyar inhabitants of the country have no objection to raise against the efforts of the Magyars to develop their language on their own territory. Indeed, they are even ready to recognize cheerfully the privileged position of the Magyar language in the higher administrative spheres of the state, within limits prescribed by Your Majesty; they wish, however, free play for their own languages in church, school, communal and municipal administration, as well as in direct communication with ,t he organs of the public administration, in so far as is necessary for the assertion of their rights as men and as citizens. The Magyars, however, will not take into consideration these just and inalienable claims, but employ every means of violence in order to cut off the Slovak people from every path to culture and thus to let it languish in a state of moral and national unconsciousness, as a prey to future Magyarization. No wonder that the county committees and magistrates who have been active since October 20 of the last years up to the present day have by excesses of all kinds ruthlessly terrorized the unsuspecting Slovak people. The same is true of the Diet which assembled in the course of this year. It has none the less caused a painful impression upon your Majesty'., devoted servant, the petitioner, that even the Royal Palatinal Council has committed a similar injustice. Despite the clear wording of the Royal Rescript of October 20, 1860, addressed to the Chancellor of Hungary and providing for the protection of the various nationalities, the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council, by its decree of October 20, 1861 (No. 61, 917) , none the less threatens all Slovak and German Catholic elementary schools with the introduction of the Magyar language. Considering the circumstance that the diocese of Banska Bystrica which is entrusted to Your Majesty's most devoted petitioner contains thirteen parishes with pure German, ninety-three with pure Slo,ak, four with Slovak-German, and not a single one with Magyar population, the result of this threatened measure of the Royal Palatinal Council would be to reduce to zero the progress of the elementary schools within this diocese-which has in any case been slight, owing to the circumstances of the past eleven months--without the intended Magyarization of the people being thereby attained. Although 1he Royal Hungarian Chancellory by two separate decrees of October 5, 1861 (No. 13,583) solemnly enjoined the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council to satisfy so far as possible the claims of the various non-Magyar nationalities of the country, when provisionally reorganizing the Catholic gymnasiums (highschools); none the less the decree of October 21, 1861, issued to the governing bodies of the gymnasiums had the exact opposite effect, and indeed so far as the gymnasium of Banska Bystrica is concerned, stood in direct conflict with the opinions expressed (in compliance with official instructions), both by the diocesan court and the governing body of that gymnasium. As a result this gymnasium-as also those others where similar linguistic con- �138 SLOVAKIA ditions prevai:-has become involved in such incredible confusion. that alike the expenditure of the parents and the time of the pupils -time which can never be made good-are robbed of all their fruits. The regrettable partiality of the provisional organization of the gymnasiums is clearly shown, among other things, by the fact that though capable and well qualified men who have been employed for years as teachers but are free from ultra-Magyar tendencies, cannot be dispensed with altogether, they are placed in the lowest category in the matter of salary; while persons of doubtful and entirely untested capacity, if only they appear reliable in respect of such tendencies, are provided with the highest salaries. Since, moreover, the county officials show practically no consideration towards the non-Hungarian population, and in open violation of the already mentioned Rescript of H. M. sent on October 20, 1860, to the Royal Hungarian Chancellor, orders and instructions are sent to non-Magyar communes drawn up in Magyar only and hence wholly incomprehensible to the people; and since, moreover, protection against such excesses is to be found neither with the counties nor with the Hungarian Palatinal Council ; it is thus clear that the county authorities which are influenced by extremists and enemies of the harmless non-Magyar people, and also the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council, unscrupulously violate the most sacred rights of the non-Magyar peoples-among whom the Slovaks alone far exceed two million souls -although these peoples have ever shown inviolable loyalty to their king and although their rights have been asserted by solemn pronouncements of the sovereign. It is further clear that the intention unhappily prevails, of condemning -these non-Magyar inhabitants to the country to perpetual ignorance and brutalization by depriving them of every suitable instrument of culture, and thus to tread under foot their feelings of human dignity, in defiance not only of the whole course of our country's history in the days preceding the present terrorism, but also in defiance of that boastful ostentation with which the late Diet in Pest saught to acquire abroad an undeserved reputation of liberalism by employing the hollow phrase of "Equality". Since then Your Majesty's most devoted petitioner-in virtue of the Divine appointment to the Episcopal dignity, as expressed through the most gracious act of your I. R. A. Majesty-feels bound to regard himself as the natural advocate of the spiritual possessions of those committed to his charge: he therefore ventures-resting upon the inalienable rights of his diocesans and upon the services which they have rendered to the country alike in peace and before the enemy, calling to mind the country's history previous to the last twenty-five years, relying the sanctity of Your Most Gracious Majesty's word-to take refuge at the foot of Your Most Gracious Majesty's throne in the most unbounded confidence, most humbly being Your I. R. A. to deign to order, that in the sense of Your Majesty's Rescript of July 21, 1861, to the Hungarian Diet, the rights of nationality of the loyal non-Magyar people, both in regard to the development of their language and nationality and to their administrative conditions, be laid down and clearly formulated, and no less effectually and permanently assured. For the rest recommending himself most earnestly to Your Most �SLOVAKIA 139 Gracious Majesty's favour-in deepest reverence, Your Imperial Royal Apostolic Majesty's most loyal subject and submissive chaplain, Stephen Moyses, Bishop of Banska Bystrica Vienna, December 5, 1861. (Translated from "Petitionen der Serben und Slowaken von Jahre 1861", Vienna, 1862, and published in Scotus Viator, Raciai Probiems in Hungary, Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1908.) The Slovak League Finnly Believes ... Our primary interest is the welfare and security of the United States of America. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at our command until the plague of Communism is completely wiped off the face of the earth. We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official and private American institutions desiring any information on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the Slovak League of America, an American institution which since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our Government, its agencies and Congressional Committees to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all communists and fellow-travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy. All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism, .s hould be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of our Government. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity in all countries of the world, as far as humanly possible. � SLOVAKIA 131 The Centenary of Bishop S. J\Ioyses J . M . Ki rs c h b au m Among all the prominent Slovaks of the 19th century, the Catholic Bishop Stephen Moyses seems to be the strongest personality even if the least known. He overI, shadowed Slovak leaders of previous decades not only by his education but also by his experience as a university professor, delegate to the ~ (~~ ) Diet, member of the diplomatic mission to the Impe~ rial Court and last but not least by his courage in the fight against the wave of -Magyarization. The reason for his relegation to obscurity between 1918 and 1938 was the official tendency of the inter-war Czecho-Slovak governments to recognize as good Slovaks and patriots only those who subscribed to the ideology of the "Czechoslovak nation" and belonged to the' Protestant church. Great figures of the Slovak past like Bernolak, Holly or even :Cudovit stlir, who was a Protestant but represented together with Bernolak and Holly the Slovak national aspirations for a distinct cultural, linguistic and political identity of Slovaks, were to be sent into oblivion. Bishop Moyses who waged a fierce struggle against the Hungarian policy of assimilation in the 1860's and was the first and the most successful President of Matica Slovenska, the institution which represented the best Slovak traditions, was not a person to be recognized by Prague and her representatives in Slovakia as a great figure of Slovak history. Even though he was a promoter of the Catholic-Protestant co-operation in Slovakia, his name, his activities and his patriotism were to be belittled or forgotten. ~7\f - �132 SLOVAKIA After the Second World War the atmosphere did not change for the better for the recognition of Slovak leaders who came from and represented the Catholic majority of Slovakia. Slovakia was ruled not only from Prague but for a short time by a coalition from which Catholics were practically excluded, and later by Communists. As a result, only after the 1968 political Spring, Moyses was accepted as one of the prominent figures of Slovak history and his centenary was duly remembered. 1 Before 1918 Moyses had been recognized even by the Slovak Protestant leaders as the most prominent national leader of his time. Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky, a prominent poet, writer and leader of the struggle for Slovak national rights at the turn of the 20th century, wrote about Bishop Moyses that Moyses was "the most outstanding head among Slovaks and possessed such an erudition and experience in life that prominent Slovak leaders had accepted his moderate, but definitive leadership without any resistance ... Not even the most radical Slovaks were more dedicated to the Slovak cause than Moyses ... " Vajansky wrote even more favourable statements about Moyses in the only biography which was until recently published in Slovakia. The recognition of Moyses' great personal qualities and dedication to the Slovak cause by Vajansky was of great importance if we take into consideration the fact that Vajansky was a prominent Protestant and Moyses a Catholic Bishop. However, Moyses fully deserved this recognition. He overlooked the confessional differences in the Slovak national life and forgot the quarrels of the past decades and together with the Lutheran Bishop Karol Kuzmany laid foundation to an exemplary co-operation of Slovak Catholics and Protestants in national offices. Each Slovak generation since the 1860's was reminded of the "Moyses-Kuzmany" tradition. In the 1930's this tradition was renewed for a short period by the prominent Slovak leaders, Andrew Hlinka and Martin Razus. Unfortunately it was abandoned after 1945 by the Protestants. Several other Protestant leaders of the past century also expressed great admiration for Moyses and recognized that he helped the Slovak cause a long time before he returned to Slovakia from Zagreb, Croatia, where he was �SLOVAKIA 133 a university professor and representative of the Croats at the Diet and at the Imperial Court in Vienna. According to Jan Francisci and M. Dohnany, the leaders of the Slovak uprising of 1848 received support from the Croatian "ban" Jelacic only thanks to the intervention of Bishop Moyses. 2 It was, however, during the period of his presidency of Matica Slovenska that Bishop Moyses became the most respected personality in Slovakia. When he was attacked by Magyar newspapers after his successful audience with the Emperor, prominent Slovaks of all walks of life expressed in hundreds of letters their admiration of and gratitude to Bishop Moyses. The role which Bishop Moyses played in Slovak national life at one of the crucial periods of Slovak history, deserved his nation's recognition. He gave an example of a courageous leadership in national, cultural and educational affairs at a time of concentrated efforts of the Hungarian Government to suppress Slovak political and cultural life and assimilate Slovaks. Among the most memorable actions of Bishop Moyses in this period was his protest to the Emperor Francis Joseph I in December 1861. In May of the same year, Slovak leaders adopted a "Memorandum of the Slovak Nation" in which they requested political, indicial and linguistic rights as a distinct national entity. The Budapest government disregarded the Memorandum and Moyses, hurt in his national feelings, decided to lead a delegation to the Emperor. He presented to the Emperor not only the Memorandum, but also his own "Memorial" which was later considered by historians as an example of great diplomatic skill. In spite of Magyar protests, Moyses obtained from Emperor the permission to organize a national cultural institution MATICA SLOVENSKA and even a gift of 1000 crowns for that purpose. 3 Moyses fought against great odds, but never discouraged he helped to organize Slovak schools, supported publications defending Slovak cultural heritage and renewed the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition which gave the Slovak nation moral strength and resistance in their struggle for survival. Honoured and respected until his death on July 6, 1869, Moyses passed in to the gallery of great Slovak figures of the 19th century. Only the anti-Slovak �134 SLOVAKIA and anti-Catholic policy of Prague government could temporarily deny him the place of honour among Slovaks. In 1969 even the Communist regime had to "rehabilitate" and revive this outstanding figure of the Slovak past. Bishop Moyses ' Role in the Views of Non-Slovaks While in the past fifty years the activities of Bishop Moyses on behalf of the Slovak nation were not recognized by the rulers of pre-war Czecho-Slovakia or by the Regime which was imposed on the Slovaks after the Second World War, we find in foreign languages an objective valuation of his work, especially of the period when he was the President of Matica Slovenska. Seton Watson, writing under the pseudonym Scotus Viator, was the first to praise the role which Bishop Moyses played amongst Slovaks in the 1860's. Moreover, Bishop Moyses had received recognition even from the Emperor Francis Joseph who appointed him in 1863 to the Imperial Court Council. In September 1863 Moyses led another delegation to Vienna and was received by the Emperor. The delegation assured the Emperor that the Slovak nation will contribute in the spirit of the "October Diploma" to the "strengthening of the empire internally as well as externally." On the same occasion the delegation was received by the Chancellor for Hungary, Count Forgach, whom Bishop Moyses greeted in Slovak. Seton Watson recorded the recognition given to Bishop Moyses, and as a historian praising Moyses' Memorial to the Emperor 4 as an example of good diplomacy wrote: "Roused by such unwarrantable action ( of the Magyars), Dr. Stephen Moyses, the Bishop of Banska Bystrica, one of the truest of Slovak patriots, decided to appeal to the monarch direct on behalf of his unfortunate countrymen; and on December 12, 1861, a Slovak deputation headed by the Bishop was actually received by Francis Joseph in the Hofburg at Vienna, and presented an address of grievances and requests. This address, and the memorial submitted by Bishop Moyses himself at the same time, mark a decided advance upon the manifestos of May 1848, and June 1861.5 They are at once more lucid and dignified, they avoid the verbosity and provocative tone of the Memorandum, show far more respect for existing institu- �SLOVAKIA 135 tions, and base their case upon law and fact. They lay stress upon the racial equality and concord which had prevailed in Hungary during former centuries, and contrast him with the Magyar hegemony which the legislation of the past seventy years established. The non-Magyars, they assert, are quite content to recognize the Magyar language in the higher administration, but they demand free play for their own tongues in church, school and local affairs, and in their direct contact with the authorities. The Magyars will not allow this, and try to 'cut off from the Slovaks every road to culture, and thus to let them languish in a condition of moral and social atrophy, as the prey of a future Magyarizing policy.' In effect, they put forward. the same claims as the Memorandists--the formation of Slovak Okolie, with a Slovak local assembly: the introduction of Slovak within this district as the official language of administration, justice and education: free control of the schools by 'the Slovak nation'-but at the same time they are careful to define the new territory of their dreams as 'an integral part of Hungary,' which would be subject to the central Parliament and to the supreme authorities. Moreover, they repair the most regrettable omission of the Memorandum: for while claiming Slovak as the official language of the Okolie, they specially exclude all places of other nationality, and express the wish that their communal affairs should be conducted without hindrance in the language of the majority. Bishop Moyses was inundated with addresses of thanks from the Slovak villages and corporations of North Hungary for his courageous advocacy of the Slovak cause." 6 FOOTNOTES 1) See Historicky casopis, No. 4, 1969 and Nove Slov o, June 26, 1969. The regime also allowed a public celebration of the centenary and a conference on the work and life of Moyses. 2) Moyses was born in Slovakia on October 27, 1797 and spent bis young years in his native country, but as a young priest he was sent by bis bishop first to Budapest and later he was appointed professor at the University of Zagreb, Croatia, where he spent 21 years. Both Slovakia and Croatia were parts of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Hahsburg Empire. 3) For more details on the life and activities of Bishop Moyses in Slovakia see J. M. Kirschbaum, "K storocnici biskupa Stefana Moysesa", Ncirodny Americko-slovensky Kalendcir, (Pittsburgh, Pa. 1970) , p. 39-44. �136 SLOVAKIA 4) See the text at the end of this article and commentary by Seton Watson (Scotus Viator) on the following pages. 5) The documents were published in Petitionen der Serben und Slo waken von Jahre 1861. (Vienna, 1862). 6) The Pe~tbudinske Vedomosti published no fewer than sixty-five of these addresses in the early months of 1862. And yet Bela Grunwald calmly asserted (Felvidek, p. 41) that "the majority of the Slovak population showed the greatest antipathy and indignation" toward Slovak national programme. MEMORIAL OF BISHOP STEPHEN MOYSES OF BANSKA BYSTRICA TO HIS MAJESTY EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH I Your Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty! Most gracious sovereign lord: It is an undoubted historic fact that the kingdom of Hungary was not founded by Saint Stephen upon any one special nationality, but rather upon the Christian faith and upon the laws borrowed from pre-Christian peoples. So far as the written records of this kingdom show us, history knows nothing of a special privileged position of the Magyar people. Even the conquerors under Arpad were not Magyars alone, but came in company with Cumanes and Russians, who all spread themselves throughout the country. At the real foundation of the kingdom under Stephen, the predominant--our native history says, the exclusive-influence was exercised by foreigners, Italians, Germans and Slavs. King Stephen expressly declares himself for the equal rights of all the languages in use in the country. The various divisions of the country as well as the highest dignities of the kingdom have preserved even to the present day their Slav names. After the country had been completely Christianized, the various races, inhabiting it lived in brotherly concord, without any trace of a privileged position for the Magyars. Indeed, the Germans and Slavs from time to time gained the upper hand •to such an extent that the Magyars felt it necessary to seek the protection of the Diet against this. Even on such occasions the Diet always proclaimed the most complete equality, without the slightest privilege for the Magyars. This did not, however, prevent the Magyars from being either completely or at least parlially excluded from the magistracy of several municipalities, in accordance with the Royal privileges to the latter. Above all was this the .!ase in the city of Buda. The Latin language, which was employed for over eight hundred years in the legislature, administration and judicature, was specially qualified to arrest the jealousy of the various nationalities. This was, moreover, recognized by the municipalities* of the ~oul)try, .and w&s specially cited in defence of the Latin language against , *) Here used in the legal sense, to include town councils and county assemblies. �SLOVAKIA 137 the Germanizing efforts of the Emperor Joseph II of glorious memory. But it was the very efforts of the Emperor Joseph which awakened the national movements in Hungary: among the Slovaks, it is true, only in the field of literature: among the Magyars politically as well. Naturally the non-Magyar inhabitants of the country have no objection to raise against the efforts of the Magyars to develop their language on their own territory. Indeed, they are even ready to recognize cheerfully the privileged position of the Magyar language in the higher administrative spheres of the state, within limits prescribed by Your Majesty; they wish, however, free play for their own languages in church, school, communal and municipal administration, as well as in direct communication with ,t he organs of the public administration, in so far as is necessary for the assertion of their rights as men and as citizens. The Magyars, however, will not take into consideration these just and inalienable claims, but employ every means of violence in order to cut off the Slovak people from every path to culture and thus to let it languish in a state of moral and national unconsciousness, as a prey to future Magyarization. No wonder that the county committees and magistrates who have been active since October 20 of the last years up to the present day have by excesses of all kinds ruthlessly terrorized the unsuspecting Slovak people. The same is true of the Diet which assembled in the course of this year. It has none the less caused a painful impression upon your Majesty'., devoted servant, the petitioner, that even the Royal Palatinal Council has committed a similar injustice. Despite the clear wording of the Royal Rescript of October 20, 1860, addressed to the Chancellor of Hungary and providing for the protection of the various nationalities, the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council, by its decree of October 20, 1861 (No. 61, 917) , none the less threatens all Slovak and German Catholic elementary schools with the introduction of the Magyar language. Considering the circumstance that the diocese of Banska Bystrica which is entrusted to Your Majesty's most devoted petitioner contains thirteen parishes with pure German, ninety-three with pure Slo,ak, four with Slovak-German, and not a single one with Magyar population, the result of this threatened measure of the Royal Palatinal Council would be to reduce to zero the progress of the elementary schools within this diocese-which has in any case been slight, owing to the circumstances of the past eleven months--without the intended Magyarization of the people being thereby attained. Although 1he Royal Hungarian Chancellory by two separate decrees of October 5, 1861 (No. 13,583) solemnly enjoined the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council to satisfy so far as possible the claims of the various non-Magyar nationalities of the country, when provisionally reorganizing the Catholic gymnasiums (highschools); none the less the decree of October 21, 1861, issued to the governing bodies of the gymnasiums had the exact opposite effect, and indeed so far as the gymnasium of Banska Bystrica is concerned, stood in direct conflict with the opinions expressed (in compliance with official instructions), both by the diocesan court and the governing body of that gymnasium. As a result this gymnasium-as also those others where similar linguistic con- �138 SLOVAKIA ditions prevai:-has become involved in such incredible confusion. that alike the expenditure of the parents and the time of the pupils -time which can never be made good-are robbed of all their fruits. The regrettable partiality of the provisional organization of the gymnasiums is clearly shown, among other things, by the fact that though capable and well qualified men who have been employed for years as teachers but are free from ultra-Magyar tendencies, cannot be dispensed with altogether, they are placed in the lowest category in the matter of salary; while persons of doubtful and entirely untested capacity, if only they appear reliable in respect of such tendencies, are provided with the highest salaries. Since, moreover, the county officials show practically no consideration towards the non-Hungarian population, and in open violation of the already mentioned Rescript of H. M. sent on October 20, 1860, to the Royal Hungarian Chancellor, orders and instructions are sent to non-Magyar communes drawn up in Magyar only and hence wholly incomprehensible to the people; and since, moreover, protection against such excesses is to be found neither with the counties nor with the Hungarian Palatinal Council ; it is thus clear that the county authorities which are influenced by extremists and enemies of the harmless non-Magyar people, and also the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council, unscrupulously violate the most sacred rights of the non-Magyar peoples-among whom the Slovaks alone far exceed two million souls -although these peoples have ever shown inviolable loyalty to their king and although their rights have been asserted by solemn pronouncements of the sovereign. It is further clear that the intention unhappily prevails, of condemning -these non-Magyar inhabitants to the country to perpetual ignorance and brutalization by depriving them of every suitable instrument of culture, and thus to tread under foot their feelings of human dignity, in defiance not only of the whole course of our country's history in the days preceding the present terrorism, but also in defiance of that boastful ostentation with which the late Diet in Pest saught to acquire abroad an undeserved reputation of liberalism by employing the hollow phrase of "Equality". Since then Your Majesty's most devoted petitioner-in virtue of the Divine appointment to the Episcopal dignity, as expressed through the most gracious act of your I. R. A. Majesty-feels bound to regard himself as the natural advocate of the spiritual possessions of those committed to his charge: he therefore ventures-resting upon the inalienable rights of his diocesans and upon the services which they have rendered to the country alike in peace and before the enemy, calling to mind the country's history previous to the last twenty-five years, relying the sanctity of Your Most Gracious Majesty's word-to take refuge at the foot of Your Most Gracious Majesty's throne in the most unbounded confidence, most humbly being Your I. R. A. to deign to order, that in the sense of Your Majesty's Rescript of July 21, 1861, to the Hungarian Diet, the rights of nationality of the loyal non-Magyar people, both in regard to the development of their language and nationality and to their administrative conditions, be laid down and clearly formulated, and no less effectually and permanently assured. For the rest recommending himself most earnestly to Your Most �SLOVAKIA 139 Gracious Majesty's favour-in deepest reverence, Your Imperial Royal Apostolic Majesty's most loyal subject and submissive chaplain, Stephen Moyses, Bishop of Banska Bystrica Vienna, December 5, 1861. (Translated from "Petitionen der Serben und Slowaken von Jahre 1861", Vienna, 1862, and published in Scotus Viator, Raciai Probiems in Hungary, Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1908.) The Slovak League Finnly Believes ... Our primary interest is the welfare and security of the United States of America. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at our command until the plague of Communism is completely wiped off the face of the earth. We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official and private American institutions desiring any information on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the Slovak League of America, an American institution which since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our Government, its agencies and Congressional Committees to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all communists and fellow-travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy. All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism, .s hould be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of our Government. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity in all countries of the world, as far as humanly possible. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1970, Vol. 20 Description An account of the resource Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 131 The Centenary of Bishop S. J\Ioyses J . M . Ki rs c h b au m Among all the prominent Slovaks of the 19th century, the Catholic Bishop Stephen Moyses seems to be the strongest personality even if the least known. He overI, shadowed Slovak leaders of previous decades not only by his education but also by his experience as a university professor, delegate to the ~ (~~ ) Diet, member of the diplomatic mission to the Impe~ rial Court and last but not least by his courage in the fight against the wave of -Magyarization. The reason for his relegation to obscurity between 1918 and 1938 was the official tendency of the inter-war Czecho-Slovak governments to recognize as good Slovaks and patriots only those who subscribed to the ideology of the "Czechoslovak nation" and belonged to the' Protestant church. Great figures of the Slovak past like Bernolak, Holly or even :Cudovit stlir, who was a Protestant but represented together with Bernolak and Holly the Slovak national aspirations for a distinct cultural, linguistic and political identity of Slovaks, were to be sent into oblivion. Bishop Moyses who waged a fierce struggle against the Hungarian policy of assimilation in the 1860's and was the first and the most successful President of Matica Slovenska, the institution which represented the best Slovak traditions, was not a person to be recognized by Prague and her representatives in Slovakia as a great figure of Slovak history. Even though he was a promoter of the Catholic-Protestant co-operation in Slovakia, his name, his activities and his patriotism were to be belittled or forgotten. ~7\f - 132 SLOVAKIA After the Second World War the atmosphere did not change for the better for the recognition of Slovak leaders who came from and represented the Catholic majority of Slovakia. Slovakia was ruled not only from Prague but for a short time by a coalition from which Catholics were practically excluded, and later by Communists. As a result, only after the 1968 political Spring, Moyses was accepted as one of the prominent figures of Slovak history and his centenary was duly remembered. 1 Before 1918 Moyses had been recognized even by the Slovak Protestant leaders as the most prominent national leader of his time. Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky, a prominent poet, writer and leader of the struggle for Slovak national rights at the turn of the 20th century, wrote about Bishop Moyses that Moyses was "the most outstanding head among Slovaks and possessed such an erudition and experience in life that prominent Slovak leaders had accepted his moderate, but definitive leadership without any resistance ... Not even the most radical Slovaks were more dedicated to the Slovak cause than Moyses ... " Vajansky wrote even more favourable statements about Moyses in the only biography which was until recently published in Slovakia. The recognition of Moyses' great personal qualities and dedication to the Slovak cause by Vajansky was of great importance if we take into consideration the fact that Vajansky was a prominent Protestant and Moyses a Catholic Bishop. However, Moyses fully deserved this recognition. He overlooked the confessional differences in the Slovak national life and forgot the quarrels of the past decades and together with the Lutheran Bishop Karol Kuzmany laid foundation to an exemplary co-operation of Slovak Catholics and Protestants in national offices. Each Slovak generation since the 1860's was reminded of the "Moyses-Kuzmany" tradition. In the 1930's this tradition was renewed for a short period by the prominent Slovak leaders, Andrew Hlinka and Martin Razus. Unfortunately it was abandoned after 1945 by the Protestants. Several other Protestant leaders of the past century also expressed great admiration for Moyses and recognized that he helped the Slovak cause a long time before he returned to Slovakia from Zagreb, Croatia, where he was SLOVAKIA 133 a university professor and representative of the Croats at the Diet and at the Imperial Court in Vienna. According to Jan Francisci and M. Dohnany, the leaders of the Slovak uprising of 1848 received support from the Croatian "ban" Jelacic only thanks to the intervention of Bishop Moyses. 2 It was, however, during the period of his presidency of Matica Slovenska that Bishop Moyses became the most respected personality in Slovakia. When he was attacked by Magyar newspapers after his successful audience with the Emperor, prominent Slovaks of all walks of life expressed in hundreds of letters their admiration of and gratitude to Bishop Moyses. The role which Bishop Moyses played in Slovak national life at one of the crucial periods of Slovak history, deserved his nation's recognition. He gave an example of a courageous leadership in national, cultural and educational affairs at a time of concentrated efforts of the Hungarian Government to suppress Slovak political and cultural life and assimilate Slovaks. Among the most memorable actions of Bishop Moyses in this period was his protest to the Emperor Francis Joseph I in December 1861. In May of the same year, Slovak leaders adopted a "Memorandum of the Slovak Nation" in which they requested political, indicial and linguistic rights as a distinct national entity. The Budapest government disregarded the Memorandum and Moyses, hurt in his national feelings, decided to lead a delegation to the Emperor. He presented to the Emperor not only the Memorandum, but also his own "Memorial" which was later considered by historians as an example of great diplomatic skill. In spite of Magyar protests, Moyses obtained from Emperor the permission to organize a national cultural institution MATICA SLOVENSKA and even a gift of 1000 crowns for that purpose. 3 Moyses fought against great odds, but never discouraged he helped to organize Slovak schools, supported publications defending Slovak cultural heritage and renewed the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition which gave the Slovak nation moral strength and resistance in their struggle for survival. Honoured and respected until his death on July 6, 1869, Moyses passed in to the gallery of great Slovak figures of the 19th century. Only the anti-Slovak 134 SLOVAKIA and anti-Catholic policy of Prague government could temporarily deny him the place of honour among Slovaks. In 1969 even the Communist regime had to "rehabilitate" and revive this outstanding figure of the Slovak past. Bishop Moyses ' Role in the Views of Non-Slovaks While in the past fifty years the activities of Bishop Moyses on behalf of the Slovak nation were not recognized by the rulers of pre-war Czecho-Slovakia or by the Regime which was imposed on the Slovaks after the Second World War, we find in foreign languages an objective valuation of his work, especially of the period when he was the President of Matica Slovenska. Seton Watson, writing under the pseudonym Scotus Viator, was the first to praise the role which Bishop Moyses played amongst Slovaks in the 1860's. Moreover, Bishop Moyses had received recognition even from the Emperor Francis Joseph who appointed him in 1863 to the Imperial Court Council. In September 1863 Moyses led another delegation to Vienna and was received by the Emperor. The delegation assured the Emperor that the Slovak nation will contribute in the spirit of the "October Diploma" to the "strengthening of the empire internally as well as externally." On the same occasion the delegation was received by the Chancellor for Hungary, Count Forgach, whom Bishop Moyses greeted in Slovak. Seton Watson recorded the recognition given to Bishop Moyses, and as a historian praising Moyses' Memorial to the Emperor 4 as an example of good diplomacy wrote: "Roused by such unwarrantable action ( of the Magyars), Dr. Stephen Moyses, the Bishop of Banska Bystrica, one of the truest of Slovak patriots, decided to appeal to the monarch direct on behalf of his unfortunate countrymen; and on December 12, 1861, a Slovak deputation headed by the Bishop was actually received by Francis Joseph in the Hofburg at Vienna, and presented an address of grievances and requests. This address, and the memorial submitted by Bishop Moyses himself at the same time, mark a decided advance upon the manifestos of May 1848, and June 1861.5 They are at once more lucid and dignified, they avoid the verbosity and provocative tone of the Memorandum, show far more respect for existing institu- SLOVAKIA 135 tions, and base their case upon law and fact. They lay stress upon the racial equality and concord which had prevailed in Hungary during former centuries, and contrast him with the Magyar hegemony which the legislation of the past seventy years established. The non-Magyars, they assert, are quite content to recognize the Magyar language in the higher administration, but they demand free play for their own tongues in church, school and local affairs, and in their direct contact with the authorities. The Magyars will not allow this, and try to 'cut off from the Slovaks every road to culture, and thus to let them languish in a condition of moral and social atrophy, as the prey of a future Magyarizing policy.' In effect, they put forward. the same claims as the Memorandists--the formation of Slovak Okolie, with a Slovak local assembly: the introduction of Slovak within this district as the official language of administration, justice and education: free control of the schools by 'the Slovak nation'-but at the same time they are careful to define the new territory of their dreams as 'an integral part of Hungary,' which would be subject to the central Parliament and to the supreme authorities. Moreover, they repair the most regrettable omission of the Memorandum: for while claiming Slovak as the official language of the Okolie, they specially exclude all places of other nationality, and express the wish that their communal affairs should be conducted without hindrance in the language of the majority. Bishop Moyses was inundated with addresses of thanks from the Slovak villages and corporations of North Hungary for his courageous advocacy of the Slovak cause." 6 FOOTNOTES 1) See Historicky casopis, No. 4, 1969 and Nove Slov o, June 26, 1969. The regime also allowed a public celebration of the centenary and a conference on the work and life of Moyses. 2) Moyses was born in Slovakia on October 27, 1797 and spent bis young years in his native country, but as a young priest he was sent by bis bishop first to Budapest and later he was appointed professor at the University of Zagreb, Croatia, where he spent 21 years. Both Slovakia and Croatia were parts of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Hahsburg Empire. 3) For more details on the life and activities of Bishop Moyses in Slovakia see J. M. Kirschbaum, "K storocnici biskupa Stefana Moysesa", Ncirodny Americko-slovensky Kalendcir, (Pittsburgh, Pa. 1970) , p. 39-44. 136 SLOVAKIA 4) See the text at the end of this article and commentary by Seton Watson (Scotus Viator) on the following pages. 5) The documents were published in Petitionen der Serben und Slo waken von Jahre 1861. (Vienna, 1862). 6) The Pe~tbudinske Vedomosti published no fewer than sixty-five of these addresses in the early months of 1862. And yet Bela Grunwald calmly asserted (Felvidek, p. 41) that "the majority of the Slovak population showed the greatest antipathy and indignation" toward Slovak national programme. MEMORIAL OF BISHOP STEPHEN MOYSES OF BANSKA BYSTRICA TO HIS MAJESTY EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH I Your Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty! Most gracious sovereign lord: It is an undoubted historic fact that the kingdom of Hungary was not founded by Saint Stephen upon any one special nationality, but rather upon the Christian faith and upon the laws borrowed from pre-Christian peoples. So far as the written records of this kingdom show us, history knows nothing of a special privileged position of the Magyar people. Even the conquerors under Arpad were not Magyars alone, but came in company with Cumanes and Russians, who all spread themselves throughout the country. At the real foundation of the kingdom under Stephen, the predominant--our native history says, the exclusive-influence was exercised by foreigners, Italians, Germans and Slavs. King Stephen expressly declares himself for the equal rights of all the languages in use in the country. The various divisions of the country as well as the highest dignities of the kingdom have preserved even to the present day their Slav names. After the country had been completely Christianized, the various races, inhabiting it lived in brotherly concord, without any trace of a privileged position for the Magyars. Indeed, the Germans and Slavs from time to time gained the upper hand •to such an extent that the Magyars felt it necessary to seek the protection of the Diet against this. Even on such occasions the Diet always proclaimed the most complete equality, without the slightest privilege for the Magyars. This did not, however, prevent the Magyars from being either completely or at least parlially excluded from the magistracy of several municipalities, in accordance with the Royal privileges to the latter. Above all was this the .!ase in the city of Buda. The Latin language, which was employed for over eight hundred years in the legislature, administration and judicature, was specially qualified to arrest the jealousy of the various nationalities. This was, moreover, recognized by the municipalities* of the ~oul)try, .and w&s specially cited in defence of the Latin language against , *) Here used in the legal sense, to include town councils and county assemblies. SLOVAKIA 137 the Germanizing efforts of the Emperor Joseph II of glorious memory. But it was the very efforts of the Emperor Joseph which awakened the national movements in Hungary: among the Slovaks, it is true, only in the field of literature: among the Magyars politically as well. Naturally the non-Magyar inhabitants of the country have no objection to raise against the efforts of the Magyars to develop their language on their own territory. Indeed, they are even ready to recognize cheerfully the privileged position of the Magyar language in the higher administrative spheres of the state, within limits prescribed by Your Majesty; they wish, however, free play for their own languages in church, school, communal and municipal administration, as well as in direct communication with ,t he organs of the public administration, in so far as is necessary for the assertion of their rights as men and as citizens. The Magyars, however, will not take into consideration these just and inalienable claims, but employ every means of violence in order to cut off the Slovak people from every path to culture and thus to let it languish in a state of moral and national unconsciousness, as a prey to future Magyarization. No wonder that the county committees and magistrates who have been active since October 20 of the last years up to the present day have by excesses of all kinds ruthlessly terrorized the unsuspecting Slovak people. The same is true of the Diet which assembled in the course of this year. It has none the less caused a painful impression upon your Majesty'., devoted servant, the petitioner, that even the Royal Palatinal Council has committed a similar injustice. Despite the clear wording of the Royal Rescript of October 20, 1860, addressed to the Chancellor of Hungary and providing for the protection of the various nationalities, the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council, by its decree of October 20, 1861 (No. 61, 917) , none the less threatens all Slovak and German Catholic elementary schools with the introduction of the Magyar language. Considering the circumstance that the diocese of Banska Bystrica which is entrusted to Your Majesty's most devoted petitioner contains thirteen parishes with pure German, ninety-three with pure Slo,ak, four with Slovak-German, and not a single one with Magyar population, the result of this threatened measure of the Royal Palatinal Council would be to reduce to zero the progress of the elementary schools within this diocese-which has in any case been slight, owing to the circumstances of the past eleven months--without the intended Magyarization of the people being thereby attained. Although 1he Royal Hungarian Chancellory by two separate decrees of October 5, 1861 (No. 13,583) solemnly enjoined the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council to satisfy so far as possible the claims of the various non-Magyar nationalities of the country, when provisionally reorganizing the Catholic gymnasiums (highschools); none the less the decree of October 21, 1861, issued to the governing bodies of the gymnasiums had the exact opposite effect, and indeed so far as the gymnasium of Banska Bystrica is concerned, stood in direct conflict with the opinions expressed (in compliance with official instructions), both by the diocesan court and the governing body of that gymnasium. As a result this gymnasium-as also those others where similar linguistic con- 138 SLOVAKIA ditions prevai:-has become involved in such incredible confusion. that alike the expenditure of the parents and the time of the pupils -time which can never be made good-are robbed of all their fruits. The regrettable partiality of the provisional organization of the gymnasiums is clearly shown, among other things, by the fact that though capable and well qualified men who have been employed for years as teachers but are free from ultra-Magyar tendencies, cannot be dispensed with altogether, they are placed in the lowest category in the matter of salary; while persons of doubtful and entirely untested capacity, if only they appear reliable in respect of such tendencies, are provided with the highest salaries. Since, moreover, the county officials show practically no consideration towards the non-Hungarian population, and in open violation of the already mentioned Rescript of H. M. sent on October 20, 1860, to the Royal Hungarian Chancellor, orders and instructions are sent to non-Magyar communes drawn up in Magyar only and hence wholly incomprehensible to the people; and since, moreover, protection against such excesses is to be found neither with the counties nor with the Hungarian Palatinal Council ; it is thus clear that the county authorities which are influenced by extremists and enemies of the harmless non-Magyar people, and also the Royal Hungarian Palatinal Council, unscrupulously violate the most sacred rights of the non-Magyar peoples-among whom the Slovaks alone far exceed two million souls -although these peoples have ever shown inviolable loyalty to their king and although their rights have been asserted by solemn pronouncements of the sovereign. It is further clear that the intention unhappily prevails, of condemning -these non-Magyar inhabitants to the country to perpetual ignorance and brutalization by depriving them of every suitable instrument of culture, and thus to tread under foot their feelings of human dignity, in defiance not only of the whole course of our country's history in the days preceding the present terrorism, but also in defiance of that boastful ostentation with which the late Diet in Pest saught to acquire abroad an undeserved reputation of liberalism by employing the hollow phrase of "Equality". Since then Your Majesty's most devoted petitioner-in virtue of the Divine appointment to the Episcopal dignity, as expressed through the most gracious act of your I. R. A. Majesty-feels bound to regard himself as the natural advocate of the spiritual possessions of those committed to his charge: he therefore ventures-resting upon the inalienable rights of his diocesans and upon the services which they have rendered to the country alike in peace and before the enemy, calling to mind the country's history previous to the last twenty-five years, relying the sanctity of Your Most Gracious Majesty's word-to take refuge at the foot of Your Most Gracious Majesty's throne in the most unbounded confidence, most humbly being Your I. R. A. to deign to order, that in the sense of Your Majesty's Rescript of July 21, 1861, to the Hungarian Diet, the rights of nationality of the loyal non-Magyar people, both in regard to the development of their language and nationality and to their administrative conditions, be laid down and clearly formulated, and no less effectually and permanently assured. For the rest recommending himself most earnestly to Your Most SLOVAKIA 139 Gracious Majesty's favour-in deepest reverence, Your Imperial Royal Apostolic Majesty's most loyal subject and submissive chaplain, Stephen Moyses, Bishop of Banska Bystrica Vienna, December 5, 1861. (Translated from "Petitionen der Serben und Slowaken von Jahre 1861", Vienna, 1862, and published in Scotus Viator, Raciai Probiems in Hungary, Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1908.) The Slovak League Finnly Believes ... Our primary interest is the welfare and security of the United States of America. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at our command until the plague of Communism is completely wiped off the face of the earth. We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official and private American institutions desiring any information on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the Slovak League of America, an American institution which since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our Government, its agencies and Congressional Committees to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all communists and fellow-travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy. All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism, .s hould be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of our Government. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity in all countries of the world, as far as humanly possible.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Centenary of Bishop S. Moyses Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970 pp. 131-139 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5537aaa0888771e68d80eaae7e103dbe.pdf 755e88aca23327760f4d22f566a11ece PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 THE CERNOVA MASSACRE: MAGYAR MISCALCULATION, SLOVAK GAIN Edita Bosak Cernova, formerly an independent municipality of Liptov county, today a suburb of Ruzomberok, played a key role in the Slovak national movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the hegemony of the Austrian Empire ended. The agreement opened the way for the ruling Magyar political forces in the Kingdom of Hungary to enforce their national interests without regard for the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities. Since this meant that no legal rights would be granted to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, the Slovaks in Northern Hungary found their political situation deteriorating over the next fifty years. Between 1905 and 1907, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a serious political and social crisis and also faced deeply divisive nationality problems as a result of the Compromise. This study will explore the role of the Cernova massacre in changing the direction of the Slovak national movement, in exposing the Magyar government's nationalities' policies both internally and abroad, and thus forcing the Magyars into a defensive position. With the passing of the Compromise in 1867, Magyar statesmen Ferenc Deak and J6szef Eotvos, crafted the Legislative Act 44/1868 on the Equality of the Nationalities, 1 commonly known as the Nationalities Law. Although this law was intended to satisfy the nationalities' yearning for equality, in actual fact it denied the equality of all the nationalities in Hungary except for the Croats, who were recognized as a separate nation. The preamble of the law clearly stated: " .... all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, in conformity with the 1 Torveny-czikk a nemzetisek egyenj ogus:ig t:irgy:iban. Magyar torvenyt:ir 10001895 . 1838-1 868 evi torvenyczikkek. (Budapest, I 896) 490-4, as cited in Milan Podrim avsky, " Slovaks in the Conditions of the Hungarian State at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Human Affairs, 9, I (1999), 45 . �8 SLOVAKIA Constitution and from the political point of view, create an indivisible unitary Hungarian (Magyar) nation, of which each citizen of the country, belonging to any nationality, is an equal member." 2 In effect, the equality of the citizens of the state as individuals, independent of their nationality, was proclaimed; but the equality of the nationalities of the old Kingdom of Hungary was not. The discriminatory character of the Nationality Law had serious ramifications for the Slovaks. As a result, in 1878 the Slovaks sent another deputation led by one of the heroes of the 1848 Revolution, Jozef M. Hurban, to Vienna requesting an independent Slovak territory.3 The emperor refused to meet with Hurban, and returned his Memorandum to him. This led to an escalation in Magyarization (assimilation into the Magyar language and culture) and legislation by Magyar political forces which sought to erode any remaining rights of the nationalities. Prior to 1867, the Slovak national movement had made considerable headway. In the early 1860's intellectuals accepted the language reforms which I.:udovit Stur had made in 1846, and which led 4 to the final codification of the Slovak language in 1851. The Slovak nationalists sought to win legal guarantees that would safeguard the Slovak national existence and sovereignty. Although they were unsuccessful in obtaining recognition for the Memorandum of 1861 and the Okolie (a Slovak territory), they did manage to create the cultural and literary organization Matica slovenska in 1863 in the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin and three Slovak gymnazia in the 1860s. The number of Slovak newspapers also expanded at this time. These achievements gave the Slovaks hope for bettering their political, social and economic situation in Hungary. It was short lived. With the signing of the A usgleich in 1867, these national developments came to a rapid end. The gymnazia were closed in 1874 and the Matica slovenska in 1875, with the state confiscating all of Matica 's property. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Kalman Tisza, announced at the sitting of the Diet that he did not know of "any Slovak nation" . Hungary.s m 2 Podrimavsky, " Slovaks ... ," 45. Anton Spiesz and Dusan Caplovic, Illustrated Slovak History (Wauconda, Ill inois: Bolchazy- Carducci Publi shers, 2006), 149. 4 Ludevi t Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej (Presporok, 1846; reprinted in Bratislava, 2006). 5 Milan Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov (Bratislava: Luc, 2003), 235. 3 �SLOVAKIA 9 The arrival of the government of Kalman Tisza in 1875 inaugurated a new period of oppression. The ruling Magyar circles were determined to strengthen the supremacy of national politics within the old Kingdom of Hungary vis-a-vis Vienna and also outside of the Monarchy, especially towards the Balkans. The virulent Magyarization policies of fifteen years of Tisza rule seriously hampered the ability of Slovaks to keep pace with their counterparts in other regions of Europe. The Slovak intelligentsia was continuously attacked and began to lose hope. The Hungarian government believed that the only solution to the nationality problem was assimilating the nonMagyar nations. Its Magyarization policies employed a variety of devices. The Magyar language was implemented at all levels of society, including from the pulpit. Various associations to help assimilate the nationalities 6 were established and also the local press was harnessed to ensure the Magyarization program would be effecttive and ensure the elimination of the Slovak language from public life. In terms of organized religion, both the authorities of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches practiced Magyarization in private, as well as in public. Slovak children attending Catholic schools were required to use the Magyar language. Slovak priests and teachers were persecuted for their national consciousness and participation in the Slovak national movement. 7 Slovak ministers and priests, who were known to be nationalists, were transferred from wealthier parishes to ones where the minister or priest, along with his flock, had . 8 to strugg Ie to survive. In 1878, the Slovenska narodna strana (Slovak National Party) announced it would boycott the elections to protest the discrimination suffered by the Slovaks. Not a single Slovak deputy was elected 6 Tisza' s gove rnment establi shed th e Magyar Educa tio nal League for Upper Hungary (FEMKE) in 1882 w ith its seat in the anci ent Slova k city of Nitra and the Educati onal League fo r Upper Hun ga ry (MT KE) in 1885 w ith its headquarters in Budapest, as we ll several j ourn als and news papers to aid in fi ghting th e g rowth of Slovak nati onal co nsc io usness. Podrimavsky, "S lova ks in the Co nditions of th e Hun gari an State . . . ," 4 7. 7 Ibid., 47-8. 8 Karel Kalal, Mad'arizacia. Obraz slovenske utrpenie. (Originall y publi shed in 1900, reprinted in Brati slava : Eko- ko nzult, 2006), 27. "The Sl ovak priest Moyses los t hi s parish in Lucky and th e Magyarone Smizar repl aced him ; the people sto pped go in g to church, th ey are bu ry in g their dead themselves, children are not be ing bapti zed, but no ne of th at moves either Smi za r, or " Fath er" Parvy. " �SLOVAKIA to the Diet in the elections of 1875 or 1878 . From this date until the early twentieth century, the Slovenska narodna strana followed a policy of political passivity and withdrew to the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin in Central Slovakia. They also brought with them their newspaper Slovenske narodne noviny (Slovak National News) from its previous home in Budapest. Two factors , one internal and the other external , were instrumental in activating the Martin nationalists at the turn of the century. First of all, the economic situation was depressed and created a climate of both social and political unrest. The gravity of this situation was described as late as 1914 in an article entitled "The Decline of Industry" 9 by the pro-Magyar, government-sponsored, newspaper Slovenske noviny , published in Budapest. Alongside this industrial problem was the failure of the agrarian sector to thrive as a result of several bad harvests. The result was a growth in anti-Semitism, as the Jews were blamed for the drop in agricultural prices. This was followed by the rise of a new Catholic, anti-Semitic, Hungarian political party: the Hungarian People's Party (Neppart) established by Ferdinand Zichy and its weekly Krest'an. ' 0 It should be pointed out that most Jews in Hungary tied their economic well-being to support for the Magyar ruling class. Another catalyst for Slovak patriots was the trial of Romanian nationalists in 1894 which helped bring together a coalition of nonMagyar nationalists. Recognizing their common goals and the advantage of solidarity, the nationalities came together for the first time in the Congress of Non-Hungarian Nations in Budapest in 1895 . The Congress sought national equality in conjunction with democratic demands for universal and secret manhood suffrage, and freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association for all the nationalities. An external factor which played a major role in ending political passivity was a new generation of university students who were 9 Dr. Adolf Phany, "Upado k priemys lu," Slovenske noviny, 14 January 1914, p. l . Robert W. Seton-Watso n, A Hislory of 1he Czechs and Slovaks (Londo n, 1943:, reprint ed., Hamden, CT, 1965) 27 1-2. See also Julius Popely, " Boj o liberalne cirkevnopoliticke reform y v Uhorsku a zaloze nie katolickej l' udovej strany," Hisloricky casopis 29, 6 ( 198 1), 85 7-70, and Julius Popely, "Yzt' ah medzi statom a cirkvou v posledn ej tretine 19. storocia a korene politi ckeho kl erikali zmu v Uhorsku," Historickestudie 24 ( 1980): 77 -96, and Owen V. Johnson, " Losing Faith : The Slova k Hungari an Constitutional Struggle, 1906-1914," Harvard Ukrainian S1udies, 22, I, ( 1998), 293-3 12. 10 �SLOVAKIA 11 either educated by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a Czech professor at Charles University in Prague, or who read his works while studying in Vienna and Budapest. As graduates and young professionals, they returned to Slovakia and spread Masaryk's ideas and teachings, his "Realist" program, and especially the concept of "drobna praca" (intensive work) . 11 On the advice of Masaryk, some of his students in 1898 established the journal Hlas (Voice). It preached the advantages of closer Czech and Slovak cooperation. This was enough to prompt the leadership of the old guard--the poet, writer, and editor of Ncirodne noviny, Svetozar Hurban Vajansky; Pavel Mudroii, party chair for the Slovenskci ncirodnci strana; Matus Dula, Ambro Pietor, and several others into protesting that the charges of political passivity levelled by Hlas editors Vavro Srobar and Pavel Blaho were unjust. A rift emerged between the older and younger generation. The elders felt the younger generation was neither respectful nor grateful for the sacrifices made by their elders in furthering the Slovak national movement. When Hlas ceased publication in 1904, there was a short respite. However, the demands of the young nationalists for a platform led to the publiccation of another journal, Prudy (Currents) in 1909. Milan Hodza, a young Budapest lawyer and publicist recognized that the Slovaks needed to become politically engaged and he put his energies into the building of a mass movement. In his newspaper Slovensky tyi dennik (Slovak Weekly) begun in 1903, Hodza tried to capture the Slovak peoples' interests and educate them in political activity. The young people rejected their elders' policy of political passivity. 11 Edita Bosak, "Czech-Slovak Relati ons and the Student Organisati on Detvan, 1882- I 91 4" in Slovak Polirics, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirsc hbaum (C leveland : Slovak Institute, 1983), 6-41. See also Ed ita Bosa k, "The Slovak National Movement, 184819 18" in Rejlecrions on Slovak Hisrory, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirschbaum and Anne C. Roman (Toronto: Sl ovak World Congress, 1987), 59-72 , and Edita Bosak, "T. G. Masaryk and th e Emerge nce of th e Hl as ist Move ment, 1898-1904", in J. M. Rydlo , ed, Milan S. Durica. Fesrschrift (Brati slava, 1995) 29-42. Edita Bosa k, " Slowakische Studentenorganisati onen in W ien, Prag und Budapes t und ihre Zusa mm enarbeit," in Wegenetz europiiischen Ceistes fl - Universitiiten und Studenten: Die Bedeutung studentischer Migrationen in Mittel - und Siidosteuropa vom 18. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Eds. Ri chard G. Plasc hka and Karlheinz Mac k (Muni ch: 1987), 162-1 82. �SLOVAKIA 12 Slovak politicians finally dropped their pass1v1ty before the Hungarian constitutional crisis in 1905-1906. Hungarian political circles noted this and their Magyarisation politics were stepped up and the persecution of Slovak nationalists reached their peak. On the eve of the 1905 elections, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza bluntly stated his position on the nationalities as follows : A cardinal condition for the enjoyment of rights by other nationalities is that the citizens of other nationalities should recognize unreservedly that this State is the Magyar State .... The Magyar nation has never given a binding promise to maintain the Law of Nationalities for all time, or not to alter it... when conditions change, and when we perceive that through this law we grant to our opponents rights against ourselves. 12 The policy of Magyarization continued to escalate at all government and religious levels, and to touch the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The Apponyi Education Acts of 1907 reiterated that teachers in religious schools were state employees, and, as such, had to be able to read, write, and teach in Magyar. Leading Magyar nationalists held firm to these views . There were even fears among government leaders that negotiations with the nationalities would derail the Magyar goal of a single national state. Tisza, in response to the fears expressed by Count Albert Apponyi, that he was negotiating with the Romanians, stated very clearly that he stood " ... on the basis of a single undivided Hungarian national state ... No Hungarian can hold any other position other than the position of a single Hungarian nation, creating a single united Hungarian national state. 13 As far as Tisza was concerned, this position was unassailable. These views were held by most of the Hungarian ruling circle and permeated throughout the administrative echelons and bureaucracy. Surprisingly, in the 1906 elections, six Slovaks from the Slovenska l'udova strana (Slovak People's Party) 14 and one from the Slovenska 12 R. W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar (New York : Howard Fertig, 1968), 45-6. 13 Kalman Tisza Slovenske noviny, 16 January 19 14, p. l. 14 The Slovenska /'udova strana had separated from Zichy's People' s Party, Neppart, in 1905 because the latter did not represent the Slovak peoples ' interests. 1 �SLOVAKIA 13 narodna strana (Slovak National Party) were elected. They demonstrated that a well-organized campaign, with emphasis on the needs of the peasants, was the way to attract votes. 15 However, the campaigners also pointed out that parties such as Neppart were not working in the interests of the Slovak peasants. Although this was a small win for the Slovak national movement (given their proportion of the population, the Slovaks should have had 40 seats in Parliament), its impact was significant enough that the Hungarian government expanded and increased the tempo of its Magyarization process. With hindsight it is clear that this political achievement was very much a milestone in the Slovak national movement. Slovak leaders, laymen as well as clergy, were now targeted in a stepped up campaign of persecution. 16 The Catholic Church's hierarchy, educated in the "great Magyar spirit," 17 was also actively involved in these persecutions . Even sermons had to be given in Magyar in completely Slovak parishes. Slovak priests who expressed national sentiments and used their own language in church were persecuted. Yet it was this Slovak clergy to which the people looked for guidance. The Slovak intelligentsia was very small, and as a result, both Roman Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers filled this gap. This form of Magyarization also attracted the attention of William Ritter, 18 a Swiss writer and artist. He published the details of the trial of Andrej Hlinka in Ruzomberok, October 26-November 6, 15 Ameri can Slovaks, in a sign of support and solidarity, had co llected $ I 0,000 and se nt it to the Slovak leadership back home to help defray electi on ex penses. The electi on of seven Slovaks to th e Hun ga ri an Parli ament, a first in history , was enthusiasti call y received as one Slovak Am erican decl ared "Our mon ey has been well spent. " In M. Mark Stolarik , Immig ration and Urban ization: The Slovak Experience, 1870- / 9 18 (New York: AM S Press, 1989), 194. 16 Several Slova k nati onali st leaders were now tri ed and convicted of " inciting aga inst the Magya r nati on" and sentenced to term s in prison: the Rev. Ferdi s Juriga, Dr. Vavro Srobar, the Rev. Andrej Hlinka, Milan Iva nka, etc. 17 Kuruc, Stefa n, " Katolicka cirkev na Slovenskom uze mi Uhorska na zaciatku 20. storocia," in My tus a realita, Stefan Kuci k, ed. (Rufo mberok : Katolicka uni versita v Rufo mberku, 2008), 6 1. 18 William Ritter ( I 867- I 955) was one of th e earli est and most creati ve of the foreign Sl ovakophiles who wrote about th e situati on faced by the Slovak s in the Hungari an part of the Dual Monarc hy of Austri a-H ungary. He pro tested aga inst Magyari zati on w ith others like th e Ru ssian Alexander Alexa ndrovic Papkov ( I 866-1920), the Scot Robert William Seton-Watson ( I 879- I 95 I), the Frenchm an Ernest Deni s ( 1849-1 92 1) and the No rweg ian Bj ornstjern e Bjorn son ( 1832- 19 10). �14 SLOVAKIA 1906 in the French Catholic magazine Demain. His article was read by officials in the Vatican and, as result, Hlinka was able to defend himself successfully from the Hungarian hierarchy' s accusations. 19 Ritter also published the letters of Hungarian bishops and Slovak priests in 1906 in Demain. He was a regular visitor to Slovakia from 1888 until 1947, and maintained a faithful and steadfast interest in the Slovaks until his death.20 Ritter had a vibrant correspondence with Slovakia's nationalists and greatest writers and poets, and through his publications pointed out to the western world the inhumane political, religious, social and cultural Magyarization of the Slovaks in the Kingdom Hungary. 21 Ritter was the first Slovakophile to expose the brutal sentiments expressed by the Magyar Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in 1905. In his article "Eveques hongrois et pretres slovaques" in the Lyons journal Demain politique, social, religieux,22 Ritter quoted Tisza as having stated "The law is dead for you Slovaks."23 Ritter had also published the harsh words of Tisza's father, Kalman Tisza, when he had been the head of government years earlier: "Slovaks should be crushed under the heel." 24 This Swiss humanitarian also expounded on Magyarization carried out in poor Slovak parish schools, in the theological seminaries and amongst Slovak priests . In fact, the fateful Cernova massacre simply confirmed the truth of Ritter's writings. Villagers in the small settlement of Cemova, in the diocese of Spis, had constructed a church mainly through the initiative and support of a local son, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka. Out of pride and gratitude, the citizens of Cemova, asked their bishop, Alexander Parvy, to allow Hlinka to consecrate the new church. 25 These people knew the importance of having one of their own sons fulfill this ceremony. Since Hlinka had been suspended from his priestly duties by Parvy because of his nationalist behavior, the people of Cemova requested a delay in consecration until such time as Hlinka could 19 Jozef M. Rydl o, " Sudny proces proti Andrejovi Hlinkovi v Rufo mberku 26. 106.11.1906 a obrana Slovakov proti mad 'arizacii perom William Rittera na strankach francu zskeho Demain", in Kucik, My tus a realita, 24. 20 Ibid. , 22 . 21 Ibid ., 23 . 22 Ibid ., 24. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 24. 25 Alexander Parvy was bishop of the Spis diocese from 1904 to 19 19. �SLOVAKIA 15 preside over it. The bishop refused. The political background leading up to this is important for, as F. S. Clarke, in a dispatch from the British Consul-General in Budapest reported to the Foreign Office, The parish priest at Rozsahegy (Ruiomberok) ... , named Hlinka ... , by his nationalist tendencies, has incurred the displeasure--not only of the civil, but also of the ecclesiastical authorities, and had, in December last, been sentenced to a fine and to two years for the incitement against the Magyar State idea '-- ... 26 Hlinka had been actively backing his friend Dr. Vavro Srobar during the election campaign, something which Parvy considered tantamount to political agitation against the Magyar state. Thus, in Hlinka's place, Parvy chose the Reverend Anton Klurimsky, a Magyarone, to consecrate the newly-built church, despite the objections of the people of Cemova. These sentiments had even been personally relayed to the bishop by deacon M. Pazurik. The bishop decided that the dedication ceremony would take place regardless of the objections voiced by the parishioners. A group of gendarmes and a magistrate from Ruzomberok were assigned to escort the priests to nearby Cemova, and to maintain law and order. Upon their arrival on 27 October 1907, the priests and the squad of gendarmes were greeted by the people of Cemova, who although passive, verbally berated them. According to eye-witness reports, the gendarmes, without any provocation, shot into the crowd gathered on the roadside, which was impeding their progress. The result was "nine dead immediately, three died the following day, one on the third day" 27 and by the 25 th of December all told there were fifteen dead. 28 Because it was feared that a revolt would follow , a contingent of Honveds (National Guards) was dispatched from Ruzomberok.29 The following day a series of arrests of so-called "agi26 F. S. Clarke to Sir Edward Goschen, Budapest, October 31 , 1907. Foreign Office Papers #371 , Pol. A-H , 1907 - # 196 fil e 36724, No. 58, (United Kingdom: Public Record Office) . 27 "Vrazdenie slovenseho l' udu v Cemovej", S/o vensky tyidennik, 1 November 1907, p. I. 28 Karol Sidor, Cerno va (/80 7- /937) (Bratislava: " Slovak", 1937), 35. 29 Ibid. , 32. �16 SLOVAKIA tators" 30 among the survivors began, one of whom was Hlinka's sister, fifty-five year old Anna Fullova. In all, there were 13 arrests. 3 1 The tragedy of Cernova did more than any other event to bring the Slovak problem before a national and international forum . Two Czech deputies, Silinger and Dr. Hruban, brought before the Reichsrat in Vienna an interpellation which requested the government "to ask for an official report on how this sad affair came about and if the guilty parties had been investigated and punished and to put it before them?" 32 The second part of the document " ... asked the Hungarian government, as the second component of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, to finally end similar persecution of the Slovak people and the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary." 33 Dr. Hruban stated most emphatically "that the Czech nation will think over very carefully if it can make an agreement with a state which so persecutes the Slovak nation and the other non-Magyar nationalities."34 During the debate on the Austro-Hungarian economic agreement before the Austrian Parliament, T.G. Masaryk took the opportunity to present his views: I turn to the nationality question. For us, who are here from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for us Czechs the Compromise had politico-national importance. You heard today in the interpellation about the events in Ruiomberok which the Agrarian speaker also spoke about. The matter is quite simple. We have two million Slovaks in Hungary who belong to our nation: a nation of eight million will not abandon two million of its brethren to Magyar national chauvinism. It is our duty here and at every opportunity in 30 Ibid., 35. Ibid. , 35. 32 Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Ha uses der Abgeordneten des oesterreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907. Haus der Abgeordneten - 30. Sitzung der XVIII. Sess ion am 30. October 1907, p. 3 I 79. "Dotaz". (London , UK: Briti sh Museum). (Hereafter, Protocol). 33 Protocol, p. 3179 34 "Cemovska vrazda na sneme," Slovensky tyi dennik, I November 190 7, p. 3. The agreement mentioned here refers to the new ten-year agreement between Austria and Hungary wh ich was about to be voted on by the Viennese Parliament. 31 �SLOVAKIA 17 this house to declare to Austria and the whole public that what the Magyars are doing to our Slovaks is inhumane. 35 The German Moravian representative Dr. Redlich also expressed his concern with the Magyarizing fervor in Hungary: I need not remind any of your Czech gentlemen of what is happening to the Slovaks in Hungary. Think not of Cernova alone; think of the whole process which led to it, the Hlinka trial, the Juriga trial /36 Later, the Czech deputy Dr. Zahradnik requested to know if the president of the Parliament intended to add the following to the protocol: " ... the expression of our deep regret and our deep sympathy not only for the unfortunate victims of Cernova but for all the nonMagyar nations who suffer under such great oppression. " 37 Deputy Gunther raised the hope that " ... the whole of civilized Europe, all who still have some feeling for human suffering will finally put themselves on the side of the great Norwegian poet. .. the whole world will find out what is hidden behind this Magyar liberalism ." 38 Gunther was referring to the poet and Nobel-prize winner Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who, the previous month, had delivered a speech criticizing the "Magyar humbug and ... oppression in the service of nationalistic thinking," 39 thus drawing the attention of Europe to its deeds. Bjornson had taken up the cudgel on Hungarian policy towards its nationalists with special reference to the Slovaks. Cernova gave him the opportunity to follow up with a long article in the Neue Freie Presse, describing at length the Magyarizing process. Needless to say, the above annoyed the Hungarian government but even greater was the upheaval caused by the writings of such wellknown foreign journalists as Henry Wickham Steed of The Times 40 (London), and the conversion of Scotus Viator to the Slovak cause. 35 Protocol, p. 2346. Protocol, p. 2365. 37 Protocol, p. 23 18. 38 Protocol, p. 2376. 39 Bjomstjerne Bjornson , Narodni listy, 23 October I 907, p. 2. 40 Scotus Viator was the pseudonym of R. W. Seton-Watson, the renowned Scots historian. Seton-Watson became acquai nted with the sociologist Anton Stefanek in 1906 in Vienna, and it was through Stefanek that he had the opportunity to learn the 36 �18 SLOVAKIA 41 In 1908, Scotus Viator published Racial Problems in Hungary, which dealt with the corruption of electoral practices and Magyarization in that country. It earned him his doctorate. Shortly after the first publication, the book was translated into several other European languages, including Czech . This book helped publicize the oppresssed condition of the Slovaks in Upper Hungary throughout the western world. The French press also adopted an inimical stance towards the Magyars . The Poles wrote in Swiat slowianski that: It is not necessary to have concern about our sympathy. We sympathize with all the p ersecuted. We are wholeheartedly on their side. No mistake is as outrageous as that which the Magyars are making when they p ersecute the Slovaks. The Magyar advance against the Slovaks will end badly for the Magyars, but the Slovaks will live on. 42 William Ritter, who was already writing and exposing the Slovaks' plight, added his voice to that of the others. The Slovak politician Milan Hodza made an interpellation in the Hungarian Parliament on the subject of Cernova only an hour after the proceedings of the Austrian Reichstag had become known to the Hungarian Parliament. Feeling amongst the Magyar deputies ran high . Hodza had barely begun to speak before he was rudely interrupted by a very rowdy assembly. His interpellation consisted of a request that the Minister of the Interior, Julius Andrassy, extend the investigation of the Cernova massacre to include an examination of the actions of the administrative official present at Cernova; then, secondly, to suspend the said official from his office on the basis of already known facts until such time as the investigation will have 43 been concluded; and finally, to withdraw the army from the village. facts about Magyari zati on and the oppresssion of the Slovaks and th e other nonMagyar peoples in Hungary. Ce rnova served to re info rce Seton-Watson' s views and he became a vigorous defender of the non-M agya r nationalities in the European ~ress, much to the ire and indignati on of the Hungari an government. 1 London: Archiba ld Constabl e, 1908; reprinted by Howa rd Ferti g, New York, 1972. 42 Swiat slowianski (Cracow, 1907), 12 and 375 , cited in Karo l Sidor, Cernova, 51 . 43 "Cernovska vrazda na sneme" Slo venskj tyi dennik, I November 1907 , p. 4. �SLOVAKIA 19 Julius Andrassy defended the priests as having gone to Cemova only to reassure the people that the consecration would not take place at that time, that the gendarmes had fired in self-defence, and finally, that Zoltan Pereszleny would not be suspended but that a fair investigation would be made.44 Andrassy, along with his colleagues, accused such newspapers as Slovensky tyidennik of "stirring the people to bloodshed." 45 Meanwhile, Hlinka continued his lecture tour of Moravia and Bohemia, acquainting the Czechs with Magyar policy and the events of Cemova. The massacre at Cemova served as a unifying force among the Czechs for the Slovak cause. Hlinka was greeted enthusiastically wherever he went. He was seen as a martyr, a representative of the whole Slovak nation. His speeches activated a far more systematic interest in the Slovaks than ever before exhibited by the Czechs. Slovensky obzor put it quite frankly: What Kalal, Masaryk, Heyduk after long years did not know how to achieve, that is what Cernova events did - in one night! In fact, Cernova even captured the interest of the heir presumptive Francis Ferdinand, who had deputy Milan Hodza inform him personally of the whole sequence of 46 events at the Cernova massacre. V In November of 1907 the Cardinal Primate of Hungary issued a circular in which he put the Eudove noviny on the Index of forbidden reading. Hlinka responded with a plea in the Brno Hlas (6 December 1907) to the Bohemian and Moravian clergy for support: ... the Magyar hierarchy has come down hard on us. They wish to suffocate Eudove noviny, the most Catholic of newspapers, with a clerical curse. I turn to the Moravian and Bohemian clergy today so that they may defend us. Do not let the strongest bastion of the faith and the Slovak language fall. The newspaper Eudove noviny is a substitute today for school. It is equally a catechism and a syllabus. Without it the Slovaks will die or will become a senseless 44 45 46 Ibid ., p.4. "Prijezd Andreje HI inky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. Slovensky obzor, 1907, 564 cited in Sidor, Cernova, 51. �SLOVAKIA 20 mass of slaves and helots .. . Me, they failed, my paper Eudove noviny they prosecute with clerical punishments! Protect our press! 47 His call did not go unheeded - the strength of the religious tie and the events of Cemova caused Czech and Moravian papers to write, urging Slovaks to continue to read Eudove noviny as a good Catholic newspaper. Arriving in Prague on 1 November 1907 in the company of A. Kolisek and J. Uprka, Hlinka was greeted by Czech leaders F. Taborsky, J. Rotnagl , Dr. Lang, and Dr. E. Krajicek, and a large number of students.48 On the 2 November 1907, he gave a speech on Slovansky ostrov which created such a stir that Ceskoslovanska jednota established a Ceskoslovensky komitet (Czechoslovak Committee) on the following day. Its function was to collect money to aid the orphans of Cemova49 and to organize the rest of Hlinka's lecture tours in the Czech Lands. Altogether, there were over 700 rallies on behalf of the Slovaks and Cemova. 50 Josef Anyz, editor-in-chief of Narodni listy, was elected chairman of the Committee with J. Rotnagl as secretary. Such a good working relationship between Anyz and Rotnagl grew out of the Committee that, according to Rotnagl , "whatever I went to N. listy 51 with some request from Cs/. Jednota, l was never turned down." Right after Cemova the number of Slovak evenings organized to acquaint the Czech public with the Slovaks and their culture increased dramatically, as did informative lectures on the same theme. Great speakers such as Pavel Blaho, Matus Dula, Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, Jozef I:udovit Hol'uby, I:udovit Medvecky, Anton Stefanek, Vavro Srobar, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, were invited by Jednota to speak to the people of Moravia and Bohemia. Czech newspapers touched the hearts of their reading public, calling for Czech financial support for the victims of Cemova: V 47 Hlas, 6 December 1907, cited in K. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka , p. 205. "Prijezd Andreje Hlinky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. 49 " Pomozte sirotkum po zavrazdenych v Cemove," Cas, XXI , o. 303 ( 1907), 5. 50 "Nasi bratia Ces i," Slovenky tyidennik, 27 March 1908, p. I. 51 "Narodni listy a slovenska vec," Rotn ag l Papers, Literarni archiv pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi, Prague. (He reafter, LA PNP). 48 �SLOVAKIA 21 At this difficult tim e it is our duty to help those .. . orphans, whose fath ers have fallen in def ense of the rights of the Slovak people against brutal violence. Let a collection be taken throughout the whole nation, the y ield of which will be dedicated to the unfortunate victims of Cernova as proof that Czechs and Slovaks f eel together both joy and grief 52 The success of the fund-raising was evident in the letter of 8 August 1908 from Anton Stefanek to Seton-Watson: "We have the whole Czech people behind us. During the last year the Czech people have raised a fund of 80,000 Crowns for us under the influence of Cemova." 53 Seton-Watson received a full report on Cemova and the imprisonment of Hlinka for "incitement against the Magyar nation" 54 from Stefanek. This caused him to write a letter to the London Spectator, describing all the events and he referred to them "as a typical example of the oppression of the Slovaks." 55 The result was a response from Count Esterhazy defending the Magyar position, followed by a scathing rebuttal from Seton-Watson in the Spectator and Manchester Guardian. The Times editor, Wickham Steed, was particularly gleeful when he read them and wrote to Seton-Watson: "The reply to Esterhazy is the best bit of pulverization I have seen anywhere. It made me green with envy for the whole day. Talk about sledgehammers! You are a steamroller when you get going." 56 Czech-Slovak relations drew closer in 1907 when Antonin Reis, a member of Ceskoslovanska j ednota suggested to Pavel Blaho, that now would be a good time to establish an informative journal on Slovakia, especially for the Czech readership. 57 Thus was born Nase Slovensko , short-lived from 1907 to 1910, but important because it 52 " Hunove vrazdi ," Cas, No. 300 ( 1907), p. I . Hugh Seton-Watson, "Anton Stefanek and R. W. Seton-Watson," Bohemia Jahrbuch des Co /legium Carolin um, 18 ( 1977), 236. 54 Jan Ryc hlfk, Thomas D. Marzik, Mi ros lav Bie lik, eds. R. W. Seton-Watson and his Relations with the Czechs and the Slovaks, I, (Prague: Ostav T. G. Masaryka and Martin : Matica slovenska, 1995), 22 55 Rychlfk, et a l. , 22. 56 Ryc hlfk, et al. , p. 139. 57 Antonin Reis, Letter to P. Blaho, 8 March 1907, Blaho Papers (Slovak State Archi ves, Bratislava, hereafter SSUA), Carton 12, Signature Bll-98. The same letter was sent to other prominent Slovaks introduc ing the plan to fo und this journal and seeking support. 53 �22 SLOVAKIA gave the young Slovak generation the motivation to seek other ways of saving themselves from the oppression of the Magyars. They became more engaged in the Slovak national movement and were able to test their skills through such vehicles as Nase Slovensko and later Prudy. It also distanced them from the old generation in Martin who continued to believe that only the Russians could save them from the Magyars. American Slovaks also became very outspoken about the situation in Slovakia. From the late 1860s to the late l 880's, American Slovaks had been more concerned with survival in their new homeland and saving their money to send home to their families . By the late 1890s and early 1900s, they had acclimatized to their new democracy and created self-help associations and newspapers indicative of a maturing Slovak national consciousness. The persecution of Hlinka in connection with the pre-election agitation in 1906 was brought to the attention of the American Slovak public by the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek. 58 The result was an open letter in the newspaper Eudove noviny written by Slovak priests working in America. Collections were organized as a result of the persecution during the elections of 1906, and once this precedent was set a similar procedure was followed to aid Cernova victims. A direct result of the persecution of Hlinka and the other Slovak representatives resulted in the emergence of the Union of Slovak Journalists and the Slovak League of America.59 A very impassioned message "For the Cernova Widows and Orphans," to all Slovaks was written by Furdek in his weekly Jednota, on 7 November 1907: They won't frighten us; our truth will not go begging crumbs from the tyrant. If it 's a fight they want, then a fight they will get; we are not afraid of it .. . Now, when we have the attention of the world, we must prove to the world that we stand together like a strong chain ... A bloody battle has begun in Cernova! Our sacred duty is to financially and morally support the struggle, which will determine whether 58 Stefan Furdek was the founder of The First Cath olic Slovak Union ( 1890) and th e Slovak League of America ( I 907). 59 Stefan Kucik, "Ohlas prenasledovania Andreja Hlinku a Cemovskej tragedie medzi Americkymi Slovakmi", in Kucik, Mytus a Realita, 115. �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slovak nation will exist or not exist in its ancient homeland. 60 With the passing of time, the furor created around Cernova abated. However, the actions of the Magyar authorities in bringing to trial those persons arrested on that tragic day, served to re-awaken interest in various camps. Both Czech and Slovak newspapers reported on the proceedings of the trial, but the Slovak newspaper Narodnie noviny gave its readers a daily account which lasted from the 2 nd to the 10 th of March in 1908. Altogether forty men and women were sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. 61 Cernova was in some ways a catalyst, not just on home ground but in Bohemia and Moravia and internationally. Slovaks in America also rallied and sought to acquaint their government of the situation in the homeland. What the Magyars had probably thought was an insignificant consecration and sign of Slovak thick-headedness turned into a cause celebre. The Magyars never expected this event to attract such attention and greatly miscalculated the damage this would cause them in the eyes of Europe. Men like Count Esterhazy never expected to find themselves having to defend Magyar racial policies, all because of an insignificant village like Cernova and a "people who did not exist," 62 according to Magyar politicians! In many ways, Cernova helped the Slovaks both in Slovakia and in America to unite and to begin thinking of alternatives to the rule of the Hungarian government and its Magyarizing policies. 60 Stefan Furdek, "Pre vdovy a siroty ce m ovske" quoted in Kucik, I 16-1 7. V. H., Cernovsky process (Turciansky Sv. Martin : Knihtl ac iarskeho ucas tinarskeho spolku, I 908), 72 . 62 Bela Grun wa ld, A felv idek, in Duri ca, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, 238. Grunwa ld wrote in 1887 that there were Slovak speak ing-inhabi tants in Hungary but there was no Slovak nation. 61 � SLOVAKIA 7 THE CERNOVA MASSACRE: MAGYAR MISCALCULATION, SLOVAK GAIN Edita Bosak Cernova, formerly an independent municipality of Liptov county, today a suburb of Ruzomberok, played a key role in the Slovak national movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the hegemony of the Austrian Empire ended. The agreement opened the way for the ruling Magyar political forces in the Kingdom of Hungary to enforce their national interests without regard for the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities. Since this meant that no legal rights would be granted to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, the Slovaks in Northern Hungary found their political situation deteriorating over the next fifty years. Between 1905 and 1907, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a serious political and social crisis and also faced deeply divisive nationality problems as a result of the Compromise. This study will explore the role of the Cernova massacre in changing the direction of the Slovak national movement, in exposing the Magyar government's nationalities' policies both internally and abroad, and thus forcing the Magyars into a defensive position. With the passing of the Compromise in 1867, Magyar statesmen Ferenc Deak and J6szef Eotvos, crafted the Legislative Act 44/1868 on the Equality of the Nationalities, 1 commonly known as the Nationalities Law. Although this law was intended to satisfy the nationalities' yearning for equality, in actual fact it denied the equality of all the nationalities in Hungary except for the Croats, who were recognized as a separate nation. The preamble of the law clearly stated: " .... all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, in conformity with the 1 Torveny-czikk a nemzetisek egyenj ogus:ig t:irgy:iban. Magyar torvenyt:ir 10001895 . 1838-1 868 evi torvenyczikkek. (Budapest, I 896) 490-4, as cited in Milan Podrim avsky, " Slovaks in the Conditions of the Hungarian State at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Human Affairs, 9, I (1999), 45 . �8 SLOVAKIA Constitution and from the political point of view, create an indivisible unitary Hungarian (Magyar) nation, of which each citizen of the country, belonging to any nationality, is an equal member." 2 In effect, the equality of the citizens of the state as individuals, independent of their nationality, was proclaimed; but the equality of the nationalities of the old Kingdom of Hungary was not. The discriminatory character of the Nationality Law had serious ramifications for the Slovaks. As a result, in 1878 the Slovaks sent another deputation led by one of the heroes of the 1848 Revolution, Jozef M. Hurban, to Vienna requesting an independent Slovak territory.3 The emperor refused to meet with Hurban, and returned his Memorandum to him. This led to an escalation in Magyarization (assimilation into the Magyar language and culture) and legislation by Magyar political forces which sought to erode any remaining rights of the nationalities. Prior to 1867, the Slovak national movement had made considerable headway. In the early 1860's intellectuals accepted the language reforms which I.:udovit Stur had made in 1846, and which led 4 to the final codification of the Slovak language in 1851. The Slovak nationalists sought to win legal guarantees that would safeguard the Slovak national existence and sovereignty. Although they were unsuccessful in obtaining recognition for the Memorandum of 1861 and the Okolie (a Slovak territory), they did manage to create the cultural and literary organization Matica slovenska in 1863 in the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin and three Slovak gymnazia in the 1860s. The number of Slovak newspapers also expanded at this time. These achievements gave the Slovaks hope for bettering their political, social and economic situation in Hungary. It was short lived. With the signing of the A usgleich in 1867, these national developments came to a rapid end. The gymnazia were closed in 1874 and the Matica slovenska in 1875, with the state confiscating all of Matica 's property. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Kalman Tisza, announced at the sitting of the Diet that he did not know of "any Slovak nation" . Hungary.s m 2 Podrimavsky, " Slovaks ... ," 45. Anton Spiesz and Dusan Caplovic, Illustrated Slovak History (Wauconda, Ill inois: Bolchazy- Carducci Publi shers, 2006), 149. 4 Ludevi t Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej (Presporok, 1846; reprinted in Bratislava, 2006). 5 Milan Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov (Bratislava: Luc, 2003), 235. 3 �SLOVAKIA 9 The arrival of the government of Kalman Tisza in 1875 inaugurated a new period of oppression. The ruling Magyar circles were determined to strengthen the supremacy of national politics within the old Kingdom of Hungary vis-a-vis Vienna and also outside of the Monarchy, especially towards the Balkans. The virulent Magyarization policies of fifteen years of Tisza rule seriously hampered the ability of Slovaks to keep pace with their counterparts in other regions of Europe. The Slovak intelligentsia was continuously attacked and began to lose hope. The Hungarian government believed that the only solution to the nationality problem was assimilating the nonMagyar nations. Its Magyarization policies employed a variety of devices. The Magyar language was implemented at all levels of society, including from the pulpit. Various associations to help assimilate the nationalities 6 were established and also the local press was harnessed to ensure the Magyarization program would be effecttive and ensure the elimination of the Slovak language from public life. In terms of organized religion, both the authorities of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches practiced Magyarization in private, as well as in public. Slovak children attending Catholic schools were required to use the Magyar language. Slovak priests and teachers were persecuted for their national consciousness and participation in the Slovak national movement. 7 Slovak ministers and priests, who were known to be nationalists, were transferred from wealthier parishes to ones where the minister or priest, along with his flock, had . 8 to strugg Ie to survive. In 1878, the Slovenska narodna strana (Slovak National Party) announced it would boycott the elections to protest the discrimination suffered by the Slovaks. Not a single Slovak deputy was elected 6 Tisza' s gove rnment establi shed th e Magyar Educa tio nal League for Upper Hungary (FEMKE) in 1882 w ith its seat in the anci ent Slova k city of Nitra and the Educati onal League fo r Upper Hun ga ry (MT KE) in 1885 w ith its headquarters in Budapest, as we ll several j ourn als and news papers to aid in fi ghting th e g rowth of Slovak nati onal co nsc io usness. Podrimavsky, "S lova ks in the Co nditions of th e Hun gari an State . . . ," 4 7. 7 Ibid., 47-8. 8 Karel Kalal, Mad'arizacia. Obraz slovenske utrpenie. (Originall y publi shed in 1900, reprinted in Brati slava : Eko- ko nzult, 2006), 27. "The Sl ovak priest Moyses los t hi s parish in Lucky and th e Magyarone Smizar repl aced him ; the people sto pped go in g to church, th ey are bu ry in g their dead themselves, children are not be ing bapti zed, but no ne of th at moves either Smi za r, or " Fath er" Parvy. " �SLOVAKIA to the Diet in the elections of 1875 or 1878 . From this date until the early twentieth century, the Slovenska narodna strana followed a policy of political passivity and withdrew to the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin in Central Slovakia. They also brought with them their newspaper Slovenske narodne noviny (Slovak National News) from its previous home in Budapest. Two factors , one internal and the other external , were instrumental in activating the Martin nationalists at the turn of the century. First of all, the economic situation was depressed and created a climate of both social and political unrest. The gravity of this situation was described as late as 1914 in an article entitled "The Decline of Industry" 9 by the pro-Magyar, government-sponsored, newspaper Slovenske noviny , published in Budapest. Alongside this industrial problem was the failure of the agrarian sector to thrive as a result of several bad harvests. The result was a growth in anti-Semitism, as the Jews were blamed for the drop in agricultural prices. This was followed by the rise of a new Catholic, anti-Semitic, Hungarian political party: the Hungarian People's Party (Neppart) established by Ferdinand Zichy and its weekly Krest'an. ' 0 It should be pointed out that most Jews in Hungary tied their economic well-being to support for the Magyar ruling class. Another catalyst for Slovak patriots was the trial of Romanian nationalists in 1894 which helped bring together a coalition of nonMagyar nationalists. Recognizing their common goals and the advantage of solidarity, the nationalities came together for the first time in the Congress of Non-Hungarian Nations in Budapest in 1895 . The Congress sought national equality in conjunction with democratic demands for universal and secret manhood suffrage, and freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association for all the nationalities. An external factor which played a major role in ending political passivity was a new generation of university students who were 9 Dr. Adolf Phany, "Upado k priemys lu," Slovenske noviny, 14 January 1914, p. l . Robert W. Seton-Watso n, A Hislory of 1he Czechs and Slovaks (Londo n, 1943:, reprint ed., Hamden, CT, 1965) 27 1-2. See also Julius Popely, " Boj o liberalne cirkevnopoliticke reform y v Uhorsku a zaloze nie katolickej l' udovej strany," Hisloricky casopis 29, 6 ( 198 1), 85 7-70, and Julius Popely, "Yzt' ah medzi statom a cirkvou v posledn ej tretine 19. storocia a korene politi ckeho kl erikali zmu v Uhorsku," Historickestudie 24 ( 1980): 77 -96, and Owen V. Johnson, " Losing Faith : The Slova k Hungari an Constitutional Struggle, 1906-1914," Harvard Ukrainian S1udies, 22, I, ( 1998), 293-3 12. 10 �SLOVAKIA 11 either educated by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a Czech professor at Charles University in Prague, or who read his works while studying in Vienna and Budapest. As graduates and young professionals, they returned to Slovakia and spread Masaryk's ideas and teachings, his "Realist" program, and especially the concept of "drobna praca" (intensive work) . 11 On the advice of Masaryk, some of his students in 1898 established the journal Hlas (Voice). It preached the advantages of closer Czech and Slovak cooperation. This was enough to prompt the leadership of the old guard--the poet, writer, and editor of Ncirodne noviny, Svetozar Hurban Vajansky; Pavel Mudroii, party chair for the Slovenskci ncirodnci strana; Matus Dula, Ambro Pietor, and several others into protesting that the charges of political passivity levelled by Hlas editors Vavro Srobar and Pavel Blaho were unjust. A rift emerged between the older and younger generation. The elders felt the younger generation was neither respectful nor grateful for the sacrifices made by their elders in furthering the Slovak national movement. When Hlas ceased publication in 1904, there was a short respite. However, the demands of the young nationalists for a platform led to the publiccation of another journal, Prudy (Currents) in 1909. Milan Hodza, a young Budapest lawyer and publicist recognized that the Slovaks needed to become politically engaged and he put his energies into the building of a mass movement. In his newspaper Slovensky tyi dennik (Slovak Weekly) begun in 1903, Hodza tried to capture the Slovak peoples' interests and educate them in political activity. The young people rejected their elders' policy of political passivity. 11 Edita Bosak, "Czech-Slovak Relati ons and the Student Organisati on Detvan, 1882- I 91 4" in Slovak Polirics, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirsc hbaum (C leveland : Slovak Institute, 1983), 6-41. See also Ed ita Bosa k, "The Slovak National Movement, 184819 18" in Rejlecrions on Slovak Hisrory, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirschbaum and Anne C. Roman (Toronto: Sl ovak World Congress, 1987), 59-72 , and Edita Bosak, "T. G. Masaryk and th e Emerge nce of th e Hl as ist Move ment, 1898-1904", in J. M. Rydlo , ed, Milan S. Durica. Fesrschrift (Brati slava, 1995) 29-42. Edita Bosa k, " Slowakische Studentenorganisati onen in W ien, Prag und Budapes t und ihre Zusa mm enarbeit," in Wegenetz europiiischen Ceistes fl - Universitiiten und Studenten: Die Bedeutung studentischer Migrationen in Mittel - und Siidosteuropa vom 18. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Eds. Ri chard G. Plasc hka and Karlheinz Mac k (Muni ch: 1987), 162-1 82. �SLOVAKIA 12 Slovak politicians finally dropped their pass1v1ty before the Hungarian constitutional crisis in 1905-1906. Hungarian political circles noted this and their Magyarisation politics were stepped up and the persecution of Slovak nationalists reached their peak. On the eve of the 1905 elections, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza bluntly stated his position on the nationalities as follows : A cardinal condition for the enjoyment of rights by other nationalities is that the citizens of other nationalities should recognize unreservedly that this State is the Magyar State .... The Magyar nation has never given a binding promise to maintain the Law of Nationalities for all time, or not to alter it... when conditions change, and when we perceive that through this law we grant to our opponents rights against ourselves. 12 The policy of Magyarization continued to escalate at all government and religious levels, and to touch the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The Apponyi Education Acts of 1907 reiterated that teachers in religious schools were state employees, and, as such, had to be able to read, write, and teach in Magyar. Leading Magyar nationalists held firm to these views . There were even fears among government leaders that negotiations with the nationalities would derail the Magyar goal of a single national state. Tisza, in response to the fears expressed by Count Albert Apponyi, that he was negotiating with the Romanians, stated very clearly that he stood " ... on the basis of a single undivided Hungarian national state ... No Hungarian can hold any other position other than the position of a single Hungarian nation, creating a single united Hungarian national state. 13 As far as Tisza was concerned, this position was unassailable. These views were held by most of the Hungarian ruling circle and permeated throughout the administrative echelons and bureaucracy. Surprisingly, in the 1906 elections, six Slovaks from the Slovenska l'udova strana (Slovak People's Party) 14 and one from the Slovenska 12 R. W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar (New York : Howard Fertig, 1968), 45-6. 13 Kalman Tisza Slovenske noviny, 16 January 19 14, p. l. 14 The Slovenska /'udova strana had separated from Zichy's People' s Party, Neppart, in 1905 because the latter did not represent the Slovak peoples ' interests. 1 �SLOVAKIA 13 narodna strana (Slovak National Party) were elected. They demonstrated that a well-organized campaign, with emphasis on the needs of the peasants, was the way to attract votes. 15 However, the campaigners also pointed out that parties such as Neppart were not working in the interests of the Slovak peasants. Although this was a small win for the Slovak national movement (given their proportion of the population, the Slovaks should have had 40 seats in Parliament), its impact was significant enough that the Hungarian government expanded and increased the tempo of its Magyarization process. With hindsight it is clear that this political achievement was very much a milestone in the Slovak national movement. Slovak leaders, laymen as well as clergy, were now targeted in a stepped up campaign of persecution. 16 The Catholic Church's hierarchy, educated in the "great Magyar spirit," 17 was also actively involved in these persecutions . Even sermons had to be given in Magyar in completely Slovak parishes. Slovak priests who expressed national sentiments and used their own language in church were persecuted. Yet it was this Slovak clergy to which the people looked for guidance. The Slovak intelligentsia was very small, and as a result, both Roman Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers filled this gap. This form of Magyarization also attracted the attention of William Ritter, 18 a Swiss writer and artist. He published the details of the trial of Andrej Hlinka in Ruzomberok, October 26-November 6, 15 Ameri can Slovaks, in a sign of support and solidarity, had co llected $ I 0,000 and se nt it to the Slovak leadership back home to help defray electi on ex penses. The electi on of seven Slovaks to th e Hun ga ri an Parli ament, a first in history , was enthusiasti call y received as one Slovak Am erican decl ared "Our mon ey has been well spent. " In M. Mark Stolarik , Immig ration and Urban ization: The Slovak Experience, 1870- / 9 18 (New York: AM S Press, 1989), 194. 16 Several Slova k nati onali st leaders were now tri ed and convicted of " inciting aga inst the Magya r nati on" and sentenced to term s in prison: the Rev. Ferdi s Juriga, Dr. Vavro Srobar, the Rev. Andrej Hlinka, Milan Iva nka, etc. 17 Kuruc, Stefa n, " Katolicka cirkev na Slovenskom uze mi Uhorska na zaciatku 20. storocia," in My tus a realita, Stefan Kuci k, ed. (Rufo mberok : Katolicka uni versita v Rufo mberku, 2008), 6 1. 18 William Ritter ( I 867- I 955) was one of th e earli est and most creati ve of the foreign Sl ovakophiles who wrote about th e situati on faced by the Slovak s in the Hungari an part of the Dual Monarc hy of Austri a-H ungary. He pro tested aga inst Magyari zati on w ith others like th e Ru ssian Alexander Alexa ndrovic Papkov ( I 866-1920), the Scot Robert William Seton-Watson ( I 879- I 95 I), the Frenchm an Ernest Deni s ( 1849-1 92 1) and the No rweg ian Bj ornstjern e Bjorn son ( 1832- 19 10). �14 SLOVAKIA 1906 in the French Catholic magazine Demain. His article was read by officials in the Vatican and, as result, Hlinka was able to defend himself successfully from the Hungarian hierarchy' s accusations. 19 Ritter also published the letters of Hungarian bishops and Slovak priests in 1906 in Demain. He was a regular visitor to Slovakia from 1888 until 1947, and maintained a faithful and steadfast interest in the Slovaks until his death.20 Ritter had a vibrant correspondence with Slovakia's nationalists and greatest writers and poets, and through his publications pointed out to the western world the inhumane political, religious, social and cultural Magyarization of the Slovaks in the Kingdom Hungary. 21 Ritter was the first Slovakophile to expose the brutal sentiments expressed by the Magyar Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in 1905. In his article "Eveques hongrois et pretres slovaques" in the Lyons journal Demain politique, social, religieux,22 Ritter quoted Tisza as having stated "The law is dead for you Slovaks."23 Ritter had also published the harsh words of Tisza's father, Kalman Tisza, when he had been the head of government years earlier: "Slovaks should be crushed under the heel." 24 This Swiss humanitarian also expounded on Magyarization carried out in poor Slovak parish schools, in the theological seminaries and amongst Slovak priests . In fact, the fateful Cernova massacre simply confirmed the truth of Ritter's writings. Villagers in the small settlement of Cemova, in the diocese of Spis, had constructed a church mainly through the initiative and support of a local son, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka. Out of pride and gratitude, the citizens of Cemova, asked their bishop, Alexander Parvy, to allow Hlinka to consecrate the new church. 25 These people knew the importance of having one of their own sons fulfill this ceremony. Since Hlinka had been suspended from his priestly duties by Parvy because of his nationalist behavior, the people of Cemova requested a delay in consecration until such time as Hlinka could 19 Jozef M. Rydl o, " Sudny proces proti Andrejovi Hlinkovi v Rufo mberku 26. 106.11.1906 a obrana Slovakov proti mad 'arizacii perom William Rittera na strankach francu zskeho Demain", in Kucik, My tus a realita, 24. 20 Ibid. , 22 . 21 Ibid ., 23 . 22 Ibid ., 24. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 24. 25 Alexander Parvy was bishop of the Spis diocese from 1904 to 19 19. �SLOVAKIA 15 preside over it. The bishop refused. The political background leading up to this is important for, as F. S. Clarke, in a dispatch from the British Consul-General in Budapest reported to the Foreign Office, The parish priest at Rozsahegy (Ruiomberok) ... , named Hlinka ... , by his nationalist tendencies, has incurred the displeasure--not only of the civil, but also of the ecclesiastical authorities, and had, in December last, been sentenced to a fine and to two years for the incitement against the Magyar State idea '-- ... 26 Hlinka had been actively backing his friend Dr. Vavro Srobar during the election campaign, something which Parvy considered tantamount to political agitation against the Magyar state. Thus, in Hlinka's place, Parvy chose the Reverend Anton Klurimsky, a Magyarone, to consecrate the newly-built church, despite the objections of the people of Cemova. These sentiments had even been personally relayed to the bishop by deacon M. Pazurik. The bishop decided that the dedication ceremony would take place regardless of the objections voiced by the parishioners. A group of gendarmes and a magistrate from Ruzomberok were assigned to escort the priests to nearby Cemova, and to maintain law and order. Upon their arrival on 27 October 1907, the priests and the squad of gendarmes were greeted by the people of Cemova, who although passive, verbally berated them. According to eye-witness reports, the gendarmes, without any provocation, shot into the crowd gathered on the roadside, which was impeding their progress. The result was "nine dead immediately, three died the following day, one on the third day" 27 and by the 25 th of December all told there were fifteen dead. 28 Because it was feared that a revolt would follow , a contingent of Honveds (National Guards) was dispatched from Ruzomberok.29 The following day a series of arrests of so-called "agi26 F. S. Clarke to Sir Edward Goschen, Budapest, October 31 , 1907. Foreign Office Papers #371 , Pol. A-H , 1907 - # 196 fil e 36724, No. 58, (United Kingdom: Public Record Office) . 27 "Vrazdenie slovenseho l' udu v Cemovej", S/o vensky tyidennik, 1 November 1907, p. I. 28 Karol Sidor, Cerno va (/80 7- /937) (Bratislava: " Slovak", 1937), 35. 29 Ibid. , 32. �16 SLOVAKIA tators" 30 among the survivors began, one of whom was Hlinka's sister, fifty-five year old Anna Fullova. In all, there were 13 arrests. 3 1 The tragedy of Cernova did more than any other event to bring the Slovak problem before a national and international forum . Two Czech deputies, Silinger and Dr. Hruban, brought before the Reichsrat in Vienna an interpellation which requested the government "to ask for an official report on how this sad affair came about and if the guilty parties had been investigated and punished and to put it before them?" 32 The second part of the document " ... asked the Hungarian government, as the second component of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, to finally end similar persecution of the Slovak people and the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary." 33 Dr. Hruban stated most emphatically "that the Czech nation will think over very carefully if it can make an agreement with a state which so persecutes the Slovak nation and the other non-Magyar nationalities."34 During the debate on the Austro-Hungarian economic agreement before the Austrian Parliament, T.G. Masaryk took the opportunity to present his views: I turn to the nationality question. For us, who are here from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for us Czechs the Compromise had politico-national importance. You heard today in the interpellation about the events in Ruiomberok which the Agrarian speaker also spoke about. The matter is quite simple. We have two million Slovaks in Hungary who belong to our nation: a nation of eight million will not abandon two million of its brethren to Magyar national chauvinism. It is our duty here and at every opportunity in 30 Ibid., 35. Ibid. , 35. 32 Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Ha uses der Abgeordneten des oesterreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907. Haus der Abgeordneten - 30. Sitzung der XVIII. Sess ion am 30. October 1907, p. 3 I 79. "Dotaz". (London , UK: Briti sh Museum). (Hereafter, Protocol). 33 Protocol, p. 3179 34 "Cemovska vrazda na sneme," Slovensky tyi dennik, I November 190 7, p. 3. The agreement mentioned here refers to the new ten-year agreement between Austria and Hungary wh ich was about to be voted on by the Viennese Parliament. 31 �SLOVAKIA 17 this house to declare to Austria and the whole public that what the Magyars are doing to our Slovaks is inhumane. 35 The German Moravian representative Dr. Redlich also expressed his concern with the Magyarizing fervor in Hungary: I need not remind any of your Czech gentlemen of what is happening to the Slovaks in Hungary. Think not of Cernova alone; think of the whole process which led to it, the Hlinka trial, the Juriga trial /36 Later, the Czech deputy Dr. Zahradnik requested to know if the president of the Parliament intended to add the following to the protocol: " ... the expression of our deep regret and our deep sympathy not only for the unfortunate victims of Cernova but for all the nonMagyar nations who suffer under such great oppression. " 37 Deputy Gunther raised the hope that " ... the whole of civilized Europe, all who still have some feeling for human suffering will finally put themselves on the side of the great Norwegian poet. .. the whole world will find out what is hidden behind this Magyar liberalism ." 38 Gunther was referring to the poet and Nobel-prize winner Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who, the previous month, had delivered a speech criticizing the "Magyar humbug and ... oppression in the service of nationalistic thinking," 39 thus drawing the attention of Europe to its deeds. Bjornson had taken up the cudgel on Hungarian policy towards its nationalists with special reference to the Slovaks. Cernova gave him the opportunity to follow up with a long article in the Neue Freie Presse, describing at length the Magyarizing process. Needless to say, the above annoyed the Hungarian government but even greater was the upheaval caused by the writings of such wellknown foreign journalists as Henry Wickham Steed of The Times 40 (London), and the conversion of Scotus Viator to the Slovak cause. 35 Protocol, p. 2346. Protocol, p. 2365. 37 Protocol, p. 23 18. 38 Protocol, p. 2376. 39 Bjomstjerne Bjornson , Narodni listy, 23 October I 907, p. 2. 40 Scotus Viator was the pseudonym of R. W. Seton-Watson, the renowned Scots historian. Seton-Watson became acquai nted with the sociologist Anton Stefanek in 1906 in Vienna, and it was through Stefanek that he had the opportunity to learn the 36 �18 SLOVAKIA 41 In 1908, Scotus Viator published Racial Problems in Hungary, which dealt with the corruption of electoral practices and Magyarization in that country. It earned him his doctorate. Shortly after the first publication, the book was translated into several other European languages, including Czech . This book helped publicize the oppresssed condition of the Slovaks in Upper Hungary throughout the western world. The French press also adopted an inimical stance towards the Magyars . The Poles wrote in Swiat slowianski that: It is not necessary to have concern about our sympathy. We sympathize with all the p ersecuted. We are wholeheartedly on their side. No mistake is as outrageous as that which the Magyars are making when they p ersecute the Slovaks. The Magyar advance against the Slovaks will end badly for the Magyars, but the Slovaks will live on. 42 William Ritter, who was already writing and exposing the Slovaks' plight, added his voice to that of the others. The Slovak politician Milan Hodza made an interpellation in the Hungarian Parliament on the subject of Cernova only an hour after the proceedings of the Austrian Reichstag had become known to the Hungarian Parliament. Feeling amongst the Magyar deputies ran high . Hodza had barely begun to speak before he was rudely interrupted by a very rowdy assembly. His interpellation consisted of a request that the Minister of the Interior, Julius Andrassy, extend the investigation of the Cernova massacre to include an examination of the actions of the administrative official present at Cernova; then, secondly, to suspend the said official from his office on the basis of already known facts until such time as the investigation will have 43 been concluded; and finally, to withdraw the army from the village. facts about Magyari zati on and the oppresssion of the Slovaks and th e other nonMagyar peoples in Hungary. Ce rnova served to re info rce Seton-Watson' s views and he became a vigorous defender of the non-M agya r nationalities in the European ~ress, much to the ire and indignati on of the Hungari an government. 1 London: Archiba ld Constabl e, 1908; reprinted by Howa rd Ferti g, New York, 1972. 42 Swiat slowianski (Cracow, 1907), 12 and 375 , cited in Karo l Sidor, Cernova, 51 . 43 "Cernovska vrazda na sneme" Slo venskj tyi dennik, I November 1907 , p. 4. �SLOVAKIA 19 Julius Andrassy defended the priests as having gone to Cemova only to reassure the people that the consecration would not take place at that time, that the gendarmes had fired in self-defence, and finally, that Zoltan Pereszleny would not be suspended but that a fair investigation would be made.44 Andrassy, along with his colleagues, accused such newspapers as Slovensky tyidennik of "stirring the people to bloodshed." 45 Meanwhile, Hlinka continued his lecture tour of Moravia and Bohemia, acquainting the Czechs with Magyar policy and the events of Cemova. The massacre at Cemova served as a unifying force among the Czechs for the Slovak cause. Hlinka was greeted enthusiastically wherever he went. He was seen as a martyr, a representative of the whole Slovak nation. His speeches activated a far more systematic interest in the Slovaks than ever before exhibited by the Czechs. Slovensky obzor put it quite frankly: What Kalal, Masaryk, Heyduk after long years did not know how to achieve, that is what Cernova events did - in one night! In fact, Cernova even captured the interest of the heir presumptive Francis Ferdinand, who had deputy Milan Hodza inform him personally of the whole sequence of 46 events at the Cernova massacre. V In November of 1907 the Cardinal Primate of Hungary issued a circular in which he put the Eudove noviny on the Index of forbidden reading. Hlinka responded with a plea in the Brno Hlas (6 December 1907) to the Bohemian and Moravian clergy for support: ... the Magyar hierarchy has come down hard on us. They wish to suffocate Eudove noviny, the most Catholic of newspapers, with a clerical curse. I turn to the Moravian and Bohemian clergy today so that they may defend us. Do not let the strongest bastion of the faith and the Slovak language fall. The newspaper Eudove noviny is a substitute today for school. It is equally a catechism and a syllabus. Without it the Slovaks will die or will become a senseless 44 45 46 Ibid ., p.4. "Prijezd Andreje HI inky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. Slovensky obzor, 1907, 564 cited in Sidor, Cernova, 51. �SLOVAKIA 20 mass of slaves and helots .. . Me, they failed, my paper Eudove noviny they prosecute with clerical punishments! Protect our press! 47 His call did not go unheeded - the strength of the religious tie and the events of Cemova caused Czech and Moravian papers to write, urging Slovaks to continue to read Eudove noviny as a good Catholic newspaper. Arriving in Prague on 1 November 1907 in the company of A. Kolisek and J. Uprka, Hlinka was greeted by Czech leaders F. Taborsky, J. Rotnagl , Dr. Lang, and Dr. E. Krajicek, and a large number of students.48 On the 2 November 1907, he gave a speech on Slovansky ostrov which created such a stir that Ceskoslovanska jednota established a Ceskoslovensky komitet (Czechoslovak Committee) on the following day. Its function was to collect money to aid the orphans of Cemova49 and to organize the rest of Hlinka's lecture tours in the Czech Lands. Altogether, there were over 700 rallies on behalf of the Slovaks and Cemova. 50 Josef Anyz, editor-in-chief of Narodni listy, was elected chairman of the Committee with J. Rotnagl as secretary. Such a good working relationship between Anyz and Rotnagl grew out of the Committee that, according to Rotnagl , "whatever I went to N. listy 51 with some request from Cs/. Jednota, l was never turned down." Right after Cemova the number of Slovak evenings organized to acquaint the Czech public with the Slovaks and their culture increased dramatically, as did informative lectures on the same theme. Great speakers such as Pavel Blaho, Matus Dula, Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, Jozef I:udovit Hol'uby, I:udovit Medvecky, Anton Stefanek, Vavro Srobar, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, were invited by Jednota to speak to the people of Moravia and Bohemia. Czech newspapers touched the hearts of their reading public, calling for Czech financial support for the victims of Cemova: V 47 Hlas, 6 December 1907, cited in K. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka , p. 205. "Prijezd Andreje Hlinky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. 49 " Pomozte sirotkum po zavrazdenych v Cemove," Cas, XXI , o. 303 ( 1907), 5. 50 "Nasi bratia Ces i," Slovenky tyidennik, 27 March 1908, p. I. 51 "Narodni listy a slovenska vec," Rotn ag l Papers, Literarni archiv pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi, Prague. (He reafter, LA PNP). 48 �SLOVAKIA 21 At this difficult tim e it is our duty to help those .. . orphans, whose fath ers have fallen in def ense of the rights of the Slovak people against brutal violence. Let a collection be taken throughout the whole nation, the y ield of which will be dedicated to the unfortunate victims of Cernova as proof that Czechs and Slovaks f eel together both joy and grief 52 The success of the fund-raising was evident in the letter of 8 August 1908 from Anton Stefanek to Seton-Watson: "We have the whole Czech people behind us. During the last year the Czech people have raised a fund of 80,000 Crowns for us under the influence of Cemova." 53 Seton-Watson received a full report on Cemova and the imprisonment of Hlinka for "incitement against the Magyar nation" 54 from Stefanek. This caused him to write a letter to the London Spectator, describing all the events and he referred to them "as a typical example of the oppression of the Slovaks." 55 The result was a response from Count Esterhazy defending the Magyar position, followed by a scathing rebuttal from Seton-Watson in the Spectator and Manchester Guardian. The Times editor, Wickham Steed, was particularly gleeful when he read them and wrote to Seton-Watson: "The reply to Esterhazy is the best bit of pulverization I have seen anywhere. It made me green with envy for the whole day. Talk about sledgehammers! You are a steamroller when you get going." 56 Czech-Slovak relations drew closer in 1907 when Antonin Reis, a member of Ceskoslovanska j ednota suggested to Pavel Blaho, that now would be a good time to establish an informative journal on Slovakia, especially for the Czech readership. 57 Thus was born Nase Slovensko , short-lived from 1907 to 1910, but important because it 52 " Hunove vrazdi ," Cas, No. 300 ( 1907), p. I . Hugh Seton-Watson, "Anton Stefanek and R. W. Seton-Watson," Bohemia Jahrbuch des Co /legium Carolin um, 18 ( 1977), 236. 54 Jan Ryc hlfk, Thomas D. Marzik, Mi ros lav Bie lik, eds. R. W. Seton-Watson and his Relations with the Czechs and the Slovaks, I, (Prague: Ostav T. G. Masaryka and Martin : Matica slovenska, 1995), 22 55 Rychlfk, et a l. , 22. 56 Ryc hlfk, et al. , p. 139. 57 Antonin Reis, Letter to P. Blaho, 8 March 1907, Blaho Papers (Slovak State Archi ves, Bratislava, hereafter SSUA), Carton 12, Signature Bll-98. The same letter was sent to other prominent Slovaks introduc ing the plan to fo und this journal and seeking support. 53 �22 SLOVAKIA gave the young Slovak generation the motivation to seek other ways of saving themselves from the oppression of the Magyars. They became more engaged in the Slovak national movement and were able to test their skills through such vehicles as Nase Slovensko and later Prudy. It also distanced them from the old generation in Martin who continued to believe that only the Russians could save them from the Magyars. American Slovaks also became very outspoken about the situation in Slovakia. From the late 1860s to the late l 880's, American Slovaks had been more concerned with survival in their new homeland and saving their money to send home to their families . By the late 1890s and early 1900s, they had acclimatized to their new democracy and created self-help associations and newspapers indicative of a maturing Slovak national consciousness. The persecution of Hlinka in connection with the pre-election agitation in 1906 was brought to the attention of the American Slovak public by the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek. 58 The result was an open letter in the newspaper Eudove noviny written by Slovak priests working in America. Collections were organized as a result of the persecution during the elections of 1906, and once this precedent was set a similar procedure was followed to aid Cernova victims. A direct result of the persecution of Hlinka and the other Slovak representatives resulted in the emergence of the Union of Slovak Journalists and the Slovak League of America.59 A very impassioned message "For the Cernova Widows and Orphans," to all Slovaks was written by Furdek in his weekly Jednota, on 7 November 1907: They won't frighten us; our truth will not go begging crumbs from the tyrant. If it 's a fight they want, then a fight they will get; we are not afraid of it .. . Now, when we have the attention of the world, we must prove to the world that we stand together like a strong chain ... A bloody battle has begun in Cernova! Our sacred duty is to financially and morally support the struggle, which will determine whether 58 Stefan Furdek was the founder of The First Cath olic Slovak Union ( 1890) and th e Slovak League of America ( I 907). 59 Stefan Kucik, "Ohlas prenasledovania Andreja Hlinku a Cemovskej tragedie medzi Americkymi Slovakmi", in Kucik, Mytus a Realita, 115. �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slovak nation will exist or not exist in its ancient homeland. 60 With the passing of time, the furor created around Cernova abated. However, the actions of the Magyar authorities in bringing to trial those persons arrested on that tragic day, served to re-awaken interest in various camps. Both Czech and Slovak newspapers reported on the proceedings of the trial, but the Slovak newspaper Narodnie noviny gave its readers a daily account which lasted from the 2 nd to the 10 th of March in 1908. Altogether forty men and women were sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. 61 Cernova was in some ways a catalyst, not just on home ground but in Bohemia and Moravia and internationally. Slovaks in America also rallied and sought to acquaint their government of the situation in the homeland. What the Magyars had probably thought was an insignificant consecration and sign of Slovak thick-headedness turned into a cause celebre. The Magyars never expected this event to attract such attention and greatly miscalculated the damage this would cause them in the eyes of Europe. Men like Count Esterhazy never expected to find themselves having to defend Magyar racial policies, all because of an insignificant village like Cernova and a "people who did not exist," 62 according to Magyar politicians! In many ways, Cernova helped the Slovaks both in Slovakia and in America to unite and to begin thinking of alternatives to the rule of the Hungarian government and its Magyarizing policies. 60 Stefan Furdek, "Pre vdovy a siroty ce m ovske" quoted in Kucik, I 16-1 7. V. H., Cernovsky process (Turciansky Sv. Martin : Knihtl ac iarskeho ucas tinarskeho spolku, I 908), 72 . 62 Bela Grun wa ld, A felv idek, in Duri ca, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, 238. Grunwa ld wrote in 1887 that there were Slovak speak ing-inhabi tants in Hungary but there was no Slovak nation. 61 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 THE CERNOVA MASSACRE: MAGYAR MISCALCULATION, SLOVAK GAIN Edita Bosak Cernova, formerly an independent municipality of Liptov county, today a suburb of Ruzomberok, played a key role in the Slovak national movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the hegemony of the Austrian Empire ended. The agreement opened the way for the ruling Magyar political forces in the Kingdom of Hungary to enforce their national interests without regard for the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities. Since this meant that no legal rights would be granted to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, the Slovaks in Northern Hungary found their political situation deteriorating over the next fifty years. Between 1905 and 1907, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a serious political and social crisis and also faced deeply divisive nationality problems as a result of the Compromise. This study will explore the role of the Cernova massacre in changing the direction of the Slovak national movement, in exposing the Magyar government's nationalities' policies both internally and abroad, and thus forcing the Magyars into a defensive position. With the passing of the Compromise in 1867, Magyar statesmen Ferenc Deak and J6szef Eotvos, crafted the Legislative Act 44/1868 on the Equality of the Nationalities, 1 commonly known as the Nationalities Law. Although this law was intended to satisfy the nationalities' yearning for equality, in actual fact it denied the equality of all the nationalities in Hungary except for the Croats, who were recognized as a separate nation. The preamble of the law clearly stated: " .... all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, in conformity with the 1 Torveny-czikk a nemzetisek egyenj ogus:ig t:irgy:iban. Magyar torvenyt:ir 10001895 . 1838-1 868 evi torvenyczikkek. (Budapest, I 896) 490-4, as cited in Milan Podrim avsky, " Slovaks in the Conditions of the Hungarian State at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Human Affairs, 9, I (1999), 45 . 8 SLOVAKIA Constitution and from the political point of view, create an indivisible unitary Hungarian (Magyar) nation, of which each citizen of the country, belonging to any nationality, is an equal member." 2 In effect, the equality of the citizens of the state as individuals, independent of their nationality, was proclaimed; but the equality of the nationalities of the old Kingdom of Hungary was not. The discriminatory character of the Nationality Law had serious ramifications for the Slovaks. As a result, in 1878 the Slovaks sent another deputation led by one of the heroes of the 1848 Revolution, Jozef M. Hurban, to Vienna requesting an independent Slovak territory.3 The emperor refused to meet with Hurban, and returned his Memorandum to him. This led to an escalation in Magyarization (assimilation into the Magyar language and culture) and legislation by Magyar political forces which sought to erode any remaining rights of the nationalities. Prior to 1867, the Slovak national movement had made considerable headway. In the early 1860's intellectuals accepted the language reforms which I.:udovit Stur had made in 1846, and which led 4 to the final codification of the Slovak language in 1851. The Slovak nationalists sought to win legal guarantees that would safeguard the Slovak national existence and sovereignty. Although they were unsuccessful in obtaining recognition for the Memorandum of 1861 and the Okolie (a Slovak territory), they did manage to create the cultural and literary organization Matica slovenska in 1863 in the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin and three Slovak gymnazia in the 1860s. The number of Slovak newspapers also expanded at this time. These achievements gave the Slovaks hope for bettering their political, social and economic situation in Hungary. It was short lived. With the signing of the A usgleich in 1867, these national developments came to a rapid end. The gymnazia were closed in 1874 and the Matica slovenska in 1875, with the state confiscating all of Matica 's property. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Kalman Tisza, announced at the sitting of the Diet that he did not know of "any Slovak nation" . Hungary.s m 2 Podrimavsky, " Slovaks ... ," 45. Anton Spiesz and Dusan Caplovic, Illustrated Slovak History (Wauconda, Ill inois: Bolchazy- Carducci Publi shers, 2006), 149. 4 Ludevi t Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej (Presporok, 1846; reprinted in Bratislava, 2006). 5 Milan Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov (Bratislava: Luc, 2003), 235. 3 SLOVAKIA 9 The arrival of the government of Kalman Tisza in 1875 inaugurated a new period of oppression. The ruling Magyar circles were determined to strengthen the supremacy of national politics within the old Kingdom of Hungary vis-a-vis Vienna and also outside of the Monarchy, especially towards the Balkans. The virulent Magyarization policies of fifteen years of Tisza rule seriously hampered the ability of Slovaks to keep pace with their counterparts in other regions of Europe. The Slovak intelligentsia was continuously attacked and began to lose hope. The Hungarian government believed that the only solution to the nationality problem was assimilating the nonMagyar nations. Its Magyarization policies employed a variety of devices. The Magyar language was implemented at all levels of society, including from the pulpit. Various associations to help assimilate the nationalities 6 were established and also the local press was harnessed to ensure the Magyarization program would be effecttive and ensure the elimination of the Slovak language from public life. In terms of organized religion, both the authorities of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches practiced Magyarization in private, as well as in public. Slovak children attending Catholic schools were required to use the Magyar language. Slovak priests and teachers were persecuted for their national consciousness and participation in the Slovak national movement. 7 Slovak ministers and priests, who were known to be nationalists, were transferred from wealthier parishes to ones where the minister or priest, along with his flock, had . 8 to strugg Ie to survive. In 1878, the Slovenska narodna strana (Slovak National Party) announced it would boycott the elections to protest the discrimination suffered by the Slovaks. Not a single Slovak deputy was elected 6 Tisza' s gove rnment establi shed th e Magyar Educa tio nal League for Upper Hungary (FEMKE) in 1882 w ith its seat in the anci ent Slova k city of Nitra and the Educati onal League fo r Upper Hun ga ry (MT KE) in 1885 w ith its headquarters in Budapest, as we ll several j ourn als and news papers to aid in fi ghting th e g rowth of Slovak nati onal co nsc io usness. Podrimavsky, "S lova ks in the Co nditions of th e Hun gari an State . . . ," 4 7. 7 Ibid., 47-8. 8 Karel Kalal, Mad'arizacia. Obraz slovenske utrpenie. (Originall y publi shed in 1900, reprinted in Brati slava : Eko- ko nzult, 2006), 27. "The Sl ovak priest Moyses los t hi s parish in Lucky and th e Magyarone Smizar repl aced him ; the people sto pped go in g to church, th ey are bu ry in g their dead themselves, children are not be ing bapti zed, but no ne of th at moves either Smi za r, or " Fath er" Parvy. " SLOVAKIA to the Diet in the elections of 1875 or 1878 . From this date until the early twentieth century, the Slovenska narodna strana followed a policy of political passivity and withdrew to the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin in Central Slovakia. They also brought with them their newspaper Slovenske narodne noviny (Slovak National News) from its previous home in Budapest. Two factors , one internal and the other external , were instrumental in activating the Martin nationalists at the turn of the century. First of all, the economic situation was depressed and created a climate of both social and political unrest. The gravity of this situation was described as late as 1914 in an article entitled "The Decline of Industry" 9 by the pro-Magyar, government-sponsored, newspaper Slovenske noviny , published in Budapest. Alongside this industrial problem was the failure of the agrarian sector to thrive as a result of several bad harvests. The result was a growth in anti-Semitism, as the Jews were blamed for the drop in agricultural prices. This was followed by the rise of a new Catholic, anti-Semitic, Hungarian political party: the Hungarian People's Party (Neppart) established by Ferdinand Zichy and its weekly Krest'an. ' 0 It should be pointed out that most Jews in Hungary tied their economic well-being to support for the Magyar ruling class. Another catalyst for Slovak patriots was the trial of Romanian nationalists in 1894 which helped bring together a coalition of nonMagyar nationalists. Recognizing their common goals and the advantage of solidarity, the nationalities came together for the first time in the Congress of Non-Hungarian Nations in Budapest in 1895 . The Congress sought national equality in conjunction with democratic demands for universal and secret manhood suffrage, and freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association for all the nationalities. An external factor which played a major role in ending political passivity was a new generation of university students who were 9 Dr. Adolf Phany, "Upado k priemys lu," Slovenske noviny, 14 January 1914, p. l . Robert W. Seton-Watso n, A Hislory of 1he Czechs and Slovaks (Londo n, 1943:, reprint ed., Hamden, CT, 1965) 27 1-2. See also Julius Popely, " Boj o liberalne cirkevnopoliticke reform y v Uhorsku a zaloze nie katolickej l' udovej strany," Hisloricky casopis 29, 6 ( 198 1), 85 7-70, and Julius Popely, "Yzt' ah medzi statom a cirkvou v posledn ej tretine 19. storocia a korene politi ckeho kl erikali zmu v Uhorsku," Historickestudie 24 ( 1980): 77 -96, and Owen V. Johnson, " Losing Faith : The Slova k Hungari an Constitutional Struggle, 1906-1914," Harvard Ukrainian S1udies, 22, I, ( 1998), 293-3 12. 10 SLOVAKIA 11 either educated by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a Czech professor at Charles University in Prague, or who read his works while studying in Vienna and Budapest. As graduates and young professionals, they returned to Slovakia and spread Masaryk's ideas and teachings, his "Realist" program, and especially the concept of "drobna praca" (intensive work) . 11 On the advice of Masaryk, some of his students in 1898 established the journal Hlas (Voice). It preached the advantages of closer Czech and Slovak cooperation. This was enough to prompt the leadership of the old guard--the poet, writer, and editor of Ncirodne noviny, Svetozar Hurban Vajansky; Pavel Mudroii, party chair for the Slovenskci ncirodnci strana; Matus Dula, Ambro Pietor, and several others into protesting that the charges of political passivity levelled by Hlas editors Vavro Srobar and Pavel Blaho were unjust. A rift emerged between the older and younger generation. The elders felt the younger generation was neither respectful nor grateful for the sacrifices made by their elders in furthering the Slovak national movement. When Hlas ceased publication in 1904, there was a short respite. However, the demands of the young nationalists for a platform led to the publiccation of another journal, Prudy (Currents) in 1909. Milan Hodza, a young Budapest lawyer and publicist recognized that the Slovaks needed to become politically engaged and he put his energies into the building of a mass movement. In his newspaper Slovensky tyi dennik (Slovak Weekly) begun in 1903, Hodza tried to capture the Slovak peoples' interests and educate them in political activity. The young people rejected their elders' policy of political passivity. 11 Edita Bosak, "Czech-Slovak Relati ons and the Student Organisati on Detvan, 1882- I 91 4" in Slovak Polirics, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirsc hbaum (C leveland : Slovak Institute, 1983), 6-41. See also Ed ita Bosa k, "The Slovak National Movement, 184819 18" in Rejlecrions on Slovak Hisrory, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirschbaum and Anne C. Roman (Toronto: Sl ovak World Congress, 1987), 59-72 , and Edita Bosak, "T. G. Masaryk and th e Emerge nce of th e Hl as ist Move ment, 1898-1904", in J. M. Rydlo , ed, Milan S. Durica. Fesrschrift (Brati slava, 1995) 29-42. Edita Bosa k, " Slowakische Studentenorganisati onen in W ien, Prag und Budapes t und ihre Zusa mm enarbeit," in Wegenetz europiiischen Ceistes fl - Universitiiten und Studenten: Die Bedeutung studentischer Migrationen in Mittel - und Siidosteuropa vom 18. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Eds. Ri chard G. Plasc hka and Karlheinz Mac k (Muni ch: 1987), 162-1 82. SLOVAKIA 12 Slovak politicians finally dropped their pass1v1ty before the Hungarian constitutional crisis in 1905-1906. Hungarian political circles noted this and their Magyarisation politics were stepped up and the persecution of Slovak nationalists reached their peak. On the eve of the 1905 elections, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza bluntly stated his position on the nationalities as follows : A cardinal condition for the enjoyment of rights by other nationalities is that the citizens of other nationalities should recognize unreservedly that this State is the Magyar State .... The Magyar nation has never given a binding promise to maintain the Law of Nationalities for all time, or not to alter it... when conditions change, and when we perceive that through this law we grant to our opponents rights against ourselves. 12 The policy of Magyarization continued to escalate at all government and religious levels, and to touch the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The Apponyi Education Acts of 1907 reiterated that teachers in religious schools were state employees, and, as such, had to be able to read, write, and teach in Magyar. Leading Magyar nationalists held firm to these views . There were even fears among government leaders that negotiations with the nationalities would derail the Magyar goal of a single national state. Tisza, in response to the fears expressed by Count Albert Apponyi, that he was negotiating with the Romanians, stated very clearly that he stood " ... on the basis of a single undivided Hungarian national state ... No Hungarian can hold any other position other than the position of a single Hungarian nation, creating a single united Hungarian national state. 13 As far as Tisza was concerned, this position was unassailable. These views were held by most of the Hungarian ruling circle and permeated throughout the administrative echelons and bureaucracy. Surprisingly, in the 1906 elections, six Slovaks from the Slovenska l'udova strana (Slovak People's Party) 14 and one from the Slovenska 12 R. W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar (New York : Howard Fertig, 1968), 45-6. 13 Kalman Tisza Slovenske noviny, 16 January 19 14, p. l. 14 The Slovenska /'udova strana had separated from Zichy's People' s Party, Neppart, in 1905 because the latter did not represent the Slovak peoples ' interests. 1 SLOVAKIA 13 narodna strana (Slovak National Party) were elected. They demonstrated that a well-organized campaign, with emphasis on the needs of the peasants, was the way to attract votes. 15 However, the campaigners also pointed out that parties such as Neppart were not working in the interests of the Slovak peasants. Although this was a small win for the Slovak national movement (given their proportion of the population, the Slovaks should have had 40 seats in Parliament), its impact was significant enough that the Hungarian government expanded and increased the tempo of its Magyarization process. With hindsight it is clear that this political achievement was very much a milestone in the Slovak national movement. Slovak leaders, laymen as well as clergy, were now targeted in a stepped up campaign of persecution. 16 The Catholic Church's hierarchy, educated in the "great Magyar spirit," 17 was also actively involved in these persecutions . Even sermons had to be given in Magyar in completely Slovak parishes. Slovak priests who expressed national sentiments and used their own language in church were persecuted. Yet it was this Slovak clergy to which the people looked for guidance. The Slovak intelligentsia was very small, and as a result, both Roman Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers filled this gap. This form of Magyarization also attracted the attention of William Ritter, 18 a Swiss writer and artist. He published the details of the trial of Andrej Hlinka in Ruzomberok, October 26-November 6, 15 Ameri can Slovaks, in a sign of support and solidarity, had co llected $ I 0,000 and se nt it to the Slovak leadership back home to help defray electi on ex penses. The electi on of seven Slovaks to th e Hun ga ri an Parli ament, a first in history , was enthusiasti call y received as one Slovak Am erican decl ared "Our mon ey has been well spent. " In M. Mark Stolarik , Immig ration and Urban ization: The Slovak Experience, 1870- / 9 18 (New York: AM S Press, 1989), 194. 16 Several Slova k nati onali st leaders were now tri ed and convicted of " inciting aga inst the Magya r nati on" and sentenced to term s in prison: the Rev. Ferdi s Juriga, Dr. Vavro Srobar, the Rev. Andrej Hlinka, Milan Iva nka, etc. 17 Kuruc, Stefa n, " Katolicka cirkev na Slovenskom uze mi Uhorska na zaciatku 20. storocia," in My tus a realita, Stefan Kuci k, ed. (Rufo mberok : Katolicka uni versita v Rufo mberku, 2008), 6 1. 18 William Ritter ( I 867- I 955) was one of th e earli est and most creati ve of the foreign Sl ovakophiles who wrote about th e situati on faced by the Slovak s in the Hungari an part of the Dual Monarc hy of Austri a-H ungary. He pro tested aga inst Magyari zati on w ith others like th e Ru ssian Alexander Alexa ndrovic Papkov ( I 866-1920), the Scot Robert William Seton-Watson ( I 879- I 95 I), the Frenchm an Ernest Deni s ( 1849-1 92 1) and the No rweg ian Bj ornstjern e Bjorn son ( 1832- 19 10). 14 SLOVAKIA 1906 in the French Catholic magazine Demain. His article was read by officials in the Vatican and, as result, Hlinka was able to defend himself successfully from the Hungarian hierarchy' s accusations. 19 Ritter also published the letters of Hungarian bishops and Slovak priests in 1906 in Demain. He was a regular visitor to Slovakia from 1888 until 1947, and maintained a faithful and steadfast interest in the Slovaks until his death.20 Ritter had a vibrant correspondence with Slovakia's nationalists and greatest writers and poets, and through his publications pointed out to the western world the inhumane political, religious, social and cultural Magyarization of the Slovaks in the Kingdom Hungary. 21 Ritter was the first Slovakophile to expose the brutal sentiments expressed by the Magyar Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in 1905. In his article "Eveques hongrois et pretres slovaques" in the Lyons journal Demain politique, social, religieux,22 Ritter quoted Tisza as having stated "The law is dead for you Slovaks."23 Ritter had also published the harsh words of Tisza's father, Kalman Tisza, when he had been the head of government years earlier: "Slovaks should be crushed under the heel." 24 This Swiss humanitarian also expounded on Magyarization carried out in poor Slovak parish schools, in the theological seminaries and amongst Slovak priests . In fact, the fateful Cernova massacre simply confirmed the truth of Ritter's writings. Villagers in the small settlement of Cemova, in the diocese of Spis, had constructed a church mainly through the initiative and support of a local son, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka. Out of pride and gratitude, the citizens of Cemova, asked their bishop, Alexander Parvy, to allow Hlinka to consecrate the new church. 25 These people knew the importance of having one of their own sons fulfill this ceremony. Since Hlinka had been suspended from his priestly duties by Parvy because of his nationalist behavior, the people of Cemova requested a delay in consecration until such time as Hlinka could 19 Jozef M. Rydl o, " Sudny proces proti Andrejovi Hlinkovi v Rufo mberku 26. 106.11.1906 a obrana Slovakov proti mad 'arizacii perom William Rittera na strankach francu zskeho Demain", in Kucik, My tus a realita, 24. 20 Ibid. , 22 . 21 Ibid ., 23 . 22 Ibid ., 24. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 24. 25 Alexander Parvy was bishop of the Spis diocese from 1904 to 19 19. SLOVAKIA 15 preside over it. The bishop refused. The political background leading up to this is important for, as F. S. Clarke, in a dispatch from the British Consul-General in Budapest reported to the Foreign Office, The parish priest at Rozsahegy (Ruiomberok) ... , named Hlinka ... , by his nationalist tendencies, has incurred the displeasure--not only of the civil, but also of the ecclesiastical authorities, and had, in December last, been sentenced to a fine and to two years for the incitement against the Magyar State idea '-- ... 26 Hlinka had been actively backing his friend Dr. Vavro Srobar during the election campaign, something which Parvy considered tantamount to political agitation against the Magyar state. Thus, in Hlinka's place, Parvy chose the Reverend Anton Klurimsky, a Magyarone, to consecrate the newly-built church, despite the objections of the people of Cemova. These sentiments had even been personally relayed to the bishop by deacon M. Pazurik. The bishop decided that the dedication ceremony would take place regardless of the objections voiced by the parishioners. A group of gendarmes and a magistrate from Ruzomberok were assigned to escort the priests to nearby Cemova, and to maintain law and order. Upon their arrival on 27 October 1907, the priests and the squad of gendarmes were greeted by the people of Cemova, who although passive, verbally berated them. According to eye-witness reports, the gendarmes, without any provocation, shot into the crowd gathered on the roadside, which was impeding their progress. The result was "nine dead immediately, three died the following day, one on the third day" 27 and by the 25 th of December all told there were fifteen dead. 28 Because it was feared that a revolt would follow , a contingent of Honveds (National Guards) was dispatched from Ruzomberok.29 The following day a series of arrests of so-called "agi26 F. S. Clarke to Sir Edward Goschen, Budapest, October 31 , 1907. Foreign Office Papers #371 , Pol. A-H , 1907 - # 196 fil e 36724, No. 58, (United Kingdom: Public Record Office) . 27 "Vrazdenie slovenseho l' udu v Cemovej", S/o vensky tyidennik, 1 November 1907, p. I. 28 Karol Sidor, Cerno va (/80 7- /937) (Bratislava: " Slovak", 1937), 35. 29 Ibid. , 32. 16 SLOVAKIA tators" 30 among the survivors began, one of whom was Hlinka's sister, fifty-five year old Anna Fullova. In all, there were 13 arrests. 3 1 The tragedy of Cernova did more than any other event to bring the Slovak problem before a national and international forum . Two Czech deputies, Silinger and Dr. Hruban, brought before the Reichsrat in Vienna an interpellation which requested the government "to ask for an official report on how this sad affair came about and if the guilty parties had been investigated and punished and to put it before them?" 32 The second part of the document " ... asked the Hungarian government, as the second component of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, to finally end similar persecution of the Slovak people and the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary." 33 Dr. Hruban stated most emphatically "that the Czech nation will think over very carefully if it can make an agreement with a state which so persecutes the Slovak nation and the other non-Magyar nationalities."34 During the debate on the Austro-Hungarian economic agreement before the Austrian Parliament, T.G. Masaryk took the opportunity to present his views: I turn to the nationality question. For us, who are here from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for us Czechs the Compromise had politico-national importance. You heard today in the interpellation about the events in Ruiomberok which the Agrarian speaker also spoke about. The matter is quite simple. We have two million Slovaks in Hungary who belong to our nation: a nation of eight million will not abandon two million of its brethren to Magyar national chauvinism. It is our duty here and at every opportunity in 30 Ibid., 35. Ibid. , 35. 32 Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Ha uses der Abgeordneten des oesterreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907. Haus der Abgeordneten - 30. Sitzung der XVIII. Sess ion am 30. October 1907, p. 3 I 79. "Dotaz". (London , UK: Briti sh Museum). (Hereafter, Protocol). 33 Protocol, p. 3179 34 "Cemovska vrazda na sneme," Slovensky tyi dennik, I November 190 7, p. 3. The agreement mentioned here refers to the new ten-year agreement between Austria and Hungary wh ich was about to be voted on by the Viennese Parliament. 31 SLOVAKIA 17 this house to declare to Austria and the whole public that what the Magyars are doing to our Slovaks is inhumane. 35 The German Moravian representative Dr. Redlich also expressed his concern with the Magyarizing fervor in Hungary: I need not remind any of your Czech gentlemen of what is happening to the Slovaks in Hungary. Think not of Cernova alone; think of the whole process which led to it, the Hlinka trial, the Juriga trial /36 Later, the Czech deputy Dr. Zahradnik requested to know if the president of the Parliament intended to add the following to the protocol: " ... the expression of our deep regret and our deep sympathy not only for the unfortunate victims of Cernova but for all the nonMagyar nations who suffer under such great oppression. " 37 Deputy Gunther raised the hope that " ... the whole of civilized Europe, all who still have some feeling for human suffering will finally put themselves on the side of the great Norwegian poet. .. the whole world will find out what is hidden behind this Magyar liberalism ." 38 Gunther was referring to the poet and Nobel-prize winner Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who, the previous month, had delivered a speech criticizing the "Magyar humbug and ... oppression in the service of nationalistic thinking," 39 thus drawing the attention of Europe to its deeds. Bjornson had taken up the cudgel on Hungarian policy towards its nationalists with special reference to the Slovaks. Cernova gave him the opportunity to follow up with a long article in the Neue Freie Presse, describing at length the Magyarizing process. Needless to say, the above annoyed the Hungarian government but even greater was the upheaval caused by the writings of such wellknown foreign journalists as Henry Wickham Steed of The Times 40 (London), and the conversion of Scotus Viator to the Slovak cause. 35 Protocol, p. 2346. Protocol, p. 2365. 37 Protocol, p. 23 18. 38 Protocol, p. 2376. 39 Bjomstjerne Bjornson , Narodni listy, 23 October I 907, p. 2. 40 Scotus Viator was the pseudonym of R. W. Seton-Watson, the renowned Scots historian. Seton-Watson became acquai nted with the sociologist Anton Stefanek in 1906 in Vienna, and it was through Stefanek that he had the opportunity to learn the 36 18 SLOVAKIA 41 In 1908, Scotus Viator published Racial Problems in Hungary, which dealt with the corruption of electoral practices and Magyarization in that country. It earned him his doctorate. Shortly after the first publication, the book was translated into several other European languages, including Czech . This book helped publicize the oppresssed condition of the Slovaks in Upper Hungary throughout the western world. The French press also adopted an inimical stance towards the Magyars . The Poles wrote in Swiat slowianski that: It is not necessary to have concern about our sympathy. We sympathize with all the p ersecuted. We are wholeheartedly on their side. No mistake is as outrageous as that which the Magyars are making when they p ersecute the Slovaks. The Magyar advance against the Slovaks will end badly for the Magyars, but the Slovaks will live on. 42 William Ritter, who was already writing and exposing the Slovaks' plight, added his voice to that of the others. The Slovak politician Milan Hodza made an interpellation in the Hungarian Parliament on the subject of Cernova only an hour after the proceedings of the Austrian Reichstag had become known to the Hungarian Parliament. Feeling amongst the Magyar deputies ran high . Hodza had barely begun to speak before he was rudely interrupted by a very rowdy assembly. His interpellation consisted of a request that the Minister of the Interior, Julius Andrassy, extend the investigation of the Cernova massacre to include an examination of the actions of the administrative official present at Cernova; then, secondly, to suspend the said official from his office on the basis of already known facts until such time as the investigation will have 43 been concluded; and finally, to withdraw the army from the village. facts about Magyari zati on and the oppresssion of the Slovaks and th e other nonMagyar peoples in Hungary. Ce rnova served to re info rce Seton-Watson' s views and he became a vigorous defender of the non-M agya r nationalities in the European ~ress, much to the ire and indignati on of the Hungari an government. 1 London: Archiba ld Constabl e, 1908; reprinted by Howa rd Ferti g, New York, 1972. 42 Swiat slowianski (Cracow, 1907), 12 and 375 , cited in Karo l Sidor, Cernova, 51 . 43 "Cernovska vrazda na sneme" Slo venskj tyi dennik, I November 1907 , p. 4. SLOVAKIA 19 Julius Andrassy defended the priests as having gone to Cemova only to reassure the people that the consecration would not take place at that time, that the gendarmes had fired in self-defence, and finally, that Zoltan Pereszleny would not be suspended but that a fair investigation would be made.44 Andrassy, along with his colleagues, accused such newspapers as Slovensky tyidennik of "stirring the people to bloodshed." 45 Meanwhile, Hlinka continued his lecture tour of Moravia and Bohemia, acquainting the Czechs with Magyar policy and the events of Cemova. The massacre at Cemova served as a unifying force among the Czechs for the Slovak cause. Hlinka was greeted enthusiastically wherever he went. He was seen as a martyr, a representative of the whole Slovak nation. His speeches activated a far more systematic interest in the Slovaks than ever before exhibited by the Czechs. Slovensky obzor put it quite frankly: What Kalal, Masaryk, Heyduk after long years did not know how to achieve, that is what Cernova events did - in one night! In fact, Cernova even captured the interest of the heir presumptive Francis Ferdinand, who had deputy Milan Hodza inform him personally of the whole sequence of 46 events at the Cernova massacre. V In November of 1907 the Cardinal Primate of Hungary issued a circular in which he put the Eudove noviny on the Index of forbidden reading. Hlinka responded with a plea in the Brno Hlas (6 December 1907) to the Bohemian and Moravian clergy for support: ... the Magyar hierarchy has come down hard on us. They wish to suffocate Eudove noviny, the most Catholic of newspapers, with a clerical curse. I turn to the Moravian and Bohemian clergy today so that they may defend us. Do not let the strongest bastion of the faith and the Slovak language fall. The newspaper Eudove noviny is a substitute today for school. It is equally a catechism and a syllabus. Without it the Slovaks will die or will become a senseless 44 45 46 Ibid ., p.4. "Prijezd Andreje HI inky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. Slovensky obzor, 1907, 564 cited in Sidor, Cernova, 51. SLOVAKIA 20 mass of slaves and helots .. . Me, they failed, my paper Eudove noviny they prosecute with clerical punishments! Protect our press! 47 His call did not go unheeded - the strength of the religious tie and the events of Cemova caused Czech and Moravian papers to write, urging Slovaks to continue to read Eudove noviny as a good Catholic newspaper. Arriving in Prague on 1 November 1907 in the company of A. Kolisek and J. Uprka, Hlinka was greeted by Czech leaders F. Taborsky, J. Rotnagl , Dr. Lang, and Dr. E. Krajicek, and a large number of students.48 On the 2 November 1907, he gave a speech on Slovansky ostrov which created such a stir that Ceskoslovanska jednota established a Ceskoslovensky komitet (Czechoslovak Committee) on the following day. Its function was to collect money to aid the orphans of Cemova49 and to organize the rest of Hlinka's lecture tours in the Czech Lands. Altogether, there were over 700 rallies on behalf of the Slovaks and Cemova. 50 Josef Anyz, editor-in-chief of Narodni listy, was elected chairman of the Committee with J. Rotnagl as secretary. Such a good working relationship between Anyz and Rotnagl grew out of the Committee that, according to Rotnagl , "whatever I went to N. listy 51 with some request from Cs/. Jednota, l was never turned down." Right after Cemova the number of Slovak evenings organized to acquaint the Czech public with the Slovaks and their culture increased dramatically, as did informative lectures on the same theme. Great speakers such as Pavel Blaho, Matus Dula, Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, Jozef I:udovit Hol'uby, I:udovit Medvecky, Anton Stefanek, Vavro Srobar, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, were invited by Jednota to speak to the people of Moravia and Bohemia. Czech newspapers touched the hearts of their reading public, calling for Czech financial support for the victims of Cemova: V 47 Hlas, 6 December 1907, cited in K. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka , p. 205. "Prijezd Andreje Hlinky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. 49 " Pomozte sirotkum po zavrazdenych v Cemove," Cas, XXI , o. 303 ( 1907), 5. 50 "Nasi bratia Ces i," Slovenky tyidennik, 27 March 1908, p. I. 51 "Narodni listy a slovenska vec," Rotn ag l Papers, Literarni archiv pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi, Prague. (He reafter, LA PNP). 48 SLOVAKIA 21 At this difficult tim e it is our duty to help those .. . orphans, whose fath ers have fallen in def ense of the rights of the Slovak people against brutal violence. Let a collection be taken throughout the whole nation, the y ield of which will be dedicated to the unfortunate victims of Cernova as proof that Czechs and Slovaks f eel together both joy and grief 52 The success of the fund-raising was evident in the letter of 8 August 1908 from Anton Stefanek to Seton-Watson: "We have the whole Czech people behind us. During the last year the Czech people have raised a fund of 80,000 Crowns for us under the influence of Cemova." 53 Seton-Watson received a full report on Cemova and the imprisonment of Hlinka for "incitement against the Magyar nation" 54 from Stefanek. This caused him to write a letter to the London Spectator, describing all the events and he referred to them "as a typical example of the oppression of the Slovaks." 55 The result was a response from Count Esterhazy defending the Magyar position, followed by a scathing rebuttal from Seton-Watson in the Spectator and Manchester Guardian. The Times editor, Wickham Steed, was particularly gleeful when he read them and wrote to Seton-Watson: "The reply to Esterhazy is the best bit of pulverization I have seen anywhere. It made me green with envy for the whole day. Talk about sledgehammers! You are a steamroller when you get going." 56 Czech-Slovak relations drew closer in 1907 when Antonin Reis, a member of Ceskoslovanska j ednota suggested to Pavel Blaho, that now would be a good time to establish an informative journal on Slovakia, especially for the Czech readership. 57 Thus was born Nase Slovensko , short-lived from 1907 to 1910, but important because it 52 " Hunove vrazdi ," Cas, No. 300 ( 1907), p. I . Hugh Seton-Watson, "Anton Stefanek and R. W. Seton-Watson," Bohemia Jahrbuch des Co /legium Carolin um, 18 ( 1977), 236. 54 Jan Ryc hlfk, Thomas D. Marzik, Mi ros lav Bie lik, eds. R. W. Seton-Watson and his Relations with the Czechs and the Slovaks, I, (Prague: Ostav T. G. Masaryka and Martin : Matica slovenska, 1995), 22 55 Rychlfk, et a l. , 22. 56 Ryc hlfk, et al. , p. 139. 57 Antonin Reis, Letter to P. Blaho, 8 March 1907, Blaho Papers (Slovak State Archi ves, Bratislava, hereafter SSUA), Carton 12, Signature Bll-98. The same letter was sent to other prominent Slovaks introduc ing the plan to fo und this journal and seeking support. 53 22 SLOVAKIA gave the young Slovak generation the motivation to seek other ways of saving themselves from the oppression of the Magyars. They became more engaged in the Slovak national movement and were able to test their skills through such vehicles as Nase Slovensko and later Prudy. It also distanced them from the old generation in Martin who continued to believe that only the Russians could save them from the Magyars. American Slovaks also became very outspoken about the situation in Slovakia. From the late 1860s to the late l 880's, American Slovaks had been more concerned with survival in their new homeland and saving their money to send home to their families . By the late 1890s and early 1900s, they had acclimatized to their new democracy and created self-help associations and newspapers indicative of a maturing Slovak national consciousness. The persecution of Hlinka in connection with the pre-election agitation in 1906 was brought to the attention of the American Slovak public by the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek. 58 The result was an open letter in the newspaper Eudove noviny written by Slovak priests working in America. Collections were organized as a result of the persecution during the elections of 1906, and once this precedent was set a similar procedure was followed to aid Cernova victims. A direct result of the persecution of Hlinka and the other Slovak representatives resulted in the emergence of the Union of Slovak Journalists and the Slovak League of America.59 A very impassioned message "For the Cernova Widows and Orphans," to all Slovaks was written by Furdek in his weekly Jednota, on 7 November 1907: They won't frighten us; our truth will not go begging crumbs from the tyrant. If it 's a fight they want, then a fight they will get; we are not afraid of it .. . Now, when we have the attention of the world, we must prove to the world that we stand together like a strong chain ... A bloody battle has begun in Cernova! Our sacred duty is to financially and morally support the struggle, which will determine whether 58 Stefan Furdek was the founder of The First Cath olic Slovak Union ( 1890) and th e Slovak League of America ( I 907). 59 Stefan Kucik, "Ohlas prenasledovania Andreja Hlinku a Cemovskej tragedie medzi Americkymi Slovakmi", in Kucik, Mytus a Realita, 115. SLOVAKIA 23 the Slovak nation will exist or not exist in its ancient homeland. 60 With the passing of time, the furor created around Cernova abated. However, the actions of the Magyar authorities in bringing to trial those persons arrested on that tragic day, served to re-awaken interest in various camps. Both Czech and Slovak newspapers reported on the proceedings of the trial, but the Slovak newspaper Narodnie noviny gave its readers a daily account which lasted from the 2 nd to the 10 th of March in 1908. Altogether forty men and women were sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. 61 Cernova was in some ways a catalyst, not just on home ground but in Bohemia and Moravia and internationally. Slovaks in America also rallied and sought to acquaint their government of the situation in the homeland. What the Magyars had probably thought was an insignificant consecration and sign of Slovak thick-headedness turned into a cause celebre. The Magyars never expected this event to attract such attention and greatly miscalculated the damage this would cause them in the eyes of Europe. Men like Count Esterhazy never expected to find themselves having to defend Magyar racial policies, all because of an insignificant village like Cernova and a "people who did not exist," 62 according to Magyar politicians! In many ways, Cernova helped the Slovaks both in Slovakia and in America to unite and to begin thinking of alternatives to the rule of the Hungarian government and its Magyarizing policies. 60 Stefan Furdek, "Pre vdovy a siroty ce m ovske" quoted in Kucik, I 16-1 7. V. H., Cernovsky process (Turciansky Sv. Martin : Knihtl ac iarskeho ucas tinarskeho spolku, I 908), 72 . 62 Bela Grun wa ld, A felv idek, in Duri ca, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, 238. Grunwa ld wrote in 1887 that there were Slovak speak ing-inhabi tants in Hungary but there was no Slovak nation. 61  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Černová Massacre: Magyar Miscalculation, Slovak Gain Description An account of the resource Edita Bosak Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010 pp. 7-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bosák, Edita, 1950-2022 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/04d889eb437b60c6ff07a9e7ed381a70.pdf b0af527f0b6ff4be550df0241e33abc7 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 81 The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents Stanislav J. Kirschbaum In the two centuries since the beginning of the French Revolution and the fall of Communism in Central Europe, Slovak political life has centered around the attainment of three political objectives: autonomy, federation, and independence. The first two are linked to the question of the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks in a common state while the third reflects the teleological objectives of the principle of selfdetermination whose origins go back to the French Revolution but whose implementation was proposed only on the morrow of the First World War. It was to implement this principle that Central Europe was reorganized from the break-up of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, and Romanov empires. Each one of these objectives was preceded by a series of declarations, memoranda, resolutions, pacts, and agreements that paved the way for their implementation. It is a singularity of Slovak history that there are very few such documents in this two-centuries span; Jorg K. Hoensch presents 57 that are linked to the objective of autonomy,' Karol Rebro puts together 27 that he L See Jorg K. Hoensch, Hrsg. Dokumente zur A utonomiepolitik der Slowakischen Vo/kspartei Hlinkas. Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984, pp. 71-257 . Hoen sch also includes three additional documents that deal with �82 SLOVAKIA associates with the drive to federalization,2 while Jaroslav Chovanec and Peter Mozolfk offer 32 documents that deal with or are connected to independence. 3 The difference in the numbers is explained by the fact that many of the documents that were chosen are specific to the objective sought; nevertheless, there are two that appear in all three volumes: the Cleveland Agreement and the Pittsburgh Pact. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate their importance in the attainment of Slovak political objectives in the twentieth century. It is their link to the three objectives that explains their interest. Still, one Slovak historian, Anton Spiesz, 4 and one Western scholar, Hoensch,5 have seen fit not to mention either; in all other works, they find their place in the history of the nation. Both documents share four principal characteristics. First, they embody the essence of Slovak political activity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely the attainment of selfdetermination; second, both seek the same objective: the creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks at the end of the Great War; third, they are laconic texts, in some respects even imprecise in their content; and fourth, they are linked to Slovaks living not in Slovakia, but in the United States. It is the differences between them, the reasons for these differences, and 2 independence, thus bringing the total to 60 documents. Karol Rebro, The Road to Federation. Bratislava: Tatrapress, 1970, pp. 64-130. It should be noted that Rebro includes also the text of the Treaty of Protection of 1939 between Slovakia and Germany, thus bringing the total to 28 . 1 Jaroslav Chovanec a Peter Mozolik, Historicke a statopnivne korene samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Procom, 1994, pp. 67-216. The two authors include six additional documents that pertain to Slovak history prior to the nineteenth century. •- Anton Spiesz, Dejiny Slo venska. Na ceste k sebauvedomeniu. Brati slava : Yydavatefstvo Respekt, I 992. 1 Jorg K. Hoensch, Geschichte der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918 bis 1965. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966. �SLOVAKIA 83 the impact that they had that make them so interesting and that have also made them the object not only of political but also scholarly controversy. Until the international context of a world war offered the Slovaks the possibility of leaving Austria-Hungary, the main Slovak objective, shared by American Slovaks, was the attainment of a form of self-determination through self-administration. From the time of the French Revolution, three proposals embodied this objective. The first is Ignac Martinovic's democratic constitution, which he worked out at the time of the French Revolution, and which included the nationality principle; its application would have turned Slovakia into an independent administrative unit called Slavonica. As Slovak Marxist historians write: "It is in fact the first proposal to include Slovakia as an independent national administrative unit within the framework of Hungary. 116 The second is the Ziadosti slovenskeho naroda (The Demands of the Slovak Nation), worked out in May 1848; the Slovak nation demanded the recognition and guarantee of national identity; the transformation of Hungary into a state composed of equal nations, each with its own parliament and equal representation in the Hungarian Diet; and the use of Slovak in all Slovak county offices. In addition, it insisted on democratic rights, including universal and equal suffrage, the total abolition of serfdom, and the return of the land to the peasants from whom it had been taken away. 7 The third is the Memorandum slovenskeho naroda (Memorandum of the Slovak Nation) adopted in Turciansky Svaty Martin in June 1861; it sought equal rights with the Magyars, the recognition of their national individuality by law, the formation of a North Hungarian Slovak ~ Dejiny S/ovenska II. Bratislava: Veda, Vydavatefstvo Slovenskej akademie vied, I 987, p. 48 I. 1 • For the text in English, see Rebro, pp. 64-67, in Slovak, Chovanec and Mozolfk, pp. 74-77, and in German, Hoensch, pp. 71 -74. �84 SLOVAKIA District (Okolie in Slovak), Slovak as the official language of adminstration of this district, a Slovak Academy of Law and a chair of Slavonic studies in Pest, and the repeal of all Hungarian laws that infringed on the principles of the equality of the nationalities. 8 In the words of Slovak historians, the memorandum "became the basic Slovak constitutional programme even if it was not worked out in detail and contained merely basic principles about a certain Slovak autonomy within the framework of Hungary." 9 American Slovaks were familiar with Slovak objectives in Hungary, since most were immigrants to the United States, forced out by Budapest's policy of Magyarization and Hungary's slow economic development. Their main organization, the Slovak League of America, prepared a memorandum in May 1914 on the occasion of an earlier visit by Hungarian Count Mihaly Karolyi in the United States. The memorandum reiterated the demands of the 1861 Memorandum, thus in effect seeking a solution in Austria-Hungary. But it became the object of some controversy 10 as it underwent certain changes before it was · published in its final version on 2 September 1914 as the Memorandum o krivdach a JX)iiadavkach slovenskfch (Memorandum on Slovak Injustices and Demands). 11 No specific conFor the text in English, see Rebro, pp. 73-76, in Slovak, Chovanec and Mozolik, pp. 81-89, and in German, Hoensch, pp. 92-99. 9 • R. Marsina et. al., Slovenske dejiny. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992, p. 173. n This is described in Konstantfn Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda . Bratislava: Knfhtlaciarell Andreja uc. spol., 1937, pp. 20-32. 11 • The original and modified versions are found in ibid., pp. 42-52. According to Ivan Markovic: "It was a political error and an indication of insufficient political foresight on the part of the Slovak League to publish this memorandum." See Ivan Markovic, Slovaci v zahranicnej revolucii. Bratislava: no publisher, no date; lecture given on 16 April 1923, p. 13. As for its publication date, Milan Getting writes that it was published on 24 September. See Milan Getting, Americkf Slovaci a vjvin ceskoslovenskej myslienky v rokoch 1914-1918. Pittsburgh: Slovenska Telocvicna Jednota & �SLOVAKIA 85 stitutional solution was put forth for Slovakia, but there was a demand for full self-administration and self-determination. In the discussions around this document the idea of Czecho-Slovak unity had also been mentioned. 12 This document opened the way for Slovak American organizations thereafter to examine a number of options that would be the object of debate for some time: 13 Slovakia in a federated Slavic state in Austria-Hungary; a Slovak-Polish union ; a Slovak-Russian union ; autonomy in a reorganized Hungary; and the creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. 14 Clearly, the objective had been redefined and had become one of national emancipation. The Cleveland Agreement _ With the outbreak of war, American Slovaks opted for cooperation with the Czechs in their struggle for national emancipation. But their approaches differed. The latter directed their efforts at the creation of a Czech state. However, according to Chovanec and Mozolfk, "the representatives of the Slovak organizations in the United States fought against the attempts of their Czech partners to attach the Slovaks as a sort of appendage to the basic Czech anti-Habsburg programme." 15 The Slovaks were seeking a solution that was in the spirit of previous Slovak demands and that would ensure national development. After months of discussions, 16 an attempt was made to create a common front and a meeting was organized in Cleveland on 22 Sokol v Amerike, 1933, p. 40. Ibid., p. 40. 13. See Markovit, p. 13. 14 • Some of these options are examined in Stanislav Matou~ek, Vznik a vfvoj spolecneho statu Cechu a Slovakii . Praha: Academia, 1980, pp. 57-60. u. Chovanec a Mozolfk, p. 19. "' For more on these discussions, see Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, VIII ( 1968), pp. 23-26. ll �86 SLOVAKIA October 1915 between representatives of Czech and Slovak American organizations. Cubomfr Liptak writes that "[t]he decision of American Slovaks to support the struggle for the creation of a common state with the Czechs - and its worth is found here - was taken after long and often bitter discussions in which the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution were weighed, including the possibilities and limits of Slovak activity." 17 The Czechs proposed a text that was only slightly modified by the Slovaks present. It has since become known as the Cleveland Agreement. Short and imprecise as it is, this text is, perhaps because of these characteristics, the object of some controversy. Composed of five points, its only two concrete proposals are found in points one and three on the independence of the Czech Lands and Slovakia and secret universal suffrage. It is the second point that has historians trying to figure out what the authors had in mind when they proposed "a union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative union of states with complete national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own parliament, its own state administration, complete cultural freedom, that is to say with the full right to use the Slovak language, its own financial and political administration, and an official Slovak state language." 18 Was this a federal proposal, if so, what kind, and if not, what was it, given its language? There are two schools of thought on this question. One rejects outright the affirmation that this was federal solution for a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. Stanislav Matousek suggests that what was proposed was a union within a federalized monarchy. He bases his argument not only on the phrase 11 • 1& Cubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci. Bratislava: Vydavatet'stvo politickej literatury, 1968, p. 64. Rebro, p. 80. Stol~rik, on the other hand, translates "vo federatfvnom zviizku ~t~tov" as "in a federal state." StolMik, p. 55. �SLOVAKIA 87 "in a federative union of states" ( vo federativnom sviizku stitov), but also on the reference to Slovakia's autonomy. According to him, such a reference would not have been necessary if a federation between the Czechs and Slovaks had been envisaged; it would have been assumed for both nations. He also suggests that the authors based their understanding of federalism on their American experience. 19 The latter is also the view of some Slovak historians.'.!) Finally, to strengthen this approach, Viliam Plevza shows that reactions in the months that followed support this interpretation? Others, on the other hand, recognize the document as proposing a federal arrangement between the two nations. Rebro writes that "[t]he Cleveland Agreement represents a clear federative model of two equal nations on the basis of partnership." 22 Josef Kalvoda understands the text to mean that "[b]oth the Czechs and Slovaks were to have autonomy in the federative state to be established after the war."n Konstantin Culen indicates that the agreement "announced the federalization of the future republic". 24 Ivan Markovic and Marian Mark Stolarik perceive it as expressing a federal solution for two nationally autonomous entities. 75 Not surprisingly, some historians pass no judgment and limit themselves simply to quoting or using directly the text of the agreement. 26 Such use of the text is 19 • Matousek, pp. 61-62. n Marsina et al., p. 197. 21 • Viliam Plevza, Ceskos/ovenska statnosf a sl ovenska otazka v politike KSC. Bratislava: Praca, 1971 , pp. 49-50. n Rebro, p. 22. 21. Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1986, p. 70. ll Culen, p. 81 . 21 Markovit, p. 25; Stolarik, p. 26. li Among those who pass no judgment are Chovanec and Mozolik, p. 19, Liptak, p. 63, Franti~ek Bokes, Dejiny S/ovenska a Slovakov od najstarsfch cias po os/obodenie. Bratislava: Slovenska akademia vied a umen1, 1946, p. 350 and �88 SLOVAKIA interpreted by at least one author as a tacit acknowledgement of this interpretation.Zl Of the two, the second interpretation seems more acceptable than the first for a number of reasons. First of all, the language of the agreement suggests that its authors were not experts in political and constitutional terminology; otherwise the language would have been precise. This allows us to infer that a federation of the two nations was the objective as this was the reason for the meeting: to decide on the framework of an arrangement between them. Those who make the claim that the authors were influenced by American federalism project their own expertise and historical experience on men of a generation that had recently emigrated to the United States and whose education was not likely to have included constitutional law and political science or specialized knowledge of the American constitution. Secondly, the reference to Slovak autonomy must be seen as understandable given the Slovak political struggle in Hungary and the demands made in the documents of 1848 and 1861. For most Slovaks, this was their main point of reference in the national struggle. It is unlikely that the document would have obtained the support from American Slovaks that it did obtain had it not included a specific reference to autonomy.28 Thirdly, subsequent events indicate that American Slovaks understood that their nation would enter into a common state with the Czechs in a federal arrangement. Dusan Kovac\ Slovaci - Cesi - Dejiny. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 1997, p. 65. n. Plevza considers Liptak as belonging to those who accept the federal interpretation. See Plevza, p. 49n. 2& It is interesting to note that Albert Mamatey, President of the Slovak League in America, who would be present when the agreement was signed the next day, wrote on 21 October 1915 in Narodne noviny that the League "is for [Slovak] independence regardless of the greater state organization in which we find ourselves." Quoted in Getting, p. 63. �SLOVAKIA 89 The agreement was generally well received, but Slovak Marxist historians also note that "[i]n France, the periodical Ceskoslovenska samostatnosf, as the "organ of political emigration" presented the Cleveland agreement in the spirit of Czechoslovakism - as the attainment of Czechoslovak national unity. This point of view resulted in protests because American Slovaks had begun to support all of the activities of the external struggle on the principle of two equal nations as outlined in the Cleveland agreement. "29 Slovak Americans were not unaware of Czech objectives, and in particular the role that Czechoslovak unity was playing in these objectives. They knew that they had to counter this. In addition, Frantisek Bokes writes that the agreement "did not eliminate distrust and the possibility of misunderstanding between Czechs and Slovaks. "D This uncertainty resulted in the Slovak League of America sending in April 1916 two representatives to Europe, Stefan Osusky and Gustav Kosfk, "to meet Professor [T.G.] Masaryk and to explain the Slovak program to the British and French foreign ministries."31 Nevertheless, as Culen writes: "from this meeting [in Cleveland] on, Czechs and Slovaks begin to appear together throughout the United States. "32 Such behaviour again strongly points to a Slovak understanding of what the agreement meant to them and also their determination to achieve their objective, a federation of the two nations. However, it must aso be pointed out that some American Slovaks saw the agreement as having brought forth "Czechoslovak unity" 33 . Equally interesting is that fact that 29 • Dejiny S/ovenska JI, p. 429. Italics added. Bokes, p. 35 I. 3 1. Kalvoda, p. 83. For an analysis of the Osusky-Ko§ik mission to Europe, see Stolarik, pp. 28-30. See also the interview with Osusky in ibid., pp. 59-61. :u Culen, p. 83. n Getting, p. 66. :n �90 SLOVAKIA Masaryk, despite his later behaviour, is said to have approved of it.34 The Pittsburgh Pact A series of developments soon made it clear that the Cleveland Agreement would have to be revisited, if not revised. In the first place, there was vigorous debate on the question of Czechoslovak unity and the nature of the future state in Slovak publications in the United States and abroad throughout 1916 and 1917. 35 Furthermore, according to Stolarik, in 1916 American Slovaks had "split into Slovak and Czechoslovak camps. "36 Secondly, there was the evolution of the Czech agenda and its transformation into a Czechoslovak one. 37 The creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks had to be seen as embodying the principle of self-determination, as inferred from President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points38 and, above all, had to be sold to the Allied Powers. The second development put American Slovaks in a very difficult position; while they did not want to give up their objective, they needed Czech support to achieve it and they also had to ensure that their mutual project of a common state did not fail because of their demands or because of serious disputes with Ibid., p. 84. Rebro also writes that Masaryk "tried to find comprise formulations that would not contradict his own conceptions. But he could not simply refuse the terms of the Cleveland agreement because they were supported by the moral, financial and first of all voluntary help of the Slovaks abroad." Rebro, pp. 24-25. 35. Getting, pp. 85-86. 36. Stolarik, p. 22. n. For more on this see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia. The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 144-152. 31!. On the question of the role of the principle of self-determination in the Fourteen Points, see Dov Ronen, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-Determination in Central Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 48-53 . 34. �SLOVAKIA 91 the Czechs. For Masaryk, the best solution to this dilemma was Czechoslovakism, that is to say the fusion of the Czechs and Slovaks into one nation. This was a concept that not only had historical roots (it was first proposed in 1848), but that could easily be proposed within the framework of the principle of selfdetermination. In addition, as the English historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote, "Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others knew even less. That was his strength in dealing with the allied leaders. "39 What Masaryk also had to do was to overcome the suspicions and disagreements that had arisen between Czechs and Slovaks in the United States and bring the latter to accept the necessity for a common front that would persuade the Allied Powers to create the new state.'° He achieved this with the document called the Pittsburgh Pact (also called the Pittsburgh Agreement) which he himself signed on two occasions, the hand-written copy on 31 May 1918, and the calligraphic copy on 14 November, the day he was elected president of Czecho-Slovakia in Prague by the Revolutionary National Assembly. The Pittsburgh document is composed of six resolutions approved by the representatives of the Slovak League of America, the Czech National Alliance, the Federation of Czech Catholics, and the Czecho-Slovak National Council in the person of Masaryk himself. Of importance to Slovakia is the acknowledgement of its own institutions, namely a state administration, a parliament, and a judiciary and the status of the Slovak language as the official language in the schools, in the public offices and in public life generally. In addition to approving a union of the two nations in an independent state, the document specifies that the state shall be a republic and that its constitution shall be 39 • CJ. A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967, p. 258. Stolarik also points out that "[t]he attitude of American Slovaks towards the Czechs changed radically in 1917." Stolarik, p. 32. �92 SLOVAKIA democratic. There is reference to "the organization of the cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks," but the most important point refers to the relegation of the "detailed provisions" to the "liberated Czechs and Slovaks and to their duly accredited representatives. 1141 The most important difference between the Cleveland and Pittsburgh texts is found in the political objectives each proposes; there was a shift from a federal solution to the autonomy of Slovakia. The Pittsburgh document not only leaves out any direct reference to the type of arrangement there would be between the Czechs and Slovaks as the Cleveland Agreement had done, but it also gives the responsibility of finding an arrangement to the "liberated Czechs and Slovaks and to their duly accredited representatives." Simply put, the agreement avoids the issue of the future constitutional make-up of the common state. It should also be noted that there is no direct use of the term autonomy; while this is clearly evident in the enumeration of the powers Slovakia would exercise, its non-mention is not without significance. It is linked directly to the avoidance of defining the future constitutional set-up of Czecho-Slovakia. Why did Masaryk, the author of the Pittsburgh Pact, propose such a text and why did the American Slovaks accept it? Aware of the differences of opinion there existed between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States, Masaryk came to the United States in order to find a common ground and eliminate any argument that might put his cause in doubt. 42 In addition, as a •1. ~ Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia . Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York, Robert A Speller & Sons Publisher, Inc., 1960, p. 326. Stolarik, translates "pravoplatnym predstavitefom" as "legal representatives" which is more correct. Stolarik, p. 56. Catholic American Slovaks, under the leadership of Jozef Hu~k. editor of Jednota , the publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest single Slovak organization in the United States, were distrustful of Masaryk. For more on Hu~ek's role, especially with regards to the Pittsburgh document, see �SLOVAKIA 93 Slovak historian writes: "The need for legitimacy brought forth the Pittsburgh Pact. When Masaryk left for the United States at the end of April 1918, he went there with the clear objective of trying to overcome the President Wilson's mistrust of the plan to destroy Austria-Hungary. One of the arguments had to be a newly documented unity of the objectives of the Czech and Slovak citizens of the United States. "43 But Masaryk had a second, less evident objective: the acceptance of a document that would not put anything in his way in the achievement of the policy of Czechoslovakism. The Pittsburgh text, unlike the Cleveland one, made this possible, as Marxist historians point out: "Masaryk formulated the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in one state on the basis of equality but side-stepped the original -demand on the Slovak side, that is to say a federal constitutional organization linked to the recognition of two independent nations - the Czechs and the Slovaks. "44 The result was that "he changed the aim of the resistance movement abroad [by] leaving out the sentences about the federal structure of the Czechoslovak Republic."45 American Slovaks accepted Masaryk's text for two reasons: first they accepted his argument about the need for a document that he could show President Wilson that would convince the American president and the American public of Czech and Slovak American support for his objectives. The search for such support from the American people was made even more forcefully with the Washington Declaration of October 1918 which addressed the link between democracy and the new state: "Another document that was meant to mobilize the American public in favour of the Czecho-Slovak cause was the declaration StolArik, pp. 47-50. Koviic, p. 66 . .._ Dejiny, p. 464. -0. 4.i. Rebro, p. 25. �94 SLOVAKIA of sovereignty known as the Washington Declaration. Both documents [the Pittsburgh Pact and the Washington Declaration] fulfilled their objectives. "46 The second reason is linked to the person of Masaryk himself. He was the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the leader of the resistance movement who was received by the heads of state and government of the Allied Powers; American Slovaks had reason to trust him. In addition, the text of the Pittsburgh document did not suggest the absence of equality between the Czechs and Slovaks. Little did they suspect that he had very definite ideas about their nation which he had expressed as early as 1915 in a memorandum to the Foreign Office: "The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language. The Slovaks strive also for independence and accept the programme of union with Bohemia. "47 In addition, Masaryk also reflected an attitude toward the Slovaks that was prevalent among the Czechs: "at that time, no one among the Czechs understood the Slovak_ problem in its full importance and implication nor thought about the constitutional position of Slovakia in a Czecho-Slovak state, about the way of respecting Slovak individuality in a unitary state, not to say anything of a federation. Concrete approaches did not correspond to the sentimental-patriarchal feelings of the Czech public. "48 There was no Slovak leader, at home or abroad, who could counter Masaryk's influence and articulate properly and forcefully Slovak demands. Milan R. Stefanik was the most influential Slovak, but he was ill placed to represent the Slovaks. 46 Kovlit, p. 66. For more on the Washington Declaration, see J.B. Kozak, T.G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonske deklarace v ffjnu 1918. Praha: Melantrich, 1968 . ~- Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943, p. 125. In the United States, Hu~k was one American Slovak who was suspicious of Masaryk's motives. See Stollirik, p. 47. • Chovanec a Mozolik, p. 20. �SLOVAKIA 95 As Jaroslav Sole writes about him: "The first Slovak in the struggle against the Habsburgs was a Czechoslovak -this was not only a definite paradox from the Slovak point of view, but also one of the formative conditions of the Czech approach!. "49 Masaryk had come to Pittsburgh to tell the Slovaks that he needed their support to achieve an aim that was also theirs, national emancipation. The Pittsburgh Pact, as had the Cleveland Agreement, helped to attain this objective; but that was all. There was nothing else as far as he was concerned, as later events would show. Much ink has flowed about the Pittsburgh Pact, especially about its binding character.:xi Two days before Masaryk signed the calligraphic copy, on 12 November 1918, the Revolutionary National Assembly in Prague had ratified all of the commitments that he had made during the war. Despite this ratification, the literature stresses the non-binding character of the Pittsburgh document based on one of its paragraphs. As Seton-Watson writes: "the final clause made the whole arrangement contingent upon its endorsement by constitutionally elected representatives of both Czechs and Slovaks at home after the war. "51 It was such a legal-constitutional argument that justified not only the Czechoslovak government's refusal to honour the clauses of the Pittsburgh document but also Masaryk's own repudiation of it as "a local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks upon the policy they were prepared to advocate." 52 There was 111 - Jaroslav Sole, Slovensko v ceskej politike. Banska Bystrica: M.O. Enterprise, 1993, p. 43 . n Vavro Srobar went so far as to claim that the Czechoslovak Republic gave the Slovaks rights that went beyond the autonomy provisions of the Pittsburgh Pact. See Plevza, p. 75. 5 '- R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of Czechs and Slovaks. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965, p. 306. 52 Thomas G. Masaryk, The Making of a State. Memories and Observations /914-1918, An English version, arranged and prepared with an introduction �96 SLOVAKIA also a political reason according to Stolarik: "Masaryk rejected the Pittsburgh Agreement partly because all Slovaks did not support it. "53 Whatever the legal justifications, it was an error on the part of Masaryk to ignore the Pittsburgh Pact's political ramification and importance. Masaryk was not unaware of the meaning of both documents, and not just for the Slovaks in the United States. As Seton-Watson wrote shortly after the creation of Czecho-Slovakia: if the Pittsburgh document was in no sense a treaty, it may fairly be taken as representing the mental attitude and political aspiration of most Czechs and Slovaks in America and (what is more important) of the chief shaper of Czechoslovak policy at the supreme crisis in 1918. To this extent it has, not a legal, but a moral, value. Moreover it may safely be claimed that in the first days of the new Republic it coincided with the general feeling in the "historic lands", that the Slovaks were fully entitled to make their own terms of union. The course of events, however, inevitably gave a different tum to the question. 54 The failure to honour it, indeed the failure of the Czechoslovak government to heed the demands of the Slovak People's Party during the two decades of interwar Czechoslovakia to implement it, 55 was, in the end, paid at the price of the First Czechoslovak Republic. by Henry Wickham Steed. New York: Frederick A Stokes Co., 1927, p. 220 . Masaryk also wrote a letter to Andrej Hlinka declaring the pact a "falsum ;" the text of the letter is found in Joseph M. Kirschbaum, pp. 238-240. n Stolarik, p. 54. Italics in the original. " R.W. Seton-Watson, The New Slovakia . Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924, p. 21. 51 This is examined in detail in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, pp. I 55- I 83. �SLOVAKIA 97 Conclusion Both documents represent important milestones in the history of the Slovak search for self-determination in the twentieth century. Their chronology is important in this respect. The Pittsburgh Pact does indicate a retreat in political objectives when compared to those proposed in the Cleveland Agreement. But it also represents a willingness on the part of the Slovaks to accept autonomy if historical and international conditions made only that option possible; what was important was to have an opportunity to leave Hungary and proceed with national development. If the Cleveland Agreement was repudiated, it also served notice of an alternative. The drive to federalization in 1968 came as a result of the experience with autonomy, from the failure to implement it in 1918- I938 to the experience of its implementation in 1938-1939 and 1945-1968. Slovak independence in 1993 was achieved as a result of the experience with the federal system since 1968. Ultimately, both documents succumbed to the Czech agenda in Czechoslovakia and its failure to accommodate properly and adequately their objectives, thus making Slovak independence the only option left. Put another way: If neither document was acceptable, then neither was what they had in common, a state of the Czechs and Slovaks. In this sense, these two documents were also precursors of Slovak independence. � SLOVAKIA 81 The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents Stanislav J. Kirschbaum In the two centuries since the beginning of the French Revolution and the fall of Communism in Central Europe, Slovak political life has centered around the attainment of three political objectives: autonomy, federation, and independence. The first two are linked to the question of the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks in a common state while the third reflects the teleological objectives of the principle of selfdetermination whose origins go back to the French Revolution but whose implementation was proposed only on the morrow of the First World War. It was to implement this principle that Central Europe was reorganized from the break-up of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, and Romanov empires. Each one of these objectives was preceded by a series of declarations, memoranda, resolutions, pacts, and agreements that paved the way for their implementation. It is a singularity of Slovak history that there are very few such documents in this two-centuries span; Jorg K. Hoensch presents 57 that are linked to the objective of autonomy,' Karol Rebro puts together 27 that he L See Jorg K. Hoensch, Hrsg. Dokumente zur A utonomiepolitik der Slowakischen Vo/kspartei Hlinkas. Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984, pp. 71-257 . Hoen sch also includes three additional documents that deal with �82 SLOVAKIA associates with the drive to federalization,2 while Jaroslav Chovanec and Peter Mozolfk offer 32 documents that deal with or are connected to independence. 3 The difference in the numbers is explained by the fact that many of the documents that were chosen are specific to the objective sought; nevertheless, there are two that appear in all three volumes: the Cleveland Agreement and the Pittsburgh Pact. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate their importance in the attainment of Slovak political objectives in the twentieth century. It is their link to the three objectives that explains their interest. Still, one Slovak historian, Anton Spiesz, 4 and one Western scholar, Hoensch,5 have seen fit not to mention either; in all other works, they find their place in the history of the nation. Both documents share four principal characteristics. First, they embody the essence of Slovak political activity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely the attainment of selfdetermination; second, both seek the same objective: the creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks at the end of the Great War; third, they are laconic texts, in some respects even imprecise in their content; and fourth, they are linked to Slovaks living not in Slovakia, but in the United States. It is the differences between them, the reasons for these differences, and 2 independence, thus bringing the total to 60 documents. Karol Rebro, The Road to Federation. Bratislava: Tatrapress, 1970, pp. 64-130. It should be noted that Rebro includes also the text of the Treaty of Protection of 1939 between Slovakia and Germany, thus bringing the total to 28 . 1 Jaroslav Chovanec a Peter Mozolik, Historicke a statopnivne korene samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Procom, 1994, pp. 67-216. The two authors include six additional documents that pertain to Slovak history prior to the nineteenth century. •- Anton Spiesz, Dejiny Slo venska. Na ceste k sebauvedomeniu. Brati slava : Yydavatefstvo Respekt, I 992. 1 Jorg K. Hoensch, Geschichte der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918 bis 1965. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966. �SLOVAKIA 83 the impact that they had that make them so interesting and that have also made them the object not only of political but also scholarly controversy. Until the international context of a world war offered the Slovaks the possibility of leaving Austria-Hungary, the main Slovak objective, shared by American Slovaks, was the attainment of a form of self-determination through self-administration. From the time of the French Revolution, three proposals embodied this objective. The first is Ignac Martinovic's democratic constitution, which he worked out at the time of the French Revolution, and which included the nationality principle; its application would have turned Slovakia into an independent administrative unit called Slavonica. As Slovak Marxist historians write: "It is in fact the first proposal to include Slovakia as an independent national administrative unit within the framework of Hungary. 116 The second is the Ziadosti slovenskeho naroda (The Demands of the Slovak Nation), worked out in May 1848; the Slovak nation demanded the recognition and guarantee of national identity; the transformation of Hungary into a state composed of equal nations, each with its own parliament and equal representation in the Hungarian Diet; and the use of Slovak in all Slovak county offices. In addition, it insisted on democratic rights, including universal and equal suffrage, the total abolition of serfdom, and the return of the land to the peasants from whom it had been taken away. 7 The third is the Memorandum slovenskeho naroda (Memorandum of the Slovak Nation) adopted in Turciansky Svaty Martin in June 1861; it sought equal rights with the Magyars, the recognition of their national individuality by law, the formation of a North Hungarian Slovak ~ Dejiny S/ovenska II. Bratislava: Veda, Vydavatefstvo Slovenskej akademie vied, I 987, p. 48 I. 1 • For the text in English, see Rebro, pp. 64-67, in Slovak, Chovanec and Mozolfk, pp. 74-77, and in German, Hoensch, pp. 71 -74. �84 SLOVAKIA District (Okolie in Slovak), Slovak as the official language of adminstration of this district, a Slovak Academy of Law and a chair of Slavonic studies in Pest, and the repeal of all Hungarian laws that infringed on the principles of the equality of the nationalities. 8 In the words of Slovak historians, the memorandum "became the basic Slovak constitutional programme even if it was not worked out in detail and contained merely basic principles about a certain Slovak autonomy within the framework of Hungary." 9 American Slovaks were familiar with Slovak objectives in Hungary, since most were immigrants to the United States, forced out by Budapest's policy of Magyarization and Hungary's slow economic development. Their main organization, the Slovak League of America, prepared a memorandum in May 1914 on the occasion of an earlier visit by Hungarian Count Mihaly Karolyi in the United States. The memorandum reiterated the demands of the 1861 Memorandum, thus in effect seeking a solution in Austria-Hungary. But it became the object of some controversy 10 as it underwent certain changes before it was · published in its final version on 2 September 1914 as the Memorandum o krivdach a JX)iiadavkach slovenskfch (Memorandum on Slovak Injustices and Demands). 11 No specific conFor the text in English, see Rebro, pp. 73-76, in Slovak, Chovanec and Mozolik, pp. 81-89, and in German, Hoensch, pp. 92-99. 9 • R. Marsina et. al., Slovenske dejiny. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992, p. 173. n This is described in Konstantfn Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda . Bratislava: Knfhtlaciarell Andreja uc. spol., 1937, pp. 20-32. 11 • The original and modified versions are found in ibid., pp. 42-52. According to Ivan Markovic: "It was a political error and an indication of insufficient political foresight on the part of the Slovak League to publish this memorandum." See Ivan Markovic, Slovaci v zahranicnej revolucii. Bratislava: no publisher, no date; lecture given on 16 April 1923, p. 13. As for its publication date, Milan Getting writes that it was published on 24 September. See Milan Getting, Americkf Slovaci a vjvin ceskoslovenskej myslienky v rokoch 1914-1918. Pittsburgh: Slovenska Telocvicna Jednota & �SLOVAKIA 85 stitutional solution was put forth for Slovakia, but there was a demand for full self-administration and self-determination. In the discussions around this document the idea of Czecho-Slovak unity had also been mentioned. 12 This document opened the way for Slovak American organizations thereafter to examine a number of options that would be the object of debate for some time: 13 Slovakia in a federated Slavic state in Austria-Hungary; a Slovak-Polish union ; a Slovak-Russian union ; autonomy in a reorganized Hungary; and the creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. 14 Clearly, the objective had been redefined and had become one of national emancipation. The Cleveland Agreement _ With the outbreak of war, American Slovaks opted for cooperation with the Czechs in their struggle for national emancipation. But their approaches differed. The latter directed their efforts at the creation of a Czech state. However, according to Chovanec and Mozolfk, "the representatives of the Slovak organizations in the United States fought against the attempts of their Czech partners to attach the Slovaks as a sort of appendage to the basic Czech anti-Habsburg programme." 15 The Slovaks were seeking a solution that was in the spirit of previous Slovak demands and that would ensure national development. After months of discussions, 16 an attempt was made to create a common front and a meeting was organized in Cleveland on 22 Sokol v Amerike, 1933, p. 40. Ibid., p. 40. 13. See Markovit, p. 13. 14 • Some of these options are examined in Stanislav Matou~ek, Vznik a vfvoj spolecneho statu Cechu a Slovakii . Praha: Academia, 1980, pp. 57-60. u. Chovanec a Mozolfk, p. 19. "' For more on these discussions, see Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, VIII ( 1968), pp. 23-26. ll �86 SLOVAKIA October 1915 between representatives of Czech and Slovak American organizations. Cubomfr Liptak writes that "[t]he decision of American Slovaks to support the struggle for the creation of a common state with the Czechs - and its worth is found here - was taken after long and often bitter discussions in which the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution were weighed, including the possibilities and limits of Slovak activity." 17 The Czechs proposed a text that was only slightly modified by the Slovaks present. It has since become known as the Cleveland Agreement. Short and imprecise as it is, this text is, perhaps because of these characteristics, the object of some controversy. Composed of five points, its only two concrete proposals are found in points one and three on the independence of the Czech Lands and Slovakia and secret universal suffrage. It is the second point that has historians trying to figure out what the authors had in mind when they proposed "a union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative union of states with complete national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own parliament, its own state administration, complete cultural freedom, that is to say with the full right to use the Slovak language, its own financial and political administration, and an official Slovak state language." 18 Was this a federal proposal, if so, what kind, and if not, what was it, given its language? There are two schools of thought on this question. One rejects outright the affirmation that this was federal solution for a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. Stanislav Matousek suggests that what was proposed was a union within a federalized monarchy. He bases his argument not only on the phrase 11 • 1& Cubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci. Bratislava: Vydavatet'stvo politickej literatury, 1968, p. 64. Rebro, p. 80. Stol~rik, on the other hand, translates "vo federatfvnom zviizku ~t~tov" as "in a federal state." StolMik, p. 55. �SLOVAKIA 87 "in a federative union of states" ( vo federativnom sviizku stitov), but also on the reference to Slovakia's autonomy. According to him, such a reference would not have been necessary if a federation between the Czechs and Slovaks had been envisaged; it would have been assumed for both nations. He also suggests that the authors based their understanding of federalism on their American experience. 19 The latter is also the view of some Slovak historians.'.!) Finally, to strengthen this approach, Viliam Plevza shows that reactions in the months that followed support this interpretation? Others, on the other hand, recognize the document as proposing a federal arrangement between the two nations. Rebro writes that "[t]he Cleveland Agreement represents a clear federative model of two equal nations on the basis of partnership." 22 Josef Kalvoda understands the text to mean that "[b]oth the Czechs and Slovaks were to have autonomy in the federative state to be established after the war."n Konstantin Culen indicates that the agreement "announced the federalization of the future republic". 24 Ivan Markovic and Marian Mark Stolarik perceive it as expressing a federal solution for two nationally autonomous entities. 75 Not surprisingly, some historians pass no judgment and limit themselves simply to quoting or using directly the text of the agreement. 26 Such use of the text is 19 • Matousek, pp. 61-62. n Marsina et al., p. 197. 21 • Viliam Plevza, Ceskos/ovenska statnosf a sl ovenska otazka v politike KSC. Bratislava: Praca, 1971 , pp. 49-50. n Rebro, p. 22. 21. Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1986, p. 70. ll Culen, p. 81 . 21 Markovit, p. 25; Stolarik, p. 26. li Among those who pass no judgment are Chovanec and Mozolik, p. 19, Liptak, p. 63, Franti~ek Bokes, Dejiny S/ovenska a Slovakov od najstarsfch cias po os/obodenie. Bratislava: Slovenska akademia vied a umen1, 1946, p. 350 and �88 SLOVAKIA interpreted by at least one author as a tacit acknowledgement of this interpretation.Zl Of the two, the second interpretation seems more acceptable than the first for a number of reasons. First of all, the language of the agreement suggests that its authors were not experts in political and constitutional terminology; otherwise the language would have been precise. This allows us to infer that a federation of the two nations was the objective as this was the reason for the meeting: to decide on the framework of an arrangement between them. Those who make the claim that the authors were influenced by American federalism project their own expertise and historical experience on men of a generation that had recently emigrated to the United States and whose education was not likely to have included constitutional law and political science or specialized knowledge of the American constitution. Secondly, the reference to Slovak autonomy must be seen as understandable given the Slovak political struggle in Hungary and the demands made in the documents of 1848 and 1861. For most Slovaks, this was their main point of reference in the national struggle. It is unlikely that the document would have obtained the support from American Slovaks that it did obtain had it not included a specific reference to autonomy.28 Thirdly, subsequent events indicate that American Slovaks understood that their nation would enter into a common state with the Czechs in a federal arrangement. Dusan Kovac\ Slovaci - Cesi - Dejiny. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 1997, p. 65. n. Plevza considers Liptak as belonging to those who accept the federal interpretation. See Plevza, p. 49n. 2& It is interesting to note that Albert Mamatey, President of the Slovak League in America, who would be present when the agreement was signed the next day, wrote on 21 October 1915 in Narodne noviny that the League "is for [Slovak] independence regardless of the greater state organization in which we find ourselves." Quoted in Getting, p. 63. �SLOVAKIA 89 The agreement was generally well received, but Slovak Marxist historians also note that "[i]n France, the periodical Ceskoslovenska samostatnosf, as the "organ of political emigration" presented the Cleveland agreement in the spirit of Czechoslovakism - as the attainment of Czechoslovak national unity. This point of view resulted in protests because American Slovaks had begun to support all of the activities of the external struggle on the principle of two equal nations as outlined in the Cleveland agreement. "29 Slovak Americans were not unaware of Czech objectives, and in particular the role that Czechoslovak unity was playing in these objectives. They knew that they had to counter this. In addition, Frantisek Bokes writes that the agreement "did not eliminate distrust and the possibility of misunderstanding between Czechs and Slovaks. "D This uncertainty resulted in the Slovak League of America sending in April 1916 two representatives to Europe, Stefan Osusky and Gustav Kosfk, "to meet Professor [T.G.] Masaryk and to explain the Slovak program to the British and French foreign ministries."31 Nevertheless, as Culen writes: "from this meeting [in Cleveland] on, Czechs and Slovaks begin to appear together throughout the United States. "32 Such behaviour again strongly points to a Slovak understanding of what the agreement meant to them and also their determination to achieve their objective, a federation of the two nations. However, it must aso be pointed out that some American Slovaks saw the agreement as having brought forth "Czechoslovak unity" 33 . Equally interesting is that fact that 29 • Dejiny S/ovenska JI, p. 429. Italics added. Bokes, p. 35 I. 3 1. Kalvoda, p. 83. For an analysis of the Osusky-Ko§ik mission to Europe, see Stolarik, pp. 28-30. See also the interview with Osusky in ibid., pp. 59-61. :u Culen, p. 83. n Getting, p. 66. :n �90 SLOVAKIA Masaryk, despite his later behaviour, is said to have approved of it.34 The Pittsburgh Pact A series of developments soon made it clear that the Cleveland Agreement would have to be revisited, if not revised. In the first place, there was vigorous debate on the question of Czechoslovak unity and the nature of the future state in Slovak publications in the United States and abroad throughout 1916 and 1917. 35 Furthermore, according to Stolarik, in 1916 American Slovaks had "split into Slovak and Czechoslovak camps. "36 Secondly, there was the evolution of the Czech agenda and its transformation into a Czechoslovak one. 37 The creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks had to be seen as embodying the principle of self-determination, as inferred from President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points38 and, above all, had to be sold to the Allied Powers. The second development put American Slovaks in a very difficult position; while they did not want to give up their objective, they needed Czech support to achieve it and they also had to ensure that their mutual project of a common state did not fail because of their demands or because of serious disputes with Ibid., p. 84. Rebro also writes that Masaryk "tried to find comprise formulations that would not contradict his own conceptions. But he could not simply refuse the terms of the Cleveland agreement because they were supported by the moral, financial and first of all voluntary help of the Slovaks abroad." Rebro, pp. 24-25. 35. Getting, pp. 85-86. 36. Stolarik, p. 22. n. For more on this see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia. The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 144-152. 31!. On the question of the role of the principle of self-determination in the Fourteen Points, see Dov Ronen, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-Determination in Central Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 48-53 . 34. �SLOVAKIA 91 the Czechs. For Masaryk, the best solution to this dilemma was Czechoslovakism, that is to say the fusion of the Czechs and Slovaks into one nation. This was a concept that not only had historical roots (it was first proposed in 1848), but that could easily be proposed within the framework of the principle of selfdetermination. In addition, as the English historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote, "Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others knew even less. That was his strength in dealing with the allied leaders. "39 What Masaryk also had to do was to overcome the suspicions and disagreements that had arisen between Czechs and Slovaks in the United States and bring the latter to accept the necessity for a common front that would persuade the Allied Powers to create the new state.'° He achieved this with the document called the Pittsburgh Pact (also called the Pittsburgh Agreement) which he himself signed on two occasions, the hand-written copy on 31 May 1918, and the calligraphic copy on 14 November, the day he was elected president of Czecho-Slovakia in Prague by the Revolutionary National Assembly. The Pittsburgh document is composed of six resolutions approved by the representatives of the Slovak League of America, the Czech National Alliance, the Federation of Czech Catholics, and the Czecho-Slovak National Council in the person of Masaryk himself. Of importance to Slovakia is the acknowledgement of its own institutions, namely a state administration, a parliament, and a judiciary and the status of the Slovak language as the official language in the schools, in the public offices and in public life generally. In addition to approving a union of the two nations in an independent state, the document specifies that the state shall be a republic and that its constitution shall be 39 • CJ. A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967, p. 258. Stolarik also points out that "[t]he attitude of American Slovaks towards the Czechs changed radically in 1917." Stolarik, p. 32. �92 SLOVAKIA democratic. There is reference to "the organization of the cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks," but the most important point refers to the relegation of the "detailed provisions" to the "liberated Czechs and Slovaks and to their duly accredited representatives. 1141 The most important difference between the Cleveland and Pittsburgh texts is found in the political objectives each proposes; there was a shift from a federal solution to the autonomy of Slovakia. The Pittsburgh document not only leaves out any direct reference to the type of arrangement there would be between the Czechs and Slovaks as the Cleveland Agreement had done, but it also gives the responsibility of finding an arrangement to the "liberated Czechs and Slovaks and to their duly accredited representatives." Simply put, the agreement avoids the issue of the future constitutional make-up of the common state. It should also be noted that there is no direct use of the term autonomy; while this is clearly evident in the enumeration of the powers Slovakia would exercise, its non-mention is not without significance. It is linked directly to the avoidance of defining the future constitutional set-up of Czecho-Slovakia. Why did Masaryk, the author of the Pittsburgh Pact, propose such a text and why did the American Slovaks accept it? Aware of the differences of opinion there existed between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States, Masaryk came to the United States in order to find a common ground and eliminate any argument that might put his cause in doubt. 42 In addition, as a •1. ~ Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia . Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York, Robert A Speller & Sons Publisher, Inc., 1960, p. 326. Stolarik, translates "pravoplatnym predstavitefom" as "legal representatives" which is more correct. Stolarik, p. 56. Catholic American Slovaks, under the leadership of Jozef Hu~k. editor of Jednota , the publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest single Slovak organization in the United States, were distrustful of Masaryk. For more on Hu~ek's role, especially with regards to the Pittsburgh document, see �SLOVAKIA 93 Slovak historian writes: "The need for legitimacy brought forth the Pittsburgh Pact. When Masaryk left for the United States at the end of April 1918, he went there with the clear objective of trying to overcome the President Wilson's mistrust of the plan to destroy Austria-Hungary. One of the arguments had to be a newly documented unity of the objectives of the Czech and Slovak citizens of the United States. "43 But Masaryk had a second, less evident objective: the acceptance of a document that would not put anything in his way in the achievement of the policy of Czechoslovakism. The Pittsburgh text, unlike the Cleveland one, made this possible, as Marxist historians point out: "Masaryk formulated the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in one state on the basis of equality but side-stepped the original -demand on the Slovak side, that is to say a federal constitutional organization linked to the recognition of two independent nations - the Czechs and the Slovaks. "44 The result was that "he changed the aim of the resistance movement abroad [by] leaving out the sentences about the federal structure of the Czechoslovak Republic."45 American Slovaks accepted Masaryk's text for two reasons: first they accepted his argument about the need for a document that he could show President Wilson that would convince the American president and the American public of Czech and Slovak American support for his objectives. The search for such support from the American people was made even more forcefully with the Washington Declaration of October 1918 which addressed the link between democracy and the new state: "Another document that was meant to mobilize the American public in favour of the Czecho-Slovak cause was the declaration StolArik, pp. 47-50. Koviic, p. 66 . .._ Dejiny, p. 464. -0. 4.i. Rebro, p. 25. �94 SLOVAKIA of sovereignty known as the Washington Declaration. Both documents [the Pittsburgh Pact and the Washington Declaration] fulfilled their objectives. "46 The second reason is linked to the person of Masaryk himself. He was the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the leader of the resistance movement who was received by the heads of state and government of the Allied Powers; American Slovaks had reason to trust him. In addition, the text of the Pittsburgh document did not suggest the absence of equality between the Czechs and Slovaks. Little did they suspect that he had very definite ideas about their nation which he had expressed as early as 1915 in a memorandum to the Foreign Office: "The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language. The Slovaks strive also for independence and accept the programme of union with Bohemia. "47 In addition, Masaryk also reflected an attitude toward the Slovaks that was prevalent among the Czechs: "at that time, no one among the Czechs understood the Slovak_ problem in its full importance and implication nor thought about the constitutional position of Slovakia in a Czecho-Slovak state, about the way of respecting Slovak individuality in a unitary state, not to say anything of a federation. Concrete approaches did not correspond to the sentimental-patriarchal feelings of the Czech public. "48 There was no Slovak leader, at home or abroad, who could counter Masaryk's influence and articulate properly and forcefully Slovak demands. Milan R. Stefanik was the most influential Slovak, but he was ill placed to represent the Slovaks. 46 Kovlit, p. 66. For more on the Washington Declaration, see J.B. Kozak, T.G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonske deklarace v ffjnu 1918. Praha: Melantrich, 1968 . ~- Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943, p. 125. In the United States, Hu~k was one American Slovak who was suspicious of Masaryk's motives. See Stollirik, p. 47. • Chovanec a Mozolik, p. 20. �SLOVAKIA 95 As Jaroslav Sole writes about him: "The first Slovak in the struggle against the Habsburgs was a Czechoslovak -this was not only a definite paradox from the Slovak point of view, but also one of the formative conditions of the Czech approach!. "49 Masaryk had come to Pittsburgh to tell the Slovaks that he needed their support to achieve an aim that was also theirs, national emancipation. The Pittsburgh Pact, as had the Cleveland Agreement, helped to attain this objective; but that was all. There was nothing else as far as he was concerned, as later events would show. Much ink has flowed about the Pittsburgh Pact, especially about its binding character.:xi Two days before Masaryk signed the calligraphic copy, on 12 November 1918, the Revolutionary National Assembly in Prague had ratified all of the commitments that he had made during the war. Despite this ratification, the literature stresses the non-binding character of the Pittsburgh document based on one of its paragraphs. As Seton-Watson writes: "the final clause made the whole arrangement contingent upon its endorsement by constitutionally elected representatives of both Czechs and Slovaks at home after the war. "51 It was such a legal-constitutional argument that justified not only the Czechoslovak government's refusal to honour the clauses of the Pittsburgh document but also Masaryk's own repudiation of it as "a local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks upon the policy they were prepared to advocate." 52 There was 111 - Jaroslav Sole, Slovensko v ceskej politike. Banska Bystrica: M.O. Enterprise, 1993, p. 43 . n Vavro Srobar went so far as to claim that the Czechoslovak Republic gave the Slovaks rights that went beyond the autonomy provisions of the Pittsburgh Pact. See Plevza, p. 75. 5 '- R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of Czechs and Slovaks. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965, p. 306. 52 Thomas G. Masaryk, The Making of a State. Memories and Observations /914-1918, An English version, arranged and prepared with an introduction �96 SLOVAKIA also a political reason according to Stolarik: "Masaryk rejected the Pittsburgh Agreement partly because all Slovaks did not support it. "53 Whatever the legal justifications, it was an error on the part of Masaryk to ignore the Pittsburgh Pact's political ramification and importance. Masaryk was not unaware of the meaning of both documents, and not just for the Slovaks in the United States. As Seton-Watson wrote shortly after the creation of Czecho-Slovakia: if the Pittsburgh document was in no sense a treaty, it may fairly be taken as representing the mental attitude and political aspiration of most Czechs and Slovaks in America and (what is more important) of the chief shaper of Czechoslovak policy at the supreme crisis in 1918. To this extent it has, not a legal, but a moral, value. Moreover it may safely be claimed that in the first days of the new Republic it coincided with the general feeling in the "historic lands", that the Slovaks were fully entitled to make their own terms of union. The course of events, however, inevitably gave a different tum to the question. 54 The failure to honour it, indeed the failure of the Czechoslovak government to heed the demands of the Slovak People's Party during the two decades of interwar Czechoslovakia to implement it, 55 was, in the end, paid at the price of the First Czechoslovak Republic. by Henry Wickham Steed. New York: Frederick A Stokes Co., 1927, p. 220 . Masaryk also wrote a letter to Andrej Hlinka declaring the pact a "falsum ;" the text of the letter is found in Joseph M. Kirschbaum, pp. 238-240. n Stolarik, p. 54. Italics in the original. " R.W. Seton-Watson, The New Slovakia . Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924, p. 21. 51 This is examined in detail in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, pp. I 55- I 83. �SLOVAKIA 97 Conclusion Both documents represent important milestones in the history of the Slovak search for self-determination in the twentieth century. Their chronology is important in this respect. The Pittsburgh Pact does indicate a retreat in political objectives when compared to those proposed in the Cleveland Agreement. But it also represents a willingness on the part of the Slovaks to accept autonomy if historical and international conditions made only that option possible; what was important was to have an opportunity to leave Hungary and proceed with national development. If the Cleveland Agreement was repudiated, it also served notice of an alternative. The drive to federalization in 1968 came as a result of the experience with autonomy, from the failure to implement it in 1918- I938 to the experience of its implementation in 1938-1939 and 1945-1968. Slovak independence in 1993 was achieved as a result of the experience with the federal system since 1968. Ultimately, both documents succumbed to the Czech agenda in Czechoslovakia and its failure to accommodate properly and adequately their objectives, thus making Slovak independence the only option left. Put another way: If neither document was acceptable, then neither was what they had in common, a state of the Czechs and Slovaks. In this sense, these two documents were also precursors of Slovak independence. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1998, Vol. 36 Description An account of the resource Vol. 36 (No. 66-67), 1998. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 81 The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents Stanislav J. Kirschbaum In the two centuries since the beginning of the French Revolution and the fall of Communism in Central Europe, Slovak political life has centered around the attainment of three political objectives: autonomy, federation, and independence. The first two are linked to the question of the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks in a common state while the third reflects the teleological objectives of the principle of selfdetermination whose origins go back to the French Revolution but whose implementation was proposed only on the morrow of the First World War. It was to implement this principle that Central Europe was reorganized from the break-up of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, and Romanov empires. Each one of these objectives was preceded by a series of declarations, memoranda, resolutions, pacts, and agreements that paved the way for their implementation. It is a singularity of Slovak history that there are very few such documents in this two-centuries span; Jorg K. Hoensch presents 57 that are linked to the objective of autonomy,' Karol Rebro puts together 27 that he L See Jorg K. Hoensch, Hrsg. Dokumente zur A utonomiepolitik der Slowakischen Vo/kspartei Hlinkas. Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984, pp. 71-257 . Hoen sch also includes three additional documents that deal with 82 SLOVAKIA associates with the drive to federalization,2 while Jaroslav Chovanec and Peter Mozolfk offer 32 documents that deal with or are connected to independence. 3 The difference in the numbers is explained by the fact that many of the documents that were chosen are specific to the objective sought; nevertheless, there are two that appear in all three volumes: the Cleveland Agreement and the Pittsburgh Pact. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate their importance in the attainment of Slovak political objectives in the twentieth century. It is their link to the three objectives that explains their interest. Still, one Slovak historian, Anton Spiesz, 4 and one Western scholar, Hoensch,5 have seen fit not to mention either; in all other works, they find their place in the history of the nation. Both documents share four principal characteristics. First, they embody the essence of Slovak political activity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely the attainment of selfdetermination; second, both seek the same objective: the creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks at the end of the Great War; third, they are laconic texts, in some respects even imprecise in their content; and fourth, they are linked to Slovaks living not in Slovakia, but in the United States. It is the differences between them, the reasons for these differences, and 2 independence, thus bringing the total to 60 documents. Karol Rebro, The Road to Federation. Bratislava: Tatrapress, 1970, pp. 64-130. It should be noted that Rebro includes also the text of the Treaty of Protection of 1939 between Slovakia and Germany, thus bringing the total to 28 . 1 Jaroslav Chovanec a Peter Mozolik, Historicke a statopnivne korene samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Procom, 1994, pp. 67-216. The two authors include six additional documents that pertain to Slovak history prior to the nineteenth century. •- Anton Spiesz, Dejiny Slo venska. Na ceste k sebauvedomeniu. Brati slava : Yydavatefstvo Respekt, I 992. 1 Jorg K. Hoensch, Geschichte der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918 bis 1965. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966. SLOVAKIA 83 the impact that they had that make them so interesting and that have also made them the object not only of political but also scholarly controversy. Until the international context of a world war offered the Slovaks the possibility of leaving Austria-Hungary, the main Slovak objective, shared by American Slovaks, was the attainment of a form of self-determination through self-administration. From the time of the French Revolution, three proposals embodied this objective. The first is Ignac Martinovic's democratic constitution, which he worked out at the time of the French Revolution, and which included the nationality principle; its application would have turned Slovakia into an independent administrative unit called Slavonica. As Slovak Marxist historians write: "It is in fact the first proposal to include Slovakia as an independent national administrative unit within the framework of Hungary. 116 The second is the Ziadosti slovenskeho naroda (The Demands of the Slovak Nation), worked out in May 1848; the Slovak nation demanded the recognition and guarantee of national identity; the transformation of Hungary into a state composed of equal nations, each with its own parliament and equal representation in the Hungarian Diet; and the use of Slovak in all Slovak county offices. In addition, it insisted on democratic rights, including universal and equal suffrage, the total abolition of serfdom, and the return of the land to the peasants from whom it had been taken away. 7 The third is the Memorandum slovenskeho naroda (Memorandum of the Slovak Nation) adopted in Turciansky Svaty Martin in June 1861; it sought equal rights with the Magyars, the recognition of their national individuality by law, the formation of a North Hungarian Slovak ~ Dejiny S/ovenska II. Bratislava: Veda, Vydavatefstvo Slovenskej akademie vied, I 987, p. 48 I. 1 • For the text in English, see Rebro, pp. 64-67, in Slovak, Chovanec and Mozolfk, pp. 74-77, and in German, Hoensch, pp. 71 -74. 84 SLOVAKIA District (Okolie in Slovak), Slovak as the official language of adminstration of this district, a Slovak Academy of Law and a chair of Slavonic studies in Pest, and the repeal of all Hungarian laws that infringed on the principles of the equality of the nationalities. 8 In the words of Slovak historians, the memorandum "became the basic Slovak constitutional programme even if it was not worked out in detail and contained merely basic principles about a certain Slovak autonomy within the framework of Hungary." 9 American Slovaks were familiar with Slovak objectives in Hungary, since most were immigrants to the United States, forced out by Budapest's policy of Magyarization and Hungary's slow economic development. Their main organization, the Slovak League of America, prepared a memorandum in May 1914 on the occasion of an earlier visit by Hungarian Count Mihaly Karolyi in the United States. The memorandum reiterated the demands of the 1861 Memorandum, thus in effect seeking a solution in Austria-Hungary. But it became the object of some controversy 10 as it underwent certain changes before it was · published in its final version on 2 September 1914 as the Memorandum o krivdach a JX)iiadavkach slovenskfch (Memorandum on Slovak Injustices and Demands). 11 No specific conFor the text in English, see Rebro, pp. 73-76, in Slovak, Chovanec and Mozolik, pp. 81-89, and in German, Hoensch, pp. 92-99. 9 • R. Marsina et. al., Slovenske dejiny. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992, p. 173. n This is described in Konstantfn Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda . Bratislava: Knfhtlaciarell Andreja uc. spol., 1937, pp. 20-32. 11 • The original and modified versions are found in ibid., pp. 42-52. According to Ivan Markovic: "It was a political error and an indication of insufficient political foresight on the part of the Slovak League to publish this memorandum." See Ivan Markovic, Slovaci v zahranicnej revolucii. Bratislava: no publisher, no date; lecture given on 16 April 1923, p. 13. As for its publication date, Milan Getting writes that it was published on 24 September. See Milan Getting, Americkf Slovaci a vjvin ceskoslovenskej myslienky v rokoch 1914-1918. Pittsburgh: Slovenska Telocvicna Jednota & SLOVAKIA 85 stitutional solution was put forth for Slovakia, but there was a demand for full self-administration and self-determination. In the discussions around this document the idea of Czecho-Slovak unity had also been mentioned. 12 This document opened the way for Slovak American organizations thereafter to examine a number of options that would be the object of debate for some time: 13 Slovakia in a federated Slavic state in Austria-Hungary; a Slovak-Polish union ; a Slovak-Russian union ; autonomy in a reorganized Hungary; and the creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. 14 Clearly, the objective had been redefined and had become one of national emancipation. The Cleveland Agreement _ With the outbreak of war, American Slovaks opted for cooperation with the Czechs in their struggle for national emancipation. But their approaches differed. The latter directed their efforts at the creation of a Czech state. However, according to Chovanec and Mozolfk, "the representatives of the Slovak organizations in the United States fought against the attempts of their Czech partners to attach the Slovaks as a sort of appendage to the basic Czech anti-Habsburg programme." 15 The Slovaks were seeking a solution that was in the spirit of previous Slovak demands and that would ensure national development. After months of discussions, 16 an attempt was made to create a common front and a meeting was organized in Cleveland on 22 Sokol v Amerike, 1933, p. 40. Ibid., p. 40. 13. See Markovit, p. 13. 14 • Some of these options are examined in Stanislav Matou~ek, Vznik a vfvoj spolecneho statu Cechu a Slovakii . Praha: Academia, 1980, pp. 57-60. u. Chovanec a Mozolfk, p. 19. "' For more on these discussions, see Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, VIII ( 1968), pp. 23-26. ll 86 SLOVAKIA October 1915 between representatives of Czech and Slovak American organizations. Cubomfr Liptak writes that "[t]he decision of American Slovaks to support the struggle for the creation of a common state with the Czechs - and its worth is found here - was taken after long and often bitter discussions in which the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution were weighed, including the possibilities and limits of Slovak activity." 17 The Czechs proposed a text that was only slightly modified by the Slovaks present. It has since become known as the Cleveland Agreement. Short and imprecise as it is, this text is, perhaps because of these characteristics, the object of some controversy. Composed of five points, its only two concrete proposals are found in points one and three on the independence of the Czech Lands and Slovakia and secret universal suffrage. It is the second point that has historians trying to figure out what the authors had in mind when they proposed "a union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative union of states with complete national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own parliament, its own state administration, complete cultural freedom, that is to say with the full right to use the Slovak language, its own financial and political administration, and an official Slovak state language." 18 Was this a federal proposal, if so, what kind, and if not, what was it, given its language? There are two schools of thought on this question. One rejects outright the affirmation that this was federal solution for a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. Stanislav Matousek suggests that what was proposed was a union within a federalized monarchy. He bases his argument not only on the phrase 11 • 1& Cubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci. Bratislava: Vydavatet'stvo politickej literatury, 1968, p. 64. Rebro, p. 80. Stol~rik, on the other hand, translates "vo federatfvnom zviizku ~t~tov" as "in a federal state." StolMik, p. 55. SLOVAKIA 87 "in a federative union of states" ( vo federativnom sviizku stitov), but also on the reference to Slovakia's autonomy. According to him, such a reference would not have been necessary if a federation between the Czechs and Slovaks had been envisaged; it would have been assumed for both nations. He also suggests that the authors based their understanding of federalism on their American experience. 19 The latter is also the view of some Slovak historians.'.!) Finally, to strengthen this approach, Viliam Plevza shows that reactions in the months that followed support this interpretation? Others, on the other hand, recognize the document as proposing a federal arrangement between the two nations. Rebro writes that "[t]he Cleveland Agreement represents a clear federative model of two equal nations on the basis of partnership." 22 Josef Kalvoda understands the text to mean that "[b]oth the Czechs and Slovaks were to have autonomy in the federative state to be established after the war."n Konstantin Culen indicates that the agreement "announced the federalization of the future republic". 24 Ivan Markovic and Marian Mark Stolarik perceive it as expressing a federal solution for two nationally autonomous entities. 75 Not surprisingly, some historians pass no judgment and limit themselves simply to quoting or using directly the text of the agreement. 26 Such use of the text is 19 • Matousek, pp. 61-62. n Marsina et al., p. 197. 21 • Viliam Plevza, Ceskos/ovenska statnosf a sl ovenska otazka v politike KSC. Bratislava: Praca, 1971 , pp. 49-50. n Rebro, p. 22. 21. Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1986, p. 70. ll Culen, p. 81 . 21 Markovit, p. 25; Stolarik, p. 26. li Among those who pass no judgment are Chovanec and Mozolik, p. 19, Liptak, p. 63, Franti~ek Bokes, Dejiny S/ovenska a Slovakov od najstarsfch cias po os/obodenie. Bratislava: Slovenska akademia vied a umen1, 1946, p. 350 and 88 SLOVAKIA interpreted by at least one author as a tacit acknowledgement of this interpretation.Zl Of the two, the second interpretation seems more acceptable than the first for a number of reasons. First of all, the language of the agreement suggests that its authors were not experts in political and constitutional terminology; otherwise the language would have been precise. This allows us to infer that a federation of the two nations was the objective as this was the reason for the meeting: to decide on the framework of an arrangement between them. Those who make the claim that the authors were influenced by American federalism project their own expertise and historical experience on men of a generation that had recently emigrated to the United States and whose education was not likely to have included constitutional law and political science or specialized knowledge of the American constitution. Secondly, the reference to Slovak autonomy must be seen as understandable given the Slovak political struggle in Hungary and the demands made in the documents of 1848 and 1861. For most Slovaks, this was their main point of reference in the national struggle. It is unlikely that the document would have obtained the support from American Slovaks that it did obtain had it not included a specific reference to autonomy.28 Thirdly, subsequent events indicate that American Slovaks understood that their nation would enter into a common state with the Czechs in a federal arrangement. Dusan Kovac\ Slovaci - Cesi - Dejiny. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 1997, p. 65. n. Plevza considers Liptak as belonging to those who accept the federal interpretation. See Plevza, p. 49n. 2& It is interesting to note that Albert Mamatey, President of the Slovak League in America, who would be present when the agreement was signed the next day, wrote on 21 October 1915 in Narodne noviny that the League "is for [Slovak] independence regardless of the greater state organization in which we find ourselves." Quoted in Getting, p. 63. SLOVAKIA 89 The agreement was generally well received, but Slovak Marxist historians also note that "[i]n France, the periodical Ceskoslovenska samostatnosf, as the "organ of political emigration" presented the Cleveland agreement in the spirit of Czechoslovakism - as the attainment of Czechoslovak national unity. This point of view resulted in protests because American Slovaks had begun to support all of the activities of the external struggle on the principle of two equal nations as outlined in the Cleveland agreement. "29 Slovak Americans were not unaware of Czech objectives, and in particular the role that Czechoslovak unity was playing in these objectives. They knew that they had to counter this. In addition, Frantisek Bokes writes that the agreement "did not eliminate distrust and the possibility of misunderstanding between Czechs and Slovaks. "D This uncertainty resulted in the Slovak League of America sending in April 1916 two representatives to Europe, Stefan Osusky and Gustav Kosfk, "to meet Professor [T.G.] Masaryk and to explain the Slovak program to the British and French foreign ministries."31 Nevertheless, as Culen writes: "from this meeting [in Cleveland] on, Czechs and Slovaks begin to appear together throughout the United States. "32 Such behaviour again strongly points to a Slovak understanding of what the agreement meant to them and also their determination to achieve their objective, a federation of the two nations. However, it must aso be pointed out that some American Slovaks saw the agreement as having brought forth "Czechoslovak unity" 33 . Equally interesting is that fact that 29 • Dejiny S/ovenska JI, p. 429. Italics added. Bokes, p. 35 I. 3 1. Kalvoda, p. 83. For an analysis of the Osusky-Ko§ik mission to Europe, see Stolarik, pp. 28-30. See also the interview with Osusky in ibid., pp. 59-61. :u Culen, p. 83. n Getting, p. 66. :n 90 SLOVAKIA Masaryk, despite his later behaviour, is said to have approved of it.34 The Pittsburgh Pact A series of developments soon made it clear that the Cleveland Agreement would have to be revisited, if not revised. In the first place, there was vigorous debate on the question of Czechoslovak unity and the nature of the future state in Slovak publications in the United States and abroad throughout 1916 and 1917. 35 Furthermore, according to Stolarik, in 1916 American Slovaks had "split into Slovak and Czechoslovak camps. "36 Secondly, there was the evolution of the Czech agenda and its transformation into a Czechoslovak one. 37 The creation of a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks had to be seen as embodying the principle of self-determination, as inferred from President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points38 and, above all, had to be sold to the Allied Powers. The second development put American Slovaks in a very difficult position; while they did not want to give up their objective, they needed Czech support to achieve it and they also had to ensure that their mutual project of a common state did not fail because of their demands or because of serious disputes with Ibid., p. 84. Rebro also writes that Masaryk "tried to find comprise formulations that would not contradict his own conceptions. But he could not simply refuse the terms of the Cleveland agreement because they were supported by the moral, financial and first of all voluntary help of the Slovaks abroad." Rebro, pp. 24-25. 35. Getting, pp. 85-86. 36. Stolarik, p. 22. n. For more on this see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia. The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 144-152. 31!. On the question of the role of the principle of self-determination in the Fourteen Points, see Dov Ronen, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-Determination in Central Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 48-53 . 34. SLOVAKIA 91 the Czechs. For Masaryk, the best solution to this dilemma was Czechoslovakism, that is to say the fusion of the Czechs and Slovaks into one nation. This was a concept that not only had historical roots (it was first proposed in 1848), but that could easily be proposed within the framework of the principle of selfdetermination. In addition, as the English historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote, "Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others knew even less. That was his strength in dealing with the allied leaders. "39 What Masaryk also had to do was to overcome the suspicions and disagreements that had arisen between Czechs and Slovaks in the United States and bring the latter to accept the necessity for a common front that would persuade the Allied Powers to create the new state.'° He achieved this with the document called the Pittsburgh Pact (also called the Pittsburgh Agreement) which he himself signed on two occasions, the hand-written copy on 31 May 1918, and the calligraphic copy on 14 November, the day he was elected president of Czecho-Slovakia in Prague by the Revolutionary National Assembly. The Pittsburgh document is composed of six resolutions approved by the representatives of the Slovak League of America, the Czech National Alliance, the Federation of Czech Catholics, and the Czecho-Slovak National Council in the person of Masaryk himself. Of importance to Slovakia is the acknowledgement of its own institutions, namely a state administration, a parliament, and a judiciary and the status of the Slovak language as the official language in the schools, in the public offices and in public life generally. In addition to approving a union of the two nations in an independent state, the document specifies that the state shall be a republic and that its constitution shall be 39 • CJ. A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967, p. 258. Stolarik also points out that "[t]he attitude of American Slovaks towards the Czechs changed radically in 1917." Stolarik, p. 32. 92 SLOVAKIA democratic. There is reference to "the organization of the cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks," but the most important point refers to the relegation of the "detailed provisions" to the "liberated Czechs and Slovaks and to their duly accredited representatives. 1141 The most important difference between the Cleveland and Pittsburgh texts is found in the political objectives each proposes; there was a shift from a federal solution to the autonomy of Slovakia. The Pittsburgh document not only leaves out any direct reference to the type of arrangement there would be between the Czechs and Slovaks as the Cleveland Agreement had done, but it also gives the responsibility of finding an arrangement to the "liberated Czechs and Slovaks and to their duly accredited representatives." Simply put, the agreement avoids the issue of the future constitutional make-up of the common state. It should also be noted that there is no direct use of the term autonomy; while this is clearly evident in the enumeration of the powers Slovakia would exercise, its non-mention is not without significance. It is linked directly to the avoidance of defining the future constitutional set-up of Czecho-Slovakia. Why did Masaryk, the author of the Pittsburgh Pact, propose such a text and why did the American Slovaks accept it? Aware of the differences of opinion there existed between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States, Masaryk came to the United States in order to find a common ground and eliminate any argument that might put his cause in doubt. 42 In addition, as a •1. ~ Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia . Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York, Robert A Speller & Sons Publisher, Inc., 1960, p. 326. Stolarik, translates "pravoplatnym predstavitefom" as "legal representatives" which is more correct. Stolarik, p. 56. Catholic American Slovaks, under the leadership of Jozef Hu~k. editor of Jednota , the publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest single Slovak organization in the United States, were distrustful of Masaryk. For more on Hu~ek's role, especially with regards to the Pittsburgh document, see SLOVAKIA 93 Slovak historian writes: "The need for legitimacy brought forth the Pittsburgh Pact. When Masaryk left for the United States at the end of April 1918, he went there with the clear objective of trying to overcome the President Wilson's mistrust of the plan to destroy Austria-Hungary. One of the arguments had to be a newly documented unity of the objectives of the Czech and Slovak citizens of the United States. "43 But Masaryk had a second, less evident objective: the acceptance of a document that would not put anything in his way in the achievement of the policy of Czechoslovakism. The Pittsburgh text, unlike the Cleveland one, made this possible, as Marxist historians point out: "Masaryk formulated the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in one state on the basis of equality but side-stepped the original -demand on the Slovak side, that is to say a federal constitutional organization linked to the recognition of two independent nations - the Czechs and the Slovaks. "44 The result was that "he changed the aim of the resistance movement abroad [by] leaving out the sentences about the federal structure of the Czechoslovak Republic."45 American Slovaks accepted Masaryk's text for two reasons: first they accepted his argument about the need for a document that he could show President Wilson that would convince the American president and the American public of Czech and Slovak American support for his objectives. The search for such support from the American people was made even more forcefully with the Washington Declaration of October 1918 which addressed the link between democracy and the new state: "Another document that was meant to mobilize the American public in favour of the Czecho-Slovak cause was the declaration StolArik, pp. 47-50. Koviic, p. 66 . .._ Dejiny, p. 464. -0. 4.i. Rebro, p. 25. 94 SLOVAKIA of sovereignty known as the Washington Declaration. Both documents [the Pittsburgh Pact and the Washington Declaration] fulfilled their objectives. "46 The second reason is linked to the person of Masaryk himself. He was the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the leader of the resistance movement who was received by the heads of state and government of the Allied Powers; American Slovaks had reason to trust him. In addition, the text of the Pittsburgh document did not suggest the absence of equality between the Czechs and Slovaks. Little did they suspect that he had very definite ideas about their nation which he had expressed as early as 1915 in a memorandum to the Foreign Office: "The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language. The Slovaks strive also for independence and accept the programme of union with Bohemia. "47 In addition, Masaryk also reflected an attitude toward the Slovaks that was prevalent among the Czechs: "at that time, no one among the Czechs understood the Slovak_ problem in its full importance and implication nor thought about the constitutional position of Slovakia in a Czecho-Slovak state, about the way of respecting Slovak individuality in a unitary state, not to say anything of a federation. Concrete approaches did not correspond to the sentimental-patriarchal feelings of the Czech public. "48 There was no Slovak leader, at home or abroad, who could counter Masaryk's influence and articulate properly and forcefully Slovak demands. Milan R. Stefanik was the most influential Slovak, but he was ill placed to represent the Slovaks. 46 Kovlit, p. 66. For more on the Washington Declaration, see J.B. Kozak, T.G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonske deklarace v ffjnu 1918. Praha: Melantrich, 1968 . ~- Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943, p. 125. In the United States, Hu~k was one American Slovak who was suspicious of Masaryk's motives. See Stollirik, p. 47. • Chovanec a Mozolik, p. 20. SLOVAKIA 95 As Jaroslav Sole writes about him: "The first Slovak in the struggle against the Habsburgs was a Czechoslovak -this was not only a definite paradox from the Slovak point of view, but also one of the formative conditions of the Czech approach!. "49 Masaryk had come to Pittsburgh to tell the Slovaks that he needed their support to achieve an aim that was also theirs, national emancipation. The Pittsburgh Pact, as had the Cleveland Agreement, helped to attain this objective; but that was all. There was nothing else as far as he was concerned, as later events would show. Much ink has flowed about the Pittsburgh Pact, especially about its binding character.:xi Two days before Masaryk signed the calligraphic copy, on 12 November 1918, the Revolutionary National Assembly in Prague had ratified all of the commitments that he had made during the war. Despite this ratification, the literature stresses the non-binding character of the Pittsburgh document based on one of its paragraphs. As Seton-Watson writes: "the final clause made the whole arrangement contingent upon its endorsement by constitutionally elected representatives of both Czechs and Slovaks at home after the war. "51 It was such a legal-constitutional argument that justified not only the Czechoslovak government's refusal to honour the clauses of the Pittsburgh document but also Masaryk's own repudiation of it as "a local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks upon the policy they were prepared to advocate." 52 There was 111 - Jaroslav Sole, Slovensko v ceskej politike. Banska Bystrica: M.O. Enterprise, 1993, p. 43 . n Vavro Srobar went so far as to claim that the Czechoslovak Republic gave the Slovaks rights that went beyond the autonomy provisions of the Pittsburgh Pact. See Plevza, p. 75. 5 '- R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of Czechs and Slovaks. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965, p. 306. 52 Thomas G. Masaryk, The Making of a State. Memories and Observations /914-1918, An English version, arranged and prepared with an introduction 96 SLOVAKIA also a political reason according to Stolarik: "Masaryk rejected the Pittsburgh Agreement partly because all Slovaks did not support it. "53 Whatever the legal justifications, it was an error on the part of Masaryk to ignore the Pittsburgh Pact's political ramification and importance. Masaryk was not unaware of the meaning of both documents, and not just for the Slovaks in the United States. As Seton-Watson wrote shortly after the creation of Czecho-Slovakia: if the Pittsburgh document was in no sense a treaty, it may fairly be taken as representing the mental attitude and political aspiration of most Czechs and Slovaks in America and (what is more important) of the chief shaper of Czechoslovak policy at the supreme crisis in 1918. To this extent it has, not a legal, but a moral, value. Moreover it may safely be claimed that in the first days of the new Republic it coincided with the general feeling in the "historic lands", that the Slovaks were fully entitled to make their own terms of union. The course of events, however, inevitably gave a different tum to the question. 54 The failure to honour it, indeed the failure of the Czechoslovak government to heed the demands of the Slovak People's Party during the two decades of interwar Czechoslovakia to implement it, 55 was, in the end, paid at the price of the First Czechoslovak Republic. by Henry Wickham Steed. New York: Frederick A Stokes Co., 1927, p. 220 . Masaryk also wrote a letter to Andrej Hlinka declaring the pact a "falsum ;" the text of the letter is found in Joseph M. Kirschbaum, pp. 238-240. n Stolarik, p. 54. Italics in the original. " R.W. Seton-Watson, The New Slovakia . Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924, p. 21. 51 This is examined in detail in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, pp. I 55- I 83. SLOVAKIA 97 Conclusion Both documents represent important milestones in the history of the Slovak search for self-determination in the twentieth century. Their chronology is important in this respect. The Pittsburgh Pact does indicate a retreat in political objectives when compared to those proposed in the Cleveland Agreement. But it also represents a willingness on the part of the Slovaks to accept autonomy if historical and international conditions made only that option possible; what was important was to have an opportunity to leave Hungary and proceed with national development. If the Cleveland Agreement was repudiated, it also served notice of an alternative. The drive to federalization in 1968 came as a result of the experience with autonomy, from the failure to implement it in 1918- I938 to the experience of its implementation in 1938-1939 and 1945-1968. Slovak independence in 1993 was achieved as a result of the experience with the federal system since 1968. Ultimately, both documents succumbed to the Czech agenda in Czechoslovakia and its failure to accommodate properly and adequately their objectives, thus making Slovak independence the only option left. Put another way: If neither document was acceptable, then neither was what they had in common, a state of the Czechs and Slovaks. In this sense, these two documents were also precursors of Slovak independence.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents Description An account of the resource Stanislav J. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 36 (No. 66-67), 1998 pp. 81-97 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Stanislav J., 1942- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4faeb77e99e69680a9f2152513c74572.pdf 58bc32caec09d426b05f6f702ff94fcc PDF Text Text 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or 22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 20-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/94c7af9930b8fd081eee8daaa38561f2.pdf ef787b1d3973786a30ecccafcb3db7c9 PDF Text Text SLOVAK.IA 47 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL. D., PH. D. mE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC I Introductory Note "No Constitution can be considered perfect or permanent", says R. G. Gettell in his renowned work Political Science. "The final requisite for a good constitution is that the constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State" (1). Among the critics and adversaries of the Slovak Republic there were few, if any, who read the Slovak Constitution, the fundamental principles that determined the basic nature of the Slovak ,S tate and Government, the distribution of its severeign powers among the various organs of government and the relation of the government to the people over whom its authority was exercised. We, therefore, hardly find someone who based his criticism of the Slovak Republic on the constitutional or legal basis or on the constitutional form of the Slovak state. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the U. S., in its special report No. 8, prepared in co-operation with Georgetown University and a group of experts from various parts of the United States, expressed its opinion in the following terms: "The Constitution contained principles, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal state, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state. In the beginning all power of the Slovak Republic was vested in the Parliament but later on, in 1941, after Slovakia had entered the war against the ,soviet Union, the executive was to prevai I over the legislature. "The Slovak state was far from being a perfect democracy in the traditional sense. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation" (2). This statement, though basically true and expressing to a great extent the view of the writer, should be complemented by a political as well as juridical analysis of the text of the Constitution and of the circumstances in which �48 SLOVAKIA it was drafted and adopted by the Slovak Diet. The first question seems to be: from whence came the features of the liberal, the Christian democratic , and the authoritari an State? As for the democratic traditions in Slovakia, they antidated not only the attainment of political independen ce in 1939, but also the inclusion of Slovakia into the CzechoSlovak Republic in 1918. The Slovak nobility was assimilated by the Ma,gyars to a great extent before the Slovak national revival took place at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, so that no aristocratic traditions could hinder the acceptance and developmen t of modern democratic ideas. In fact, Slovakia became the refuge of many lofty intellectual efforts during the 17th century and later it "revealed itself as a meeting-pla ce of practically all contempor ary currents of cultural and political ideas" (3). It is true that the policy of Budapest, after the Ausgleich of 1867, aimed at suppressing Slovak nationalism and Slovak political activities. This resulted in the reduction of the IS lovak representat ion in Budapest's Parliament to only two representat ives at the end of World War I. However, this situation cannot reasonably be used as a yardstick for Slovak disposition for political maturity. This became evident shortly after the creation of the CzechoSlovak Republic, when not only genuine Slovak political parties sprang up, but also, more or less, all the Czech parties extended their activities into Slovakia. Practically all political tendencies from socialism to agrarian democracy and communism found an echo in the Slovak poulation. The genuine and most representat ive Slovak parties were: 1) the Slovak People's Party, later called Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Party of National l:Jnity (since October 1938), representin g the bulk of the nationally conscious Catholic population, although some non-Catholics were among its members (the party never officially labeled its program as Catholic); and, 2) the Slovak National Party which organized those Slovak Protestants who remained faithful to the traditions of Slovak national- �SLOVAKIA 49 ism and to the idea of distinct Slovak culture and selfgovernment. All political parties in Slovakia developed during the period of 191'8-1938 along the lines of the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia which is often praised as a model of modern democratic constitutions. It must, therefore, sound highly improbable and illogial when adversaries of the Slovak State assert that all this changed from one day to another, that all the democratic traditions of Czecho-Slovakia ,w ere so weak that they were transformed without any resistance into "fascist" and "nazi" tendencies by the simple act of the declaration of Slovakia's independence. It would certainly be safe to assume that democracy survived, in many respects, the Declaration of 1M arch 14, 19'39, and that the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect the principles of democratic thinking and institutions which were alive in Slovakia. Actually, they survived to such an extent that in many respects the Slovak Constitution has a strinking resemblance to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (4). Provisions referring to legislative powers of the Parliament, election and powers of the President of the Republic, the judiciary, and the whole legal structure of the Slovak State had much in common with the Constitution of Czecho..!Slovakia which, like the ,S lovak Constitution, adopted principles of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or the fundamental principles of French and American Constitutions. The authors of the Slovak Constitution were jurists and parliamentarians educated predominantly at the universities and in the Parliament of Czecho-:Slovakia; with one or two exceptions, they were men who studied law abroad and were mainly responsible for the liberal elements in the draft of the Slovak Constitution. There are, of course, striking differences, too, as far as the ideological bases of these two constitutions are concerned. The religiosity of the Slovak people and their Christian world outlook gave quite a different ideological basis to the Slovak constitution in general, and to its many provisions regarding social institutions, which reflect the ideas of the Papal encyclicals in particular. While the Slovak �50 SLOVAKIA Constitution presents God as the ultimate source of Law and declares that the function of the Slovak Republic is to unite all the moral and economic forces of the people in a Christian and national community in order to become the executor of social justice and the protector of common good, the ideological roots of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution were as far from God and religion as were Prague's leading politicians. On the other hand, the Slovak Constitution could not but differ in provisions or institutions which were imposed by the international situation and which are described as "authoritarian." As we mentioned before, the final requisite for a good Constitution, according to Gettell, is that the Constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State. While the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia reflected certain ideological currents and political structures of the French Republic which was mainly responsible for the creation and existence of Czecho-Slovakia and for the new organization of Central Europe after First World War, the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect a new situation, new organization and a "new order" in Central Europe, created by Hitler's Germany in 1938-1939 with the consent of France and England. Considered objectively, one has to to recognize that it took courage and deep attachment to traditions to proclaim in Slovakia, in 1939, God as the ultimate source of Law and order and to use Papal encyclicals as the basis for social institutions, human and family rights on the one hand, and, on the other, "to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czechoslovak state" (5). When, in the summer of 1939, the committee appointed by the Slovak Parliament, labored on the draft of the Constitution, the political crisis in Europe was nearing its climax, and the ideological confusion attained irrational dimensions. The area of Central and Eastern Europe was exposed to ideological struggles and political ambitions of at least three Great Powers and, thus, Democracy, Communism, and Nazism as well as remnants of liberal tendencies were engaged in a rough competition for influence over the Central European peoples. Slovakia, in the middle of this ideological ferment and 1 �SLOVAKIA 51 international instability, found herself also threatened by aggression or territorial claims from her neighbors, so that even the very existence of the newly created state on the banks of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains was, from its beginning, endangered. To expect, in the midst of such political and ideological chaos, any uncompromis ing attitudes on the side of the Constitutiona l Committee would amount to expecting from it something humanly impossible. Slovakia had to take a compromising position politically and ideologically not only for reasons of good relations with her neighbors, but also, if not in the first place, in order to survive as a State, since Democracy was considered a provocation, and, in its classic form, in the summer of 1939, was already dying in all Central Eiuropean countries. An analysis of the main principles and fundamental rights will show how far the work of the Constitutiona l Committee of Slovakia - despite its compromising tenor reflects the tendencies and genuine traditions of the Slovak people. According to the expert opinion of several jurists, the Constitution adopted practically the whole sysb~m of democratic-lib eralistic constitutions of the 1'8th and 19th centuries and, though Slovakia was weighed in from the right and left between Godless bolshevism and anti-Christian neo-paganism , she brought forth a constitution "saturated with the Christian spirit and especially with the principles of the social encyclicals of the Holy See" (6). As for the features of Christian democracy, besides many institutions concerned with social life, family, attitude to work, and function of property, in which we can find the influence of modern Christian sociology, the Christian character was given to the whole Constitution by its Preamble which reads as follows: "The Slovak nation, under the protection of Almighty God, survived throughout the ages on the territory destined for its national development and there, with the help of God, Who is the Source of all Power and Law, established its independent Slovak State. "The SI ova k State unites, according to Natural Law, all the moral and economic forces of the Nation in a Christian and national community for the purpose of regulating clashing social aspirations and mutually opposed interests of all occupational and professional groups, and has for its goal the highest attainable degree of happi- �52 SLOVAKIA ness of society and the individual. This ideal can only be achieved through a moral and political process, initiated by the State, which in harmonious unity will function as an executor of social justice and a protector of common good." It would certainly be difficult to find among the constitutions of modern states any other which so clearly states that God must be recognized as the original source of Law and Order and that the function of the nation in a Christian and national community in order to become "an executor of social justice and protector of common good" (7). The accentuation of the social function of the State, which we find in the Preamble, and the emphasis placed on the happiness of both the individual and society, are an indication of the legislators' intention to build a modern welfare state on the principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how these ideas found their expressions in particular provisions and institutions of the Slovak Constitution. n General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution It is not necessary to be an expert in constitutional law to notice that the Slovak Constitution contains all the democratic devices which political science usually requires from democratic constitutions - such as the separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and balances, and the principle of rule by law. Even the most bitter adversaries of Slovak independence - the Communists and the supporters of Czechoslovakism - did not try to deny these features to the Slovak Constitution. "The Slovak State was intended to make a full show of independence," wrote Alexander IKunosi, one of today's communist diplomats of Czecho-,Slovakia, in 11944, from his London exile: "It was to be vested with all the institutions formerly possessed by the Czechoslovak State. Steps were taken to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czecho-Slovak State" (8). Admitting this, the adversaries of the Slovak Republic could not try to say that "the parlimentary facade of Government in Slovakia had, of course, no real signifi1 �SLOVAKIA 53 cance, " or that the "Diet did not express the will of the nation or the people," which, as we shall see further , hardly correspond with the truth since the Parliament in Slovakia was not only in theory but also in fact the suprem e organ of the State and the most essential powers were vested in Parliament from the beginning to the end. The Constitution was adopted by a legally constit uted Slovak Diet which was established in accordance with the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and on the basis of the general election which took place on December 18, 19'38. According to Law No. 299, adopted on November 22, 1938, Slovakia became an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, with her own Government and her own Diet composed of 63 members, vested with legislative powers goveerning not only internal affairs, but required also for ratification of Czecho-Slovak international agreements concerning Slovakia. This Diet, summoned to a session on March 14, 1939, by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil H a c h a , declared Slovakia an independent State, and a special committee of the Diet prepared the draft of the Constitution which was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1939, as Law No. 185. The draft of the Constitution was preceded by a study of several existing modern constitutions with a view to giving the country a set of principles that would correspond with contemporary constitutional thinking and the practical needs and national traditions of the Slovak people. The text was prepared by two university professors of Law, Dr. V. Tuka and Dr. F. :Durcansky, and by several jurists and parliamentarians of young and old generations, Senator Dr. K. Mederly, Dr. M. Sokol, Dr. V. Tvrdy, and Dr. Cerhelyi. In 103 short articles (paragraphs) divided into 13 chapters, the Slovak Constitution gave a radical as well as social basis to the new State in Central Europe. The first article of the Constitution declared the Slovak State a Republic with a President as an elected head, with t erms, according to Gettell, are used to indicate a representative democracy (9) . According to articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, legislative power �54 SLOVAKIA for the entire country vested in the Parliament, composed of 80 members and elected in a general, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a period of five years. The right to vote belonged to every citizen over 2'1 years of age, man and woman, without racial or religious discrimination. This right to be elected to Parliament belonged to citizens over 30 years of age. The Parliament was based on the unicameral system,. and the President of the Republic was obliged to convene the Parliament for regular sessions twice a year, and for extraordinary sessions whenever the majority of members. demanded such a session. Laws promulgated by the Parliament required the President's signature for their validity. Paragraph 26 provided, however, that laws could be promulgated despite the President's veto, if they were adopted by a three-fifths majority in the presence of a two-thirds majority of deputies. The right to appoint governments belonged to the President, but the Government was responsible to Parliament and subject to its vote of confidence. The Parliament also had the right of prosecution of the· President for high treason. Part IN of the Constitution deals with the powers and functions of the President, who was elected for a period of seven years. Any citizen, 40 years of age or over, was eligible for the office, and the election was valid if two. thirds of the members were present and the candidate obtained a three-fifths majority. A comparision of powers and functions of the Slovak ·P resident, as defined in the Constitution, with those of other parliamentary democracies will prove that his powers were somewhere between the extensive functions and powers of the American president and the purely representative functions of the Presidents of France (before De Gaulle). He represented the State internationally, had the right, with the consent of Parliament to declare wars and conclude peace, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to appoint, but not to dismiss university professors, judges, civil servants, and military officers of the three highest categories. He also had the right to be present at the sessions of the Government and Council of State, to request their convention under his chairmanship, �SLOVAKIA 55 to convene, dissolve and prologue Parliament, to sign or veto Parliament's acts, etc. While making the president a dominant figure of the executive, the Constitution, on the other hand, contained provisions which were designed to prevent dictatorial powers (10). The Parliament was able, as we have seen, to promulgate laws even if opposed by the President and according to paragraph 40, "any executive act of the president requires counter-signature by a competent cabinet minister for its validity." No person could be re-elected more than once to the presidential office and when the president died during his term, abdicated or was permanently unable to exercise his functions, it was the duty of the Prime Minister to assume temporary functions of the president. A new president had to be elected by the iParliament within thirty days. The President represented, together with the Cabinet, the executive of the !Slovak Republic and, consequently, the Slovak Government had some features of a presidential type of government and, at the same time, it also contained elements of parliamentary government. An expert on constitutional theories can prove both, because - while the essential characteristics of parliamentary government are: 1) a politically independent head of State; and, 2) a cabinet which is politically responsible to Parliament - "parliamentary Government may also develop in the opposite direction. The Cabinet can become the dominant political organ, able to control the government of the country and direct the work of the Parliament which assists it in the execution of its program," says Andre Mathiot in his ercellent treatise "The British Political System" (11). it is not, however, our intention to discuss theoretical issues here. One can easily prove that the executive in the Slovak Republic was also predominantly of the presidential type, because "every system of 'P arliamentary government has its own distinctive features, resulting from a complex of many different factors. History, the national temperament, beliefs and ideologies, conventions of political behavior, attempts to imitate a particular model or to avoid certain dangers, etc." - states Mathiot. All these factors �56 SLOVAKIA played their distinctive roles in the Slovak Constitution and made it a constitution "sui generis." As for the powers and constitution of the Slovak Cabinet, the President of the Republic appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and determined which member would administer individual ministries (Article 41). The Parliament was also empowered to call the Cabinet and its individual members to political responsibility and to express lack of confidence which would result in the dissolution of the cabinet (Article 48) . Practical considerations demanded, on the other hand, a certain measure of delegation of legislative powers to the Cabinet. The jurisdiction of the Cabinet was limited to governmental orders, namely, during a national emergency, or orders pertaining to the execution of certain types of laws, and within the limits specified in the laws. Validity of such orders was conditional, since the Prime Minister was obliged to submit them within three months to the Parliament, which, in turn, could disallow such measures or could make whatever changes it deemed necessary, or pass it as its own law (12). Chapter V of the Slovak Constitution defined the functions and composition of the Council of State, a pecial body composed of outstanding personalities from various walks of life whose functions pertained to a sort of control of the political life in ,Slovakia. The Council was composed of 6 members appointed by the President of the Republic, ten members were chosen by the Slovak People's Party, two members by the registered parties of ethnic groups, and one was delegated by each estate. The Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly were also memb2rs of the Council. The functions of the Council were defined by the Article 52 and consisted in initiating legislation, controlling and prosecuting the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, and in advising the President and the government on matters of a political, cultural, and economic nature. The Council also prepared the list of candidates for parliamentary elections and made decisions concerning the loss of 0 �SLOVAKIA 57 parliamentary seats, following a request from the President of the Assembly. Politically, the reason for the existence of the Council was given by the desire to have, in the absence of a Senate, representatives in the political life of the new State from groups or professions who usually did not look for an election to Parliament, but whose advice, abilities, and moral stature were destined to help the Government in its endeavour to make the population happy and united behind the political leadership. The authors of the draft of the Constitution expressed their intention in stating that "the Council of State is the expression of political and national unity, and also joins the national and political life with the constitutional representatives, combining itself the function of legal initiation and control." Following the social doctrine of the Papal encyclicals, the authors of the Constitution also included in their draft certain institutions which characterize the so-called "corporative" systems. Chapter VII of the Slovak Constitution had foressen organization of Slovakia's inhabitants into six self-administered bodies called "stavy" (estates) according to occupation and profession: the association of workers and employers in agriculture, in industry, trade, commerce and banking; the association of the free professions and the association of State and public employees. "The associations included both employers and employees and they were assigned to take care of the economic, social, and cultural interests of their members, to solve labor and wage disputes and problems among employees and employers, and to help members of the association to achieve better results in their industries and occupations and a higher standard of living for the nation (Article 62). Acting on Law No. 297 of the Collection of Laws, the President of the Republic appointed the presidents on November 19, 1940, and the aim of the associations was again given as "to manifest the unity of the Slovak workers' community, without heed to classes and callings, and bearing in mind only the interests of the nation and the State" (13). As for the judiciary, we have already stated that the Slovak Constitution was based on the principle of separa- �58 SLOVAKIA tion of powers, as defined by modern political theories. There were three types of courts: courts of law, administrative courts, and military courts. The organization of courts and their legal competence were left to a special legislation. As in any modern constitutions, the Slovak Constitution provided that the courts of law were empowered to review any decision of administrative courts and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of military courts could be extended over the civil population during wartime and for war crimes. "Judges are independent," states Article 67, "in their judicial functions and are bound only by law." The Constitution contained provisions that no person could be deprived of the judge designated by law to hear the case (Article 62), and Article 66 made the judiciary free of any interference either on the part of administrative or political leadership. The professional judges were appointed to their positions permanently and "they have held a highly privileged position, appropriate to their equally high office," states Judge A. Peltzner (14). The Chapter dealing with the rights and obligations of the citizens (Chapter X) can sustain comparision with any democratic and liberal constitution and a modern "Bill of Rights." The 1Slovak Constitution guaranteed full and equal rights to all citizens without distinction of sex, race, creed, occupation, or ethnic origin. The guarantees refer to personal freedoms, private ownership, religious freedom, freedom of expression of opinion, scientific research and arts (15), provided they were exercised within the limits of valid laws and did not come into conflict with public order and Christian morals [Article 85] - (16). The Constitution was based on the principle that "no person can be punished for behavior which is not in conflict with valid legal form and for which a punishment has not been previously determined," applying the old principle "nulla poena sine lege," and all inhabitants, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, or occupation, were entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property (Article 81). There are, in the Slovak Constitution, even some particular provisions which intended to give to the Slovak State �SLOVAKIA 59 a progressive, modern, social and Christian character. Such provisions are as follows: Ownership has a social function and demands from the owner adminstration in the best interest of the common good (Article 79). Marriage, family and motherhood are under the· strict protection of the legal order (Article 86). Labor is protected. Exploitation of socially weak citizens is. prohibited. Wages should be adequate to the working effort and family status. Mental and physical work is a civil duty, etc. "All these provisions can be described," says Dr. Peltzner, "as an intensified care and protection of the family, social purpose of private ownership, protection of the working man, his wages, and social justice to all. All were aimed at achieving a new social order, where clashing social interests would be minimized and eventually abolished. This concept of social and labor legislation was greatly influenced by the encyclical letters of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno" (17). ln order to present a complete picture of the Slovak Constitution, we have to mention provisions regarding political parties. The chapter dealing with the political organization (Chapter Vil) merely legalized the existing situation which was created in Slovakia by the so-called Zilina .A:greement of October 6, 1938, long before Slovakia declared her independence and the Parliament adopted the Constitution. The provision referring to political parties consists of only two paragraphs, the first stating that "the Slovak people participate in political life through the medium of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity) ," and the second legalizing the political activities of ethnic groups, providing that "the ethnic groups participate in political life through a medium of their own political party, provided that such a party can be considered as a representative of the political will of the entire ethnic group" (Articles 58, 59). Since October, 1938, when the number of political parties was reduced due to internal and international circumstances and development, there were in Slovakia three po1 �60 SLOVAKIA litical parties, legally constituted and taking part in the political life of Slovakia. The Communist and the Social Democrat parties, representing only ten deputies, had been dissolved or suppressed following the Zilina Agreement. Six other parties merged into the Slovak National Unity Party, which remained the backbone of the political s y s t e m of autonomous Slovakia before March 1939, and of the Slovak Republic thereafter. The German and Magyar ethnic groups were represented by two minority parties, and the Ukrainian minority by a member of Parliament within Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the Party of National Unity. The fact that the Slovak Constitution provided for only one party for the Slovak people caused certain criticism abroad and marked, according to some critics, the Slovak R e p u b 1 i c as an authoritarian state. For everybody who knows the Slovak political life between the years 1918-1939 and who is aware of the composition of the Slovak Diet in which representatives of practically all previous political parties except Communists and Social Democrats had their seats, such reproaches would seem to be more of a theoretical than practical nature. There is no doubt that without provisions restricting political life of the Slovak population to one party only, even if it was composed of fractions of many parties, the Constitution would have looked more democratic and beyond reproach, because a multiparty system is one of the main characteristics of modern representative democracies. However, war conditions and specific needs and dangers forced the Slovak political leaders to adopt many restrictions which are understandable only if we take into consideration all the problems and dangers which the Slovak Republic had to face from the first days of its existence to the end of the war from the outside and the inside. This as well as other features which marked the Slovak Constitution as "authoritarian" were or will be discussed later in this treatise. Before concluding our remarks on the general characteristics of the Slovak Constitution, it seems appropriate to analyze the formal features of the text and its contents. In this respect, we can say that from the point of view of political science and constitutional law, the Slo- �SLOVAKIA 61 vak Constitution conforms to all requirements which political science demands from modern constitutions. It can be classified as a comprehensive set of fundamental principles and laws covering the whole field of government and making provisions for the exercise of political power. It outlined the governmental organization, determined the relations of the governors and the governed, and provided a legal method for amendments, so that it might be changed when necessary by the prescribed majority in Parliament. m "Authoritarian" Features and Deviations The statement of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives mentions that the Slovak Constitution contained also principles of "an authoritarian state." There is, however, no indication in the report where these principles are to be found, except perhaps in the words that "the executive was to prevail over the legislature after Slovakia, in 1941, had entered the war against the Soviet Union," and that "the number of political parties was reduced - after the Communist and the Social Democrat parties. had been suppressed as subversive - in October, 1938, and the six other parties merged into the Slovak Unity Party, the backbone of the political system of the Slovak State." Actually, the Constitution did not reduce the number of Slovak political parties. It merely legalized a situation which was created in Slovakia in 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia became a federation. We have already explained in part how and why this happened and that unity was not forced on any political party as was later claimed. The representatives of all Slovak and Czecho-Slovak parties were happy that the victorious autonomist movement did not resort to reprisals, and the Slovak population, regardless of previous political affiliation or creed, also approved the new situation. Though the law and electoral system allowed participation of many parties and the autonomous government of Dr. Tiso published an announcement requiring political parties to file the list of their candidates for election, only the Slovak People's Party - the Party of National Unity filed a joint list of candidates which contained leading per- �62 SLOVAKIA sonalities of all previous parties except the Communist and Social Democrats. The new Slovak Parliament issued from this election, held on December 18, 1938, and conducted under the rules of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and electoral system, was composed of 48 former Populists, 12 former agrarian, Artisans, Slovak Nationalists and even National Socialists (Dr. E. Benes's Party), two Germans, one Hungarian, and one Ukrainian. It was this Diet which unanimously proclaimed Slovakia on March 14, 1939, an independent State and adopted the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. There were no changes in Party system or in the composition of party representatives in 1939, and former adherents of Prague's centralism worked in the 1Slovak Parliament and Party organs quite happily together with former autonomists, Protestant ministers with the Catholic clergy, agrarians with artisans, etc. , until 1944, when the outcome of the War became clearly unfavorable to the further existence of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho.,Slovakia by the ,Soviets and Allies was in sight. There was, of course, a change in the structure of the Party of National Unity, which combined from March, 1939, nominations with election of Party functionaries on all levels, and the role of the Party altered considerably. The President of the Party, Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, and this writer as Secretary General, insisted on avoiding imitation of foreign models either in ideology or organization, as had been admitted even by Communist and Czech adversaries (18). Some features and symbols of Italian and German party systems were nevertheless adopted, and on the surface there was an adaptation to the "New Order" in Central Europe, which in some respect was far from a parliamentarian or representative democracy in the traditional sense. In practice and ideologically Slovakia, however, continued the "decrepit democratic system of Benes' Republic," as Hitler stated in his reproach to the Slovak leaders in July, 1940, during the so-called "Salzburg Summons." After the Salzburg meeting which resulted in the forced resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Af- �SLOVAKIA 63 fairs, Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, and of this writer a:s Secretary General of the Party, some measures were adopted which did not correspond either with the letter or with the spirit of the Slovak Constitution and which measures effected, in some respects, "the executive prevailed over the legislature." The Party's importance for some time considerably diminished and the Hlinka Guard, originally and according to the law a section of the ·P arty, tried to control the Party and political life, but this development did not bring about any constitutional changes, it did not last for any length of time, and was either challenged or disapproved and finally checked by the Parliament, the President and the Party leaders (19). It is a matter of fact that there were, in this period, attempts to introduce a sort of "Slovak National Socialism" in the administration of public affairs and there were arbitrary actions of irresponsible persons and groups against certain ,groups of population, but the Parliament and especally the President and the .P arty tried to stop these currents and transgressions and gained satisfactory control of the situation in this case, as in the first weeks after the declaration of independence. This, however, did not prevent the adversaries of the Slovak •S tate from an incorrect and often malicious interpretation of the intentions of the Slovak political leaders who centralized political institutions and also economic and administrative offices only because they were forced to do so by war conditions and by the desire to achieve unity of the nation which was before intentionally divided into many fractions by Prague's rulers who ruled Slovakia during twenty years according to the old dictum "divide et impera." They presented many institutions which were imposed upon Slovakia by war conditions and the international situation as a part of a "totalitarian or authoritative system," though, on the other hand, they admitted that "public offices and institutions which had not formerly existed in 1Slovakia, were introduced on a Czecho..Slovak model, among them the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Audit Department, the Post �64 SLOVAKIA Office Savings Bank, the National Bank, the Land Office, the Statistics Office, etc. " (20). The war imposed a number of new offices everywhere, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, such as: Price Control Office, Central :Eiconomic Office, Propaganda Office, etc. When similar offices were organized in Slovakia, the adversaries of Slovak independence, from their London or Washington asylums, denounced them as proofs and instruments of "authoritarian" or "nazi and fascist" systems and oppression. No doubt, the Slovak administration during the last years of the war had some offices and institutions which had names or structures similar to German or Italian institutions, but there was "a mixture of old and new elements," as admitted even by the Communists and Czech adversaries and definitely the democratic or "Czechoslovak" model prevailed and the intention of the responsible Slovak leaders behind all these institutions was not to introduce nazism or fascism, but to secure prosperity, security, and smooth functioning of the new State, or in other words, to save the Slovak people and its substance at a time when it was faced with physical and spiritual ruin. Some original "authoritarian" features of the !Slovak Constitution are due to the fact that the jurists and Parliamentarians who prepared the draft looked for inspirations in the countries which were in similar political or geographical situations and equally threatened either by the impact of nazism or communism. For this reason mainly the Constitution of Austria under Dolfuss-Schuschni gg and the Constitution of Portugal were studied by some members of the preparatory legislative committee and, while the Ausstrian Constitution showed them how to defend the country against infiltration of German National Socialist ideology, the Constitution of Portugal was studied because of the threat of Communist infiltration. Adversaries of Slovak independence who knew that this was the correct interpretation of the "authoritarian" elements in the Slovak Constitution, tried to prove, of course, the very opposite: they spoke and wrote of a deliberate introduction of "nazi" or "fascist" ideology and system, using for proof some short comings or measures imposed by the war and German pressure �SLOVAKIA 65 on Slovak Administration and Government. They also failed to realize that "the value of any form of government may be judged either by the success and efficiency with which it accomplishes its proper purposes or by the effect which it produces on its citizens and the degree of satisfaction and confidence that they feel toward it," as Gettel says. That there were problems and shortcomings, none among responsible Slovak leaders had ever denied. "Our constitutional o~gans, our legislation, executive, and judiciary are in their infancy," wrote the official newspaper Slovak. "We shall show no weakness if we admit that here and there various institutions are still very shaky." There was quite open criticism of all shortcomings and often violent attacks on institutions and leaders from many parts, even from President Tiso and the young leadership of the Party, because, while there was formally only one Slovak political party, the public heard critical voices, and public opinion was created outside Parliament by the Party press, Hlinka Guard press, German and Hungarian minority press, and clandestine Communist opposition. All of them wrote and spoke from their own angles and viewpoints. Certainly, too many voices for an "authoritarian" or "nazi" regime and State - a fact which was later recognized even by some adversaries. "The fact remains," reported Dr. M. Kvetko, one of the leaders of the "People's Democracy," installed in Slovakia in collaboration with the Communists, to American authorities in Germany in 1948, "that a significant number of the politicians of the Slovak People's Party, and especially of the populace, were not inclined to fascism and prevented its spread so effectively that, excepting the retaliations against Jews and Communists, no special actions were undertaken against the vast majority of the people. And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed the affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collaboration (with nazism) as the Communists tried to do in order to frighten the people and create chaos, so that they could come to power." This chapter was intended, however, to deal with the �66 SLOVAKIA Constitution of the Slovak Republic which, without being changed, remained the basis of legal system and ,governmental structure from 1939 to 1945, when Russians armies overran the country, raping and looting without precedence in Slovak history, and imposed on the Slovak people the new "people's democracy" and Czech domination within the framework of a restored Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak Constituaion reflected old Slovak Christian and democratic traditions and there can hardly be any doubt that the responsible Slovak leaders endeavoured to govern in accordance with the Constitution, and only because of limitations imposed by the international situation and other circumstances which were beyond the control of the people and their leaders, t here were deviations from the Constitution. For this reason it can be admitted that "the Slovak State reflected a compromise between the past and present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central E' u rope." And for the same reason the Slovak Constitution "contained principles which in some aspects combined features of the liberal, the Christian Democratic, and the authoritarian State." 1. R. ,G. Gettell: Political Science, University of Calif., 1933, p. 244. 2. Cfr.: "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czecho-Slovakia," Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 14, Washington, 1954. The Select Committee was composed of Congressmen, as well as a group of experts from Georgetown University and various parts of the United States. 3. Milan Hodza : Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, p. 208-9. 4. Cfr . .Alexander Kunosi: The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity, London, 1944, p. 86; and H. Lee MdBain: The New Constitutions of Europe, New York, 1922, p. 307-342. 5. Even communist adversaries has to admit that "the Nazi model was not shamelessly imposed" and that "the n ew Slovak state was launched with all the paraphernalia of a national ideology apparently corporative and Christian," as wrote K. Kunosi in London, in 1944. 6. Joseph .A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de !'Europe, Paris, 1955, p. 12.7-131; also article by J. F. Gleiman in symposium Slovenska Republika, ed. N. Sprinc, Scranton, Pa., 1949, p. 108-112, and the English translation in Slovakia, Middletown, Pa., Vol. II, No. 3, p. 20 . .An excellent analysis of the Slovak Constitution was also prepared by former judge .Anton Peltzner, DL. D., as a thesis for the M. .A. degree at the U niversity of Montreal in 1957. �SLOVAKIA 67 7. "This presentation of God as the ultimate ,s ource of Law, and the interdependence of human and divine order as reflected in the Preamble of the Slovak !Constitution can prompt one to question." says Dr. A. Peltzner in his analysis, "why the authors of the text considered it wise and appropriate to formulate the preface in such a sense and import." The answer, in his opinion and in the opinion of all who are familiar with the history of the Slovak people, is based on two elements: l) there was a long and sincere dedication of the Slovak people to their religion, and a mutually long and faithful service of the Slovak clergy to their nation ; and, 2) the geographical position of the Slovak Republic was such that, on the Eastern frontiers stood the might of ,M arxist atheism, and from the Western side there was a potential danger of spreading and infiltrating of modern paganism, as formulated and taught by ,o erman National Socialism. The political leaders of the Slovak people considered it, therefore, as highly desirable to state that '\Slovaks stood firmly by their national traditions, of which belief in God and His Omnipotence was the substance of the whole concept." - Cfr. Dr. A. Peltzner: The Slovak Constitution and Modern Political Theory, p . 105. 8. Ibidem, p. 8·6. 9. lbidem, p. 195. 10. Ibidem, p. 48. 11. Andre Mathiot: The Bri tish Political System , London, 1958, p . 13·5. 12. The Constitution empowered the Cabinet to issue a government order with -the legal force and effect of law when economic, financial or political interests of the State required immediate attention, and only when lack of action could cause irreparable damage to these interests. 13. Cfr. Kunosi: Opus cit., p. 86. 14. ilbidem, pp. 76-82. 15. See: Chapter X, articles 75-85. That some of these freedoms were later limited or in individual cases disregarded, nobody would deny. The war imposed restrictions on personal freedoms in every country. In Slovakia, one could hardly expect that ideological influences of Germany and the political and economic pressures of war conditions would not result in a restriction of civil rights, or in transgressions by some individuals or groups of individuals. This, however, was not the fault of the Constitution, and as for the President of the Slovak !Republic and the Parliament, they tried to apply restrictions with respect to human life and natural rights. 16. 'The measures adopted against Jewish citizens were in many regards unconstitutional and mainly a result of German interference and deceit, especially as far as the transfer of a part of Slovak Jews to Poland was concerned. They were destined for labor, not extermination. The President as well as other Slovak authorities tried to avoid the tragedy but were able to save only a portion of those to be transferred. On the attitude of the Slovak Population see Raport du Co mite In- �68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the � SLOVAK.IA 47 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL. D., PH. D. mE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC I Introductory Note "No Constitution can be considered perfect or permanent", says R. G. Gettell in his renowned work Political Science. "The final requisite for a good constitution is that the constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State" (1). Among the critics and adversaries of the Slovak Republic there were few, if any, who read the Slovak Constitution, the fundamental principles that determined the basic nature of the Slovak ,S tate and Government, the distribution of its severeign powers among the various organs of government and the relation of the government to the people over whom its authority was exercised. We, therefore, hardly find someone who based his criticism of the Slovak Republic on the constitutional or legal basis or on the constitutional form of the Slovak state. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the U. S., in its special report No. 8, prepared in co-operation with Georgetown University and a group of experts from various parts of the United States, expressed its opinion in the following terms: "The Constitution contained principles, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal state, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state. In the beginning all power of the Slovak Republic was vested in the Parliament but later on, in 1941, after Slovakia had entered the war against the ,soviet Union, the executive was to prevai I over the legislature. "The Slovak state was far from being a perfect democracy in the traditional sense. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation" (2). This statement, though basically true and expressing to a great extent the view of the writer, should be complemented by a political as well as juridical analysis of the text of the Constitution and of the circumstances in which �48 SLOVAKIA it was drafted and adopted by the Slovak Diet. The first question seems to be: from whence came the features of the liberal, the Christian democratic , and the authoritari an State? As for the democratic traditions in Slovakia, they antidated not only the attainment of political independen ce in 1939, but also the inclusion of Slovakia into the CzechoSlovak Republic in 1918. The Slovak nobility was assimilated by the Ma,gyars to a great extent before the Slovak national revival took place at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, so that no aristocratic traditions could hinder the acceptance and developmen t of modern democratic ideas. In fact, Slovakia became the refuge of many lofty intellectual efforts during the 17th century and later it "revealed itself as a meeting-pla ce of practically all contempor ary currents of cultural and political ideas" (3). It is true that the policy of Budapest, after the Ausgleich of 1867, aimed at suppressing Slovak nationalism and Slovak political activities. This resulted in the reduction of the IS lovak representat ion in Budapest's Parliament to only two representat ives at the end of World War I. However, this situation cannot reasonably be used as a yardstick for Slovak disposition for political maturity. This became evident shortly after the creation of the CzechoSlovak Republic, when not only genuine Slovak political parties sprang up, but also, more or less, all the Czech parties extended their activities into Slovakia. Practically all political tendencies from socialism to agrarian democracy and communism found an echo in the Slovak poulation. The genuine and most representat ive Slovak parties were: 1) the Slovak People's Party, later called Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Party of National l:Jnity (since October 1938), representin g the bulk of the nationally conscious Catholic population, although some non-Catholics were among its members (the party never officially labeled its program as Catholic); and, 2) the Slovak National Party which organized those Slovak Protestants who remained faithful to the traditions of Slovak national- �SLOVAKIA 49 ism and to the idea of distinct Slovak culture and selfgovernment. All political parties in Slovakia developed during the period of 191'8-1938 along the lines of the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia which is often praised as a model of modern democratic constitutions. It must, therefore, sound highly improbable and illogial when adversaries of the Slovak State assert that all this changed from one day to another, that all the democratic traditions of Czecho-Slovakia ,w ere so weak that they were transformed without any resistance into "fascist" and "nazi" tendencies by the simple act of the declaration of Slovakia's independence. It would certainly be safe to assume that democracy survived, in many respects, the Declaration of 1M arch 14, 19'39, and that the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect the principles of democratic thinking and institutions which were alive in Slovakia. Actually, they survived to such an extent that in many respects the Slovak Constitution has a strinking resemblance to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (4). Provisions referring to legislative powers of the Parliament, election and powers of the President of the Republic, the judiciary, and the whole legal structure of the Slovak State had much in common with the Constitution of Czecho..!Slovakia which, like the ,S lovak Constitution, adopted principles of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or the fundamental principles of French and American Constitutions. The authors of the Slovak Constitution were jurists and parliamentarians educated predominantly at the universities and in the Parliament of Czecho-:Slovakia; with one or two exceptions, they were men who studied law abroad and were mainly responsible for the liberal elements in the draft of the Slovak Constitution. There are, of course, striking differences, too, as far as the ideological bases of these two constitutions are concerned. The religiosity of the Slovak people and their Christian world outlook gave quite a different ideological basis to the Slovak constitution in general, and to its many provisions regarding social institutions, which reflect the ideas of the Papal encyclicals in particular. While the Slovak �50 SLOVAKIA Constitution presents God as the ultimate source of Law and declares that the function of the Slovak Republic is to unite all the moral and economic forces of the people in a Christian and national community in order to become the executor of social justice and the protector of common good, the ideological roots of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution were as far from God and religion as were Prague's leading politicians. On the other hand, the Slovak Constitution could not but differ in provisions or institutions which were imposed by the international situation and which are described as "authoritarian." As we mentioned before, the final requisite for a good Constitution, according to Gettell, is that the Constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State. While the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia reflected certain ideological currents and political structures of the French Republic which was mainly responsible for the creation and existence of Czecho-Slovakia and for the new organization of Central Europe after First World War, the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect a new situation, new organization and a "new order" in Central Europe, created by Hitler's Germany in 1938-1939 with the consent of France and England. Considered objectively, one has to to recognize that it took courage and deep attachment to traditions to proclaim in Slovakia, in 1939, God as the ultimate source of Law and order and to use Papal encyclicals as the basis for social institutions, human and family rights on the one hand, and, on the other, "to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czechoslovak state" (5). When, in the summer of 1939, the committee appointed by the Slovak Parliament, labored on the draft of the Constitution, the political crisis in Europe was nearing its climax, and the ideological confusion attained irrational dimensions. The area of Central and Eastern Europe was exposed to ideological struggles and political ambitions of at least three Great Powers and, thus, Democracy, Communism, and Nazism as well as remnants of liberal tendencies were engaged in a rough competition for influence over the Central European peoples. Slovakia, in the middle of this ideological ferment and 1 �SLOVAKIA 51 international instability, found herself also threatened by aggression or territorial claims from her neighbors, so that even the very existence of the newly created state on the banks of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains was, from its beginning, endangered. To expect, in the midst of such political and ideological chaos, any uncompromis ing attitudes on the side of the Constitutiona l Committee would amount to expecting from it something humanly impossible. Slovakia had to take a compromising position politically and ideologically not only for reasons of good relations with her neighbors, but also, if not in the first place, in order to survive as a State, since Democracy was considered a provocation, and, in its classic form, in the summer of 1939, was already dying in all Central Eiuropean countries. An analysis of the main principles and fundamental rights will show how far the work of the Constitutiona l Committee of Slovakia - despite its compromising tenor reflects the tendencies and genuine traditions of the Slovak people. According to the expert opinion of several jurists, the Constitution adopted practically the whole sysb~m of democratic-lib eralistic constitutions of the 1'8th and 19th centuries and, though Slovakia was weighed in from the right and left between Godless bolshevism and anti-Christian neo-paganism , she brought forth a constitution "saturated with the Christian spirit and especially with the principles of the social encyclicals of the Holy See" (6). As for the features of Christian democracy, besides many institutions concerned with social life, family, attitude to work, and function of property, in which we can find the influence of modern Christian sociology, the Christian character was given to the whole Constitution by its Preamble which reads as follows: "The Slovak nation, under the protection of Almighty God, survived throughout the ages on the territory destined for its national development and there, with the help of God, Who is the Source of all Power and Law, established its independent Slovak State. "The SI ova k State unites, according to Natural Law, all the moral and economic forces of the Nation in a Christian and national community for the purpose of regulating clashing social aspirations and mutually opposed interests of all occupational and professional groups, and has for its goal the highest attainable degree of happi- �52 SLOVAKIA ness of society and the individual. This ideal can only be achieved through a moral and political process, initiated by the State, which in harmonious unity will function as an executor of social justice and a protector of common good." It would certainly be difficult to find among the constitutions of modern states any other which so clearly states that God must be recognized as the original source of Law and Order and that the function of the nation in a Christian and national community in order to become "an executor of social justice and protector of common good" (7). The accentuation of the social function of the State, which we find in the Preamble, and the emphasis placed on the happiness of both the individual and society, are an indication of the legislators' intention to build a modern welfare state on the principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how these ideas found their expressions in particular provisions and institutions of the Slovak Constitution. n General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution It is not necessary to be an expert in constitutional law to notice that the Slovak Constitution contains all the democratic devices which political science usually requires from democratic constitutions - such as the separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and balances, and the principle of rule by law. Even the most bitter adversaries of Slovak independence - the Communists and the supporters of Czechoslovakism - did not try to deny these features to the Slovak Constitution. "The Slovak State was intended to make a full show of independence," wrote Alexander IKunosi, one of today's communist diplomats of Czecho-,Slovakia, in 11944, from his London exile: "It was to be vested with all the institutions formerly possessed by the Czechoslovak State. Steps were taken to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czecho-Slovak State" (8). Admitting this, the adversaries of the Slovak Republic could not try to say that "the parlimentary facade of Government in Slovakia had, of course, no real signifi1 �SLOVAKIA 53 cance, " or that the "Diet did not express the will of the nation or the people," which, as we shall see further , hardly correspond with the truth since the Parliament in Slovakia was not only in theory but also in fact the suprem e organ of the State and the most essential powers were vested in Parliament from the beginning to the end. The Constitution was adopted by a legally constit uted Slovak Diet which was established in accordance with the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and on the basis of the general election which took place on December 18, 19'38. According to Law No. 299, adopted on November 22, 1938, Slovakia became an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, with her own Government and her own Diet composed of 63 members, vested with legislative powers goveerning not only internal affairs, but required also for ratification of Czecho-Slovak international agreements concerning Slovakia. This Diet, summoned to a session on March 14, 1939, by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil H a c h a , declared Slovakia an independent State, and a special committee of the Diet prepared the draft of the Constitution which was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1939, as Law No. 185. The draft of the Constitution was preceded by a study of several existing modern constitutions with a view to giving the country a set of principles that would correspond with contemporary constitutional thinking and the practical needs and national traditions of the Slovak people. The text was prepared by two university professors of Law, Dr. V. Tuka and Dr. F. :Durcansky, and by several jurists and parliamentarians of young and old generations, Senator Dr. K. Mederly, Dr. M. Sokol, Dr. V. Tvrdy, and Dr. Cerhelyi. In 103 short articles (paragraphs) divided into 13 chapters, the Slovak Constitution gave a radical as well as social basis to the new State in Central Europe. The first article of the Constitution declared the Slovak State a Republic with a President as an elected head, with t erms, according to Gettell, are used to indicate a representative democracy (9) . According to articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, legislative power �54 SLOVAKIA for the entire country vested in the Parliament, composed of 80 members and elected in a general, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a period of five years. The right to vote belonged to every citizen over 2'1 years of age, man and woman, without racial or religious discrimination. This right to be elected to Parliament belonged to citizens over 30 years of age. The Parliament was based on the unicameral system,. and the President of the Republic was obliged to convene the Parliament for regular sessions twice a year, and for extraordinary sessions whenever the majority of members. demanded such a session. Laws promulgated by the Parliament required the President's signature for their validity. Paragraph 26 provided, however, that laws could be promulgated despite the President's veto, if they were adopted by a three-fifths majority in the presence of a two-thirds majority of deputies. The right to appoint governments belonged to the President, but the Government was responsible to Parliament and subject to its vote of confidence. The Parliament also had the right of prosecution of the· President for high treason. Part IN of the Constitution deals with the powers and functions of the President, who was elected for a period of seven years. Any citizen, 40 years of age or over, was eligible for the office, and the election was valid if two. thirds of the members were present and the candidate obtained a three-fifths majority. A comparision of powers and functions of the Slovak ·P resident, as defined in the Constitution, with those of other parliamentary democracies will prove that his powers were somewhere between the extensive functions and powers of the American president and the purely representative functions of the Presidents of France (before De Gaulle). He represented the State internationally, had the right, with the consent of Parliament to declare wars and conclude peace, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to appoint, but not to dismiss university professors, judges, civil servants, and military officers of the three highest categories. He also had the right to be present at the sessions of the Government and Council of State, to request their convention under his chairmanship, �SLOVAKIA 55 to convene, dissolve and prologue Parliament, to sign or veto Parliament's acts, etc. While making the president a dominant figure of the executive, the Constitution, on the other hand, contained provisions which were designed to prevent dictatorial powers (10). The Parliament was able, as we have seen, to promulgate laws even if opposed by the President and according to paragraph 40, "any executive act of the president requires counter-signature by a competent cabinet minister for its validity." No person could be re-elected more than once to the presidential office and when the president died during his term, abdicated or was permanently unable to exercise his functions, it was the duty of the Prime Minister to assume temporary functions of the president. A new president had to be elected by the iParliament within thirty days. The President represented, together with the Cabinet, the executive of the !Slovak Republic and, consequently, the Slovak Government had some features of a presidential type of government and, at the same time, it also contained elements of parliamentary government. An expert on constitutional theories can prove both, because - while the essential characteristics of parliamentary government are: 1) a politically independent head of State; and, 2) a cabinet which is politically responsible to Parliament - "parliamentary Government may also develop in the opposite direction. The Cabinet can become the dominant political organ, able to control the government of the country and direct the work of the Parliament which assists it in the execution of its program," says Andre Mathiot in his ercellent treatise "The British Political System" (11). it is not, however, our intention to discuss theoretical issues here. One can easily prove that the executive in the Slovak Republic was also predominantly of the presidential type, because "every system of 'P arliamentary government has its own distinctive features, resulting from a complex of many different factors. History, the national temperament, beliefs and ideologies, conventions of political behavior, attempts to imitate a particular model or to avoid certain dangers, etc." - states Mathiot. All these factors �56 SLOVAKIA played their distinctive roles in the Slovak Constitution and made it a constitution "sui generis." As for the powers and constitution of the Slovak Cabinet, the President of the Republic appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and determined which member would administer individual ministries (Article 41). The Parliament was also empowered to call the Cabinet and its individual members to political responsibility and to express lack of confidence which would result in the dissolution of the cabinet (Article 48) . Practical considerations demanded, on the other hand, a certain measure of delegation of legislative powers to the Cabinet. The jurisdiction of the Cabinet was limited to governmental orders, namely, during a national emergency, or orders pertaining to the execution of certain types of laws, and within the limits specified in the laws. Validity of such orders was conditional, since the Prime Minister was obliged to submit them within three months to the Parliament, which, in turn, could disallow such measures or could make whatever changes it deemed necessary, or pass it as its own law (12). Chapter V of the Slovak Constitution defined the functions and composition of the Council of State, a pecial body composed of outstanding personalities from various walks of life whose functions pertained to a sort of control of the political life in ,Slovakia. The Council was composed of 6 members appointed by the President of the Republic, ten members were chosen by the Slovak People's Party, two members by the registered parties of ethnic groups, and one was delegated by each estate. The Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly were also memb2rs of the Council. The functions of the Council were defined by the Article 52 and consisted in initiating legislation, controlling and prosecuting the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, and in advising the President and the government on matters of a political, cultural, and economic nature. The Council also prepared the list of candidates for parliamentary elections and made decisions concerning the loss of 0 �SLOVAKIA 57 parliamentary seats, following a request from the President of the Assembly. Politically, the reason for the existence of the Council was given by the desire to have, in the absence of a Senate, representatives in the political life of the new State from groups or professions who usually did not look for an election to Parliament, but whose advice, abilities, and moral stature were destined to help the Government in its endeavour to make the population happy and united behind the political leadership. The authors of the draft of the Constitution expressed their intention in stating that "the Council of State is the expression of political and national unity, and also joins the national and political life with the constitutional representatives, combining itself the function of legal initiation and control." Following the social doctrine of the Papal encyclicals, the authors of the Constitution also included in their draft certain institutions which characterize the so-called "corporative" systems. Chapter VII of the Slovak Constitution had foressen organization of Slovakia's inhabitants into six self-administered bodies called "stavy" (estates) according to occupation and profession: the association of workers and employers in agriculture, in industry, trade, commerce and banking; the association of the free professions and the association of State and public employees. "The associations included both employers and employees and they were assigned to take care of the economic, social, and cultural interests of their members, to solve labor and wage disputes and problems among employees and employers, and to help members of the association to achieve better results in their industries and occupations and a higher standard of living for the nation (Article 62). Acting on Law No. 297 of the Collection of Laws, the President of the Republic appointed the presidents on November 19, 1940, and the aim of the associations was again given as "to manifest the unity of the Slovak workers' community, without heed to classes and callings, and bearing in mind only the interests of the nation and the State" (13). As for the judiciary, we have already stated that the Slovak Constitution was based on the principle of separa- �58 SLOVAKIA tion of powers, as defined by modern political theories. There were three types of courts: courts of law, administrative courts, and military courts. The organization of courts and their legal competence were left to a special legislation. As in any modern constitutions, the Slovak Constitution provided that the courts of law were empowered to review any decision of administrative courts and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of military courts could be extended over the civil population during wartime and for war crimes. "Judges are independent," states Article 67, "in their judicial functions and are bound only by law." The Constitution contained provisions that no person could be deprived of the judge designated by law to hear the case (Article 62), and Article 66 made the judiciary free of any interference either on the part of administrative or political leadership. The professional judges were appointed to their positions permanently and "they have held a highly privileged position, appropriate to their equally high office," states Judge A. Peltzner (14). The Chapter dealing with the rights and obligations of the citizens (Chapter X) can sustain comparision with any democratic and liberal constitution and a modern "Bill of Rights." The 1Slovak Constitution guaranteed full and equal rights to all citizens without distinction of sex, race, creed, occupation, or ethnic origin. The guarantees refer to personal freedoms, private ownership, religious freedom, freedom of expression of opinion, scientific research and arts (15), provided they were exercised within the limits of valid laws and did not come into conflict with public order and Christian morals [Article 85] - (16). The Constitution was based on the principle that "no person can be punished for behavior which is not in conflict with valid legal form and for which a punishment has not been previously determined," applying the old principle "nulla poena sine lege," and all inhabitants, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, or occupation, were entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property (Article 81). There are, in the Slovak Constitution, even some particular provisions which intended to give to the Slovak State �SLOVAKIA 59 a progressive, modern, social and Christian character. Such provisions are as follows: Ownership has a social function and demands from the owner adminstration in the best interest of the common good (Article 79). Marriage, family and motherhood are under the· strict protection of the legal order (Article 86). Labor is protected. Exploitation of socially weak citizens is. prohibited. Wages should be adequate to the working effort and family status. Mental and physical work is a civil duty, etc. "All these provisions can be described," says Dr. Peltzner, "as an intensified care and protection of the family, social purpose of private ownership, protection of the working man, his wages, and social justice to all. All were aimed at achieving a new social order, where clashing social interests would be minimized and eventually abolished. This concept of social and labor legislation was greatly influenced by the encyclical letters of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno" (17). ln order to present a complete picture of the Slovak Constitution, we have to mention provisions regarding political parties. The chapter dealing with the political organization (Chapter Vil) merely legalized the existing situation which was created in Slovakia by the so-called Zilina .A:greement of October 6, 1938, long before Slovakia declared her independence and the Parliament adopted the Constitution. The provision referring to political parties consists of only two paragraphs, the first stating that "the Slovak people participate in political life through the medium of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity) ," and the second legalizing the political activities of ethnic groups, providing that "the ethnic groups participate in political life through a medium of their own political party, provided that such a party can be considered as a representative of the political will of the entire ethnic group" (Articles 58, 59). Since October, 1938, when the number of political parties was reduced due to internal and international circumstances and development, there were in Slovakia three po1 �60 SLOVAKIA litical parties, legally constituted and taking part in the political life of Slovakia. The Communist and the Social Democrat parties, representing only ten deputies, had been dissolved or suppressed following the Zilina Agreement. Six other parties merged into the Slovak National Unity Party, which remained the backbone of the political s y s t e m of autonomous Slovakia before March 1939, and of the Slovak Republic thereafter. The German and Magyar ethnic groups were represented by two minority parties, and the Ukrainian minority by a member of Parliament within Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the Party of National Unity. The fact that the Slovak Constitution provided for only one party for the Slovak people caused certain criticism abroad and marked, according to some critics, the Slovak R e p u b 1 i c as an authoritarian state. For everybody who knows the Slovak political life between the years 1918-1939 and who is aware of the composition of the Slovak Diet in which representatives of practically all previous political parties except Communists and Social Democrats had their seats, such reproaches would seem to be more of a theoretical than practical nature. There is no doubt that without provisions restricting political life of the Slovak population to one party only, even if it was composed of fractions of many parties, the Constitution would have looked more democratic and beyond reproach, because a multiparty system is one of the main characteristics of modern representative democracies. However, war conditions and specific needs and dangers forced the Slovak political leaders to adopt many restrictions which are understandable only if we take into consideration all the problems and dangers which the Slovak Republic had to face from the first days of its existence to the end of the war from the outside and the inside. This as well as other features which marked the Slovak Constitution as "authoritarian" were or will be discussed later in this treatise. Before concluding our remarks on the general characteristics of the Slovak Constitution, it seems appropriate to analyze the formal features of the text and its contents. In this respect, we can say that from the point of view of political science and constitutional law, the Slo- �SLOVAKIA 61 vak Constitution conforms to all requirements which political science demands from modern constitutions. It can be classified as a comprehensive set of fundamental principles and laws covering the whole field of government and making provisions for the exercise of political power. It outlined the governmental organization, determined the relations of the governors and the governed, and provided a legal method for amendments, so that it might be changed when necessary by the prescribed majority in Parliament. m "Authoritarian" Features and Deviations The statement of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives mentions that the Slovak Constitution contained also principles of "an authoritarian state." There is, however, no indication in the report where these principles are to be found, except perhaps in the words that "the executive was to prevail over the legislature after Slovakia, in 1941, had entered the war against the Soviet Union," and that "the number of political parties was reduced - after the Communist and the Social Democrat parties. had been suppressed as subversive - in October, 1938, and the six other parties merged into the Slovak Unity Party, the backbone of the political system of the Slovak State." Actually, the Constitution did not reduce the number of Slovak political parties. It merely legalized a situation which was created in Slovakia in 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia became a federation. We have already explained in part how and why this happened and that unity was not forced on any political party as was later claimed. The representatives of all Slovak and Czecho-Slovak parties were happy that the victorious autonomist movement did not resort to reprisals, and the Slovak population, regardless of previous political affiliation or creed, also approved the new situation. Though the law and electoral system allowed participation of many parties and the autonomous government of Dr. Tiso published an announcement requiring political parties to file the list of their candidates for election, only the Slovak People's Party - the Party of National Unity filed a joint list of candidates which contained leading per- �62 SLOVAKIA sonalities of all previous parties except the Communist and Social Democrats. The new Slovak Parliament issued from this election, held on December 18, 1938, and conducted under the rules of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and electoral system, was composed of 48 former Populists, 12 former agrarian, Artisans, Slovak Nationalists and even National Socialists (Dr. E. Benes's Party), two Germans, one Hungarian, and one Ukrainian. It was this Diet which unanimously proclaimed Slovakia on March 14, 1939, an independent State and adopted the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. There were no changes in Party system or in the composition of party representatives in 1939, and former adherents of Prague's centralism worked in the 1Slovak Parliament and Party organs quite happily together with former autonomists, Protestant ministers with the Catholic clergy, agrarians with artisans, etc. , until 1944, when the outcome of the War became clearly unfavorable to the further existence of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho.,Slovakia by the ,Soviets and Allies was in sight. There was, of course, a change in the structure of the Party of National Unity, which combined from March, 1939, nominations with election of Party functionaries on all levels, and the role of the Party altered considerably. The President of the Party, Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, and this writer as Secretary General, insisted on avoiding imitation of foreign models either in ideology or organization, as had been admitted even by Communist and Czech adversaries (18). Some features and symbols of Italian and German party systems were nevertheless adopted, and on the surface there was an adaptation to the "New Order" in Central Europe, which in some respect was far from a parliamentarian or representative democracy in the traditional sense. In practice and ideologically Slovakia, however, continued the "decrepit democratic system of Benes' Republic," as Hitler stated in his reproach to the Slovak leaders in July, 1940, during the so-called "Salzburg Summons." After the Salzburg meeting which resulted in the forced resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Af- �SLOVAKIA 63 fairs, Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, and of this writer a:s Secretary General of the Party, some measures were adopted which did not correspond either with the letter or with the spirit of the Slovak Constitution and which measures effected, in some respects, "the executive prevailed over the legislature." The Party's importance for some time considerably diminished and the Hlinka Guard, originally and according to the law a section of the ·P arty, tried to control the Party and political life, but this development did not bring about any constitutional changes, it did not last for any length of time, and was either challenged or disapproved and finally checked by the Parliament, the President and the Party leaders (19). It is a matter of fact that there were, in this period, attempts to introduce a sort of "Slovak National Socialism" in the administration of public affairs and there were arbitrary actions of irresponsible persons and groups against certain ,groups of population, but the Parliament and especally the President and the .P arty tried to stop these currents and transgressions and gained satisfactory control of the situation in this case, as in the first weeks after the declaration of independence. This, however, did not prevent the adversaries of the Slovak •S tate from an incorrect and often malicious interpretation of the intentions of the Slovak political leaders who centralized political institutions and also economic and administrative offices only because they were forced to do so by war conditions and by the desire to achieve unity of the nation which was before intentionally divided into many fractions by Prague's rulers who ruled Slovakia during twenty years according to the old dictum "divide et impera." They presented many institutions which were imposed upon Slovakia by war conditions and the international situation as a part of a "totalitarian or authoritative system," though, on the other hand, they admitted that "public offices and institutions which had not formerly existed in 1Slovakia, were introduced on a Czecho..Slovak model, among them the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Audit Department, the Post �64 SLOVAKIA Office Savings Bank, the National Bank, the Land Office, the Statistics Office, etc. " (20). The war imposed a number of new offices everywhere, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, such as: Price Control Office, Central :Eiconomic Office, Propaganda Office, etc. When similar offices were organized in Slovakia, the adversaries of Slovak independence, from their London or Washington asylums, denounced them as proofs and instruments of "authoritarian" or "nazi and fascist" systems and oppression. No doubt, the Slovak administration during the last years of the war had some offices and institutions which had names or structures similar to German or Italian institutions, but there was "a mixture of old and new elements," as admitted even by the Communists and Czech adversaries and definitely the democratic or "Czechoslovak" model prevailed and the intention of the responsible Slovak leaders behind all these institutions was not to introduce nazism or fascism, but to secure prosperity, security, and smooth functioning of the new State, or in other words, to save the Slovak people and its substance at a time when it was faced with physical and spiritual ruin. Some original "authoritarian" features of the !Slovak Constitution are due to the fact that the jurists and Parliamentarians who prepared the draft looked for inspirations in the countries which were in similar political or geographical situations and equally threatened either by the impact of nazism or communism. For this reason mainly the Constitution of Austria under Dolfuss-Schuschni gg and the Constitution of Portugal were studied by some members of the preparatory legislative committee and, while the Ausstrian Constitution showed them how to defend the country against infiltration of German National Socialist ideology, the Constitution of Portugal was studied because of the threat of Communist infiltration. Adversaries of Slovak independence who knew that this was the correct interpretation of the "authoritarian" elements in the Slovak Constitution, tried to prove, of course, the very opposite: they spoke and wrote of a deliberate introduction of "nazi" or "fascist" ideology and system, using for proof some short comings or measures imposed by the war and German pressure �SLOVAKIA 65 on Slovak Administration and Government. They also failed to realize that "the value of any form of government may be judged either by the success and efficiency with which it accomplishes its proper purposes or by the effect which it produces on its citizens and the degree of satisfaction and confidence that they feel toward it," as Gettel says. That there were problems and shortcomings, none among responsible Slovak leaders had ever denied. "Our constitutional o~gans, our legislation, executive, and judiciary are in their infancy," wrote the official newspaper Slovak. "We shall show no weakness if we admit that here and there various institutions are still very shaky." There was quite open criticism of all shortcomings and often violent attacks on institutions and leaders from many parts, even from President Tiso and the young leadership of the Party, because, while there was formally only one Slovak political party, the public heard critical voices, and public opinion was created outside Parliament by the Party press, Hlinka Guard press, German and Hungarian minority press, and clandestine Communist opposition. All of them wrote and spoke from their own angles and viewpoints. Certainly, too many voices for an "authoritarian" or "nazi" regime and State - a fact which was later recognized even by some adversaries. "The fact remains," reported Dr. M. Kvetko, one of the leaders of the "People's Democracy," installed in Slovakia in collaboration with the Communists, to American authorities in Germany in 1948, "that a significant number of the politicians of the Slovak People's Party, and especially of the populace, were not inclined to fascism and prevented its spread so effectively that, excepting the retaliations against Jews and Communists, no special actions were undertaken against the vast majority of the people. And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed the affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collaboration (with nazism) as the Communists tried to do in order to frighten the people and create chaos, so that they could come to power." This chapter was intended, however, to deal with the �66 SLOVAKIA Constitution of the Slovak Republic which, without being changed, remained the basis of legal system and ,governmental structure from 1939 to 1945, when Russians armies overran the country, raping and looting without precedence in Slovak history, and imposed on the Slovak people the new "people's democracy" and Czech domination within the framework of a restored Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak Constituaion reflected old Slovak Christian and democratic traditions and there can hardly be any doubt that the responsible Slovak leaders endeavoured to govern in accordance with the Constitution, and only because of limitations imposed by the international situation and other circumstances which were beyond the control of the people and their leaders, t here were deviations from the Constitution. For this reason it can be admitted that "the Slovak State reflected a compromise between the past and present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central E' u rope." And for the same reason the Slovak Constitution "contained principles which in some aspects combined features of the liberal, the Christian Democratic, and the authoritarian State." 1. R. ,G. Gettell: Political Science, University of Calif., 1933, p. 244. 2. Cfr.: "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czecho-Slovakia," Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 14, Washington, 1954. The Select Committee was composed of Congressmen, as well as a group of experts from Georgetown University and various parts of the United States. 3. Milan Hodza : Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, p. 208-9. 4. Cfr . .Alexander Kunosi: The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity, London, 1944, p. 86; and H. Lee MdBain: The New Constitutions of Europe, New York, 1922, p. 307-342. 5. Even communist adversaries has to admit that "the Nazi model was not shamelessly imposed" and that "the n ew Slovak state was launched with all the paraphernalia of a national ideology apparently corporative and Christian," as wrote K. Kunosi in London, in 1944. 6. Joseph .A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de !'Europe, Paris, 1955, p. 12.7-131; also article by J. F. Gleiman in symposium Slovenska Republika, ed. N. Sprinc, Scranton, Pa., 1949, p. 108-112, and the English translation in Slovakia, Middletown, Pa., Vol. II, No. 3, p. 20 . .An excellent analysis of the Slovak Constitution was also prepared by former judge .Anton Peltzner, DL. D., as a thesis for the M. .A. degree at the U niversity of Montreal in 1957. �SLOVAKIA 67 7. "This presentation of God as the ultimate ,s ource of Law, and the interdependence of human and divine order as reflected in the Preamble of the Slovak !Constitution can prompt one to question." says Dr. A. Peltzner in his analysis, "why the authors of the text considered it wise and appropriate to formulate the preface in such a sense and import." The answer, in his opinion and in the opinion of all who are familiar with the history of the Slovak people, is based on two elements: l) there was a long and sincere dedication of the Slovak people to their religion, and a mutually long and faithful service of the Slovak clergy to their nation ; and, 2) the geographical position of the Slovak Republic was such that, on the Eastern frontiers stood the might of ,M arxist atheism, and from the Western side there was a potential danger of spreading and infiltrating of modern paganism, as formulated and taught by ,o erman National Socialism. The political leaders of the Slovak people considered it, therefore, as highly desirable to state that '\Slovaks stood firmly by their national traditions, of which belief in God and His Omnipotence was the substance of the whole concept." - Cfr. Dr. A. Peltzner: The Slovak Constitution and Modern Political Theory, p . 105. 8. Ibidem, p. 8·6. 9. lbidem, p. 195. 10. Ibidem, p. 48. 11. Andre Mathiot: The Bri tish Political System , London, 1958, p . 13·5. 12. The Constitution empowered the Cabinet to issue a government order with -the legal force and effect of law when economic, financial or political interests of the State required immediate attention, and only when lack of action could cause irreparable damage to these interests. 13. Cfr. Kunosi: Opus cit., p. 86. 14. ilbidem, pp. 76-82. 15. See: Chapter X, articles 75-85. That some of these freedoms were later limited or in individual cases disregarded, nobody would deny. The war imposed restrictions on personal freedoms in every country. In Slovakia, one could hardly expect that ideological influences of Germany and the political and economic pressures of war conditions would not result in a restriction of civil rights, or in transgressions by some individuals or groups of individuals. This, however, was not the fault of the Constitution, and as for the President of the Slovak !Republic and the Parliament, they tried to apply restrictions with respect to human life and natural rights. 16. 'The measures adopted against Jewish citizens were in many regards unconstitutional and mainly a result of German interference and deceit, especially as far as the transfer of a part of Slovak Jews to Poland was concerned. They were destined for labor, not extermination. The President as well as other Slovak authorities tried to avoid the tragedy but were able to save only a portion of those to be transferred. On the attitude of the Slovak Population see Raport du Co mite In- �68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAK.IA 47 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL. D., PH. D. mE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC I Introductory Note "No Constitution can be considered perfect or permanent", says R. G. Gettell in his renowned work Political Science. "The final requisite for a good constitution is that the constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State" (1). Among the critics and adversaries of the Slovak Republic there were few, if any, who read the Slovak Constitution, the fundamental principles that determined the basic nature of the Slovak ,S tate and Government, the distribution of its severeign powers among the various organs of government and the relation of the government to the people over whom its authority was exercised. We, therefore, hardly find someone who based his criticism of the Slovak Republic on the constitutional or legal basis or on the constitutional form of the Slovak state. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the U. S., in its special report No. 8, prepared in co-operation with Georgetown University and a group of experts from various parts of the United States, expressed its opinion in the following terms: "The Constitution contained principles, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal state, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state. In the beginning all power of the Slovak Republic was vested in the Parliament but later on, in 1941, after Slovakia had entered the war against the ,soviet Union, the executive was to prevai I over the legislature. "The Slovak state was far from being a perfect democracy in the traditional sense. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation" (2). This statement, though basically true and expressing to a great extent the view of the writer, should be complemented by a political as well as juridical analysis of the text of the Constitution and of the circumstances in which 48 SLOVAKIA it was drafted and adopted by the Slovak Diet. The first question seems to be: from whence came the features of the liberal, the Christian democratic , and the authoritari an State? As for the democratic traditions in Slovakia, they antidated not only the attainment of political independen ce in 1939, but also the inclusion of Slovakia into the CzechoSlovak Republic in 1918. The Slovak nobility was assimilated by the Ma,gyars to a great extent before the Slovak national revival took place at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, so that no aristocratic traditions could hinder the acceptance and developmen t of modern democratic ideas. In fact, Slovakia became the refuge of many lofty intellectual efforts during the 17th century and later it "revealed itself as a meeting-pla ce of practically all contempor ary currents of cultural and political ideas" (3). It is true that the policy of Budapest, after the Ausgleich of 1867, aimed at suppressing Slovak nationalism and Slovak political activities. This resulted in the reduction of the IS lovak representat ion in Budapest's Parliament to only two representat ives at the end of World War I. However, this situation cannot reasonably be used as a yardstick for Slovak disposition for political maturity. This became evident shortly after the creation of the CzechoSlovak Republic, when not only genuine Slovak political parties sprang up, but also, more or less, all the Czech parties extended their activities into Slovakia. Practically all political tendencies from socialism to agrarian democracy and communism found an echo in the Slovak poulation. The genuine and most representat ive Slovak parties were: 1) the Slovak People's Party, later called Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Party of National l:Jnity (since October 1938), representin g the bulk of the nationally conscious Catholic population, although some non-Catholics were among its members (the party never officially labeled its program as Catholic); and, 2) the Slovak National Party which organized those Slovak Protestants who remained faithful to the traditions of Slovak national- SLOVAKIA 49 ism and to the idea of distinct Slovak culture and selfgovernment. All political parties in Slovakia developed during the period of 191'8-1938 along the lines of the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia which is often praised as a model of modern democratic constitutions. It must, therefore, sound highly improbable and illogial when adversaries of the Slovak State assert that all this changed from one day to another, that all the democratic traditions of Czecho-Slovakia ,w ere so weak that they were transformed without any resistance into "fascist" and "nazi" tendencies by the simple act of the declaration of Slovakia's independence. It would certainly be safe to assume that democracy survived, in many respects, the Declaration of 1M arch 14, 19'39, and that the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect the principles of democratic thinking and institutions which were alive in Slovakia. Actually, they survived to such an extent that in many respects the Slovak Constitution has a strinking resemblance to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (4). Provisions referring to legislative powers of the Parliament, election and powers of the President of the Republic, the judiciary, and the whole legal structure of the Slovak State had much in common with the Constitution of Czecho..!Slovakia which, like the ,S lovak Constitution, adopted principles of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or the fundamental principles of French and American Constitutions. The authors of the Slovak Constitution were jurists and parliamentarians educated predominantly at the universities and in the Parliament of Czecho-:Slovakia; with one or two exceptions, they were men who studied law abroad and were mainly responsible for the liberal elements in the draft of the Slovak Constitution. There are, of course, striking differences, too, as far as the ideological bases of these two constitutions are concerned. The religiosity of the Slovak people and their Christian world outlook gave quite a different ideological basis to the Slovak constitution in general, and to its many provisions regarding social institutions, which reflect the ideas of the Papal encyclicals in particular. While the Slovak 50 SLOVAKIA Constitution presents God as the ultimate source of Law and declares that the function of the Slovak Republic is to unite all the moral and economic forces of the people in a Christian and national community in order to become the executor of social justice and the protector of common good, the ideological roots of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution were as far from God and religion as were Prague's leading politicians. On the other hand, the Slovak Constitution could not but differ in provisions or institutions which were imposed by the international situation and which are described as "authoritarian." As we mentioned before, the final requisite for a good Constitution, according to Gettell, is that the Constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State. While the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia reflected certain ideological currents and political structures of the French Republic which was mainly responsible for the creation and existence of Czecho-Slovakia and for the new organization of Central Europe after First World War, the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect a new situation, new organization and a "new order" in Central Europe, created by Hitler's Germany in 1938-1939 with the consent of France and England. Considered objectively, one has to to recognize that it took courage and deep attachment to traditions to proclaim in Slovakia, in 1939, God as the ultimate source of Law and order and to use Papal encyclicals as the basis for social institutions, human and family rights on the one hand, and, on the other, "to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czechoslovak state" (5). When, in the summer of 1939, the committee appointed by the Slovak Parliament, labored on the draft of the Constitution, the political crisis in Europe was nearing its climax, and the ideological confusion attained irrational dimensions. The area of Central and Eastern Europe was exposed to ideological struggles and political ambitions of at least three Great Powers and, thus, Democracy, Communism, and Nazism as well as remnants of liberal tendencies were engaged in a rough competition for influence over the Central European peoples. Slovakia, in the middle of this ideological ferment and 1 SLOVAKIA 51 international instability, found herself also threatened by aggression or territorial claims from her neighbors, so that even the very existence of the newly created state on the banks of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains was, from its beginning, endangered. To expect, in the midst of such political and ideological chaos, any uncompromis ing attitudes on the side of the Constitutiona l Committee would amount to expecting from it something humanly impossible. Slovakia had to take a compromising position politically and ideologically not only for reasons of good relations with her neighbors, but also, if not in the first place, in order to survive as a State, since Democracy was considered a provocation, and, in its classic form, in the summer of 1939, was already dying in all Central Eiuropean countries. An analysis of the main principles and fundamental rights will show how far the work of the Constitutiona l Committee of Slovakia - despite its compromising tenor reflects the tendencies and genuine traditions of the Slovak people. According to the expert opinion of several jurists, the Constitution adopted practically the whole sysb~m of democratic-lib eralistic constitutions of the 1'8th and 19th centuries and, though Slovakia was weighed in from the right and left between Godless bolshevism and anti-Christian neo-paganism , she brought forth a constitution "saturated with the Christian spirit and especially with the principles of the social encyclicals of the Holy See" (6). As for the features of Christian democracy, besides many institutions concerned with social life, family, attitude to work, and function of property, in which we can find the influence of modern Christian sociology, the Christian character was given to the whole Constitution by its Preamble which reads as follows: "The Slovak nation, under the protection of Almighty God, survived throughout the ages on the territory destined for its national development and there, with the help of God, Who is the Source of all Power and Law, established its independent Slovak State. "The SI ova k State unites, according to Natural Law, all the moral and economic forces of the Nation in a Christian and national community for the purpose of regulating clashing social aspirations and mutually opposed interests of all occupational and professional groups, and has for its goal the highest attainable degree of happi- 52 SLOVAKIA ness of society and the individual. This ideal can only be achieved through a moral and political process, initiated by the State, which in harmonious unity will function as an executor of social justice and a protector of common good." It would certainly be difficult to find among the constitutions of modern states any other which so clearly states that God must be recognized as the original source of Law and Order and that the function of the nation in a Christian and national community in order to become "an executor of social justice and protector of common good" (7). The accentuation of the social function of the State, which we find in the Preamble, and the emphasis placed on the happiness of both the individual and society, are an indication of the legislators' intention to build a modern welfare state on the principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how these ideas found their expressions in particular provisions and institutions of the Slovak Constitution. n General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution It is not necessary to be an expert in constitutional law to notice that the Slovak Constitution contains all the democratic devices which political science usually requires from democratic constitutions - such as the separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and balances, and the principle of rule by law. Even the most bitter adversaries of Slovak independence - the Communists and the supporters of Czechoslovakism - did not try to deny these features to the Slovak Constitution. "The Slovak State was intended to make a full show of independence," wrote Alexander IKunosi, one of today's communist diplomats of Czecho-,Slovakia, in 11944, from his London exile: "It was to be vested with all the institutions formerly possessed by the Czechoslovak State. Steps were taken to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czecho-Slovak State" (8). Admitting this, the adversaries of the Slovak Republic could not try to say that "the parlimentary facade of Government in Slovakia had, of course, no real signifi1 SLOVAKIA 53 cance, " or that the "Diet did not express the will of the nation or the people," which, as we shall see further , hardly correspond with the truth since the Parliament in Slovakia was not only in theory but also in fact the suprem e organ of the State and the most essential powers were vested in Parliament from the beginning to the end. The Constitution was adopted by a legally constit uted Slovak Diet which was established in accordance with the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and on the basis of the general election which took place on December 18, 19'38. According to Law No. 299, adopted on November 22, 1938, Slovakia became an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, with her own Government and her own Diet composed of 63 members, vested with legislative powers goveerning not only internal affairs, but required also for ratification of Czecho-Slovak international agreements concerning Slovakia. This Diet, summoned to a session on March 14, 1939, by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil H a c h a , declared Slovakia an independent State, and a special committee of the Diet prepared the draft of the Constitution which was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1939, as Law No. 185. The draft of the Constitution was preceded by a study of several existing modern constitutions with a view to giving the country a set of principles that would correspond with contemporary constitutional thinking and the practical needs and national traditions of the Slovak people. The text was prepared by two university professors of Law, Dr. V. Tuka and Dr. F. :Durcansky, and by several jurists and parliamentarians of young and old generations, Senator Dr. K. Mederly, Dr. M. Sokol, Dr. V. Tvrdy, and Dr. Cerhelyi. In 103 short articles (paragraphs) divided into 13 chapters, the Slovak Constitution gave a radical as well as social basis to the new State in Central Europe. The first article of the Constitution declared the Slovak State a Republic with a President as an elected head, with t erms, according to Gettell, are used to indicate a representative democracy (9) . According to articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, legislative power 54 SLOVAKIA for the entire country vested in the Parliament, composed of 80 members and elected in a general, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a period of five years. The right to vote belonged to every citizen over 2'1 years of age, man and woman, without racial or religious discrimination. This right to be elected to Parliament belonged to citizens over 30 years of age. The Parliament was based on the unicameral system,. and the President of the Republic was obliged to convene the Parliament for regular sessions twice a year, and for extraordinary sessions whenever the majority of members. demanded such a session. Laws promulgated by the Parliament required the President's signature for their validity. Paragraph 26 provided, however, that laws could be promulgated despite the President's veto, if they were adopted by a three-fifths majority in the presence of a two-thirds majority of deputies. The right to appoint governments belonged to the President, but the Government was responsible to Parliament and subject to its vote of confidence. The Parliament also had the right of prosecution of the· President for high treason. Part IN of the Constitution deals with the powers and functions of the President, who was elected for a period of seven years. Any citizen, 40 years of age or over, was eligible for the office, and the election was valid if two. thirds of the members were present and the candidate obtained a three-fifths majority. A comparision of powers and functions of the Slovak ·P resident, as defined in the Constitution, with those of other parliamentary democracies will prove that his powers were somewhere between the extensive functions and powers of the American president and the purely representative functions of the Presidents of France (before De Gaulle). He represented the State internationally, had the right, with the consent of Parliament to declare wars and conclude peace, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to appoint, but not to dismiss university professors, judges, civil servants, and military officers of the three highest categories. He also had the right to be present at the sessions of the Government and Council of State, to request their convention under his chairmanship, SLOVAKIA 55 to convene, dissolve and prologue Parliament, to sign or veto Parliament's acts, etc. While making the president a dominant figure of the executive, the Constitution, on the other hand, contained provisions which were designed to prevent dictatorial powers (10). The Parliament was able, as we have seen, to promulgate laws even if opposed by the President and according to paragraph 40, "any executive act of the president requires counter-signature by a competent cabinet minister for its validity." No person could be re-elected more than once to the presidential office and when the president died during his term, abdicated or was permanently unable to exercise his functions, it was the duty of the Prime Minister to assume temporary functions of the president. A new president had to be elected by the iParliament within thirty days. The President represented, together with the Cabinet, the executive of the !Slovak Republic and, consequently, the Slovak Government had some features of a presidential type of government and, at the same time, it also contained elements of parliamentary government. An expert on constitutional theories can prove both, because - while the essential characteristics of parliamentary government are: 1) a politically independent head of State; and, 2) a cabinet which is politically responsible to Parliament - "parliamentary Government may also develop in the opposite direction. The Cabinet can become the dominant political organ, able to control the government of the country and direct the work of the Parliament which assists it in the execution of its program," says Andre Mathiot in his ercellent treatise "The British Political System" (11). it is not, however, our intention to discuss theoretical issues here. One can easily prove that the executive in the Slovak Republic was also predominantly of the presidential type, because "every system of 'P arliamentary government has its own distinctive features, resulting from a complex of many different factors. History, the national temperament, beliefs and ideologies, conventions of political behavior, attempts to imitate a particular model or to avoid certain dangers, etc." - states Mathiot. All these factors 56 SLOVAKIA played their distinctive roles in the Slovak Constitution and made it a constitution "sui generis." As for the powers and constitution of the Slovak Cabinet, the President of the Republic appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and determined which member would administer individual ministries (Article 41). The Parliament was also empowered to call the Cabinet and its individual members to political responsibility and to express lack of confidence which would result in the dissolution of the cabinet (Article 48) . Practical considerations demanded, on the other hand, a certain measure of delegation of legislative powers to the Cabinet. The jurisdiction of the Cabinet was limited to governmental orders, namely, during a national emergency, or orders pertaining to the execution of certain types of laws, and within the limits specified in the laws. Validity of such orders was conditional, since the Prime Minister was obliged to submit them within three months to the Parliament, which, in turn, could disallow such measures or could make whatever changes it deemed necessary, or pass it as its own law (12). Chapter V of the Slovak Constitution defined the functions and composition of the Council of State, a pecial body composed of outstanding personalities from various walks of life whose functions pertained to a sort of control of the political life in ,Slovakia. The Council was composed of 6 members appointed by the President of the Republic, ten members were chosen by the Slovak People's Party, two members by the registered parties of ethnic groups, and one was delegated by each estate. The Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly were also memb2rs of the Council. The functions of the Council were defined by the Article 52 and consisted in initiating legislation, controlling and prosecuting the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, and in advising the President and the government on matters of a political, cultural, and economic nature. The Council also prepared the list of candidates for parliamentary elections and made decisions concerning the loss of 0 SLOVAKIA 57 parliamentary seats, following a request from the President of the Assembly. Politically, the reason for the existence of the Council was given by the desire to have, in the absence of a Senate, representatives in the political life of the new State from groups or professions who usually did not look for an election to Parliament, but whose advice, abilities, and moral stature were destined to help the Government in its endeavour to make the population happy and united behind the political leadership. The authors of the draft of the Constitution expressed their intention in stating that "the Council of State is the expression of political and national unity, and also joins the national and political life with the constitutional representatives, combining itself the function of legal initiation and control." Following the social doctrine of the Papal encyclicals, the authors of the Constitution also included in their draft certain institutions which characterize the so-called "corporative" systems. Chapter VII of the Slovak Constitution had foressen organization of Slovakia's inhabitants into six self-administered bodies called "stavy" (estates) according to occupation and profession: the association of workers and employers in agriculture, in industry, trade, commerce and banking; the association of the free professions and the association of State and public employees. "The associations included both employers and employees and they were assigned to take care of the economic, social, and cultural interests of their members, to solve labor and wage disputes and problems among employees and employers, and to help members of the association to achieve better results in their industries and occupations and a higher standard of living for the nation (Article 62). Acting on Law No. 297 of the Collection of Laws, the President of the Republic appointed the presidents on November 19, 1940, and the aim of the associations was again given as "to manifest the unity of the Slovak workers' community, without heed to classes and callings, and bearing in mind only the interests of the nation and the State" (13). As for the judiciary, we have already stated that the Slovak Constitution was based on the principle of separa- 58 SLOVAKIA tion of powers, as defined by modern political theories. There were three types of courts: courts of law, administrative courts, and military courts. The organization of courts and their legal competence were left to a special legislation. As in any modern constitutions, the Slovak Constitution provided that the courts of law were empowered to review any decision of administrative courts and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of military courts could be extended over the civil population during wartime and for war crimes. "Judges are independent," states Article 67, "in their judicial functions and are bound only by law." The Constitution contained provisions that no person could be deprived of the judge designated by law to hear the case (Article 62), and Article 66 made the judiciary free of any interference either on the part of administrative or political leadership. The professional judges were appointed to their positions permanently and "they have held a highly privileged position, appropriate to their equally high office," states Judge A. Peltzner (14). The Chapter dealing with the rights and obligations of the citizens (Chapter X) can sustain comparision with any democratic and liberal constitution and a modern "Bill of Rights." The 1Slovak Constitution guaranteed full and equal rights to all citizens without distinction of sex, race, creed, occupation, or ethnic origin. The guarantees refer to personal freedoms, private ownership, religious freedom, freedom of expression of opinion, scientific research and arts (15), provided they were exercised within the limits of valid laws and did not come into conflict with public order and Christian morals [Article 85] - (16). The Constitution was based on the principle that "no person can be punished for behavior which is not in conflict with valid legal form and for which a punishment has not been previously determined," applying the old principle "nulla poena sine lege," and all inhabitants, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, or occupation, were entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property (Article 81). There are, in the Slovak Constitution, even some particular provisions which intended to give to the Slovak State SLOVAKIA 59 a progressive, modern, social and Christian character. Such provisions are as follows: Ownership has a social function and demands from the owner adminstration in the best interest of the common good (Article 79). Marriage, family and motherhood are under the· strict protection of the legal order (Article 86). Labor is protected. Exploitation of socially weak citizens is. prohibited. Wages should be adequate to the working effort and family status. Mental and physical work is a civil duty, etc. "All these provisions can be described," says Dr. Peltzner, "as an intensified care and protection of the family, social purpose of private ownership, protection of the working man, his wages, and social justice to all. All were aimed at achieving a new social order, where clashing social interests would be minimized and eventually abolished. This concept of social and labor legislation was greatly influenced by the encyclical letters of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno" (17). ln order to present a complete picture of the Slovak Constitution, we have to mention provisions regarding political parties. The chapter dealing with the political organization (Chapter Vil) merely legalized the existing situation which was created in Slovakia by the so-called Zilina .A:greement of October 6, 1938, long before Slovakia declared her independence and the Parliament adopted the Constitution. The provision referring to political parties consists of only two paragraphs, the first stating that "the Slovak people participate in political life through the medium of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity) ," and the second legalizing the political activities of ethnic groups, providing that "the ethnic groups participate in political life through a medium of their own political party, provided that such a party can be considered as a representative of the political will of the entire ethnic group" (Articles 58, 59). Since October, 1938, when the number of political parties was reduced due to internal and international circumstances and development, there were in Slovakia three po1 60 SLOVAKIA litical parties, legally constituted and taking part in the political life of Slovakia. The Communist and the Social Democrat parties, representing only ten deputies, had been dissolved or suppressed following the Zilina Agreement. Six other parties merged into the Slovak National Unity Party, which remained the backbone of the political s y s t e m of autonomous Slovakia before March 1939, and of the Slovak Republic thereafter. The German and Magyar ethnic groups were represented by two minority parties, and the Ukrainian minority by a member of Parliament within Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the Party of National Unity. The fact that the Slovak Constitution provided for only one party for the Slovak people caused certain criticism abroad and marked, according to some critics, the Slovak R e p u b 1 i c as an authoritarian state. For everybody who knows the Slovak political life between the years 1918-1939 and who is aware of the composition of the Slovak Diet in which representatives of practically all previous political parties except Communists and Social Democrats had their seats, such reproaches would seem to be more of a theoretical than practical nature. There is no doubt that without provisions restricting political life of the Slovak population to one party only, even if it was composed of fractions of many parties, the Constitution would have looked more democratic and beyond reproach, because a multiparty system is one of the main characteristics of modern representative democracies. However, war conditions and specific needs and dangers forced the Slovak political leaders to adopt many restrictions which are understandable only if we take into consideration all the problems and dangers which the Slovak Republic had to face from the first days of its existence to the end of the war from the outside and the inside. This as well as other features which marked the Slovak Constitution as "authoritarian" were or will be discussed later in this treatise. Before concluding our remarks on the general characteristics of the Slovak Constitution, it seems appropriate to analyze the formal features of the text and its contents. In this respect, we can say that from the point of view of political science and constitutional law, the Slo- SLOVAKIA 61 vak Constitution conforms to all requirements which political science demands from modern constitutions. It can be classified as a comprehensive set of fundamental principles and laws covering the whole field of government and making provisions for the exercise of political power. It outlined the governmental organization, determined the relations of the governors and the governed, and provided a legal method for amendments, so that it might be changed when necessary by the prescribed majority in Parliament. m "Authoritarian" Features and Deviations The statement of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives mentions that the Slovak Constitution contained also principles of "an authoritarian state." There is, however, no indication in the report where these principles are to be found, except perhaps in the words that "the executive was to prevail over the legislature after Slovakia, in 1941, had entered the war against the Soviet Union," and that "the number of political parties was reduced - after the Communist and the Social Democrat parties. had been suppressed as subversive - in October, 1938, and the six other parties merged into the Slovak Unity Party, the backbone of the political system of the Slovak State." Actually, the Constitution did not reduce the number of Slovak political parties. It merely legalized a situation which was created in Slovakia in 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia became a federation. We have already explained in part how and why this happened and that unity was not forced on any political party as was later claimed. The representatives of all Slovak and Czecho-Slovak parties were happy that the victorious autonomist movement did not resort to reprisals, and the Slovak population, regardless of previous political affiliation or creed, also approved the new situation. Though the law and electoral system allowed participation of many parties and the autonomous government of Dr. Tiso published an announcement requiring political parties to file the list of their candidates for election, only the Slovak People's Party - the Party of National Unity filed a joint list of candidates which contained leading per- 62 SLOVAKIA sonalities of all previous parties except the Communist and Social Democrats. The new Slovak Parliament issued from this election, held on December 18, 1938, and conducted under the rules of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and electoral system, was composed of 48 former Populists, 12 former agrarian, Artisans, Slovak Nationalists and even National Socialists (Dr. E. Benes's Party), two Germans, one Hungarian, and one Ukrainian. It was this Diet which unanimously proclaimed Slovakia on March 14, 1939, an independent State and adopted the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. There were no changes in Party system or in the composition of party representatives in 1939, and former adherents of Prague's centralism worked in the 1Slovak Parliament and Party organs quite happily together with former autonomists, Protestant ministers with the Catholic clergy, agrarians with artisans, etc. , until 1944, when the outcome of the War became clearly unfavorable to the further existence of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho.,Slovakia by the ,Soviets and Allies was in sight. There was, of course, a change in the structure of the Party of National Unity, which combined from March, 1939, nominations with election of Party functionaries on all levels, and the role of the Party altered considerably. The President of the Party, Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, and this writer as Secretary General, insisted on avoiding imitation of foreign models either in ideology or organization, as had been admitted even by Communist and Czech adversaries (18). Some features and symbols of Italian and German party systems were nevertheless adopted, and on the surface there was an adaptation to the "New Order" in Central Europe, which in some respect was far from a parliamentarian or representative democracy in the traditional sense. In practice and ideologically Slovakia, however, continued the "decrepit democratic system of Benes' Republic," as Hitler stated in his reproach to the Slovak leaders in July, 1940, during the so-called "Salzburg Summons." After the Salzburg meeting which resulted in the forced resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Af- SLOVAKIA 63 fairs, Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, and of this writer a:s Secretary General of the Party, some measures were adopted which did not correspond either with the letter or with the spirit of the Slovak Constitution and which measures effected, in some respects, "the executive prevailed over the legislature." The Party's importance for some time considerably diminished and the Hlinka Guard, originally and according to the law a section of the ·P arty, tried to control the Party and political life, but this development did not bring about any constitutional changes, it did not last for any length of time, and was either challenged or disapproved and finally checked by the Parliament, the President and the Party leaders (19). It is a matter of fact that there were, in this period, attempts to introduce a sort of "Slovak National Socialism" in the administration of public affairs and there were arbitrary actions of irresponsible persons and groups against certain ,groups of population, but the Parliament and especally the President and the .P arty tried to stop these currents and transgressions and gained satisfactory control of the situation in this case, as in the first weeks after the declaration of independence. This, however, did not prevent the adversaries of the Slovak •S tate from an incorrect and often malicious interpretation of the intentions of the Slovak political leaders who centralized political institutions and also economic and administrative offices only because they were forced to do so by war conditions and by the desire to achieve unity of the nation which was before intentionally divided into many fractions by Prague's rulers who ruled Slovakia during twenty years according to the old dictum "divide et impera." They presented many institutions which were imposed upon Slovakia by war conditions and the international situation as a part of a "totalitarian or authoritative system," though, on the other hand, they admitted that "public offices and institutions which had not formerly existed in 1Slovakia, were introduced on a Czecho..Slovak model, among them the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Audit Department, the Post 64 SLOVAKIA Office Savings Bank, the National Bank, the Land Office, the Statistics Office, etc. " (20). The war imposed a number of new offices everywhere, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, such as: Price Control Office, Central :Eiconomic Office, Propaganda Office, etc. When similar offices were organized in Slovakia, the adversaries of Slovak independence, from their London or Washington asylums, denounced them as proofs and instruments of "authoritarian" or "nazi and fascist" systems and oppression. No doubt, the Slovak administration during the last years of the war had some offices and institutions which had names or structures similar to German or Italian institutions, but there was "a mixture of old and new elements," as admitted even by the Communists and Czech adversaries and definitely the democratic or "Czechoslovak" model prevailed and the intention of the responsible Slovak leaders behind all these institutions was not to introduce nazism or fascism, but to secure prosperity, security, and smooth functioning of the new State, or in other words, to save the Slovak people and its substance at a time when it was faced with physical and spiritual ruin. Some original "authoritarian" features of the !Slovak Constitution are due to the fact that the jurists and Parliamentarians who prepared the draft looked for inspirations in the countries which were in similar political or geographical situations and equally threatened either by the impact of nazism or communism. For this reason mainly the Constitution of Austria under Dolfuss-Schuschni gg and the Constitution of Portugal were studied by some members of the preparatory legislative committee and, while the Ausstrian Constitution showed them how to defend the country against infiltration of German National Socialist ideology, the Constitution of Portugal was studied because of the threat of Communist infiltration. Adversaries of Slovak independence who knew that this was the correct interpretation of the "authoritarian" elements in the Slovak Constitution, tried to prove, of course, the very opposite: they spoke and wrote of a deliberate introduction of "nazi" or "fascist" ideology and system, using for proof some short comings or measures imposed by the war and German pressure SLOVAKIA 65 on Slovak Administration and Government. They also failed to realize that "the value of any form of government may be judged either by the success and efficiency with which it accomplishes its proper purposes or by the effect which it produces on its citizens and the degree of satisfaction and confidence that they feel toward it," as Gettel says. That there were problems and shortcomings, none among responsible Slovak leaders had ever denied. "Our constitutional o~gans, our legislation, executive, and judiciary are in their infancy," wrote the official newspaper Slovak. "We shall show no weakness if we admit that here and there various institutions are still very shaky." There was quite open criticism of all shortcomings and often violent attacks on institutions and leaders from many parts, even from President Tiso and the young leadership of the Party, because, while there was formally only one Slovak political party, the public heard critical voices, and public opinion was created outside Parliament by the Party press, Hlinka Guard press, German and Hungarian minority press, and clandestine Communist opposition. All of them wrote and spoke from their own angles and viewpoints. Certainly, too many voices for an "authoritarian" or "nazi" regime and State - a fact which was later recognized even by some adversaries. "The fact remains," reported Dr. M. Kvetko, one of the leaders of the "People's Democracy," installed in Slovakia in collaboration with the Communists, to American authorities in Germany in 1948, "that a significant number of the politicians of the Slovak People's Party, and especially of the populace, were not inclined to fascism and prevented its spread so effectively that, excepting the retaliations against Jews and Communists, no special actions were undertaken against the vast majority of the people. And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed the affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collaboration (with nazism) as the Communists tried to do in order to frighten the people and create chaos, so that they could come to power." This chapter was intended, however, to deal with the 66 SLOVAKIA Constitution of the Slovak Republic which, without being changed, remained the basis of legal system and ,governmental structure from 1939 to 1945, when Russians armies overran the country, raping and looting without precedence in Slovak history, and imposed on the Slovak people the new "people's democracy" and Czech domination within the framework of a restored Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak Constituaion reflected old Slovak Christian and democratic traditions and there can hardly be any doubt that the responsible Slovak leaders endeavoured to govern in accordance with the Constitution, and only because of limitations imposed by the international situation and other circumstances which were beyond the control of the people and their leaders, t here were deviations from the Constitution. For this reason it can be admitted that "the Slovak State reflected a compromise between the past and present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central E' u rope." And for the same reason the Slovak Constitution "contained principles which in some aspects combined features of the liberal, the Christian Democratic, and the authoritarian State." 1. R. ,G. Gettell: Political Science, University of Calif., 1933, p. 244. 2. Cfr.: "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czecho-Slovakia," Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 14, Washington, 1954. The Select Committee was composed of Congressmen, as well as a group of experts from Georgetown University and various parts of the United States. 3. Milan Hodza : Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, p. 208-9. 4. Cfr . .Alexander Kunosi: The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity, London, 1944, p. 86; and H. Lee MdBain: The New Constitutions of Europe, New York, 1922, p. 307-342. 5. Even communist adversaries has to admit that "the Nazi model was not shamelessly imposed" and that "the n ew Slovak state was launched with all the paraphernalia of a national ideology apparently corporative and Christian," as wrote K. Kunosi in London, in 1944. 6. Joseph .A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de !'Europe, Paris, 1955, p. 12.7-131; also article by J. F. Gleiman in symposium Slovenska Republika, ed. N. Sprinc, Scranton, Pa., 1949, p. 108-112, and the English translation in Slovakia, Middletown, Pa., Vol. II, No. 3, p. 20 . .An excellent analysis of the Slovak Constitution was also prepared by former judge .Anton Peltzner, DL. D., as a thesis for the M. .A. degree at the U niversity of Montreal in 1957. SLOVAKIA 67 7. "This presentation of God as the ultimate ,s ource of Law, and the interdependence of human and divine order as reflected in the Preamble of the Slovak !Constitution can prompt one to question." says Dr. A. Peltzner in his analysis, "why the authors of the text considered it wise and appropriate to formulate the preface in such a sense and import." The answer, in his opinion and in the opinion of all who are familiar with the history of the Slovak people, is based on two elements: l) there was a long and sincere dedication of the Slovak people to their religion, and a mutually long and faithful service of the Slovak clergy to their nation ; and, 2) the geographical position of the Slovak Republic was such that, on the Eastern frontiers stood the might of ,M arxist atheism, and from the Western side there was a potential danger of spreading and infiltrating of modern paganism, as formulated and taught by ,o erman National Socialism. The political leaders of the Slovak people considered it, therefore, as highly desirable to state that '\Slovaks stood firmly by their national traditions, of which belief in God and His Omnipotence was the substance of the whole concept." - Cfr. Dr. A. Peltzner: The Slovak Constitution and Modern Political Theory, p . 105. 8. Ibidem, p. 8·6. 9. lbidem, p. 195. 10. Ibidem, p. 48. 11. Andre Mathiot: The Bri tish Political System , London, 1958, p . 13·5. 12. The Constitution empowered the Cabinet to issue a government order with -the legal force and effect of law when economic, financial or political interests of the State required immediate attention, and only when lack of action could cause irreparable damage to these interests. 13. Cfr. Kunosi: Opus cit., p. 86. 14. ilbidem, pp. 76-82. 15. See: Chapter X, articles 75-85. That some of these freedoms were later limited or in individual cases disregarded, nobody would deny. The war imposed restrictions on personal freedoms in every country. In Slovakia, one could hardly expect that ideological influences of Germany and the political and economic pressures of war conditions would not result in a restriction of civil rights, or in transgressions by some individuals or groups of individuals. This, however, was not the fault of the Constitution, and as for the President of the Slovak !Republic and the Parliament, they tried to apply restrictions with respect to human life and natural rights. 16. 'The measures adopted against Jewish citizens were in many regards unconstitutional and mainly a result of German interference and deceit, especially as far as the transfer of a part of Slovak Jews to Poland was concerned. They were destined for labor, not extermination. The President as well as other Slovak authorities tried to avoid the tragedy but were able to save only a portion of those to be transferred. On the attitude of the Slovak Population see Raport du Co mite In- 68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.<br />Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959<br />pp. 47-68<br /><ol type="I"><li>Introductory Note</li> <li>General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution</li> <li>"Authoritarian" Features and Deviations</li> </ol> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8071ba5523ab887312dd16e8dbc89dbb.pdf 275d0b991ec2daf93713b41d78eda43a PDF Text Text 98 SLOVAKIA The Cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius Amongst the Slovaks Ln U.S.A. and Canada* * This essay w as prepare d by t he late Konstan tin culen i n 1962 for a symposium or ganized and edited by Prof. J. M . K i rschbaum for the 11th cent ennary of the arrival of SS. Cyril and Methodius among t he ancest ors of Slov aks. T he essays co llected and edit ed or translated by J. M. K i r sc h baum appeared in SLOVAK STUDT ES, CYRILLO-METH ODIANA, V ol. 3, (Rome, 1963). Culen's essay was not yet tr anslated and therefore not published. I n view of the valuable information and in order to complet e the history of the CyriUo-Methodia n tradition among Sl ov aks, we are grat efiil to Dr. Kirschbaum for preserving the manuscript and his adaptation for an English piiblication . By K . C u len THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN IRISH ON AMERICAN SLOVAKS The migration of Slovaks to the U.S.A. had many traits similar to those of the migration of the Irish. It was the catastrophic potato crop failure which caused the first man emigration of the Irish to the U.S.A. And we come across a similar cause of emigration of the Slovaks. The Slovak statistician Dr. Emil Stodola noted that each poor p otato crop in Slovakia was followed by rising emigration to the U.S .A. There were other similarities between the Irish and the Slovak migrations. The oppression of the Irish dates even further back in history than the Slovak one and is many sided. The political oppression started in Slovakia at the end of the 18th century and culminated befor the First World War. The Irish were oppressed due to their religion and suffered culturally and economically and therefore their resistance was stronger and more passionate than that of the Slovaks. In Ireland the oppression affected all the classes but in Slovakia the intelligentsia suffered most. The difference comes to light when we compare the cult of S t . Patrick to the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius . �SLOVAKIA 99 St. Patrick is a national saint and is known and revered by all the Irish. SS. Cyril and Methodius were not known to the same extent amongst Slovaks. The population in general had only a vague knowledge of them. But the Slovak intelligentsia had even a deeper devotion to them than the Irish to St. Patrick. Therefore the cult of the SS. Cyril and Methodius in the U.S.A. was not a cult brought over by the masses as in the case of St. Patrick, but it was a cult especially nurtured by nationally conscious immigrants, nurtured to an extent that would not have been possible in Slovakia. Generally speaking, the Slovak immigrants became aware, in their new countries, of a need for a national saint and this became evident to them on such days as the feast of St. Patrick, with its festivities attracting not only the Irish but also numerous names of other nationalities. In older Slovak papers we frequently see articles about large groups of Slovaks participating in the festivities of St. Patrick. In one case the writer claimed that Slovaks outnumbered the Irish. No wonder these Slovaks asked"Who would correspond to St. Patrick in our national life? " They frequently raised this question in the Slovak press and of course the only answer they could obtain was-SS . Cyril and Methodius. It was this background which helped to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius between the Slovak names in the U.S .A. It should be noted in this connection, that SS . Cyril and Methodius completed amongst the Slovaks the missionary work which prior to them was already initiated by Bavarian and Irish missionaries, the first Christian missionaries in the Danube area. 1 THE INFLUENCE OF THE CULT OF ST. PATRICK ON THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS In the very early Slovak papers in the U.S.A. appeared dozens of articles, some short and some extensive enough, for serial publication, describing the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius amongst the Slovak ancestors. American Slovaks who were scattered amongst the Irish saw in the SS. Cyril and Methodius their St. Patrick. The Slovak papers exhorted them to venerate them just as the Irish revered St. Patrick. It is interesting to ask the question, how much did �100 SLOVAKIA the American Slovaks know about SS. Cyril and Methodius? Not a great deal. Most often they learned about them them from the excellent and well known prayer book of Rev. Andrej Radlinsky "Nabozne Vylevy." This prayer book contained a color picture of the Saints, their brief history and their prayers. Rev. Radlinsky succeeded in doing this to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Later on when a small prayer book was published in the U.S.A., the bishop of Spis, Parvy, put it on the Index for no reason other than that it contained a prayer to SS. Cyril and Methodius. Thus while Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical highly extoling the missionary work of these two Saints, a Magyar bishop with his seat in Catholic Slovakia put the prayer book on the Index as he mistrusted these Saints because of their panslavistic learnings. The large groups of Slovak immigrants in the U.S.A. had for the first time an opportunity to learn more about the missionary work of those Apostles, as well as about their cultural and linguistic work. But at the moment when the cult of these Apostles began to spread, a group of Catholic priests rose against it even in the U.S .A. and according to the spirit which was taught to them in the seminaries in the old country prepared the road-blocks to this cult. At the head of the group were Kossalko, Denes and Haitinger. In the papers edited by them they vituperated both Saints in the same manner as did the Magyar Catholic periodical "Katolikus Szemle" (Catholic Review) in the year 1893 in an article "Slavonic Christianity in our territories before their occupation". St. Methodius was denounced here as a panslavistic chauvinist, a forerunner of the schism and a very untrustworthy personality. The author of the article applied the modern Magyar approach and the chauvinistic terminology to the period prior to 900 when the national questions were of very minor importance.2 The pupils of this chauvinistic school working in the U.S .A. could find nothing worthy to say about these Saints and made them subjects of the intrigues of the Hungarian premier Koloman Tisza and of his successors. Their success was, however, small as they were unpopular priests and their arguments were without any force against the well documented work of their opponents. �SLOVAKIA 101 THE FIRST CHURCH DEDICATED TO SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS The first church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius in the U.S .A. was a small wooden church built by two Czech Societies: the Society of St. Wenceslas and the Society of St. Ludmila in New York. These two societies were founded in 1874 with the purpose of building the first church for the growing Czech colony in New York, in the block between the 1st and 10th streets and between the Avenues B-D, where the Czechs were intermingled with the Poles. The Plan for the building of the church received a new impetus when Rev. A. V. Vacula came to New York from Baltimore, Md. He was born on the 15th of August 1845, in Osek, near Olomouc, in Moravia. He studied in Kromeriz, at the University of Vienna and at Louvain, Belgium. Here the American bishops established a seminary into which they accepted students from the whole of Europe, to prepare them for work in the ethnic settlements in the U.S.A. Vacula was accepted as the future priest of the Czech settlement in Baltimore, Md. Immediately after his consecration in 1870 he left for the U.S.A. and from the beginning of December he served in the parish of St. Wenceslas, Baltimore, Md. As the Czech Catholics of New York could not make progress with their plan, they invited into this parish Rev. Vacula, who arrived in 1875 and started his work with great enthusiasm. He immediately bought the land and the building, Number 316 E. 4th Street for $12,000.00, then enlarged the building for an outlay of an additional $6,000.00 and on the 1st of December 1875 the Vicar General of New York consecrated the Church in the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius. 3 This was the first church in the U.S.A. to be named after SS. Cyril and Methodius. And it appeared very appropriate that behind this achievement was a priest from Moravia. Out of all Slavic countries, in Moravia the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the deeepest, most widely spread and most popular. In no other Slavic country were the names SS. Cyril and Methodius given so often at baptism as in Moravia. The Cyrillo-Methodian cult spread from the Moravian Velehrad in all directions and the �102 SLOVAKIA Slovaks made frequent pilgrimages there as to a source of spiritual strength. The New York church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methoqius was the first catholic church which was also attended by "the first Slovak immigrants in that city. When later this church was closed, they went to the Irish church of St. Brigitte or to the nearest German or Polish churches until in 1894 they built the first Slovak Catholic church dedicated to St. Elizabeth of Hungary. This church was built in the same street where earlier had been the church of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Similarly as amongst the Slovaks, the Cyrillo-Methodian cult was as widely spread amongst the Czechs, especially in those districts where also Moravians were settled. After the first Cyrillo-Methodian church in New York, which soon closed, there were another 15 churches built in the U.S.A., namely in: Bannister, Mich.; Kansas City, Kansas; Chicago, Ill.; Platoma, Texas; Clarkson, Nebraska; Corpus Christi, Tex.; Doman, Texas; Dubina, Texas; East St. Louis, Illinois; Granger, Texas; North Judson, Indiana; Plasi (Prague), Nebraska; Shiner, Texas ; Tanton, Michigan; Vodnary, Dakota. Besides the Slovaks and the Czechs the Cyrillo-Methodian churches were mainly built by Slovenes, Croatians and · Poles. THE UNFULFILLED PLAN OF A NEW CHURCH OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN NEW YORK The next church in New York which was to bear the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the church originally dedicated to St. John Nepomucene. That this plan did not succeed was due mainly to the bitter struggles between the nationally conscious Slovaks and the Magyarones. The consecration of the first Slovak Catholic Church took place in 1894. This was the church of St. Elizabeth of Hungary. It was around this church that the struggle between the Slovaks and the Magyars and Magyar sympathizers developed. The night before the consecration the "Magyarones" removed from the corner stone the plaque bearing the text written in literary Slovak: "Rim. Kat. Kostal Sv. Alzbety, Vystavany R. 1892". Instead of this they �SLOVAKIA 103 placed there plaque with a text in Eastern-Slovak dialect : " Uherszko Szlovenszki Kat. Koscel Szv. Elizabethy Uherszkej, Visztav. R. 1892." This arnmounted to a declaration of war. The Slovaks refused to support a Church with a name written in a distorted Slovak language and in foreign, non-Slovak orthography. This battle lasted for over a year until finally Archbishop Corrigan wrote to Slovakia inquiring which version was correct. When he received the reply he had the plaque changed as he considered that what was orthographically incorrect, was of poor taste and unfitting for a house of God. The Slovaks were jubilant but not for long as the Archbishop was approached by a delegation led by a Magyar lawyer Czukor (Jewish by religion) who persuaded the Archbishop that this struggle was between the Eastern Orthodox Panslavistic Church and between Catholicism. The Magyars were the true catholics, a European nation, but the Slovaks were Panslavs, Russofiles and sympathizers with the Eastern-Orthodoxy. Should this movement gain power it would dominate the Danubian Basin and soon it would undermine even the See. of St. Peter. The Cyrillo-Methodian cult which they spread is an Eastern-Orthodox religion. The archbishop believed these arguments and the following day he ordered to put back the plaque with the text in the Eastern dialect. The local priest, Rev. Polakovic, protested but the Archbishop rebuked him and informed him he had to look for a new parish outside of his diocese. This naturally caused a great disappointment amongst the Slovaks. A delegation of Slovaks informed the Archbishop that they would not attend this church and would not support it but would built a new Slovak Church. The Archbishop approved the plans for the new Church. The Slovaks started to work with enthusiasm and in a few weeks they transformed an old building into a new church which stood only one block away on the same street. It was planned that this church would bear the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius, this had been already announced in the papers and the donations for the building paid and it was accepted under this name.4 But this plan did not materialize. The Archbishop appointed here a Czech priest, Rev. simonik, who under �104 SLOVAKIA the pressure from the Archbishop gave the church the name of St. John Nepomuce ne. This was the first but also the last time that the names of SS. Cyril and Methodius were in the disfavor of an American Bishop. THE OLDEST CATHOLIC CHURCHE S WITH PATRON SAINTS SS. CYRIL AND METHODI US The sudden expansion of the Cyrillo-Me thodian cult on the American continent was described by Rev. Jozef Martincek as follows: "As soon as the Slovak immigrant s settled in the U.S.A. and began to form their parishes and to build their churches, the Cyrillo-Me thodian flame, which appeared for almost extinguishe d, suddenly rekindled in the hearts of our compatriot s. They almost competed with each other in their Cyrillo-Me thodian zeal to build and dedicate churches to them and there is hardly any Slovak church in the U.S.A. where their picture or their statue would not be given a distinguish ed place." 5 The Cyrillo-Me thodian cult spread in the U.S.A. due to the expanding Slovak periodicals and papers, due to the work of the patriotic Slovak priest and to a great extent also as a result of a protest against the Magyar persecutio n at home. The popularity which the cult gained in the U.S.A. was inconceiva ble in Slovakia of that time. The first Slovak Catholic Church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius was built in 1891 in Minneapol is, Minn. The initiative came from the local Society of SS. Cyril and Methodius which was founded in 1888 as the first society on the American soil called after these Saints. In the same year another church bearing the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius was opened in Bethlehem , Pa. The founder of this church was Rev. Heinen, a missionary of German origin. He was originally an officer in the German Army but later on he changed the uniform for a priestly garb and after completing his theological studies he came to the U.S.A. and worked as a missionary mainly amongst the Slavic immigrant s in Pennsylvan ia. His assistant in missionary work ( which he directed from Mau Chung, Pa.) was Rev. Vlossak, a Slovak priest, and it was due to his influence that the church in Bethlehem , Pa., was given the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius .6 �SLOVAKIA 105 THE LIST OF THE SLOVAK CHURCHES OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. This example was followed by others and the following list shows chronologically the founding of the churches dedicated to the SS. Cyril and Methodius in different parts of the U.S.A. the brackets show the diocese to which the parish belonged. 7 1891. Minneapolis, Minn. (St. Paul, Minn. ) 1891. Bethlehem, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1893. Reading, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1895. Brookside, Ala. (Mobile, Ala. ) 1898. Haverstraw, N. Y. (New York, N. Y.) 1898. Youngstown, 0. (Youngstown, 0.) 1900. Kingston, Pa. (Scranton, Pa.) 1900. Stockett, Mont. (Great Falls, Mont.) 1900. Joliet, Ill. (Joliet, Ill.) 1900. Stuttgart, Ark. (Little Rock, Ark. ) 1901. Edwardsville, Pa. 1902. Charleroi, Pa. (Pittsburgh, Pa. ) 1903. Binghamton, N. Y. (Syracuse, N . Y.) 1903. Lakewood, Ohio (Cleveland, Ohio ) 1904. Winburne, Pa. (Erie, Pa.) 1905. Lebanon, Pa. (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1905. Windber, Pa. (Altoona, Pa.) 1906. Kansas City, Kans. (Kansas City Kans.) 1906. Barberton, Ohio 1906. Boonton, N. J. (Paterson, N. J.) 1907 . Bridgeport, Conn. (Hartford, Conn.) 1911. East St. Louis, Ill. (Belleville, Ill.) 1911. Fairchance, Pa. (Greensburg, Pa.) 1911. Superior, Wis. (Superior, Wis.) 1912. Rock Spring, Wyoming 1913. Clifton, N . J. (Paterson, N. J.) 1913. Sugar Creek, Mo. 1913. Schenectady, N . Y. (Albany, N . Y.) 1914. Chicago, Ill. (Chicago, Ill.) 1916. New Brighton, Pa. (Pittsburgh, Pa. ) 1918. Detroit, Mich. (Detroit, Mich.) 1920. Coaldale, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1923. Lisbon Falls, Maine (Portland, Maine ) 1923. Rossford, Ohio (Toledo, Ohio) 1928. Warren, Ohio 1949. Slovak Manor, N. Y. (New York, N . Y .) �106 SLOVAKIA THE GROWTH OF THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS One of the early articles dealing with the CyrilloMethodian cult appeared in Jednota in 1899. The author, J. Stas, is critical of Slovak immigrants and of their lack of devotions to SS. Cyril and Methodius. He makes the following suggestions about how to pay homage to SS. Cyril and Methodius. 1. Keep their picture in your house and teach your children about their life, their work, their contributions to our faith and our culture. 2. Give their names to your children at baptism. 3. Build and dedicate churches to these Saints and decorate the existing churches with their statues. 4. Put your societies under their patronage. So far less than 10 societies have been named after them. Is this not a disgrace to American Slovaks? 5. The 5th of July should be for the Slovaks a religious and a national holiday and in this we should learn from the Irish who so devotedly revere St. Patrick. This day, or at least the following Sunday, should be devoted to religious services and sermons in reverence to their work. On that day also other national and cultural celebrations should be organized. "I am asking our priests, our editors and all Slovaks to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius amongst our compatriots, and so preserve their heritage-- our faith and our culture." 8 But in spite of this exhortation the Slovaks in the U.S.A. were unable to organize any mass Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations. Rev. Jozef Martincek, one of the most ardent promoters of the Cyrillo-Methodian cult, wrote in 1913: "Why don't we pay the necessary homage to SS. Cyril and Methodius and why don't we celebrate one day in a year as their holiday as this was already suggested before by our compatriots and our brother in Christ, Michael Bosak. I ask Rev. Furdek and other leading Slovaks to take up this matter seriously and to present to the Slovak public a plan for Cyrillo-Methodian celebration."9 �SLOVAKIA 107 REV. F. V. SASINEK AND THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. In the days when the first Slovak papers commenced publication in the U.S.A., the 20-30,000 Slovak immigrants had only two priests and two educated laymen, Wolf and Slovensky, ( both teachers by profession and editors of these papers). It took several years before the number of such laymen together with the priest grew to 25. Naturally, under these circumstances any cultural work was extremely difficult as it fell on the shoulders of a very small group of men who besides their cultural work without monastery remuneration had also to carry on with their regular employment to provide for themselves and their families. Therefore, from the very beginning these men had to look to Slovakia for new help in their cultural and national work. The most enthusiastic and successful of such early workers was Rev. F . V. Sasinek, a catholic priest and a historian. Falling into disgrace of his bishop IpolyiStummer, he left Banska Bystrica and for some years he lived in Kuty as a guest of his friend Rev. Pukancik. He then went to Prague and from there to Maria Zell , a pilgrimage shrine in Austria, where he served as a confessor of the pilgrims and heard confessions in 12 languages. In this voluntary exile be became greatly interested in Slovak immigrants to the U.S.A. and as soon as he made contacts with Rovnianek and Furdek he became the main contributor to Slovak papers in the U.S.A. 10 He played especially a very important part in the cultivating of the Cyrillo-Methodian spirit. We estimate that approximately 85 ¼' of all Slovak publications about SS. Cyril and Methodius in the last century came from the pen of Sasinek. His first literary contribution published in 1852, was a poem: "Piesen o slovanskych blahozvestcoch", "A song about the missionaries of the Slavs".11 THE MAIN ADVOCATES OF THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. There were many active supporters of the CyrilloMethodian cult among the Catholic priests. Probably the most active was Rev. Jan Porubsky. He was an ingenious �108 SLOVAKIA writer, with a general, almost encyclopedic knowledge and was especially well acquainted with Slovak history. He began to write from Slovakia for the American Slovak papers and published a great number of articles about the life and the significance of the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Similar topics were covered by him in his books which were published in the U.S.A.12 From among other priests who were in the foreground of the Cyrillo-Methodian movement it is necessary to mention especially Stefan Furdek, then Rev. Stas, Rev. Dianiska, D. D., Rev. Pavco, Rev. Martincek, 13 Rev. Duchon and out of the younger generation, Rev. Stefan Panik, Msgr. Mlynarovic, etc. THE ORDER OF THE SISTERS OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS But probably the greatest achievement in this field can be attributed to Rev. Matus Jankola who founded the first Slovak teaching order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Dr. Fr. Hrusovsky in his history of this Order notes the following: "The Order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius has a special place amongst the Slovak Orders in the U.S.A. because it is a truly Slovak Order. Even more, it is the only truly Slovak Order. Figuratively speaking we may say that The Order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius is the only Slovak flower in the large bouquet of Slovak Orders. It was not by coincidence that this Order was not founded in Slovakia where SS. Cyril and Methodius worked many centuries ago and where different Orders, fo many centuries, maintained and developed their heritage. The fact that this Order was founded in the U.S .A. illustrates well how bright was the legacy of these Saints amongst those members of the Slovak nation who had to leave the mother country and how deep was their determination to preserve this legacy." 14 REV. DANIEL ZABOJ LAUcEK AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS Amongst the Slovak Protestant pastors it is especially �SLOVAKIA 109 necessary to mention Rev. Daniel Zaboj Laucek who dedicated his work to the Cyrillo-Methodian ideals when still in Slovakia and continued in this work on his arrival in America. In 1885, in Turciansky Sv. Martin he published the book Sv. Cyril a Metod, apostolovia slovanski, jich vyznam v cirkvi krest'anskej v6bec a v Slovanstve zvlast'. Nakladom vlastnym pri pomoci podporovatel'ov slovenskej spisby. (SS. Cyril and Methodius, Apostles of the Slavs, their place in Christendom and in Slavdom.) Private edition with the help of the supporters of the Slovak Literature. Besides this he published a series of articles : "Po tisic rokoch." "Pamiatke sv. slovanskych apostolov". (After a thousand years. In memory of the Saint Apostles of Slavs.) "Ocenenie jich p6sobenia" (Evaluation of their work) . "Blizsie o p6sobeni a razu sv. slovanskych apostolov" (More about the work and the spirit of the Saint Apostles of the Slavs) . "Pamiatky p6sobenia slovanskych bratov v nasom narode" (The imprints of the work of the Apostles of the Slavs in our nation). The series was published in Ndrodnie Noviny, XVI, 1885, number 1-7 . Rev. Laucek continued in this work in the U.S.A. and he wrote about similar topics in "cas" of which he was an editor for a short time. He also wrote in Slovak Protestant papers especially in Slovensky Hldsnik. Unfortunately a bibliography of the Slovak publications in the U.S.A. has never been put together and many of the works have not been preserved which means a great loss for Slovak literature. THE ASSOCIATIONS BEARING THE NAME OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS It is of great interest that the Cyrillo-Methodian Cult first spread amongst the immigrants from Eastern Slovakia. In 1875 the brothers Jan and Juraj Gogola came to Minneapolis, Minn. and shortly after them Jan Zelenak, Jan Martonik, and Tomas Ovsak. They came across an advertisement of the firm Timm Eliot and as they expected that this was probably a Slovak name, Elias, they answered the advertisement and applied for work with that firm. They were accepted and the firm found in them such good employees that it was willing in future to give preference to Slovaks. The owner of the firm was very �110 SLOVAKLA just and humanitarian and the Slovaks were pleased to work for him. From 1875 on, the number of the Slovaks in this city grew considerably and in 1878 the brothers Juraj and Andrej Olha and Jan Martonik thought of the plan of forming an Association of the Minneapolis Slovaks. They met on November 12th, 1888 and decided to form the Association. There is a notation in the minutes of the first meeting which reads: "As SS. Cyril and Methodius were our Apostles, it will be appropriate that our Association be placed under their patronage." This resolution was carried out. In 1891 the Association formed the first Slovak Catholic parish in the U.S.A. called after the two Apostles. This was the beginning of our active CyrilloMethodian cult amongst the American Slovaks. The men who were first preoccupied with this idea in the U.S.A. came from Bystre in saris county. 15 The first branch of "Narodny Slovensky Spolok" which put itself under the patronage of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the local branch No. 8, in Youngstown, Ohio. Rev. Horvath, and ardent Slovak Catholic priest, was in Youngstown at that time and it is likely that the Branch accepted the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius on his suggestion. 16 It will be of interest to note that one of the cofounders of the branch was John smigovsky, the grandfather of the colonel smigovsky, who for his service to the Slovak Republic was sentenced to death in 1946 by the pro-Communist National Tribunal under the chairmanship of Igor Daxner. Daxner recommended an amnesty, however, the chairman of the Slovak National Council refused to deal with this request on technical grounds and Smigovsky was executed the following day. Colonel smigovsky was born in the U.S.A. but was educated in Slovakia. THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN CANADA The possition of the Slovak immigrants to Canada was quite different from that of the immigration to the U.S.A. The immigration to Canada reached noticeable proportions only after the First World War when immigration to the U.S.A. became restricted and the quotas allowed were quickly filled. Unable to obtain admission to the U.S.A. many immigrants choose Canada, often with plans to seek admission to the U.S.A. later. The immigrants �SLOVAKIA 111 who come to Canada were of a different political background than those who in the previous century went to the U.S.A. They experienced the First World War, the political upheavals which followed, many of them went to Slovak schools and were on a higher cultural level than the generation who before them went to the U.S.A. They were more aware of national and political problems. There were no Magyarones amongst them and regardless of their political affiliations they declared themselves as Slovaks. Only a very small number of them believed that Slovaks ceased to exist as an individual nation and that a new "Czechoslovak" nation emerged. The first Catholic church in Canada dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius was a small church built in 1906 in Bellevue, Alberta. The oldest parish called after SS. Cyril and Methodius is the Montreal parish which was established in 1928. Similar parishes were formed in Toronto in 1934 and in Windsor in 1940. New parishes were founded following a new wave of immigrants after the Second World War. Amongst them are the parishes of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Hamilton, Ontario of 1945 and in Westminster, B. C. of 1960. 17 EPILOG The Cyrillo-Methodian ideology did not find favorable ground in Czecho-Slovakia after 1918 due to a strong anti-Catholic feeling of the ruling Czechs. But the Slovaks, in spite of many difficulties, were able to make progress in every direction. The ranks of the intelligentsia grew, the letters and the sciences advanced even in those fields where there was not one Slovak representative before. And slowly also the Cyrillo-Methodian ideas became better known to the masses. There were many who thought this development was too slow. Thus we read: "It is a pity that while the Slovaks in the U.S.A. have 16 parishes and 200 altars in their churches dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius, we at home, in Slovakia, have only 16 such altars in our 2,300 Catholic churches and chapels." 18 The author of course was poorly informed, as the number-of such parishes in the U.S.A. was not 16 but more �112 SLOVAKIA than twice that number. As in many other fields of Slovak affairs only after the formation of the Slovak Republic definite steps were taken to accept SS. Cyril and Methodius as national Saints. Their feast in Slovakia was also a day of commemoration for all Slovaks abroad. Throughout Slovakia there were festivals, meetings, lectures commemorating the Slovaks who had to leave their fatherland. The plans were made to build a cathedral to SS. Cyril and Methodius in Bratislava. Many research projects were under way and a Cyrillo-Methodian archives and library were in preparation. But with the loss of political independence these projects also died and with them also much of the work inspired by bishop Moyses, Fr. Sasinek and Holly. Out of these endeavors only those that grew abroad, in the U.S.A. and in Canada survived. But we believe that, in this age when even small nations and tribes throughout Africa are gaining independence, it will not be possible to beep in chains a nation which already 1,100 years ago belonged to the cultured and Christian nations of Europe and this mainly through the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius.19 FOOTNOTES AMI) LITERATURE 1) See Dr. F . Hrusovsky: frska misia a zaciatky krest'anstva (The Irish Mission and the Beginning of Christianity), pp. 41-65, and also by the same author Slovenski v ladari (Slovak Rulers ), Scranton 1948, p. 263. 2) Ries, Viliam : Frantisek Richard Osvald (Trnava, 1939), pp. 87, 93 . 3) Goulding, S: Catholic Churches of New York City, with sketches of their history and lives of the present Pastors, (New York, 1878 ), pp. 748. 4) Culen, K.: Dejiny newyorskych Slovcikov (The History of t he Slovaks of New York) . 5) " Oslava cyrilometodejska, 863-1863-1913," Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, p. 129. 6) Fink, Leo, Gregory: Monsignor Heinen, Militant Missionary , The Dolphin Press, (P hiladelphia, Pa. 1937) , p. 75. 7 ) Hrobak, Philip: Slovak Catholic Parishes and Institution in the United States of America, (Middletown, Pa. 1955), pp. 32, 34, 39, 42, 50, 52, 63, 65, 68, 70, 81 , 84, 87, 90, 92, 99, 105, 106, 107, 121, 132, 134, 146, 152, 154, 162. See also Piroch, Mary: "American Slovaks and SS. Cyril and Methodius," Slovakia Vol. XIII, N. 1/36, March 1963, pp. 25-28 ; ~ofranec, Tomas, Rev.: "Sv. Cyril a Metod a m y americki Slovaci" ( SS. Cyril and Methodi us and American Slovaks). Ave Maria, XLVII, No. 4, April 1, 1963, pp.175-176; Slovenske osady v Amerike, (Slovak Parishes in the U.S.A.), Kalendar Jednota for �SLOVAKIA 113 1906, pp. 23 , 51, 53-57, 73 , 81, 109, 113, 114; Baska, Louis, O.S.B.: Slovenske katolicke osady v Spojenych Statoch (Slovak Catholic Parishes in the U.S.A.) , Katolicke Slovensko (Trnava) , p. 623 ; Kushner, Jozef, Rev.: Slovaci katolici pittsburghskeho biskupstva ( Slovak Catholics of the Pittsburgh Diocese), Katolicky Sokol (Passaic, 1946) , p. 174. 8 ) J ednota, July 12, 1899. 9) Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, p. 130. 10) The first biography of SS. Cyril and Methodius started publicatio n in Jednota on the 18th January, 1899, and continued in a long series of articles. The author was Rev. Fr. Sasinek. 11) See Katolicke Noviny, 1852, 1st year, No. 35. 12) Porubsky, Jan Rev.: 100 rokov spisovnej slovenciny (One Hundred Years of Literary Slovak), Scranton, Pa.; Slovaci a slovencina (Slovaks and the Slovak language). This was edited anonymously, but it was the work of Rev. Porubsky, Katolicky Sokol, 1929, p . 114. 13 ) Martincek, Jozef, Rev. : "Oslava cyrilometodejska" (The CyrilloMethodian Jubilee) 863-1863-1913 ; Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, pp. 129135. " Oslava sv. Cyrila a Metoda v dobe Moysesa a dnes" (The Cyrillo-Methodian Celebration at the time of Moyses and Today), Kalendcir Sviitovojtessky, 1936, pp. 119-125. 14) Hrusovsky, Franti.sek, Dr. : Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Slovak Religious Orders in the U. S.A. ), Cleveland, Ohio 1935, p.496. See Chapter: Kongregacia sestier sv. Cyrila a Metoda, Danville, P a. (Congregation of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, Danville, Pa.), pp. 161-232. This Chapter has a detailed bibliography on pages 231-232 ; See also Pauco, Jozef: Matus Jankola, knaz a ncirodovec (Matus Jankola as a priest and a patriot) , Danville, Pa. , p . 173. 15) Pamiitnik Spolku sv. Cyrila a Metoda (Almanac of SS. Cyril and Methodius), No. 3, I.K.S.J. , Minneapolis, Minn. 1888-1938. 16) V. S. Platek: Nase odbory , D ejiny a pamiitnica 60 . vyrocia N. S.S. (Our Associations. The Memoirs of the 60th Anniversary of the National Slovak Society), Pittsburgh, Pa. , pp. 225-392. 17) On the religious organization of Canadian Slovaks, see J . M. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, (Toronto, 1967) , pp. 227-276. 18) Kalendcir Sviitovojtessky (St. Adalbert's Almanac ), 1936, p. 125. 19) On the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition in Slovakia, see Prof. J . M. Kirschbaum "The Role of the Cyrillo-Methodian Tradition in Slovak Na tional Life," Slovak Studies, Vol. III, (Rome, 1963 ) . • THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA heartily commends all efforts of our governmental and other organs to ferret out and unmask all Communists and fellow travellers, as well as all persons and organizations who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism promoted by the Soviet Union. � 98 SLOVAKIA The Cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius Amongst the Slovaks Ln U.S.A. and Canada* * This essay w as prepare d by t he late Konstan tin culen i n 1962 for a symposium or ganized and edited by Prof. J. M . K i rschbaum for the 11th cent ennary of the arrival of SS. Cyril and Methodius among t he ancest ors of Slov aks. T he essays co llected and edit ed or translated by J. M. K i r sc h baum appeared in SLOVAK STUDT ES, CYRILLO-METH ODIANA, V ol. 3, (Rome, 1963). Culen's essay was not yet tr anslated and therefore not published. I n view of the valuable information and in order to complet e the history of the CyriUo-Methodia n tradition among Sl ov aks, we are grat efiil to Dr. Kirschbaum for preserving the manuscript and his adaptation for an English piiblication . By K . C u len THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN IRISH ON AMERICAN SLOVAKS The migration of Slovaks to the U.S.A. had many traits similar to those of the migration of the Irish. It was the catastrophic potato crop failure which caused the first man emigration of the Irish to the U.S.A. And we come across a similar cause of emigration of the Slovaks. The Slovak statistician Dr. Emil Stodola noted that each poor p otato crop in Slovakia was followed by rising emigration to the U.S .A. There were other similarities between the Irish and the Slovak migrations. The oppression of the Irish dates even further back in history than the Slovak one and is many sided. The political oppression started in Slovakia at the end of the 18th century and culminated befor the First World War. The Irish were oppressed due to their religion and suffered culturally and economically and therefore their resistance was stronger and more passionate than that of the Slovaks. In Ireland the oppression affected all the classes but in Slovakia the intelligentsia suffered most. The difference comes to light when we compare the cult of S t . Patrick to the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius . �SLOVAKIA 99 St. Patrick is a national saint and is known and revered by all the Irish. SS. Cyril and Methodius were not known to the same extent amongst Slovaks. The population in general had only a vague knowledge of them. But the Slovak intelligentsia had even a deeper devotion to them than the Irish to St. Patrick. Therefore the cult of the SS. Cyril and Methodius in the U.S.A. was not a cult brought over by the masses as in the case of St. Patrick, but it was a cult especially nurtured by nationally conscious immigrants, nurtured to an extent that would not have been possible in Slovakia. Generally speaking, the Slovak immigrants became aware, in their new countries, of a need for a national saint and this became evident to them on such days as the feast of St. Patrick, with its festivities attracting not only the Irish but also numerous names of other nationalities. In older Slovak papers we frequently see articles about large groups of Slovaks participating in the festivities of St. Patrick. In one case the writer claimed that Slovaks outnumbered the Irish. No wonder these Slovaks asked"Who would correspond to St. Patrick in our national life? " They frequently raised this question in the Slovak press and of course the only answer they could obtain was-SS . Cyril and Methodius. It was this background which helped to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius between the Slovak names in the U.S .A. It should be noted in this connection, that SS . Cyril and Methodius completed amongst the Slovaks the missionary work which prior to them was already initiated by Bavarian and Irish missionaries, the first Christian missionaries in the Danube area. 1 THE INFLUENCE OF THE CULT OF ST. PATRICK ON THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS In the very early Slovak papers in the U.S.A. appeared dozens of articles, some short and some extensive enough, for serial publication, describing the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius amongst the Slovak ancestors. American Slovaks who were scattered amongst the Irish saw in the SS. Cyril and Methodius their St. Patrick. The Slovak papers exhorted them to venerate them just as the Irish revered St. Patrick. It is interesting to ask the question, how much did �100 SLOVAKIA the American Slovaks know about SS. Cyril and Methodius? Not a great deal. Most often they learned about them them from the excellent and well known prayer book of Rev. Andrej Radlinsky "Nabozne Vylevy." This prayer book contained a color picture of the Saints, their brief history and their prayers. Rev. Radlinsky succeeded in doing this to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Later on when a small prayer book was published in the U.S.A., the bishop of Spis, Parvy, put it on the Index for no reason other than that it contained a prayer to SS. Cyril and Methodius. Thus while Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical highly extoling the missionary work of these two Saints, a Magyar bishop with his seat in Catholic Slovakia put the prayer book on the Index as he mistrusted these Saints because of their panslavistic learnings. The large groups of Slovak immigrants in the U.S.A. had for the first time an opportunity to learn more about the missionary work of those Apostles, as well as about their cultural and linguistic work. But at the moment when the cult of these Apostles began to spread, a group of Catholic priests rose against it even in the U.S .A. and according to the spirit which was taught to them in the seminaries in the old country prepared the road-blocks to this cult. At the head of the group were Kossalko, Denes and Haitinger. In the papers edited by them they vituperated both Saints in the same manner as did the Magyar Catholic periodical "Katolikus Szemle" (Catholic Review) in the year 1893 in an article "Slavonic Christianity in our territories before their occupation". St. Methodius was denounced here as a panslavistic chauvinist, a forerunner of the schism and a very untrustworthy personality. The author of the article applied the modern Magyar approach and the chauvinistic terminology to the period prior to 900 when the national questions were of very minor importance.2 The pupils of this chauvinistic school working in the U.S .A. could find nothing worthy to say about these Saints and made them subjects of the intrigues of the Hungarian premier Koloman Tisza and of his successors. Their success was, however, small as they were unpopular priests and their arguments were without any force against the well documented work of their opponents. �SLOVAKIA 101 THE FIRST CHURCH DEDICATED TO SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS The first church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius in the U.S .A. was a small wooden church built by two Czech Societies: the Society of St. Wenceslas and the Society of St. Ludmila in New York. These two societies were founded in 1874 with the purpose of building the first church for the growing Czech colony in New York, in the block between the 1st and 10th streets and between the Avenues B-D, where the Czechs were intermingled with the Poles. The Plan for the building of the church received a new impetus when Rev. A. V. Vacula came to New York from Baltimore, Md. He was born on the 15th of August 1845, in Osek, near Olomouc, in Moravia. He studied in Kromeriz, at the University of Vienna and at Louvain, Belgium. Here the American bishops established a seminary into which they accepted students from the whole of Europe, to prepare them for work in the ethnic settlements in the U.S.A. Vacula was accepted as the future priest of the Czech settlement in Baltimore, Md. Immediately after his consecration in 1870 he left for the U.S.A. and from the beginning of December he served in the parish of St. Wenceslas, Baltimore, Md. As the Czech Catholics of New York could not make progress with their plan, they invited into this parish Rev. Vacula, who arrived in 1875 and started his work with great enthusiasm. He immediately bought the land and the building, Number 316 E. 4th Street for $12,000.00, then enlarged the building for an outlay of an additional $6,000.00 and on the 1st of December 1875 the Vicar General of New York consecrated the Church in the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius. 3 This was the first church in the U.S.A. to be named after SS. Cyril and Methodius. And it appeared very appropriate that behind this achievement was a priest from Moravia. Out of all Slavic countries, in Moravia the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the deeepest, most widely spread and most popular. In no other Slavic country were the names SS. Cyril and Methodius given so often at baptism as in Moravia. The Cyrillo-Methodian cult spread from the Moravian Velehrad in all directions and the �102 SLOVAKIA Slovaks made frequent pilgrimages there as to a source of spiritual strength. The New York church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methoqius was the first catholic church which was also attended by "the first Slovak immigrants in that city. When later this church was closed, they went to the Irish church of St. Brigitte or to the nearest German or Polish churches until in 1894 they built the first Slovak Catholic church dedicated to St. Elizabeth of Hungary. This church was built in the same street where earlier had been the church of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Similarly as amongst the Slovaks, the Cyrillo-Methodian cult was as widely spread amongst the Czechs, especially in those districts where also Moravians were settled. After the first Cyrillo-Methodian church in New York, which soon closed, there were another 15 churches built in the U.S.A., namely in: Bannister, Mich.; Kansas City, Kansas; Chicago, Ill.; Platoma, Texas; Clarkson, Nebraska; Corpus Christi, Tex.; Doman, Texas; Dubina, Texas; East St. Louis, Illinois; Granger, Texas; North Judson, Indiana; Plasi (Prague), Nebraska; Shiner, Texas ; Tanton, Michigan; Vodnary, Dakota. Besides the Slovaks and the Czechs the Cyrillo-Methodian churches were mainly built by Slovenes, Croatians and · Poles. THE UNFULFILLED PLAN OF A NEW CHURCH OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN NEW YORK The next church in New York which was to bear the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the church originally dedicated to St. John Nepomucene. That this plan did not succeed was due mainly to the bitter struggles between the nationally conscious Slovaks and the Magyarones. The consecration of the first Slovak Catholic Church took place in 1894. This was the church of St. Elizabeth of Hungary. It was around this church that the struggle between the Slovaks and the Magyars and Magyar sympathizers developed. The night before the consecration the "Magyarones" removed from the corner stone the plaque bearing the text written in literary Slovak: "Rim. Kat. Kostal Sv. Alzbety, Vystavany R. 1892". Instead of this they �SLOVAKIA 103 placed there plaque with a text in Eastern-Slovak dialect : " Uherszko Szlovenszki Kat. Koscel Szv. Elizabethy Uherszkej, Visztav. R. 1892." This arnmounted to a declaration of war. The Slovaks refused to support a Church with a name written in a distorted Slovak language and in foreign, non-Slovak orthography. This battle lasted for over a year until finally Archbishop Corrigan wrote to Slovakia inquiring which version was correct. When he received the reply he had the plaque changed as he considered that what was orthographically incorrect, was of poor taste and unfitting for a house of God. The Slovaks were jubilant but not for long as the Archbishop was approached by a delegation led by a Magyar lawyer Czukor (Jewish by religion) who persuaded the Archbishop that this struggle was between the Eastern Orthodox Panslavistic Church and between Catholicism. The Magyars were the true catholics, a European nation, but the Slovaks were Panslavs, Russofiles and sympathizers with the Eastern-Orthodoxy. Should this movement gain power it would dominate the Danubian Basin and soon it would undermine even the See. of St. Peter. The Cyrillo-Methodian cult which they spread is an Eastern-Orthodox religion. The archbishop believed these arguments and the following day he ordered to put back the plaque with the text in the Eastern dialect. The local priest, Rev. Polakovic, protested but the Archbishop rebuked him and informed him he had to look for a new parish outside of his diocese. This naturally caused a great disappointment amongst the Slovaks. A delegation of Slovaks informed the Archbishop that they would not attend this church and would not support it but would built a new Slovak Church. The Archbishop approved the plans for the new Church. The Slovaks started to work with enthusiasm and in a few weeks they transformed an old building into a new church which stood only one block away on the same street. It was planned that this church would bear the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius, this had been already announced in the papers and the donations for the building paid and it was accepted under this name.4 But this plan did not materialize. The Archbishop appointed here a Czech priest, Rev. simonik, who under �104 SLOVAKIA the pressure from the Archbishop gave the church the name of St. John Nepomuce ne. This was the first but also the last time that the names of SS. Cyril and Methodius were in the disfavor of an American Bishop. THE OLDEST CATHOLIC CHURCHE S WITH PATRON SAINTS SS. CYRIL AND METHODI US The sudden expansion of the Cyrillo-Me thodian cult on the American continent was described by Rev. Jozef Martincek as follows: "As soon as the Slovak immigrant s settled in the U.S.A. and began to form their parishes and to build their churches, the Cyrillo-Me thodian flame, which appeared for almost extinguishe d, suddenly rekindled in the hearts of our compatriot s. They almost competed with each other in their Cyrillo-Me thodian zeal to build and dedicate churches to them and there is hardly any Slovak church in the U.S.A. where their picture or their statue would not be given a distinguish ed place." 5 The Cyrillo-Me thodian cult spread in the U.S.A. due to the expanding Slovak periodicals and papers, due to the work of the patriotic Slovak priest and to a great extent also as a result of a protest against the Magyar persecutio n at home. The popularity which the cult gained in the U.S.A. was inconceiva ble in Slovakia of that time. The first Slovak Catholic Church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius was built in 1891 in Minneapol is, Minn. The initiative came from the local Society of SS. Cyril and Methodius which was founded in 1888 as the first society on the American soil called after these Saints. In the same year another church bearing the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius was opened in Bethlehem , Pa. The founder of this church was Rev. Heinen, a missionary of German origin. He was originally an officer in the German Army but later on he changed the uniform for a priestly garb and after completing his theological studies he came to the U.S.A. and worked as a missionary mainly amongst the Slavic immigrant s in Pennsylvan ia. His assistant in missionary work ( which he directed from Mau Chung, Pa.) was Rev. Vlossak, a Slovak priest, and it was due to his influence that the church in Bethlehem , Pa., was given the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius .6 �SLOVAKIA 105 THE LIST OF THE SLOVAK CHURCHES OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. This example was followed by others and the following list shows chronologically the founding of the churches dedicated to the SS. Cyril and Methodius in different parts of the U.S.A. the brackets show the diocese to which the parish belonged. 7 1891. Minneapolis, Minn. (St. Paul, Minn. ) 1891. Bethlehem, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1893. Reading, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1895. Brookside, Ala. (Mobile, Ala. ) 1898. Haverstraw, N. Y. (New York, N. Y.) 1898. Youngstown, 0. (Youngstown, 0.) 1900. Kingston, Pa. (Scranton, Pa.) 1900. Stockett, Mont. (Great Falls, Mont.) 1900. Joliet, Ill. (Joliet, Ill.) 1900. Stuttgart, Ark. (Little Rock, Ark. ) 1901. Edwardsville, Pa. 1902. Charleroi, Pa. (Pittsburgh, Pa. ) 1903. Binghamton, N. Y. (Syracuse, N . Y.) 1903. Lakewood, Ohio (Cleveland, Ohio ) 1904. Winburne, Pa. (Erie, Pa.) 1905. Lebanon, Pa. (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1905. Windber, Pa. (Altoona, Pa.) 1906. Kansas City, Kans. (Kansas City Kans.) 1906. Barberton, Ohio 1906. Boonton, N. J. (Paterson, N. J.) 1907 . Bridgeport, Conn. (Hartford, Conn.) 1911. East St. Louis, Ill. (Belleville, Ill.) 1911. Fairchance, Pa. (Greensburg, Pa.) 1911. Superior, Wis. (Superior, Wis.) 1912. Rock Spring, Wyoming 1913. Clifton, N . J. (Paterson, N. J.) 1913. Sugar Creek, Mo. 1913. Schenectady, N . Y. (Albany, N . Y.) 1914. Chicago, Ill. (Chicago, Ill.) 1916. New Brighton, Pa. (Pittsburgh, Pa. ) 1918. Detroit, Mich. (Detroit, Mich.) 1920. Coaldale, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1923. Lisbon Falls, Maine (Portland, Maine ) 1923. Rossford, Ohio (Toledo, Ohio) 1928. Warren, Ohio 1949. Slovak Manor, N. Y. (New York, N . Y .) �106 SLOVAKIA THE GROWTH OF THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS One of the early articles dealing with the CyrilloMethodian cult appeared in Jednota in 1899. The author, J. Stas, is critical of Slovak immigrants and of their lack of devotions to SS. Cyril and Methodius. He makes the following suggestions about how to pay homage to SS. Cyril and Methodius. 1. Keep their picture in your house and teach your children about their life, their work, their contributions to our faith and our culture. 2. Give their names to your children at baptism. 3. Build and dedicate churches to these Saints and decorate the existing churches with their statues. 4. Put your societies under their patronage. So far less than 10 societies have been named after them. Is this not a disgrace to American Slovaks? 5. The 5th of July should be for the Slovaks a religious and a national holiday and in this we should learn from the Irish who so devotedly revere St. Patrick. This day, or at least the following Sunday, should be devoted to religious services and sermons in reverence to their work. On that day also other national and cultural celebrations should be organized. "I am asking our priests, our editors and all Slovaks to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius amongst our compatriots, and so preserve their heritage-- our faith and our culture." 8 But in spite of this exhortation the Slovaks in the U.S.A. were unable to organize any mass Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations. Rev. Jozef Martincek, one of the most ardent promoters of the Cyrillo-Methodian cult, wrote in 1913: "Why don't we pay the necessary homage to SS. Cyril and Methodius and why don't we celebrate one day in a year as their holiday as this was already suggested before by our compatriots and our brother in Christ, Michael Bosak. I ask Rev. Furdek and other leading Slovaks to take up this matter seriously and to present to the Slovak public a plan for Cyrillo-Methodian celebration."9 �SLOVAKIA 107 REV. F. V. SASINEK AND THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. In the days when the first Slovak papers commenced publication in the U.S.A., the 20-30,000 Slovak immigrants had only two priests and two educated laymen, Wolf and Slovensky, ( both teachers by profession and editors of these papers). It took several years before the number of such laymen together with the priest grew to 25. Naturally, under these circumstances any cultural work was extremely difficult as it fell on the shoulders of a very small group of men who besides their cultural work without monastery remuneration had also to carry on with their regular employment to provide for themselves and their families. Therefore, from the very beginning these men had to look to Slovakia for new help in their cultural and national work. The most enthusiastic and successful of such early workers was Rev. F . V. Sasinek, a catholic priest and a historian. Falling into disgrace of his bishop IpolyiStummer, he left Banska Bystrica and for some years he lived in Kuty as a guest of his friend Rev. Pukancik. He then went to Prague and from there to Maria Zell , a pilgrimage shrine in Austria, where he served as a confessor of the pilgrims and heard confessions in 12 languages. In this voluntary exile be became greatly interested in Slovak immigrants to the U.S.A. and as soon as he made contacts with Rovnianek and Furdek he became the main contributor to Slovak papers in the U.S.A. 10 He played especially a very important part in the cultivating of the Cyrillo-Methodian spirit. We estimate that approximately 85 ¼' of all Slovak publications about SS. Cyril and Methodius in the last century came from the pen of Sasinek. His first literary contribution published in 1852, was a poem: "Piesen o slovanskych blahozvestcoch", "A song about the missionaries of the Slavs".11 THE MAIN ADVOCATES OF THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. There were many active supporters of the CyrilloMethodian cult among the Catholic priests. Probably the most active was Rev. Jan Porubsky. He was an ingenious �108 SLOVAKIA writer, with a general, almost encyclopedic knowledge and was especially well acquainted with Slovak history. He began to write from Slovakia for the American Slovak papers and published a great number of articles about the life and the significance of the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Similar topics were covered by him in his books which were published in the U.S.A.12 From among other priests who were in the foreground of the Cyrillo-Methodian movement it is necessary to mention especially Stefan Furdek, then Rev. Stas, Rev. Dianiska, D. D., Rev. Pavco, Rev. Martincek, 13 Rev. Duchon and out of the younger generation, Rev. Stefan Panik, Msgr. Mlynarovic, etc. THE ORDER OF THE SISTERS OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS But probably the greatest achievement in this field can be attributed to Rev. Matus Jankola who founded the first Slovak teaching order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Dr. Fr. Hrusovsky in his history of this Order notes the following: "The Order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius has a special place amongst the Slovak Orders in the U.S.A. because it is a truly Slovak Order. Even more, it is the only truly Slovak Order. Figuratively speaking we may say that The Order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius is the only Slovak flower in the large bouquet of Slovak Orders. It was not by coincidence that this Order was not founded in Slovakia where SS. Cyril and Methodius worked many centuries ago and where different Orders, fo many centuries, maintained and developed their heritage. The fact that this Order was founded in the U.S .A. illustrates well how bright was the legacy of these Saints amongst those members of the Slovak nation who had to leave the mother country and how deep was their determination to preserve this legacy." 14 REV. DANIEL ZABOJ LAUcEK AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS Amongst the Slovak Protestant pastors it is especially �SLOVAKIA 109 necessary to mention Rev. Daniel Zaboj Laucek who dedicated his work to the Cyrillo-Methodian ideals when still in Slovakia and continued in this work on his arrival in America. In 1885, in Turciansky Sv. Martin he published the book Sv. Cyril a Metod, apostolovia slovanski, jich vyznam v cirkvi krest'anskej v6bec a v Slovanstve zvlast'. Nakladom vlastnym pri pomoci podporovatel'ov slovenskej spisby. (SS. Cyril and Methodius, Apostles of the Slavs, their place in Christendom and in Slavdom.) Private edition with the help of the supporters of the Slovak Literature. Besides this he published a series of articles : "Po tisic rokoch." "Pamiatke sv. slovanskych apostolov". (After a thousand years. In memory of the Saint Apostles of Slavs.) "Ocenenie jich p6sobenia" (Evaluation of their work) . "Blizsie o p6sobeni a razu sv. slovanskych apostolov" (More about the work and the spirit of the Saint Apostles of the Slavs) . "Pamiatky p6sobenia slovanskych bratov v nasom narode" (The imprints of the work of the Apostles of the Slavs in our nation). The series was published in Ndrodnie Noviny, XVI, 1885, number 1-7 . Rev. Laucek continued in this work in the U.S.A. and he wrote about similar topics in "cas" of which he was an editor for a short time. He also wrote in Slovak Protestant papers especially in Slovensky Hldsnik. Unfortunately a bibliography of the Slovak publications in the U.S.A. has never been put together and many of the works have not been preserved which means a great loss for Slovak literature. THE ASSOCIATIONS BEARING THE NAME OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS It is of great interest that the Cyrillo-Methodian Cult first spread amongst the immigrants from Eastern Slovakia. In 1875 the brothers Jan and Juraj Gogola came to Minneapolis, Minn. and shortly after them Jan Zelenak, Jan Martonik, and Tomas Ovsak. They came across an advertisement of the firm Timm Eliot and as they expected that this was probably a Slovak name, Elias, they answered the advertisement and applied for work with that firm. They were accepted and the firm found in them such good employees that it was willing in future to give preference to Slovaks. The owner of the firm was very �110 SLOVAKLA just and humanitarian and the Slovaks were pleased to work for him. From 1875 on, the number of the Slovaks in this city grew considerably and in 1878 the brothers Juraj and Andrej Olha and Jan Martonik thought of the plan of forming an Association of the Minneapolis Slovaks. They met on November 12th, 1888 and decided to form the Association. There is a notation in the minutes of the first meeting which reads: "As SS. Cyril and Methodius were our Apostles, it will be appropriate that our Association be placed under their patronage." This resolution was carried out. In 1891 the Association formed the first Slovak Catholic parish in the U.S.A. called after the two Apostles. This was the beginning of our active CyrilloMethodian cult amongst the American Slovaks. The men who were first preoccupied with this idea in the U.S.A. came from Bystre in saris county. 15 The first branch of "Narodny Slovensky Spolok" which put itself under the patronage of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the local branch No. 8, in Youngstown, Ohio. Rev. Horvath, and ardent Slovak Catholic priest, was in Youngstown at that time and it is likely that the Branch accepted the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius on his suggestion. 16 It will be of interest to note that one of the cofounders of the branch was John smigovsky, the grandfather of the colonel smigovsky, who for his service to the Slovak Republic was sentenced to death in 1946 by the pro-Communist National Tribunal under the chairmanship of Igor Daxner. Daxner recommended an amnesty, however, the chairman of the Slovak National Council refused to deal with this request on technical grounds and Smigovsky was executed the following day. Colonel smigovsky was born in the U.S.A. but was educated in Slovakia. THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN CANADA The possition of the Slovak immigrants to Canada was quite different from that of the immigration to the U.S.A. The immigration to Canada reached noticeable proportions only after the First World War when immigration to the U.S.A. became restricted and the quotas allowed were quickly filled. Unable to obtain admission to the U.S.A. many immigrants choose Canada, often with plans to seek admission to the U.S.A. later. The immigrants �SLOVAKIA 111 who come to Canada were of a different political background than those who in the previous century went to the U.S.A. They experienced the First World War, the political upheavals which followed, many of them went to Slovak schools and were on a higher cultural level than the generation who before them went to the U.S.A. They were more aware of national and political problems. There were no Magyarones amongst them and regardless of their political affiliations they declared themselves as Slovaks. Only a very small number of them believed that Slovaks ceased to exist as an individual nation and that a new "Czechoslovak" nation emerged. The first Catholic church in Canada dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius was a small church built in 1906 in Bellevue, Alberta. The oldest parish called after SS. Cyril and Methodius is the Montreal parish which was established in 1928. Similar parishes were formed in Toronto in 1934 and in Windsor in 1940. New parishes were founded following a new wave of immigrants after the Second World War. Amongst them are the parishes of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Hamilton, Ontario of 1945 and in Westminster, B. C. of 1960. 17 EPILOG The Cyrillo-Methodian ideology did not find favorable ground in Czecho-Slovakia after 1918 due to a strong anti-Catholic feeling of the ruling Czechs. But the Slovaks, in spite of many difficulties, were able to make progress in every direction. The ranks of the intelligentsia grew, the letters and the sciences advanced even in those fields where there was not one Slovak representative before. And slowly also the Cyrillo-Methodian ideas became better known to the masses. There were many who thought this development was too slow. Thus we read: "It is a pity that while the Slovaks in the U.S.A. have 16 parishes and 200 altars in their churches dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius, we at home, in Slovakia, have only 16 such altars in our 2,300 Catholic churches and chapels." 18 The author of course was poorly informed, as the number-of such parishes in the U.S.A. was not 16 but more �112 SLOVAKIA than twice that number. As in many other fields of Slovak affairs only after the formation of the Slovak Republic definite steps were taken to accept SS. Cyril and Methodius as national Saints. Their feast in Slovakia was also a day of commemoration for all Slovaks abroad. Throughout Slovakia there were festivals, meetings, lectures commemorating the Slovaks who had to leave their fatherland. The plans were made to build a cathedral to SS. Cyril and Methodius in Bratislava. Many research projects were under way and a Cyrillo-Methodian archives and library were in preparation. But with the loss of political independence these projects also died and with them also much of the work inspired by bishop Moyses, Fr. Sasinek and Holly. Out of these endeavors only those that grew abroad, in the U.S.A. and in Canada survived. But we believe that, in this age when even small nations and tribes throughout Africa are gaining independence, it will not be possible to beep in chains a nation which already 1,100 years ago belonged to the cultured and Christian nations of Europe and this mainly through the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius.19 FOOTNOTES AMI) LITERATURE 1) See Dr. F . Hrusovsky: frska misia a zaciatky krest'anstva (The Irish Mission and the Beginning of Christianity), pp. 41-65, and also by the same author Slovenski v ladari (Slovak Rulers ), Scranton 1948, p. 263. 2) Ries, Viliam : Frantisek Richard Osvald (Trnava, 1939), pp. 87, 93 . 3) Goulding, S: Catholic Churches of New York City, with sketches of their history and lives of the present Pastors, (New York, 1878 ), pp. 748. 4) Culen, K.: Dejiny newyorskych Slovcikov (The History of t he Slovaks of New York) . 5) " Oslava cyrilometodejska, 863-1863-1913," Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, p. 129. 6) Fink, Leo, Gregory: Monsignor Heinen, Militant Missionary , The Dolphin Press, (P hiladelphia, Pa. 1937) , p. 75. 7 ) Hrobak, Philip: Slovak Catholic Parishes and Institution in the United States of America, (Middletown, Pa. 1955), pp. 32, 34, 39, 42, 50, 52, 63, 65, 68, 70, 81 , 84, 87, 90, 92, 99, 105, 106, 107, 121, 132, 134, 146, 152, 154, 162. See also Piroch, Mary: "American Slovaks and SS. Cyril and Methodius," Slovakia Vol. XIII, N. 1/36, March 1963, pp. 25-28 ; ~ofranec, Tomas, Rev.: "Sv. Cyril a Metod a m y americki Slovaci" ( SS. Cyril and Methodi us and American Slovaks). Ave Maria, XLVII, No. 4, April 1, 1963, pp.175-176; Slovenske osady v Amerike, (Slovak Parishes in the U.S.A.), Kalendar Jednota for �SLOVAKIA 113 1906, pp. 23 , 51, 53-57, 73 , 81, 109, 113, 114; Baska, Louis, O.S.B.: Slovenske katolicke osady v Spojenych Statoch (Slovak Catholic Parishes in the U.S.A.) , Katolicke Slovensko (Trnava) , p. 623 ; Kushner, Jozef, Rev.: Slovaci katolici pittsburghskeho biskupstva ( Slovak Catholics of the Pittsburgh Diocese), Katolicky Sokol (Passaic, 1946) , p. 174. 8 ) J ednota, July 12, 1899. 9) Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, p. 130. 10) The first biography of SS. Cyril and Methodius started publicatio n in Jednota on the 18th January, 1899, and continued in a long series of articles. The author was Rev. Fr. Sasinek. 11) See Katolicke Noviny, 1852, 1st year, No. 35. 12) Porubsky, Jan Rev.: 100 rokov spisovnej slovenciny (One Hundred Years of Literary Slovak), Scranton, Pa.; Slovaci a slovencina (Slovaks and the Slovak language). This was edited anonymously, but it was the work of Rev. Porubsky, Katolicky Sokol, 1929, p . 114. 13 ) Martincek, Jozef, Rev. : "Oslava cyrilometodejska" (The CyrilloMethodian Jubilee) 863-1863-1913 ; Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, pp. 129135. " Oslava sv. Cyrila a Metoda v dobe Moysesa a dnes" (The Cyrillo-Methodian Celebration at the time of Moyses and Today), Kalendcir Sviitovojtessky, 1936, pp. 119-125. 14) Hrusovsky, Franti.sek, Dr. : Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Slovak Religious Orders in the U. S.A. ), Cleveland, Ohio 1935, p.496. See Chapter: Kongregacia sestier sv. Cyrila a Metoda, Danville, P a. (Congregation of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, Danville, Pa.), pp. 161-232. This Chapter has a detailed bibliography on pages 231-232 ; See also Pauco, Jozef: Matus Jankola, knaz a ncirodovec (Matus Jankola as a priest and a patriot) , Danville, Pa. , p . 173. 15) Pamiitnik Spolku sv. Cyrila a Metoda (Almanac of SS. Cyril and Methodius), No. 3, I.K.S.J. , Minneapolis, Minn. 1888-1938. 16) V. S. Platek: Nase odbory , D ejiny a pamiitnica 60 . vyrocia N. S.S. (Our Associations. The Memoirs of the 60th Anniversary of the National Slovak Society), Pittsburgh, Pa. , pp. 225-392. 17) On the religious organization of Canadian Slovaks, see J . M. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, (Toronto, 1967) , pp. 227-276. 18) Kalendcir Sviitovojtessky (St. Adalbert's Almanac ), 1936, p. 125. 19) On the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition in Slovakia, see Prof. J . M. Kirschbaum "The Role of the Cyrillo-Methodian Tradition in Slovak Na tional Life," Slovak Studies, Vol. III, (Rome, 1963 ) . • THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA heartily commends all efforts of our governmental and other organs to ferret out and unmask all Communists and fellow travellers, as well as all persons and organizations who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism promoted by the Soviet Union. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 98 SLOVAKIA The Cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius Amongst the Slovaks Ln U.S.A. and Canada* * This essay w as prepare d by t he late Konstan tin culen i n 1962 for a symposium or ganized and edited by Prof. J. M . K i rschbaum for the 11th cent ennary of the arrival of SS. Cyril and Methodius among t he ancest ors of Slov aks. T he essays co llected and edit ed or translated by J. M. K i r sc h baum appeared in SLOVAK STUDT ES, CYRILLO-METH ODIANA, V ol. 3, (Rome, 1963). Culen's essay was not yet tr anslated and therefore not published. I n view of the valuable information and in order to complet e the history of the CyriUo-Methodia n tradition among Sl ov aks, we are grat efiil to Dr. Kirschbaum for preserving the manuscript and his adaptation for an English piiblication . By K . C u len THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN IRISH ON AMERICAN SLOVAKS The migration of Slovaks to the U.S.A. had many traits similar to those of the migration of the Irish. It was the catastrophic potato crop failure which caused the first man emigration of the Irish to the U.S.A. And we come across a similar cause of emigration of the Slovaks. The Slovak statistician Dr. Emil Stodola noted that each poor p otato crop in Slovakia was followed by rising emigration to the U.S .A. There were other similarities between the Irish and the Slovak migrations. The oppression of the Irish dates even further back in history than the Slovak one and is many sided. The political oppression started in Slovakia at the end of the 18th century and culminated befor the First World War. The Irish were oppressed due to their religion and suffered culturally and economically and therefore their resistance was stronger and more passionate than that of the Slovaks. In Ireland the oppression affected all the classes but in Slovakia the intelligentsia suffered most. The difference comes to light when we compare the cult of S t . Patrick to the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius . SLOVAKIA 99 St. Patrick is a national saint and is known and revered by all the Irish. SS. Cyril and Methodius were not known to the same extent amongst Slovaks. The population in general had only a vague knowledge of them. But the Slovak intelligentsia had even a deeper devotion to them than the Irish to St. Patrick. Therefore the cult of the SS. Cyril and Methodius in the U.S.A. was not a cult brought over by the masses as in the case of St. Patrick, but it was a cult especially nurtured by nationally conscious immigrants, nurtured to an extent that would not have been possible in Slovakia. Generally speaking, the Slovak immigrants became aware, in their new countries, of a need for a national saint and this became evident to them on such days as the feast of St. Patrick, with its festivities attracting not only the Irish but also numerous names of other nationalities. In older Slovak papers we frequently see articles about large groups of Slovaks participating in the festivities of St. Patrick. In one case the writer claimed that Slovaks outnumbered the Irish. No wonder these Slovaks asked"Who would correspond to St. Patrick in our national life? " They frequently raised this question in the Slovak press and of course the only answer they could obtain was-SS . Cyril and Methodius. It was this background which helped to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius between the Slovak names in the U.S .A. It should be noted in this connection, that SS . Cyril and Methodius completed amongst the Slovaks the missionary work which prior to them was already initiated by Bavarian and Irish missionaries, the first Christian missionaries in the Danube area. 1 THE INFLUENCE OF THE CULT OF ST. PATRICK ON THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS In the very early Slovak papers in the U.S.A. appeared dozens of articles, some short and some extensive enough, for serial publication, describing the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius amongst the Slovak ancestors. American Slovaks who were scattered amongst the Irish saw in the SS. Cyril and Methodius their St. Patrick. The Slovak papers exhorted them to venerate them just as the Irish revered St. Patrick. It is interesting to ask the question, how much did 100 SLOVAKIA the American Slovaks know about SS. Cyril and Methodius? Not a great deal. Most often they learned about them them from the excellent and well known prayer book of Rev. Andrej Radlinsky "Nabozne Vylevy." This prayer book contained a color picture of the Saints, their brief history and their prayers. Rev. Radlinsky succeeded in doing this to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Later on when a small prayer book was published in the U.S.A., the bishop of Spis, Parvy, put it on the Index for no reason other than that it contained a prayer to SS. Cyril and Methodius. Thus while Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical highly extoling the missionary work of these two Saints, a Magyar bishop with his seat in Catholic Slovakia put the prayer book on the Index as he mistrusted these Saints because of their panslavistic learnings. The large groups of Slovak immigrants in the U.S.A. had for the first time an opportunity to learn more about the missionary work of those Apostles, as well as about their cultural and linguistic work. But at the moment when the cult of these Apostles began to spread, a group of Catholic priests rose against it even in the U.S .A. and according to the spirit which was taught to them in the seminaries in the old country prepared the road-blocks to this cult. At the head of the group were Kossalko, Denes and Haitinger. In the papers edited by them they vituperated both Saints in the same manner as did the Magyar Catholic periodical "Katolikus Szemle" (Catholic Review) in the year 1893 in an article "Slavonic Christianity in our territories before their occupation". St. Methodius was denounced here as a panslavistic chauvinist, a forerunner of the schism and a very untrustworthy personality. The author of the article applied the modern Magyar approach and the chauvinistic terminology to the period prior to 900 when the national questions were of very minor importance.2 The pupils of this chauvinistic school working in the U.S .A. could find nothing worthy to say about these Saints and made them subjects of the intrigues of the Hungarian premier Koloman Tisza and of his successors. Their success was, however, small as they were unpopular priests and their arguments were without any force against the well documented work of their opponents. SLOVAKIA 101 THE FIRST CHURCH DEDICATED TO SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS The first church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius in the U.S .A. was a small wooden church built by two Czech Societies: the Society of St. Wenceslas and the Society of St. Ludmila in New York. These two societies were founded in 1874 with the purpose of building the first church for the growing Czech colony in New York, in the block between the 1st and 10th streets and between the Avenues B-D, where the Czechs were intermingled with the Poles. The Plan for the building of the church received a new impetus when Rev. A. V. Vacula came to New York from Baltimore, Md. He was born on the 15th of August 1845, in Osek, near Olomouc, in Moravia. He studied in Kromeriz, at the University of Vienna and at Louvain, Belgium. Here the American bishops established a seminary into which they accepted students from the whole of Europe, to prepare them for work in the ethnic settlements in the U.S.A. Vacula was accepted as the future priest of the Czech settlement in Baltimore, Md. Immediately after his consecration in 1870 he left for the U.S.A. and from the beginning of December he served in the parish of St. Wenceslas, Baltimore, Md. As the Czech Catholics of New York could not make progress with their plan, they invited into this parish Rev. Vacula, who arrived in 1875 and started his work with great enthusiasm. He immediately bought the land and the building, Number 316 E. 4th Street for $12,000.00, then enlarged the building for an outlay of an additional $6,000.00 and on the 1st of December 1875 the Vicar General of New York consecrated the Church in the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius. 3 This was the first church in the U.S.A. to be named after SS. Cyril and Methodius. And it appeared very appropriate that behind this achievement was a priest from Moravia. Out of all Slavic countries, in Moravia the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the deeepest, most widely spread and most popular. In no other Slavic country were the names SS. Cyril and Methodius given so often at baptism as in Moravia. The Cyrillo-Methodian cult spread from the Moravian Velehrad in all directions and the 102 SLOVAKIA Slovaks made frequent pilgrimages there as to a source of spiritual strength. The New York church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methoqius was the first catholic church which was also attended by "the first Slovak immigrants in that city. When later this church was closed, they went to the Irish church of St. Brigitte or to the nearest German or Polish churches until in 1894 they built the first Slovak Catholic church dedicated to St. Elizabeth of Hungary. This church was built in the same street where earlier had been the church of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Similarly as amongst the Slovaks, the Cyrillo-Methodian cult was as widely spread amongst the Czechs, especially in those districts where also Moravians were settled. After the first Cyrillo-Methodian church in New York, which soon closed, there were another 15 churches built in the U.S.A., namely in: Bannister, Mich.; Kansas City, Kansas; Chicago, Ill.; Platoma, Texas; Clarkson, Nebraska; Corpus Christi, Tex.; Doman, Texas; Dubina, Texas; East St. Louis, Illinois; Granger, Texas; North Judson, Indiana; Plasi (Prague), Nebraska; Shiner, Texas ; Tanton, Michigan; Vodnary, Dakota. Besides the Slovaks and the Czechs the Cyrillo-Methodian churches were mainly built by Slovenes, Croatians and · Poles. THE UNFULFILLED PLAN OF A NEW CHURCH OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN NEW YORK The next church in New York which was to bear the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the church originally dedicated to St. John Nepomucene. That this plan did not succeed was due mainly to the bitter struggles between the nationally conscious Slovaks and the Magyarones. The consecration of the first Slovak Catholic Church took place in 1894. This was the church of St. Elizabeth of Hungary. It was around this church that the struggle between the Slovaks and the Magyars and Magyar sympathizers developed. The night before the consecration the "Magyarones" removed from the corner stone the plaque bearing the text written in literary Slovak: "Rim. Kat. Kostal Sv. Alzbety, Vystavany R. 1892". Instead of this they SLOVAKIA 103 placed there plaque with a text in Eastern-Slovak dialect : " Uherszko Szlovenszki Kat. Koscel Szv. Elizabethy Uherszkej, Visztav. R. 1892." This arnmounted to a declaration of war. The Slovaks refused to support a Church with a name written in a distorted Slovak language and in foreign, non-Slovak orthography. This battle lasted for over a year until finally Archbishop Corrigan wrote to Slovakia inquiring which version was correct. When he received the reply he had the plaque changed as he considered that what was orthographically incorrect, was of poor taste and unfitting for a house of God. The Slovaks were jubilant but not for long as the Archbishop was approached by a delegation led by a Magyar lawyer Czukor (Jewish by religion) who persuaded the Archbishop that this struggle was between the Eastern Orthodox Panslavistic Church and between Catholicism. The Magyars were the true catholics, a European nation, but the Slovaks were Panslavs, Russofiles and sympathizers with the Eastern-Orthodoxy. Should this movement gain power it would dominate the Danubian Basin and soon it would undermine even the See. of St. Peter. The Cyrillo-Methodian cult which they spread is an Eastern-Orthodox religion. The archbishop believed these arguments and the following day he ordered to put back the plaque with the text in the Eastern dialect. The local priest, Rev. Polakovic, protested but the Archbishop rebuked him and informed him he had to look for a new parish outside of his diocese. This naturally caused a great disappointment amongst the Slovaks. A delegation of Slovaks informed the Archbishop that they would not attend this church and would not support it but would built a new Slovak Church. The Archbishop approved the plans for the new Church. The Slovaks started to work with enthusiasm and in a few weeks they transformed an old building into a new church which stood only one block away on the same street. It was planned that this church would bear the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius, this had been already announced in the papers and the donations for the building paid and it was accepted under this name.4 But this plan did not materialize. The Archbishop appointed here a Czech priest, Rev. simonik, who under 104 SLOVAKIA the pressure from the Archbishop gave the church the name of St. John Nepomuce ne. This was the first but also the last time that the names of SS. Cyril and Methodius were in the disfavor of an American Bishop. THE OLDEST CATHOLIC CHURCHE S WITH PATRON SAINTS SS. CYRIL AND METHODI US The sudden expansion of the Cyrillo-Me thodian cult on the American continent was described by Rev. Jozef Martincek as follows: "As soon as the Slovak immigrant s settled in the U.S.A. and began to form their parishes and to build their churches, the Cyrillo-Me thodian flame, which appeared for almost extinguishe d, suddenly rekindled in the hearts of our compatriot s. They almost competed with each other in their Cyrillo-Me thodian zeal to build and dedicate churches to them and there is hardly any Slovak church in the U.S.A. where their picture or their statue would not be given a distinguish ed place." 5 The Cyrillo-Me thodian cult spread in the U.S.A. due to the expanding Slovak periodicals and papers, due to the work of the patriotic Slovak priest and to a great extent also as a result of a protest against the Magyar persecutio n at home. The popularity which the cult gained in the U.S.A. was inconceiva ble in Slovakia of that time. The first Slovak Catholic Church dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius was built in 1891 in Minneapol is, Minn. The initiative came from the local Society of SS. Cyril and Methodius which was founded in 1888 as the first society on the American soil called after these Saints. In the same year another church bearing the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius was opened in Bethlehem , Pa. The founder of this church was Rev. Heinen, a missionary of German origin. He was originally an officer in the German Army but later on he changed the uniform for a priestly garb and after completing his theological studies he came to the U.S.A. and worked as a missionary mainly amongst the Slavic immigrant s in Pennsylvan ia. His assistant in missionary work ( which he directed from Mau Chung, Pa.) was Rev. Vlossak, a Slovak priest, and it was due to his influence that the church in Bethlehem , Pa., was given the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius .6 SLOVAKIA 105 THE LIST OF THE SLOVAK CHURCHES OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. This example was followed by others and the following list shows chronologically the founding of the churches dedicated to the SS. Cyril and Methodius in different parts of the U.S.A. the brackets show the diocese to which the parish belonged. 7 1891. Minneapolis, Minn. (St. Paul, Minn. ) 1891. Bethlehem, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1893. Reading, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1895. Brookside, Ala. (Mobile, Ala. ) 1898. Haverstraw, N. Y. (New York, N. Y.) 1898. Youngstown, 0. (Youngstown, 0.) 1900. Kingston, Pa. (Scranton, Pa.) 1900. Stockett, Mont. (Great Falls, Mont.) 1900. Joliet, Ill. (Joliet, Ill.) 1900. Stuttgart, Ark. (Little Rock, Ark. ) 1901. Edwardsville, Pa. 1902. Charleroi, Pa. (Pittsburgh, Pa. ) 1903. Binghamton, N. Y. (Syracuse, N . Y.) 1903. Lakewood, Ohio (Cleveland, Ohio ) 1904. Winburne, Pa. (Erie, Pa.) 1905. Lebanon, Pa. (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1905. Windber, Pa. (Altoona, Pa.) 1906. Kansas City, Kans. (Kansas City Kans.) 1906. Barberton, Ohio 1906. Boonton, N. J. (Paterson, N. J.) 1907 . Bridgeport, Conn. (Hartford, Conn.) 1911. East St. Louis, Ill. (Belleville, Ill.) 1911. Fairchance, Pa. (Greensburg, Pa.) 1911. Superior, Wis. (Superior, Wis.) 1912. Rock Spring, Wyoming 1913. Clifton, N . J. (Paterson, N. J.) 1913. Sugar Creek, Mo. 1913. Schenectady, N . Y. (Albany, N . Y.) 1914. Chicago, Ill. (Chicago, Ill.) 1916. New Brighton, Pa. (Pittsburgh, Pa. ) 1918. Detroit, Mich. (Detroit, Mich.) 1920. Coaldale, Pa. (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1923. Lisbon Falls, Maine (Portland, Maine ) 1923. Rossford, Ohio (Toledo, Ohio) 1928. Warren, Ohio 1949. Slovak Manor, N. Y. (New York, N . Y .) 106 SLOVAKIA THE GROWTH OF THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS One of the early articles dealing with the CyrilloMethodian cult appeared in Jednota in 1899. The author, J. Stas, is critical of Slovak immigrants and of their lack of devotions to SS. Cyril and Methodius. He makes the following suggestions about how to pay homage to SS. Cyril and Methodius. 1. Keep their picture in your house and teach your children about their life, their work, their contributions to our faith and our culture. 2. Give their names to your children at baptism. 3. Build and dedicate churches to these Saints and decorate the existing churches with their statues. 4. Put your societies under their patronage. So far less than 10 societies have been named after them. Is this not a disgrace to American Slovaks? 5. The 5th of July should be for the Slovaks a religious and a national holiday and in this we should learn from the Irish who so devotedly revere St. Patrick. This day, or at least the following Sunday, should be devoted to religious services and sermons in reverence to their work. On that day also other national and cultural celebrations should be organized. "I am asking our priests, our editors and all Slovaks to spread the cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius amongst our compatriots, and so preserve their heritage-- our faith and our culture." 8 But in spite of this exhortation the Slovaks in the U.S.A. were unable to organize any mass Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations. Rev. Jozef Martincek, one of the most ardent promoters of the Cyrillo-Methodian cult, wrote in 1913: "Why don't we pay the necessary homage to SS. Cyril and Methodius and why don't we celebrate one day in a year as their holiday as this was already suggested before by our compatriots and our brother in Christ, Michael Bosak. I ask Rev. Furdek and other leading Slovaks to take up this matter seriously and to present to the Slovak public a plan for Cyrillo-Methodian celebration."9 SLOVAKIA 107 REV. F. V. SASINEK AND THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. In the days when the first Slovak papers commenced publication in the U.S.A., the 20-30,000 Slovak immigrants had only two priests and two educated laymen, Wolf and Slovensky, ( both teachers by profession and editors of these papers). It took several years before the number of such laymen together with the priest grew to 25. Naturally, under these circumstances any cultural work was extremely difficult as it fell on the shoulders of a very small group of men who besides their cultural work without monastery remuneration had also to carry on with their regular employment to provide for themselves and their families. Therefore, from the very beginning these men had to look to Slovakia for new help in their cultural and national work. The most enthusiastic and successful of such early workers was Rev. F . V. Sasinek, a catholic priest and a historian. Falling into disgrace of his bishop IpolyiStummer, he left Banska Bystrica and for some years he lived in Kuty as a guest of his friend Rev. Pukancik. He then went to Prague and from there to Maria Zell , a pilgrimage shrine in Austria, where he served as a confessor of the pilgrims and heard confessions in 12 languages. In this voluntary exile be became greatly interested in Slovak immigrants to the U.S.A. and as soon as he made contacts with Rovnianek and Furdek he became the main contributor to Slovak papers in the U.S.A. 10 He played especially a very important part in the cultivating of the Cyrillo-Methodian spirit. We estimate that approximately 85 ¼' of all Slovak publications about SS. Cyril and Methodius in the last century came from the pen of Sasinek. His first literary contribution published in 1852, was a poem: "Piesen o slovanskych blahozvestcoch", "A song about the missionaries of the Slavs".11 THE MAIN ADVOCATES OF THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN THE U.S.A. There were many active supporters of the CyrilloMethodian cult among the Catholic priests. Probably the most active was Rev. Jan Porubsky. He was an ingenious 108 SLOVAKIA writer, with a general, almost encyclopedic knowledge and was especially well acquainted with Slovak history. He began to write from Slovakia for the American Slovak papers and published a great number of articles about the life and the significance of the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Similar topics were covered by him in his books which were published in the U.S.A.12 From among other priests who were in the foreground of the Cyrillo-Methodian movement it is necessary to mention especially Stefan Furdek, then Rev. Stas, Rev. Dianiska, D. D., Rev. Pavco, Rev. Martincek, 13 Rev. Duchon and out of the younger generation, Rev. Stefan Panik, Msgr. Mlynarovic, etc. THE ORDER OF THE SISTERS OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS But probably the greatest achievement in this field can be attributed to Rev. Matus Jankola who founded the first Slovak teaching order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Dr. Fr. Hrusovsky in his history of this Order notes the following: "The Order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius has a special place amongst the Slovak Orders in the U.S.A. because it is a truly Slovak Order. Even more, it is the only truly Slovak Order. Figuratively speaking we may say that The Order of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius is the only Slovak flower in the large bouquet of Slovak Orders. It was not by coincidence that this Order was not founded in Slovakia where SS. Cyril and Methodius worked many centuries ago and where different Orders, fo many centuries, maintained and developed their heritage. The fact that this Order was founded in the U.S .A. illustrates well how bright was the legacy of these Saints amongst those members of the Slovak nation who had to leave the mother country and how deep was their determination to preserve this legacy." 14 REV. DANIEL ZABOJ LAUcEK AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS Amongst the Slovak Protestant pastors it is especially SLOVAKIA 109 necessary to mention Rev. Daniel Zaboj Laucek who dedicated his work to the Cyrillo-Methodian ideals when still in Slovakia and continued in this work on his arrival in America. In 1885, in Turciansky Sv. Martin he published the book Sv. Cyril a Metod, apostolovia slovanski, jich vyznam v cirkvi krest'anskej v6bec a v Slovanstve zvlast'. Nakladom vlastnym pri pomoci podporovatel'ov slovenskej spisby. (SS. Cyril and Methodius, Apostles of the Slavs, their place in Christendom and in Slavdom.) Private edition with the help of the supporters of the Slovak Literature. Besides this he published a series of articles : "Po tisic rokoch." "Pamiatke sv. slovanskych apostolov". (After a thousand years. In memory of the Saint Apostles of Slavs.) "Ocenenie jich p6sobenia" (Evaluation of their work) . "Blizsie o p6sobeni a razu sv. slovanskych apostolov" (More about the work and the spirit of the Saint Apostles of the Slavs) . "Pamiatky p6sobenia slovanskych bratov v nasom narode" (The imprints of the work of the Apostles of the Slavs in our nation). The series was published in Ndrodnie Noviny, XVI, 1885, number 1-7 . Rev. Laucek continued in this work in the U.S.A. and he wrote about similar topics in "cas" of which he was an editor for a short time. He also wrote in Slovak Protestant papers especially in Slovensky Hldsnik. Unfortunately a bibliography of the Slovak publications in the U.S.A. has never been put together and many of the works have not been preserved which means a great loss for Slovak literature. THE ASSOCIATIONS BEARING THE NAME OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS It is of great interest that the Cyrillo-Methodian Cult first spread amongst the immigrants from Eastern Slovakia. In 1875 the brothers Jan and Juraj Gogola came to Minneapolis, Minn. and shortly after them Jan Zelenak, Jan Martonik, and Tomas Ovsak. They came across an advertisement of the firm Timm Eliot and as they expected that this was probably a Slovak name, Elias, they answered the advertisement and applied for work with that firm. They were accepted and the firm found in them such good employees that it was willing in future to give preference to Slovaks. The owner of the firm was very 110 SLOVAKLA just and humanitarian and the Slovaks were pleased to work for him. From 1875 on, the number of the Slovaks in this city grew considerably and in 1878 the brothers Juraj and Andrej Olha and Jan Martonik thought of the plan of forming an Association of the Minneapolis Slovaks. They met on November 12th, 1888 and decided to form the Association. There is a notation in the minutes of the first meeting which reads: "As SS. Cyril and Methodius were our Apostles, it will be appropriate that our Association be placed under their patronage." This resolution was carried out. In 1891 the Association formed the first Slovak Catholic parish in the U.S.A. called after the two Apostles. This was the beginning of our active CyrilloMethodian cult amongst the American Slovaks. The men who were first preoccupied with this idea in the U.S.A. came from Bystre in saris county. 15 The first branch of "Narodny Slovensky Spolok" which put itself under the patronage of SS. Cyril and Methodius was the local branch No. 8, in Youngstown, Ohio. Rev. Horvath, and ardent Slovak Catholic priest, was in Youngstown at that time and it is likely that the Branch accepted the name of SS. Cyril and Methodius on his suggestion. 16 It will be of interest to note that one of the cofounders of the branch was John smigovsky, the grandfather of the colonel smigovsky, who for his service to the Slovak Republic was sentenced to death in 1946 by the pro-Communist National Tribunal under the chairmanship of Igor Daxner. Daxner recommended an amnesty, however, the chairman of the Slovak National Council refused to deal with this request on technical grounds and Smigovsky was executed the following day. Colonel smigovsky was born in the U.S.A. but was educated in Slovakia. THE CULT OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN CANADA The possition of the Slovak immigrants to Canada was quite different from that of the immigration to the U.S.A. The immigration to Canada reached noticeable proportions only after the First World War when immigration to the U.S.A. became restricted and the quotas allowed were quickly filled. Unable to obtain admission to the U.S.A. many immigrants choose Canada, often with plans to seek admission to the U.S.A. later. The immigrants SLOVAKIA 111 who come to Canada were of a different political background than those who in the previous century went to the U.S.A. They experienced the First World War, the political upheavals which followed, many of them went to Slovak schools and were on a higher cultural level than the generation who before them went to the U.S.A. They were more aware of national and political problems. There were no Magyarones amongst them and regardless of their political affiliations they declared themselves as Slovaks. Only a very small number of them believed that Slovaks ceased to exist as an individual nation and that a new "Czechoslovak" nation emerged. The first Catholic church in Canada dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius was a small church built in 1906 in Bellevue, Alberta. The oldest parish called after SS. Cyril and Methodius is the Montreal parish which was established in 1928. Similar parishes were formed in Toronto in 1934 and in Windsor in 1940. New parishes were founded following a new wave of immigrants after the Second World War. Amongst them are the parishes of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Hamilton, Ontario of 1945 and in Westminster, B. C. of 1960. 17 EPILOG The Cyrillo-Methodian ideology did not find favorable ground in Czecho-Slovakia after 1918 due to a strong anti-Catholic feeling of the ruling Czechs. But the Slovaks, in spite of many difficulties, were able to make progress in every direction. The ranks of the intelligentsia grew, the letters and the sciences advanced even in those fields where there was not one Slovak representative before. And slowly also the Cyrillo-Methodian ideas became better known to the masses. There were many who thought this development was too slow. Thus we read: "It is a pity that while the Slovaks in the U.S.A. have 16 parishes and 200 altars in their churches dedicated to SS. Cyril and Methodius, we at home, in Slovakia, have only 16 such altars in our 2,300 Catholic churches and chapels." 18 The author of course was poorly informed, as the number-of such parishes in the U.S.A. was not 16 but more 112 SLOVAKIA than twice that number. As in many other fields of Slovak affairs only after the formation of the Slovak Republic definite steps were taken to accept SS. Cyril and Methodius as national Saints. Their feast in Slovakia was also a day of commemoration for all Slovaks abroad. Throughout Slovakia there were festivals, meetings, lectures commemorating the Slovaks who had to leave their fatherland. The plans were made to build a cathedral to SS. Cyril and Methodius in Bratislava. Many research projects were under way and a Cyrillo-Methodian archives and library were in preparation. But with the loss of political independence these projects also died and with them also much of the work inspired by bishop Moyses, Fr. Sasinek and Holly. Out of these endeavors only those that grew abroad, in the U.S.A. and in Canada survived. But we believe that, in this age when even small nations and tribes throughout Africa are gaining independence, it will not be possible to beep in chains a nation which already 1,100 years ago belonged to the cultured and Christian nations of Europe and this mainly through the work of SS. Cyril and Methodius.19 FOOTNOTES AMI) LITERATURE 1) See Dr. F . Hrusovsky: frska misia a zaciatky krest'anstva (The Irish Mission and the Beginning of Christianity), pp. 41-65, and also by the same author Slovenski v ladari (Slovak Rulers ), Scranton 1948, p. 263. 2) Ries, Viliam : Frantisek Richard Osvald (Trnava, 1939), pp. 87, 93 . 3) Goulding, S: Catholic Churches of New York City, with sketches of their history and lives of the present Pastors, (New York, 1878 ), pp. 748. 4) Culen, K.: Dejiny newyorskych Slovcikov (The History of t he Slovaks of New York) . 5) " Oslava cyrilometodejska, 863-1863-1913," Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, p. 129. 6) Fink, Leo, Gregory: Monsignor Heinen, Militant Missionary , The Dolphin Press, (P hiladelphia, Pa. 1937) , p. 75. 7 ) Hrobak, Philip: Slovak Catholic Parishes and Institution in the United States of America, (Middletown, Pa. 1955), pp. 32, 34, 39, 42, 50, 52, 63, 65, 68, 70, 81 , 84, 87, 90, 92, 99, 105, 106, 107, 121, 132, 134, 146, 152, 154, 162. See also Piroch, Mary: "American Slovaks and SS. Cyril and Methodius," Slovakia Vol. XIII, N. 1/36, March 1963, pp. 25-28 ; ~ofranec, Tomas, Rev.: "Sv. Cyril a Metod a m y americki Slovaci" ( SS. Cyril and Methodi us and American Slovaks). Ave Maria, XLVII, No. 4, April 1, 1963, pp.175-176; Slovenske osady v Amerike, (Slovak Parishes in the U.S.A.), Kalendar Jednota for SLOVAKIA 113 1906, pp. 23 , 51, 53-57, 73 , 81, 109, 113, 114; Baska, Louis, O.S.B.: Slovenske katolicke osady v Spojenych Statoch (Slovak Catholic Parishes in the U.S.A.) , Katolicke Slovensko (Trnava) , p. 623 ; Kushner, Jozef, Rev.: Slovaci katolici pittsburghskeho biskupstva ( Slovak Catholics of the Pittsburgh Diocese), Katolicky Sokol (Passaic, 1946) , p. 174. 8 ) J ednota, July 12, 1899. 9) Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, p. 130. 10) The first biography of SS. Cyril and Methodius started publicatio n in Jednota on the 18th January, 1899, and continued in a long series of articles. The author was Rev. Fr. Sasinek. 11) See Katolicke Noviny, 1852, 1st year, No. 35. 12) Porubsky, Jan Rev.: 100 rokov spisovnej slovenciny (One Hundred Years of Literary Slovak), Scranton, Pa.; Slovaci a slovencina (Slovaks and the Slovak language). This was edited anonymously, but it was the work of Rev. Porubsky, Katolicky Sokol, 1929, p . 114. 13 ) Martincek, Jozef, Rev. : "Oslava cyrilometodejska" (The CyrilloMethodian Jubilee) 863-1863-1913 ; Kalendcir Jednota, 1913, pp. 129135. " Oslava sv. Cyrila a Metoda v dobe Moysesa a dnes" (The Cyrillo-Methodian Celebration at the time of Moyses and Today), Kalendcir Sviitovojtessky, 1936, pp. 119-125. 14) Hrusovsky, Franti.sek, Dr. : Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Slovak Religious Orders in the U. S.A. ), Cleveland, Ohio 1935, p.496. See Chapter: Kongregacia sestier sv. Cyrila a Metoda, Danville, P a. (Congregation of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, Danville, Pa.), pp. 161-232. This Chapter has a detailed bibliography on pages 231-232 ; See also Pauco, Jozef: Matus Jankola, knaz a ncirodovec (Matus Jankola as a priest and a patriot) , Danville, Pa. , p . 173. 15) Pamiitnik Spolku sv. Cyrila a Metoda (Almanac of SS. Cyril and Methodius), No. 3, I.K.S.J. , Minneapolis, Minn. 1888-1938. 16) V. S. Platek: Nase odbory , D ejiny a pamiitnica 60 . vyrocia N. S.S. (Our Associations. The Memoirs of the 60th Anniversary of the National Slovak Society), Pittsburgh, Pa. , pp. 225-392. 17) On the religious organization of Canadian Slovaks, see J . M. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, (Toronto, 1967) , pp. 227-276. 18) Kalendcir Sviitovojtessky (St. Adalbert's Almanac ), 1936, p. 125. 19) On the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition in Slovakia, see Prof. J . M. Kirschbaum "The Role of the Cyrillo-Methodian Tradition in Slovak Na tional Life," Slovak Studies, Vol. III, (Rome, 1963 ) . • THE SWVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA heartily commends all efforts of our governmental and other organs to ferret out and unmask all Communists and fellow travellers, as well as all persons and organizations who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism promoted by the Soviet Union.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Cult of SS. Cyril and Methodius Amongst the Slovaks in U.S.A. and Canada Description An account of the resource K. Čulen trans. and adapted by J. M. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 98-113 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8f82b142b04278bd07dbb6849afe0c55.pdf a6e0a2ff98b268bf6f148328ce71cc1e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 97 The Czech Question in Slovakia in the Post-War Years STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM It is not a simple task to describe the role of the "Czech question" in Slovakia in the post-war period, especially under the Communist regime (1948-1989). The difficulties in understanding it are not unlike the dilemmas faced by a man who is looking for a comfortable place to rest at night in a dark room in which a black panther is sleeping: he knows that he must not disturb it and each movement he makes is influenced by its unseen presence. Similarly, the best way to understand the role the Czech question has played in Slovakia is to examine the twists and turns of Slovak politics in this period. The restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1945 meant that the Slovaks would once again have to come to terms with the Czech control of the state. For most Czech politicians, in particular Edvard Bend, the re-created state was to be identical to the pre-Munich First Republic . Many declarations to that effect had been made during the war. At first glance it seems therefore that the war had merely been an interruption. However, the political situation at its end was quite different from what it had been in the twenties and thirties. The six-year existence of the first Slovak Republic (19391945) had brought about such changes in Slovak national life that Slovakia's re-incorporation into Czechoslovakia had to take place on new terms. What was not clear were not only the terms, but above �98 SLOVAKIA all the room for manoeuvre that the Slovaks would have to negotiate and maintain the new relationship with the Czechs. Slovak leaders had to deal with two factors that influenced postwar politics: first of all, the war-time resistance movement that the Allies recognized had been organized and led by Czech politicians with Benes at their head in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic. Slovak non-Communist politicians who joined them had no choice but to accept Czech leadership . Even Slovak Communists, who initially went their own way by creating the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and propagating the idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic attached to the USSR, accepted it not only in the state, but in the end also in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS). The second factor had to do with the existence of the Slovak Republic. Jozef Lettrich, one of the Slovak non-Communist leaders, writes that "Slovak separatism was not only anti-Czech; it was also anti-democratic" .45 We can question the accuracy of this statement; in 1945, however, it had validity and justified the decision of the Allies to have the Slovak Republic disappear at the end of hostilities. These were the arguments invoked not only to maintain the decision to deny the Slovaks the right to their own state but above all to allow the Czechs a relatively free hand in dealing with them. As a result, as the Slovak writer, Peter Zig man, put it recently, "After the renewal of the CSR in 1945, it was not possible to renew the pre-war autonomy [of Slovakia], rather certain political forces whose particular representative was President Edvard Benes preferred to apply against Slovakia and the Slovaks the principle of collective guilt (the only problem was that, unlike the Sudeten Germans, there was no place where to deport them)" .46 The Czech question in Slovakia thus came to be identified with these two factors. They created a political situation which for all intents and purposes subjected the Slovaks to a Czech agenda which 45 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955 , p. 110. 46 Peter Zigman, •Cesko-slovenske s1Htatie", Slovenske narodne noviny, 44/3 November 1992. �SLOVAKIA 99 once again was defined as "Czechoslovak", notwithstanding the Kosice Programme of April 1945 which officially recognized the Slovak nation. This meant that there was no question of Slovakia's equality with the Czech Lands nor of equal Slovak participation in the running of the state. This situation was in total disregard of the slogan "equal partners" (rovnf s rovnfm) which the leaders of the Slovak resistance movement propagated during the 1944 Revolt in order to gain support among the Slovak people. The Revolt was a military action whose aim had been not only to overthrow the Slovak Republic and tie the Slovaks to the anti-Nazi movements in Europe, but above all to proclaim their allegiance to Czechoslovakia. 47 The first and clearest indication that they would have limited room for manoeuvre came during the negotiations that took place in Moscow in March 1945 between the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and Slovak representatives; the latter failed to have their main demand implemented, namely the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a federal state .48 Nevertheless, in the Czechoslovak government's first post-war programme, known as the Kosice Programme, the Slovaks were given relatively broad political and administrative autonomy. The institutions created during the Revolt, the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners , took over the legislative and executive functions of the Parliament and Government of the Slovak Republic. For a short while, Slovakia was a state within a state. This was a situation that could not last. In a process reminiscent of the first years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the Czech agenda was swiftly imposed on the Slovaks by the government once it was back in Prague: first, it 47 On the events of August 1944, see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , 'The Re volt of 1944', in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , ed ., Slovak Politics , Cleveland, Slovak Institute , 1983 , pp . 286-313 . 48 For more on this and subsequent events, see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , "Federalism in Slovak Communist Politics", Canadian Slavonic Papers, XIX (4), 1977 , pp . 444451. �100 SLOVAKIA forced the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners to sign the three Prague Agreements of 1945 and 1946 which seriously curtailed Slovak political and administrative autonomy; secondly, it sanctioned the trials of officials of the Slovak Republic, in particular President Jozef Tiso and Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka, most of whom were condemned either to death or prison terms. The political struggle between the Communist and Democratic Parties in Slovakia gave additional leverage to the government to control Slovakia. The elections of 1946 were won by the Democratic Party. As a result, the Communists , in the political battle that ensued, abandoned the nationalist stance they had taken during the elections, aligned themselves with the CPCS and ceased to oppose the centralizing tendencies of the Prague government. By the time the CPCS won power in a coup in February 1948 (with a dry-run in Slovakia in November 1947), Czechoslovakia had become a unitary centralized state in all but name, a situation which the Constitution of 1948 recognized. What this meant for the Slovaks, in the words of the Slovak historian C'ubomfr Liptak, was that "Slovak politics was replaced by politics in Slovakia" .49 For all intents and purposes, the Czech agenda, writ large as "Czechoslovak", was once again in place throughout the state. The Communists who ended up in charge of Slovak affairs in the first decade of the regime were not those who had participated in the 1944 Revolt. The latter, who were known as "povstalci", had lost a power struggle within the CPS to comrades who gave their total allegiance to the Czech leadership of the CPCS. The "povstalci" became the victims of the Stalinist purges that befell Eastern Europe in the late forties and early fifties. The "centralists", as those in power were called, proceeded to implement the Czech agenda. Their programme was an economic one: to industrialize Slovakia to the level of the Czech Lands. They allowed Slovak national institutions to be all but stripped of their remaining powers, they conducted campaigns against Slovak nationalism not only during the Stalinist 49 1:ubomfr Liptlik, Slovensko v 20. storoci, Bratislava, Vydavatefstvo politickej literatury , 1968 , p. 296. �SLOVAKIA purges, but also in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and in 1960, together with their Czech colleagues, they celebrated the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia with the promulgation of a socialist constitution. The second Soviet destalinization in 1961 and an economic crisis in the early 1960s made possible a challenge to the regime, in particular its handling of Czech-Slovak relations. First came the pressure to free and rehabilitate the condemned "povstalci". However, as Zigman writes, "The suppression of Slovak interests did not end even in the 1960s, a period which in the Czech Lands was perceived as a political thaw. This was particularly evident in the activities of [CPCS First Secretary] Antonfn Novotny and his followers as head of the state and the party" .50 Therefore, when Slovak Communists challenged the Czech agenda, they did so only in a veiled way. They allowed and even encouraged the rehabilitated "povstalci" to refer to the goals of the 1944 Revolt, namely the transformation of the state into a federation. The Slovak press as well as academic journals published new and revised histories of the 1944 events, called officially the Slovak National Uprising, and argued for the implementation of their goals .s I This challenge, which culminated in the federalization of the state on 28 October 1968, was successful only because it was shown to have ideological validity. This is the message in the memorandum52 Milo~ Gosiorovsky submitted to the Central Committee of the CPCS in 1963 which provoked an angry reaction from Novotny. Nevertheless, even with clearly acceptable ideological arguments, it took five years before a law federalizing the state could be passed. Novotny and his supporters had to be removed from office, a 50 see note 2. 51For more on this period , see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , "National Self-Assertion in Slovakia" in George Simmonds, ed ., Nationalism in the U.S.S.R . and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Detroit , University of Detroit Press , 1977 , pp. 380-400. 52 Milo~ Gosiorovsky, "K niektorym otazkam vziahu Cechov a Slovakov v politike KSC ", Historicky casopis XVI (3), 1968, pp . 370-396. �102 SLOVAKIA removal which also made possible for a reform process to be introduced in the political life of the state _53 Under the leadership of Novotny's successor, the Slovak Alexander Dubcek, an effort was made during the spring and summer of 1968 to introduce "socialism with a human face" in the political life of the Czechs and Slovaks . The federalization of the state was one of the reforms envisaged and was the object of intensive discussions.54 However, Czechoslovakia's neighbours did not approve of this experiment in political liberalization 55 and cut it short with a military intervention in August. Of all the reforms, only the federalization of the state survived. Compared with the first decade and a half of the regime, the years leading up to the liberalization process were a period of relative freedom of expression which enabled the Slovaks to renegotiate their status in the state. They were not, on the other hand, permitted to put its existence in question.56 Put another way, there could be no discussion of the "Czech question". It is not surprising therefore that the federalization law ended up being a compromise that reflected far more the limits of Czech tolerance of constitutional change than the successful implementation of Slovak objectives or 53For an examination of the reform process of the 1960s, see Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971. 54For an analysis of the debate around the federal solution, see H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia 's Interrupted Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976), pp . 451-489 . 55 For more on the reform movement of 1968 see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Kontinuitat und politischer Wechsel in der "Tschechoslowakei 1968"", Bohemia , XV, 1974, pp . 378-395 and Galia Golan , Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia 1968-1969, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973). 56 However, as Robert W. Dean writes, "While nothing indicated that separatism was actively being considered as an altemat_ive by responsible Slovak politicians, discussions of it appreared in the press regularly". See Robert W. Dean, Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: the Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 10, Denver, University of Denver, 1973, p. 31. �SLOVAKIA 103 even a definition of mutually acceptable goals. The two decades that followed the Warsaw Pact intervention of August 1968 , the period known as normalization, saw the wine of centralization being poured out of a federal bottle. The fact that a Slovak, Gustav Husak, had replaced Dubcek as head of the party and was from 1975 on also head of state seemed to suggest that an acceptable constitutional relationship had been found between the two nations. In actual fact, the regime was pursuing new ideological goals which once again reflected Czech interests and which were not dissimilar to the ideology of Czechoslovakism of the First Republic. As Viliam Plevza, the leading Slovak scholar of the normalization regime, writes: "It is evidently only a question of time for the prerequisites to develop, under new and most favourable conditions, based on the recent history of mutual relations , which will lead to the acceleration of the total development and rapprochement of the Czechs and Slovaks and the nationalities living in the republic, and to the attainment of such a synthesis that the notion of a "Czechoslovak people" will be the symbol of a new qualitative unity of all the citizens of the CSSR" _57 On the constitutional level, the results of the policy of normalization on the federal system were quite dramatic, as Zigman points out: "Progressively , with the argument of making the central organs more effective, a number of laws were passed which transformed the Czech Socialist and the Slovak Socialist Republics into unequal provinces in the CSSR whose republican institutions merely carried out orders from above. Every social movement was frozen and officially the theory of proletarian internationalism prevailed. In this way - with the help Soviet conservatives - this situation was maintained for twenty years and nothing modified it, not even cosmetic changes under [CPCS Secretary-General Milos] Jakes or the [political] game of "glasnost'" _58 Nevertheless , federalism did allow initially for a Slovak national 57 Viliam Plevza, Socialisticke premeny Ceskoslovenska, Bratislava, Pravda , 1983 , p. 420 . 5 8s ee note 2. �104 SLOVAKIA cultural renaissance; but given the political climate, it was quickly halted. Carol Skalnik Leff notes that in the mid-1970s there were warnings and threats about bourgeois nationalism, reminiscent of those uttered in the 1950s, which signalled a move away from the earlier enthusiastic recovery of the national heritage in cultural and academic publications. She writes that "It is unlikely that this noticeable shift reflects a diminution of Slovak national sentiment - quite the contrary, it suggests a concern that such sentiment was getting out of hand" .59 Clearly, anything in Slovakia that threatened the Czech agenda had to be eliminated; and it was. The Husak policy of normalization faced increased opposition both in Slovakia and in the Czech Lands after the Czechoslovak government signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Czechs, in particular academics, artists and writers, formed a loose movement called Charter 77 which attacked the ideology and policies of the regime. 60 Only a very small number of Slovak Communist dissidents adhered to it. The more significant Slovak opposition to the regime found its outlet primarily in religious demonstrations which had a broad mass appeal. This opposition was in fact a challenge to the continued imposition of the Czech agenda in Slovakia. The regime responded with a policy of open repression to both movements, especially the Slovak one. As far as it was concerned, there could be no discussion of anything but its own agenda while it was in power. It is only with the fall of Communism in November 1989 that a discussion of the Czech question could finally begin to take place in Slovakia. The first signal that there would be such a discussion came with the motion proposed by Slovak deputies to the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament on 30 March 1990 to return the hyphen to Czechoslovakia, the short name of the country. This spelling had been used in the Peace Treaties when the country was formed in 1918. 59 carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 268. 60 on this movement see H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981. �SLOVAKIA 105 Officially the country was still the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The motion was defeated by the Czech majority (with the help of some Slovak deputies). The compromise title of Czech and Slovak Federative Republic with the authorization of using the hyphen in Slovakia on the short form adopted a fortnight later was also not satisfactory. As a result, a campaign to influence Slovak public opinion on Czech-Slovak relations began in earnest. However, unlike the immediate post-war years and the Communist period when one outcome, the separation of Slovakia, was excluded, all solutions were now possible. This debate around the name of the common state strengthened the resolve of many Slovaks to initiate discussions on constitutional reform and helped to clarify the different positions. According to Zigman, "Suddenly, along with other problems, the question of a constitutional arrangement came to the surface. On the Czech side in particular, voices came to be heard shortly after the revolution [suggesting] that in the interest of the transformation of our economy the already centralized pseudo-federation should be further centralized and replaced by a unitary state (part of Civic Forum and [also] Public Against Violence). On the other hand , parties and movements appeared in Slovakia which sought greater rights for the republics and the breaking up of the federal moloch which crushed every national political movement. They demanded that it be replaced with a flexible system of institutions whose task it would be to coordinate the activities of the republics (part of the Slovak National Party and later part of the Christian Democratic Movement)" .6 1 The constitutional debate went on for two years 62 and indicated a desire to find a solution to the Czech question in Slovak political life. It was, however, only one aspect of a wider public debate, 61 See note 2. 62 For an examination of this debate, see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Les Slovaques et le droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-m~mes: a la recherche d'une solution", in Andre Liebich et Andre Reszler, eds ., L 'Europe centrale et ses minorites: vers une solution europeenne?, (Geneve , Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales) , Paris , Presses universitaires de France , 1993, pp . 92-10 I. �106 SLOVAK.IA initiated by the Czech writer Ludvik Vaculfk when he published in May 1990 an article entitled "Our Slovak Problem". In an at times bitter tone, Vaculfk railed at the fact that the Slovaks, to whom he referred as little brothers, refused to share the common bed with the Czechs. He did not think, furthermore, that they were ready to sleep in their own. In his rejection of a Slovak approach and in his steadfast conviction of the importance of Czechoslovak statehood he wrote; "To develop our own Czech state - it is after all a step backwards. Not long ago I went to Bratislava and all my friends said to me why are you getting so agitated because those nationalist noises come from carrierists, idiots or else intrigue-makers. I heard this with pleasure" _63 Among the many who responded, it was Vladimir Minac, a Slovak writer, who best took Vaculfk to task in an article entitled "Our Czecho-Slovak Problem". Rejecting the notion of a "little brother" and examining generally the meaning of Czechoslovakism, Minac added: "Vaculik writes that "it is an honest duty to be a Czechoslovak". However, what you find behind a Czechoslovak is a badly covered pure Czech who in some peculiar way made the land of the Slovaks his own; and if he hasn't done so, then he wants to do so. But a Slovak doesn't want to be a Czechoslovak, he doesn't want to be shoved behind a foreign facade, he wants to be himself, independent and equal. Is that so difficult to understand?" .64 Minac did not propose a solution; he left that to the politicians. The parameters, on the other hand, had been made quite clear. During the twenty-four months that separate the first two free elections in post-Communist Czechoslovakia, Slovak politicians, while pushing for the transformation of the state, made every effort to come to terms with the Czechs. A parallel with the 1968 constitutional discussions comes to mind. There is, however, an important difference this time, namely the absence of a superpower to influ63Ludv0c VaculOc, "Na§e slovenska otazka", Literami noviny, 5/1990, 3 May 1990, reprinted in Nove slovo 21/1990, 24 May 1990. 64 Vladimfr Minac, "Na§a cesko-slovenska otlizka", Nove s/ovo, 21/1990, 24 May 1990 . �SLOVAKIA 107 ence, if not determine the outcome. As a result, the Czech parties were able to indicate very clearly that they were unwilling to abandon their historical perception of Czechoslovakia as a Czech state with which the Slovaks were asked to identify and accept. At best, the status quo, in other words the federal law of 1968, was acceptable. As far as most Slovaks were concerned, despite a certain lack of unity , there had to be major constitutional reforms. There were many meetings and many propositions,65 including a number of interventions from President Vaclav Havel, yet no constitutional agreement was reached before the elections of June 1992. As a result, an important percentage of the electorate in each republic cast votes for parties that articulated a parallel message: if the other nation will not accept our terms, then let us make a go of it alone. This paved the way for the Czechs to rid themselves of the "Slovak question" while the Slovaks, many reluctantly, came to the conclusion that they might be better off without a "Czech question". After the Slovak National Council declared the sovereignty of the Slovak nation in July 1992, Prime Ministers Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic and Vladimfr Meciar of the Slovak Republic agreed that Czechoslovakia would be dissolved and two states would come into existence on 1 January 1993; on 25 November 1992, the Federal Parliament passed a law approving the dissolution. Thereafter, until the break up, both sides negotiated the division of federal property and other assets. Did the independence of Slovakia and the creation of a Czech Republic put to rest the "Czech question" in Slovak politics? Two factors suggest that one cannot give a categorical answer. First, public opinion polls preceding the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in the Czech and Slovak Republics suggested that if a referendum had been held at that time on the acceptance of the break-up of Czechoslovakia into two independent national states it would most likely not have won a majority. One may well ask whether this means that 65 These are described in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Czechoslovakia: The Creation, Federalisation and Disolution of a Nation-State", Regional Politics and Policy, III (I), 1993, pp . 69-95. �108 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks, after 68 years in a common state, when shove comes to push, saw living with a "Czech question", however intractable it was, as acceptable and perhaps even preferable to an uncertain future in an independent state? There is probably no simple answer to this question. What is certain, however, is that democratic politicians, unlike Communist ones, who treat public opinion as quantite negligeable do so at their own risk. It is possible that these polls reflected some degree of nostalgia as much as a fear of the future. But then again, they may have reflected the recognition of a second factor , the close relations that the two nations developed over the years. As Zigman indicated when these polls were taken, this factor placed the Slovaks before a choice: "The economic relations [with the Czechs] which were created during the recent period of development will remain and will become a significant element in a future European integration [process]. We [the Slovaks] are at a crossroads and have to decide between a Czecho-Slovak state and Czech-Slovak cooperation. I think that the starting point out of this dilemma is clear" .66 To return to our image of the beginning, after many attempts to find a comfortable place for themselves, the Slovaks found in the end that it was better to leave the room which they shared with the allegorical black panther. But they did so only after first seeking to come to an understanding with it. They also made a choice for a different kind of Czech-Slovak cooperation. Therefore, as they proceed to develop their own state, for the foreseeable future at any rate, the Slovaks will have to pay attention to a "Czech question". It is not clear what, if any, influence it will have on Slovak political life. It will, however, have ceased to be that which had been the main challenge to Slovak politics in the common state, namely an unhyphenated "Czechoslovak question" which they had not been allowed either to define or influence. 66 see note 2. � SLOVAKIA 97 The Czech Question in Slovakia in the Post-War Years STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM It is not a simple task to describe the role of the "Czech question" in Slovakia in the post-war period, especially under the Communist regime (1948-1989). The difficulties in understanding it are not unlike the dilemmas faced by a man who is looking for a comfortable place to rest at night in a dark room in which a black panther is sleeping: he knows that he must not disturb it and each movement he makes is influenced by its unseen presence. Similarly, the best way to understand the role the Czech question has played in Slovakia is to examine the twists and turns of Slovak politics in this period. The restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1945 meant that the Slovaks would once again have to come to terms with the Czech control of the state. For most Czech politicians, in particular Edvard Bend, the re-created state was to be identical to the pre-Munich First Republic . Many declarations to that effect had been made during the war. At first glance it seems therefore that the war had merely been an interruption. However, the political situation at its end was quite different from what it had been in the twenties and thirties. The six-year existence of the first Slovak Republic (19391945) had brought about such changes in Slovak national life that Slovakia's re-incorporation into Czechoslovakia had to take place on new terms. What was not clear were not only the terms, but above �98 SLOVAKIA all the room for manoeuvre that the Slovaks would have to negotiate and maintain the new relationship with the Czechs. Slovak leaders had to deal with two factors that influenced postwar politics: first of all, the war-time resistance movement that the Allies recognized had been organized and led by Czech politicians with Benes at their head in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic. Slovak non-Communist politicians who joined them had no choice but to accept Czech leadership . Even Slovak Communists, who initially went their own way by creating the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and propagating the idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic attached to the USSR, accepted it not only in the state, but in the end also in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS). The second factor had to do with the existence of the Slovak Republic. Jozef Lettrich, one of the Slovak non-Communist leaders, writes that "Slovak separatism was not only anti-Czech; it was also anti-democratic" .45 We can question the accuracy of this statement; in 1945, however, it had validity and justified the decision of the Allies to have the Slovak Republic disappear at the end of hostilities. These were the arguments invoked not only to maintain the decision to deny the Slovaks the right to their own state but above all to allow the Czechs a relatively free hand in dealing with them. As a result, as the Slovak writer, Peter Zig man, put it recently, "After the renewal of the CSR in 1945, it was not possible to renew the pre-war autonomy [of Slovakia], rather certain political forces whose particular representative was President Edvard Benes preferred to apply against Slovakia and the Slovaks the principle of collective guilt (the only problem was that, unlike the Sudeten Germans, there was no place where to deport them)" .46 The Czech question in Slovakia thus came to be identified with these two factors. They created a political situation which for all intents and purposes subjected the Slovaks to a Czech agenda which 45 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955 , p. 110. 46 Peter Zigman, •Cesko-slovenske s1Htatie", Slovenske narodne noviny, 44/3 November 1992. �SLOVAKIA 99 once again was defined as "Czechoslovak", notwithstanding the Kosice Programme of April 1945 which officially recognized the Slovak nation. This meant that there was no question of Slovakia's equality with the Czech Lands nor of equal Slovak participation in the running of the state. This situation was in total disregard of the slogan "equal partners" (rovnf s rovnfm) which the leaders of the Slovak resistance movement propagated during the 1944 Revolt in order to gain support among the Slovak people. The Revolt was a military action whose aim had been not only to overthrow the Slovak Republic and tie the Slovaks to the anti-Nazi movements in Europe, but above all to proclaim their allegiance to Czechoslovakia. 47 The first and clearest indication that they would have limited room for manoeuvre came during the negotiations that took place in Moscow in March 1945 between the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and Slovak representatives; the latter failed to have their main demand implemented, namely the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a federal state .48 Nevertheless, in the Czechoslovak government's first post-war programme, known as the Kosice Programme, the Slovaks were given relatively broad political and administrative autonomy. The institutions created during the Revolt, the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners , took over the legislative and executive functions of the Parliament and Government of the Slovak Republic. For a short while, Slovakia was a state within a state. This was a situation that could not last. In a process reminiscent of the first years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the Czech agenda was swiftly imposed on the Slovaks by the government once it was back in Prague: first, it 47 On the events of August 1944, see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , 'The Re volt of 1944', in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , ed ., Slovak Politics , Cleveland, Slovak Institute , 1983 , pp . 286-313 . 48 For more on this and subsequent events, see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , "Federalism in Slovak Communist Politics", Canadian Slavonic Papers, XIX (4), 1977 , pp . 444451. �100 SLOVAKIA forced the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners to sign the three Prague Agreements of 1945 and 1946 which seriously curtailed Slovak political and administrative autonomy; secondly, it sanctioned the trials of officials of the Slovak Republic, in particular President Jozef Tiso and Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka, most of whom were condemned either to death or prison terms. The political struggle between the Communist and Democratic Parties in Slovakia gave additional leverage to the government to control Slovakia. The elections of 1946 were won by the Democratic Party. As a result, the Communists , in the political battle that ensued, abandoned the nationalist stance they had taken during the elections, aligned themselves with the CPCS and ceased to oppose the centralizing tendencies of the Prague government. By the time the CPCS won power in a coup in February 1948 (with a dry-run in Slovakia in November 1947), Czechoslovakia had become a unitary centralized state in all but name, a situation which the Constitution of 1948 recognized. What this meant for the Slovaks, in the words of the Slovak historian C'ubomfr Liptak, was that "Slovak politics was replaced by politics in Slovakia" .49 For all intents and purposes, the Czech agenda, writ large as "Czechoslovak", was once again in place throughout the state. The Communists who ended up in charge of Slovak affairs in the first decade of the regime were not those who had participated in the 1944 Revolt. The latter, who were known as "povstalci", had lost a power struggle within the CPS to comrades who gave their total allegiance to the Czech leadership of the CPCS. The "povstalci" became the victims of the Stalinist purges that befell Eastern Europe in the late forties and early fifties. The "centralists", as those in power were called, proceeded to implement the Czech agenda. Their programme was an economic one: to industrialize Slovakia to the level of the Czech Lands. They allowed Slovak national institutions to be all but stripped of their remaining powers, they conducted campaigns against Slovak nationalism not only during the Stalinist 49 1:ubomfr Liptlik, Slovensko v 20. storoci, Bratislava, Vydavatefstvo politickej literatury , 1968 , p. 296. �SLOVAKIA purges, but also in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and in 1960, together with their Czech colleagues, they celebrated the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia with the promulgation of a socialist constitution. The second Soviet destalinization in 1961 and an economic crisis in the early 1960s made possible a challenge to the regime, in particular its handling of Czech-Slovak relations. First came the pressure to free and rehabilitate the condemned "povstalci". However, as Zigman writes, "The suppression of Slovak interests did not end even in the 1960s, a period which in the Czech Lands was perceived as a political thaw. This was particularly evident in the activities of [CPCS First Secretary] Antonfn Novotny and his followers as head of the state and the party" .50 Therefore, when Slovak Communists challenged the Czech agenda, they did so only in a veiled way. They allowed and even encouraged the rehabilitated "povstalci" to refer to the goals of the 1944 Revolt, namely the transformation of the state into a federation. The Slovak press as well as academic journals published new and revised histories of the 1944 events, called officially the Slovak National Uprising, and argued for the implementation of their goals .s I This challenge, which culminated in the federalization of the state on 28 October 1968, was successful only because it was shown to have ideological validity. This is the message in the memorandum52 Milo~ Gosiorovsky submitted to the Central Committee of the CPCS in 1963 which provoked an angry reaction from Novotny. Nevertheless, even with clearly acceptable ideological arguments, it took five years before a law federalizing the state could be passed. Novotny and his supporters had to be removed from office, a 50 see note 2. 51For more on this period , see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , "National Self-Assertion in Slovakia" in George Simmonds, ed ., Nationalism in the U.S.S.R . and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Detroit , University of Detroit Press , 1977 , pp. 380-400. 52 Milo~ Gosiorovsky, "K niektorym otazkam vziahu Cechov a Slovakov v politike KSC ", Historicky casopis XVI (3), 1968, pp . 370-396. �102 SLOVAKIA removal which also made possible for a reform process to be introduced in the political life of the state _53 Under the leadership of Novotny's successor, the Slovak Alexander Dubcek, an effort was made during the spring and summer of 1968 to introduce "socialism with a human face" in the political life of the Czechs and Slovaks . The federalization of the state was one of the reforms envisaged and was the object of intensive discussions.54 However, Czechoslovakia's neighbours did not approve of this experiment in political liberalization 55 and cut it short with a military intervention in August. Of all the reforms, only the federalization of the state survived. Compared with the first decade and a half of the regime, the years leading up to the liberalization process were a period of relative freedom of expression which enabled the Slovaks to renegotiate their status in the state. They were not, on the other hand, permitted to put its existence in question.56 Put another way, there could be no discussion of the "Czech question". It is not surprising therefore that the federalization law ended up being a compromise that reflected far more the limits of Czech tolerance of constitutional change than the successful implementation of Slovak objectives or 53For an examination of the reform process of the 1960s, see Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971. 54For an analysis of the debate around the federal solution, see H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia 's Interrupted Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976), pp . 451-489 . 55 For more on the reform movement of 1968 see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Kontinuitat und politischer Wechsel in der "Tschechoslowakei 1968"", Bohemia , XV, 1974, pp . 378-395 and Galia Golan , Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia 1968-1969, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973). 56 However, as Robert W. Dean writes, "While nothing indicated that separatism was actively being considered as an altemat_ive by responsible Slovak politicians, discussions of it appreared in the press regularly". See Robert W. Dean, Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: the Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 10, Denver, University of Denver, 1973, p. 31. �SLOVAKIA 103 even a definition of mutually acceptable goals. The two decades that followed the Warsaw Pact intervention of August 1968 , the period known as normalization, saw the wine of centralization being poured out of a federal bottle. The fact that a Slovak, Gustav Husak, had replaced Dubcek as head of the party and was from 1975 on also head of state seemed to suggest that an acceptable constitutional relationship had been found between the two nations. In actual fact, the regime was pursuing new ideological goals which once again reflected Czech interests and which were not dissimilar to the ideology of Czechoslovakism of the First Republic. As Viliam Plevza, the leading Slovak scholar of the normalization regime, writes: "It is evidently only a question of time for the prerequisites to develop, under new and most favourable conditions, based on the recent history of mutual relations , which will lead to the acceleration of the total development and rapprochement of the Czechs and Slovaks and the nationalities living in the republic, and to the attainment of such a synthesis that the notion of a "Czechoslovak people" will be the symbol of a new qualitative unity of all the citizens of the CSSR" _57 On the constitutional level, the results of the policy of normalization on the federal system were quite dramatic, as Zigman points out: "Progressively , with the argument of making the central organs more effective, a number of laws were passed which transformed the Czech Socialist and the Slovak Socialist Republics into unequal provinces in the CSSR whose republican institutions merely carried out orders from above. Every social movement was frozen and officially the theory of proletarian internationalism prevailed. In this way - with the help Soviet conservatives - this situation was maintained for twenty years and nothing modified it, not even cosmetic changes under [CPCS Secretary-General Milos] Jakes or the [political] game of "glasnost'" _58 Nevertheless , federalism did allow initially for a Slovak national 57 Viliam Plevza, Socialisticke premeny Ceskoslovenska, Bratislava, Pravda , 1983 , p. 420 . 5 8s ee note 2. �104 SLOVAKIA cultural renaissance; but given the political climate, it was quickly halted. Carol Skalnik Leff notes that in the mid-1970s there were warnings and threats about bourgeois nationalism, reminiscent of those uttered in the 1950s, which signalled a move away from the earlier enthusiastic recovery of the national heritage in cultural and academic publications. She writes that "It is unlikely that this noticeable shift reflects a diminution of Slovak national sentiment - quite the contrary, it suggests a concern that such sentiment was getting out of hand" .59 Clearly, anything in Slovakia that threatened the Czech agenda had to be eliminated; and it was. The Husak policy of normalization faced increased opposition both in Slovakia and in the Czech Lands after the Czechoslovak government signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Czechs, in particular academics, artists and writers, formed a loose movement called Charter 77 which attacked the ideology and policies of the regime. 60 Only a very small number of Slovak Communist dissidents adhered to it. The more significant Slovak opposition to the regime found its outlet primarily in religious demonstrations which had a broad mass appeal. This opposition was in fact a challenge to the continued imposition of the Czech agenda in Slovakia. The regime responded with a policy of open repression to both movements, especially the Slovak one. As far as it was concerned, there could be no discussion of anything but its own agenda while it was in power. It is only with the fall of Communism in November 1989 that a discussion of the Czech question could finally begin to take place in Slovakia. The first signal that there would be such a discussion came with the motion proposed by Slovak deputies to the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament on 30 March 1990 to return the hyphen to Czechoslovakia, the short name of the country. This spelling had been used in the Peace Treaties when the country was formed in 1918. 59 carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 268. 60 on this movement see H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981. �SLOVAKIA 105 Officially the country was still the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The motion was defeated by the Czech majority (with the help of some Slovak deputies). The compromise title of Czech and Slovak Federative Republic with the authorization of using the hyphen in Slovakia on the short form adopted a fortnight later was also not satisfactory. As a result, a campaign to influence Slovak public opinion on Czech-Slovak relations began in earnest. However, unlike the immediate post-war years and the Communist period when one outcome, the separation of Slovakia, was excluded, all solutions were now possible. This debate around the name of the common state strengthened the resolve of many Slovaks to initiate discussions on constitutional reform and helped to clarify the different positions. According to Zigman, "Suddenly, along with other problems, the question of a constitutional arrangement came to the surface. On the Czech side in particular, voices came to be heard shortly after the revolution [suggesting] that in the interest of the transformation of our economy the already centralized pseudo-federation should be further centralized and replaced by a unitary state (part of Civic Forum and [also] Public Against Violence). On the other hand , parties and movements appeared in Slovakia which sought greater rights for the republics and the breaking up of the federal moloch which crushed every national political movement. They demanded that it be replaced with a flexible system of institutions whose task it would be to coordinate the activities of the republics (part of the Slovak National Party and later part of the Christian Democratic Movement)" .6 1 The constitutional debate went on for two years 62 and indicated a desire to find a solution to the Czech question in Slovak political life. It was, however, only one aspect of a wider public debate, 61 See note 2. 62 For an examination of this debate, see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Les Slovaques et le droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-m~mes: a la recherche d'une solution", in Andre Liebich et Andre Reszler, eds ., L 'Europe centrale et ses minorites: vers une solution europeenne?, (Geneve , Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales) , Paris , Presses universitaires de France , 1993, pp . 92-10 I. �106 SLOVAK.IA initiated by the Czech writer Ludvik Vaculfk when he published in May 1990 an article entitled "Our Slovak Problem". In an at times bitter tone, Vaculfk railed at the fact that the Slovaks, to whom he referred as little brothers, refused to share the common bed with the Czechs. He did not think, furthermore, that they were ready to sleep in their own. In his rejection of a Slovak approach and in his steadfast conviction of the importance of Czechoslovak statehood he wrote; "To develop our own Czech state - it is after all a step backwards. Not long ago I went to Bratislava and all my friends said to me why are you getting so agitated because those nationalist noises come from carrierists, idiots or else intrigue-makers. I heard this with pleasure" _63 Among the many who responded, it was Vladimir Minac, a Slovak writer, who best took Vaculfk to task in an article entitled "Our Czecho-Slovak Problem". Rejecting the notion of a "little brother" and examining generally the meaning of Czechoslovakism, Minac added: "Vaculik writes that "it is an honest duty to be a Czechoslovak". However, what you find behind a Czechoslovak is a badly covered pure Czech who in some peculiar way made the land of the Slovaks his own; and if he hasn't done so, then he wants to do so. But a Slovak doesn't want to be a Czechoslovak, he doesn't want to be shoved behind a foreign facade, he wants to be himself, independent and equal. Is that so difficult to understand?" .64 Minac did not propose a solution; he left that to the politicians. The parameters, on the other hand, had been made quite clear. During the twenty-four months that separate the first two free elections in post-Communist Czechoslovakia, Slovak politicians, while pushing for the transformation of the state, made every effort to come to terms with the Czechs. A parallel with the 1968 constitutional discussions comes to mind. There is, however, an important difference this time, namely the absence of a superpower to influ63Ludv0c VaculOc, "Na§e slovenska otazka", Literami noviny, 5/1990, 3 May 1990, reprinted in Nove slovo 21/1990, 24 May 1990. 64 Vladimfr Minac, "Na§a cesko-slovenska otlizka", Nove s/ovo, 21/1990, 24 May 1990 . �SLOVAKIA 107 ence, if not determine the outcome. As a result, the Czech parties were able to indicate very clearly that they were unwilling to abandon their historical perception of Czechoslovakia as a Czech state with which the Slovaks were asked to identify and accept. At best, the status quo, in other words the federal law of 1968, was acceptable. As far as most Slovaks were concerned, despite a certain lack of unity , there had to be major constitutional reforms. There were many meetings and many propositions,65 including a number of interventions from President Vaclav Havel, yet no constitutional agreement was reached before the elections of June 1992. As a result, an important percentage of the electorate in each republic cast votes for parties that articulated a parallel message: if the other nation will not accept our terms, then let us make a go of it alone. This paved the way for the Czechs to rid themselves of the "Slovak question" while the Slovaks, many reluctantly, came to the conclusion that they might be better off without a "Czech question". After the Slovak National Council declared the sovereignty of the Slovak nation in July 1992, Prime Ministers Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic and Vladimfr Meciar of the Slovak Republic agreed that Czechoslovakia would be dissolved and two states would come into existence on 1 January 1993; on 25 November 1992, the Federal Parliament passed a law approving the dissolution. Thereafter, until the break up, both sides negotiated the division of federal property and other assets. Did the independence of Slovakia and the creation of a Czech Republic put to rest the "Czech question" in Slovak politics? Two factors suggest that one cannot give a categorical answer. First, public opinion polls preceding the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in the Czech and Slovak Republics suggested that if a referendum had been held at that time on the acceptance of the break-up of Czechoslovakia into two independent national states it would most likely not have won a majority. One may well ask whether this means that 65 These are described in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Czechoslovakia: The Creation, Federalisation and Disolution of a Nation-State", Regional Politics and Policy, III (I), 1993, pp . 69-95. �108 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks, after 68 years in a common state, when shove comes to push, saw living with a "Czech question", however intractable it was, as acceptable and perhaps even preferable to an uncertain future in an independent state? There is probably no simple answer to this question. What is certain, however, is that democratic politicians, unlike Communist ones, who treat public opinion as quantite negligeable do so at their own risk. It is possible that these polls reflected some degree of nostalgia as much as a fear of the future. But then again, they may have reflected the recognition of a second factor , the close relations that the two nations developed over the years. As Zigman indicated when these polls were taken, this factor placed the Slovaks before a choice: "The economic relations [with the Czechs] which were created during the recent period of development will remain and will become a significant element in a future European integration [process]. We [the Slovaks] are at a crossroads and have to decide between a Czecho-Slovak state and Czech-Slovak cooperation. I think that the starting point out of this dilemma is clear" .66 To return to our image of the beginning, after many attempts to find a comfortable place for themselves, the Slovaks found in the end that it was better to leave the room which they shared with the allegorical black panther. But they did so only after first seeking to come to an understanding with it. They also made a choice for a different kind of Czech-Slovak cooperation. Therefore, as they proceed to develop their own state, for the foreseeable future at any rate, the Slovaks will have to pay attention to a "Czech question". It is not clear what, if any, influence it will have on Slovak political life. It will, however, have ceased to be that which had been the main challenge to Slovak politics in the common state, namely an unhyphenated "Czechoslovak question" which they had not been allowed either to define or influence. 66 see note 2. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1991-92, Vol. 35 Description An account of the resource Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The Slovak League of America Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available 1991-92 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 97 The Czech Question in Slovakia in the Post-War Years STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM It is not a simple task to describe the role of the "Czech question" in Slovakia in the post-war period, especially under the Communist regime (1948-1989). The difficulties in understanding it are not unlike the dilemmas faced by a man who is looking for a comfortable place to rest at night in a dark room in which a black panther is sleeping: he knows that he must not disturb it and each movement he makes is influenced by its unseen presence. Similarly, the best way to understand the role the Czech question has played in Slovakia is to examine the twists and turns of Slovak politics in this period. The restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1945 meant that the Slovaks would once again have to come to terms with the Czech control of the state. For most Czech politicians, in particular Edvard Bend, the re-created state was to be identical to the pre-Munich First Republic . Many declarations to that effect had been made during the war. At first glance it seems therefore that the war had merely been an interruption. However, the political situation at its end was quite different from what it had been in the twenties and thirties. The six-year existence of the first Slovak Republic (19391945) had brought about such changes in Slovak national life that Slovakia's re-incorporation into Czechoslovakia had to take place on new terms. What was not clear were not only the terms, but above 98 SLOVAKIA all the room for manoeuvre that the Slovaks would have to negotiate and maintain the new relationship with the Czechs. Slovak leaders had to deal with two factors that influenced postwar politics: first of all, the war-time resistance movement that the Allies recognized had been organized and led by Czech politicians with Benes at their head in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic. Slovak non-Communist politicians who joined them had no choice but to accept Czech leadership . Even Slovak Communists, who initially went their own way by creating the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and propagating the idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic attached to the USSR, accepted it not only in the state, but in the end also in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS). The second factor had to do with the existence of the Slovak Republic. Jozef Lettrich, one of the Slovak non-Communist leaders, writes that "Slovak separatism was not only anti-Czech; it was also anti-democratic" .45 We can question the accuracy of this statement; in 1945, however, it had validity and justified the decision of the Allies to have the Slovak Republic disappear at the end of hostilities. These were the arguments invoked not only to maintain the decision to deny the Slovaks the right to their own state but above all to allow the Czechs a relatively free hand in dealing with them. As a result, as the Slovak writer, Peter Zig man, put it recently, "After the renewal of the CSR in 1945, it was not possible to renew the pre-war autonomy [of Slovakia], rather certain political forces whose particular representative was President Edvard Benes preferred to apply against Slovakia and the Slovaks the principle of collective guilt (the only problem was that, unlike the Sudeten Germans, there was no place where to deport them)" .46 The Czech question in Slovakia thus came to be identified with these two factors. They created a political situation which for all intents and purposes subjected the Slovaks to a Czech agenda which 45 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955 , p. 110. 46 Peter Zigman, •Cesko-slovenske s1Htatie", Slovenske narodne noviny, 44/3 November 1992. SLOVAKIA 99 once again was defined as "Czechoslovak", notwithstanding the Kosice Programme of April 1945 which officially recognized the Slovak nation. This meant that there was no question of Slovakia's equality with the Czech Lands nor of equal Slovak participation in the running of the state. This situation was in total disregard of the slogan "equal partners" (rovnf s rovnfm) which the leaders of the Slovak resistance movement propagated during the 1944 Revolt in order to gain support among the Slovak people. The Revolt was a military action whose aim had been not only to overthrow the Slovak Republic and tie the Slovaks to the anti-Nazi movements in Europe, but above all to proclaim their allegiance to Czechoslovakia. 47 The first and clearest indication that they would have limited room for manoeuvre came during the negotiations that took place in Moscow in March 1945 between the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and Slovak representatives; the latter failed to have their main demand implemented, namely the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a federal state .48 Nevertheless, in the Czechoslovak government's first post-war programme, known as the Kosice Programme, the Slovaks were given relatively broad political and administrative autonomy. The institutions created during the Revolt, the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners , took over the legislative and executive functions of the Parliament and Government of the Slovak Republic. For a short while, Slovakia was a state within a state. This was a situation that could not last. In a process reminiscent of the first years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the Czech agenda was swiftly imposed on the Slovaks by the government once it was back in Prague: first, it 47 On the events of August 1944, see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , 'The Re volt of 1944', in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , ed ., Slovak Politics , Cleveland, Slovak Institute , 1983 , pp . 286-313 . 48 For more on this and subsequent events, see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , "Federalism in Slovak Communist Politics", Canadian Slavonic Papers, XIX (4), 1977 , pp . 444451. 100 SLOVAKIA forced the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners to sign the three Prague Agreements of 1945 and 1946 which seriously curtailed Slovak political and administrative autonomy; secondly, it sanctioned the trials of officials of the Slovak Republic, in particular President Jozef Tiso and Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka, most of whom were condemned either to death or prison terms. The political struggle between the Communist and Democratic Parties in Slovakia gave additional leverage to the government to control Slovakia. The elections of 1946 were won by the Democratic Party. As a result, the Communists , in the political battle that ensued, abandoned the nationalist stance they had taken during the elections, aligned themselves with the CPCS and ceased to oppose the centralizing tendencies of the Prague government. By the time the CPCS won power in a coup in February 1948 (with a dry-run in Slovakia in November 1947), Czechoslovakia had become a unitary centralized state in all but name, a situation which the Constitution of 1948 recognized. What this meant for the Slovaks, in the words of the Slovak historian C'ubomfr Liptak, was that "Slovak politics was replaced by politics in Slovakia" .49 For all intents and purposes, the Czech agenda, writ large as "Czechoslovak", was once again in place throughout the state. The Communists who ended up in charge of Slovak affairs in the first decade of the regime were not those who had participated in the 1944 Revolt. The latter, who were known as "povstalci", had lost a power struggle within the CPS to comrades who gave their total allegiance to the Czech leadership of the CPCS. The "povstalci" became the victims of the Stalinist purges that befell Eastern Europe in the late forties and early fifties. The "centralists", as those in power were called, proceeded to implement the Czech agenda. Their programme was an economic one: to industrialize Slovakia to the level of the Czech Lands. They allowed Slovak national institutions to be all but stripped of their remaining powers, they conducted campaigns against Slovak nationalism not only during the Stalinist 49 1:ubomfr Liptlik, Slovensko v 20. storoci, Bratislava, Vydavatefstvo politickej literatury , 1968 , p. 296. SLOVAKIA purges, but also in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and in 1960, together with their Czech colleagues, they celebrated the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia with the promulgation of a socialist constitution. The second Soviet destalinization in 1961 and an economic crisis in the early 1960s made possible a challenge to the regime, in particular its handling of Czech-Slovak relations. First came the pressure to free and rehabilitate the condemned "povstalci". However, as Zigman writes, "The suppression of Slovak interests did not end even in the 1960s, a period which in the Czech Lands was perceived as a political thaw. This was particularly evident in the activities of [CPCS First Secretary] Antonfn Novotny and his followers as head of the state and the party" .50 Therefore, when Slovak Communists challenged the Czech agenda, they did so only in a veiled way. They allowed and even encouraged the rehabilitated "povstalci" to refer to the goals of the 1944 Revolt, namely the transformation of the state into a federation. The Slovak press as well as academic journals published new and revised histories of the 1944 events, called officially the Slovak National Uprising, and argued for the implementation of their goals .s I This challenge, which culminated in the federalization of the state on 28 October 1968, was successful only because it was shown to have ideological validity. This is the message in the memorandum52 Milo~ Gosiorovsky submitted to the Central Committee of the CPCS in 1963 which provoked an angry reaction from Novotny. Nevertheless, even with clearly acceptable ideological arguments, it took five years before a law federalizing the state could be passed. Novotny and his supporters had to be removed from office, a 50 see note 2. 51For more on this period , see Stanislav J . Kirschbaum , "National Self-Assertion in Slovakia" in George Simmonds, ed ., Nationalism in the U.S.S.R . and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Detroit , University of Detroit Press , 1977 , pp. 380-400. 52 Milo~ Gosiorovsky, "K niektorym otazkam vziahu Cechov a Slovakov v politike KSC ", Historicky casopis XVI (3), 1968, pp . 370-396. 102 SLOVAKIA removal which also made possible for a reform process to be introduced in the political life of the state _53 Under the leadership of Novotny's successor, the Slovak Alexander Dubcek, an effort was made during the spring and summer of 1968 to introduce "socialism with a human face" in the political life of the Czechs and Slovaks . The federalization of the state was one of the reforms envisaged and was the object of intensive discussions.54 However, Czechoslovakia's neighbours did not approve of this experiment in political liberalization 55 and cut it short with a military intervention in August. Of all the reforms, only the federalization of the state survived. Compared with the first decade and a half of the regime, the years leading up to the liberalization process were a period of relative freedom of expression which enabled the Slovaks to renegotiate their status in the state. They were not, on the other hand, permitted to put its existence in question.56 Put another way, there could be no discussion of the "Czech question". It is not surprising therefore that the federalization law ended up being a compromise that reflected far more the limits of Czech tolerance of constitutional change than the successful implementation of Slovak objectives or 53For an examination of the reform process of the 1960s, see Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971. 54For an analysis of the debate around the federal solution, see H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia 's Interrupted Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976), pp . 451-489 . 55 For more on the reform movement of 1968 see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Kontinuitat und politischer Wechsel in der "Tschechoslowakei 1968"", Bohemia , XV, 1974, pp . 378-395 and Galia Golan , Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia 1968-1969, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973). 56 However, as Robert W. Dean writes, "While nothing indicated that separatism was actively being considered as an altemat_ive by responsible Slovak politicians, discussions of it appreared in the press regularly". See Robert W. Dean, Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: the Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 10, Denver, University of Denver, 1973, p. 31. SLOVAKIA 103 even a definition of mutually acceptable goals. The two decades that followed the Warsaw Pact intervention of August 1968 , the period known as normalization, saw the wine of centralization being poured out of a federal bottle. The fact that a Slovak, Gustav Husak, had replaced Dubcek as head of the party and was from 1975 on also head of state seemed to suggest that an acceptable constitutional relationship had been found between the two nations. In actual fact, the regime was pursuing new ideological goals which once again reflected Czech interests and which were not dissimilar to the ideology of Czechoslovakism of the First Republic. As Viliam Plevza, the leading Slovak scholar of the normalization regime, writes: "It is evidently only a question of time for the prerequisites to develop, under new and most favourable conditions, based on the recent history of mutual relations , which will lead to the acceleration of the total development and rapprochement of the Czechs and Slovaks and the nationalities living in the republic, and to the attainment of such a synthesis that the notion of a "Czechoslovak people" will be the symbol of a new qualitative unity of all the citizens of the CSSR" _57 On the constitutional level, the results of the policy of normalization on the federal system were quite dramatic, as Zigman points out: "Progressively , with the argument of making the central organs more effective, a number of laws were passed which transformed the Czech Socialist and the Slovak Socialist Republics into unequal provinces in the CSSR whose republican institutions merely carried out orders from above. Every social movement was frozen and officially the theory of proletarian internationalism prevailed. In this way - with the help Soviet conservatives - this situation was maintained for twenty years and nothing modified it, not even cosmetic changes under [CPCS Secretary-General Milos] Jakes or the [political] game of "glasnost'" _58 Nevertheless , federalism did allow initially for a Slovak national 57 Viliam Plevza, Socialisticke premeny Ceskoslovenska, Bratislava, Pravda , 1983 , p. 420 . 5 8s ee note 2. 104 SLOVAKIA cultural renaissance; but given the political climate, it was quickly halted. Carol Skalnik Leff notes that in the mid-1970s there were warnings and threats about bourgeois nationalism, reminiscent of those uttered in the 1950s, which signalled a move away from the earlier enthusiastic recovery of the national heritage in cultural and academic publications. She writes that "It is unlikely that this noticeable shift reflects a diminution of Slovak national sentiment - quite the contrary, it suggests a concern that such sentiment was getting out of hand" .59 Clearly, anything in Slovakia that threatened the Czech agenda had to be eliminated; and it was. The Husak policy of normalization faced increased opposition both in Slovakia and in the Czech Lands after the Czechoslovak government signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Czechs, in particular academics, artists and writers, formed a loose movement called Charter 77 which attacked the ideology and policies of the regime. 60 Only a very small number of Slovak Communist dissidents adhered to it. The more significant Slovak opposition to the regime found its outlet primarily in religious demonstrations which had a broad mass appeal. This opposition was in fact a challenge to the continued imposition of the Czech agenda in Slovakia. The regime responded with a policy of open repression to both movements, especially the Slovak one. As far as it was concerned, there could be no discussion of anything but its own agenda while it was in power. It is only with the fall of Communism in November 1989 that a discussion of the Czech question could finally begin to take place in Slovakia. The first signal that there would be such a discussion came with the motion proposed by Slovak deputies to the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament on 30 March 1990 to return the hyphen to Czechoslovakia, the short name of the country. This spelling had been used in the Peace Treaties when the country was formed in 1918. 59 carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 268. 60 on this movement see H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981. SLOVAKIA 105 Officially the country was still the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The motion was defeated by the Czech majority (with the help of some Slovak deputies). The compromise title of Czech and Slovak Federative Republic with the authorization of using the hyphen in Slovakia on the short form adopted a fortnight later was also not satisfactory. As a result, a campaign to influence Slovak public opinion on Czech-Slovak relations began in earnest. However, unlike the immediate post-war years and the Communist period when one outcome, the separation of Slovakia, was excluded, all solutions were now possible. This debate around the name of the common state strengthened the resolve of many Slovaks to initiate discussions on constitutional reform and helped to clarify the different positions. According to Zigman, "Suddenly, along with other problems, the question of a constitutional arrangement came to the surface. On the Czech side in particular, voices came to be heard shortly after the revolution [suggesting] that in the interest of the transformation of our economy the already centralized pseudo-federation should be further centralized and replaced by a unitary state (part of Civic Forum and [also] Public Against Violence). On the other hand , parties and movements appeared in Slovakia which sought greater rights for the republics and the breaking up of the federal moloch which crushed every national political movement. They demanded that it be replaced with a flexible system of institutions whose task it would be to coordinate the activities of the republics (part of the Slovak National Party and later part of the Christian Democratic Movement)" .6 1 The constitutional debate went on for two years 62 and indicated a desire to find a solution to the Czech question in Slovak political life. It was, however, only one aspect of a wider public debate, 61 See note 2. 62 For an examination of this debate, see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Les Slovaques et le droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-m~mes: a la recherche d'une solution", in Andre Liebich et Andre Reszler, eds ., L 'Europe centrale et ses minorites: vers une solution europeenne?, (Geneve , Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales) , Paris , Presses universitaires de France , 1993, pp . 92-10 I. 106 SLOVAK.IA initiated by the Czech writer Ludvik Vaculfk when he published in May 1990 an article entitled "Our Slovak Problem". In an at times bitter tone, Vaculfk railed at the fact that the Slovaks, to whom he referred as little brothers, refused to share the common bed with the Czechs. He did not think, furthermore, that they were ready to sleep in their own. In his rejection of a Slovak approach and in his steadfast conviction of the importance of Czechoslovak statehood he wrote; "To develop our own Czech state - it is after all a step backwards. Not long ago I went to Bratislava and all my friends said to me why are you getting so agitated because those nationalist noises come from carrierists, idiots or else intrigue-makers. I heard this with pleasure" _63 Among the many who responded, it was Vladimir Minac, a Slovak writer, who best took Vaculfk to task in an article entitled "Our Czecho-Slovak Problem". Rejecting the notion of a "little brother" and examining generally the meaning of Czechoslovakism, Minac added: "Vaculik writes that "it is an honest duty to be a Czechoslovak". However, what you find behind a Czechoslovak is a badly covered pure Czech who in some peculiar way made the land of the Slovaks his own; and if he hasn't done so, then he wants to do so. But a Slovak doesn't want to be a Czechoslovak, he doesn't want to be shoved behind a foreign facade, he wants to be himself, independent and equal. Is that so difficult to understand?" .64 Minac did not propose a solution; he left that to the politicians. The parameters, on the other hand, had been made quite clear. During the twenty-four months that separate the first two free elections in post-Communist Czechoslovakia, Slovak politicians, while pushing for the transformation of the state, made every effort to come to terms with the Czechs. A parallel with the 1968 constitutional discussions comes to mind. There is, however, an important difference this time, namely the absence of a superpower to influ63Ludv0c VaculOc, "Na§e slovenska otazka", Literami noviny, 5/1990, 3 May 1990, reprinted in Nove slovo 21/1990, 24 May 1990. 64 Vladimfr Minac, "Na§a cesko-slovenska otlizka", Nove s/ovo, 21/1990, 24 May 1990 . SLOVAKIA 107 ence, if not determine the outcome. As a result, the Czech parties were able to indicate very clearly that they were unwilling to abandon their historical perception of Czechoslovakia as a Czech state with which the Slovaks were asked to identify and accept. At best, the status quo, in other words the federal law of 1968, was acceptable. As far as most Slovaks were concerned, despite a certain lack of unity , there had to be major constitutional reforms. There were many meetings and many propositions,65 including a number of interventions from President Vaclav Havel, yet no constitutional agreement was reached before the elections of June 1992. As a result, an important percentage of the electorate in each republic cast votes for parties that articulated a parallel message: if the other nation will not accept our terms, then let us make a go of it alone. This paved the way for the Czechs to rid themselves of the "Slovak question" while the Slovaks, many reluctantly, came to the conclusion that they might be better off without a "Czech question". After the Slovak National Council declared the sovereignty of the Slovak nation in July 1992, Prime Ministers Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic and Vladimfr Meciar of the Slovak Republic agreed that Czechoslovakia would be dissolved and two states would come into existence on 1 January 1993; on 25 November 1992, the Federal Parliament passed a law approving the dissolution. Thereafter, until the break up, both sides negotiated the division of federal property and other assets. Did the independence of Slovakia and the creation of a Czech Republic put to rest the "Czech question" in Slovak politics? Two factors suggest that one cannot give a categorical answer. First, public opinion polls preceding the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in the Czech and Slovak Republics suggested that if a referendum had been held at that time on the acceptance of the break-up of Czechoslovakia into two independent national states it would most likely not have won a majority. One may well ask whether this means that 65 These are described in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Czechoslovakia: The Creation, Federalisation and Disolution of a Nation-State", Regional Politics and Policy, III (I), 1993, pp . 69-95. 108 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks, after 68 years in a common state, when shove comes to push, saw living with a "Czech question", however intractable it was, as acceptable and perhaps even preferable to an uncertain future in an independent state? There is probably no simple answer to this question. What is certain, however, is that democratic politicians, unlike Communist ones, who treat public opinion as quantite negligeable do so at their own risk. It is possible that these polls reflected some degree of nostalgia as much as a fear of the future. But then again, they may have reflected the recognition of a second factor , the close relations that the two nations developed over the years. As Zigman indicated when these polls were taken, this factor placed the Slovaks before a choice: "The economic relations [with the Czechs] which were created during the recent period of development will remain and will become a significant element in a future European integration [process]. We [the Slovaks] are at a crossroads and have to decide between a Czecho-Slovak state and Czech-Slovak cooperation. I think that the starting point out of this dilemma is clear" .66 To return to our image of the beginning, after many attempts to find a comfortable place for themselves, the Slovaks found in the end that it was better to leave the room which they shared with the allegorical black panther. But they did so only after first seeking to come to an understanding with it. They also made a choice for a different kind of Czech-Slovak cooperation. Therefore, as they proceed to develop their own state, for the foreseeable future at any rate, the Slovaks will have to pay attention to a "Czech question". It is not clear what, if any, influence it will have on Slovak political life. It will, however, have ceased to be that which had been the main challenge to Slovak politics in the common state, namely an unhyphenated "Czechoslovak question" which they had not been allowed either to define or influence. 66 see note 2.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Czech Question in Slovakia in the Post-War Years Description An account of the resource Stanislav J. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92 pp. 97-108 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Stanislav J., 1942- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991-92 SNK